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THE
DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING
HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
IN
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND OTHER AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS

BY THE LATE


COLONEL GURWOOD, C.B., K.C.T.S.,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH, AND DEPUTY LIEUTENANT
OF THE TOWER OF LONDON.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.—Vol. V.

NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION.

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THE

OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

THE PENINSULA.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 9th May, 1811.

I have taken an opportunity of reading over the enclosures in your letter of the 21st April, in regard to the reforms of the departments attached to the Portuguese army, from which I find that nothing that was proposed is to be done. We are now getting beyond trifling upon these important subjects; and I must draw the serious attention of government to the state of things here. I assure you that, in a very short time, there will be no Portuguese army left, if all the military departments are not reformed as proposed, and all connected with them are not made liable to punishment for neglects under the military law. There is Barbacena's brigade, which is not now so numerous as one of our squadrons. Gen. Campbell sent me a regiment of it the other night, which he reported to consist of 60 horses. Is this to be borne? Can the war go on in this way?

Every thing else is the same. The sick and wounded are taken care of by our medical officers; the artillery have no mules, and the guns must be sent away; they have no ammunition, and we are at this moment picking up the French ammunition in our camps to make up again with powder and materials furnished by us!! It is because the departments at Lisbon don't take care to find means to move forward the reserves; and then, in order not to lose a battle, the British Commissary Gen. must find means of transport for the musket as well as the gun ammunition of the Portuguese army, which means of transport ought to be used to bring up food for the horses and soldiers of the army. All this falls upon me. I am involved in a most serious situation, and it is quite impossible for me to allow matters to go on as they are. The Portuguese army are not paid, positively; and many men, particularly of Pack's brigade, have consequently deserted.

I enclose the letter which I have written to the Prince Regent under a flying seal; and I beg you to peruse it, to allow Dom M. de Forjaz to peruse it, and then to close and forward it to Brazil.

I cannot but observe that either — is very ill informed of what passes at Rio Janeiro, or else he must, on the 12th Feb., have been acquainted with the contents of the letter of the Prince, of the 7th Feb., to me.

If you think that any alteration of my letter would be advisable, let me know it, and I will alter it. I conceived it best to appear perfectly indifferent about you or Dom M. Forjaz; but to hold out that I should go.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Villar Formoso, 9th May, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, and of a memorandum, which I sent to Gen. Castaños on the 24th April, proposing a plan of co-operation for the siege of Badajoz, to which letter I have hitherto received no answer. I have therefore written to Marshal Sir W. Beresford to desire that, until the Spanish Generals will positively engage to co-operate with him in the siege of Badajoz in the manner pointed out, he should proceed with caution in that operation; as I think there is reason to believe that the removal of the King from Madrid will occasion the march of the army of the centre to the southward, or into Estremadura, and I know that some battalions, now in this quarter, which have been in Portugal, are eventually destined to reinforce the 1st, 4th, and 5th *corps d'armée*, which are in Andalusia.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of my dispatch of the 8th inst. to the Sec. of State, from which you will see the state of affairs here.

I beg you to inform the Spanish government that I am much gratified by the alacrity of Don J. Sanchez to communicate with me, and to give me every assistance in his power, and by the constant attention and assistance I receive from Brig. Gen. Don M. de Alava and Col. Don J. O'Lawlor.

P.S. 10th May. I enclose the copy of my dispatch of this day to the Sec. of State, from which you will learn the result of the enemy's operations for the relief of Almeida.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

9th May, 1811.

I have the honor to acquaint you, in reply to your letter of the 19th April, enclosing charges from Capt. —, commanding at Belem, against Lieut. —, of the —, that the Commander of the Forces has taken all the circumstances into his consideration, and his Excellency cannot help considering that this dispute is childish, and might have been easily adjusted, if not avoided, more especially as he took some pains to explain to Lieut. — how completely he must consider himself under Capt. —'s orders, except in the details of the cavalry duties. The Commander of the Forces does not choose, at such a moment, to take up the time of the officers of the army in investigating trifling circumstances. Lieut. — must obey the orders he receives from Capt. —, the latter being responsible for the propriety of the orders he gives, and that he does not interfere with Lieut. —'s peculiar cavalry duties.

The Commander of the Forces trusts this explanation of his sentiments and opinion will enable you to satisfy Capt. —, and accommodate what has occurred, as that officer has conducted the business of the dépôt hitherto to the Commander of the Forces' satisfaction; and Lieut. —'s conduct has been in like manner approved by Sir S. Cotton.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 10th May, 1811.

I enclose my dispatch, &c., to my brother, to which I have added the copy of that of this day to the Sec. of State, from which you will see that our concerns here are happily concluded. My only anxiety now is on

your side, and I propose immediately to put in motion some troops towards the Alentejo, to continue their march as soon as the place shall fall.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 10th May, 1811.

The enemy retired on the 8th to the woods between Espeja, Gallegos, and Fuentes, in which position the whole army were collected on that day and yesterday, with the exception of that part of the 2d corps which continued opposite Almeida. Last night the whole broke up, and retired across the Azava, covering their retreat by their numerous cavalry; and this day the whole have retired across the Agueda, leaving Almeida to its fate. The 2d corps retired by the bridge of Barba de Puerco, and the ford of Val de Espino on the Agueda.

Our advanced posts are upon the Azava and on the Lower Agueda, and the army will be to-morrow in the cantonments on the Dos Casas.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 10th May, 1811.

I enclose a dispatch, which I hope will be in time to go with the letters.

It occurs to me that the articles most suited to relieve the distress of the Portuguese would be wheat, of which there are several cargoes now at Lisbon; Indian corn; planks and beams for building; nails, large pipe staves, and iron hoops, or rather casks (shapen), with their hoops, &c. If you are of the same opinion, write for these articles to England.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.

10th May, 1811.

In consequence of Ensign —, of the — regt., having sent in his resignation, no official notification has been received of the same having been accepted; still, as I understand it is much desired by the officers of that corps that the above officer should be removed thence, there will be no objection on the part of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces for that officer to proceed to Lisbon, reporting himself to the Commandant there, and waiting at the dépôt at Belem for further orders.

Au Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

Au Quartier Général, ce 11 Mai, 1811.

Le Capitaine Salles, du 66^{me} régt., a été envoyé en parlementaire aux avant postes de l'armée alliée, dans la nuit du 3 de ce mois, par le Colonel de son régiment, d'une manière très irrégulière, et à une heure très indue. J'ai cru de mon devoir de le retenir pendant la durée de l'état des affaires qui existait dans ce moment là; mais étant persuadé qu'il a vraiment été envoyé en parlementaire, quoique dans des circonstances très irrégulières, je le renvoie à l'armée Française.

Au Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

Au Quartier Général, ce 11 Mai, 1811.

M. le Général Brenier, gouverneur d'Almeida, a fait prisonniers 4 soldats Anglais qu'il a renvoyés sur parole; j'envoie avec M. le Capitaine Salles 4 soldats Français, en échange pour les 4 soldats Anglais renvoyés par M. le Général Brenier.

To Major Gen. Long.

Villar Formoso, 11th May, 1811.

You will have observed by the G. O. of the day, that I have altered the arrangements which I had made for the command of the cavalry on the left of the Tagus. When I was at Elvas I found, upon communication

with Sir W. Beresford, that it would be impossible to continue to employ Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade as I had proposed, and that this body of troops must have been joined to the remainder of the cavalry in Estremadura. Under these circumstances, Brig. Gen. Madden, the senior General officer, must have commanded the whole, notwithstanding the previous arrangement for the command which I had made.

As I was returning from Elvas I received a letter from Sir W. Erskine, who had for some time had the command of our cavalry in this quarter, connected in their operations with the Light division, requesting to be employed with the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, where, under different circumstances, I had appointed you. I intended to appoint you to the command of a good brigade of light dragoons with this army, only that I yesterday received the notification of the appointment, by command of the Prince Regent, of Major Gen. V. Alten to command the hussars of the Legion. This appointment, and his expected early arrival, must alter that arrangement; and I have not yet determined in what manner it will be most advantageous to the service to employ you. I request you, therefore, to remain with the troops under Sir W. Beresford till you shall hear further from me.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Villar Formoso, 11th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst., regarding the prisoners of war proposed to be sent to England.

I consider it most desirable that even 1500 should be sent away, as the number is increasing daily; but I have had no answer from the Sec. of State upon the subject, and the Lords of the Admiralty have ordered you not to send home any more on any account whatever. I should think it very improper if I were to request you to send home any, so long as that order exists.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Villar Formoso, 11th May, 1811, 10½ a.m.

Lieut. Cuyler, of the Royal dragoons, has just arrived here with a verbal report that the enemy's garrison had made their escape from Almeida, and that the 36th regt. and the 4th foot were on the Agueda near Barba de Puerco, that the enemy were drawn up in some force on the other side of the Agueda, and that you desired to have orders.

It is not easy to forward orders upon so indistinct a representation of the situation in which you find yourself, and I had hoped that I should receive some report from you in writing. However, as the garrison have escaped, there appears now no reason why the troops should be extended so far as Barba de Puerco. The 36th regt., therefore, may be drawn into their cantonments. The 4th regt., belonging to the 5th division, was, I conclude, at Barba de Puerco, in consequence of the orders sent to Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine; and orders will be sent to the 5th division respecting the disposal of that regiment.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 11th May, 1811.

I am concerned to inform you that Almeida was blown up last night, and I fear that the garrison has, in great part at least, escaped.* I cannot

* See Appendix, No. I.

tell how this occurred; the troops which had been taken from the duty of the blockade were sent back to it yesterday afternoon, and in the whole were 4 times more numerous than the garrison. However, I suppose that I shall hear from Gen. Campbell soon.

I have had 2 conversations with —; and I am concerned to say that, notwithstanding his abilities, he appears to me but little calculated to do the business I require from him. I want him to assist me in obtaining a knowledge of the mode in which the connexion between the troops and the several civil departments is regulated; to know how all that business is now going on here; and to see how we can make the matter work better than it does under the existing regulations. He thinks of nothing but new regulations and establishments, which are very necessary perhaps; but it is not his business to propose them, nor mine to carry them into execution. I hope that we shall understand each other better, and that I may be able to put every thing on a good footing here.

You will hardly believe that we were obliged to pick up the French shot in our camp to make up ammunition for Arentschildt's guns, his reserve having been left behind at Çaragoça; and there being no Portuguese means of transport to carry on the ammunition, the Commissary Gen. is obliged to undertake the business. The Commissary carried up the musket ammunition. Then I have been obliged to send back 2 guns of the brigade in the 6th division for want of mules to draw them!!! I have reported the state of things to the British government, and they will do as they please. In the mean time the Prince Regent of Portugal insists upon Dom M. Forjaz's going to his presence, and upon Mr. Stuart being recalled from Lisbon.

P.S. I shall be much obliged to you if you will make Gen. Castaños acquainted with the state of affairs here, and point out to him how important it is that no time should be lost in getting on foot the army of Galicia. The French will invade and obtain possession of that province as sure as we are alive if some decided measure is not adopted immediately.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

11th May, 1811.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ult., and enclosures, and have to acquaint you that the conduct of quarter master —, of the — regt., appears highly reprehensible to the Commander of the Forces. Mrs. — has no right whatever to have quarters by billet; and to have them at all is a favor conferred upon her by yourself and the staff officers at Lisbon. Under these circumstances the Commander of the Forces is astonished at quarter master —'s conduct in writing the letter he has done to Major —; and if he does not make the Major an ample apology for his conduct, he will not only be brought under the cognizance of a General Court Martial, but his Excellency will give orders that Mrs. — may be deprived of the accommodation of quarters she has hitherto enjoyed.

The A.G. to Col. de Berniwitz, Brunswick Light Infantry.

11th May, 1811.

I herewith enclose you a communication that has been forwarded, together with several enclosures, relative to the conduct of Capt. —, of the Duke of Brunswick Oëls' corps, prior to your assuming the command of it. It would be desirable you should fully investigate all the circumstances attending it, and report to me thereon, accordingly, for the Commander of the Forces' information.

It does not appear to me that a General Court Martial can investigate whether

Capt. — had a right to wear a foreign order of merit; and unless there are more positive and important charges against him, little advantage would be derived from bringing that officer to a Court Martial. If the officers of the Duke of Brunswick's corps conceive Capt. — to have acted so improperly as not to associate with him, they certainly are at liberty so to do; but without stronger grounds of charge than there appears in the enclosed papers, and more positive evidence, little benefit would result from Capt. — being ordered before a General Court Martial.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 12th May, 1811.

I have been to Almeida, of which I don't think the destruction so complete as that the place cannot be re-established. All the outworks are entire and uninjured, excepting that in front of the gateway, the counterscarp uninjured, the exterior revêtement of the rampart uninjured, and the rampart itself so little injured, that, on our walking upon it, it is not perceived that the interior revêtement has been blown away; three fourths of the exterior revêtement uninjured, and where it is blown away it appears that the foundation is uninjured. I think that they had opened the mines on a level with the *terre plein* of the fort, and have carried them along the exterior revêtement, which being the line of least resistance, was blown away, while the rampart itself stood firm, and the guns are generally still in their embrasures, and the interior of the parapets standing.

There is a great deal of ordnance and shot in the place, better carriages, and I think more ordnance, than when we left it. I think that with some labor we might clear the rubbish out of the ditch, then scarp down the earth of the rampart where the revêtement is blown away, and stockade it at bottom and at top, by which we should make the place secure against a *coup de main*; and hereafter government might repair it. To do any thing, however, will require workmen and money, and I shall supply neither the one nor the other. The 7th division begin their march towards you to-morrow, the 3d next day.

P.S. I think the escape of the garrison of Almeida (although we have taken and destroyed a good lot of them) is the most disgraceful military event that has yet occurred to us. Excepting a few cavalry, which I believe crossed this morning, the whole French army have crossed the Agueda, and quitted Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 12th May, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 7th. I don't think that the conclusion which you have drawn, 'that the troops have all been paid to the end of April,' is warranted by Joaquim da Costa's paper. I have never perused a more loose performance on an official fact which ought to be stated in one line, and which the Paymaster Gen. of this army would state in 2 minutes regarding every individual in the army. The conclusion which you have drawn does not agree with the state of the fact, even with this part of the army. I will let you know, if possible by this post, to what day officers and troops have been paid.

I beg to draw your attention to the fact, that the British government give the old subsistence for the officers of 30,000 men in the subsidy, as well as the new addition to the whole army. Surely we have a right to

expect that the officers of the regiments composing the 30,000 men shall have their old subsistence regularly, as well as the new addition.

In respect to money, you don't appear to me to have observed that, now that we feed 6 brigades of Portuguese troops, the claim of the Portuguese government to subsidy in money is much reduced, at the same time that our means of supplying them with money must be diminished. However, I ordered that they might have 100,000 dollars last week.

I have considered it my duty to write seriously to the government upon the whole subject. The responsibility resting upon me is too great for any individual, particularly for one so circumstanced as I am. As long as the French are not reinforced, matters will go on well enough; but, as soon as they are, there will be a terrible crash.

The unfortunate government of Portugal, by their miserable intrigues at Brazil, and their weakness here, are losing their country and the cause; and if our government don't produce a radical change, I will have nothing more to say to the concern.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 12th May, 1811.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have received your letter of the 8th inst.

The Portuguese government appear to me to wish to have their full subsidy, and to have their army provisioned likewise, which I conceive will not answer; and, at all events, I will neither give them a shilling which is required for the British army, nor allow a shilling to be raised for them in the money markets, allotted for us upon British credit, at least, if my opinion is consulted upon the subject.

In regard to increase of subsidy, by payments in kind, I understand that none is to be given till they shall change their mode of proceeding in respect to commissariat, medical department, arsenal, transport, &c. &c. All that I can say is, that it is useless to consult my opinion upon any part of their concerns, unless the changes which I have pointed out are made; it only takes up your time and mine unnecessarily, and it is much better to let them go to the devil in their own way than to give ourselves any further trouble about them.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Villar Formoso, 13th May, 1811.

I beg to know what repairs are required to Fort S. Julian, besides a bridge to the ravelin, to enable Col. Fisher to obey the orders long since given to him, to lodge the ordnance and military stores belonging to the army in that fort.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 13th May, 1811.

I enclose you the extract of a letter which I have received from Sir D. Dundas, from which you will see that he allows of the recommendation of 6 officers for the brevet rank of Lieut. Col. or Major. You will select the persons to be recommended, and let me know their names. I beg to remind you of Arbuthnot, Elder, Sutton, and Douglas, as persons having claims, leaving it to you to name them or others, as you may think proper.

It will be necessary that those promoted on this occasion should clearly understand that they are not, on promotion, to be made Portuguese Colonels, unless circumstances attaching to the Portuguese service should render it expedient on other grounds.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Villar Formoso, 13th May, 1811, 6 p.m.

I enclose intercepted letters which I have just received. You see that you have nothing to apprehend from Lamartinière. I am glad to find that you have such good prospects at Badajoz. I continue the troops on their march; and I am inclined to go over and have a conference with Blake and Castaños. I have not yet had time to read your letter about the Portuguese troops.

To Capt. Gen. Don F. X. Castaños. Villar Formoso, 13th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 8th inst., and it gives me great satisfaction to find that the plan of operations for the allied armies, which I had proposed to your Excellency, with a view to the siege of Badajoz, meets with your Excellency's approbation, and will be carried into execution by your Excellency and the troops under Gen. Blake.

The alteration which your Excellency has made in the propositions made by me meets with my concurrence. It was my duty to make a proposition upon so delicate a subject as that of the command of allied troops acting in co-operation, which should be so reasonable in itself as to meet with the concurrence of all those to whom it should be made; but it is consistent with the manly good sense, and candor, and knowledge of the state of affairs, which characterize your Excellency, to amend that proposition, by one calculated to give satisfaction to those of the allies who have most to lose in the contest for which it is our object to provide. It is impossible but that what you have proposed should be approved by all parties; and I assure you, that the disinterested forbearance of your conduct is highly appreciated by me.

To Brig. Gen. Colman. Villar Formoso, 13th May, 1811.

There is nothing like striking while the iron is hot; and I write by this post to recommend that you and Madden may be allowed to return to the army, with the rank which you would have held respectively if you had not quitted it.

To Charles Stuart, Esq. Villar Formoso, 13th May, 1811.

Having directed the field ordnance and stores belonging to the British army to be placed in store at Fort S. Julian, it has been reported to me that the bridge communicating from the body of the place to the ravelin, in which the greater proportion of the stores are to be lodged, is in so ruinous a state as to render it dangerous to make use of it.

I beg to know, by return of post, whether the Portuguese government will or will not repair the bridge; and what orders they will give upon that subject, and to whom; and whether or not the officer, to whom the

orders will be given, will be held at all responsible for the due and early execution of them.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso. 13th May, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that the enemy blew up a part of the works of Almeida on the night of the 10th inst., when their army had retired and crossed the Agueda. I enclose a report of a British engineer, stating the extent of the damage done to the works of the place, which, in my opinion, can be repaired at no very great expense. The first measure to be adopted would be to render the place tenable as a military post against a *coup de main*. This would be very desirable, and the expense would be the work of 300 men for less than a month, according to the report of Lieut. Trench. The government would then have time to receive the orders of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, whether he will incur the larger expense of repairing the place entirely, which work I conceive can hardly be completed as long as the war shall last upon the frontier.

I beg to have forthwith the decision of the government, whether they will or not put this place in repair in the manner first pointed out. If they should determine to do so, it will be necessary that they should collect 300 or 400 men, with tools to perform the work, and officers to superintend them; and that they should have on the spot means of feeding them. I expect to have an answer upon this subject in two posts after you shall receive this letter; and that measures should be in progress to commence the work in one fortnight from this time, or I shall blow up the fort entirely, and withdraw from it all the allied troops.

The A.G. to Capt. —.

13th May, 1811.

I have not failed to state to the Commander of the Forces the circumstance contained in your private letter, of your having embargoed certain animals, mules, &c., to carry off wounded Portuguese to the rear; and I am directed by his Excellency strongly to animadvert on the impropriety and irregularity of such proceeding; as all applications for conveyance should be solely made to the Commissariat department, and no Commandant at any hospital station can assume authority out of the regular arrangements and orders of the service. I have, therefore, to desire that you will take effectual means not only to release all these animals, but likewise to have them returned to their several owners.

The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.

13th May, 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 6th inst., and enclosures from Capt. —, of the — regt., I am instructed to observe that as you are placed in the situation of Commandant at the Coimbra depôt, no officer can in any way interfere with the orders that have been laid down for your guidance, either in the march of convalescents or any other arrangements that may occur. But it appears in the instance of Capt. —'s request respecting the men of the — regt., that he submits the arrangement for your approbation. I have only to add that any orders you may think necessary to give, as commanding at that station, are to be obeyed by all officers passing on route with detachments or otherwise through Coimbra.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I beg that you will write to Col. Fisher by this night's post, to request that the ships having on board the battering train may be sent off to Oporto without loss of time. I enclose a list of engineers' stores, which

I request Col. Fisher will arrange to have put on board the ships with the battering train.

I write to Adm. Berkeley by this opportunity on the subject. There will be no occasion for sending any of the heavy ordnance which is landed.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

As I understand from you that there are 20,000 stands of arms at Lisbon, I request you to give directions to Col. Fisher that 20,000 stands may be given to the Spanish Ambassador at Lisbon, for the use of the troops under Gen. Castaños.

I also request you to direct Col. Fisher to send to Elvas 2000 barrels of gunpowder. He will be so kind as to arrange with the Commissary Gen. respecting the best mode of having this powder transported, whether by sea to Setuval, and thence by the river to Alcacer do Sal, and thence by land to Elvas, or to be landed at Aldea Galega, and thence by land to Elvas. Col. Fisher will apprise Marshal Sir W. Beresford of the road by which this powder will be sent off.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date. I cannot but observe that, when you write to me to request that orders may be given to have a place put into such a state of repair as to make it capable of receiving stores, you should recollect that it is not in my power to give those orders, without knowing exactly what repairs are necessary; and you should take care, when you have no accurate knowledge upon the subject on which you write, to word your letter accordingly. Had you referred to the paper transmitted by Col. Fisher, you would have seen that the Colonel does not report any repairs to be absolutely necessary, excepting the bridge from the body of the place to the ravelin.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocks.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this morning from Adm. Berkeley, to which I beg you will attend. It is desirable that the guns in S. Julian, Cascaes, Fort Bugio, and other batteries bearing upon the entry of the harbour at Lisbon, should be pointed towards the sea; and that you should be prepared to occupy those points with the troops at Lisbon, in case of the appearance of the enemy's fleet in that quarter, which I don't conceive very probable. I beg, at the same time, that you will understand that you are not to detain at Lisbon any men belonging to the regiments with the army who may be deemed sufficiently recovered to do their duty.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I request you to give directions that the ships, having on board the battering train belonging to the army, may proceed to Oporto under suitable convoy, as soon as certain engineers' stores, which Col. Fisher will have been ordered to have put on board these ships, shall have been embarked.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I request you to let me know, as soon as it is in your power, in what state, in respect to numbers, arms, and other equipments, the several regiments of militia are in the provinces of *Tras os Montes*, and *Minho*, and in the *Partido d'Oporto*; what orders you have given to have the regiments completed; and what progress has been made in completing them. I beg that you will let the officers commanding in those provinces respectively know that I hold them responsible for having the regiments complete, and that, if any of the civil magistrates omit to exert themselves to perform their duty in completing them, they are to be sent, with their crimes in writing, and the proofs, without loss of time, to appear for trial before the Special commission sitting at Marshal Beresford's head quarters; and these magistrates, and others, may depend upon it that I will do every thing in my power to have those punished who shall be found by the Special commission guilty of any neglect of duty, in so important a concern as providing for the defence of the country.

I was much concerned to learn, by intelligence from Col. Trant, that some of the soldiers of the militia had deserted on a march which he recently made towards the frontier. I beg that Col. Trant may be called upon to supply a return of the names of those men who had deserted, and that proceedings may be commenced against them and their properties; and that application may be made to Marshal Sir W. Beresford to order a General Court Martial to try some of those recently guilty of this offence.

As the enemy have retired from this part of the frontier, and have apparently gone off towards the *Douro*, it may be expected that their future plan of operations may be directed on the Portuguese provinces north of that river. I have no intelligence that that is their intention, but it is possible; and it is necessary to be prepared with a plan to meet this possible contingency. I beg leave to refer you to the instructions which were sent last year by Marshal Beresford to the officers commanding divisions in the northern provinces, for the line of operations to be adopted by each, in case of the invasion of the enemy by the several lines of attack upon the country. As soon as Gen. Silveira shall find that the enemy are collecting in force upon the frontier, it will be necessary that he also should collect his troops. It is not impossible but that the enemy may detach some of his moveable columns within the frontier, principally with a view to plunder, and Gen. Silveira will be able to meet and defeat them, without incurring the risk of defeat. But if the enemy should threaten a serious invasion of the province of *Tras os Montes*, it will be necessary that Gen. Silveira should act precisely on the plan and according to the instructions above referred to, given to him last year by Marshal Sir W. Beresford.

I beg that the officers commanding in the several divisions will, in the mean time, employ themselves assiduously in completing, in equipping, and in disciplining their several corps, so that if the enemy should invade *Tras os Montes*, they may meet with that steady opposition which can alone be successful.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

The 3d division marched this morning. The 2d hussars will likewise proceed in the same direction from Celorico, probably to-morrow, so that if the siege should be prolonged (and I think it must be longer than you expect), and if the enemy should attempt to raise it, we shall be in strength in that quarter.

I don't think it possible for me to undertake more to the south, under existing circumstances, than the siege of Badajoz. I cannot, by any effort I can make, raise the British and Portuguese army beyond 30,000 men, to which the Spanish force may add from 8000 to 10,000 men more. Exclusive of Sebastiani's force, I conceive that Soult cannot have less in Andalusia than from 30,000 to 35,000; entrenched at Seville, and afterwards at Cadiz, we cannot dislodge them by a direct movement upon them. Then as to movements to cut off their communication with Madrid and the north, from all that I know of the French, and of their situation in Andalusia, I judge that they are completely established in the southern provinces of Spain, independently of any communication north of the Sierra Morena, and that unless they can be deprived *permanently* of Seville, or of their lines of contravallation before Cadiz, nothing can shake them in that part of the Peninsula. It is out of our power to effect the former unless we can effect the latter; and my opinion is, that we cannot effect the latter with any force that I can venture to detach to the south. The intention which I have, therefore, is to assemble the army, or the greatest part of it, here, to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, if possible, and afterwards either to move to the southward, or otherwise, as I may find most advantageous.

I communicate to you the course of my reflections on this subject at present, as you wrote to me about it in a letter of the 10th. I have no objections to your communicating what I say to Gen. Castaños in confidence. At the same time, my mind is not entirely made up; and as soon as I shall have received all the reports upon Almeida, I shall take another ride to your quarter, to see how matters really are to the south, and what are the opinions of Gens. Castaños and Blake, and yourself, and what are the objects, and to settle what shall be their operations, while we shall be engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

I wonder that you allow — to manage your concerns on the right of the Guadiana.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I enclose the statement of the period to which the several regiments of this army have received their pay and gratification, officers and men, from which you will perceive that Joaquim da Costa's statement is false. I have not yet got the returns of other regiments; but they are equally in arrear with those of which I have the returns.

To the Rt. Hon. the Commander in Chief.

Villar Formoso, 14th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 23d April; and I assure you that I am highly flattered by the gracious mark

of approbation which H. R. H. the Prince Regent has been pleased to convey of the conduct of the troops under my command. I am convinced that His Royal Highness' favor will be gratefully received by the officers of the army, and that the desire to deserve the continuance of His Royal Highness' protection will be an additional incentive to all to continue those exertions which have already received His Royal Highness' most gracious notice and approbation.

I have now the honor to submit for your consideration the names of 6 Majors of the army, to be promoted by brevet to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Among these there are two Majors, Coghlan of the 61st, and Way of the 29th, for services previous to the late operations; for which services I had before recommended them to your Excellency, and particularly that Major Way should be promoted to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 29th regt. I am not certain whether His Royal Highness had in his view, and intended to convey his approbation of, the conduct of the army in their recent, or in all their operations. If the recent only, and Major Coghlan and Major Way cannot be included, I have added the names of Major Woodgate of the 60th, and Major Macintosh of the 85th. I likewise enclose the names of 12 Captains to receive the brevet rank of Major.

I beg leave to draw your notice to the conduct of Lieut. Col. Beckwith, and of Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan; and to recommend to your Excellency's favor, when there may be an opportunity of promoting them, Lieut. Bell of the 52d regt.;* Lieuts. Weyland and Tomkinson of the 16th light dragoons; Lieuts. Townshend and Badcock of the 14th light dragoons; Lieuts. Krauchenberg, Cordemann, and Wish of the 1st hussars; and Lieut. Eckersley of the Royal dragoons.

I have referred to Marshal Sir W. Beresford that part of your Excellency's letter which notifies His Royal Highness' gracious intentions regarding the British officers serving with the Portuguese army; and I shall have the honor of addressing you regarding them as soon as I shall have received his answer.

The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

14th May, 1811.

I have not failed to submit your plan for the arrangement of the sick of the army in the north to the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency approves generally of the disposition you propose to make.

With respect to the 1st clause of your proposal; it must be understood the regimental hospitals are to be formed only for slight cases not requiring carriage. In answer to the 2d; it will be hardly possible not to have an hospital at Coimbra, in case of necessity. The 3d proposition is approved of, but no man must be kept in regimental hospital who would require carriage to remove him. The 4th and 5th are likewise consented to; and you will be pleased to take such measures as you shall deem fit for carrying the above arrangement into effect, reporting to me from time to time the result, for his Excellency the Commander of the Forces' information.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Cuyler, 11th regt.

14th May, 1811.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, and enclosure herewith returned, I have to acquaint you the Commander of the Forces has no right to interfere with the arrangement of the officers of the 2d batt. 11th, especially as the 2d batt. is not in this country. Your application, therefore, had better be addressed to the Adj. Gen. of the Forces in England.

* Major Gen. Bell, C.B., late Secretary of Government at the Cape of Good Hope. His great talent in sketching country had recommended him to Lord Wellington's notice.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811.

Adverting to your report of the transactions of the morning of the 11th inst., in the pursuit of the garrison of Almeida,* I have to state that nothing has given me more concern than the conduct of Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt.

When the enemy had passed the bridge of Barba de Puerco, the farther pursuit of their troops was useless; and every step taken beyond the point to which the Lieut. Colonel was ordered to proceed was one of risk to the officers and soldiers under his command, from which the retreat was next to impossible. The Lieut. Colonel did not know possibly that the whole of the second *corps d'armée* were at San Felices, but a short distance on the other side of Barba de Puerco, and upon hearing the firing, formed upon the Agueda to protect the retreat of those troops; he knew, however, that the garrison of Almeida, although, perhaps, in disorder, were a body far superior in numbers to those he had under his command, and he did

* Major Gen. Alex. Campbell to Gen. Visc. Wellington. Malpartida, 12th May, 1811.

Having received your Lordship's commands, on the evening of the 10th inst., to resume the blockade of Almeida, I immediately proceeded with the division under my command to occupy the village where it had been formerly stationed for that service, at the same time moving Gen. Pack's head quarters to Cinco Villas, and informing the Brig. Gen. that I should relieve his piquets before the place at daybreak next morning. A little after 12 that night, however, the explosion took place, and I instantly got the 36th regt., the only corps in Malpartida, under arms, and proceeded with it to the support of the piquets, guided by some scattered firing, intending to throw myself in front of the enemy till the piquets should close up, and the battalion of support and remainder of the troops should come up. I however soon ascertained from the enemy's stragglers that his column had passed, and followed on its track where it could be discerned, most essentially aided by a small party of Brig. Gen. Pack's piquets under the Field officer, Major Dursbach, 1st Portuguese regt., conducted by the Major Gen. himself, who, with the activity and intelligence that mark his character, hung upon the enemy's column and continued to harass and press him during the whole night through a most difficult country. In the mean time my staff were sent off in all directions to discover the course of the enemy. In this manner I continued the pursuit with 8 companies of the 36th regt., the grenadiers having been detached to the right and the light infantry having missed the regiment in the night, until near daybreak, when Capt. Ahmuty, A. A. G., ascertained from a peasant the direct course of the enemy towards Villar de Ciervo, at which place a squadron of the Royal dragoons had turned out under Capt. Purvis, to interrupt their progress, which service he performed in a most officerlike manner.

Within half a mile of Barba del Puerco, I was most opportunely joined by Lieut. Col. Bevan, with 9 companies of the 4th regt., and soon after by Lieut. Col. Visconde de Barbaena with a squadron of dragoons, from whom, as well as from Lieut. Col. Bevan, I received the greatest assistance and support. Perceiving that the enemy's object was to gain the bridge, I immediately pushed forward to cut him off; but the head of his column had unfortunately reached it before it was possible to intercept him. I had, however, the satisfaction to open a most destructive fire of musketry on him while passing it, as well as in the ravine on this side and the ascent of the opposite hill; and I have reason to believe that his loss does not fall short of 300 killed, precipitated from the rocks, and drowned, with an immense number of wounded, and above 200 prisoners; among the taken the Colonel Commandant of Almeida and 12 other officers. Exclusive of these, many officers and soldiers who had missed the column during the night have fallen a sacrifice to the peasantry, so that I do not imagine that more than one third of the garrison, if so many, have escaped in safety. I should have had the satisfaction of reporting this heavy loss of the enemy with hardly a casualty on our side, although he brought down some columns, and latterly a gun from San Felices, to

not know what troops were in San Felices to support them. This advance, however, and his passage of the bridge, was an imprudence to which all the losses of the day must be attributed.

The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they are ordered and beyond all bounds, such as the loss of the prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes, on the 3d and 5th inst.; the loss incurred by the 13th light dragoons, near and at Badajoz, on the 25th March; the severe loss incurred by the troops in the siege of Badajoz on the right of the Guadiana on the 10th inst.; and the loss incurred by Lieut. Col. — on the 11th inst., have induced me to determine to bring before a General Court Martial, for disobedience of orders, any officer who shall, in future, be guilty of this conduct.

I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; but it is my duty, and that of every General and other officer in command, to regulate this spirit, and not to

cover the passage of the river, had not the ill timed gallantry of — —, untempered by prudence, and totally unauthorised by me, induced him to give up the advantageous post on which he was placed, and by crossing the river with a part of the 36th and 4th regts., to place himself in such a position, without any attainable object to warrant it, as rendered his return almost impracticable, from the heavy fire of the enemy from the heights above; and, in consequence an officer and 10 men of the 36th, and 5 of the 4th regt., were made prisoners. The troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry.

The other corps employed in the blockade were not so fortunate as to fall in with the enemy's track, though I have no doubt every exertion was made by the officers commanding brigades to come up, as I trust will appear by the letters which I have the honor to enclose. I was much aided by the activity of my staff in our endeavors to discover the direction which the enemy had taken.

		Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.
Killed	—	—	4
Wounded	1	—	14
Missing	1	1	15

Brig. Gen. Pack to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Cinco Villas, 12th May, 1811.

I can by no means satisfactorily account for the piquets not having closed, as the Commander of the Forces expected, on the enemy's column, on the morning of the 11th, and endeavoring to pursue and as much as possible to retard his progress, as, in justice to myself, I must remark that they were particularly instructed to do so. The piquets were placed in 3 divisions, denominated those of right, centre, and left, No. 1, 2, and 3 of each; each division under a Field officer in the fullest manner empowered to act for himself without waiting for my orders.

The general discharge of artillery from the fort a few nights back, resembling an explosion, and the skirmishes of late between the piquets, appear in no small degree to have thrown all off their guard. Lieut. Col. do Rego, of the 4th caçadores, commanded the right division, and thinking the affair a similar occurrence, did not move. The commanding officer of the Queen's, with a Field officer from his own regiment to the piquets in front, had always the command of the left division; he remained also on his ground sending out patrols to ascertain the fact, and, supposing the 36th regt. was placed in addition to my own brigade the evening before at Malpartida, did not think we were likely to want support in that direction, and was too jealous of his left. Behind the centre division was always a reserve of 200 men. Major Dursbach, of the 1st Portuguese regt., commanded them on that night, and not far from his left the enemy's column passed.

expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers in situations disadvantageous to them; and, above all, not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages to situations in which they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten. The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigor and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity. The officers of the army may depend

He made first a diversion to the right, which threw the piquet, No. 4 of the centre, back in disorder on the reserve. The killed and wounded on the ground where No. 2 was placed shows that piquet did its duty.

I arrived myself just as the enemy had broke through our line, but at first seeing only the rear, I allowed but 80 of the reserve to advance. Riding a little forward, I came upon his column, and then began anxiously to look for support. A serjeant was immediately sent back to Major Dursbach to bring up all the reserve. I dispatched the only orderly I had for the same purpose, and to go on to Gen. Campbell. A mule taken from the enemy was also mounted by an orderly and sent back. So precious, indeed, did the moments appear, I was myself going to the Queen's; but reflecting that the fire which I *could* and *did* constantly keep up all the way, together with stragglers and prisoners, would sufficiently mark our track and bring support, and that I might probably lose myself and fail in both objects, I therefore determined to remain in sight of the enemy. His march was rapid and compact, and made in perfect silence. He was admirably guided through a very intricate country by paths but little frequented. No insult to his column could induce him to act on the offensive or fire a single shot before daylight. Nothing, indeed, but extreme good fortune and ardent perseverance could have enabled my party, reduced to the Major, a serjeant, and 10 men, to keep our place. Capt. Beresford, D.A.Q.M.G., joined on the way, and rendered most essential service, particularly in getting some dragoons of the Royals out of Villar de Ciervo, and with a great deal of intelligence forcing on a skirmish that caused delay and nearly proved fatal to the enemy. Though certainly from this statement there will appear a want of prompt decision and presence of mind which I regret, yet I have the pleasure to know that there were many who zealously exerted themselves, following close, though unsuccessfully, in pursuit of the enemy. One under the direction of my aide de camp did so particularly.

For the information desired by the Commander of the Forces, as to how my brigade was employed from the time of the alarm, I beg to refer his Excellency to the letter from Col. Campbell, who commanded in my absence, which is herewith transmitted. I take the liberty also of annexing an order, issued to the brigade on its first arrival in these cantonments, which I hope his Excellency will have the goodness to peruse.*

* B.O. by Major Gen. Pack.

Cinco Villas, 17th April, 1811.

In reference to the orders of yesterday, commanding officers will hold their regiments in readiness to march at a moment's notice, by day or night. They will be under arms every morning half an hour before daylight, and remain so for half an hour after. As usual, the soldiers are to cook their rations of meat in advance, and will have, if possible, 3 days' bread. The garrison of Almeida is supposed to be about 1400 men, and the probability is that after blowing up the place they will make an attempt to escape, which ought to be guarded against by every possible means, and must be frustrated by the attention, zeal, and care of the Field officers who may be on duty with the piquets, which may be always certain of assistance from the brigade and other troops in readiness to support them.

upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than they are powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realised the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons.

I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to circulate to the General officers commanding divisions, with directions to circulate it among the officers of the army, will have the effect of inducing them to reflect seriously upon the duties which they have to perform before the enemy, and to avoid the error which is the subject of it, which is really become one of serious detriment to the army and to the public interests.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811.

I am obliged to you for your recollection of Elder: I had not, however, forgotten him. Besides the 6 Field officers whom I am allowed to recommend to be Lieut. Colonels, I have been allowed to recommend certain officers serving with the Portuguese army for promotion. Of course I have not made the arrangements for promotion without consulting Sir W. Beresford's wishes; but I have recommended Elder to Sir W. Beresford as one of those whom I think he ought to recommend to me; and I have no doubt that he will name Elder as one.

I shall speak to the Commissary Gen. about Mr. Purcell, of whose merits I have a very high opinion.

To Major Gen. Cameron, 79th regt.

Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811.

When I wrote to you last week I felt that I conveyed to you information which would give you great pain; but I hoped that I had made you acquainted with the full extent of the misfortune which had befallen you. Unfortunately, however, those upon whose judgment I relied were deceived: your son's wound was worse than it was then supposed to be: it was mortal, and he died on the day before yesterday, at 2 in the morning.

I am convinced that you will credit the assurance which I give you, that I condole with you most sincerely upon this misfortune, of the extent of which no man is more capable than myself of forming an estimate, from the knowledge which I had, and the just estimate which I had formed, in my own opinion, of the merits of your son. You will always regret and lament his loss, I am convinced; but I hope that you will derive some consolation from the reflection that he fell in the performance of his duty, at the head of your brave regiment, loved and respected by all that knew him, in an action in which, if possible, the British troops surpassed every thing they had ever done before, and of which the result was most honorable to His Majesty's arms.

At all events, Providence having deprived you of your son, I cannot conceive a string of circumstances more honorable and glorious than those under which he lost his life, in the cause of his country. Believe me, however, that, although I am fully alive to all these honorable circumstances attending his death, I most sincerely condole with you upon your loss.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811.

I beg leave again to draw your Lordship's attention to the orders of the Admiralty, that neither prisoners nor deserters from the enemy shall be sent to England.

Under your Lordship's former orders many deserters have been enlisted into regiments, some of them not serving in this country; and these are all waiting at Lisbon for leave to be removed to England; and of course a considerable expense is incurred in provisioning them. Those enlisted with regiments serving in this country ought likewise to be sent to depôts elsewhere, as they are generally addicted to desertion; and the desertion of the foreign troops from this army is not only very disgraceful, but very inconvenient, on account of the information which they convey to the enemy, which is frequently the only information which they can acquire.

In a recent instance 26 men, who had been enlisted from the prisons at Cadiz, and had belonged to Dupont's army, deserted from the Chasseurs Britanniques in one night; and it frequently happens that 12 desert in a night from that regiment, and from the Brunswick O&S corps.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811.

No part of the enemy's army remained on the left of the Agueda on the evening of the 10th inst., excepting one brigade of cavalry, close to the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo. The 2d corps had crossed at Barba de Puerco and the ford of Val de Espino, and were cantoned in that neighbourhood; and our advanced posts were upon the Azava and the Lower Agueda.

The 6th division resumed the duty of the blockade of Almeida on that evening; and Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine was ordered to send a battalion to Barba de Puerco to guard the bridge there, which had been previously ordered, and had been posted, to observe the passages of the Dos Casas between Aldea del Obispo and Barba de Puerco. The enemy blew up some mines which they had constructed at the works of Almeida at a little before 1 of the morning of the 11th, and immediately attacked the piquets by which the place was observed, and forced their way through them. They fired but little; and they appear to have marched between the bodies of troops posted to support the piquets; and in particular could not have passed far from the right of the Queen's regt.

Upon the first alarm Brig. Gen. Pack, who was at Malpartida, joined the piquets, and continued to follow and to fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops employed in the blockade; and Major Gen. Campbell marched from Malpartida with a part of the 1st batt. 36th regt. But the enemy continued their march in a solid compact body, without firing; and were well guided between the positions occupied by our troops. The 4th regt., which was ordered to occupy Barba de Puerco, unfortunately missed the road, and did not arrive there till the enemy had reached the place, and commenced to descend to the bridge, and at the same moment with the 36th regt. with Major Gen. Campbell, and the light battalions of the 5th division, which Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo to Barba de Puerco, as soon as he had heard that the enemy had come out from Almeida.

The enemy suffered very considerable loss both in prisoners and in

killed and wounded, as well in the march from Almeida as in the passage of the Aguada. It appears that that part of the 2d corps which were in San Felices formed upon the river, to protect their passage, as soon as they heard the firing; and Lieut. Col. — of the — regt., who had crossed with a detachment of the — and — regts., was obliged to retire with some loss.

I enclose the reports (p. 14) of Major Gen. Campbell, Brig. Gen. Pack, and other officers employed, upon the transactions of this night; to which I add the reports of Gen. Regnier and of Gen. Brenier to the Prince of Essling, which have been intercepted and brought to me.* From the former your Lordship will observe that the arrival of the garrison at Barba de Puerco was entirely unexpected; and that it was, as reported in my letter of the 10th inst., left to its fate by the enemy.

The enemy are indebted for the small part of the garrison which they have saved principally to the unfortunate mistake of the road to Barba de Puerco by the 4th regt. During the whole period of the blockade, but particularly during the period that the enemy's army were between the Dos Casas and the Azava, the garrison were in the habit of firing cannon during the night; and the piquets near the place were frequently attacked. On the night of the 7th there had been a very heavy fire of cannon from the place, and the piquets were attacked; and another on the night of the 8th; and the Queen's regt. in particular, and the other troops employed in the blockade, were induced to believe that the explosion which they heard on the morning of the 11th was of the same description with those which they had heard on the preceding nights; and the Queen's regt. did not move at all, nor the other troops, till the cause of the explosion had been ascertained.

Since the 11th inst. the enemy have continued their retreat towards the Tormes, and it has been reported to me that they have crossed that river, and are on their march towards the Douro. But I have not received this report from any authority on which I can rely.

I have detached from this army, into the Alentejo, the 3d and 7th divisions of infantry; and I have ordered the 2d hussars, which have arrived at Celorico, to march in that direction likewise. My reason for making this detachment is to be able to support Sir W. Beresford in strength, if the enemy should attempt to interrupt the siege of Badajoz; and as all is now quiet on this frontier, I propose to return to the Alentejo in the course of a few days. Sir W. Beresford invested Badajoz on both sides of the Guadiana on the 8th, and broke ground on both sides on that night. The enemy made a sortie, and endeavored to prevent our troops from occupying the ground from which they were to direct their attack against the outwork of San Cristoval, but the enemy were driven in. They had made another sortie on the morning of the 10th, in large force, and were driven in again by our troops; but I am concerned to add that our loss upon this occasion was very severe, owing to the gallant but imprudent advance of the troops quite to the glacis of San Cristoval, and to a situation in which they were exposed to the fire of musketry and grape from that outwork, as well as from the body of the

* See Appendix, No. I.

place. I have not received the official reports of Sir W. Beresford of these transactions, nor of his opening his fire, which, I have reason to believe, commenced on the Pardaleras, Picurina, and San Cristoval, on the morning of the 11th.

Your Lordship will observe from Major Gen. Campbell's report of the transactions at Barba de Puerco, that the same imprudence to which I have above referred was the cause of the loss sustained upon that occasion; and all the loss of prisoners in the action at Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3d and 5th inst. was to be attributed to the impetuosity of the officers and troops, which could not be kept within bounds.

The corps of Spanish troops under Gen. Blake, which had been landed in the Guadiana, had drawn near the frontiers of Estremadura, in order to co-operate with Sir W. Beresford in the attack of Badajoz; and I understand that Marshal Soult is employed in fortifying Seville, where he has collected a large body of troops.

P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops engaged at Barba de Puerco.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing at Barba de Puerco, on the 11th May, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	—	4	—	4
Wounded	1	—	15	—	16
Missing	1	1	14	—	16

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811.

You will receive by this post the account of the blowing up of Almeida; and, although I believe that we have taken or destroyed the greatest part of the garrison, I have never been so much distressed by any military event as by the escape of even a man of them.

The enemy having retired across the Azava during the night of the 9th, I went forward in the morning to observe their subsequent movements. About 1 o'clock of the day of the 10th, having seen their whole army in march to cross the Agueda, I sent orders for the right of the army to resume their cantonments on the Dos Casas; the advanced guard and cavalry upon the Azava and Upper Agueda; the 5th division (Sir W. Erskine) to send a regiment to Barba de Puerco; and the 6th division (Major Gen. Campbell) to resume the blockade of Almeida.

Sir W. Erskine was dining with Sir B. Spencer at head quarters, and received his orders about 4 o'clock; and he says he sent them off forthwith to the 4th regt., which were stationed, under former orders, on the Dos Casas, half way between Aldea del Obispo and Barba de Puerco. Gen. Campbell called upon me about 5½ or 6 o'clock, and told me that,

before dark, his division would have resumed their positions for the blockade.

At about 12½ the place was blown up; and the garrison had about 14 miles to march to Barba de Puerco, and nearly the same distance to the only fords on the Agueda, the whole of which were occupied by our dragoons.

Gen. Pack and Gen. Campbell both expected that the garrison would attempt to escape, and were both at Malpartida, about 4 miles from Almeida, on the road towards the Agueda and Barba de Puerco. Gen. Pack joined the piquets, and followed the enemy with 10 men, and kept up a fire upon them, as a guide to the other troops, which he supposed were following. Gen. Campbell did follow with 8 companies of the 36th regt. The 8th Portuguese regt., under Lieut. Col. Douglas, which were at Junça, on the south-west side of Almeida, marched when the explosion was heard, and arrived at Barba de Puerco before the French; but finding nobody there excepting a piquet of cavalry, they passed the Dos Casas again, and thus missed them.

The Queen's regt., which were within a mile of Almeida, on the road to Malpartida, were not aware that the place was blown up, and did not march at all; and the 4th regt., which it is said did not receive their orders before midnight, and had only 2½ miles to march, missed their road, and did not arrive at Barba de Puerco till after the French, and with Gen. Campbell and Gen. Pack; and the flank battalions of the 5th division which Sir W. Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo (so long after he had heard the explosion, that he had sent an officer to Almeida, between 5 and 6 miles, to ascertain what it was, and this officer had returned), arrived nearly at the same time.

The other corps of the 6th division had marched different distances in pursuit of the enemy; but, excepting the 36th and the 8th Portuguese, none had crossed the Turones.

Thus your Lordship will see that, if the 4th regt. had received the orders, issued at 1, before it was dark at 8 o'clock at night; or if they had not missed their road, the garrison must have laid down their arms; and the same would have occurred if Lieut. Col. Douglas had remained at Barba de Puerco; and possibly the same would have occurred had the pursuit been judiciously managed.

Possibly I have to reproach myself for not having been on the spot; but really, when the enemy's whole army had crossed the Agueda, with the exception of one brigade of cavalry, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it probable that the attempt to escape would be made; and having employed 2 divisions and a brigade, to prevent the escape of 1400 men, who I did not think it likely would attempt to escape, the necessity of my attending personally to this operation, after I had been the whole day on the Azava, did not occur to me. However, it is that alone in the whole operation in which I have to reproach myself, as every thing was done that could be done in the way of order and instruction. I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation, something goes wrong. It is to be hoped that the General and other

officers of the army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be attained only by attention to the most minute details; and by tracing every part of every operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

15th May, 1811.

By all accounts which I have received, it appears that the enemy have retired beyond the Tormes, leaving a garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo, with but a small body of cavalry attached to them. It is even reported that they have crossed the Tormes, and have moved towards the Douro; but of this report I have no certainty. It is probable, however, that some time will elapse before the French army, in this part of Spain, will be capable of making any movement against the allies. Having made so considerable a detachment of the army to the south, it is necessary that what remains of this army should be for the present on the defensive. If, therefore, the enemy should collect again a large force upon Ciudad Rodrigo, it will be necessary that our army should be collected about Nave d'Aver, still, however, holding its advanced posts upon the Azava; and that it should be prepared, if necessary, to fall back upon the position behind Aldea Velha, Alfaiates, &c., and its left towards Badamalos, and thence to the position with its right behind Soito and the left to Rendo; and thence across the Coa to Sabugal.

If the collection of the enemy should be of such force, or made under such circumstances, as to create a belief that they will enter Portugal with a view to establish themselves again in the country, it will be necessary that the troops in this part of the country should fall back, when necessary, from Sabugal upon Belmonte, and thence by the Estrada Nova towards the Zezere. The strong country, however, between Belmonte and the Zezere must not be given up in a hurry; and a magazine, for a few days, should be formed at Belmonte, and care should be taken to remove from Celorico, and on the Mondego, the magazines, hospitals, &c., formed at those places.

It is desirable that the troops should remain in the positions which they now occupy as long as possible, with the exception of the cavalry, which it might be desirable to move to the rear, for the sake of forage. Brig. Gen. Pack should keep one regiment in Almeida; and should have advanced posts at Barba de Puerco. In case of the necessity of assembling the army in consequence of the advance of the enemy, and should it be necessary for Gen. Pack to evacuate Almeida, he should set fire to the carriages, &c., in Almeida, and to the mines not already blown up; and move either by the Caril road, or by the left of the Coa, or by the road of Freixedas, Alverca, and Guarda, according to the situation of the remainder of the troops, to join the army.

It is desirable, however, that until the government shall have determined what they will do respecting Almeida, that place should not be abandoned till it shall be necessary; and further directions will be sent respecting the collection and arrangement of the ordnance, stores, &c., preparatory to any future plan for keeping and making use of the place.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

15th May, 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 31st ult., addressed to the D. A. G., relative to —, of the — regt., I have the Commander of the Forces' directions to acquaint you that that person is a British subject, convicted of a crime in Portugal, and under sentence of punishment; and you must not take charge of him under a military guard without some official notification or authority from the British minister.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

The bearer of this letter is attached, in some manner or other, to the Portuguese brigade of infantry in the 3d division; and I found him employed here embargoing mules, by order of Col. Sutton, with a guard of one of the regiments of the brigade; and he embargoes those belonging to the army, which are, I believe, the only mules in the country. This irregularity cannot be permitted, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Col. Sutton to adopt some other mode of completing the brigade in mules besides that of pressing those already in the British service, by means of the Portuguese soldiers.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

I request that you will adopt measures to have the carriages of the 24 pounders, as well as the mortar beds and howitzer carriages, in the garrison of Almeida, put in a state to be fit for service. It is desirable that these carriages should be parked in a separate place on the ramparts; and that those belonging to guns of other calibres should, in like manner, be parked, those of each calibre by themselves, so as to be in readiness to be either removed or destroyed, according to the orders which may hereafter be given respecting them.

I also request you to have the several carts and transport carriages in the garrison examined; and let those be set apart which are fit for any service, and the others likewise brought together for the further disposal of them.

It is desirable that measures should be adopted to enable you to have the guns in the fort drilled when I shall send you directions for that purpose; and that you should, therefore, send to Lisbon, without loss of time, for the persons who are able to perform this work, with the instruments which they require for it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

When the army were employed on the pursuit of the enemy out of Portugal, the Light division of infantry and the cavalry were placed under the directions of Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, which has led to an alteration of the organization of the army that may be very inconvenient.

Although the cavalry may at times be joined to one or more divisions of the army for particular services, and that the senior officer present would of course command the whole, still each division, as well as the cavalry, must be considered as a separate body, under its own Commanding officer, for all matters of interior regulation, having its Staff officers and departments exclusively attached to it, and employed under the directions of the General officer commanding the division, in the duties of the division to

which they are attached. In all duties of a general nature, of course the senior officer of the 2 or 3 divisions acting together, would give his directions, and would be responsible, leaving the execution of the duty to be performed by each division, under the direction of its Commanding officer, who would be responsible to him for it. As the Light division and the cavalry were a good deal jumbled together on the late service, I had determined to draw this line, but I forgot it before I came away; and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate this letter to Sir S. Cotton and Gen. Craufurd.

As for our advanced guard, at present I think it ought to consist of the Light division and 4 squadrons of cavalry, and Pack ought to have 2 squadrons of Portuguese cavalry with his post at Barba de Puerco, &c.

Sir Stapleton will decide whether he will remain forward with these 4 squadrons, taking the command of the advanced guard on the principle above laid down; or whether the 4 squadrons shall be employed, also on the principle above laid down, with the Light division under the orders of Gen. Craufurd. In either case Sir Stapleton will of course relieve the 4 squadrons as often as he may think it expedient.

I also forgot to mention that Col. Hervey, of the 14th, asked me for leave to go into the Alentejo, to which I have no objection.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

I received last night your letters of the 12th and 13th, and I immediately determined to set out for the Alentejo; to which quarter I had intended to go, in a day or two, at all events.

I am much concerned to hear of your want of provisions. Mr. Kennedy tells me that he never heard even of the probability of want, excepting of corn and of cattle, which he had ordered to be supplied; that there are in Abrantes, he believes, above 700,000 rations of biscuit; and that no post ever comes from Lisbon that does not bring him a report of articles sent for the use of the troops in Estremadura.

Unless I should see reason on the road to move more quickly, I shall be at Elvas on the 21st. I should hope that you have been able to leave some troops long enough near Badajoz to have time to move off all your stores, if you had begun on the night of the 11th and 12th.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

In consequence of the reports which I received last night from Marshal Beresford, dated the 12th and 13th, I set out this morning for the Alentejo. I shall be at Castello Branco on the 18th, Portalegre the 20th, and Elvas the 21st, unless I shall see reason on the road to go a little quicker.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Pedrogão, 17th May, 1811, 2½ P.M.

In consequence of a letter of the 14th, which I have received from Beresford, I am about to go on to Castello Branco to-night, and I shall push on without my baggage to-morrow. There is no very particular intelligence in the letter; but I see that he does not like his situation, and I think it best to go to him.

I shall be obliged if you will desire Pakenham to correspond with the

officers commanding at the hospitals at Celorico and Coimbra, and with Capt. Tucker, to send to the regiments with you the men who may recover, as fast as they shall be well enough to move, according to our old regulation upon this subject.

Pray direct the General officers commanding divisions to keep the men in the habits of exercise, by marching occasionally.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 19th May, 1811, 4 P.M.

I arrived here this day, and received your letter of the 17th this morning.

Beresford had an action with the French at Albuera on the 16th, in which he repulsed Soult, but suffered great loss. Gen. Hoghton and Sir W. Myers killed, and Gen. Cole wounded. I don't yet know the particulars of the action, nor the extent of the loss; but it is certainly very severe. I understand that Soult retired on the morning of the 18th, and that Beresford marched to S^{ta} Marta; but of this I am not certain.

I understand that the Spaniards did not behave ill, and their loss has been heavy; the Portuguese were but little engaged; those that were behaved well, and they have not suffered much.

P.S. Will you tell Sir S. Cotton that I have no objection to his removing the head quarters of the cavalry here; but he must leave with Gen. Slade the means of carrying on the duty.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 19th May, 1811, 4½ P.M.

I arrived here about 2 this day, and received your letter of the 17th. I had not received any from you since the 14th. Your loss, by all accounts, has been very large; but I hope that it will not prove so large as was at first supposed. You could not be successful in such an action without a large loss; and we must make up our minds to affairs of this kind sometimes, or give up the game. As I hear you have marched to S^{ta} Marta, and I see that some troops have taken up the ground before Badajoz, I don't propose to move from hence in the morning, unless I should hear from you this evening.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocke.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

You will have heard that Marshal Beresford fought a severe action on the 16th; in consequence of which it is necessary that all the medical and surgical attendance which our hospitals at Lisbon can afford should be sent as soon as possible, together with 2000 sets of bedding. Desire the medical gentlemen at the head of the hospitals at Lisbon to act upon this order, respecting which I shall write to Dr. Franck.

I also request that one company of British artillery may be sent here without delay by the usual route and stages. Desire Col. Fisher to settle which company it shall be; and tell him that I shall write upon this subject to Major Gen. Howorth.

P.S. Besides the company of artillery above mentioned, it will be necessary to send here 3 officers of the civil department of the ordnance who have some intelligence.

To Dr. Franck.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811

You will have heard that Sir W. Beresford fought a severe action on the 16th; the result of which is a great number of wounded in the hospitals, in addition to a considerable number which were already here.

The gentleman here appears to me to be doing every thing that is in his power, and has written to Lisbon for further assistance. I have written also to Gen. Peacocke, and have desired that all possible assistance may be sent here, and 2000 sets of bedding. It is impossible to calculate the number of wounded there will be; but I should think at least that number. You will know best whether, from the state of the hospitals elsewhere, it will be possible to send assistance from other quarters.

P.S. I have desired Mr. Hogg to take care not to allow his hospitals there to become too crowded, and to evacuate upon Estremoz in time.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

In consequence of the loss of artillerymen in the late action, and the want of them in this quarter, I have written to Gen. Peacocke to desire him to send here a company of Royal artillery, of those now at or near Lisbon, upon which Col. Fisher will make the necessary arrangements.

From what I hear, I think it probable that we shall have to transfer our German brigade to the Royal artillery, keeping only one German brigade with the army.

P.S. I have desired Gen. Peacocke to send here 3 officers of the civil department of the ordnance, besides the company of British artillery. Upon recollection, we have at Lisbon a German company of artillery. I shall not determine, therefore, whether our German brigade shall be broken up, till I hear from you.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811, 5 p.m.

It is reported that you are coming here this day; but lest you should not, I write to tell you that unless I should hear, during the night, that you are coming to-morrow, I shall go to Valverde by the ford over the Guadiana, by which I crossed before; and from thence to Albuera, if I should not find you at Valverde. My baggage will not be up till to-morrow or next day; therefore I must live upon you.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811, 9 p.m.

Arbutnot is arrived; and as I find you are at Albuera, and it appears desirable that you should remain there, I shall go straight there in the morning, not going by Valverde.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow certain sheep belonging to Gen. the Hon. C. Stewart, to the number of 1200, to go to England in the empty transports or store ships, about to be sent home. He communicated with the Transport board on this subject when he was in England, and understood there was no objection; and I shall be obliged to you if you will signify to Capt. Poulder your consent to the removing the sheep in the transports: of course the General's agent will put fodder

on board for them. I am much obliged to you for having ordered the ships you mention in your letter of the 13th to the Mondego.

You will have heard of the Marshal's action on the 16th: the fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious and honorable to the character of the troops of any that has been fought during the war.

I arrived here only yesterday, and have not yet seen the Marshal, and don't know, and can scarcely form a guess, what the loss is. Gens. Hoghton, Sir W. Myers, and poor Duckworth, are killed; and Gen. Cole, Cols. Ellis* and Blakeney† wounded. Soult retired on the 18th, and Badajoz was invested yesterday.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

Since I wrote you my letter of this day I have received yours of the 16th.

The calculation on which the grant of the subsidy was founded, contained the estimate of the expense of two principal heads of the military expenditure, viz., the pay and the provisions for the number of men for whom the calculation was made. There could be no mistake about the pay: the mistake was in the provisions, and in omitting entirely some establishments and heads of expense which belong to all armies.

I contend for it, therefore, that we do supply the pay of 30,000 officers and men, and the gratuity to all the officers of the Portuguese army, and that this pay so supplied ought to be regularly given to them. I admit that Marshal Beresford's return is a sufficient voucher on which you may issue the money; but if you should find, as in this case I conceive it to be proved, that for several months the officers have not been paid, and for a considerable time the soldiers have not been paid, there is ground for serious representation, and even report, to our government. I don't believe there is any peculation among the heads of the government, but there is gross misapplication of funds. The *Junta de Viveres* and the Junta of the Arsenal are connected possibly in trade, but certainly by friendship or acquaintance, with all the merchants and dealers of Lisbon; and those who could best afford to wait for their money are, and have been, invariably paid regularly; while the dealers in the country and the officers and troops wait, and the former are never paid. The fears of the government, and their desire of popularity, lead to the same disposal of funds by their authority; and this evil is one of those which I expected would be remedied by the abolition of the *Junta de Viveres*.

In respect to the payments to the chest of the 'Aids,' you will recollect that upon an estimate of the expenses of the British army in Portugal, compared with the amount of the subsidy, it was settled that the Portuguese government, having a demand of about £80,000 *per mensem*, should

* Of the 23d Welsh Fusiliers, afterwards killed at Waterloo.

† Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Blakeney, K.C.B.

receive a certain proportion, two sevenths, of the sums raised by bills at Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Lisbon, or sent from England to the Commissary Gen. After this arrangement was made, the strength and the expense of the British army were much increased, and the proportions ought to have been altered; but still they were continued as settled, and the Portuguese government received in money only, last year, much more than the subsidy. Then lately we have increased the expense of the British commissariat, by undertaking to feed 6 Portuguese brigades of infantry and a proportion of the artillery; and of course not only this would alter the proportions by adding to our expense, but would diminish the demand for money subsidy by the Portuguese government.

On these grounds I conceive that it will be found that, in the months of March and April, they have been overpaid; and I hope soon to be able to send you the accounts of our demands for the provisions to the 24th April, and hereafter regularly for every month before its close.

In this statement I have not adverted to the new subsidy, as I conceive it is not the intention of the King's government that any part of it should be given till the reforms which have been suggested shall be made. But there is another reason for not giving more to the Portuguese government, which is, that we have it not to give. This part of the army have now 3 months' pay due to them, the other 2 months, and there is not a shilling here to pay them. It is perfectly true that Major Arentschildt left the reserve of his artillery, that is, the spare ammunition, at Caragoça, between Celorico and Ponte da Murcella. Why? because his mules and cattle had been starved on the Rio Maior, and could not draw it any farther; and because the magistrates of the country would supply no means of transport to draw it on.

I don't know the person at Batalha, and the British head quarters were never there. I have no objection, however, to any advance you please to make to the person you mention; but I should think that it cannot be made in money.

P.S. You don't mention whether you received my letter enclosing one for the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

I enclose the copy of a memorandum which has been put into my hands by Major Dickson, of the artillery, regarding the march of certain guns demanded for the service of this garrison from Lisbon. I trust that the movement of these guns has not been suspended, as their early arrival is very important; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make inquiry upon this subject.

I am not able to give you any details upon the battle of the 16th, as I have not seen or heard from the Marshal. Our loss is very large; but we must expect loss whenever we engage the British troops with the Spaniards as allies. The Spaniards, by all accounts, behaved remarkably well; but they were immovable; and their want of discipline, and of the power of manœuvring, appears to me to have created a necessity for using the British infantry in all parts of the field, and to have thrown upon us the great burden of the battle. This was exactly the case in the battle

of Talavera; and, only that the Spanish troops were more distant from the fire, I suspect it was the case at the battle of Barrosa.

I have received your letter of the 17th, and return the newspapers.

P.S. I think it very desirable that, if possible, no flying details of the battle of Albuera should go home till Sir W. Beresford's report shall be sent. I conclude that the account that there had been a battle went by the mail yesterday, which is of no importance; but where there are many killed and wounded the first reports are not favorable; and it is not doing justice to the Marshal to allow them to circulate without his.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I went yesterday to Albuera, and saw the field of battle. We had a very good position, and I think should have gained a complete victory in it, without any material loss, if the Spaniards could have manœuvred; but unfortunately they cannot.

The French are retiring; but I don't think it clear that they are going beyond the Sierra Morena. As I know you have plenty of correspondents, I don't give you any details of the action here, or of our loss. I think the action, upon the whole, to be the most honorable to the troops that they have been engaged in during the war.

P.S. I received your letter of the 20th this morning; I think it appears that the enemy's loss cannot be less than between 8000 and 9000 men.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I have received the directions of the Sec. of State to request that you will send to Cork tonnage to convey to Portugal 200 horses for the Royal artillery, and likewise tonnage to convey to Portugal the Enniskillen dragoons, consisting of 680 horses; and that you will send all the remainder of the tonnage for horses, which may be, or may arrive, in the Tagus, to Plymouth, to convey from thence remount horses for the different services.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I am about to send Col. Arbuthnot home with the accounts of Sir W. Beresford's action of the 16th inst.; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send a ship of war with him, as it is desirable that he should arrive as soon as possible. He goes to Lisbon with this letter, and the dispatches will follow him to-morrow or next day.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811, 11 A.M.

I have received your letter of yesterday; and I shall send to England your official letter, and the intercepted enclosure. I think that Gazan's letter refers to the march of the wounded, with whom he is, he being himself wounded.* I believe the confusion is there; but I doubt there being much among the others, excepting the plunder, which is not unusual wherever the French troops are. It is very desirable, therefore, that you should not go too far from our main object. I think it probable, from one part of Gazan's letter (that in which he says that he has sent to order

* See Appendix, No. II.

the troops at Almaraz to join Soult), that the latter proposes to maintain himself in Estremadura, and has sent back only his wounded, covering them by the troops with himself. There is an expression in the order of the 19th at Solana, respecting the distribution which will be made from the resources of the country, which would tend to show that that is their object, and the march on Los Santos would show the same.

I don't know what to do about the French wounded at Albuera. We must remove our own in the first instance, and I will then endeavor to remove them; but we are very hard run for carriages. You should leave some few men and an officer to take care of them, and some provisions for them.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 20th inst., I have to inform you that I have no arms to give to Sousa.

In answer to your letter of the 18th, I must only say that I have not leisure to read long papers, which are called documents, but which contain not one syllable of truth. I have no money to give to the Portuguese government; and I believe it was never intended by our government that they should have the increased subsidy (nor do I believe they have any official knowledge of its grant) till they shall make the necessary alterations in their military system to render it efficient. I don't think they have any right to mention the increased subsidy in an official document; nor can they say with any truth that any part of the old subsidy is in arrears.

I have written my opinion of the state of affairs to the British government; and the Portuguese government will find that their intrigues and their folly will end in the ruin of their country.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose my dispatch of the 15th inst. to the Sec. of State, likewise that of this date, in the last of which you will find copies of Marshal Beresford's reports of his operations before Badajoz and of the action of the 16th inst. at Albuera.

I beg that you will do me the favor to congratulate the Regency upon this success, and to express the satisfaction with which I have read Marshal Sir W. Beresford's reports of the conduct of the Spanish General officers, officers, and troops, throughout the action, as well as in the operations previous to it.

In my letter of the 9th inst., I transmitted the copy of my letter to Gen. Castaños, and the memorandum on the plan of operations, and I omit now to enclose another copy; but I send you the copy of his answer to me, and of my letter to him of the 13th inst.

In my opinion, nothing can be more honorable to Gen. Castaños than this act of self denial, which I hope will be duly appreciated by the Regency, as it is by me.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

We have had warm work here; however, I hope that the French have suffered more than we have. I mean, if Soult goes far enough from me,

to renew the operations of the siege of Badajoz; but he will soon have a large reinforcement from Castille, and another such battle would ruin us.

The Spanish troops, I understand, behaved admirably; they stood like stocks, both parties at times firing on them, but they were quite immovable; and this is the great cause of all our losses. After they had lost their position, the natural thing to do would have been to attack it with the nearest Spanish troops, but they could not be moved; the British troops were the next, and they were brought up, and must always in these cases be brought up; and they suffered accordingly. The battle of Talavera was an example of the same defect in the Spanish troops; they could not be moved, however advantageous this movement might have been; and I suspect that the battle of Barrosa was something of the same kind. It is scarcely to be believed that any officer, who could depend upon the discipline of his troops in their movements, would have remained the quiet spectator of such an action at such a moment.

From these circumstances, you will believe that I am not very easy about the result of another action, if we should be obliged to fight one. What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops! We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops; we manœuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing, but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate if they don't run away.

Beresford tells me that it would be a great point gained if Blake were to return to the Regency, as he is not very accommodating, although he adhered strictly to the letter of every thing I laid down for his guidance.

P.S. Show every thing to Graham.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I write to the Commander in Chief this day, to recommend Capt. Chapman for promotion to a Majority by brevet; and I send an official recommendation for Major the Hon. H. Arbuthnot* to be promoted to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 52d, and Rowan† to the Majority. Besides this, I conceive that, Way‡ having lost his arm in the late action, the Commander in Chief would be disposed to give him the vacant Lieut. Colonelcy of the 29th, for which I long ago recommended him; and thus some vacancies would be left among the brevet commissions for which I was permitted to recommend.

I have not yet been able to arrange the promotions, in consequence of the casualties in the recent battle; but there is one officer, Major L'Estrange,§ of the 31st, whom I must recommend in the strongest manner for promotion in some way or other. After the other parts of the same brigade were swept off by the cavalry, this little battalion alone held its ground against all the *colonnes en masse*!

I desired Beresford to recommend Arbuthnot|| for one of the brevet

* Lieut. Gen. the Hon. H. Arbuthnot, C.B.

† Lieut. Col. Rowan, C.B.

‡ The late Major Gen. Sir G. Way, Kt., C.B.

§ Lieut. Gen. Sir G. L'Estrange, K.C.B.

|| Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Arbuthnot, K.C.B.

Lieut. Colonelcies in the Portuguese service; but the windfall of the action of the 16th will probably give him the rank. I have not yet received from Beresford his list; but I shall be obliged to you if you will let Arbuthnot stand the first, if I should be able to transmit it by this dispatch, which at present is not very likely.

P.S. The late action has made a terrible hole in our ranks; but I am working hard to set all to rights again.

To the Rt. Hon. the Commander in Chief.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

When I had the honor of addressing you on the 14th inst., in consequence of the permission which you had given me to recommend to your notice certain officers for promotion, I omitted the name of one, to whom I consider myself and the army more indebted than certainly to any other officer of his rank in the service: I mean Capt. Chapman, of the Royal Engineers, now secretary to the Master Gen. of the Ordnance.

Capt. Chapman being absent from the army, and having understood that your Excellency was disposed to recommend that he might be promoted, and considering that he, as an officer of the corps of engineers, did not stand within the scope of your Excellency's letter to me of the 23d April, I omitted his name; but I beg to assure you that the services rendered by Capt. Chapman are of the highest description, and I earnestly entreat that he may be promoted to the rank of Major by brevet, in priority to any of those officers whom I recommended to your Excellency in my address of the 14th inst.

To the Rt. Hon. the Commander in Chief.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report, which I have made to the Sec. of State, of the recent operations in this quarter by the troops under the command of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing his reports to me of the operations of the siege of Badajoz and of the action of the 16th inst.

To the Rt. Hon. C. Yorke.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Cadogan, in which he has requested that I would recommend to your consideration his brother's (Capt. G. Cadogan)* claim for employment in the navy. I shall be much obliged to you if you will take these claims into consideration.

To P. Colquhoun, Esq.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 7th inst., in which you have informed me of the loss which you and the country have sustained by the death of Lieut. Col. Barclay. I assure you that there is no man more sensible than myself of the excellent qualities of that gallant officer, and I lament his loss most sincerely.

It gives me much concern to find that he has left his widow and child slenderly provided for; and I wish that I could relieve the affliction which you feel upon this occasion, and that provision should be made for

* Now Earl Cadogan.

them ; but I have done every thing in my power to obtain it for them. I have written and forwarded your letter to Mr. Perceval, whom I have always found disposed to attend to my requests in favor of the families of officers who have lost their lives in the service ; and I have earnestly entreated him to endeavor to provide for the family of the late Col. Barclay.

To the Rt. Hon. S. Perceval.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from the father of the widow of a most respectable officer, the late Col. Barclay of the 52d regt., giving me an account of his death, and apprising me of the distressed circumstances in which he has left his family. Lieut. Col. Barclay commanded a brigade in the Light division, in which he had served during the entire war in the Peninsula, and he was wounded in the battle of Busaco, and never recovered. I believe that there was not a more meritorious officer in the army, and I beg leave to recommend his widow to your favor and protection.

I am very much obliged to you for your attention to my recommendation in favor of my friends, the Portuguese nation, who really deserve the generosity of the people of England. My soldiers have continued to show them every kindness in their power, as well as to the Spaniards. The village of Fuentes de Oñoro having been the field of battle the other day, and not having been much improved by this circumstance, they immediately and voluntarily subscribed to raise a sum of money, to be given to the inhabitants as a compensation for the damage which their properties have sustained in the contest.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

On the night of the 15th inst. I received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th inst., which reported that Marshal Soult had broken up from Seville, and had advanced towards Estremadura, about the 10th, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously raised, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, by works ; and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia.

I therefore set out on the following morning from Villar Formoso ; and having received further information of the 14th from Sir W. Beresford, of the enemy's movements, I hastened my progress, and arrived here on the 19th, and found that Sir W. Beresford had raised the siege of Badajoz, without the loss of ordnance or stores of any description, had collected the troops under his command, and had formed a junction with Gens. Castaños and Blake, at Albuera, in the course of the 15th inst. He was attacked there on the 16th, by the French army under the command of Marshal Soult ; and after a most severe engagement, in which all the troops conducted themselves in the most gallant manner, Sir W. Beresford gained the victory. The enemy retired in the night of the 17th inst., leaving between 900 and 1000 wounded on the ground. Sir W. Beresford sent the allied cavalry after them, and on the 19th in the morning reinvested Badajoz.

I enclose the reports of Sir W. Beresford* of the 16th and 18th inst., on the operations of the siege to the moment of raising it, and on the battle at Albuera; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability, the firmness, and the gallantry manifested by Marshal Sir W. Beresford throughout the transactions on which he has written. I shall

* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Albuera, 16th May, 1811.

In conformity to your Lordship's instructions given to me on the 24th ult., in consequence of the then state of the weather, and our means of communication across the Guadiana having been destroyed by the sudden flooding of that river, and leaving my cavalry in Zafra, Los Santos, and Villa Franca, I placed the infantry with its head at Almendralejo, Azauchal, and Villa Alva, where were the divisions of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart and Major Gen. Hamilton: and the Hon. Major Gen. Cole's division with Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of cavalry in Merida, the infantry brigade of it commanded by Brig. Gen. Kemmis, intended for the attack of Fort San Cristoval, at Montijo, and the light brigade German Legion, under Major Gen. Baron Alten, at Talavera Real, leaving the light battalion L. L. Legion in Olivença during the period of waiting the fall of the water of the Guadiana, and the re-establishment of our bridge, it being of considerable importance to push the enemy from us as far as possible during the siege, as he had on our obliging him to retire from Llerena to Guadalecanal held the latter place.

I directed a small column of 2000 men, composed of the 1st brigade 2d division, under the command of Lieut. Col. Colborne, with 2 squadrons of cavalry and 2 Spanish 4 pounders, to proceed from Almendralejo, by Ribera and Maguilla, to Azuaga to threaten his right, sending at the same time 4 squadrons of cavalry from Brig. Gen. Long at Villa Franca to Llerena, to support the Conde de Penne Villemur, who was then with the Spanish cavalry of Gen. Castaños' corps, to make him fear an attack in front, and Gen. Ballesteros went from Monasterio to Montemolin to threaten his left. These manœuvres had the desired effect: as soon as the enemy saw the advance of Lieut. Col. Colborne near Azuaga, where he had 500 infantry and 300 cavalry, he abandoned precipitately the place and retired to Guadalcanal, which place Gen. Latour Maubourg, with the 5th corps, quitted in 2 hours after the arrival of this detachment, and at 11 o'clock at night retired near to Constantina. Lieut. Col. Colborne performed this service in a most judicious and handsome manner.

The weather having been some time fine, and the waters of the Guadiana having subsided, and our preparations having, by Lieut. Col. Fletcher's activity, been nearly completed for the siege of Badajoz, on the 3d of May I sent 3 brigades of infantry, a brigade of 6 pounders, and 2 squadrons of cavalry, under the orders of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, to invest Badajoz more closely, on the south of the river, which he performed with his usual zeal and attention on the 4th. On the 6th inst. I directed the march of the remaining divisions on Badajoz, one by Albuera, the other by Talavera, leaving the cavalry as before placed. On the 7th I came before Badajoz with these divisions. Gen. Castaños furnished also to co-operate in the siege 2000 men, under the command of Brig. Don Carlos de España. On the 8th I directed the brigade of Brig. Gen. Kemmis, which had been previously placed on the Gévora, to proceed to the Torre of Sta Engracia, about 2 miles from Badajoz, on the Campo Maior road, and to be joined there by the 17th Portuguese regt., 2 squadrons of cavalry, and four 6 pounders from Elvas; the force to meet at 3 o'clock in the morning, and the whole to be placed under the orders of the Hon. Major Gen. W. Lumley, to invest the north side, and to attack Fort San Cristoval. By some accident to the bearer of the orders to Brig. Gen. Kemmis, the officer did not arrive at his post till 9 o'clock, the Hon. Major Gen. Lumley, on the approach of the light companies of the brigade, advancing towards the town, with the force he brought from Elvas; the garrison made a sortie upon it, but was immediately driven back, and the grenadiers of the 17th regt. particularly distinguished themselves by charging the enemy, headed by Col. Turner; the detachment suffered the loss as per return No. 1.

On the 8th, Lieut. Col. Fletcher, to protect the further approaches, constructed

add nothing to what he has said of the conduct of all the officers and troops, excepting to express my admiration of it, and my cordial concurrence in the favorable reports made by Sir W. Beresford of the good conduct of all.

As Sir W. Beresford frequently refers in the enclosed dispatches to the

batteries against the Pardaleras and Picurina, on the heights commanding them, though at a considerable distance; and Capt. Squire, whom the Lieut. Colonel had sent to superintend the works intended to be erected against San Cristoval, began his operations on the 8th. The breaking ground on that side immediately caused great jealousy to the enemy, and he opposed it by a most heavy fire of shot and shell, and on the morning of the 10th he made a sortie against the battery constructing, with about 1200 men, being within 500 yards of the place. He soon reached the battery, and it having, of the covering party allotted to it, only one light infantry company in it, the enemy got possession of it, but had it not for 2 minutes, as the whole of the covering party that was close to the battery on the slope of the hill immediately seized their arms, and drove the enemy back with considerable loss to him, but I regret to say ours on this occasion must have been considerably greater, from our troops having exposed themselves to the shot and shell of the town and fort of San Cristoval, and the musketry from this latter.

I annex the return of our loss on this day, and in it I have to lament being deprived of the services of Col. Turner, who, in the very short time he had been in the Portuguese service, had given me the greatest satisfaction, and in these 2 days the most conspicuous proofs of his gallantry.

I annex the returns of our further loss of men on the respective days that our operations against Badajoz continued, and the Hon. Major Gen. Lumley's reports on the circumstances and consequences of the enemy's sorties.

On the 12th I received information from Gen. Blake that Marshal Soult had left Seville on the 10th, and with the avowed intention of coming to Badajoz, his force stated to be 15,000 men; and Gen. Latour Maubourg had already again moved upon and occupied Guadalcanal and Llerena, from which places the Count de Penne Villemur had been obliged to retire. As Gen. Blake had come down to Fregenal, and Gen. Ballesteros from Monasterio had pushed his advances within a league of Seville, I could not judge if this advance of Marshal Soult was merely to oblige these Generals to retire, and leave him undisturbed in Seville, or really, as it was given out to be, against me, and with the object of raising the siege of Badajoz, and therefore continued my operations against the place, until the further advance of Soult should more clearly determine this point; but in the middle of the night I received information from Gen. Blake and other quarters, of the rapid advance of Marshal Soult, and which left no doubt as to his intentions. I immediately sent to suspend operations against Badajoz, and to commence to remove to Elvas our guns and stores, which unfortunately had been nearly completed to what would have been wanted for the siege.

By great exertions of Lieut. Col. Fletcher of the Royal Engineers, and Major Dickson of the Artillery, every thing was removed on the evening of the 15th. To Lieut. Gen. Leite's (the Governor of the province of Alentejo) zeal and unwearied activity in whatever regards the service and welfare of his country, it is but just to say we are on all occasions much indebted; and particularly on this, in the getting together the transports necessary to us, and in furnishing and forwarding whatever else could be useful. I seize with pleasure this opportunity of giving to Gen. Leite that praise which he has ever so fully merited.

I had been obliged, to cover the removal of the stores, &c., to leave the division of Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole before Badajoz. Major Gen. Cole marched from before Badajoz to join the army here at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 16th; and arrived about half an hour before the enemy made his attack.

I have, however, the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the enemy cannot boast of having got a particle of our stores; they were all safely lodged in Elvas, and, with the exception of Brig. Gen. Kemmis's brigade, which was on the north side of the Guadiana, our troops were all united on the morning of the 16th, to meet the attack and oppose the march of Marshal Soult.

instructions from me, and to the correspondence between Gen. Castaños and me; and as I think it possible that the papers may not have reached England from Cadiz, I now transmit copies of my instructions to Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and of my letter to Gen. Castaños, on the plan of co-operation for the allied troops in the siege of Badajoz.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., to Lieut. Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.
Albuera, 18th May, 1811.

I have infinite satisfaction in communicating to your Lordship that the allied army, united here under my orders, obtained, on the 16th inst., after a most sanguinary contest, a complete victory over that of the enemy, commanded by Marshal Soult; and I shall proceed to relate to your Lordship the circumstances.

In a former report I have informed your Lordship of the advance of Marshal Soult from Seville, and I had in consequence judged it wise entirely to raise the siege of Badajoz, and prepare to meet him with our united forces, rather than, by looking to two objects at once, to risk the loss of both.

Marshal Soult, it appears, had been long straining every nerve to collect a force which he thought fully sufficient to his object for the relief of Badajoz; and for this purpose he had drawn considerable numbers from the corps of Marshal Victor and Gen. Sebastiani, and also, I believe, from the French army of the centre. Having thus completed his preparations, he marched from Seville on the 10th inst., with a corps then estimated at 15,000 or 16,000 men, and was joined on descending into Estremadura by the corps under Gen. Latour Maubourg, stated to be 5000 men.

His Excellency Gen. Blake, as soon as he learned the advance of Marshal Soult, in strict conformity to the plan proposed by your Lordship, proceeded to form his junction with the corps under my orders, and arrived at Valverde in person on the 14th inst., where, having consulted with his Excellency and Gen. Castaños, it was determined to meet the enemy and to give him battle.

On finding the determination of the enemy to relieve Badajoz, I had broken up from before that place, and marched the infantry to the position in front of Valverde, except the division of Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, which, with 2000 Spanish troops, I left to cover the removal of our stores.

The cavalry, which had, according to orders, fallen back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Sta Marta by the cavalry of Gen. Blake; that of Gen. Castaños, under the Comde de Penne Villemer, had been always with it.

As remaining at Valverde, though a stronger position, left Badajoz entirely open, I determined to take up a position (such as could be got, in this widely open country) at this place, thus standing directly between the enemy and Badajoz.

The army was therefore assembled here on the 15th inst. The corps of Gen. Blake, though making a forced march to effect it, only joined in the night, and could not be placed in its position till the morning of the 16th inst.; when Gen. Cole's division, with the Spanish brigade under Don Carlos de España, also joined, and a little before the commencement of the action. Our cavalry had been forced on the morning of the 15th inst. to retire from Sta Marta, and joined here.

In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us. The next morning our disposition for receiving him was made, being formed in 2 lines, nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the ridge of the gradual ascent rising from that river, and covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde, though your Lordship is aware that the whole face of this country is every where passable for all arms. Gen. Blake's corps was on the right in 2 lines; its left, on the Valverde road, joined the right of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart's division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, where commenced the right of Major Gen. Hamilton's division, which closed the left of the line. Gen. Cole's division, with one brigade of Gen. Hamilton's, formed the 2d line of the British and Portuguese army.

The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his attack. At 8 o'clock he was observed to be in motion, and his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above our right; and shortly after he marched out of the wood opposite to us a strong force of cavalry, and 2 heavy columns of infantry, pointing them to our front, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera. During this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right; and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank, and to cut us off from Valverde.

Major Gen. Cole's division was therefore ordered to form an oblique line to the rear of our right, with his own right thrown back; and the intention of the enemy to attack our right becoming evident, I requested Gen. Blake to form part of his first line, and all his second, to that front, which was done

I likewise enclose Gen. Castaños' answer to my letter upon this subject, agreeing to carry into execution the plan proposed; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to that part of the General's letter in which, with great delicacy and propriety, he declines to agree to that part of the proposed plan which would have given him the command of the allied

The enemy commenced his attack at 9 o'clock, not ceasing at the same time to menace our left; and after a strong and gallant resistance of the Spanish troops, he gained the heights upon which they had been formed. Meanwhile the division of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart had been brought up to support them, and that of Major Gen. Hamilton brought to the left of the Spanish line, and formed in contiguous close columns of battalions, to be moveable in any direction. The Portuguese brigade of cavalry, under Brig. Gen. Otway, remained at some distance on the left of this, to check any attempt of the enemy below the village.

As the heights the enemy had gained raked and entirely commanded our whole position, it became necessary to make every effort to retake and maintain them; and a noble one was made by the division of Gen. Stewart, headed by that gallant officer.

Nearly at the beginning of the enemy's attack a heavy storm of rain came on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to discern any thing distinctly. This, with the nature of the ground, had been extremely favorable to the enemy in forming his columns, and in his subsequent attack.

The right brigade of Gen. Stewart's division, under Lieut. Col. Colborne, first came into action, and behaved in the most gallant manner; and finding that the enemy's column could not be shaken by fire, proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; and, while in the act of charging, a body of Polish lancers (cavalry), which the thickness of the atmosphere and the nature of the ground had concealed (and which was, besides, mistaken by those of the brigade, when discovered, for Spanish cavalry, and therefore not fired upon), turned it; and, being thus attacked unexpectedly in the rear, was unfortunately broken, and suffered immensely. The 31st regt., being the left one of the brigade, alone escaped this charge, and, under the command of Major L'Estrange, kept its ground until the arrival of the 3d brigade, under Major Gen. Hoghton. The conduct of this brigade was most conspicuously gallant; and that of the 2d brigade, under the command of Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercrombie, was not less so. Major Gen. Hoghton, cheering on his brigade to the charge, fell pierced by wounds.

Though the enemy's principal attack was on this point of the right, he also made a continual attempt upon that part of our original front at the village and bridge, which were defended in the most gallant manner by Major Gen. Baron C. Alten, and the light infantry brigade of the German Legion, whose conduct was, in every point of view, conspicuously good. This point now formed our left, and Major Gen. Hamilton's division had been brought up there; and he was left to direct the defence of that point, whilst the enemy's attack continued on our right, a considerable proportion of the Spanish troops supporting the defence of this place.

The enemy's cavalry, on his infantry attempting to force our right, had endeavored to turn it; but, by the able manœuvres of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley, commanding the allied cavalry, though vastly inferior to that of the enemy in number, his endeavors were foiled. Major Gen. Cole, seeing the attack of the enemy, very judiciously bringing up his left a little, marched in line to attack the enemy's left, and arrived most opportunely to contribute, with the charges of the brigades of Gen. Stewart's division, to force the enemy to abandon his situation, and retire precipitately, and to take refuge under his reserve. Here the Fusilier brigade particularly distinguished itself. He was pursued by the allies to a considerable distance, and as far as I thought it prudent, with his immense superiority of cavalry; and I contented myself with seeing him driven across the Albuera.

I have every reason to speak favorably of the manner in which our artillery was served, and fought; and Major Hartmann, commanding the British, and Major Dickson, commanding the Portuguese, and the officers and men, are entitled to my thanks. The 4 guns of the horse artillery, commanded by Capt. Le Fevre, did great execution on the enemy's cavalry; and one brigade of Spanish artillery (the only one in the field) I saw equally gallantly and well served. We lost in the misfortune which occurred to the brigade commanded by Lieut. Col. Colborne (whom Gen. Stewart reports to have acted, and was then acting, in a most noble manner, leading on the brigade in admirable order) one howitzer, which the enemy, before the arrival of the gallant Gen. Hoghton's brigade, had time to carry off with 200 or 300 prisoners of that brigade. After he had been beaten from this his principal attack he still continued that near the village, on which he never could make any impression, or cross the rivulet, though I had been obliged to bring a very great proportion of the troops from it, to support the principal point of attack; but the enemy seeing his main attack defeated, relaxed in his attempt there also. The Portuguese division

army in the action, for which it was the object of the plan to provide, and proposes another mode of settling this delicate question, by which the command would rest with Marshal Sir W. Beresford. I likewise enclose the copy of my answer to this last letter.

All has remained quiet in Castille since I quitted that part of the country. The battalions of the 9th corps belonging to regiments serving

of Major Gen. Hamilton in every instance evinced the utmost steadiness and courage, and manœuvred equally well with the British.

Brig. Gen. Harvey's Portuguese brigade, belonging to Gen. Cole's division, had an opportunity of distinguishing itself when marching in line across the plain, by repulsing, with the utmost steadiness, a charge of the enemy's cavalry.

It is impossible to enumerate every instance of discipline and valor shown on this severely contested day; but there never were troops that more valiantly or more gloriously maintained the honor of their respective countries. I have not been able to particularise the Spanish divisions, brigades, or regiments, that were particularly engaged, because I am not acquainted with their denominations or names; but I have great pleasure in saying that their behaviour was most gallant and honorable: and though, from the superior number and weight of the enemy's force, that part of them that were in the position attacked were obliged to cede the ground, it was after a gallant resistance, and they continued in good order to support their allies; and I doubt not his Excellency Gen. Blake will do ample justice on this head, by making honorable mention of the deserving.

The battle commenced at 9 o'clock, and continued without interruption till 2 in the afternoon, when, the enemy having been driven over the Albuera, for the remainder of the day there was but cannonading and skirmishing.

It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished gallantry of the troops; but every individual most nobly did his duty, which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repulsing the enemy; and it was observed that our dead, particularly the 57th regt., were lying as they had fought in ranks, and every wound was in front.

Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart most particularly distinguished himself, and conducted much to the honor of the day; he received 2 contusions, but would not quit the field. Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole is also entitled to every praise; and I have to regret being deprived for some time of his services by the wound he has received. Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercrombie, commanding the 2d brigade, 2d division, and Major L'Estrange, 31st regt., deserve to be particularly mentioned; and nothing could exceed the conduct and gallantry of Col. Inglis* at the head of his regiment. To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley, for the very able manner in which he opposed the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and foiled him in his object, I am particularly indebted. To Major Gen. Hamilton, who commanded on the left during the severe attack upon our right, I am also much indebted; and the Portuguese brigades of Brig. Gens. Fonseca and Arch. Campbell deserve to be mentioned. To Major Gen. C. Alten, and to the excellent brigade under his orders, I have much praise to give; and it is with great pleasure I assure your Lordship that the good and gallant conduct of every corps, and of every person, was in proportion to the opportunity that offered for distinguishing themselves. I know not an individual who did not do his duty.

I have, I fear, to regret the loss to the service of Col. Collins, commanding a Portuguese brigade, his leg having been carried off by a cannon shot. He is an officer of great merit; and I deeply lament the death of Major Gen. Hoghton, and of those 2 promising officers, Lieut. Col. Sir W. Myers and Lieut. Col. Duckworth.

It is most pleasing to me to inform your Lordship, not only of the steady and gallant conduct of our allies, the Spanish troops under his Excellency Gen. Blake, but also to assure you that the most perfect harmony has subsisted between us; and that Gen. Blake not only conformed in all things to the general line proposed by your Lordship, but in the details; and in whatever I suggested to his Excellency I received the most immediate and cordial assent and co-operation; nothing was omitted on his part to ensure the success of our united efforts; and during the battle he most essentially, by his experience, knowledge, and zeal, contributed to its fortunate result.

His Excellency the Capt. Gen. Castaños, who had united the few troops he had in a state to be brought into the field to those of Gen. Blake, and placed them under his orders, assisted in person in the field; and not only on this, but on all occasions, I am much indebted to Gen. Castaños, who is ever beforehand in giving whatever can be beneficial to the success of the common cause.

Though I unfortunately cannot point out the corps, or many of the individuals of the Spanish troops, that distinguished themselves, yet I will not omit to mention the names of

* The late Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Inglis, K.C.B.

in the *corps d'armée* in Andalusia had marched from Salamanca on or about the 15th, and went towards Avila, and were to come by Madrid.

I send this dispatch by Major (Lieut. Col.) Arbuthnot, the secretary of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, who was present in the battle of Albuera, and can give your Lordship any further information you may require; and I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship.

Gen. Ballesteros, whose gallantry was most conspicuous, as of the corps he had under his command; and the same of Gen. Zayas and of Don Carlos de España. The Spanish cavalry have behaved extremely well; and the Conde de Penne Villemur is particularly deserving to be mentioned.

I annex the return of our loss in this hard contested day: it is very severe; and in addition to it is the loss of the troops under his Excellency Gen. Blake, who are killed, missing, and wounded, but of which I have not the return. The loss of the enemy, though I cannot know what it is, must be still more severe. He has left on the field of battle about 2000 dead, and we have taken from 900 to 1000 prisoners. He has had 5 Generals killed and wounded: of the former, Generals of Division, Werle and Pesim; and Gazan and 2 others amongst the latter. His force was much more considerable than we had been informed of, as I do not think he displayed less than from 20,000 to 22,000 infantry, and he certainly had 4000 cavalry, with a numerous and heavy artillery. His overbearing cavalry cramped and confined all our operations, and, with his artillery, saved his infantry after its rout.

He retired after the battle to the ground he had been previously on, but occupying it in position; and on this morning, or rather during the night, commenced his retreat on the road he came towards Seville, and has abandoned Badajoz to its fate. He left a number of his wounded on the ground he had retired to, and to whom we are administering what assistance we can. I have sent our cavalry to follow the enemy; but in that arm he is too powerful for us to attempt any thing against him in the plains he is traversing.

Thus we have reaped the advantage we proposed from our opposition to the attempts of the enemy; and, whilst he has been forced to abandon the object for which he has almost stripped Andalusia of troops, instead of having accomplished the haughty boasts with which Marshal Soult harangued his troops on leaving Seville, he returns there with a curtailed army, and, what perhaps may be still more hurtful to him, with a diminished reputation.

In enumerating the services received from the officers of my own staff, I must particularly call your Lordship's attention to those of Brig. Gen. d'Urban, Q. M. G. to the Portuguese army; and which I cannot sufficiently praise, though I can appreciate. On all occasions I have felt the benefits of his talents and services, and more particularly on this, where they very essentially contributed to the success of the day: and I cannot here omit the name of Lieut. Col. Hardinge, D. Q. M. G. to the Portuguese troops, whose talents and exertions deserve my thanks. To Brig. Gen. Mozinho, A. G. of the Portuguese army, and to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A. A. G. to the united British and Portuguese force, and to Brig. Gen. Lemos, and to the officers of my own personal staff, I am indebted for their assistance.

To the services of Lieut. Col. Arbuthnot (Major in His Majesty's service) I am also much indebted; and he is the bearer of this to your Lordship, and is fully enabled to give you any further information you may desire, and is most deserving of any favor your Lordship may be pleased to recommend him for to H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

P.S. Major Gen. Hamilton's division, and Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, march to-morrow morning to reinvest Badajoz on the south side of the Guadiana.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the corps of the army under the immediate orders of Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., in the battle with the French army commanded by Marshal Soult, at Albuera, on the 16th May, 1811.

	Officers.	Non - commis- sioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	34	33	917	63	984
Wounded	181	146	2666	35	2993
Missing	14	28	523	17	570

The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

Referring to my dispatch to your Lordship of this date, in which I have enclosed the copies of a correspondence with Gen. Castaños on the co-operation of the allied troops in this quarter, I have to mention to your Lordship that, when I proposed that plan to Gen. Castaños, it was understood that the General, having been appointed to command the army in Galicia, as well as that in Estremadura, was aiming to establish his head quarters near mine; and Marshal Sir W. Beresford would of course, as the senior to Gen. Blake, have had the command in the action, for which it was the object to provide; and this delicate question would thus have been settled in a manner satisfactory to all parties, and on the principle of the orders recently conveyed by your Lordship to Gen. Graham.

Gen. Castaños, however, remained in Estremadura, contrary to my expectations, and he has settled the question in a much more satisfactory manner; but in one which I could not with propriety have proposed; and if I had proposed it, it would in all probability have been rejected.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

I enclose a letter of the 21st inst., which I have received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford,* containing a letter from Gen. Gazan to Marshal Soult,† which had been intercepted by some of our parties. Gen. Gazan, wounded himself, was marching with the wounded; and from his account of those with him, from the account of those at Almendralejo, and those left on the ground at Albuera, from the number found dead on the field, and the prisoners, the Marshal computes the enemy's loss not to fall short of 9000 men.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

As the 3d and 7th divisions of the allied British and Portuguese army are on their march to this part of the country, and will arrive in the course of to-morrow and next day at Campo Maior, it is my intention to resume the operations of the siege of Badajoz, as soon as I shall be able to collect means of transport to move the stores and materials from hence to the ground in the neighbourhood of Badajoz: by which time I shall see what line the enemy has taken, whether to retire entirely from the province, or

* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Albuera, 21st May, 1811.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying intercepted letters of some importance; after the severe battle we had, it is satisfactory to know that our calculations of the enemy's loss were not exaggerated, and you will see, by Gen. Gazan's letter to Marshal Soult, that in killed and wounded it cannot be less than 8000 men.† Left dead on the field and taken, we have the knowledge of near 3000; Gen. Gazan states that he has more than 4000 wounded with him; 320 were at Almendralejo by the same letters; Gazan says many have died on the road, and which we know must have been the case, as it is in the first few days that the bad cases die in numbers, and a precipitate retreat and want of convenient carriage must increase the mortality. Thus we can scarcely calculate the loss of the enemy from these data at less than 9000 men.

Our advance was close to Azauchal and Almendralejo, and I propose putting a strong column of infantry in march towards those places to-morrow morning, and shall accompany it.

† See Appendix, No. II.

to maintain a position in the mountains within it. I have likewise ordered here the 2d hussars, which will arrive in a few days.

The troops marching with Gen. Drouet, mentioned in my dispatch marked A of this date, cannot arrive at Toledo, where it is said they are to cross the Tagus, till the end of the month; and I should hope that by that time I may have made some progress in the operations of the siege. However, so much depends upon means of transport, which it is difficult to collect, and so large a proportion of the means we possess are employed in the removal of the wounded in the action of the 16th, that I cannot be certain of being able to effect my object.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

Your Lordship will be anxious to know what measures I propose to adopt, in order to render the several battalions of the army, which have been lately employed in this quarter, more efficient. I propose immediately to form the 2 battalions of the 7th regt. into one; and to send the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 2d batt. home to England; and the same with the 48th regt.

As soon as I shall receive your Lordship's reply to my private letter of the 7th inst., on the subject of the battalions therein referred to, I intend, if the plan which I proposed should be approved of, to apply it to all the regiments which have suffered severely in the late action; viz., the 3d or Buffs, 29th, 57th, the 2d batt. 66th, the 2d batt. 31st, and to any others to which it can in my opinion be applied with advantage; and I will send home to recruit such proportions of the officers and non-commissioned officers of each as I may think can be spared from this country with advantage, classed in companies; keeping here such number of companies as there will be men to fill.

By the time I shall receive your Lordship's answer to that letter I shall be able to judge of the real amount of the loss which we have sustained; as men, supposed to be and returned as prisoners, are constantly appearing with all the regiments who, having been sent from the field of battle with wounded officers or soldiers, and having been still absent when the returns were made out, were returned as missing. It may be expected also, that a large proportion of the wounded will soon be fit for service.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 23d May, 1811, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 4, P.M.

I have received your letters of this day, and I still think that the enemy mean to hang about the limits of Estremadura; so that you should be cautious in your advance. Blake has written to Alava respecting his cavalry, which he wants to have at his disposal; and you had better send it to him. Will not his division at Feria be a little exposed?

We have letters from England to the 9th. Affairs appear to be coming to blows in the north of Europe. People are in great good humour with the affairs of Portugal. I believe the 11th dragoons have sailed, and they have authorised me to send for the Enniskillen dragoons.

Drouet marched towards Avila, on the 17th, with 17 battalions. Mas-sena has gone to France, with many other General officers.*

* See Appendix, No. III.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

I have received your letters of the 28th April and 7th May, regarding the remounts for the cavalry; and I write to Adm. Berkeley to send transports to Cork to bring to Portugal 200 horses of the artillery, and 680 of the Enniskillen dragoons; to send all the other horse transports to Plymouth. I rather believe, however, that all the transports are by this time gone home, and that transports must be taken from those coming out with the horses to remount the cavalry and artillery, and with the 11th light dragoons.

The enemy's superiority now consists in his cavalry alone; and I should entertain no doubt of any of our concerns, if ours were complete: however, that on the frontier of Beira is coming about, and I shall bring the 11th dragoons here.

I think it would be desirable to keep in this country only 3 squadrons, or 6 troops of each regiment, and 2 squadrons, or 4 troops at home; the home squadrons could then supply the casualties, as well of men as of horses of those abroad; and we should have at all times an equally efficient cavalry at a smaller expense. If this arrangement were agreed to, I can easily carry it into execution. It must be recollected, however, that the Peninsula is the grave of horses; I have lost no less than 12 for my own riding since I have been here, and many more of an ordinary kind.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

I am obliged to you for your letter of the 7th, regarding the publication of my dispatches. I generally confine myself to a relation of facts, and seldom give any opinion upon them, and always send the same dispatches to the Portuguese government, with the exception only of any detail to which it may refer, which is purely a British concern: I then mark in the Portuguese dispatch those facts which, in my opinion, ought not to be published; but that opinion goes no farther than to what appears to me that it would be inconvenient that the enemy should obtain a knowledge of, and seldom to circumstances which it would be desirable to withhold from the knowledge of the public.

I shall, with your Lordship's permission, adopt the same practice with my dispatches to you, and mark with a pencil in the margin those parts which, in my opinion, ought not to be published; leaving it to you afterwards to omit such other parts as you may think proper.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 8th.

When Hill comes he must return to his command; and I must confine Beresford to the management of the detail of the Portuguese army, which has suffered from his employment in this campaign, as well as from other circumstances. I should like to have Gen. Graham; but I rather think that your Lordship's letters don't go so far as to allow me to call him to this country, till the force at Cadiz shall be reduced to 2000 men.

You see from my dispatches how affairs are here. Soult had south of the Sierra Morena an army of about 53,000 effectives on the 25th March, including what is called the Catholic army, which is Dessolles' reserve, and

was sent to him from the army of the centre, of this number 7000 are cavalry. Drouet is marching to him with 17 battalions, which, however, are weak, and can scarcely make 3000 men, and some cavalry, of which I don't exactly know the number. From this force must be deducted the losses since the 25th March, which cannot be less than 10,000 men, including the battle of the 16th May, and the garrison of Badajoz about 2500; and Soult will remain, when Drouet arrives, with about 50,000 effective men. From this statement you will see that, supposing that I can get through the siege of Badajoz, it will be impossible to do more to the southward, till I shall have closed the door upon Beira, by obtaining possession of Ciudad Rodrigo: indeed I am thinking of bringing another division from Castille, in order to make sure of Badajoz, in consequence of Beresford's large losses; but I can scarcely venture to do that, and certainly cannot do more, without exposing to risk the frontier of Beira.

Fortunately for me, the French armies have no communication, and one army no knowledge of the position or of the circumstances in which the other is placed; both depend upon orders from Paris, whereas I have a knowledge of all that passes on all sides. From this knowledge I think I may draw more troops from Beira for my operations against Badajoz; but I cannot venture farther south till I shall get Ciudad Rodrigo, without exposing all to ruin. I beg, therefore, that people in England will have patience about Cadiz, and allow us to do our work gradually.

I should feel no anxiety about the result of any of our operations, if the Spaniards were as well disciplined as the soldiers of that nation are brave, and if they were at all moveable; but this is, I fear, beyond all hope; all our losses have been caused by this defect. At Talavera the enemy would have been destroyed, if we could have moved the Spanish army; at Albuera, the natural thing would have been to support the Spaniards on the right with the Spaniards who were next to them; but any movement of that body would have created inextricable confusion; and it was necessary to support the right with British, and thus the great loss fell upon our troops; in the same way, I suspect, the difficulty and danger of moving the Spanish troops was the cause that Gen. La Peña did not support Gen. Graham at Barrosa.

I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the north. God send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny: however, of this I am very certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.

To S. Whitbread, Esq.

Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th April, which I received last night; and I beg leave to return my thanks for the mode in which you have taken the trouble of informing me of the favorable change of your opinion respecting affairs in this country.

I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that persons, for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose opinions were likely to have great weight in England and throughout Europe, had delivered erroneous opinions, as I thought, respecting affairs in this country; and I prized their

judgments so highly, at the same time that I was certain of the error of the opinion which they had delivered, that I was induced to attribute their conduct to the excess of the spirit of party.

I assure you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by the approbation of — — —, and yourself and others, that which gives me most pleasure in the account which I received last night from England, is to be convinced that such men could not be unjust towards an officer in the service of the country abroad; and that the opinions which they had delivered, however unfavorable to him, were the real dictates of their judgments, upon a fair view of all the circumstances which had come to their knowledge. To the gratification arising from this conviction to one who appears destined to pass his life in the harness, you have added that which I received from your obliging letter; and I assure you that I am very sensible of the kindness towards me which induced you to write to me.

To the Junta of La Mancha.

Villar Formoso, 24th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter by Los Señores Don Joaquim Gomez and Don Ramon Rodriguez Belasco, and it would give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to assist the province of La Mancha with arms; but I have at present none in my possession; and I request you to apply to Mr. Wellesley, His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, for arms.

Memorandum for Col. Murray, Q. M. G.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

The siege of Badajoz to be undertaken immediately, and to be carried on by the following troops: the 3d, 7th, and Gen. Hamilton's divisions of infantry, the 17th Portuguese regt. from the garrison of Elvas, regiments of militia from the garrison of Elvas, Gen. Madden's brigade of cavalry, 3000 Spanish troops, the 2 companies of Portuguese artillery from Lisbon, and 300 artillery from the garrison of Elvas.

The British and Portuguese cavalry, and the 2d and 4th divisions of allied infantry, with the cavalry attached to them, and the Spanish divisions under Gens. Castaños and Blake, will cover the operation.

On the 25th inst. the 7th division of infantry will take up its ground to invest the place on the right of the Guadiana. This division is to be joined, and to bring with it a brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders from the 3d division. The 17th Portuguese regt. and one regiment of militia are likewise to march from the garrison of Elvas on the 25th, and to join the 7th division on the ground; and Brig. Gen. Madden is to send across the

G. O.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in communicating to the army letters from the Speakers of the Houses of Lords and Commons of the United Kingdom, of the unanimous approbation of the Lords and Commons of their services.

2. The Commander of the Forces takes this opportunity of again returning his thanks to the General officers, officers, and troops, for the uniform support he has received from the former, and for the good conduct of the latter, by which alone those services have been performed which have received the approbation of the two Houses of Parliament.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford will take measures to communicate these orders, and the accompanying vote of thanks, to the whole Portuguese army.

Guadiana, above the town, one regiment of his cavalry to join Major Gen. Houstoun.

On the 25th inst. the flying bridge is to be placed on the Guadiana at the place fixed upon; and Major Dickson and Lieut. Col. Fletcher are to commence forming their depôts for the attack of the place, to be continued from day to day till they shall be prepared to break ground, according to the means of transport which will be supplied to them.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 22d, and I agree in opinion with you that it is best to change one German for a British complete brigade: I have therefore ordered another company of artillery with guns to march from Lisbon, according to the terms of the enclosed copy of a letter to Gen. Peacocke. Col. Framingham is forward with the troops; and I don't think it expedient to wait to send orders through him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

I received this day your letters of the 22d, and that of the 23d of 1 P.M.

I think the French are about to do exactly what I expected, viz., collect their army about the Tagus. Having sent 17 battalions of the 9th corps to the southward, and the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 3d battalions of regiments to France, they are not so strong in infantry even as you are, and Marmont's movement is decidedly this way, or farther to the rear. Murray sends you a route this day for the march here of Gen. Howard's brigade, and of Col. Ashworth's Portuguese brigade; and as these troops will be within your reach for 2 or 3 days after they shall have marched, I beg you to stop them, and to order them to rejoin you if you should find that the enemy is moving towards you, notwithstanding my expectations to the contrary, as above expressed.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Marmont, which I beg you to forward the moment you receive it: in order that he may believe I am still at Villar Formoso, I date it the 25th.

The Portuguese government have determined to repair the fort of Almeida, upon which subject I shall write to you hereafter. The French have retired to Llerena.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 23d from Almendralejo, but not that from Villa Franca, and I cannot tell therefore what disposition you have made. The 3d division having, however, arrived this day at Campo Maior, I have determined to go on with the siege of Badajoz; and I send you a copy of the memorandum which I arranged this day for our operations. I have ordered Gen. Howard's and Col. Ashworth's Portuguese brigade from Beira to this place; the 2d hussars can scarcely be here before the 29th.

My news from Salamanca is, that Marmont,* who now commands the '*Armée de Portugal*,' is about to move, as it is said, towards Avila; this

* See Appendix, No. III. and No. XV.

looks like reinforcing this point. I shall make corresponding movements with our army of Beira, particularly the cavalry.

I should be very glad if we were together for a few days; for we have a monstrous quantity of business to settle of different descriptions. Could we not bring out of Abrantes Lobo's regiment, at least, in our existing dearth of troops? Hill is arrived in Lisbon.

Although this place is the most convenient for head quarters for the siege, I don't know whether it is not too far for the conduct of the operations of the covering army: however, there is no hurry in deciding that point, and I wait to receive your distribution of the force which you sent from Villa Franca.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocke.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

Besides the company of artillery ordered to Elvas by my letter of the 20th inst. I have to request that another company of artillery, with a brigade of 6 pounders, and as many horses as there may be at Lisbon to draw the guns, and the usual complement of drivers and artificers for a brigade of artillery, may be sent to Elvas as soon as may be convenient. If there are at Lisbon a sufficient number of horses fit for service to draw the guns, they are to be sent to Aldea Galega, and to march by the usual route. If there are not, the guns are to be sent by water to Abrantes, and the men and horses are to march to that place, and a report is to be made to the Q. M. G. of the day they shall arrive there.

I request you to give these orders to Col. Fisher, and inform him that I shall send a copy of them to Gen. Howorth.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 22d inst. I have received reports that Marshal Soult had retired to Llerena; and the 3d and 7th divisions having arrived at Campo Maior, I have given directions that Badajoz may be closely invested on the right of the Guadiana to-morrow; and I propose forthwith to recommence the operations of the siege.

I learn from Castille that the Prince d'Essling, Gens. Junot, Loison, and others, had set out for France; and that the 3 *corps d'armée*, the 2d 6th, and 8th, had been formed into 6 divisions, still called the '*Armée de Portugal*,' having for its commander in chief the Duc de Raguse, and Gen. Regnier as second in command.*

Marshal Sir W. Beresford reports that the greatest number of the officers and men returned missing in the action of the 16th inst. have rejoined their regiments.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

I write you a few lines, thinking it possible that my letter may overtake Col. Arbuthnot, or that, at all events, it will be in time for the packet on Sunday.

I hear from Salamanca that the '*Armée de Portugal*' are about to move; and it is reported, and I think it probable from the movement of their detachments, that they are about to approach the Tagus: however, I am ready for them at all points.

* See Appendix, No. III.

Drouet has with him 17 battalions and some cavalry, as a reinforcement for the troops in Andalusia, and they may join about the second week in June. I don't know when Marmont will be ready to co-operate with Soult: however, as the siege of Badajoz can be raised with so much ease, and without loss of any kind, whenever it may be necessary, I have thought it best to lose no time about it, and to adopt every measure to get that place, if I can, before the enemy's troops can join; and if I cannot, to raise the siege and fight a battle, or not, as I may find most proper, according to the state of our respective forces. I think that, if you intend to reinforce this army, you should send the men out soon.

The A. G. to Major Downman, commg. Royal horse artillery.

24th May, 1811.

I have not failed to lay your letter of the 17th inst. before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed by his Lordship to observe that the promotion to which he was directed to recommend was not to be confined solely to the Light division, but the selection was to be made from the army generally. His Excellency took a larger proportion from the Light division for their eminent services, and he is fully aware of the services that have been individually performed by Capts. Bull and Ross, but their seniority in the army, compared with many officers in this country, cannot fairly, at present, bring them forward. I trust, therefore, that the knowledge of the Commander of the Forces' good opinion of the zeal and abilities which the above officers have displayed, will be as gratifying to them as if his Excellency had more power to recompense their several merits.

Au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise, ce 25 Mai, 1811.

Je n'ai reçu que la 22^{me} la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 16^{me} de ce mois; et j'ai tardé d'y envoyer une réponse jusqu'à ce que j'aie pu savoir si le Colonel La Motte était toujours à Celorico, où on l'avait envoyé. Je suis fâché de vous faire savoir qu'il était déjà parti pour Lisbonne, mais si vous voulez avoir la bonté d'envoyer M. le Lieut. Col. Hill aux avant postes de l'armée, j'aurai soin que M. le Col. La Motte soit tout de suite renvoyé à l'armée Française.

Peu de jours après que M. le Prince d'Essling eut pris le commandement de l'armée qui est à présent sous les ordres de votre Excellence, je lui avais proposé que les chirurgiens et les officiers des autres départemens civils des armées fussent considérés comme non combattans, et que s'ils étaient pris, ils seraient rendus des deux côtés. Mais son Excellence ne m'a donné aucune réponse sur cette proposition, malgré qu'elle fut accompagnée par l'offre de lui rendre quelques officiers de santé de l'armée Française qui avaient été pris. Après, quand toute l'ambulance de l'armée Française fut prise à Coimbra, son Excellence m'a proposé que les officiers de santé seraient censés non combattans, et que les non combattans seraient rendus de part et d'autre. Mais c'était alors trop tard; car dans le temps qui s'était passé, depuis que je lui fis la même proposition, j'avais reçu la copie des pièces d'une négociation entre les gouvernemens Anglais et Français pour l'échange des prisonniers de guerre, par lesquelles j'ai vu que les non combattans de toute espèce, des voyageurs, des marchands qui suivaient leurs affaires, des personnes qui n'avaient rien à faire avec la guerre, détenus en France quand elle a malheureusement commencée, étaient censés prisonniers de guerre, et devaient être changés comme tels, en cartel, pour des officiers et des soldats de l'armée Française.

Il n'est plus donc dans mon pouvoir de mettre en liberté quelque prisonnier que ce soit, comme non combattant; et je le regrette d'autant plus, que j'aurais eu le plus grand plaisir à me rendre aux désirs de votre Excellence en faveur de M. le Sous Inspecteur Ville sur Arce.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 25th May, 1811, 4 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 23d. I understand from O'Lawlor that you have sent our friends at Salamanca 1000 dollars, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give direction that they may have 2000 more, making in the whole 3000 dollars.

We have invested Badajoz on this side this day. Nothing new.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 25th May, 1811, P.M.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send back Gen. Mad-den's brigade to the siege of Badajoz; and if you will write to Gen. Leite to let us have as many regiments of militia as will make up 1000 men, for the attack on each side of the river.

To the Rt. Hon. J. Villiers.

Elvas, 25th May, 1811.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of yesterday, and I am very much obliged to you for it.

No man can appreciate better than yourself the difficulties with which I have had to contend; but I believe that you are not aware of all of them. I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwithstanding that it was the opinion of every British officer in the country that I ought to embark the army; while, on the other hand, the Portuguese civil authorities contended that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier, for which they wanted not only physical force, but the means of providing for the force which they could produce in the field. I believe nothing but something worse than firmness could have carried me through the 9 months' discussion with these contending opinions. To this add that people in England were changing their opinions almost with the wind, and you will see that I had not much to look to excepting myself.

I am concerned to tell *you*, who are interested in every thing concerning this country, that we are in rather an uncomfortable state with the Portuguese government. In August last, Principal Sousa was appointed to the government; and, at the same time, we learned that he was a kind of agent of an intrigue to remove Beresford from the command of the army, and to give it to the Duke of Brunswick, which you will readily believe was not very agreeable to me. He then began the persecution of French partisans, and nobody was exempt from his accusation. Mozinho, Lemos, even Sodré, were accused, and would have been sent off, if I had not set my face against such proceedings, of which, by the bye, he afterwards said we were the authors; and, as he was appointed with a view to curb 'the despotism of the Secretariat,' as ——— calls it, he immediately made a dart at Forjaz, the instrument of which, since you had arrived at Lisbon, the servants of the British government had availed themselves to manage the affairs of Portugal.

Then there was no subject in which the mischievous activity of his

mind did not interfere, and he was the most active partisan of carrying on the war on the frontier; and, in his conversations upon this subject, was so indiscreet as to infuse into the militia of Lisbon opinions so dangerous, that Beresford and I thought it expedient to *honor these corps* by calling them to the army, providing others for the duties of the city. Then, by his influence in the Regency, he delayed, by the discussions on this point, all the measures which had been recommended early in the summer for the removal of persons, property, and provisions, and rendering useless the mills, till it was too late; and to him is to be attributed the length of time which the French were enabled to remain in the country.

These circumstances brought me into direct discussion with this gentleman; and I complained of him to the Prince, in a letter which I wrote in December last, and sent open to the Regency, in which I told the Prince that it was my opinion that it would not be to his advantage to retain Principal Sousa and me in his service at the same time. To this letter the Prince has sent an answer which shows that intrigue is hard at work in Brazil.

However, upon all this I should be indifferent, as it must be indifferent to me who are the Governors of the Kingdom, only that things are growing to such a state as to threaten the existence of the country, if the French should be able again to invade it. We can get the government to do nothing. All the departments of the army are worse than useless. The army is not near complete; indeed we have not 20,000 Portuguese troops in the field; and some circumstances have occurred lately which have demonstrated the positive danger resulting from the system on which we are acting to such a degree, as to induce me to tell our government that it was my opinion that the British army ought not to be exposed to it, if the French should again be able to get the superiority in the country.

Forjaz has sent in his resignation; Mr. Stuart no longer attends the Regency. I have no intercourse with them; and I think this country will be lost, should the French be again able to attack it, if we cannot re-establish the influence of Great Britain (not of ———) in the councils of Brazil. After all that you have done here, this account will not be very pleasing to you; but it is perfectly true, and I assure you that I have not exaggerated the consequences which are likely to follow from this state of things. The worst is, that I don't know how they can be remedied. The removal of Principal Sousa from the government would not now answer; and I don't know what will, excepting a radical change of system in the government, as well here as in Brazil.

P.S. I hope that the people in England will not be out of temper with the loss in Beresford's action with Soult: it was owing to the Spaniards, who could not be moved. Beresford was rather in a hurry in making his returns, and nearly all the men returned missing have since joined their regiments.

To the Rt. Hon. Lord Eldon, Lord High Chancellor.

Elvas, 25th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 29th

April, in which your Lordship enclosed the resolutions of the House of Lords of the 26th April, expressing the approbation of their Lordships of the conduct of the army under my command, during the late campaign in Portugal, which I have communicated, according to your Lordship's desire, to the allied British and Portuguese armies.

The approbation of the House of Lords must be highly gratifying to the General officers and officers, by whose able assistance and support, and to the troops, by whose good conduct, discipline, and bravery (under Providence), the service has been performed, which their Lordships have been pleased to distinguish in this manner; and I request your Lordship to convey to the House of Lords the expression of my gratitude for the favor with which they have been pleased to view my endeavors to serve His Majesty, and for the high honor which their Lordships have conferred upon me. I likewise request your Lordship to accept my acknowledgments for the handsome terms in which your Lordship has conveyed to me the sentiments of the House of Lords.

[A letter in nearly the same terms to the Rt. Hon. C. Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons.]

The A.G. to J. P. Boys, Esq., Deputy Paymaster General.

25th May, 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to state to you that, in consequence of the number of wounded officers at Coimbra, and entirely without money, his Excellency judges it necessary, although it should appear out of the regular course, that you should advance a sum of money, £100 sterling, to Capt. Kipping, the Commandant at that station. This sum will be distributed as he may think proper, taking the receipts of the several officers to whom he may advance any money; and Capt. Kipping will send you an account of his issues, which you will be pleased to charge to the accounts of the paymasters of the regiments to which the officers shall belong.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 26th May, 1811, noon.

I have just now received your letter of the 24th.

I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Gen. Howorth to report particularly on the 8 pounders you mention as being in Almeida, whether our 9 pounder shot will fit them; and whether he has, in that part of the country, or can get, horses to horse them: if he has not, I think he had better make arrangements to send them down to Coimbra by bullocks, and thence to Lisbon by sea.

I don't yet understand what the French are about on your side: I should think a movement towards the Tagus the most probable; but this is not yet quite clear, and their preparation of biscuit at such a distance as Llerena does not look like it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 26th May, 1811.

I received by the last mail the duplicate of your letter of the 28th April, respecting Santoña; and by the messenger afterwards, the original; to which I should have replied by the opportunity which immediately offered in the departure of Lieut. Col. Arbuthnot, if my letter of the 7th inst. had not contained an opinion on the principle of the operation proposed.

I have no doubt of the utility of such an establishment on the northern

coast, as it is proposed to have at Santoña; but I believe you will find that the demands for your force in this country, and at Cadiz, are fully equal to what you can supply; and I am convinced that not a man that could be sent here ought to be diverted to any other part of the Peninsula. It is impossible to say, without knowing more of the ground than I do (for I have no plan), whether the number of men you propose to send to Santoña would be able to hold the ground till it could be so strengthened as to render the tenure of it quite secure. From Gen. Walker's report and opinion, I should say that 4000 men would be able to hold it, and I have no doubt, from the description, that it might be made so strong as to be almost impregnable; but I would beg to refer your Lordship to one of the enclosures, viz., the letter from Capt. Birch, of the 1st Sept. 1808, and you will see from his description of the peninsula and the harbour, that even when the former shall be secured, parts of it, and the whole of the harbour, will be exposed to fire from the opposite shore; and indeed this opinion appears confirmed by Capt. Digby's report on the harbour of Santoña of the 14th Sept. 1808.

If it be correct, then, we should have possession, when we should have fortified it, only of this barren peninsula, with which the communication would be difficult by sea, as we could not use the harbour; and with which the communication would be impossible by land, if the enemy should maintain near it a superior force to that which we should have within it. The proposal to occupy Santoña, however, is founded upon a notion that the whole of the neighbouring provinces would immediately rise in arms; and that this place would immediately be the centre and foundation of their operations. I should be inclined to doubt this effect of our occupying this place; and, whatever might be the case eventually, I have no doubt that in the first instance your force would have to stand the attack of whatever troops Bessières would bring against them. There is now here a very good officer, Gen. Abadia, who is going to command in Galicia, and I shall turn his mind to this operation. I shall desire him to consult with Gen. Walker, or the British agent at Coruña, respecting the means required, and the troops which he must furnish; and when the experiment shall have been tried in this way, your Lordship will be able to determine whether you will give any or what support to the establishment which will be formed there.

The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

26th May, 1811.

Mr. Briscall having represented again to the Commander of the Forces the circumstance of the men at Elvas, Lisbon, &c., being all buried, in a state of nudity, in one large pit or grave, and as it would be desirable so far to remedy this as to provide some old blankets or coarse canvas for the bodies, I am desired by his Excellency to call your attention to this subject, and request that you will communicate with the Purveyor accordingly, to ascertain if no mode can be devised of burying the soldiers in a more decent manner. If they can be furnished in any mode with old blankets, or coarse canvas, or old sacks, directions might be given as to their being interred in separate graves, which would be more consonant to the usual practice, and not offend the delicacy of the inhabitants of Lisbon, which Mr. Briscall strongly observes on. It appears to me that it may easily be managed for the soldiers to be decently buried at no great expense.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

I am very glad to hear that you are returned in good health, and I hope that we shall see you soon.

You will have heard of events here, which I hope will enable us to obtain possession of Badajoz, upon which we are busily employed.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th, 6 p.m.; and I enclose an answer for Capt. —, which I beg you to peruse, and forward to him.

I don't think it clear that the French have moved more troops yet from the Tormes than the battalions of the 9th corps. However, there can be no inconvenience in the movements which you have made, as the 1st and Light divisions will be as near their positions on the ground pointed out in my memorandum of the 16th, almost as they would be where they were before, and equally near their provisions, which must come from Celorico.

P.S. Nothing new here. The heavy dragoons cut up some of the enemy on the 25th.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocke.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

Orders will go by this occasion for the 11th light dragoons to march to this place, as soon as they shall be disembarked and prepared to move. I am excessively anxious that this regiment should reach the army in good order; and I particularly request you to point out to the Commanding officer how much the condition of his horses will depend upon the attention paid to them by the officers and men on their first arrival, and on the care with which they are at first moved.

Great attention should likewise be paid to the mode of feeding and watering the horses, as pointed out repeatedly in General Orders; and I recommend that inquiry should be made from the officers of dragoons, and veterinary surgeons at Lisbon, regarding the mode of treating the prevailing disorder among the horses in this country, in case those of the 11th should be attacked with it on the march. Great attention should likewise be paid to the backs of the horses; they will otherwise suffer very materially.

To the Commissary General.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

I gave directions some time ago that the Engineer should construct certain jetties at Fort S. Julian for the convenience of embarking and disembarking stores there, and he was to be assisted by means from the arsenal by Col. Fava, of the Portuguese engineers, for this service. I request you to pay Col. Fava, from time to time, for such articles as he may supply, upon certificates, signed by the British Engineer, of the receipt of the articles supplied, and charged for by Col. Fava.

To Dep. Commissary Gen. —.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th; and I beg that you will put in writing such complaints as you may have to make of Mr. Kennedy, and I shall decide what I will do with them.

It is proper that I should inform you that the report of you, which I made to Col. Gordon, was not founded on any complaint received of you from Mr. Kennedy. I made that report because the service had suffered, and is now suffering, the greatest inconvenience, owing to delays in that part of the department of which you were the head; and from which post I ordered that you might be removed, from a thorough conviction, which has since proved to be well founded, that the service would be still further embarrassed if you continued to conduct it. As I made no reflection upon your character, excepting it can be called a reflection to report that you were not able to conduct a very complicated branch of business, to which you were entirely unaccustomed, I don't think that any necessity existed for informing you that you were removed at my suggestion; but as you have been so informed, I have no objection to state to you that I had no wish to do you an injury, and that I have no doubt that you are perfectly competent to conduct those branches of the commissariat to which you have been accustomed, in those scenes in which you have hitherto served.

His Majesty's government, and the British public, will not hear excuses for failures in this country; and it is my business to take care, where there is any failure in any department, not to employ again the person who is the cause of it; and in instances in which the officer who fails is of high rank and standing in respect to others, as you are, there is no remedy excepting to remove him from this country to one with the service of which he may be better acquainted, and in which failure may be less critical than it is in this.

P.S. I have to mention that I have received no letter from you excepting that of the 25th inst.

The A.G. to the Officer commanding 45th regt.

27th May, 1811.

As I understand from a communication that you had with an officer of my department, that the officers of the 45th regt. were desirous of no further steps being taken against Mr. Burke, late of that corps, and as this gentleman appears to be superseded by the *Gazette*, I have represented the circumstances to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces. He has been pleased to direct, in compliance with your wishes, that Mr. Burke may proceed to England, or elsewhere, on his own avocations, he being no longer in the situation of an officer belonging to this army.

The A.G. to Capt. Tucker, Belem.

27th May, 1811.

I have had the honor to lay your letter and request to be removed from your command before the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency regrets that at the present moment, and under the actual circumstances of the army, he cannot accede to your wishes, but will consider them on the first favorable opportunity that shall occur.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 28th May, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 26th; from which I learn that you had moved back the troops which you had moved to Penamacor, with the exception of those I had ordered to move. You will have seen from my letter of yesterday that I considered them, under all circumstances, equally well placed at Penamacor as at their original stations. However, I don't consider it certain that Marmont's troops have moved from the Termes, as reported by Don Julian on the 24th, notwithstanding the respect

I have for Don Julian. I have this day ordered some dragoons to move to Caria, where they will be in rear of your right instead of the rear of your left, equally well foraged, and some marches nearer me.

It appears that the French are tolerably well informed at Ciudad Rodrigo. However, we cannot help that. I hope that my letter, which they expected, will help to deceive them.

Ashworth's brigade were to have marched with Howard's brigade, and the Commissary of the latter was to have fed them. I don't know how this is arranged now, but I will speak to the Commissary Gen. on the subject.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocke.

Elvas, 28th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 26th; and I beg that you will tell Col. Fisher that it is very desirable that every horse or mule at Lisbon, at all capable of rendering any service, should be sent to Abrantes; and therefore that I desire that such of the old, worn out, and convalescents which he mentions, as may be capable of performing service of only a few days, may be sent to Abrantes, according to my former directions.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Elvas, 28th May, 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 26th inst., I have to inform you that the Sec. of State has not informed me which of the services for the horse transports, detailed in my letter of the 22d inst., ought to have the priority; but as you mention that several horse transports have been sent to Plymouth, and as there will be at Cork for embarkation what we must require, viz., horses for the artillery and the cavalry, I conceive that it will be desirable that the number stated should be sent in the first instance to Cork.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 26th. I have no objection to your withdrawing all the British and German artillery from the works in front of Lisbon, the officer in command of them taking care to give notice to the Engineers severally in charge of the works of his department, in order that they may take measures to have the works occupied, and the ordnance and ammunition guarded by the Ordenanza.

To Major Gen. Howorth.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th inst., enclosing returns of the ordnance and ammunition found in Almeida; and I am very much obliged to you, and very sensible of the pains taken by Col. Robe, Major May, and the officers and soldiers of the artillery, to perform this service.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 27th; and having conversed, on the subject to which it relates, with the Commissary Gen., he says that he has given no authority whatever to any officer of the Commissariat to make such a purchase as it has been reported to you an officer of the Commissariat is making of a vessel in the Tagus: I therefore trust that you have been misinformed.

I am much obliged to you for the account of the arrival of the 11th light dragoons.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811, 9 A.M.

I have received your letter of the 27th, in the afternoon; and I am obliged to you for the intelligence from Capt. Grant, which confirms the notion which I had, that the enemy had not made any serious movement this way, excepting the battalions of the 9th corps.

In respect to Almeida, the Portuguese government propose to repair the place entirely eventually, and in the mean time to occupy it as a post; in order to do this, it will be necessary to remove the rubbish from the ditch, and the Portuguese government are sending men and tools to perform this work, and Beresford has ordered militia to occupy the place. Although Mr. French was employed to survey and report upon the existing state of the place, and Col. Fletcher gave him an opinion, which it was intended he should convey to the Portuguese engineers, regarding the mode of rendering it a post for the present, I was desirous of avoiding that any of the British engineers, or any of the regular troops of the army, should be employed either in setting it to rights, or in occupying it, excepting the latter only, till the militia garrison should arrive; and for this reason I never troubled you upon the subject, intending to write to you about it when all should be prepared by the Portuguese authorities, as well for setting it to rights as for occupying it. My reason for this was, that knowing that it might be necessary to abandon Almeida before it could be put to rights, either to prosecute our views in this quarter, or that you might collect your troops as stated in my memorandum of the 15th inst., I did not wish to be embarrassed by having regular troops to take care of Almeida; or, on the other hand, to incur the disgrace of abandoning an object which I had manifested an intention of occupying. I think, therefore, it will be best to leave matters as they are at Almeida, keeping Pack's brigade there, and thereabouts, till the militia shall arrive to take their post; unless you should find it necessary to collect your force and withdraw, as pointed out in the memorandum of the 15th inst.

You may depend upon it that, although I may not have leisure to give instructions upon more points than it is necessary you should attend to, my mind has been made up, and a plan formed, upon every point that can occur; and, generally speaking, it is desirable that, until you shall hear from me, you should not make any alterations in the general situation of affairs, not adverted to in my memorandum of the 15th inst.

P.S. There is nothing new here.

Memorandum for Capt. Gens. Castaños and Blake, the Q. M. Gen., and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

All the preparations being made, it is intended to break ground before Badajoz to-morrow, on both sides of the river Guadiana; and it is desirable that, as long as the enemy shall remain at and in the neighbourhood of Llerena, the following disposition should be made of the allied armies:

The infantry and artillery of the allied British and Portuguese army (with the exception of that part of both employed at the siege) to be at Almendralejo and in that neighbourhood; and the allied British and Portuguese cavalry at Ribera, together with the cavalry of the 5th Spanish army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, observing the roads leading from Llerena by Usagre. It is proposed, that the infantry and artillery of the 5th Spanish army, and the infantry and artillery of the corps immediately under his Excellency Gen. Blake, should be cantoned in the villages extending from Sta Marta towards Barcarrota on their right, and communicating on their left with the allied British and Portuguese infantry at Solana. The advanced guard should not be farther on than Zafra, with Gen. Blake's cavalry at Bienvenida and Calzadilla, observing the roads towards Monasterio and Llerena, and communicating on the left with the cavalry of the 5th army and the allied British and Portuguese cavalry.

In case the enemy should advance again in force, it will be desirable again to collect the whole force of the allies about Albuera; and, according to this proposed distribution, the whole of the infantry will be within one easy march of that place, excepting the infantry which his Excellency Gen. Blake may think proper to place at Zafra, which can easily join him by Feria, &c., and the whole of the cavalry within one forced, or two easy marches.

It is very desirable that the General officers commanding the several corps of troops in advance should endeavor to ascertain the enemy's force about Llerena; acquiring, if possible, a knowledge of the number of the several regiments of which it is composed, and of the several squadrons and battalions in each, and of the names of the General officers commanding. If the enemy should withdraw from Llerena, it will be in the power of the allied troops, not employed in the siege of Badajoz, to canton themselves more with a view to their convenience than they can under existing circumstances; keeping, however, the great body of the infantry within two, and the advanced guards of the infantry and the cavalry within three marches of the ground at Albuera. In this case it is proposed that the Conde de Penne Villemur's cavalry should occupy Llerena, and observe the enemy in that quarter; the infantry of the advanced guard of his Excellency Gen. Blake's corps at Monasterio, with his Excellency Gen. Blake's cavalry observing the road through the mountains, and his advanced guard communicating with the Conde de Penne Villemur.

As the object of all the operations of the allied armies is the siege of Badajoz, it is desirable that nothing should be undertaken which can divert the attention of any from that object; and that, if necessary, the whole should collect in a position in which the armies have already acquired the greatest glory, by which the operation can be covered, if it should be possible to continue it; or the siege can be raised, if it should be necessary to raise it.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 9th inst., and of the 24th and 25th (Nos. 7 and 8).

You will see by my letter to Mr. Wellesley of this date, that I have

persevered in the siege of Badajoz, of which town I hope to be able to obtain possession, before the enemy can be in force to relieve it. I acknowledge that I have very little faith in distant diversions, and am very much of opinion, that if it is an object with Soult to collect another army to make a second attempt to relieve Badajoz, he will not be prevented by any diversion that may be made. If, however, he should be wavering in his opinion upon the subject, and should be inclined to wait for the arrival of the battalions of the 9th corps, which I know are on their march from Castille, the appearance of our troops on the coast might have the effect of inducing him to delay his movement till their arrival, before which time I hope that the fate of Badajoz must be decided. Under these circumstances, I am anxious that you should adopt any one of the modes which you propose which you may think will have most effect, and will expose your own force the least, to alarm the enemy for his situation before Cadiz or for the security of Seville.

My opinion is, that the allied armies are not now sufficiently strong, particularly in cavalry, to attempt the relief of Cadiz; and they cannot be made so for some time, and not at all with any safety to our communication with Lisbon, until we shall have more effectually secured the frontier of Old Castille. I mention this to you at present, in order that you may not turn your attention to San Lucar, in preference to any other point at which you might think your appearance would create an earlier or a more general alarm. I assure you that there is nothing I am more anxious for than to have your personal assistance.

I understand that the French have but few prisoners of ours in their hands, nearly all the missing having joined their regiments; and I think you will do well to send to England the prisoners you mention.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 25th inst., containing Lord Wellesley's dispatch of the 18th April, with postscript, directing you to require that the command of the Spanish troops in this and in other provinces of Spain should be given to me; upon which you desire to have my opinion. I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish government will not comply with this requisition; and from all that I see and hear, I am convinced that the demand will tend to interrupt much of the harmony and good will which exist among us at present.

To tell you the truth, also, I think that the plan does not go far enough. It is impossible to expect to discipline troops without paying them; British officers, of all others, could not effect that object, nor indeed could they be expected to serve with the Spanish troops without pay or reward of any description. I think, therefore, that the plan, even if consented to, would not give discipline to the Spaniards, would indispose towards us all the principal officers of the army, and of course their adherents and followers in the several armies; and we should probably not have so much effective control over their operations, or so much assistance as we may expect under the existing arrangement; but it is probable that the demand would not be acceded to by the government, and therefore, on every ground, it is my opinion that it ought not to be made.

You will have seen, by my letter and dispatch of the 23d inst., the real state of the fact regarding the Spanish troops in the action. There is no doubt that they fought bravely; but they want the power of movement, which they can acquire only by the instruction of the officers, from the heads of the army to those of the lowest rank.

We break ground at Badajoz to-morrow, and we hope to get the place in a few days. If we don't succeed in a few days, we shall not succeed at all, as the 17 or 19 battalions, and some cavalry of the 9th corps, are on their march to join Soult, and I think will join him the second week in June. I shall be much obliged to you if you will not allow people at Cadiz to run away with the notion that, when we shall get possession of Badajoz, we shall relieve Cadiz. We cannot attempt that operation without having our whole army, and we cannot bring our army without being more secure on the side of Castille. However, if we can hold our superiority throughout the summer, I think that we may make the attempt.

I received your letter of the 9th; and I now enclose that of Lord Liverpool, to which my dispatch of the 23d April referred.

P.S. Tell Graham that I shall send Capt. Walpole back to him.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart. Between Elvas and Badajoz, 30th May, 1811, 6½ P.M.

I have received your letter, 3 P.M., of the 28th, and Lord FitzRoy Somerset has shown me that of noon yesterday. Col. Murray will have written to Sir W. Erskine instructions on the subject to which yours relate.

We are not in Estremadura to save the country from the plunder of the French, but to obtain possession of Badajoz: the attention of all must be directed to this object; and I have no intention to engage in any affair of any description, in any situation more advanced than Albuera, to save this siege. At the same time, I don't mean that the allied troops should give up any ground which it is not necessary they should give up, owing to the superiority of the enemy's force, and that they should retire gradually upon Albuera, obtaining, as far as it may be in their power, a knowledge of the enemy's force in their front.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 30th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch, No. 25, of the 16th inst.

Your Lordship will have observed, from the dispatches of His Majesty's minister at Lisbon to the Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, that Mr. Stuart did not consider himself authorised (nor did I) even to announce to the Portuguese government the recent increase of the subsidy, till he should have prevailed upon them to introduce such reforms in the several civil departments of the Portuguese army, as should insure to the army and to the cause all the benefits of the increase of aid, which H. R. H. the Prince Regent had been authorised by the vote of Parliament, and had it in contemplation to afford to them. And your Lordship will have observed with concern, from the same correspondence, not only that the local government of Portugal have declined to make the reforms which have been recommended to them in detail by Marshal Sir W. Beresford and me,

but that they declare they are not authorised by the Prince Regent of Portugal to make them.

I have already taken occasion to apprise your Lordship that the great evil in Portugal is a want of money. The local government have no money to pay their servants, or those employed by them in any department, and they possess no influence over them; and the occurrences of the last few years have excited such a desire in the leading men in the government to acquire popularity by all means, that it is impossible to persuade them to exert the authority which the laws or their own regulations give them, in any instance of neglect, disobedience, or delinquency, by any public servant.

Owing to the difficulties in obtaining specie for the payment of the expenses in the Peninsula, even of the British army, the increase of the subsidy (if the King's minister considered himself authorised to announce it) would not increase the pecuniary means of the Portuguese government. The advances would be made, in kind, of articles for which, I think, there is reason to believe that the local government in Portugal have not paid hitherto, the troops having seized many articles for their subsistence and equipment in a very irregular manner, for which no payment has ever been made by the government. The distressed state of the country, in the existing seat of the war, will no longer afford supplies in this irregular manner; and I imagine that the advances, in kind, on account of the new subsidy, will only make up for those supplies heretofore irregularly plundered from the country.

Indeed this fact is strongly proved by the existing distress of the Portuguese government. More than half of the active Portuguese army are now fed by the British commissariat; but notwithstanding this arrangement, which it would be supposed would relieve all the pecuniary difficulties of the Portuguese government, they appear to have increased; and their demands for money are more urgent than previous to this arrangement, which was attended by a bargain that the expense of these provisions should be stopped out of the subsidy; and I know that the payments to the army, and to all the departments, are now in arrear to an unexampled degree.

Even if the King's minister considered himself authorised to increase the subsidy, I doubt whether I could with propriety authorise the issue of increased money payments by the Commissary Gen. to the King's minister; and therefore it has always appeared to me that the only chance the Portuguese government had of being extricated from their pecuniary difficulties was to increase their own pecuniary resources to the utmost extent, as well by opening new sources of revenue as by the improvement of the old, and by the general reform of the numerous abuses which prevailed in all the departments of the government, particularly in the collection of the revenue.

The unfortunate desire to acquire and retain a low and vulgar popularity, and to please and flatter the lower orders, which has characterised almost every man who has appeared in a conspicuous situation throughout the recent events in Spain and Portugal, prevented the adoption of any of these measures till very lately; and I believe that some inefficient mea-

asures have been adopted upon these subjects, which, if they should ever produce any, can produce no effect for some months; and in the mean time the pecuniary distresses of the government are increasing daily, are undermining their strength and authority, and will end by overwhelming every thing.

From this detail your Lordship will observe that there is no permanent remedy for these evils, excepting a change of system by the local government; and no temporary remedy, excepting the advance to them of a large sum of money in specie to relieve their immediate distresses.

Your Lordship will have been apprised, by my dispatch of the 8th inst., of the measures which I had adopted to assist and relieve the Portuguese commissariat, and of the measures which I had recommended to the government for the reform of all the civil departments of the army; with which recommendations, as I have above stated, the government have not complied. I don't think I should improve the concern by placing at the head of it English Commissaries. In truth, the great difficulty consists in want of money, and want of authority to enforce obedience to regulations; and I fear that there is no English Commissary who could find a remedy for these difficulties.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, near Elvas, 30th May, 1811.

We invested Badajoz on the 25th inst., on the right of the Guadiana; and the ordnance and stores for the siege having been brought forward, we broke ground last night.

The enemy have retired their main body upon Llerena, and hold the advanced posts of their cavalry at Usagre.

I enclose the copy of the report of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley, of a very gallant affair of the cavalry near that place on the 25th.* The

* Major Gen. Hon. W. Lumley to Marshal Beresford, Camp near Usagre, 26th May, 1811.

As will have been stated to you yesterday verbally by the officer I sent for that purpose, I have the honor to acquaint you, that having, as I before reported, driven the enemy's rear guard from Usagre, I occupied that post on the night of the 24th, by placing the Spanish troops in front of the town, with their tiradores well in advance towards the enemy, and the Portuguese and British cavalry, with the four 6 pounders, in rear of the place; a small brook, hollow and deep ravine, and narrow defile being on this side of the town. About 6 o'clock yesterday morning it was reported to me that the enemy's cavalry were advancing in force, and that there was reason to believe they were accompanied by artillery and infantry. Conceiving reports might exaggerate the fact, and not wishing to yield the post to inferior numbers, the 13th light dragoons and Col. Otway's Portuguese brigade of cavalry were ordered across the ravine to the left of the town, through the narrow fords and passes which had been previously reconnoitred, and Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry in like manner to the right, with orders to retire by the same passes if necessary, the heavy brigade of British with the guns being still in reserve behind the town.

Upon the nearer approach of the enemy it was evident they were advancing with the whole of their cavalry, and 5 or 6 heavy guns (8 pounders). This being ascertained, and upon opening their first gun, the line was ordered to retire, which they did slowly, in excellent order, and without loss; the Spanish troops filing on the main road, through the town, which had been left open for them. A smart cannonade now commenced from the opposite heights, the superiority of numbers and weight of metal decidedly in favor of the enemy; but the superior skill and well directed aim of Capt. Lefevre and his corps, with only four 6 pounders, was most pre-eminently conspicuous. The enemy now committed a most daring

Major General has reported that he received very great assistance upon this occasion from Major Holmes, of the 3d dragoon guards, who was acting in the department of the Adj. Gen., and from Lieut. Heathcote, who was acting in the department of the Q. M. G., as well as from the officers mentioned in his report.

As the object of the troops in Estremadura is to carry on the siege of

attempt, or rather an error, for which they were severely punished. In spite of 2 of our guns, which bore directly for a few paces on the road, 3 of their chosen regiments, 4th, 20th, and 26th, dashed through the town and formed rapidly on the flank of the 3d dragoon guards, which corps, concealed by a small hill, I verily believe they did not see, and in front of the 4th dragoons; themselves presenting 2 fronts. A charge of the 3d dragoon guards was at this moment ordered on the right, and a simultaneous movement of the 4th dragoons, directed most judiciously by Brig. Gen. Long at the same moment on the left, where I had requested him to remain, decided the point.

The enemy wavered before our cavalry reached them; but almost in the same instant they were overturned, and apparently annihilated. The affair took place so near the brook and bridge which immediately leads into the town, and which I had forbid the cavalry to enter, that it was impossible for them to pursue; it is difficult therefore to decide upon the enemy's loss; many severely wounded escaped through the town, others threw themselves off their horses, and escaped over the brook and through the gardens; but besides 78 prisoners, 29 lay dead on the spot, many were also observed lying dead on the bridge and in the first street; and a peasant reports that from 30 to 50 were sent off wounded to their rear on horses and cars.

I must not omit to state that a portion of the Conde de Penne Villemur's Spanish cavalry gallantly supported the charge on the left of the 3d dragoon guards, as I am informed Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade did on the right; but the dust caused by the charge was so great, I was myself unable to observe on that flank.

I am positively assured from the report of the prisoners that the enemy had 13 regiments of cavalry in the field, which, though not exceeding from 200 to 300 men each, gave them so great a superiority over the force under my orders, composed of 3 nations, many of them as yet but little known to each other in cavalry movements, that I feel fully justified in not placing a deep ravine and defile in my rear, and attempting to defend the town, which is only defensible by infantry, from an attack on the other side.

I have the peculiar satisfaction to add, that the advantage gained has been almost bloodless on our part, although occasionally, for a few seconds, of necessity exposed to the range of artillery and a charge made against a corps élité of the enemy, who, on the other hand, visibly suffered from our artillery, in addition to those lost in the charge.

I feel myself under the highest obligation to Brig. Gen. Long for his zealous, well timed, and active exertions during the day, as well as for his assistance at all times.

To Brig. Gen. Loy, commanding the Spanish cavalry (the Conde de Penne Villemur being sick at Villa Franca), and to Brig. Gen. Madden, commanding the Portuguese division, I am highly indebted for their readiness in obeying and promptitude in executing my orders; to the Hon. Col. De Grey, commanding the British brigade of heavy cavalry, and to Col. Otway, commanding the Portuguese brigade, both under the orders of Brig. Gen. Long; to Col. Lord E. Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons; to Col. Head, commanding the 13th light dragoons; to Major Weston, commanding the 3d dragoon guards (Sir G. Calcraft being sick at Villa Franca); and to Capt. Lefevre, of the Royal Horse Artillery, my very best thanks are due, as well as to every officer and soldier, for the promptitude and steadiness with which every, even retrograde, movement was performed in the face of a superior enemy.

The advantage gained will not only in some degree lessen the enemy's superior cavalry, but will, I trust, still further tend to render him fearful and timid in all his movements.

Badajoz with the utmost activity, and as I have every reason to believe that the reinforcements of the 9th corps will have arrived at Madrid by the 24th or 25th of this month, I have not thought it expedient to delay the operations of the siege, in order to drive Marshal Soult further back, having reason to hope that he will not attempt to interrupt them till he shall be reinforced, and that we may reduce the place to extremities before his reinforcements can arrive.

After the enemy's reinforcements shall arrive the proportions of force will alter, although I have ordered further reinforcements from the army on the frontiers of Castille. But at all events, if we should not be able to obtain possession of Badajoz in a short time, we shall not be able to obtain it at all, as it will not be advisable to expose the soldiers to the heat of the weather of Estremadura and to the labor of the siege in a more advanced season.

The enemy have made no movement in Castille since I addressed you last; but it is generally reported that the '*Armée de Portugal*' is about to move towards Avila and the Tagus. From the preparations which have been made, I have no doubt that some movement is in contemplation.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 25th inst. Your Lordship will have received from thence the reports of the fall of Figueras.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Quinta de Granichia, 1st June, 1811, 6½ p.m.

I have not been able to take a look at you for these 2 days; but I hear from Major Gordon that Col. Fletcher thinks he shall not be ready to open till the 3d, as there was some mistake in the arrival of the working parties from Gen. Hamilton's division last night.

I hope that the fire which the enemy will bring to-morrow upon the batteries which are constructing will not do them so much injury as to prevent their opening next day; but, independently of the probable increase of difficulty in the ultimate attack upon the place by the delay already occasioned, I think it not improbable that the batteries will receive much damage from the enemy's fire in the course of the next 24 hours. On this account I am most anxious that, if they can at all open to-morrow, they should; at all events, I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know the cause of the disappointment of the working parties from Gen. Hamilton's division last night, and if you will urge the General from me to take measures to prevent a similar disappointment in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granichia, 1st June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 30th, for which I am much obliged.

As soon as the persons ordered by the Portuguese government to work at the fort of Almeida shall arrive, the engineers you mention may begin to remove the rubbish in the ditch, and to dispose of it as directed in Col. Fletcher's letter to Mr. French; and Mr. French will make these gentlemen acquainted with the intention I had of making Almeida an infantry

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 1st June, 1811.

3. ———, —th regt., is to be released from his confinement, and the Commander of the Forces trusts, the disgrace which he has suffered, and risk which he incurred in his late intoxication, will prevent a repetition of that vice.

post, tenable against a *coup de main*. Two regiments of militia are ordered there for a garrison.

From all the reports which I have received, it appears to me likely that the '*Armée de Portugal*' will move by its left, and will bring its left upon the Tagus. As soon as you shall find that this movement is commenced, I beg you to break up from your present position, and march by your right. First bring your right to Penamacor, and your left in the cantonments about Sabugal, with your advanced guard either where it is now, if the enemy show nothing about Ciudad Rodrigo, or, if they do, further back to Nave d'Aver, or even Alfaiates.

If you should find that the movement of the enemy is decided, or if they should move any troops through the Puerto de Baños, or through the Puerto de Perales, you might continue your march, and bring the troops to Castello Branco and the neighbouring cantonments. The 5th division must remain in the cantonments on the Upper Coa, about Sabugal; and Gen. Pack must remain at Almeida and the neighbourhood, till the militia garrison shall arrive. One regiment of Barbacena's cavalry must remain with Pack, the other regiment with the 5th division. All the British cavalry might move by the road of Belmonte and Caria, if that should be convenient, and all the troops march by cantonments.

We have gone on prosperously hitherto with the siege of Badajoz, and without material loss. We shall open our fire, I hope, to-morrow, from 50 pieces of ordnance.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811.

I received yesterday your letter of the 29th; and I shall certainly recommend Lieut. Hopkins and Lieut. M'Culloch to the Commander in Chief for promotion, being thoroughly convinced of their merits.

I am well aware of Major Ridewood's merits, and I shall be happy to have an opportunity of recommending him; but it would not be doing justice to the remainder of the army, when I am allowed to recommend a limited number of officers for promotion, if I did not recommend some from all parts of it; but Major Ridewood is recommended, if other arrangements, which I had proposed, are made for the promotion of other officers, recommended in the list recently sent home.

I have long wished to carry into execution a plan of the description which you have suggested for the employment of Capt. Stewart, of whose merits I entertain a very high opinion; but this plan must be undertaken in concert with Gen. Castaños, if not with the Spanish government. I have spoken to the General upon it; but, notwithstanding his good inclination, I could not bring him to a decision; and I rather believe that he, and all the Spanish officers, have such decided objection to our interfering with their army in any manner, that they will not allow of the adoption of any plan, of which the result might be to prove the benefit which would be derived from our services.

You will have heard of our concerns here. I hope that we shall open our fire from 50 pieces of cannon on Badajoz to-morrow, and that it will not hold out long. Our loss in this siege has been very trifling hitherto.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811.

I agree with you respecting the supplies to the people of Portugal. What they want are cattle, carts, seed corn, and some materials for building. The first, unless sent from Ireland, will require money to purchase them. Money we cannot give, and therefore I did not at first mention cattle. Nails, and the rough materials for building, might be brought from England likewise, which would save money.

I approve highly of loans without interest, because they give a chance for the revival of industry, which is half the battle. In fact, however, the people of Portugal have not lost their money so much as the articles of primary necessity which I have above mentioned, viz., cattle, carts, seed corn, and materials for building, and implements of husbandry.

The country which I think least likely to recover, because farthest removed from water conveyance, or a district which has not been ruined, is the tract to the northward of the road from Thomar to Leiria, bounded on the north by the road from Condeixa to Ponte da Murcella. It is a barren country, having some fruitful valleys in it; but I fear the people in these valleys must starve. I believe that in the remainder of the country but little more is required to save the people than to open the markets, and to send their priests and medical people with medicines among them; and aid in the articles which I have above enumerated will entirely re-establish the country.

Upper Beira, with the exception of the country about Guarda and the Coa, has not suffered. Lower Beira was always a bad country, at least that part between Castello Branco and the Zezere. I have passed through that part between Castello Branco and the Upper Coa three times lately, and it has not materially suffered.

We are getting on well with the siege. Our loss hitherto has been most trifling; and I think we shall open our fire to-morrow.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 28th May; and I now enclose my dispatch to the Sec. of State of the 30th May.

We are going on very well with the siege. We shall open our fire, I think, to-morrow morning, and, up to this moment, our loss has been very small. Notwithstanding Gen. Castaños' good inclination, there is not a Spanish soldier at the siege; but the fact is, that these people have not the power of carrying into effect what they are most anxious for. If, however, we are obliged to raise the siege again, and have it in our power to undertake it again, the Spanish troops must come and work; for the season is becoming too hot for the constitution of our northern troops. I shall have 2 more brigades of infantry at Campo Maior to-morrow and next day.

Let me hear from you when you shall get intelligence of any moment from before Cadiz.

I think the title offered to Beresford is a strong proof of the disinclination of the Cortes and Spanish government to allow us to have any thing to say to their army. The honor which it would have been natural to confer upon him is the rank of Captain General, to which he has a better claim

than I had, as he commanded the Spanish as well as the other troops in the action, which I did not; but, instead of that, they make him a Marquis of Castille, a title which can be purchased by any body. He doubts about accepting it; but he will not refuse it, unless it should be really a degradation to accept.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter of the 10th May, which I have received from the Commander in Chief, announcing the arrival of 2 squadrons of the 12th dragoons at Lisbon, the horses belonging to which are to be transferred to the regiments of cavalry in this country, and the men are to proceed to Sicily.

As the casualties which have occurred in the service have materially altered the proportions of horses and men in the several regiments since the Commander in Chief gave the orders in the enclosed letter regarding the disposal of these horses, I consider it best to direct you to distribute these horses among all the regiments in Portugal, in proportion to their several wants, and to the means in their possession severally of supplying horse appointments for them, selecting for the heavy dragoons (if you should think proper to allot any to those regiments) the strongest horses: and, adverting to the supply of 80 horses for the 13th light dragoons, expected to arrive, I beg you to be prepared to have charge taken of these horses as soon as they shall land at Lisbon, in order that the officers and men of the 12th light dragoons may proceed on their voyage to Sicily.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the secretary of the Commander in Chief, directing that 3 squadrons, or 6 troops, of each of the 3d dragoon guards and 4th dragoons should be kept in this country, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers, and such men as there may be supernumerary to the 6 troops, should be

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 2d June, 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests to have by return of post, from the several regiments, addressed to the Adj. General, returns, stating what number of these men are mounted and dismounted, and the names of the several General and Staff officers to whom they are attached.

4. The G. O. upon this subject are perfectly well known, and it must be obvious that if they had been attended to, so many men could not have been taken from the ranks of the cavalry, and the Commander of the Forces requests the General and Staff officers of the army will send back to the regiments of cavalry the men they may have beyond the numbers allowed by the orders of the army, and Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton is requested hereafter to report immediately the detention of any soldier of the cavalry by any officer of the army.

5. It is not the intention of the Commander of the Forces to prevent the General and Staff officers of the army from having the assistance of dismounted bat men from the cavalry, if the General officer commanding the cavalry is of opinion that they can be spared from the service of their regiments, and the officers commanding regiments of cavalry are disposed to allow them this convenience, but they must be prepared to forego it, if the soldiers of the cavalry are wanted for any cavalry service whatever.

8. The Commander of the Forces requests the Commanding officers of regiments of cavalry to adopt every means in their power to keep and increase the effective strength of their regiments.

9. Mounted dragoons should not be allowed to attend baggage, or to lead camp kettle mules, when there are so many men dismounted in every regiment, and this practice is positively forbid.

sent home in the 7th and 8th troops, or 4th squadron. I beg you accordingly to give directions that the private men of these 2 regiments may be formed into 6 troops, each consisting of 5 serjeants, one trumpeter, and 82 R. and F.; and that the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, who may be above that number in this country, may be sent home in the 7th and 8th troops, or 4th squadron. The Commanding officers of regiments will select to be sent home the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, least fit for active service.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

I enclose a letter of the 10th May from Lieut. Col. Torrens, on the subject of the purchase of certain horses in England, for the use of the officers of the British cavalry in this country, which horses I expect will have arrived at Lisbon by this time. The prime cost of these horses having been £50, it is necessary that those who shall receive them should pay for them £60 each, in order to cover the expenses and losses by the public which may be incurred in their transport to Portugal. The money must be paid to the Commissary Gen., upon the receipt of the horses, by those to whom they will be allotted. It is desirable that every officer in the British cavalry should have at least one English horse, and these horses are to be distributed to the officers doing duty with the regiments, 3d dragoon guards, Royal dragoons, 4th dragoons, 1st hussars, K.G.L., 13th, 14th, and 16th light dragoons, generally of the lowest ranks, who are unprovided with English horses, provided they wish to have them at the price fixed upon them. I beg you to give directions that these horses may be taken charge of at the depôt at Belem as soon as they shall be landed, in order that the men of the 3d dragoons, who will come out in charge of them, may be sent back to England, and that you will give such directions as you may think proper for the disposal of them to the several regiments.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

You will see by my letter of yesterday, that I did not make a bad guess of the enemy's probable movement, as described in the letter from our friends of the 28th, enclosed in yours of the 31st.

I think it desirable that the military chest which is at Celorico should be moved to Guarda, in order to be in readiness to move upon Castello Branco, as well as the reserves of ammunition. I understand there is money to pay to the 24th May, and I think you will do well to order the estimates to that day to be discharged.

We did not open our fire this day, as was expected; but I understand we shall certainly to-morrow. There is nothing new.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a list of the names of certain medical officers of the French army — — —, prisoners on board the *Venus* frigate, who I request may be detained at Lisbon, in order to attend a number of wounded officers and soldiers of the French army, who will be sent down there.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 31st, and have communicated with Beresford as to the paragraphs in the Cadiz gazette, respecting the battle of Albuera. He and I agree that there is very little in these paragraphs deserving attention; that, at all events, it is desirable that nothing should be said or written on our parts to disturb the harmony now existing between us and the Spaniards; and that as Beresford's letter is not only published in Portuguese, but is gone to Cadiz, it is better to take no notice of any publication of this description.

Senhor Vasconcellos has not written to me, and I don't understand what Principal Sousa can gain from him. These people are a miserable race; and I am most angry with them that they should believe us to be at all like themselves. Principal Sousa and others are much mistaken if they suppose that Senhor Vasconcellos or any body else can carry them tales from head quarters, at all consistent with truth, which they can in any way turn to my disadvantage.

We have not been able to open our fire this day, as I expected; but I hope we shall to-morrow.

To Major Gen. Pieton.

Quinta de Granicha, 3d June, 1811, 1 P.M.

From the manner in which we are going on, I think it not impossible but that we may have a breach in the castle wall this evening, and if that should be the case, I beg you to put a date to the enclosed summons, and send it into the town; if there should be no breach this day, the summons may be delayed till morning. If the gentleman should be disposed to capitulate, you may allow him to march out with honors of war; the garrison to lay down their arms on the glacis, and be prisoners of war; the gates to be given over to us to-morrow morning at 5 o'clock.

You must refuse to allow him to make terms for the inhabitants or Spanish subjects, saying that we have no right to interfere in Spanish concerns. The officers of the garrison may keep their *bonâ fide* property, and the men their knapsacks; but every thing taken from the inhabitants of the town, and the remains of all requisitions made upon them, must be restored to the inhabitants. All plans, returns of stores, &c., and papers belonging to the place must be given up. If the Commandant should refuse to give up the place upon this summons, the officer who goes in may say that he will not be summoned again.

P.S. The terms above enumerated are of course not to be referred to unless the Governor should be disposed to capitulate, in which case you will go on with the capitulation on these terms, letting me hear from you, and I will come over immediately.

To the Officer of H. M. Navy in charge of the flat bottomed boats at Jurumenha.

Near Elvas, 3d June, 1811.

I have no doubt whatever that, in the present state of affairs, the army will not require the service of the flat bottomed boats, and of the materials which you have brought with them, on the Guadiana; but as the officers of the Portuguese service are very slow, I think it not improbable that we may require them at the passage of the Tagus at Villa Velha. I would,

therefore, request you to proceed with them by the route enclosed to that place, and to establish there, either a standing bridge, if the boats and materials should be sufficient, or 2 or 3 flying bridges, in aid of the flying bridge which is already established there. I conceive that it would be desirable to leave at Jurumenha a detachment of the seamen who are there, and that you should take with you the remainder; and I will direct the Commissary Gen. to take care that they shall receive provisions.

To Brig. Gen. Peacocks.

Quinta de Granicha, 3d June, 1811.

As I understood from your letter of the 31st May that certain horses of the artillery are arrived at Lisbon, I am desirous that the 2 guns belonging to the 9 pounder brigade with this part of the army should be sent to Elvas to join the brigade, with the equipment belonging to them; and that Capt. Le Fevre's troop of horse artillery should be completed by

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 3d June, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has been in the constant habit of allowing those soldiers who make any capture from the enemy, to receive the value of their capture; but he is concerned to have observed, and to have received reports from several of the General officers, that this indulgence has had the effect of inducing some of the soldiers to look for and secure captures, rather than to engage and destroy the enemy, and he is induced therefore to give the following orders.

2. The orders of the 19th May, 1809, Nos. 7 and 8, must be understood to be in full force, and all horses, &c. captured from the enemy, not purchased by the Commissary, must be sold by public auction, at head quarters, or such other place as the Commander of the Forces may select, as that in which it is most likely they will bring the largest price.

3. It is the intention of the Commander of the Forces to order that the value of any animal taken from the enemy, the contents of baggage, knapsacks, saddle-bags, &c. captured, shall be divided among those present at the capture, whoever may be the individual who may happen to make it.

4. Any men, or number of men, who shall secure or bring in a number of prisoners or captured horses, shall not be allowed to share in this benefit, unless he or they shall be ordered by the officer under whose immediate command he or they are serving, to secure the prisoners or horses captured.

5. Any man who leaves his ranks in order to secure prisoners or horses, or other articles captured, without orders from his Commanding officer, must be brought before a court martial on a charge of disobedience of orders when before the enemy.

6. These orders must be read to every regiment in the army at two different parades, and afterwards at the same periods with the Articles of War.

7. The Commander of the Forces has had occasion to notice in the G. O. of the 30th March, No. 2, the inconvenience that was felt from the great quantities of baggage in the transports; and having referred to the Commander in Chief upon this subject, the Commander of the Forces has been informed that the regiments which embarked at different times for Portugal had left regimental depôts of their heavy baggage behind them, where they certainly should have deposited all articles not required in the field.

8. Under these circumstances the quantities of heavy baggage which are now on board the transports in the Tagus ought not to be there; and the Commander in Chief has been pleased to give directions that the Storekeeper General at Portsmouth may receive them into his stores, from whence they can be sent to the regimental deposits.

9. The Commander of the Forces is not disposed to deprive any regiment, or any individual officer, of what may be necessary or convenient to them; but from all the accounts he has received, much of the baggage at Lisbon must be entirely useless to the regiments as well as to the officers, while, on the other hand, it is very inconvenient and expensive to keep it where it is.

10. The Commander of the Forces therefore requests the officers commanding regiments will give directions to the officers of their several regiments sent to Lisbon, under the G. O. of the 30th March, on the concerns of the baggage, to select that baggage, as well belonging to the regiment as to individual officers, which it will be convenient to them to retain in the country, and to apply to the A. Q. M. G. at Lisbon for tonnage to send the remainder to Portsmouth to the stores of the Storekeeper General.

11. Every package thus sent is to be marked 'Regimental baggage of — batt. — regt., to be lodged in the stores of the Storekeeper General.'

the addition of a gun and a howitzer wanting, of which I beg you to apprise Col. Fisher.

I am desirous that if only one of these arrangements can be adopted, the 9 pounders should be sent in preference to the gun and howitzer of the horse artillery.

To Dep. Commissary Gen. —.

Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st May, to which I have to reply, that I don't consider it to be consistent with justice to appoint a person to receive proofs of the foundation of your complaints against Mr. Kennedy, which complaints you have not stated in writing, and more especially in Mr. Kennedy's absence. I repeat, that when you shall make your complaints in writing, I will determine whether it is expedient to enter upon any inquiry into them. In respect to the complaints on the subject of the Spanish troops, I believe I was more to blame than Mr. Kennedy. I had ordered that when these troops should enter Spain they should no longer receive supplies from the British commissariat, as the reasons which had induced me to order that they should be supplied no longer existed. When the Spanish troops passed the frontier, however, Badajoz was invested, and the whole province of Estremadura occupied by the enemy; and although the condition of my order was strictly complied with, and the Spanish troops had passed the frontier, it was impossible that they could be subsisted, unless by means provided by the British commissariat: I therefore desired that the supplies should be continued to them. I cannot understand how that can be a crime against Mr. Kennedy; if any body was in fault it was myself.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811.

In respect to —, the rule is that, when an officer has entered the Portuguese service, he is not to be allowed to quit it when he chooses, and most particularly not when his wishes for promotion in the British service have been disappointed. I wish this to be understood by —, and all others serving with the Portuguese army; at the same time, if you wish that his resignation of his Portuguese commission should be accepted, I shall not object. I likewise beg to observe upon —'s letter, that according to the Commander in Chief's letter to me of 10th July, 1809, — has not lessened his claim for promotion in the British service, by having for a time quitted the Welsh Fusiliers; but that, on the contrary, I am authorised to say, that a British officer, by serving with the Portuguese army, strengthens his claim to promotion to any vacancy which may fall in the British regiment to which he may belong.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 8 P.M.

I have received your letter of 3 P.M., and I think it very desirable that you should mount the guns in the battery which you constructed last night and this day. The wall of the castle appears to me to be constructed of earth, and I can easily conceive that some time must elapse before a slope will be made in it by battering; but I recommend that we should persevere on the point on which we have begun, and to act on

the principle on which we have hitherto acted. The enemy have certainly made an intrenchment from their right of the houses in the castle to the rampart of the place, cutting off the rampart of the castle; and they appear, by a view I took this morning from near No. 4, to have one from the left of the batteries in the castle, to cover the approach to the east from the castle on their flank. We must be prepared therefore to establish ourselves in the castle in the first instance, if it should be necessary. If we should be able to get possession of San Cristoval, and to erect a powerful battery, having its right resting on that fort, I have no doubt that we should overpower every thing in the castle; otherwise we may not.

I have not been able to see this evening how we got on at San Cristoval. I shall go to-morrow morning early to Gen. Houstoun, and thence to the ground on this side of the Gevora, from whence the whole is seen; and if I should not see you, I will write you any observations I may have upon what is going on.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 4th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 2d. I will send a warrant for Capt. Grant's account. I believe the Staff Surgeon should settle his account with the Purveyor Gen.; but I will speak to Dr. Franck on that subject, and will have the sum settled.

We opened our fire yesterday, but have not yet breached either San Cristoval or the castle: we are, however, very superior to the enemy, and I think we shall breach both in the course of this day and night.

P.S. Drouet's delay is very satisfactory, and I hope is true.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst., and I hope immediately to have it in my power to send you authentic accounts of the demands of the commissariat on the Portuguese government. The accounts for the 20th regt. at Cadiz alone amount to 70,000 dollars. Besides the 100,000*l.* in paper, which I have ordered to be paid, I have since ordered 100,000 dollars in specie.

In respect to the papers and returns forwarded in your letter, I shall not even take the trouble of reading them, because I know they are fabricated for a particular purpose, and they cannot contain an answer to the strong fact stated by me, viz., that owing to neglect, deficiency of arrangement, and omission of the government to supply the means, the army and their equipments were starved during the winter, and that, when the moment of action came, the soldiers and animals were unable to perform the service; the former deserted or went to the hospital, and the latter died: and that the army in Beira does not produce in the ranks for action half its numbers. Mind, I don't refer to the army in Alentejo, which, from adventitious circumstances, has been better provided for. It is therefore no answer to that statement to send a gross return of the army, including not only the force in Beira, but all the troops in garrisons, including those at Cadiz, at Oporto, in Elvas, Abrantes, &c.

Since I wrote the letter upon which you have been ordered to make a representation, I have written one still stronger, to apprise the Sec. of State of the deficiencies resulting from these same neglects in the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, and of my opinion that if the whole system of the government were not altered, the increase of the enemy's force in the Peninsula might create a danger for this country, in which it might not be expedient that His Majesty's troops should participate.

This is my sincere opinion, which I could not with propriety any longer conceal from the Regent's government; and the ministers will determine what they shall do upon it. I have no objection to the Portuguese government being informed of its existence, in order that they may be prepared with their *documentos* in answer to it; but nothing but a change of system can induce me to change it, or to recommend to the King's government to support the contest one moment beyond that at which I shall see in the government, not only verbal professions, but a cordial desire and corresponding exertions to carry it on, and to save their own country. That has been my invariable sentiment, and upon that sentiment I shall evacuate the country as readily as I have defended it. The government are quite mistaken if they suppose that any selfish desire of acquiring character has, or ever will, actuate my conduct. I come here to perform my duty; and I neither do nor can enjoy any satisfaction in any thing, excepting the performance of my duty to my own country, of which a principal part is the communication of my opinions to the government of Great Britain.

At this moment Col. Ashworth's brigade, which I have ordered from Beira into Alentejo, in consequence of the battle of Albuera, are living upon the supplies of the British army. As usual, they were living from hand to mouth, generally starving, when the order to march arrived, and Sir B. Spencer was obliged to supply them with every thing to enable them to move! This is called maintaining an army for service!! One brigade cannot move from one province to another, because the government will not supply it with food!!!

I rather imagine that you have mistaken the nature of the paper I have sent you regarding the ammunition at Coimbra. There are no troops at Coimbra; but we were informed that there was ammunition at Coimbra for the Portuguese army in Beira, which, considering that the battle was fought on the frontier, was far enough, God knows! But the paper which I sent to you proved that the reserve ammunition for the army was not even at Coimbra; and if a serious battle had been fought the Portuguese troops would have had none.

These dignitaries of the church are always dreaming of battles; but I should like to know whether they ever dreamt that a soldier with a musket could not fight without ammunition, and that in 2 hours he can expend all he can carry.

In respect to these papers, such as they are, you must send them to the British government. They will decide whether they will depend upon them or upon my assertions and opinions. I only say that nothing shall induce me even to read, much less to give an answer to *documentos*, very ingeniously framed, certainly, but which don't contain one word bearing upon the point.

The A.G. to the A.A. Gs. of divisions. (Circular.)

4th June, 1811

The Commander of the Forces having observed with great regret the number of men returned absent on command, in the several regimental returns of the — division, of the 15th May last, I feel it my duty to call your particular attention to this subject; and while I subjoin an extract of the number of men from each return, as well as letters to the several commanding officers, calling upon them to explain particularly where the men 'on command' actually are, what duty they are upon, and by whom sent, I request you will collect all these answers on communication with the several commanding officers in the — division, and you will apprise them in future that you have directions most minutely to examine into every man's duty returned 'on command,' and they must specify the same in detail, in a return, as follows:

On Command.

Name of the man. | By whom sent. | When sent. | On what duty. | His probable absence.

This return, as an explanatory one of men 'on command,' may be sent separate with the usual returns. Every commanding officer, in every regiment, must know nearly the number of men allowed to his sick and convalescents in general hospital, and against these men's names this just ground of absence is allowed, and may be stated; and by strict inquiries I should think it could be always ascertained if men said to be 'on command' are actually on essential duties or otherwise, more especially when commanding officers are directed to state by whose orders the men have been detached, and on what service, which in future must invariably be the case.

In the states of the 15th ult. there are no less than 4020 R. and F. returned 'on command.' The most rigid inquiry has been therefore directed to be made by the Commander of the Forces.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

4th June, 1811.

In consequence of the numbers of men, of different regiments, which have been returned in the last general returns, of the 15th May, of the army, as being 'on command' at Lisbon, I have, by desire of the Commander of the Forces, to call your particular attention to the subject, transmitting to you at the same time an extract from the return of all men above alluded to, as far as the number of each regiment. I am not enabled at present to particularise them by name or companies.

You will be so good, on the receipt of this return, to cause a general muster of all the soldiers at Lisbon and Belem to be made, and ascertain exactly if the number stated to be 'on command' there at all corresponds with the regimental returns. You will be pleased likewise to ascertain what the several men are employed in, at Lisbon, beyond those authorised by G. O. for hospital purposes; and you will not fail immediately to send up to their several regiments all those non-commissioned officers or men who appear to be absent from their regiments, at Lisbon, without the most satisfactory grounds.

You will be pleased to report to me fully on this head, for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

4th June, 1811.

I have not failed to submit your application in favor of Lieut. Col. —, of the —, to the Commander of the Forces; and his Excellency requests you will acquaint that officer that there are many matters to be arranged, with respect to that regiment, which require his presence in Portugal. Lord Wellington is concerned to refuse a request made by an officer in Col. —'s situation; but his Excellency must adhere to his rules, and allow no officer to go, in the active state of the campaign, whose state of health does not absolutely require his absence.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

Having made Col. Harvey a Brigadier, I don't see how you can avoid making Col. M'Mahon one; but I don't know what all the officers of the British army will say to this. I am glad to find you are better. If you could come to the mill in front of my house at between 5 and 6 this

evening, Fletcher and Murray will be there to settle our future proceedings. The French are certainly intrenching the castle. Our breach is getting on at San Cristoval, and I think will be practicable to-morrow in the wall of the castle.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Hill, Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, and Captains Gen. Castaños and Blake. Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

It appears by an intercepted letter written on the 30th May by the Baron de St. Pol, the enemy's Commanding officer at Cordova, that the 9th corps were expected at that place, through La Mancha, on the 5th or 6th of this month; in which case they may be at Guadalcanal on the 8th or 9th, and at Llerena on the 10th or 11th. This information is consistent with what is stated in other intercepted letters, regarding the progress of the 9th corps in the neighbourhood of Madrid; but it is positively contradicted by information from Castille, stating that the 9th corps were still at Avila on the 29th May. It is not impossible that all these letters may have been written to fall into our hands, and mislead us; and that the last, in particular, may have been intended to mislead the commandant of the army of Murcia, who, it was said, was in the neighbourhood of Baylen about the 23d May: however, the intelligence should put us on our guard. The enemy will certainly move when joined by this reinforcement; and all the troops should be prepared to move at the earliest notice of that of the enemy, in order to join as proposed in a former memorandum. The commandants of the advanced guards of the several nations, and the persons employed to get intelligence, should endeavor to discover whether it is true that the 9th corps are in march as stated.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3d inst. regarding the fort of Cascaes. The occupation of Cascaes might become an object of importance in case the enemy should be able to send a fleet to sea; and although I am of opinion that it ought not to be occupied by us permanently, it might be desirable to have all the means prepared to move into it, and to occupy it at a short notice. Lieut. Col. Fisher should therefore examine the fort of Cascaes, and see what guns and stores would be required there for a temporary purpose of the kind above described, and to be prepared with his arrangements to move them in when it might be necessary. These guns and stores might be taken for this temporary purpose from Fort S. Julian.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

I am much obliged to you for having stopped the *Regulus* with the Guards, and I shall be obliged to you for any intelligence you may be able to give me hereafter, regarding the arrival of troops, &c.

The A.G. to Capt. Tucker, Belem.

5th June, 1811.

In reply to your application relative to Mr. ———, the Commander of the Forces directs, if that gentleman does not conduct himself in a becoming manner while he remains in the country, you are to put him into the provost guard, and convince him that no person whatever, volunteer or officer, can behave improperly with impunity in this country, so long as his Excellency commands in it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 4th. It is not very easy to tell which way the enemy are directing their march; but I think it probable by Ciudad Rodrigo and Perales, and others by Baños and Plasencia; the next march would probably decide the point: neither can I decide what is become of Drouet. Don Julian's Captain's report would leave him still at Avila on the 29th May; but I have other reports which state him at Madrid on the 24th; and one yesterday from Cordova, which states that Drouet was to be at Cordova on the 5th or 6th, which is consistent with the account of his progress to Madrid on the 24th: on the other hand, his being at Avila is confirmed by the letter from Alba de Tormes of the 1st June, or else it is obvious that the troops of the '*Armée de Portugal*' were to march in that direction, for you will observe that supplies from Congosto, &c., were moving to Piedrahita. Our breach in San Cristoval is not yet practicable, nor is that in the main wall.

P.S. It is as well to be prepared for every event; and therefore I wish to mention to you, in case the enemy should pass the Agueda with the whole '*Armée de Portugal*' and invade Lower Beira by the entry of Sabugal, and you should think it expedient to retire by the Estrada Nova, it will be necessary that you should send an officer to take up the flying bridge at Villa Velha, and to send down the river and destroy all the boats at that place. Your communication with me will then be by Abrantes, where there is a bridge. The country through which you would have to retire towards the Zezere is very strong, and it is not probable that the enemy would attempt in their existing force to oblige you to retire from it.

The great position of all has its right at Villa Velha, its centre at Sobreira Ferosa, and its left upon the continuation of the same ridge

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 6th June, 1811.

1. All the private men of the 2d batt. 48th regt. in Portugal or Spain are to be drafted into the 1st batt., and are to be distributed to companies in the 1st batt.

2. All men missing from the 2d batt. are to continue on the strength of the 2d batt.

3. The transfer is to be made as soon as it may be convenient; and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for their men up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt., to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order.

4. When this transfer shall be made, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batt. 48th regt. are to proceed to Elvas, where they will receive further orders.

5. The Commander of the Forces takes this opportunity of declaring his approbation and returning his thanks to the 2d batt. 48th regt. for their services on many important and memorable occasions, and he assures them that he adopts the measure now ordered only because it is necessary in order to re-establish both battalions, and he hopes soon to have the advantage of the assistance of the 2d batt. in increased strength.

8. The 3d regt. or Buís, 29th, 2d batt. 31st, 57th, and 2d batt. 66th, are for the present to be formed into a provisional battalion under the command of Lieut. Col. Colborne.

9. The non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to remain in their companies in their several regiments as at present; but for the purpose of the formation those present and fit for duty of each of these regiments are to be divided into two companies, and Lieut. Col. Colborne will be pleased to arrange what proportion of the field officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of each of the regiments, and the camp and other equipments, shall remain to do duty with the provisional battalion, and what proportion shall proceed to Elvas to collect and re-equip the men belonging to their several regiments at Elvas and Estremoz, and Lieut. Col. Colborne will give such directions as he may think necessary to have the men of these regiments re-equipped as soon as may be practicable.

10. The colors of these regiments to be sent to Elvas to be under the charge of the senior officer of each, who will be there.

on the Estrada Nova. The last very good one is upon the Codes, covering Abrantes, having the left of the corps upon the Zezere, below the junction of the Codes. In case you should find it necessary to quit the Codes, and withdraw across the Zezere at Punhete, it would be necessary to throw into Abrantes one brigade of Portuguese troops besides those now there, in order to secure that place. I merely throw out these memorandums in case of an occurrence by no means probable, to remind you of what it would be necessary to attend to. We have a large magazine at Abrantes, by which you will be subsisted, whether you move by the Estrada Nova or by Castello Branco.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

You should write a letter to Mr. Wellesley, in answer to the enclosed, expressing your satisfaction upon the receipt of the copy of Don E. de Bardaxi's note.

I enclose a letter from Rooke regarding the disposal of the horses you mention. I likewise enclose the orders given regarding the disposal of these horses: I cannot find this last letter, but Rooke's letter shows how they have been disposed of. I have a good deal of interesting information this morning, from which it would appear that Don Julian's man is right; but, on the other hand, Soult has certainly been reinforced with 3 battalions from Cadiz, and the '*Armée de Portugal*' has moved from the Tormes on the 3d, apparently for this quarter. This is clear, that either they are going towards Avila, or Drouet was there in the end of May.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

I enclose an account of circumstances which have occasioned a want of arms by the 16th light dragoons, in answer to your letter of the 25th March.

It is impossible to attach means of transport to regiments of cavalry and infantry serving in the Peninsula, to carry the arms and appointments of all the soldiers, or of their horses, which may become disabled in the course of the service, and with every exertion it is not always practicable to procure what are wanted.

The inhabitants of the country, and the soldiers of the Portuguese militia and Ordenanza, and all the Spanish troops, are constantly on the search for arms and military appointments; and, as soon as an article of any description cannot be carried by the man or horse to which it belongs, it is stolen by one or other of these descriptions of persons. This will account for the loss of arms and appointments in situations in which, in service in other countries, there would be none.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

I enclose the weekly states of the army of the 15th May.

I have ordered the private men of the 2d batt. 48th regt. to be drafted into the 1st batt. 48th regt.; but I have not carried into execution that measure in respect to the 7th regt., as I have been informed, by the officers of that regiment, that 500 men of the militia have volunteered to serve in it, under the Act recently passed; and, as both battalions will

probably have more than 500 men each remaining, I considered it better for the service, that the 500 volunteers should be divided between the 2 battalions (each of which they could make of sufficient strength) and joined with the old soldiers, than that they should form the only strength of one battalion. I have therefore delayed this measure till I shall receive your Lordship's orders.

I have formed the men present and fit for duty, of the 3d, 29th, 31st, 57th, and 66th, into a provisional battalion for the present, until I shall see what number of the wounded of these regiments will recover so as to be fit for service. But, from all I hear, I have little doubt that the Buffs, the 29th, and 57th, will again be very efficient.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

We have continued the operations of the siege of Badajoz with the utmost activity since I addressed your Lordship on the 30th ult., and our fire commenced on the morning of the 2d inst. from 4 batteries on the right of the Guadiana, directed against the outwork of San Cristoval, and on the enemy's batteries in the castle constructed to support that outwork; and from 8 batteries on the left of the Guadiana, directed against the eastern face of the castle. The fire from these batteries has continued ever since, and a breach has been made in the outwork of San Cristoval, which, however, is not yet practicable for assault; and considerable progress has been made in effecting a breach in the eastern front of the castle. Notwithstanding that these works have been carried on with great rapidity, I am happy to say that they are in themselves so complete, and the communication from one to the other so well assured, that our loss hitherto, throughout the siege, has been very small. I am sorry to say that Lieut. Hawker, of the Royal artillery, an officer who has distinguished himself in these operations, was killed this morning.

The enemy have hitherto made no movement to disturb our operations; but I understand that 3 battalions were moved from the blockade of Cadiz in the last days of May, and I have received a report that the battalions of the 9th corps, destined to reinforce the army of the south, were to arrive at Cordova on the 5th or the 6th of this month.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' likewise broke up from the Tormes on the 3d inst., and their first march was in the direction of the passages of the Tagus. I am apprehensive, therefore, that we may again be obliged to raise the siege.

I have received a letter from Mr. Wellesley of the 1st inst., from which I learn that Gen. Suchet had invested Tarragona.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

It is very desirable that arrangements should be made to send to the Tagus at an early period 4000 barrels of gunpowder; that is to say, 2000 barrels immediately, and 2000 barrels in a short time hence.

We have consumed powder belonging to Elvas at the siege of Badajoz, which I have ordered to be replaced by 2000 barrels of powder from our stores at Lisbon, upon which stores there may soon be other calls of magnitude; and it will be desirable to have the deficiency made good.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

You will see from my dispatches of this day how we stand. We have a chance, and in my opinion, not a bad one, of obtaining possession of Badajoz before the enemy can relieve the place; or we must raise the siege before the 10th, from all that I see of the enemy's movements. According to an intercepted letter, they have provisions, I should think, to the 18th or 20th; so that if we could be assured that we could keep the blockade, we should have the place. I must therefore determine what I shall do when I shall raise the siege according to the means I shall have of maintaining the blockade. If I can't prevent them from receiving provisions, it is not worth while to risk an action; for we have not the means, nor would it be fair towards the soldiers, to make them endure the labors of another siege at this advanced season.

Notwithstanding that we have carried on our operations with such celerity, we have had great difficulties to contend with, and have been much delayed by the use of the old ordnance and equipments of Elvas, and of the Portuguese artillery, in this siege; some of the guns from which we fire are above 150 years old. The enemy appear to be intrenching that part of the castle which we have breached; but I have strong hopes that they will not be able to keep us out of the place.

The A.G. to Dr. Franch, Inspector of hospitals.

6th June, 1811.

I have had the honor to lay before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 5th inst., and his Excellency has directed me to acquaint you in reply, that every Captain of a troop or company is obliged to defray the expense of burying the soldiers belonging to it. In reference to the expense thus incurred, it appears to have been too great, which has caused the difficulty in recovering the sums laid out by the Purveyor on this account.

His Excellency requests that you will have an estimate made of a reasonable expense to which the burial of every soldier should amount, and you will be pleased to transmit the same to me, for the approval of the Commander of the Forces, and in order that it should be inserted in the G. O. of the army, and the point finally adjusted.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 7th June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 5th, for which I am much obliged to you. We made an attempt upon San Cristoval last night, which however failed, as the breach was not so practicable as it ought to have been. We don't get on with the breach in the body of the place, and I am much afraid that after all our ammunition will fail.

To Major Gen. Walker.

Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

This letter will be delivered to you by Gen. Abadia, who is appointed to command in Galicia; and I have every reason to believe that you will find him disposed to make the most of the means which will be at his disposal in that province; and I shall be obliged to you if you will afford him such assistance as may have been placed at your disposal, or as you can procure from the British government.

I have had a long conversation with Gen. Abadia on the state of affairs in Galicia, and on the course which it may be expedient that his operations should take. My opinion is, that until he shall have a good body of cavalry and artillery, and his infantry well disciplined, he should not

venture into the plains of Leon. The most desirable object for him to look to would be to make the siege of Astorga; and till he can effect that he should be satisfied, first with securing the defence of Galicia, and next with working the French out of the Asturias and La Montaña. I have turned his attention to the post of Santoña, on which subject he will communicate with you.

Gen. Mendizabal has been appointed to command in Biscay, and his views will be turned to the same object, in concert with Gen. Abadia. Gen. Mendizabal should act upon the French by land, while Gen. Abadia's expedition would proceed there by sea, and between the two the French may be got out of that interesting post: they must co-operate afterwards with such naval means as we may give them, in keeping possession of this post; for it is very obvious to me, that if even Santoña can be retained as a military station, it will be useless as a naval station unless the surrounding country is friendly to the possessor. Gen. Abadia will let you know how affairs are circumstanced here.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

I beg that you will give directions to Col. Fisher to forward to Elvas, as soon as convenient, from the stores in his charge, 2000 stands of arms complete, and 2000 sets of accoutrements, including 425 sets of buff accoutrements.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

Gen. Abadia, who is appointed to command the troops in Galicia, and who will have the honor of presenting this letter to you, is desirous of proceeding to his command by sea; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to send him in a man of war. I understand that he wishes to be landed at Vigo, which may likewise be more convenient to you.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 5th, and I have no objection to your making any use you please of my letter to you of the 1st, respecting the supplies for the people of Portugal. Badajoz may fall; but the business will be very near run on both sides. We are going on better with the breaches this day; but I have never seen walls bear so much battering, nor ordnance nor artillery so bad as those belonging to Elvas. Soult must be joined by the 9th corps within 2 or 3 days. Vasconcellos might as well sail therefore; for I think it just as likely that he will take bad as that he will take good news.

P.S. I see that Marmont has crossed the Agueda in some strength, and Sir Brent has retired towards the Coa.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 1st, and I am happy to find that you agree in opinion with me, regarding the propositions to the Spanish government, in respect to the improvement of the discipline of their army. To be of any service, the measure must originate in a proposition

from themselves, which I am convinced they will not make till they are reduced to extremities, any more than they would have proposed to receive us at Cadiz, if they had not been much alarmed for their safety.

I enclose a copy of my last dispatch. I don't know what to say to Badajoz. I think Soult will be joined by the 9th corps to-morrow or next day, and we have not yet a practicable breach, either in San Cristoval or the body of the place; both are, however, going on tolerably well this day.

P.S. Marmont has moved a good large force upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and Sir B. Spencer has fallen back towards the Coa. I am not quite certain that the force has advanced; or that it is not his advanced guard to cover the main body of his army through Baños and Perales.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 6th, 10 P.M. I think it probable, from Capt. Brotherton's report, which you enclosed, that the greatest part of the enemy's army are in march on the Puertos de Baños and Perales; and that a strong advanced guard has been thrown across the Agueda in order to keep you in check, and to prevent you from disturbing this march. The advanced guard will move probably by Navas Frias, &c. I only hope that Pack will not have been disturbed at Almeida. We are going on better this day, and have made progress towards practicable breaches in San Cristoval and the castle.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 9th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and I think there is scarcely a doubt that the enemy are coming to the Tagus; they could not go through the Puerto de Perales till they obliged you to withdraw from the sources of the Azava, and every thing which goes through Perales must pass by or close to Ciudad Rodrigo. Regnier's corps was at Fuente Roble on the 5th, and it appears was to halt thereabouts the 6th; that is the road to the Puerto de Baños. We shall attempt San Cristoval this night: the enemy cleared the rubbish from the main breach last night; but we are getting on with it this day again.

P.S. From the number of rations demanded near Fuente Roble, I think it probable that Regnier has with him only one division.

5 P.M. Since writing the above, I have seen a letter of the 7th from Plasencia, from which it appears that Gen. Regnier was near the Puerto de Baños on the 6th, and had required rations for 30,000 men at Baños, for the 7th or 8th; but from the mode of expression in the letter, I cannot tell which.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 10th June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 8th. I am much concerned that Gen. Pack has destroyed the works of Almeida. I shall be much obliged to you if you will send me a copy of the orders which were sent to him by Col. De Lancey.

I have no doubt that the French are crossing the Tagus; and Murray sends orders for your troops to do the same. We failed last night in the

attack of San Cristoval; and, as I find the enemy are about to advance again, I have ordered the siege of Badajoz to be raised this night. It will be completed to-morrow night.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 10th June, 1811.

Since I saw you I have heard that Drouet did not arrive at Cordova till the 8th, which is not improbable; but they state his force, some to be 12,000, others 8000 men, having been joined by different detachments, probably Sebastiani's, on the road. From the reports in circulation of another invasion of Portugal, and from the immense magazines of provisions which both Soult and Marmont have collected, and particularly cattle, I am inclined to suspect that they are for a dart into Portugal, probably to endeavor to seize our works at Almada.

It would be very desirable to order under arms immediately the Lisbon, Setuval, and Alcacer do Sal militia, and to have a garrison in Setuval and Palmella. These, with the troops, marines, convalescents, &c., which we have at Lisbon, would hold the works at Almada till I could get a division down, which indeed I ought to do by water if they were to make a dart that way. I am certain there is something more in the wind than the desire to force us out of Estremadura, and it is either this plan or the siege of Elvas.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de Granicha, 10th June, 1811.

We made another attempt upon San Cristoval last night, which failed; and in fact we have not made a practicable breach in that outwork, nor in the body of the place. In the mean time both Soult and Marmont are moving into Estremadura in great strength, and I think will join by the 15th, and I have therefore ordered that the siege may be raised again.

The enemy are either coming into Portugal or they are about to attack Elvas. The only circumstance I have to apprehend is, that Elvas will be ill provided. The Portuguese troops in this part of the country have, as usual, been living upon the stores of the garrison; and I must either leave the place without supplies, or give them from our stores; and it is not impossible but that the necessity of waiting here to collect these supplies, and throw them into the place, may bring us into an awkward situation. Thus this terrible system of government, and the abuses in all the departments, are getting us into scrapes at every step we take.

Au Capt. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Quinta de Granicha, ce 10 Juin, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer copies de 2 lettres interceptées qui m'ont été envoyées aujourd'hui, par lesquelles il paraît que l'ennemi va rassembler toutes ses forces en Estremadure, à la suite de quelque nouveau projet, qui a été probablement ordonné de Paris.

Il est probable par les nouvelles dans ces lettres, et par celles que j'ai reçues de la date de —, de nos avant postes, que l'ennemi s'est mis en marche aujourd'hui de Llerena; et je crois par les nouvelles que je viens de recevoir des frontières de la Castille, que le Maréchal Marmont arrivera à Merida le 15.

Je viens donc de donner ordre qu'on commence à lever le siège de Ba-

dajoz ce soir ; et j'espère que cette opération sera accomplie demain au soir. L'état de la brèche ne donnait nulle espérance de pouvoir donner assaut pour quelques jours ; et nos munitions commencent à manquer.

Il reste à déterminer ce qu'il faut faire dans cette crise de la campagne. Ce n'est pas possible d'attaquer le Maréchal Soult avant sa jonction avec le Maréchal Marmont. Nous ne pourrions marcher pour cet objet que le 12 ; nous ne pourrions l'atteindre que le 14, même s'il ne faisait aucun mouvement pour s'éloigner ; et le Maréchal Marmont serait le 15 sur nos derrières à Merida ; ou s'il préférerait passer par Medellin, il se joindrait ce jour là avec Soult, si celui-ci se retirait. D'ailleurs nous ne connaissons pas la force de Soult. Nous savons qu'il est supérieur en cavalerie et en artillerie ; et la composition de la force des alliés est telle qu'il n'est pas du tout à désirer de donner des batailles rangées.

Je suis décidé quand l'ennemi s'avancera à faire retirer l'armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise ; et je compte prendre position sur la Caya près d'Elvas pour voir arriver l'ennemi, et pour reconnaître ses projets ; et après, s'il est nécessaire, je me porterai vers Portalegre, pour opérer ma jonction avec les divisions qui viennent du nord du Tage, et avec la cavalerie, &c., qui vient de Lisbonne.

Je crois que vous ferez bien de vous tenir en étroite communication avec nous, et que le Capitaine Général Blake fasse la même chose ; ou qu'il passe en le Condado de Niebla, pour opérer sur les derrières de l'ennemi ou sur Seville.

Après que Soult aura fait son mouvement de Llerena, surtout s'il passe par Hornachos et va à Almendralejo, le Capitaine Général Blake aura le choix de deux routes par lesquelles il pourrait passer dans le Condado de Niebla : ou celle à la gauche de la Guadiana, par Xerez, &c. ; ou celle à la droite de cette rivière dans le royaume de Portugal, et en passant la rivière à Mertola. Si le Capitaine Général se décide à se porter dans le Condado de Niebla, et à choisir cette route, je ferai tout en mon pouvoir pour faciliter sa marche.

Je vous prie de me faire savoir quelles sont vos résolutions et celles du Capitaine Général Blake aussitôt que vous pourrez, parcequ'il est à désirer que je puisse bientôt prendre la position de la Caya.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Elvas ; and Capt. Stewart, Estremoz. 10th June, 1811.

As his Excellency the Commander of the Forces has decided that the sick and wounded at Elvas shall be removed towards Lisbon, you will make the necessary preparations accordingly, and receive such other instructions from the Inspector of hospitals as may be requisite to carry on this service.

As it is very desirable, under the present circumstances of the army, that no effective men should proceed to the rear, his Excellency cannot allow of escorts proceeding even with the men whose cases enable them to walk. You must, therefore, make the best arrangements you can with such non-commissioned officers or steady soldiers as go to the rear, to take charge of the men, giving them, previous to their marching, the most positive orders not to straggle from their posts, or attempt pillaging or plundering upon the road, as they will undoubtedly be heard of if this takes place, and the severest examples will be made.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

10th June, 1811.

I have not failed to call the attention of the Commander of the Forces to the subject of your letter of the 9th inst., and its several enclosures. The evil you

describe is no doubt a very serious one, but there would be so much difficulty attending the forcing of the soldiers' wives out of this country, and so much impracticability in the Commander of the Forces carrying, himself, into execution, without previous consultation with the heads of departments in England, the plan you propose, that it does not seem feasible to his Excellency, or one that can now be decided upon. The great mischief has arisen from commanding officers of regiments not attending to the orders relative to the embarkation of only the women that are allowed on their corps being sent on service. To remedy as far as possible the existing evil, the Commander of the Forces directs that

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and the Commander of the Forces trusts that by their exertion, as much as by that of yourself and Capt. Tucker, a remedy will be found for the serious evil stated to exist.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 11th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 9th June.

I don't exactly understand what orders have been given to Gen. Pack, and in what manner affairs are situated at Almeida.

My memorandum to you of the 15th May was founded on a supposition that it might be necessary for you to retire from the frontier, and I expressed a particular anxiety 'that that place (Almeida) should not be abandoned till it should be necessary.'

My letter to you of the 1st inst. was founded on a supposition that the enemy were about to move through the mountains towards the Tagus; and, after having requested you to make a corresponding movement, I requested that Gen. Pack's brigade might remain at Almeida, and in the neighbourhood, till relieved by the militia.

I did not think it probable that, if you should make the movement to the south directed by my letter of the 1st inst., there could exist any necessity for abandoning and destroying Almeida, and I did not advert to it in that letter. But it appears by your letter of the 8th inst., which I received yesterday, that you had directed Gen. Pack 'to consider his secure retreat as a primary object, and that, upon evacuating the place, he should blow up the remainder of the fortifications, and destroy the military stores,' adverting, of course, to my memorandum to you of the 15th May. According to this memorandum, Almeida should not have been abandoned till it was necessary; and yet it appears, by your letter of the 9th inst., to have been so little necessary, that Gen. Pack left in that neighbourhood one regiment of his brigade, which is there still.

There can be no reason whatever why that regiment should now remain at Almeida. The place, and every thing it contained, are destroyed, and the regiment should be directed to join the brigade; but as I have had a good deal of correspondence with the government upon the subject of Almeida, and they have taken some pains and incurred some expense in preparing to repair the place, it is desirable that I should have a copy of the orders sent to Gen. Pack, and his official report of the mode in which he executed them; and that the necessity for abandoning and destroying the place should be made clear. Upon this last point, it would be desirable to have in detail the reports of the enemy's situation on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, and the situation of Barbacena's cavalry and of our posts.

I requested Col. Murray to write to you yesterday respecting the passage of the Tagus by the troops under your command; since which I have re-

ceived Capt. Grant's letter of the 7th, from the enclosures in which it would appear that the passage of the Tagus by the '*Armée de Portugal*,' although a probable operation, is not absolutely decided. I request, therefore, that the following disposition may, for the present, be made of the troops under your command, instead of that directed in Col. Murray's letter of yesterday: the Light division, and one brigade of cavalry, at Niza, as therein directed; the 1st division, the right at Villa Velha, the left in the villages between Villa Velha and Castello Branco, and one brigade of cavalry in front of Castello Branco, towards Salvaterra; the 5th division in the cantonments, as directed in Col. Murray's letter of yesterday.

I have seen Mr. Kennedy regarding your supplies. From your letter, I understand that the whole have, or will have, bread to the 15th inclusive; 100,000 rations of bread have been ordered to Castello Branco, which it is apprehended may not arrive there. But there are 50,000 rations at Villa Velha, and the magazine is at Abrantes, about 9 leagues from Niza.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Campbell, 94th regt.

11th June, 1811.

I have received your letter addressed to the Adj. Gen., head quarters. Although the Commander of the Forces believes, according to your representation, that you received no G.O. about leaving your heavy baggage at home, prior to your embarkation for this country, still there is no objection to your carrying the G.O. of the 3d June, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, into execution. With respect to the persons you are to send to take care of the same, on a reference to G.O. you will perceive that you have a permission to send an officer to Lisbon to arrange your baggage, &c.; but no regiment has had leave to send an officer home to England for this purpose, and no particular exception can be made in favor of the 94th regt. There will be no objection, however, to the officer you mention, Lieut. Spooner, going home with your heavy baggage if a Medical Board recommends his leave of absence to England for recovery of health.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I received this morning your two letters of the 10th.

You had better send the sick you may have to Abrantes, but not by water from Villa Velha. The Portuguese should also go from Castello Branco to Lisbon by Abrantes.

To Col. Austin.

Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

In consequence of the expected early collection of the enemy's whole force in Estremadura, I think it probable that Gen. Blake's corps will return to the Condado de Niebla, and that they will pass through Portugal on their way thither. I have desired the Commissary Gen. to prepare for their passage with provisions at Beja and at Villa Viçosa; and I request you to have from 12,000 to 15,000 rations of bread and meat, and 1500 rations of forage, prepared for them at Mertola, and boats collected at that place, in order to transport them across the Guadiana. I cannot say exactly when they will march, but it is desirable that all the preparations should be made immediately; and I will give you the earliest intimation of the movement.

I will pay any expense that may be incurred to collect the rations or boats.

Au Capt. Gén. Don J. Blake.

Quinta de Granicha, ce 12 Juin, 1811.

J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 11, et je conviens avec vous que vous ferez bien de porter les opérations du corps d'armée de votre Excellence dans le Condado de Niebla, en cas qu'il devienne nécessaire pour l'armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise de se porter sur la Caya.

Je vous envoie une route par laquelle seule votre artillerie pourrait marcher, et vous verrez à la note la provision qu'on aura faite pour votre marche. J'ai donné ordre qu'on fasse provision pour 12,000 hommes et 1500 chevaux, et je vous prie de me faire savoir-s'il vous en faut plus.

Le siège de Badajoz sera entièrement levé cette nuit.

Je n'ai pas encore de nouvelles du mouvement du Maréchal Soult; mais je crois qu'il aura été joint par le corps de Drouet aujourd'hui, et probablement qu'il se mettra en mouvement demain. Son premier mouvement sera, il y a apparence, vers Hornachos, ou même plus à sa droite, pour éviter toute affaire avec nous, jusqu'à l'arrivée de l'armée de Portugal. Je suppose que votre premier mouvement sera sur Valverde pour attendre celui de l'ennemi. Celui de nos troupes en avant sera sur Albuera.

Les 3^{me} et 4^{me} divisions de l'armée de Portugal, sous les ordres du Général Regnier, sont arrivées à Plasencia le 9 de ce mois. C'est un jour plus tard que je n'ai compté, mais elles pourront toujours arriver à Merida le 16; et si elles font la jonction par le pont de Medellin, elles la feront le 15.

Je vous prie, M. le Général, de donner ordre qu'on conserve la discipline en passant par le royaume de Portugal.

Je suis bien fâché de n'avoir pas eu le plaisir de faire la connaissance de votre Excellence; mais j'espère que l'occasion est seulement retardée pour le moment.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 9th.

I was allowed by the Commander in Chief to recommend for brevet promotion a certain number of officers; and I was under the necessity of course of taking them from all parts of the army. I was also obliged to attend to the claims of seniority in instances in which the senior officer had besides the claim of merit. Under these circumstances, although the light regiments had their proportion of this promotion, I was not enabled to recommend your brother Capt. J. Stewart, although I certainly wished it. Gen. Craufurd has since proposed to me a plan, under which I could have got him the rank of Major, if that plan had been practicable; but the Spaniards were to be concerned; and if the plan was practicable, so much time must elapse before they can be brought to consent to it, that it is useless to undertake it. I assure you that it will give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to forward the views of your brother in the service, not only for his advantage, but for that of the public.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811

I have received your letter of the 17th May, and I am much obliged

to you for the desire you express to render your department useful to us in this country.

The Portuguese commissariat, and all the departments attached to that army, are in a miserably inefficient state from two causes: the want of authority to enforce obedience to order and regulation; the want of money to defray the necessary expenses.

The departments attached to the army are not liable to the military law; we therefore have no power to punish those guilty of any offence; and, as for expecting punishment from complaint to the government or to the civil tribunals, it would be just as reasonable to expect the coming of the Messiah, or the return of King Sebastian.

These unfortunate governments in the Peninsula had been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partisan. Those malversations in office; those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partisans, are passed unnoticed; and notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I don't know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office.

The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity, of which the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes, of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this bubble the government of Portugal, as well as the successive governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favorites with the mob. They have a general income tax called 10 *per cent.*, and in some cases 20 *per cent.*, which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, from want of money, they can pay nobody, and of course have not even the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments. The hire of mules and carts, the food for the animals and drivers, are never paid; and of course the animals die, and the people desert the service.

The Commissaries have no money to purchase any thing in the country. I will not allow the soldiers to pillage. The government have no money to pay for the transport of provisions from the magazines on the coast to the army, and are bankrupt in credit, and are unwilling to execute their

own law to force means of transport; and the result is that the troops get nothing, and every department and branch of the service is paralysed.

The remedy which has been proposed from England has been that we should take the commissariat upon ourselves. I have already done as much as I could in this way; that is, under an arrangement which provides for the expense being subtracted from the subsidy. I have arranged that the Commissary Gen. shall provide for those parts of the army serving with the British divisions. I know that we cannot do more without failure.

In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than any thing else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or any thing, can get the better, even in individuals.

Our transport, which is the great lever of the commissariat, is done principally, if not entirely, by Spanish muleteers; and, to oblige Mr. Kennedy, they would probably once or twice carry provisions to a Portuguese regiment, but they would prefer to quit us, and attend the French, to being obliged to perform this duty constantly.

When a Portuguese brigade is in a British division, the muleteers don't inquire, and don't know, for whom they carry the supplies; and the Commissary with the division issues to the Portuguese Commissary what is required for the Portuguese troops, taking his receipt for the quantities, and a charge is made against the subsidy for the actual cost, including a certain sum for transport from the magazines.

There are but few Portuguese troops not serving in our divisions; but there is the militia, there are the forts, and other establishments, to be provided for, into which we could not enter without involving ourselves in inextricable details and an enormous expense.

The remedy for the existing evils is simple, and has been repeatedly recommended by me as far back as Nov. 1809, at the period of the Austrian peace. It consists in the following measures:

1st; To make the disposable income of the State more nearly equal to the expenditure, by reforms, improvements in collection, and some increase of taxation. Something has lately been done in this way, and I understand with very considerable success: but, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, and telling the government over and over again that money (that is, specie) could not be got for their expenses in England, and that they must look to the produce of their own exertions alone for that necessary, it is only lately that they have done any thing.

2dly; To make all officers and departments connected with the army liable to the military law of the country.

3dly; To alter the military law of the country so as to render it more conformable to the circumstances of the present day.

4thly; To appoint a Commissary Gen., with a sufficient number of deputies and assistants, to perform the duty of the army, instead of what is called a Junta, consisting of merchants of Lisbon and their clerks, who have no responsibility, and know nothing of provisioning an army, excepting the profitable jobs they themselves derive from it, and to regulate

the duties of the Commissary Gen.'s office, in the manner the details of which have been proposed to them.

5thly ; To regulate the medical department, and render it liable to military law. You will scarcely believe that the office of Physician General is a sinecure, held for life, with a right to appoint a deputy, likewise a sinecure held for life, and at the same time a right to interfere in the medical department, and to prevent any body else from doing any good.

6thly ; To regulate the department of the arsenal, and render its officers liable to the military law. This is a department connected not only with army and military stores, but with the clothing and appointments of the army ; and this also is managed by a Junta, responsible to nobody, and who do nothing.

It may be observed that all these improvements would do very well, but still that a British Commissary or two might be of use. So they might if they were worth having ; but if they are worth having, I can't spare them ; and if they are not, they will do no good to the Portuguese concerns. In fact, there is no want of ability in the country or of good will. The wants consist in what we can't give them, unless more disposition is shown to attend to our counsel, and the local governments determine to alter their system, and really to do their duty by their country.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir C. Asgill, Bart.

Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 18th May, and I shall be very happy to give you every assistance in my power, in carrying into execution the charitable intentions of the people of Ireland. That which the people of Portugal have lost, from the want of which they are likely to suffer most, is their laboring cattle, bullocks : Ireland could supply many ; and cows with calf would be very acceptable. Building materials, such as planks, nails, and bar iron, would be very useful ; large casks with iron hoops would also be desirable, particularly at an early period, as the French destroyed their casks, and they will find it difficult to replace them in time to receive the wine harvest of this year. Blankets, and coarse woollen in the piece, might be sent with advantage.

To the Officer commg. at Niza.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

I request that the brigade of cavalry under Major Gen. Anson, which I understand arrived at Niza on the 12th, and the Light division of infantry under Major Gen. Craufurd, which I understand arrived at Niza on this day, the 13th, may march to Portalegre on the morning of the 15th inst.

To the Officer commg. the 1st Division of Infantry. Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

I request that the 1st division of infantry, with the artillery attached, or marching with it, which I understand arrived this day at Villa Velha, Sarnadas, and the villages between Villa Velha and Castello Branco, may cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, on the morning of the 15th inst., and proceed to Niza, and on the 16th to Portalegre.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811, 7 P.M.

I have received your letter of 10 A.M., and if you have no authority.

excepting ———'s report, for saying that the enemy were in Los Santos, I should be inclined to doubt it. However, I have ordered Gen. Hamilton's division to Albuera this night; and if I should not receive a contradiction of the report before the moon rises I shall go there myself.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811, 7 P.M.

I enclose some letters just received. I doubt the enemy being in Los Santos, although, as Drouet joined either last night or this morning, they will probably move to-morrow. I have ordered Hamilton to move to Albuera, and I shall go there to-night if I should not receive a contradiction of the report before the moon rises.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811, 20 min. past 8 P.M.

I have just received your letter of yesterday evening; and I request that the blankets, which the Commanding officers of regiments may be desirous of getting rid of, may be sent by return mules to the Commissary's stores at Abrantes, if any should be sent there. A mule will not carry more than about 40, and they should be made up in packages of 20 each. The Commanding officers of regiments should report to the Q. M. G. the number they send into store, and to what place.

I send directions to Gen. Craufurd to march with the Light division, and to Gen. Anson to march with his cavalry, to Portalegre on the 15th, and to the 1st division to march on the same day to Niza, and on the 16th to Portalegre; and I request you to order Gen. Campbell and Gén. Pack to move on the 15th to Villa Velha and Sarnadas, and on the 16th to Niza. The other brigade of cavalry may move into Castello Branco on the 15th, keeping still a look towards Salvaterra. I beg that the 9 pounders, the reserve artillery, &c., may move with any division with which they may be.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

I beg leave to inform your Lordship that, since the commencement of the siege of Badajoz, 52 of the Chasseurs Britanniques have deserted, notwithstanding that we have with the army only a selection of that corps; 686 who are suspected being left behind at Lisbon. The inconvenience of the desertion of the soldiers of this army is very great, because it is almost the only mode by which the enemy can acquire intelligence; but, besides the inconvenience which all must feel, the disgrace is no trifle, and it would be very desirable if these corps could be relieved by others. I much fear from all that I hear that the recruiting of these corps has not been conducted as government intended, and that prisoners have been enlisted, as well as deserters, into the Chasseurs Britanniques and the Brunswick Legion.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

In consequence of a report from the Chief Engineer, Lieut. Col. Fletcher, that the fire from San Cristoval might occasion the loss of many lives in the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in

that outwork having been apparently much improved by the fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be made to carry San Cristoval by storm that night. Major Gen. Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a detachment under Major Macintosh, of the 85th regt., to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very heavy fire of musketry and hand grenades from the outworks, and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach; the advanced guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regt., who volunteered to perform this duty: but they found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp; and, notwithstanding that they were provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it. They retired with some loss.

The fire upon San Cristoval, as well as upon the place, continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which day the breach in the wall of San Cristoval appeared practicable, and I directed that a second attempt should be made on that night to obtain possession of that outwork. Major Gen. Houstoun ordered another detachment for this service, under the command of Major M'Geechy, of the 17th Portuguese regt., who, with the officers destined to command the different parties composing the detachment, had been employed throughout the 8th and 9th in reconnoitring the breach and the different approaches to it. They advanced at about 9 at night, in the best order, though opposed by the same means, and with the same determination as had been opposed to the detachment which had made the attempt on the 6th. Ensign Dyas* again led the service, and the storming party arrived at the foot of the breach; but they found it impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major M'Geechy, the Commanding officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of the officers fell; but the troops continued to maintain their station till Major Gen. Houstoun ordered them to retire.

When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontiers of Castille, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajoz, entertaining a belief that the means of which I had the command would reduce the place before the end of the second week in June, at which time I expected that the reinforcement for the enemy's southern army, detached from Castille, would join Marshal Soult. I was unfortunately mistaken in my estimate of the quality of these means.

The ordnance belonging to the garrison of Elvas is very ancient and incomplete; unprovided with the improvements adopted by modern science to facilitate and render more certain the use of cannon; and although classed generally as 24 pounders, the guns were found to be of a calibre larger than the shot in the garrison of that weight. The fire from this ordnance was therefore very uncertain, and the carriages proved to be worse even than we supposed they were; and both guns and car-

* Ensign Dyas succeeded by regimental rotation to a Lieutenancy, and remained a subaltern in the 51st until the 30th Oct. 1820. A representation of his services and position was then again made to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief. He was, in consequence, promoted to be Captain of a company in a Ceylon regiment, but shortly afterwards retired from the service.

riages were rendered useless so frequently by the effect of our own fire as to create delay, in consequence of the necessity which existed for exchanging both in the advanced batteries. Those who are accustomed to observe the effect of the fire of artillery will be astonished to learn that fire was kept up from the 2d to the 10th inst. from fourteen 24 pounders, upon the wall of the castle of Badajoz, constructed of rammed earth and loose stones, of which the foot was seen at the distance of from 400 to 600 yards, and that it had not at last effected a practicable breach. It was impossible to estimate the length of time which would elapse before a practicable breach could have been effected in this wall; and, even if one had been effected, it was the opinion of the engineers and others, as well as my own, that although the breach could have been stormed, we could not have formed our troops to attack the enemy's intrenchment within, unless we had possession of Fort San Cristoval.

We had failed in two attempts to obtain possession of Fort San Cristoval, and it was obvious to me that we could not obtain possession of that outwork without performing a work which would have required the labor of several days to accomplish it.

On the morning of the 10th inst. I received the enclosed intercepted dispatch, from the Duc de Dalmatie to the Duc de Raguse,* which pointed out clearly the enemy's design to collect in Estremadura their whole force; and I had reason to believe that Bonet's corps, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th May, and was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th inst., would have joined the southern army by the 10th; and it was generally expected in the country that the southern army would have moved by that time.

The movement of this army alone would have created a necessity for raising the siege; but on the same morning I received accounts from the frontiers of Castille, which left no doubt of the destination of the '*Armée de Portugal*' to the southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive at Merida on the 15th inst. I therefore ordered that the siege should be raised. I am concerned to add that this measure was rendered expedient, not only by the military considerations to which I have above referred, but by others relative to the security of Elvas.

If the siege had been continued only for 2 days longer there would have remained in Elvas only 10,000 24 pound shot; a quantity by no means sufficient for its defence, if the course of events should enable the enemy to attack that place; and I learn that there are none at Lisbon, and if there were any, the government, under present circumstances, have not the power of procuring means of transport to send it up.

Since the troops under Sir W. Beresford have been in this part of the country, Gen. Hamilton's division of Portuguese troops, consisting of 3 brigades, had been supplied with provisions generally from the stores of Elvas, as well as the troops of the garrison; and the stores of Elvas had been very inadequately, if at all, upheld to answer these demands. The consequence is that there are not at this moment in the fort supplies for the garrison for one fortnight.

* See Appendix, No. IV.

All the means of transport which could be collected in this neighbourhood were employed in aid of the operations of the siege, from which they could not be relieved till the siege should be raised, and the ordnance and stores returned to Elvas.

The application of these means of transport, to bring a supply to Elvas from the British magazines at Abrantes (which is the resource from which at last it must be drawn), and the eventual safety of that place, depended upon the early discontinuance of the operations against Badajoz; and this, independent of the circumstances above referred to, and the military considerations resulting from them, was a principal motive with me for raising the siege on the 10th inst. From this circumstance your Lordship will see additional reason to lament the state of inefficiency of all the Portuguese departments attached to the army. It affords an additional proof of the embarrassments which meet me at every turn, from wants and deficiencies for which the Portuguese government ought to provide, but which invariably at last fall, at the most critical moments, upon the resources which have been provided, with great difficulty and labor, and at great expense, by the departments of the British army.

I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops employed at the siege of Badajoz, whose labors and exertions deserved a very different result. Major Gen. Picton directed the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Major Gen. Houstoun on the right; and I am much indebted to those officers, as well as to Major Gen. Hamilton, and the other General and Staff officers, and the officers and troops under their command respectively. Lieut. Col. Fletcher, of the Royal engineers, was the directing engineer, and immediately superintended the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Capt. Squire those on the right of that river; and these officers, and the corps of Royal engineers, have, by their conduct on this occasion, augmented their claims to my approbation. Lieut. Col. Framingham commanded the artillery, having under his orders Major Dickson, attached to the Portuguese service, who, during the absence of Lieut. Col. Framingham with the troops which were employed to cover the operations, conducted all the details of this important department. I had every reason to be satisfied with these officers, and most particularly with Major Dickson,* from whose activity, zeal, and intelligence, the British service has derived great advantage in the different operations against Badajoz. Capt. Cleves, of the Hanoverian artillery, conducted that department on the right of the Guadiana with great success.

The service of the batteries was performed by detachments from the 1st, 2d, and 3d regts. of Portuguese artillery, who conducted themselves remarkably well. They were aided by Capt. Rainsford's company of the Royal artillery, who were indefatigable; some of them having never quitted the batteries.

I am much indebted to Gen. Leite, the governor of the province of

* The late Major Gen. Sir Alex. Dickson, K.C.B., then Capt. Dickson, R.A., and Major in the Portuguese service. The details and superintendence of the artillery at the sieges were principally confided to him.

Alentejo and of Elvas, for the assistance which he again afforded me in this operation.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout the siege, from which your Lordship will observe that, excepting in the attempts to obtain possession of San Cristoval, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the blockade of Badajoz; and I know from an intercepted letter, that the enemy had in the place, on the 28th May, only 3 weeks' provisions.

I have not yet heard that the enemy have moved from their position at Llerena, and I imagine that the arrival of the 9th corps has been delayed longer than was expected; and it is probable that Soult will be unwilling to move till he hears of the movements of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' They broke up from the Tormes on the 3d, and their advanced guard arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th. They moved forward again on the 6th, and Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer withdrew the advanced guard of the troops under his command, first to Nave d'Aver, and thence to Alfaiates; having his main body on the high ground behind Soito; and on the following morning he retired behind the Coa at Sabugal. The enemy patrolled on the 6th into Fuentes de Oñoro and into Nave d'Aver.

I enclose Sir B. Spencer's report* of these operations, from which it appears that the Royal dragoons, under Col. Clifton, and a squadron of the 14th, the whole directed by Major Gen. Slade, distinguished themselves.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer to Gen. Visc. Wellington.

Soito, 7th June, 1811.

In my letter of the 5th inst. from Villar Formoso, I did myself the honor of acquainting your Lordship that I had just returned from the heights in front of Gallegos, from whence I discovered a body of the enemy of about 3000 men, consisting of 500 cavalry and 2500 infantry, with artillery, entering Ciudad Rodrigo from the Salamanca road. I requested Col. Waters to remain on the heights until sunset, to notice whether any more of the enemy followed those which I have mentioned, and he reported to me that they were succeeded by another column; but I have strong reason to think, from what I shall relate to your Lordship, that they must have marched large bodies of infantry and cavalry into Ciudad Rodrigo in the course of the night.

According to your Lordship's instructions I concentrated the troops rather more in their cantonments, upon hearing, a few days before, that the enemy were moving in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo, and took the other necessary precautions for falling back.

The enemy advanced, as I thought it probable, at daybreak on the morning of the 6th, in 2 columns; one taking the direction of Gallegos, and the other that of Carpio and Espeja. The former was a heavy column of cavalry and infantry, with several guns, and the latter consisted of about 6000 infantry; but in saying this I should observe that, from the nature of the country, the rear of these columns could not be discovered. They had also upwards of 2000 cavalry, and 10 guns, which moved across the plain in front of Fuentes de Oñoro.

From the nature of the country being so perfectly open, and the probability of the enemy bringing a large portion of his cavalry upon this point, I deemed it most prudent to withdraw the Light division under Brig. Gen. Craufurd, which accordingly fell back from Gallegos and Espeja, at 2 o'clock in the morning, upon Nave d'Aver.

Observing the rapidity of the enemy's advance, and the superior number of his cavalry, the Light division, with the horse artillery attached to them, was directed to retire further back upon Alfaiates, the 1st and 5th divisions gradually falling back from Aldea da Ponte and Nave d'Aver to the heights just behind Soito, and

I imagine that the enemy's march in this direction was intended as a reconnaissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, as on the following day, the 7th, the whole moved from thence to Moras-verdes, in the direction of the Puerto de Baños; near which pass Gen. Regnier had been with 2 divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*' since the 5th. On the 8th, in the evening, one division of Gen. Regnier's troops had come through Baños; and I expect that those divisions will have arrived at Plasencia on the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.

I had directed Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer to make a movement corresponding with those of the enemy, if they should move to the southward; and the greatest part of his corps is now at Castello Branco and Villa Velha; and a part of it on this side of the Tagus, at Niza.

The Commissary Gen. has thrown a sufficient quantity of provisions into all the places on the frontier, and measures are in progress to improve the defence of them all.

P.S. Since writing this dispatch I have received accounts that Gen. Drouet's troops joined on the enemy's right at Berlanga and Azuaga yesterday, and a report that their cavalry were in movement towards Los Santos this morning. The British cavalry and the 2d and 4th divisions were about to march from Villa Franca and Almendralejo towards Albuera; and I have ordered there Gen. Hamilton's division; and I shall proceed there this night myself, if I should find this report confirmed.

the 6th division from Malhada-sorda to Rendo, the cavalry remaining in front of Alaiates.

It is with great pleasure I have to mention the very admirable conduct of the Royals, under the command of Lieut. Col. Clifton,* and one troop of the 14th light dragoons, which being all that were employed in covering the front from Villar de Yegua to Espeja, were assembled at Gallegos, and retreated from thence agreeably to my directions. The force which they were opposed to, your Lordship is in possession of in this letter; and notwithstanding all the efforts of Gen. Montbrun, who commanded the French cavalry, to outflank the British, pressing them at the same time in front with 8 pieces of cannon, their retiring to Nave d'Aver merits the highest admiration.

In offering my sense of their conduct, and of the very stubborn manner in which they retired, I derive very great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that Major Gen. Skude directed in person the whole of the affair, and by his movements foiled the designs of the enemy, and the British cavalry maintained, as usual, their high character.

The Major Gen., in his report to me, speaks in much praise of Major Dorville, of the Royal dragoons; of Capt. Purvis, of the same regiment; and of Capt. Dowson, of the 14th light dragoons, who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves much.

I am not able to judge exactly of the designs of the enemy, but I know that they left Salamanca with 18,000 infantry, and with upwards of 3000 cavalry, and 34 pieces of artillery, on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo.

In concluding my statement of the movements of yesterday, I beg leave to add my acknowledgments for the choice made by your Lordship, of the Hon. Col. Pakenham, and of Lieut. Col. De Lancey, at the head of their respective departments, with this portion of the army; their zeal and good judgment are already known to your Lordship.

The loss of the cavalry upon this occasion, I am happy to say, amounted to no more than 10 R. and F. wounded, and 9 missing; and 6 horses killed, 10 wounded, and 4 missing.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Clifton, K.C.B.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the several affairs with the French army, from the 30th May to the 11th June, 1811, inclusive.

Head quarters, Quinta de St. João, 13th June, 1811.

	Officers.	Non - commis- sioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	9	3	106	—	118
Wounded	22	17	315	—	354
Missing	3	—	6	—	9

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

I enclose the weekly state of the 1st inst., from which you will observe that our list of sick and wounded is much increased. We have no sickness of any consequence, but I should think not less than 7000 altogether.

I likewise enclose the last return from Belem, which will show of what descriptions the men returned sick absent, in the May returns, are composed. There are now at Elvas 300 or 400 recovered, who cannot join for want of arms and accoutrements; our friends the Spaniards having played the usual trick of plundering the arms and accoutrements of the wounded at Albuera, on the field of battle. I am much annoyed about Badajoz, although convinced I could not have taken the place with the means we had of carrying on the operation.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Albuera, 14th June, 1811, 10 A.M.

I find that Gen. Blake is not satisfied with the arrangement made for feeding his troops on their passage through Portugal, and he insists upon having rations at Jurumenha. I beg you to give most particular orders to the Governor of Jurumenha to allow no armed men to go into his fort, and to give rations to nobody not belonging to the garrison, without an order from you.

The French are in strength in Los Santos, and we are not certain of any thing on this side of that town, although it has been reported they are every where. We could not take the position in front of this for want of water. If what I have heard this morning is true, they must be this day at Truxillo.

P.S. If our provisions should be sent to Jurumenha they should be well escorted, for fear of outrages, if Blake should be on his march.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Albuera, 14th June, 1811.

I learn from Gen. Blake, that his demand in Portugal will be for 13,000 men, and I request you, therefore, to order rations for 26,000 at each of the stations I mentioned to you.

Au Capt. Gén. Don J. Blake.

À Albuera, ce 14 Juin, 1811, à 10 heures du matin.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 13 dans la nuit; et je suis

bien fâché d'être obligé de vous prévenir que les Commissaires ne peuvent donner des rations à vos troupes, après leur entrée en Portugal, que dans les lieux nommés dans la route que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous indiquer. Ainsi il reste à votre Excellence de faire les arrangemens qui seront nécessaires à Olivença ou à Valverde pour empêcher que les troupes ne souffrent l'inconvénient de ne trouver rien à manger le jour qu'elles arriveront à Jurumenha.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Albuera, 14th June, 1811.

Col. Murray has communicated to me your letter to him of last night, in which you have expressed a want of confidence in the Spanish troops (at which I am, not astonished), and have desired specific instructions. My object in keeping any troops before Badajoz, just at present, is to maintain the blockade, and prevent the garrison from getting provisions.

Adverting to the disposable strength of the garrison, which may be about 2500 men, and to the description of troops which are co-operating in the blockade, and to the advantage which the enemy would immediately derive from the possession of our advanced batteries and trenches, as cover for their outposts, as far as the range of their guns would reach, I have thought it expedient that we should continue to hold those advanced batteries and trenches. It is not very probable that, as long as we are so forward, the enemy will attempt any thing upon the Spaniards; nor, with 2500 men, are they likely to make any formidable sortie upon us. I don't think it at all necessary to employ 1500 men to guard these trenches: we have nothing in them to guard, and in my opinion, one quarter of the number would be sufficient. If these guards should be attacked by a superior force, their retreat is always secure and covered; and if they are so attacked, they must be considered as any other advanced guard not able to keep its ground, and must be kept farther back.

In respect to other points, all I wish is to have a strict blockade kept; the ground favors it, and the Spanish troops who may be employed in it might be encamped so far off as to be out of the reach of sorties by the garrison, and the situation of their piquets altered, in order to prevent the facility of enterprise against them. I have gone thus into details, because you desired it. I think it probable, however, that I shall be obliged to relieve you from this duty before long.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Albuera, 14th June, 1811, 9 P.M.

I have received your letter of 3 P.M.; and I hope that you will have taken up the position near Solana, keeping your parties of observation out. You will have good cover there. As for the Spaniards, we must manage them the best way we can; but as for the Portuguese, they are entirely under your orders, and you must direct Paes what he is to do. I wish you to treat them in every respect as British cavalry, observing always that their horses are of an inferior order. Are you certain that the enemy are in Villa Franca?

P.S. The bivouac which Hill quitted this morning appears to be an excellent situation for the cavalry to-morrow. It is in an olive wood; half a league south of Solana.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Albuera, 15th June, 1811, 8½ A.M.

A note from you arrived here a little after 5 this morning, which Capt. James lost; and if its contents are important, I request that you will repeat them.

Gen. Loy has sent in here to inform me that the enemy were advancing upon S^{ta} Marta, and had already come as far as Feria about 6 o'clock, and that he intended to retire upon Almendral as soon as he should ascertain the fact. I conclude that I shall hear from the officer of our cavalry who is at S^{ta} Marta.

I have heard from the north of the Guadiana that the French from Castille were in Truxillo on the 13th. They will therefore be in Merida this night.

P.S. The letter that was lost was brought by a man of the 4th dragoons, who takes this back, and who was dispatched at half past 1 this morning. I understand that the letter was not directed for me, but for Murray.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Albuera, 15th June, 1811, noon.

As I have not heard from you upon the subject, I conclude that you have not heard that the enemy's cavalry arrived in S^{ta} Marta* 2 hours ago. Some officers whom we had there say that they could see no infantry from the steeple of the church; but a Spanish officer, sent here by Gen. Loy, reports that there were infantry as well as cavalry, and that the infantry were upon their own right of the great road from Los Santos.

The Portuguese cavalry are now marching from S^{ta} Marta upon this place, and the Spanish cavalry under Loy upon Almendral. I have not heard of the party of British cavalry which was to have been there, and to have reported to me here. You ought to fall back with your cavalry to the wood in front of this place, otherwise you may be too late.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Albuera, 15th June, 1811, noon.

I think that Gen. Blake will commence his march from Jurumenha for Redondo on the 17th or 18th, and you had better send up, on the receipt of this letter, to have the rations got ready.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Albuera, 15th June, 1811.

It would be very desirable either to appoint a General officer to command in Upper Beira, as Le Cor does in Lower Beira, or to extend the powers of Le Cor over Upper Beira; and to have the militia there, if not actually embodied in their towns, which in my opinion they ought to be, at least in such a state of organization as that we can get them for duty when we shall want them. This would relieve me from the necessity of keeping a division of infantry in Beira, at least while the enemy are weak in Castille, which is very desirable in the existing state of our army.

P.S. The Spaniards have sent us word that the French are advancing upon S^{ta} Marta, which however we have not heard from any other

* A false report.

authority, and we have officers at that place: as an officer, however, has arrived from Truxillo, and reports that the French entered that town on the 13th, and they will be in Merida this evening, I shall break up from hence this evening.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

Albuera, 15th June, 1811.

As we are not likely to have occasion for the 4 or 5 tin pontoons, remaining of the 6 brought from Lisbon, for some time; and as we shall have plenty of others by the time we shall have occasion to use them, I am desirous of giving the 4 or 5 tin pontoons, now at Elvas, with their carriages and all the equipments belonging to them (excepting the horses), to Gen. Blake; and I request you to deliver them to the person who will give you this letter, or a duplicate of it.

As the flying bridge between Elvas and Badajoz can no longer be of any use to any body, I think it might be as well to take it up, and have the boats, &c., lodged in Elvas, together with the boats, casks, stores, &c., still at Jurumenha. All this should be done as soon as may be in your power.

Au Capt. Gén. Don J. Blake.

À Albuera, ce 15 Juin, 1811.

Je viens de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence de midi et demi. Je ne vous ai pas écrit sur les événemens de S^{te} Marta parceque tout à l'heure, seulement, j'ai reçu des nouvelles du Général Loy qui a dû vous écrire.

Je viens de recevoir un rapport du Général Cotton d'Azauchal, qui me dit que l'ennemi a seulement 800 hommes de cavalerie à S^{te} Marta. Il ne me dit pas où est l'infanterie de l'ennemi; et l'officier qui est venu de la part du Général Loy m'a dit qu'il y en avait à S^{te} Marta. L'ennemi n'a pas encore dépassé le bois de ce côté-ci de S^{te} Marta; et le Général Erskine écrit à 11½ heures de Corte de Peleas qu'il allait y envoyer 3 escadrons de cavalerie Anglaise. La cavalerie Portugaise est dans le bois en avant d'ici.

Vous avez reçu l'arrangement proposé pour la marche de cette nuit. J'ai donné l'ordre à votre cavalerie de se replier au bois qui est en avant d'Albuera, et aussitôt qu'elle arrivera je vous ferai dire l'heure à laquelle je ferai marcher l'infanterie.

Si l'infanterie de l'ennemi est campée à Feria, il est probable qu'elle marchera à S^{te} Marta dans l'après midi.

Au Capt. Gén. Don J. Blake.

À Albuera, ce 15 Juin, 1811, 5 P.M.

Je viens de recevoir un rapport que l'ennemi a quitté S^{te} Marta et s'est porté du côté d'Azauchal. Je crois que la cavalerie Anglaise y est maintenant, et que la cavalerie Espagnole y sera retournée.

Le Général Hill se mettra en marche au lever de la lune, c'est-à-dire, vers 1 heure du matin.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Albuera, 16th June, 1811, 8 A.M.

I was in hopes that the cavalry would have been here some hours ago, in consequence of the orders sent to you yesterday and last night. This

movement does not depend solely upon what is passing in your front, but principally upon what is passing upon your left; and you must recollect that from hence you have 6 leagues at least to Elvas, near which place probably it will be necessary the cavalry should be to-morrow morning. Under these circumstances, I was anxious that you should be here early this morning, in order that men and horses might have time to go to rest and feed, and that your baggage might have time to get off before you in the afternoon.

Your note of 9 P.M. did not arrive till after 4 this morning. The officer of the 4th dragoons to stay with Gen. Slade did not arrive till the troops had marched, and Gen. Hill was leaving this also, about 4. All this shows how uncertain this description of communication is at night, and how desirable it is that a certain direction given to a particular body of troops, as part of a general combination, should be strictly adhered to.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Albuera, 16th June, 1811.

I am afraid that you are deceived about the bread in possession of the 2d and Light divisions, as I understand they had none yesterday, and the cavalry no corn. I understood from you that all these divisions had their biscuit complete.

I have given an order, which you will see, that the blankets in the possession of the soldiers of the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions should be sent to your stores at Elvas as occasion may offer. It is desirable that they should be sent to Lisbon by the return carriages, and there cleaned and put into store.

Au Capt. Gén. Don J. Blake.

À Albuera, ce 16 Juin, 1811.

L'ennemi n'a fait aucun mouvement encore de ce côté-ci. Ses vedettes sont près de Feria, et à Solana, Azauchal, &c. Nos postes d'observation sont à Sta Marta en avant de Corte de Peleas, &c. Le Général Loy est ici, et je l'ai prié d'envoyer un escadron à Almendral pour y rester, si vous n'y avez pas laissé de cavalerie. Notre cavalerie est ici.

L'ennemi avait hier 5000 hommes d'infanterie à Villa Franca; et vers le soir ils sont entrés à Almendralejo, mais je ne sais pas en quel nombre.

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 16th June, 1811.

1. The Commanding officers of regiments are to make requisitions upon the Q. M. G. for such intrenching tools as they may want to complete the number required to be in possession of each regiment or battalion.

2. The Commanding officers of regiments in the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and of Brig. Gen. Long's and Col. De Grey's brigades of cavalry, who are not desirous of retaining the soldiers' blankets, are to have them packed in bales, containing each 20 blankets, and to send them as opportunities of sending them shall offer into the Commissary's stores at Elvas. The Commanding officers of regiments will report to the Q. M. G. what number of blankets have been sent into store by each regiment.

3. The General officers commanding divisions are requested to give particular directions that the G. O. may be strictly attended to, which require that all men unable to march on account of sickness should be sent into the general hospital immediately.

4. No officer can be enabled to form an opinion of the moment at which the troops under his command may be called upon to move, and although the means of transport with the army may be sufficient to remove those who may by accident fall sick, if they should be removed immediately, they cannot be sufficient if the numbers are allowed to accumulate, and if the sick are not removed till the order for a march shall actually have arrived.

Je viens de donner ordre pour que l'armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise passe la Guadiana demain matin. Les troupes ici, et les divisions avec le Général Hill, se mettront en mouvement vers 2 heures du matin ; et demain nous nous trouverons avec la droite en avant d'Elvas, et la gauche à Campo Maior, avec nos postes sur la Caya.

Je proposerais à votre Excellence de vous mettre en mouvement à la même heure, et de passer la Guadiana à Jurumenha, laissant le Général Loy comme avant garde à Olivença, ou il pourrait aller en même tems que les autres troupes quitteront cette position. Si les mouvemens de l'ennemi sur notre gauche vers Talavera rendent nécessaire quelque mouvement de ce côté-ci, plutôt qu'à l'heure ci-dessus indiquée, j'ordonnerai au Général Cotton de vous le communiquer tout de suite, et de prier le Général Loy de se porter sur Olivença par Valverde, jusqu'à ce qu'il puisse recevoir les ordres de votre Excellence.

Je resterai ici jusqu'à vers 2 heures de l'après midi ; et j'irai d'ici au camp du Général Hill, où je resterai jusqu'à la nuit ; et j'irai coucher à la Quinta de Granicha, de l'autre côté de la Guadiana.

J'ai fait marcher le Général Giron sur Villa Real, près Jurumenha, ce matin ; pour qu'il puisse être en mesure de se joindre à vous sur la marche de demain.

Memorandum for Major Gens. Campbell and Slade.

Quinta de Granicha, 17th June, 1811, 6 A.M.

I wish the 6th division, and Gen. Pack's brigade, to cross the Tagus to-morrow, the 18th inst., and to move to Niza, and next day, the 19th, to Portalegre.

If this order should reach the rear of these troops so late that they cannot reach Niza on the 18th, they must remain either on the Tagus on the left bank, or on the stream between the Niza and the Tagus, and march on the 19th to Alpalhão, and on the 20th to Portalegre.

I wish Major Gen. Slade's brigade to march to-morrow, the 18th, to Sarnadas and neighbourhood from Castello Branco, on the 19th to cross the Tagus and march to Niza, and on the 20th to march to Portalegre.

When the troops cross at Villa Velha they must march on, each regiment of infantry, and each troop of cavalry, as soon as it shall have crossed, and not wait for the others.

Major Gen. Campbell is requested to forward this memorandum to Brig. Gen. Pack without loss of time.

Au Capt. Gén. Don J. Blake.

Elvas, ce 17 Juin, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que les troupes sous mes ordres ont fait ce matin le mouvement indiqué dans la lettre que je vous ai écrite hier d'Albuera.

Je n'ai pas encore de nouvelles positives de l'ennemi. Il y a un bruit que le Général Regnier s'est porté sur Medellin au lieu de sur Merida. Une grande partie de la force ennemie a passé le Tage ; et toutes leurs troupes sont en mouvement sur Almaraz, selon les nouvelles que j'ai reçues dans la nuit, de Coria, du 15.

J'ose recommander à votre Excellence de continuer votre marche

demain pour arriver bien vite en Andalousie. L'ennemi ne s'attendra pas à ce mouvement; et il est probable qu'il n'en apprendra rien de quelques jours, pendant lesquels vous pourrez avoir le tems de faire un beau coup.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Quinta de Granicha, 17th June, 1811.

I send with this orders addressed to Major Gen. Campbell and Gen. Pack, to march to Niza to-morrow, the 18th, and to Portalegre the 19th; and to Major Gen. Slade to march to Sarnadas the 18th, to Niza the 19th, and to Portalegre the 20th. It is important that these orders should reach them without loss of time, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send them copies of this letter by an officer, besides my memorandum addressed to each by the guide, who must not be delayed a moment.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 17th June, 1811, 8 p.m.

Campo Maior must of course at present be supplied from hence; and, as that place is in the first instance of primary importance, I have desired Mr. Kennedy to settle with the Superintendent of Viveres, to send there to-morrow morning 20,000 rations, which will last the garrison about a month, which is all we want of them. 14,000 rations were sent to Jurumenha this afternoon at 4 o'clock upon 40 mules; and if you will let Mr. Kennedy know immediately what ammunition you wish to have back, he will bring it back upon these mules as far as they will go. Our ammunition has already been brought here, I understand from Col. Framingham.

In respect to the wounded of the French army, I know nothing of them, as Gen. Leite and the Portuguese departments have had charge of them from the beginning; but if we should receive any distinct account of the numbers which require carriages, and what can walk, I have no doubt but that we shall be able to remove the whole.

To Col. Austin.

Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

I am much obliged to you for your two letters of the 15th, which I just received.

Gen. Blake marches from Jurumenha to-morrow, and will arrive at Mertola on the 22d or 23d. He passes by Beja, where he will be on the 20th or 21st, and you will do well to communicate with him at that place.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

In the course of the last 3 months, the British army have had but few men less than 7000 wounded in the service of Portugal; and the hardships and fatigues of the service, and the season, must, of course, have occasioned some sickness.

I have frequently endeavored to prevail upon the Portuguese government to allow us to establish the British hospitals in the rope walk at Belem, of which no use can, at present, or indeed ought to be made; and I find that the convents, &c., which were used as hospitals at Lisbon by the British army heretofore, are now applied to other purposes, and all accommodation of this description is now refused.

I beg you will do me the favor to lay this letter before the Portuguese government, and to obtain for me a decided answer, by return of post, whether they will or not supply any and what accommodation, at Lisbon, for the British soldiers wounded in fighting the battles of Portugal.

If I should find the government still disinclined to attend to my requests upon this subject, I propose to send an officer express to England to apprise H.R.H. the Prince Regent and his ministers of this extraordinary circumstance, and I request to hear from you as soon as possible.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

I have received your letters of the 12th, 13th, and 15th; but as I have been forward with the troops for some days, I have not been able to send you answers as regularly as I ought.

I don't recollect to have written to you upon the subject of hay in Lower Beira. If I should want any article of that description, and money is to be laid out in the previous collection of it for a magazine for the British army, I shall employ a British Commissary on the service, as I know from experience what a very good thing it is to give money to have a magazine collected for the British army by the Portuguese. We can scarcely keep them out of the magazines we collect for ourselves, and we should scarcely get into one which they should collect for us.

I shall send Dr. Somers' memorial home.

If it was not a matter of most serious importance, which may go not only to the safety of the army, but to the fate of the whole cause, I should be highly diverted by the bustle occasioned at Lisbon by the danger of Elvas. All of a sudden the utmost activity prevails, and all means are set at work, to relieve distress which ought never to have existed, if common precautions had been taken, or if any measures had been adopted to feed Gen. Hamilton's division, excepting to throw their consumption upon the magazines of the fortress. After all, this bustle will produce nothing in time; and if I cannot get up a sufficient supply from our magazines, I shall be obliged to fight a battle to save this place against the whole force of Andalusia, Castille, and the centre of Spain, with diminished force on my side. The enemy will be one fourth stronger than us in every arm, nearly double in cavalry, and we shall not have in the action 14,000 Portuguese troops!! Under these circumstances I should, and shall, avoid a general action if I can; but I must put a countenance upon the state of affairs, and matters must be risked till provisions be placed in Elvas.

The Portuguese government may depend upon my bringing this subject under the distinct consideration of the Regent's ministers. I have long determined that I will have no discussion with them upon any subject; but I shall report the consequences of their conduct to my own government, and leave to them to determine what shall be done. I conclude, however, that Lord Wellesley will think it necessary that our Regent should explain himself clearly to the Regent of Portugal on these subjects.

I have no objection to agricultural cattle being purchased and distributed to the districts that require them, provided the money which is to purchase them is not to come out of the military chest. I give the same answer about pipes. I also beg that whatever is thus given in charity may be given on the ground of the wants of the several districts, and by no means in reference to the wants of the means of transport for the military operations. The government have it in their power to collect those

means of transport whenever we may require them, and ought to do their duty; and I don't think that the charity of the people of England ought to be laid out to aid in the operations of the war, or to save the government the trouble of forcing those parts of the people who have not suffered to do their duty by their country.

The quantity of 24 pound shot, we understand, that could be sent from Lisbon, was 480, which we fired in about 2 hours!!! I never heard there were any at Estremoz. This place, however, has 6000 more shot than it had before we commenced operations against Badajoz; and although we destroyed 16 miserable guns, it has 4 more pieces of ordnance, and these sent up are better than those they had. All it wants is provisions. The state of this place, however, and the means of keeping it hereafter, are subjects of very, very serious consideration, upon which I shall address Sir W. Beresford, and I shall send to you, and to my government, a copy of my letter. If we save it now, this government will yet lose it, if they pay the usual attention to it.

Soult has been very cautious in his movements, and has kept clear of us, and has gone to his right. I think he communicated with Regnier yesterday, not by Merida, but by Medellin, as Regnier also does not dash now. We raised the blockade and crossed the Guadiana this morning. Blake marches to-morrow to cross the Guadiana again at Mertola, and try something towards Seville.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

17th June, 1811.

The Inspector Gen. of hospitals having represented to the Commander of the Forces the serious inconvenience that arises to the medical officers at Lisbon, from having to visit the wounded officers in various districts of the town, and the time that necessarily elapses in going from quarter to quarter where these officers are accommodated with billets, and that thence less attendance can be given than would otherwise be the case, I am directed by his Excellency to call your particular attention to this subject. Dr. Franck has proposed to fit up a capacious house with cot frames and hospital bedding for their accommodation. In this house he suggested they might diet themselves, the medical officers being responsible only for their attendance. However, as there may be reasons stated against such an arrangement, the Commander of the Forces is of opinion it would be better that you should communicate and give orders to the D. A. Q. M. G. and the magistrates granting billets, for the purpose of making an allotment of quarters to be appropriated solely to wounded or sick officers requiring constant attendance. These districts might be at two, or perhaps three, different places, but not more, and the districts might be contiguous. Every officer of the above description should be obliged to have his billet in the quarter of the town thus marked out; and the medical officers would thus be enabled, by concentrating their patients, to give, not only more ample attendance, but they would feel satisfied that all the wounded officers and bad cases of the sick were visited by them, which it is more than probable may under present circumstances be neglected. When you have made the above arrangement, you will be pleased to communicate with Dep. Inspector Bolton and the medical officers at Lisbon accordingly; and you will cause the allotment to be made known in your garrison orders, &c., so that no officer who is at Lisbon for his cure, and not for his pleasure, need plead ignorance of the same. You will be pleased to communicate to me fully for his Excellency's information the arrangements you make for the above head of service.

The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

17th June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose for your information the copy of a letter I have addressed to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, at Lisbon, in consequence of your letter of the 15th, proposing an arrangement for the accommodation of the wounded officers at

Lisbon. Although your idea would be very convenient if it could be well carried into effect, still, as British officers are not used to be sent to what they might deem a general hospital, but have generally billets and rooms to themselves, and as, besides that, there would be probable difficulties in their dieting themselves, &c., the Commander of the Forces is of opinion that an arrangement, such as I have directed, may be carried into effect without difficulty, and might answer the purpose of obviating the inconvenience now felt by the medical officers.

So soon as I receive Brig. Gen. Peacocke's answer, I shall not fail to communicate with you.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

Adverting to my letter to you of the 2d inst., regarding 2 squadrons of the 12th light dragoons expected from England in this country, I have now the honor to enclose the copy of a letter of the 28th May, which I received yesterday from the Secretary of the Commander in Chief, in which I have been informed that the squadrons of the 12th light dragoons are destined for service in Portugal. You will therefore countermand the orders for the disposal of their horses, if you should have given any; and I send orders this day that they may be landed and prepared for the field as soon as they shall arrive.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

The circumstances of this place have been materially altered since the enemy have obtained possession of Badajoz; but they appear to have been but little adverted to hitherto, either by the Governors of the Kingdom or by those charged with its immediate defence, in consequence of a large part of the army having been in this part of the country ever since Badajoz fell into the hands of the enemy. It is obvious that the army cannot always remain in the Alentejo; and yet it is clear, from what occurred in the recent attempts to obtain possession of Badajoz by the allied troops, that there is no time during which the army may be absent so short that the enemy will not be justified in military prudence to make the attempt to obtain possession of Elvas, and that they can raise the siege at any time, and carry off every thing in 36 hours. Of all fortified towns in the world, Elvas therefore ought to be the one in the state best prepared to stand an attack; but I am sorry to observe that, however respectable in itself as a fortification, it appears to me to be the fortified town that I have yet seen that is the least prepared to make a defence.

I recommend to you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to the following measures, to put the place in the state in which it ought to be:

1st; A distinct clear arrangement by the government to keep the place supplied with the provisions which it will require; to keep up the stock of provisions in the forts to the quantity which it will be deemed necessary to have in them. The Commissary Gen. of the British army is taking measures, as you know, to throw a stock of provisions into Elvas; but these measures will answer only a temporary purpose, if the government should not take care, by adequate arrangements, to keep up the stock of provisions, and providing for the regular daily consumption of the garrison, as well as for the consumption of those Portuguese troops which may be employed in its neighbourhood.

2dly; The ordnance in Elvas is generally very bad, and in very bad

order; the carriages worn out, and generally unfit for service; the shot does not suit the calibres of the guns, and of course the practice of the artillery must be very uncertain. The ordnance and carriages should be very particularly inspected and reported upon, as well as the shot; and measures should be taken to replace by degrees those guns deemed unserviceable or bad by others of the calibres for which shot can be procured. If there is no good ordnance in the arsenal of Lisbon, it will be necessary to apply for it to England, and I will make the application.

As Elvas must now be considered in the light of a real and important *place de guerre*, it is desirable that a sufficient space, from 800 to 1000 yards around it, should be cleared of trees, that walls and fences should be levelled, and all the measures adopted which can increase its security, by exposing to its fire, as far as possible, all the ground within its range. There are some glaring deficiencies and defects in the works, to which, without incurring any large expense, by degrees, improvements might be made.

1st; The covert way, as well of Elvas as of La Lippe and S^{ra} Lucia, ought to be palisaded.

2dly; The ground over which the road from Villa Boim passes is not seen at all from S^{ra} Lucia, or from the body of the place; and it appears that a redoubt on the rock on the right of S^{ra} Lucia would command that ground, and would aid in the defence of S^{ra} Lucia, and of the body of the place, by both of which its flanks would, in some degree, be protected. A good palisaded redoubt ought to be constructed on that ground.

I have no doubt that a closer examination of the place would point out other improvements; and if I saw any desire in the government to maintain the place manifested by their constant attention to keep it supplied with provisions, ordnance, and ammunition, I would employ our best engineer to examine it, and to make a complete report upon it. In the existing situation of Elvas as a fortified garrison, liable at every moment to be attacked, it is a question whether the head quarters of the province of Alentejo should remain there, and so large a population as there is in it should be encouraged, or even allowed to remain. At all events, nobody ought to be allowed to remain who has not at all times a supply of provisions for 4 months.

The duty of the garrison, and the discipline of the troops composing it, ought to be most particularly attended to; and the whole system ought to be founded on the situation in which Elvas is placed as a fortified garrison, necessarily left to itself, close to one occupied by an active and enterprising enemy, possessing means of attack at any moment; and the duties ought to be carried on in the most regular manner.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

I request that, when the 12th light dragoons shall arrive at Lisbon, they may be landed and prepared in the usual manner to join the army as soon as it may be convenient.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

I enclose the copy of an intercepted letter from Joseph to Napoleon,* which appears to me to be as interesting a document as has yet appeared;

* See Appendix, Vol. IV., No. XXXVIII.

and you may depend upon it that this is a true copy of the original, which is at Cadiz, in the possession of that government.

It shows that this tyrant does not treat his relations, or even his brothers, better than he does other people; and gives ground for hope that his tyrannical temper will at no distant period deprive him of the advantages which he would derive from the Austrian alliance.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

Capt. —, of the French service, who was aide de camp to Gen. —, deserted from the French army about a month ago, when they were at Salamanca. He is desirous of serving in the East Indies, which is, I believe, impossible; or, if that can't be done, in the service of Russia; and I request your Lordship to facilitate to him the means of arriving in Russia.

The A.G. to Capt. O'Kelly, Celorico.

18th June, 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will without loss of time proceed from Celorico to Abrantes, at which latter place a general hospital station is to be established, of which you are to be appointed Commandant. It will be necessary for you, previous to your leaving Celorico, to be satisfied that all the convalescents, sick, &c., are removed from that station to Coimbra, &c.

You will not fail to acknowledge the receipt of this letter, and report your arrival at Abrantes, where I hope you will be with the least possible delay.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.

19th June, 1811.

Major Rageon, of the 20th dragoons, taken prisoner at Usagre, is now on his way to Lisbon, where he will receive his parole. It was the intention of his Excellency to have exchanged this officer, but some circumstances have prevented its taking place at this moment. I have, therefore, to request he may be well treated until an opportunity offers to effect the exchange.

The French horses forwarded this day to Lisbon are to be handed over to Lieut. Hill, and disposed of for the benefit of the captors, agreeably to the G. O. on that head.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Quinta de S. João, 20th June, 1811, 6 P.M.

I write to let you know that a body of the enemy's cavalry, consisting, as is stated, of 1500 or 1600 men, entered Badajoz at 4½ P.M.; about 300 are said to be encamped upon the Gevora.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 20th June, 1811, 1 P.M.

I have been over the ground behind Campo Maior, as far as Ouguela. It is very important that this last place, although in a great degree dismantled, should be occupied by about 200 infantry; and I have given orders to Gen. Picton to send there that number this evening, and shall be obliged to you if you will desire Gen. Leite to relieve them in the morning early with 100 of the line and 100 militia: they should take with them provisions for to-morrow and next day; and I will settle with the Commissary Gen. to throw in, for ten days, provisions for them: there will be no difficulty in withdrawing these men, if we should withdraw.

I have sent for Dickson to endeavor to get two 18 or 24 pounders for the garrison of Campo Maior, in order to assist us; and I think it might be desirable to put 2 iron 6 or 4 pounders in Ouguela, if there are such guns in Elvas.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 20th June, 1811.

The enemy moved forward his advanced guard, consisting of about 10,000 men, to Los Santos, on the morning of the 13th.

Upon this occasion, Lieut. Strenuwitz, of the 21st dragoons, was sent out by Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine to reconnoitre the enemy with a small detachment of the 2d hussars and the 3d dragoon guards, which distinguished themselves in an attack upon a superior number of the enemy, and took some prisoners.

I had arranged that the cavalry, and 2d and 4th divisions of the allied British and Portuguese army, and the corps of Spanish troops under Gen. Blake, should collect upon Albuera, if the enemy should advance to interrupt the siege or blockade of Badajoz; and I went to Albuera on that night to superintend the movements of the troops.

I also moved, on the night of the 13th, Gen. Hamilton's division from the blockade of Badajoz to Albuera, with an intention to stop the enemy at that place, in case the army of the south alone should have moved forward.

On the 14th, in the night, Lieut. Ayling, of the 40th regt., who had been employed at Truxillo to observe the movements of the enemy, arrived at Albuera with the account that the advanced guard of the enemy's army of Portugal from Castille had entered that town (Truxillo) at noon on the 13th, which confirmed the other accounts which I had received of their progress up to the 12th; and as from Truxillo they might have been at Merida on the 15th, and in communication with the army of the south, I determined to raise the blockade of Badajoz, and that all the allied troops should cross the Guadiana on the 17th. This was accordingly effected without difficulty or loss of any description; and Gen. Blake, who it had been settled should cross the Guadiana again at Mertola on the 22d inst., in order to make an attempt upon Seville, likewise crossed with his corps at Jurumenha on the 17th.

Since that period the right of the allied British and Portuguese army have been encamped in the woods upon the Caya, about Torre del Moro, having their right upon the Ponte de Caya; the 3d and 7th divisions, and Brig. Gen. Madden's cavalry, being in Campo Maior; and the troops which had been under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer on the frontier of Castille have crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, in proportion as the enemy have crossed that river at Almaraz; and, with the exception of the 5th division and Col. Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which I did not order to move from Lower Beira till I was assured that the last of the enemy had moved from Almaraz, the whole are now upon the Caya, between this place and Arronches. I expect that the 5th division will be at Arronches by the 24th inst.

The enemy's advance have appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajoz this day; and I conceive that their whole army will be collected to-morrow in the neighbourhood of Merida. The enemy have collected upon this occasion all their force from Castille, their whole force from Madrid, and what is called their centre army, and all the force from Andalusia, excepting what is absolutely necessary to maintain their position before Cadiz and that held by Sebastiani in the eastern kingdoms of Andalusia.*

* See Appendix, No. V.

I believe that they have left for these objects about 11,000 infantry, and no cavalry fit for service; and that they have collected in this province from 48,000 to 50,000 effective R. and F. of infantry, and about 7000 cavalry, besides artillery, &c.

I hope to have to oppose to them about 41,000 or 42,000 effective R. and F. of infantry, if the 5th division should be in time, and 4000 cavalry, besides artillery.

The diversion made by Gen. Blake upon Seville may possibly have a good effect; and, at all events, the enemy have abandoned Old and New Castille, with the exception of a small garrison in Madrid, and have risked every thing in all parts of Spain in order to collect this large army in Estremadura. Under these circumstances, I am inclined not to risk the fate of the cause on the result of one battle, in which I am certain that, with every exertion, the allies must be inferior in numbers, particularly in that description of troops (cavalry) for whose operations this country is favorable. I therefore propose not to risk an action, unless I should find it necessary in order to provision Elvas; notwithstanding that I have the fullest confidence in the result of any action in which I may deem it expedient to engage the troops.

I am in hopes that, before the 24th, the convoys expected from Abrantes will arrive in Elvas; and your Lordship may depend upon it that I shall not engage in any affair which will involve the safety of the army, or at this moment any serious loss, without evident necessity.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General. Quinta de S. João, 21st June, 1811.

I have desired that 200 men of the garrison of Elvas might be sent to occupy Ouguela, which is situated about 4 miles from Campo Maior. As usual, the Portuguese authorities have no means of providing for these men, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send biscuit, wine, and sheep to Ouguela, either this day or very early to-morrow, to last this detachment for ten days.

P.S. How are the supplies getting on at Elvas?

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B. Quinta de S. João, 21st June, 1811, 2½ P.M.

I have been so busy that I have not been able to write to you for some days; but I have had no news to tell you.

The French came to Badajoz yesterday; but it appears that the greatest part of their cavalry went back to Talavera this morning.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send Waters and O'Lawlor, and any others of the officers attached to head quarters that you don't want with you. I am only 3 or 4 leagues from you, and dine every day at 3, and shall be glad to see you any day that you will come over.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley. Quinta de S. João, 21st June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I wrote on the 10th inst. to Gen. Castaños,* regarding the operations of the armies in consequence of raising the siege of Badajoz, with his reply, and that of Gen. Blake; and the copy of a letter which I wrote to Gen. Blake of the 12th inst.,†

* See p. 80.

† See p. 84.

on his route, and his reply; and of one which I wrote to him on the 14th inst.; and the copy of a letter to Gen. Blake of the 17th inst., which I beg you to lay before the Spanish government.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 21st June, 1811.

I enclose copies of my last dispatches, which contain all the intelligence I can give you. Matters are in a very critical state just now; but I think I shall carry them through.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Elvas.

21st June, 1811.

In reply to your letter of this date, I have to acquaint you that the Inspector of hospitals is making arrangements by which all the cases of wounded men in Elvas, that cannot be removed, will be given over to the civil hospital there, agreeably to an arrangement heretofore fixed on in cases where the necessity arises, the patient paying to the civil hospital 3 *testoons* a day. So soon as this service is effected, the medical staff and stores at that place will be removed to a station in the rear, nearer Abrantes. Estremoz will likewise be broken up, and also moved to such place as will be fixed on in a day or two; I rather believe it will be Crato. When this occurs, it is my intention to direct Capt. Stewart, who is now at Estremoz, to take charge of the new hospital station that is to be formed; and as there will be no immediate change at Belem, I should think, as it is your wish, that you might, on the conclusion of the service at Elvas, join the Portuguese army. You shall, however, hear from me again on this subject in a day or two. The Assist. Provost, to whom you allude, must proceed with the sick to the new hospital station, which the Inspector Gen. will point out. Another man has been appointed to the 4th division. A subaltern, with the colors of the 57th regt., may join the station where the other staff of the different corps are, under Lieut. Col. Stewart, of the Buffs.

The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

21st June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose for your information a letter and enclosure I have received from Brig. Gen. Peacocke, on the intended arrangement for billeting the wounded and sick officers at Lisbon, in one or two districts of the town, and to have them collected as far as possible.

It would appear, however, from the Brig. Gen.'s report, that he has gone rather further than was meant; and as I conceive all your practitioners are equally capable of treating all maladies, it seems unnecessary to go into the minute arrangement the Brig. Gen. points out, merely for the convenience of particular celebrated practitioners. In fact, the Commandant proposes to appropriate the wards of a general hospital, whereas all that I understood you to desire was, to collect as contiguous as could be conveniently managed the wounded cases particularly, and the sick together. If such are your ideas on this subject, further instructions will be sent to Brig. Gen. Peacocke accordingly.

To Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

Ponte de Caya, 22d June, 1811, 5½ P.M.

The enemy appear to be withdrawing, and I beg you will order ——— to take up his ground in any convenient situation near Elvas, and that he will attend to the directions he before received from Sir S. Cotton, to throw out small piquets of observation on the Caya and Guadiana. If he had had his whole brigade instead of a large piquet on the Caya, he could not have prevented the enemy from advancing, and the difficulty of retiring is increased in proportion to the numbers of which the body which is to retire consists. This principle is well known and understood in this army; and if it had not been acted upon invariably, we should have lost all our cavalry long ago in the way in which ——— ——— lost

the piquet of the —th this morning. To crown all, I understand that these large piquets were not able to give sufficiently early intelligence of the enemy, and that the —th dragoons have lost their corn sacks.

Let the piquets of ———'s brigade communicate with those of Gen. Madden, which they have not done yet, and with the piquet of the 28th regt. on the Atalaya, near the Ponte de Caya; and I repeat that they must be very small, being only of observation. They can always retire upon Elvas, and thence join their brigades.

P.S. Let Col. Murray know where Gen. ———'s brigade will be, and desire Gen. ——— to apply to the Commissary Gen. this evening for corn sacks for the —th dragoons; he is in Elvas.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Quinta de S. João, 23d June, 1811, 11½ A.M.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send an intelligent officer, with a glass, to Ouguela, and another to the Atalaya, between Ouguela and Campo Maior, an hour or two before sunset this evening, in order to reconnoitre well the wood beyond the Gevora, and to see whether the enemy have in it any infantry, and let me know if they should observe any.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 23d June, 1811, 11½ P.M.

I am just come in from Campo Maior, where all is perfectly quiet. Gen. Picton told me that the Governor had informed him that he had sent to Elvas yesterday, by order of Gen. Leite, 40 bullocks, which had before been sent to Campo Maior, as provision for the garrison.

P.S. Mr. Kennedy tells me that the Governor of Jurumenha has sent his bullocks back, saying that he had no money to pay any body to take care of them!

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 23d June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th inst., and I am much obliged to you for the arrangement which you have ordered respecting the flat boats in the river Tagus, for the conveyance of the sick, &c., down to Lisbon.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 23d June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th inst., and I have again communicated to Sir W. Beresford the desire of the Portuguese government that he should recommend the detail of the measures to be adopted in respect to the Commissariat.

1. It appears to Marshal Beresford, as I confess it does to me, that these details have already been fully discussed and recommended by him as well as by me; by me in my private and public letters to you of the 26th March and 8th April, and by Sir W. Beresford in his comments upon those letters. It is desirable, therefore, that Sir W. Beresford should be informed upon what point the government wish to have his opinion further in detail. I have not understood that the Commissary Gen. required hay in Lower Beira, but I will inquire.

2. It always gives me much concern to make any observation on an assertion made by Dom M. Forjaz ; but I must say that the assertion made that the magazines of Elvas supplied the British troops with provisions is without foundation in the view in which it is made. It is true that, because the government will not enforce their own regulations, means of transport could not be procured in Alentejo, and therefore at times the troops serving on that frontier, during the month of April and part of May, were not very regularly supplied with provisions. I beg to refer you to a letter which I wrote to you on this on the 31st March.

The troops must have been withdrawn, as I stated they would, if they had not received occasional assistance from the garrison of Elvas ; but the whole amount which they received was trifling, and could not have been the cause of the existing distress, as the whole was repaid. If assertions of this description are repeated, I must be under the necessity of withholding all assistance from the Portuguese government. I do every thing in my power to assist them. At this moment I have provisioned all the forts on the frontier, and the return made is a reproach that our troops have been the cause of the deficiency. If I were to withhold this assistance our troops would never have occasion to ask for any, even the smallest supply, from any of the Portuguese establishments.

I am apprehensive that the money received from Mr. Sampayo to be laid out in the purchase of cattle and wine pipes will interfere with the supplies for the military chest.

3. I don't know of any signal being made to prevent the transmission of 24 pound shot. I was informed by Marshal Sir W. Beresford that there were no more at Lisbon, excepting 480, which the Admiral was about to send.

4. I have this day had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st, containing a proposition from Dom M. Forjaz for the regulation of the boats on the Tagus. I concur in the propriety of the first two articles of the regulation, and will direct the Commissary Gen. to attend to them. In respect to the 3d article, which regulates a division of the boats between the commissariat establishments of the two armies, I must beg leave to decline to have any concern in such a distribution.

When the troops were on the Mondego such a distribution was agreed upon, and carried into effect ; and the consequence was, that the boats delivered over by the Commissary Gen., and employed in the service of the Portuguese army, were never paid for, and the British army has since experienced the inconvenience resulting from this loss of credit. The owners of boats on the Mondego were unwilling to engage to serve us, because they expected to be obliged to serve the Portuguese army without payment.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

23d June, 1811.

In reply to your letter and enclosure relative to the arrangement for appropriating billets of wounded and sick officers, as contiguous together as possible, at Lisbon, I have to acquaint you that it is not deemed necessary to go into so minute an arrangement as to fix on quarters for particular diseases or complaints. as this might be evidently attended with extreme awkwardness and inconvenience

to many officers. All that the Commander of the Forces desires is, that one or two districts may be allotted for the reception of officers whose wounds or maladies require constant attendance. The Inspector Gen.'s letter, which I enclose, will show you that a more minute distribution is not necessary.

Au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse. Au Quartier Général, ce 24 Juin, 1811.

Je suis bien fâché que vous n'avez pas reçu la réponse que je vous ai faite à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 16 Mai, et j'ai l'honneur, à présent, d'en envoyer à votre Excellence le duplicata.

Je crois que M. Ville sur Arce a été depuis envoyé en Angleterre; mais si votre Excellence consent que M. Gray reste ici, je manderai que M. Ville sur Arce soit tout de suite renvoyé en France. Si non, je renverrai M. Gray aux avant postes de l'armée Française demain matin, ou aussitôt que je connaîtrai les désirs de votre Excellence.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Quinta de S. João, 24th June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State, directing that you should join this army, leaving Major Gen. Disney in the command at Cadiz, and authorising me to draw from Cadiz such reinforcements as I might think proper.

Adverting to the return of the troops at Cadiz of the 1st June, which is the last that I have received, I find that you have not at Cadiz nearly so many men as is supposed by the Sec. of State; and I learn from a private letter from Mr. Wellesley, your letter upon that subject not having reached me, that you have detached the 2d batt. 47th regt.; and it appears to me that the only troops that can be spared from Cadiz are one squadron, or the dismounted men of the 2d hussars, with the Major and a proportion of the officers, and the detachment of the 3d batt. 95th regt. If you should agree in opinion with me that these troops can, with propriety, be detached from Cadiz under existing circumstances, I beg you to send them to Lisbon without loss of time.

I also request you to give such orders and instructions as you may think necessary that Gen. Disney should have, including those which I originally gave to Gen. Stewart, and those which you have received from time to time from the Sec. of State and Commander in Chief; and you will deliver to Gen. Disney the command of the British troops at Cadiz, and proceed yourself to join the army in this country.

I beg you to make such arrangements as you may think proper respecting the Staff at Cadiz, bringing with you such of the officers belonging to it as you may be desirous should accompany you, and leaving to perform the duties, under Major Gen. Disney, those who may be necessary to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Quinta de S. João, 24th June, 1811.

I have great pleasure in sending you the accompanying orders to join this army. You will find us somewhere in this neighbourhood; but I believe you will find it most convenient to join us by Lisbon, particularly if you should have at all a fair wind from Cadiz. Let me know by which road you will come, that I may have arrangements made to facilitate your progress.

I don't know whether you have had any communication from England

respecting sending troops to Tarragona. If you have not, I should think you had better take advantage of the detachment now drawn from Cadiz to call back the 47th, as, if the government have not altered their opinion upon this subject, I am apprehensive that they will not approve of your sending these troops. This is, however, only an opinion floating in my mind. I am not at all aware of the circumstances in which Tarragona stands, or of those which induced you to detach these troops, as I have not yet received your letter upon this subject, and it is not improbable that both may be of that urgent nature to prevent your recalling the troops.

Nothing of importance has occurred since I sent my last dispatch to my brother, excepting a great reconnaissance by the enemy the day before yesterday, in which we lost a piquet of the —th dragoons, just arrived, owing very much to the officer, — of the —th, having mistaken the French dragoons for ours.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Stewart, 3d or Buffs, Estremoz.

24th June, 1811.

I have to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces directed, some time since, 2000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements to be sent from Lisbon to Elvas, for the use of the soldiers unequipped, from being wounded and otherwise, who had lost their arms and accoutrements in the battle of Albuera.

Upon sending away the general hospital establishment from Elvas, his Excellency directed 400 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements *only* should be sent up, as the men sent down to Lisbon would be provided in the dépôt at Belem, upon quitting the hospital. The Commander of the Forces is not certain whether these arms and accoutrements are coming up to Alcaccer do Sal, or by Aldea Galega; but he desires you will send an officer to each of those places to inquire for these arms and accoutrements, and to arrange with the Commissary stationed at the place where they will be found, to have them sent to you at Evora.

P.S. Since writing my letter of this morning, I understand that the head quarters, &c., of the different corps under your orders are to go to Evora, and not to Monte Mór.

The A.G. to Capt. Stewart, 74th regt., Alter do Chão.

24th June, 1811.

As an escort of 2 serjeants and 18 men will proceed to-morrow morning from Elvas to Alter do Chão, in charge of 150 wains with ammunition, I have to request that you will appoint a similar escort of convalescents over the ammunition on its arrival at that place, in order that the party from hence may return to their corps with as little delay as possible.

N.B. The above party has been since ordered to consist of 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, and 30 men, instead of 2 serjeants and 18 men.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Baron C. Alten, K.G.L.

24th June, 1811.

Your letter of the 19th to Lieut. Col. Rooke, enclosing Col. Halkett's on the subject of the desertion from the Light battalions of the King's German Legion, has been laid before the Commander of the Forces, and his Excellency much regrets that any prisoners of war should have been enlisted for, or permitted to enter, the Light battalions of the King's German Legion. He has directed me to write to Major Gen. Baron Low upon this subject, and to call on the officer employed in the recruiting service, at Lisbon, to account for his conduct in this instance. His Excellency, however, cannot permit you to detach an officer to Lisbon for this service, as Major Gen. Baron Low is generally intrusted with the same by orders from home. The Commander of the Forces will not fail to take all the measures he can to prevent the enlistment in future of prisoners into the King's German Legion.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Baron Low, K.G.L.

24th June, 1811.

I herewith enclose for your information some papers that have been received

relative to the desertion of various men from the Light battalions of Major Gen. Alten's brigade to the enemy. It appears to the Commander of the Forces, from these letters, that, notwithstanding his repeated orders, prisoners of war have been enlisted for the Legion. You will be pleased, therefore, to call the officers who have been employed in the recruiting service strictly to account for this disobedience of orders; and you will not fail to adopt such measures as you shall deem most advisable for preventing in future the enlistment of a description of men into the King's German Legion who do not fail, the first favorable moment that occurs, to bring disgrace and obloquy on the very deserving men with whom they are embodied.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

24th June, 1811.

I have the honor to acquaint you that, in compliance with the renewed application of Capt. Tucker to be removed from the duties of the depôt at Belem, and in consequence of his probable immediate promotion, his Excellency has been pleased to acquiesce in his wishes of joining his regiment, although he feels satisfied, from the very able manner in which he has conducted the arduous business of the situation at Belem, the army at large will experience a loss in his very able services; but the Commander of the Forces is unwilling to refuse the request of an officer of Capt. Tucker's merit, repeatedly made.

Capt. Brown, of the 23d fusiliers, late Commandant at the hospital station at Elvas, has received orders to repair to Lisbon, and to report himself to you, for the purpose of taking upon himself the duties of the depôt. It will be necessary that Capt. Tucker should wait to see this officer well initiated into all parts of the details of the depôt before Capt. Tucker joins the 29th; and this can be more facilitated now from the circumstances under which the 29th are, Capt. Tucker's immediate presence not being required. So soon as you feel satisfied that Capt. Brown is informed of every part of his duty, and that the public service will not suffer by Capt. Tucker's leaving the depôt, that officer may join his regiment.

The A.G. to Capt. Tucker, Belem.

24th June, 1811.

I have to apologise for not sooner answering your letter and memorial, for which, however, there was no occasion, as the Commander of the Forces availed himself immediately of the opportunity that offered for recommending to notice your meritorious service.

I have now to perform a very unpleasant task to myself, as I feel that the service, as well as this department in particular, will experience a very essential loss in your removal from the duties of the depôt at Belem. But as you have repeatedly urged this point with the Commander of the Forces, his Excellency was unwilling any longer to refuse the request of an officer whose services and merits claim from the Commander of the Forces every attention in his power. I am directed, therefore, especially to assure you of the satisfaction Lord Wellington has derived from your diligent, constant, and arduous exertions at Belem, and that only your own repeated requests should have induced his Excellency to make an arrangement for your removal from a situation of the utmost importance to the army in general. Capt. Brown of the 23d fusiliers has been directed to repair to Belem, to take charge of the depôt. I have written further on this subject to Brig. Gen. Peacocke, to whom I beg to refer you.

The A.G. to Dr. Frunch, Inspector of hospitals.

24th June, 1811.

I enclose herewith for your information the result of an inquiry on a complaint made by a private of the 27th regt. against Dr. —, for cruel and improper treatment. It appears to the Commander of the Forces, that in no case has Dr. — a right to inflict any punishments of the nature here described, and his Excellency requests Dr. — may be informed of the same; for although it appears the individual may be a worthless subject, and highly deserving of chastisement, still when that is directed to be inflicted by persons who have no power to order it, representations of an improper nature will arise, highly detrimental to Dr. —'s professional character and situation

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811, noon.

About 1600 cavalry, which were at Olivença, have come over to Badajoz, and at 9½ A.M. were still upon the esplanade of the fort on the left of the Guadiana.

Send this intelligence to Cotton and Picton, as it is not improbable they may make another reconnaissance upon Campo Maior.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811, 2 P.M.

I enclose an account of what is already thrown into Elvas by Mr. Kennedy. Would you wish to have any more thrown in by us?

You will have seen how well pleased they are in England about Albuera. I wish to see you upon that subject.

To Major Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State, in consequence of which I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send to Gibraltar vessels to convey to Lisbon the 1st batt. 28th regt.; and I beg you to order them to embark as soon as those vessels shall arrive at Gibraltar.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

In consequence of the receipt of orders from the Sec. of State, I have to request that you will send vessels to Gibraltar, to convey from thence to Lisbon the 1st batt. 28th regt., which consists of about 600 R. and F.

I have the honor to enclose a letter for the Governor of Gibraltar, which I request you to forward by this occasion.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

On the Atalaya of Ponte de Caya, 25th June, 1811, 6½ P.M.

The intelligence which I have from Elvas this day states that about 1600 cavalry left Olivença this morning, marched through Badajoz at 10, passed the river, and went into the woods on the Gevora, where I now see them, and that 600 cavalry went from the woods on the other side of Badajoz to Olivença.

I think it possible that there may be a great reconnaissance to-morrow morning at Campo Maior, and therefore I recommend that Gen. De Grey's and Anson's brigades, and Le Fevre's troop of artillery, should be shortly after daylight behind the hill behind the town.

To Col. Murray, Q.M.G.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811, 8 P.M.

The greatest part of the cavalry which were about Olivença, have certainly moved into the woods on the Gevora, where I saw them this afternoon.

I have desired Sir S. Cotton to have De Grey's brigade and Anson's under the hill behind Campo Maior in the morning, as I think it not unlikely that there will be a reconnaissance on that place, and it would be advisable that Sir W. Erskine should be desired to have Long's brigade shortly after daylight near the Ponte de Caya, as it is clear that the cavalry are now on this side of the Guadiana, and to the northward of Badajoz.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State, regarding the transmission of prisoners and deserters to England; and I beg leave to recommend that you should send the whole number to England as soon as it may be convenient to you.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st, upon this subject.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 30th May; and I am sorry to say that Mr. Kennedy did apply to me to be relieved from his situation, but I prevailed upon him to allow me to delay the application for some time. I did not understand that his application was founded on his own want of health, but rather upon the anxiety of his wife that he should return to England; and I shall have to thank this lady and her sister, Mrs. Bourke, for having deprived me of the assistance of two very able officers.

I don't know how to fill Mr. Kennedy's place. Mr. — is certainly the best here; but, as I have lately discovered, even he is not entirely fit for such a charge. He certainly did not manage extremely well the duties of the Commissary of the troops which were here under Marshal Beresford. Matters were not going on well when I arrived here in April, or afterwards in May; and the wants of that department, of which, however, I believe that Mr. **** was the cause, occasioned the fatal delays of the end of March and beginning of April.

If therefore I must submit to the misfortune of losing Mr. Kennedy, I believe you had better send out Mr. Bissett. I hope, however, that Mr. Kennedy, who is as well as I am, will be prevailed upon to stay.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

I received this day your letter of the 11th; and I have replied in another letter to what you say respecting the thanks for the battle of Fuentes.

I will communicate the vote to Gen. Blake in the mode which I may think will be the most satisfactory to him. I rather think that I shall send it to my brother, as it will afford him an opportunity of conciliating Blake.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 4th, marked 'Private.' Your Lordship may rest assured that I am perfectly satisfied that you acted right in not proposing a vote in Parliament on the battle of Fuentes. The business would have been different if we had caught the garrison of Almeida; but, as it happened, the government were quite right. Indeed, people in England appear to me to be so much elated by any success, and so much depressed by any temporary check, that I feel difficulty in describing the state of our affairs, and am always apprehensive that the government will appreciate too highly what we do. I have sent for Gen. Graham.

I had a communication with Gen. Abadia, when he was on his way

to Coruña, and recommended to him to attend to Santoña. He is certainly the best of all the Spanish officers that I have seen; but still some time must elapse before he or any body else can form a Spanish army that will be of much use to us or to themselves.

Memorandum.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

1. The *Junta de Viveres* to be abolished, and in lieu of that board a commissariat to be appointed, consisting of a Commissary Gen., a certain number of deputies, assistants, and clerks, to perform the task of provisioning the Portuguese army.

2. For the present it is proposed to appoint a Commissary Gen., 6 deputies, 12 assistants, and 24 clerks.

3. The Commissary Gen. to receive possession of all the magazines and stores of the *Junta de Viveres*, and to correspond in the same manner with the magistrates in the different districts.

4. The Commissary Gen. should be obliged to give in an estimate, on the 1st of every month, of the articles and their cost required for his department, stating for what purposes required, where to be sent, the expense of transport, &c., for which the government should be obliged to furnish funds. The Commissary Gen. must show in each estimate the state of the magazines in every part of Portugal, and how far each can be made available for the service.

5. The commissariat of provisions and transport to be united.

6. The departments of the arsenal to be more distinctly enumerated, and the head of each department to be responsible for the duties of it. Estimates from the arsenal to be furnished every month, of the articles and their cost, required for each of the departments, and funds to be provided by the government for the payment of them.

7. All the civil departments attached to the army (the commissariat arsenal and hospitals) to be placed under military law. All crimes committed by the people employed in those departments to be tried by Courts Martial: the interposition of the civil law in all such cases to be abolished. A code of regulations to be framed, and specific punishments to be decreed, for certain crimes and misdemeanors.

8. A medical board to be formed, consisting of the *delegado* of the *Physico Mor* and the Inspector of Hospitals, for the general management of the medical department. The *delegado* is more particularly to superintend the physical departments, and the Inspector Gen. the surgical. The hospitals to be under the superintendence of the Inspector Gen., who will make his report to the board. The medical officers should, on the 1st of every month, give in an estimate of the expense of their departments, and the government should be obliged to provide funds for the payment of them.

9. Though the commissariat and medical departments are to be placed under military law, it is clearly to be understood that the rise of each individual is not to be regulated on any military principle, but that each individual is to be promoted according to his merit.

10. The military law to be altered according to the suggestions of Lord Wellington and the repeated representations of Marshal Beresford.

11. The government to enforce strictly their own laws and regulations respecting the means of transport to be supplied by the country for the use of the army; and specific punishments, whether of fine or confinement, to be decreed against those guilty of withholding their carts, boats, &c., when required in the regular manner for the public service; and against carters and boatmen guilty of desertion and of embezzlement, or destruction of provisions or stores which they are employed to transport.

12. The odious and oppressive system of *embargo* to be abolished; and any Commissary, or officer, or other public servant guilty of it to be punished.

13. The government to provide funds for the regular payment of the officers and troops, regulars as well as militia, of the *Bagajeiros* attached to the several regiments, and of all the departments of the army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 25th June, 1811.

The messenger did not arrive till the day before yesterday with your Lordship's letter marked 'Private,' of the 30th May.

Since Beresford has been relieved from the command of the army in this quarter many measures have been adopted to reinforce and recruit the Portuguese troops, which I hope will in a short time increase our numbers for duty; and I have had many conversations with Marshal Beresford and Mr. Sydenham since the latter arrived here, with a view to the arrangement of the civil departments of the Portuguese army, without which I have considered it proper to withhold my consent to the grant of the increased subsidy to the Portuguese government. When these points are settled here, Mr. Sydenham will go to Lisbon to arrange them with Mr. Stuart.

The revenue arrangements recently adopted have already had the effect of increasing the pecuniary means of the Portuguese government, as I was sure they would; and I have but little doubt that they will get on tolerably well in finance. There may be some difficulties in procuring specie; and we may not be able to prevail upon the government to carry the laws of the country strictly into execution as they ought; but the complaints which I have made of them to your Lordship, and which I have uniformly communicated to them, have had an excellent effect, and are not unlikely to stimulate their efforts. We are, however, suffering much from the misconduct of the Portuguese government; and I am risking an action at a moment in which it is desirable I should not fight. But, notwithstanding that the French have collected all their troops here, and have left literally nothing in other parts of Spain, and are so much stronger than we, they appear as little inclined to risk an action as we ought to be.

The Spaniards have now another opportunity to make an effort to shake off the yoke somewhere; but I am apprehensive that they will not avail themselves of it. I have not heard of, or from, Blake since he left Juru-menha.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 26th June, 1811.

Learning from your private letter of the 24th inst., just received,

that it is probable there will be no vessel at Cadiz to bring round 500 men, viz., about 300 of the 95th regt., and about 200 dismounted hussars, who I have requested might be sent to the Tagus, I request you to send vessels there to convey that number of troops, and that you will request Sir R. Keats to send them back, in case he should have been able to send away the troops.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I enclose some papers which have been put into my hands by Brig. Gen. Alava, regarding the conduct of certain persons at Sabugal, in seizing and detaining mules coming from Spain to join the army. As this has been a very common practice lately, I request you to direct that those persons may be called before the Special Commission to answer for their conduct.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 26th June, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has received the orders of the Commander in Chief to transfer the privates of the 7th line batt. K. G. L. to the 1st, 2d, and 5th batts., and to send the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 7th batt. to England to receive recruits.

2. Major Gen. Baron Low will accordingly give orders that this transfer may be made, taking care to transfer to each battalion such a number of effective men as will nearly equalize the strength of each.

3. All soldiers in Portugal or Spain must be transferred; the prisoners of war and missing of the 7th batt. must remain on the strength of the 7th line batt.

4. The transfer is to be made as soon as it may be convenient, and the officers commanding companies in the 7th line batt. are to draw pay for their men to the 24th inst. inclusive, and are to account in the usual manner, with the officers commanding companies in the several battalions to which the men will be distributed, under the orders of Major Gen. Low.

5. Major Gen. Low is requested, in making this transfer, to direct that the soldiers transferred may be placed in battalions and companies with their countrymen and comrades.

6. As soon as the transfer shall be made, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 7th line batt. are to proceed to Lisbon, preparatory to their return to England. And the Commander of the Forces requests them to accept his thanks for their services, and the assurance of his esteem for their good conduct since they have been under his command in the Peninsula.

7. The Commander of the Forces having received orders to draft the 2d batt. Royal Fusiliers into the 1st batt., the following arrangement is to be made for that purpose:

8. All the private men in the 2d batt. Fusiliers in Portugal and Spain are to be drafted into the 1st batt., and are to be distributed into companies in the 1st batt.

9. All men missing from the 2d batt. are to continue on the strength of the 2d batt.

10. The transfer is to be made as soon as it may be convenient, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for their men up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt. to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order.

11. When the transfer shall be completed, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batt. Fusiliers are to proceed to Lisbon, preparatory to their embarkation for England.

12. The Commander of the Forces begs the 2d batt. Fusiliers will accept his thanks for their services since they have been in the Peninsula. They have on every occasion supported the high character of the Royal Fusiliers, and the Commander of the Forces hopes soon to have this battalion under his command again in renewed strength.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 27th June, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in communicating to the army letters which he has received from the Lord Chancellor, and from the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the unanimous votes of approbation of the Houses of Lords and Commons on the conduct of the General officers, officers, and troops engaged in the battle fought at Albuera, on the 16th May.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford will communicate to the Portuguese officers and troops engaged on that occasion, the votes of approbation of their conduct of the Houses of Lords and Commons.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th, with its enclosure from Dom M. Forjaz, announcing the intention of the inhabitants of Caminha to present to the British government a number of bullocks now in the service of the army: and I request you to have the goodness to inform the Portuguese government that I am highly sensible of the desire of their people to assist the British army; but that I recommend that they should apply their voluntary donations to the service of their own country, or to relieve the sufferings of their countrymen in Estremadura.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst., regarding certain green barley said to have been consumed near Elvas by the British troops. I am concerned to observe, in all the complaints of this description which I receive from the Portuguese government, a want of accuracy of statement, which precludes the successful issue of any inquiry. In this case, the numbers of the regiments to which the persons belonged, who are said to have taken this corn, are not detailed; and, in point of fact, there were no British troops at Elvas on the 11th May, and could be none on the 18th May, 2 days after the battle of Albuera.

This circumstance having occurred to me, I requested Senhor Sodré to call upon the complainant and mention it to him, and request him to let me know the numbers of the regiments to which the soldiers belonged who cut the barley; and he then sent me the enclosed paper, stating that on the 22d and 23d May the barley was cut. At that period I was at Elvas; but at all events I should think that the Governor of the province of Alentejo might have contrived to protect the barley growing under the guns of the fort, without complaining on the subject to government.

It is impossible for me to give any redress for an evil complained of in such loose terms, and in making which there appears so little adherence to truth.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I have so repeatedly received anonymous letters from the Patriarch and the Principal, that at last it is necessary to put an end to a practice which is carried on in the most barefaced manner. I now enclose one which I beg you will look at, merely that you may be able to recognise the writing again in case it should come in question; and that you will then forward it, as directed, to the Patriarch. I have not read it.

I have received from Dom M. Forjaz the answer to my dispatch of last week, which contains a paragraph giving great credit to Senhor Cardoso, for throwing supplies into the place of Elvas. I shall send you to-morrow the return up to yesterday of what had been thrown into Elvas, from which you will see with what degree of justice the merit of provisioning the place is attributed principally to Cardoso; and then you will not think me unreasonable in declaring that justice to the departments of the British army will prevent me in future from giving the assistance which they are capable of giving; for you must observe that these efforts, which are

entirely gratuitous, and which are even denied by the government, much less acknowledged and thanked, are not made without considerable inconvenience to the British army.

I am sorry to be again obliged to remark upon Dom M. Forjaz' want of justice, to say no more; but these repeated instances of efforts to screen inefficient departments by misrepresentation don't add to my good opinion of that minister.

To ———.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your ———'s letter of the 3d inst., and it is impossible not to feel for the unhappiness of the young lady, which you have so well described; but it is not so easy as you imagine to apply the remedy.

It appears to me that I should be guilty of a breach of discretion if I were to send for the fortunate object of this young lady's affections, and to apprise him of the pressing necessity for his early return to England; the application for permission to go ought to come from himself, and, at all events, the offer ought not to be made by me, and particularly not founded on the secret of this interesting young lady.

But this fortunate Major now commands his battalion, and I am very apprehensive that he could not with propriety quit it at present, even though the life of this female should depend upon it; and, therefore, I think that he will not ask for leave.

We read, occasionally, of desperate cases of this description, but I cannot say that I have ever yet known of a young lady dying of love. They contrive, in some manner, to live, and look tolerably well, notwithstanding their despair and the continued absence of their lover; and some even have been known to recover so far as to be inclined to take another lover, if the absence of the first has lasted too long. I don't suppose that your *protégée* can ever recover so far, but I do hope that she will survive the continued necessary absence of the Major, and enjoy with him hereafter many happy days.*

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' commands of the 30th May, and those of the 5th inst.

I had already drafted the 2d batt. 48th regt. into the 1st batt., and orders have been given to draft the 2d batt. 7th Fusiliers into the 1st batt., and the 7th line batt. K. G. L. into the other 3 line battalions of the Legion; and the officers and non-commissioned officers of those battalions which have been drafted will be sent home immediately. The 2d batt. 88th regt. will likewise be drafted into the 1st batt.; but, as both these battalions are at present almost in sight of the enemy, it will be necessary to delay the arrangement for a short time.

I request to have your Royal Highness' commands whether I am to complete the 1st batts. of the 5th foot, 31st, 38th, 39th, and 42d, to the numbers stated in the memorandum enclosed in your Royal Highness'

* This officer afterwards married the young lady. He returned to the army, and was mortally wounded at the battle of Vitoria.

letter of the 30th May, from the 2d batts. of those regiments respectively, before I shall send those 2d batts. to England; or whether I am to send those 2d batts. to England when the 1st batts. shall arrive in Portugal, whatever may be the actual strength of the 1st batts.

I likewise request to have your Royal Highness' commands whether I am to send to England the 2d batts. of the 24th, 44th, 53d, 58th, 66th, and 83d, and the 85th regts., when the 1st batts. of the 5th, 31st, 38th, 49th, and 42d, shall arrive in Portugal.

It is impossible to have better soldiers than the real Hanoverians; and it would be very desirable that the 1st, 2d, and 5th line batts. of the Legion should be reinforced by any men of that description who may be in the depôts.

In consequence of orders from the Sec. of State, of the , I have directed Gen. Graham to join the army from Cadiz; and to send to the army the detachment of the 3d batt. 95th regt., and the squadron of the 2d hussars which are dismounted, which are at Cadiz. The horses expected from England will enable me to mount them.

I have not yet been able to ascertain the exact amount of the final loss of each of the regiments in the late actions, under the command of Sir W. Beresford; but I should hope that in a short time so many men will have recovered from their wounds, that it will not amount to more than half the number of killed, wounded, and missing, in the first returns.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

The enemy made a great reconnoissance, with a very large body of cavalry, upon Elvas and Campo Maior, on the 23d. The cavalry of the army of the south went upon Elvas from the neighbourhood of Olivença, and to the woods between that town and Badajoz; and the cavalry of the '*Armée de Portugal*' upon Campo Maior, from the neighbourhood of Badajoz.* The former succeeded in cutting off a piquet of the —th light dragoons, who had been posted on the Caya, in front of Elvas, under the command of ——. It is understood that the cause of this misfortune was that ——— mistook a regiment of the enemy's hussars for a body of ours sent to his support. The —d hussars also, which were on the Guadiana, on the right of Elvas, suffered considerably in their retreat towards Elvas.

The enemy were kept in check in the neighbourhood of Campo Maior, by Gen. de Grey's brigade of British and Gen. Madden's Portuguese cavalry, and they retired without seeing the position of our troops. Since that day they have made no movement of importance. Their army is along the Guadiana, between Badajoz and Merida, and their principal occupation appears to be to procure subsistence.

They are already beginning to experience in some degree the effects of drawing together in Estremadura their whole force. Gen. Bonet has evacuated the Asturias. Don J. Sanchez has possession of the open country in Old Castille, and has recently intercepted a valuable convoy of money and provisions, on the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo; and I learn from Valladolid, that a very valuable convoy has been intercepted by Mina, consisting of the King's baggage and property, near

* See Appendix, No. V., last letter.

Vitoria, the whole escort having been put to the sword. Gen. Blake crossed the Guadiana, as had been arranged, on the 22d inst., and I understand was at Castillejos on the 24th; and I conclude that the enemy, finding that the allied army are in a situation in which the attack of them could not be made without difficulty, will detach towards that quarter.

It is to be wished that the Spaniards would take more extensive advantage of the concentration of the enemy's forces, and thus oblige them, by the loss of their convoys, the danger of their small garrisons and civil departments, and adherents residing in the large towns, to keep their armies separate, and expose some to our attacks.

The Commissary Gen. has thrown a sufficient quantity of provisions into all the places on the frontier; and measures are in progress to improve the defences of them all.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I enclose the weekly state to the 25th. The loss of the piquet of the —th dragoons, and that sustained by the piquet of the —d hussars, were disagreeable circumstances; but they tend to show the difference between old and new troops. The old regiments of cavalry, throughout all their services, and all their losses put together, have not lost so many men as the —d hussars, and —th and —th dragoons, the former in a few days, and the latter in a few months. However, we must make the new as good as the old. Our cavalry are just now in very good condition.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Quinta de S. João, 27th June, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Major Gen. Picton in favor of Lieut. Clerke, 5th regt.,* and I beg leave to recommend the services of this officer to the favorable consideration of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

To Capt. Gen. Don J. Blake.

Quinta de S. João, 28th June, 1811.

When the accounts of the recent battle at Albuera arrived in England, all ranks and descriptions of His Majesty's subjects were eager to manifest their admiration of the conduct of all the allied troops, and their sense of the benefits which had resulted to the common cause from the cordial union of councils of the Generals in command of the armies of the different nations, and from the gallantry and discipline of the troops.

The Houses of Lords and Commons have expressed these sentiments in resolutions which they have unanimously voted upon this occasion; and they have imposed upon me, as the Commander of His Majesty's forces in this country, the pleasing task of communicating to the Generals commanding the forces of the several allied nations their unanimous sense of the conduct of the armies under their command respectively.

I have therefore the honor of enclosing to your Excellency the unanimous resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons of Great Britain and Ireland of the 7th, expressing their sense of the conduct of the Spanish army under the command of your Excellency, in the battle fought at Albuera, on the 16th May, 1811; and I beg leave to congratulate your

* Major Shadwell Clerke. He had been severely wounded on the 12th March at Redinha, and suffered amputation of his leg in consequence.

Excellency upon receiving this justly merited honor, which is the highest those illustrious assemblies have to bestow, and which must be esteemed and valued by every friend to the freedom and good order of society.

The A.G. to the Commissary General.

28th June, 1811.

Your letter and enclosure from Assist. Commissary Gen. — have been laid before the Commander of the Forces, and a communication has been likewise received from the Lieut. General commanding the cavalry on the subject. Upon the view of this transaction which his Excellency has taken, he has directed me to send for Col. —, and inform him of the extreme inconvenience to the service which his conduct has occasioned. He had positively no right to give such an order as that which he gave to Mr. —. The day's forage to the regiment having been issued, Mr. — had no right to be accessory or responsible for the 2 sacks of corn stated to have been left by a serjeant with the clerk, by Col. —'s orders. The consequence of Col. — having put Mr. — into arrest is, that the regiment has suffered from the want of a proper person to perform the commissariat duties with it, and much inconvenience to the service results. Agreeably to these orders, I have stated the Commander of the Forces' opinion, as above expressed, to Col. —; and you will be pleased to direct Mr. — to resume his duties with the —th dragoons.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

28th June, 1811.

I herewith enclose, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton and Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, the copy of a letter I have written to the Commissary Gen., by the Commander of the Forces' direction, on the transaction that has occurred between Lieut. Col. —, of the — dragoons, and Mr. Assist. Commissary —. I also annex Mr. —'s statement of the case, the Lieut. General having, perhaps, only seen Col. —'s letter on the subject.

You will be pleased to request the Lieut. General to order Mr. Assist. Commissary Gen. — to resume his duties with the — dragoons, he being released from his arrest.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Quinta de S. João, 29th June, 1811.

I have had a conversation with Gen. C. Stewart respecting your wish to quit the army for a short time, and conceived that he had communicated with you, which is the reason that you have not received an earlier answer to your letter.

We experienced so much inconvenience last spring, from the absence of the General officers from the army, that I have received orders, which leave very little discretion with me to give leave of absence on private concerns. Your case, however, appears to me to be of a different description; for, at the same time that you have private affairs to settle, the state of your health renders your absence desirable; and I think that at this period it will be more convenient that you should absent yourself than it would be at any other. Under these circumstances, I have no objection to your going; but, as I think it not improbable that others will desire the same indulgence, who have neither the same claims nor the same reasons for going as you have, I wish you would send me a certificate, in the usual form, of the state of your health.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 29th June, 1811.

2. The General officers of the army are requested to refer to the order of the 20th March, No. 3, about foraging, as great irregularities occur now in regiments and soldiers in taking forage in the country, wherever they please.

To H.S.H. the Prince of Orange.

Quinta de S. João, 29th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Highness' letter of the 27th inst., and I assure you that I shall be happy to see your Highness with the army whenever it will be convenient to you to join it.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 29th June, 1811.

You must be the best judge of the expediency of applying the money which will come into your hands, as the proceeds of the flour imported from America, to the purposes of the Portuguese charity. I expected that this money would come into the military chest, upon which the demands are very heavy, and which is at present but ill supplied. However, as you have received directions from government on this subject, you must be the best judge in what manner this money shall be disposed of.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 29th June, 1811.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures which I have received from the Commissary Gen., on the subject of a complaint transmitted to me some time ago by you, received from the Portuguese government, respecting the want of boats on the Mondego. None of these complaints have ever come under my cognizance, in which the facts were not misrepresented or exaggerated, or in which some facts were not omitted, that were material to a just decision on the case.

There is no British officer who is not interested to give every assistance in his power to the officers of the Portuguese government, because he well knows that the deficiencies resulting from the want of means, or from neglects of the latter, are invariably supplied from the stores of the British army.

But I am sorry to observe that the officers of the Portuguese government, almost without exception, neglect their duty, in the performance of which there is neither intelligence nor activity; and the excuse of the interference of the British Commissaries is too readily admitted by the Portuguese government and their ministers, who prefer any thing, even the loss of the Kingdom of their Sovereign, to the punishment of those who neglect their duty, although they receive their salaries.

The enclosed letter from Mr. Drake is deserving of attention, as showing how business is carried on by the officers of the *Junta de Viveres*.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Quinta de S. João, 29th June, 1811.

The last post brought us accounts of the Duke of York's appointment to be Commander in Chief, at which I assure you I rejoice most sincerely.* The arrangement is not less a matter of justice to him than it is beneficial to the public interests; and it appears to me to have been admirably timed, and that the motion of Lord Milton upon it is likely to be advantageous to the Duke's character. I would not allow the mail to go without telling you how well satisfied I am with this arrangement; and I beg you to take an opportunity of conveying my congratulations to His Royal Highness.

* H. R. H. the Duke of York had been reappointed to the command of the army on the 25th May, 1811.

The dispatches will let you know how we are situated. We have now got upon us the whole disposable force in Spain; and, although we are not quite so effective as I could wish, I entertain no apprehensions for the result. Blake's operations in Andalusia, if he can do any thing, will immediately relieve us from part of the weight bearing upon us; and as soon as that is done, I have some operations in view to remove the war from this frontier.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 30th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th June, with its enclosures. I am sorry to say that, under existing circumstances, no confidence can be placed in the parole of any French officer. I know many who have been allowed to quit England, on their parole not to serve till exchanged, who are now serving in the armies in Spain, although no British officer, or others, have been sent from France in exchange for them. This practice will be continued till the allies determine to adopt a system of rigor and punishment towards the prisoners in their power, in proportion to that followed by the enemy, and in reference to the conduct of the prisoners themselves. I have invariably experienced the greatest inconvenience from allowing any persons to return to the enemy's army.

As nothing is believed in England that is written by persons in authority in this country, it is not believed that the Generals commanding the French armies have no communication with each other, and that they are entirely ignorant of all that is passing around them, and that they have, in fact, no information, excepting what they derive from deserters from the foreign regiments in our service, of whom there are, I am sorry to say, too many, and from the prisoners occasionally sent back to them, in exchange for some of our officers or soldiers.

Adverting to the superiority of the enemy's numbers over the allied British and Portuguese armies, and to the inefficiency of the Spanish troops, I attribute the success which we have had hitherto in a great degree to the want of information by the enemy's General officers. At this moment, though the whole army are within a few miles of them, they don't know where they are; but, if disabled prisoners are to be sent to them, they will get all the information they require, if not directly from themselves, from their friends of the French interest at Lisbon, from Portuguese or English newspapers, &c. &c. I am therefore of opinion that the disabled, as well as the other prisoners, ought to be sent to England, and thence to France, if the government are desirous of getting rid of them.

To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor of London.

Quinta de S. João, 30th June, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 20th May, in which your Lordship has transmitted to me the resolutions of the Court of Common Council of the City of London, of the 9th May, expressing their approbation of the conduct of the army under my command in the late operations in Portugal.

I have communicated the resolutions of the Common Council to the

General and other officers, the non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the allied army.

I beg that the Court of Common Council will accept my thanks for the honor which they have conferred upon me and upon the army under my command; and I trust that, by a continuance of our endeavors to serve His Majesty, and to promote his interests in this country, we shall continue to enjoy the good opinion of the city of London.

To the Governor of Coimbra, and the Magistrates of Arganil, Goes, Louzão, Ponte da Murcella, and Foz d'Arouce. Quinta de S. João, 30th June, 1811.

I have sent Capt. Macleod, of the Royal engineers, to look at the state of the bridges on the Alva and the Ceira, and to put them in a state of repair, if they should not already have been repaired. I desire that you will give him every assistance of workmen and materials which he may require for the work upon which he has been ordered, and I hold you responsible to attend to his requisitions.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Murray, Q.M.G.

30th June, 1811.

Orders having been issued by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces for the drafting of the regiments named in the margin, and for the proceeding of the officers and non-commissioned officers of these corps to Lisbon, to return to England, so soon as the arrangement has been completed and the men's accounts, &c., settled, I have to request you will have the goodness to forward to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole and Major Gen. Baron Low the necessary routes for the march of the staff, officers, &c., of these corps to Lisbon, as also orders for their embarkation, Gens. Cole and Low having been apprised that they are to receive the same and deliver them to the officers commanding, so soon as the drafting has been carried into effect.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de S. João, 1st July, 1811, 9½ p.m.

The priest of La Roca is arrived; but I don't recollect who it was that complained of him, or the nature of the complaint. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what you recollect of this complaint.

To the Rt. Hon. the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Quinta de S. João, 1st July, 1811.

In obedience to the orders of the House of Commons, I have communicated to Sir W. Beresford, and to Capt. Gen. Blake, the resolutions of the House of the 7th June, conveying their approbation of the conduct of the General and other officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the allied armies, which fought the battle of Albuera on the 16th May. It has given me great satisfaction to have been made the channel of communicating to those officers the high honors which the House have conferred upon them. I have the honor to enclose a letter from Sir W. Beresford.

The A.G. to Lieut. Burke, late 45th regt.

1st July, 1811.

The Commander of the Forces had consented, in consequence of the wishes expressed by the officers of the 45th regt., to your being permitted to go about your own concerns and to take no further notice of your case; but as it appears you desire a trial, I am to acquaint you that you are ordered to be sent under escort to Campo Maior preparatory to your trial before a General Court Martial now assembled there. You will be tried for desertion to the enemy, and you will furnish the Dep. Judge Advocate, at Campo Maior, with a list of the evidences you are desirous of summoning in your behalf.

To Gen. Leite, Governor of Elvas.

Quinta de S. João, 2d July, 1811.

The provisions at Ouguela being almost expended, I request that you will send to that fort, to-morrow morning, provisions for 10 days for 220 men: by provisions is to be understood bread, meat, and wine; and you will be good enough to report when this order is executed.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de S. João, 2d July, 1811.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Howard, enclosing one from Col. Stewart, of the 50th regt., regarding the equipments of a detachment of that regiment recently arrived from England. I beg that you will make a requisition upon Col. Fisher for new arms and accoutrements for this detachment, if upon inspection those which they have in use should be deemed unserviceable.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 2d July, 1811.

Upon considering of the best mode to communicate to Gen. Blake the resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons regarding the Spanish army, I have thought it best to communicate them in a letter from myself, as being the mode most likely to be agreeable to him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 2d July, 1811.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 19th June. I have already informed you that I had had some conversation with Gen. Abadia when he was on his journey to Galicia. That which I recommended to him was, if possible, to retake Astorga, and, if he could not do that, to endeavor to extend himself in the Asturias and La Montaña; but not to venture into the plains of Leon and Castille till he should have formed his army, and, particularly, should have got a body of cavalry.

I believe that the French have evacuated Astorga, as well as the Asturias; so that the first measures I recommended to his attention are already accomplished; and he may now direct his attention to something further, as soon as he shall have an army. Indeed, he might now work on in La Montaña, towards Biscay. I have also requested Gen. Abadia to endeavor to obtain possession of Santoña, in concert with the officer commanding His Majesty's ships at Coruña, and with Gen. Mendizabal, who has been sent by the Spanish Regency to command in Biscay.

When Gen. Walker quitted Coruña he left there Mr. —, a Commissary, who has continued the correspondence with me; but as I consider that a most important point, and that the supplies of arms, ammunition, &c. to the guerrillas may be best distributed from that quarter, I conceive that it might be convenient to government, as well as to me, that a person of more respectable station in life than Mr. — should be appointed to reside there. I have no officers to spare for this service; and I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will send the gentleman you mention; and I shall be happy to see him here, or I will send him instructions to Coruña, if your Lordship should think it better that he should go there at once.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 3d July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 30th.

I have no doubt but that the letter which I sent to you was written by

the Patriarch; but, as you entertain a doubt upon the subject, I am much obliged to you for stopping it. To send an anonymous letter to any body is to accuse him of writing it, the meanest action, certainly, of which any man can be guilty. It is not very proper, perhaps, to accuse a man in the Patriarch's situation of being guilty of such an action; but he positively ought not to be accused of it if there is any, the slightest, doubt of his guilt. I therefore acquiesce entirely in your retaining the letter.

In the account which the Commissary Gen. has made out of supplies to the Portuguese government, he has charged for the articles delivered in kind, at the rate which they cost. I have given directions that the paper issued to the Portuguese government shall be taken credit for at the price of the day. For instance, when £100,000 in paper was given to them, the rate of discount being 18 *per cent.*, the charge against them was to be only £82,000. If they don't take care to manage the markets, they may lose even by this arrangement; but that I cannot help.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 3d July, 1811.

I enclose Dom M. Forjaz's commissariat regulations, with some remarks upon them. If I had leisure to go minutely through the whole, probably I might out of them be able to form something; but I have written in the margin the general principles on which the establishment ought to be formed, and that of all the regulations for its guidance, which will probably answer better than to enter into the particulars of the regulations, and, at all events, saves me some time.

Observations by Lieut. Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B., upon the Plan proposed for the Portuguese Commissariat.*
Quinta de S. João, 3d July, 1811.

Page 1. The Commissariat should be composed of a Commissary Gen., deputies, assistants, clerks, conductors, sub-conductors, treasurer, and accountants.

These denominations of officers would comprise all the functions required from the other officers specified in the text.

Page 2. The Commissary Gen., and all the officers of the Commissariat, should be appointed by a Minister of State, or by the Commander in Chief.

Whoever shall make the appointment should be answerable for the selection of competent persons.

The inferior clerks might be appointed by the individual under whose authority it is intended they should be employed.

The conductors should be appointed by the Commissary Gen. But whoever may make the appointment should be answerable for the competency of the person to fulfil the duties of his appointment.

The continuance of the officers in their several places should be during pleasure.

The establishment must be a military one; the persons of whom it is

* The original draft of these observations is missing from the papers of the Duke of Wellington. A copy of it was sent to Dom M. Forjaz, and Sir John Croft translated it into Portuguese for him. Sir John Croft re-translated it into English from the Portuguese for this compilation.

composed should be liable to trial by military law : but the tenure or title by which they hold their employments should entirely depend on the will of the government, and so should their promotion.

Page 4. It is the duty of the Commissary Gen., and of the persons under his authority, to collect, to preserve in good condition, and to issue, provisions and forage to the troops, and to the horses and mules belonging to them. It is their duty also to provide the means of transporting the several articles from one place to another, and to furnish all other means of transport which the army may require.

Page 5. The Commissary Gen. should, between the 24th and the 30th of each month, render to the Sec. of State, and to the Commander in Chief, a return of all such provisions as are in the different depôts of the Kingdom and belonging to the army ; stating what portions he has furnished in the preceding month, and giving in an estimate of the quantities which he thinks may be required of him in the following month, pointing out from whence they should be drawn, and whither they should be transported ; and, besides this, he should give in a calculation of the expense likely to be incurred in each of the following articles, viz :

Provisions and forage for the troops and their beasts ; means of transport also, stating the purposes for which they will be required ; and the salaries of the persons employed in the commissariat.

These arrangements having been completed, and the funds necessary to meet the expenses of his department having been placed at the disposal of the Commissary Gen., it will then become necessary to consider in what way he shall make his purchases. These should always be made at the cheapest rate, and should be accompanied with certificates of the price of them. After this, the object will be to ascertain the best way of keeping in good order the several articles, of making his issues to the troops, and of giving an account of the issues which he shall have already made.

All these are matters of detailed regulation which cannot fail to exist already in the department of the commissariat ; and nothing more will be necessary but to compel obedience to the regulations, whatever the nature of them may be, and to ensure the punishment of disobedience.

The estimate by the Commissary Gen. should comprise the value of the provisions, which are to be bought by his deputies attached to the different divisions of the army or stationed in forts. These deputies must render account, in the manner prescribed, and within the time limited, of the money which they have expended ; but the Commissary Gen. and all his subordinate officers must be apprised that they will have to answer for the omissions of their inferiors if they don't give them up to punishment.

Page 17. Deputy Commissaries must be under the immediate authority of the Commissary Gen., and must be stationed in those places, and attached to those divisions of the army, which he may be pleased to fix upon. All must be under the direction of a deputy appointed by the Commissary Gen., and charged with the duty of issuing the necessary orders.

They must fulfil that portion of the obligations generally incumbent upon the Commissary Gen. which he shall allot to them ; whether it be in making purchases, or looking to the preservation of the articles already

purchased, or watching over the transport of the same, the issuing them to the inferior Commissaries for the supply of the troops, and directing the fulfilment of the general engagements of the commissariat, and of the Commissaries attached to any particular division, or stationed in any fort or district, pursuant to the orders which they shall receive from the Commissary Gen., and to the general regulations of the service.

Every Dep. Commissary, through whose hands either money or any articles may pass, must be answerable for such money or for such articles, until he shall have been exonerated either by a receipt or some other official document which may be required.

Whenever the articles which shall have been entrusted to any Dep. Commissary Gen. may be considered of a quality unfit for the service, this circumstance must be made known to the Commissary Gen.; but the said articles must not be destroyed until they shall have been first examined by a board of officers, whose decision must be confirmed by the Commander in Chief.

The Commander in Chief will then direct that the said articles be destroyed in the presence of the board of officers who had examined them; and nothing short of this order from the Commander in Chief should exonerate the Deputy or other Commissary.

Page 25. I don't see that any advantage will result from making regulations for the clerks of this department.

The Commissary Gen. will employ, whenever he may think fit, a Dep. Commissary in each province, and will instruct him as to the nature of the services which will be required of him.

The Commissary Gen. should, nevertheless, place himself in communication with the magistrates in all great cities of the provinces, and by their aid should provide the means of supplying the small detachments of the army which move from one place to another along the high roads, according to routes which the Q. M. G. gives them.

Page 26. In those provinces in which corn or any other species of grain may exist, it is clear that the Commissary Gen. must employ some of the deputies to collect this grain; and he must render an account thereof, in his return, of the state of the depôts, every month, to the Sec. of State and the Commander in Chief.

Page 49. The duties of the Deputy or Assistant Commissaries attached to divisions consist especially in receiving or collecting provisions and forage for the use of those divisions; in taking care to preserve those articles in good condition; in effecting the transport of them from one place to another; in issuing them to the troops upon receiving proper documents and receipts; and in rendering an account, as well of the money expended as of the depôts of provisions.

All these duties necessarily require regulations in detail from the Commissary Gen.; and the Commissaries attached to divisions or brigades must answer for the fulfilment of them.

Page 59. The duty of directing the transports from one place to another, and watching over the transit of the several articles from one Commissary to another, might be fulfilled through the medium of one or more deputies or assistants under the directions of the Commissary Gen., and

in conformity with certain rules and orders, general and particular, established for their government.

Page 69. There ought to be a treasurer of the commissariat; but, as a general rule, no money ought to stop in the hands of the Commissary Gen. He ought to have a credit opened with the military chest in the beginning of each month, to meet that portion of the amount of his estimate which shall have been granted to him by the Sec. of State and by the Commander in Chief; and he ought to draw bills upon the military chest from time to time for the amount of his payments, never exceeding in any one month the sum total of his absolute necessities, and stating on each bill what head of those services which are specified in his estimate is to be liquidated by the said bill.

In the same manner the treasurer should keep an account of the payments made by the Commissary Gen. conformably with those heads, setting apart what the estimate of each month consists of; and every Commissary who lays out money should render an account after the same form to the treasurer of the commissariat.

Page 124. I don't possess sufficient knowledge of the Portuguese language, nor have I time, to examine the detail of these regulations, the whole of which may probably be very expedient.

Nevertheless, the duty of the Commissary Gen. is set forth, generally, in the observations which I have made. This duty both he and his deputies and assistants should fulfil, pursuant to certain convenient regulations.

In collecting provisions, care should always be taken to select them of the best quality, and at the cheapest rate; and the object of all and every regulation should be to make this certain, as well as to show the sum of money which shall have been expended.

In receiving the provisions, the object of every regulation should be to obtain the certainty, by means of receipts or some other form, that the provisions have really been received by each of the persons through whose hands they shall have been reported to have passed.

In keeping the provisions in good condition, whether it be upon the march or in the depôt, the object of every regulation should be to attach responsibility to the person charged with the care of them, in order to avoid waste or loss through negligence.

In making issues of the provisions, the object of regulations should be to exonerate the persons who shall have made a just and true delivery of them, and to attach responsibility to the person who shall have received them; further, to ascertain the accuracy of his receipts, and to make him answerable as well for the quantity as the quality thereof.

In making a detailed issue of provisions, the object of regulations should be to ensure that every individual shall receive what belongs to him, and nothing more; and that the proper requisitions and receipts shall be passed by those who shall receive, and by the Commissary who shall make the issue.

In procuring transports, the object of regulations should be to secure that the person who makes requisition for them shall apply to the proper magistrate; and shall not apply for more than is absolutely necessary.

In paying for transports, the object of regulations should be to make it certain that the owner of the transports shall receive the money which is due to him, and which is paid and carried to the account of the public.

The duties of magistrates form another subject, and are entirely distinct from the duties of the Commissary General.

The A.G. to R. H. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

3d July, 1811.

I herewith enclose a letter I have received from the Dep. Judge Advocate at Campo Maior, by which it appears that there will not be sufficient evidence on the trial of quarter master — to prove the charge against him. Under these circumstances, as there has been such an interference on the part of the Commander of the Forces as to prevent similar impropriety occurring without the certainty of punishment, it may be better, with your acquiescence, to dispense with any further proceedings against quarter master —.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B., 1st division.

3d July, 1811.

I have laid your letter of yesterday's date, and enclosures from Major Gen. Campbell and Major Gen. *Baron Low*, before the Commander of the Forces, and am directed to acquaint you :

1st; With regard to Major Gen. Campbell's enclosures from Col. Fermor, representing the inadequate state of the 1st batt. 3d Guards, as to officers, that the Commander of the Forces has already ordered Capt. Canning, on the staff of his Excellency, to join his regiment, which Col. Fermor will see carried into effect.

2d; With respect to Col. Fuller's desire, that private — —, of the Coldstream, should be permitted to commute his punishment for service for life, I am to observe, that from late orders received, the Commander of the Forces cannot consent to this arrangement, and — — must receive the punishment awarded to him by the regimental Court Martial.

3d; The list of disabled men, submitted by Major Gen. Campbell, must be referred by the surgeons of the Guards to the Inspector Gen. of hospitals, and these men must be assembled at Lisbon, and a board will be ordered to report on their cases, when they will be sent to England according to the recommendation of the board.

4th; The request of the Guards to receive back their blankets is referred to the Commissary Gen., to know where the same may now be, and how far it is possible to get at them in order that they may be issued again.

5th; The route has been sent by the Q. M. G. to Major Gen. *Baron Low*, for the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 7th line battalion to proceed to Lisbon, and there will be no objection to the request of the 2 Captains being particularly complied with.

The A.G. to Col. Beckwith, 95th regt.

3d July, 1811.

The D. A. G. having submitted to me several communications relative to a mule belonging to Mr. Sparkes, which has been found in the possession of Capt. —; having taken the Commander of the Forces' pleasure on the subject, I am directed to acquaint you, that the rule of the army and the law of every well regulated state is, that when a person finds his undisputed property he has a right to it. The operation of this rule would certainly have been vitiated by the chance of the property having fallen into the hands of the enemy, or having been lost by the carelessness of the owner, or by any of the accidents to which property of all descriptions is liable during a military operation; but it does not appear that Mr. Sparkes was deprived of his mule by any of these circumstances, but that it was stolen from him, and is now in the possession of Capt. —. It is his Excellency's opinion, therefore, that Mr. Sparkes should have his mule immediately returned to him, and you will be pleased to give this order accordingly.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst.

I am convinced of the expediency of adopting some measures to

stimulate and support the efforts of the inhabitants of Portuguese Estremadura to restore the agriculture of their province; but the circumstances which I am about to state will show you that it is of paramount importance not to deliver any money from the military chest to be employed in that manner.

The pay of the British troops is now nearly 2 months in arrears, instead of being paid one month in advance, according to His Majesty's regulations. The muleteers, upon whose services the army depend almost as much as upon those of the soldiers, are 6 months in arrears.

There are bills to a large amount, drawn by the Commissaries in the country on the Commissary at Lisbon, still remaining unpaid, by which delay the credit of the British army and government must be impaired; and you are aware of the pressing demands of the Portuguese government for specie. There is but little money in hand to be applied to those several services. There is no prospect that any will be sent from England; and the supplies derived from the negotiation of bills upon the Treasury at Cadiz and Lisbon have been gradually decreasing.

Under these circumstances, it is my duty to object to the application of any sum of money which can be brought into the military chest to any purpose excepting to defray our expenses, which would otherwise fall upon the chest.

Admitting, as I do, the expediency of adopting measures to revive the agriculture of Estremadura, I have reason to believe that matters are not in so bad a state in that province, generally, as they are represented to be in the papers which you enclose in your letter of the 2d; and I cannot admit that, if they were, it would be expedient to encourage an expectation that they would be restored, or wise to endeavor to restore them at once to the situation in which they were previous to the recent invasion.

Time must elapse before the agricultural classes will have in their possession the carriages and other means by which they could render their laboring cattle useful to them, if the cattle could be restored to them; and time also must elapse before the land will produce sufficient food to support all the laboring cattle which they could use. It would be prudent, therefore, not to distribute in those districts at once too large a proportion of laboring cattle, if the distribution is to be made by degrees; and in the progress of time I see no reason why we should not look to a supply from Ireland and other countries from whence they might be brought, in which the purchase of them would not be a burthen upon the military chest of this army.

I don't foresee any inconvenience from your countermanding the execution of that part of the commission for the purchase of flour in America which may remain unexecuted when your order shall reach America.

To the Rev. J. Owen, Chaplain General.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I enclose letters which Mr. Briscall has put into my hands from Mr. Downes and Mr. Hill, two of the Chaplains attached to this army. I have accepted Mr. Downes' resignation, and have given leave to Mr. Hill to go to England: the latter gentleman never quitted Lisbon.

I have already, upon a former occasion, made Gen. Calvert acquainted

with my opinion respecting the establishment on which the army Chaplains are placed, in a letter which I believe you saw; and I now assure you, that the opinions which that letter contains have been confirmed by the experience which I have since had. The remuneration in the shape of half pay is not sufficient to induce respectable persons in a good state of health, who have any other prospect in the profession, to accept the situation of Chaplains to the army; and advertng to the general expense of the establishment, compared with that of the old regimental establishment, of which, after many years, it is intended to be an efficient substitute, I cannot see why the remuneration, particularly in the shape of half pay, should not be made more liberal. My decided opinion is, that until that is done the government will not ensure a religious establishment for the army on foreign service; and it is obvious that all that could be done in that way would not amount to one third part of the expense of the old regimental establishment.

To the High Sheriff of the County of Limerick. Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th May, in which you have enclosed the unanimous resolutions of a meeting of the county of Limerick, assembled under your auspices on the 16th May. I am much flattered by the notice which the county of Limerick have been pleased to take of my endeavors to serve His Majesty, and by the approbation which they have expressed of the conduct of the officers and troops which have been placed under my command; and I hope, by the support and assistance of the General and other officers, and the discipline of the troops, to continue to enjoy the valuable approbation of the gentlemen of the county of Limerick.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Kent.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 9th June; and, in obedience to your Royal Highness' commands, I have placed Lieut. St. Martin, of your Royal Highness' regiment, at the disposal of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, to be appointed a Captain in the Portuguese service.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th June; and I have desired the Commissary Gen. to give directions that the stores may be placed in the store houses in such manner that the houses may be made to contain the largest quantity they are capable of containing.

The large quantities of provisions now at Lisbon are to be attributed to the removal of the magazines from the Douro and the Mondego to the Tagus, in consequence of the change of the seat of operations of the army. These magazines had, immediately previous to their removal, been very much increased by the arrival at Oporto and Figueira of several ships from England laden with provisions, which had been sent to those places by order from the Sec. of State. The quantity of provisions now at Lisbon has also been increased very much lately by the arrival of flour purchased in America for the Portuguese government, and of provisions

from England likewise for the Portuguese government, to be delivered as subsidy in lieu of money payments, which provisions they have not yet taken from His Majesty's minister.

These circumstances have occasioned the inconvenience of which you complain, which, however, I hope will be only temporary, as I have requested that no more provisions may at present be sent from England, and the consumption of the army occasions a constant draw upon the magazines. I am apprehensive that it would not be possible to store our magazines of provisions along the Tagus, without incurring a very large and useless expense, and putting ourselves eventually to great inconvenience.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

Since I wrote on the 27th June the enemy have withdrawn the great force which they had in the neighbourhood of Badajoz. Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton reconnoitred with a part of the cavalry along the Gevora and the Guadiana, as far as Montijo, on the 2d inst., and found no troops excepting a small body of infantry and cavalry at Montijo, and, near Badajoz, the cavalry belonging to the garrison.

By all accounts, the '*Armée de Portugal*' are on the right of the Guadiana, between Montanches and Merida, keeping a small part at Montijo; and the army of the south on the left of that river, extending their left towards Zafra. It is reported that one division of infantry has been detached from the latter towards Seville. The enemy have withdrawn from Badajoz their train of artillery with which the place was taken, and have sent it to the southward.

A part of Gen. Bonet's troops, whose evacuation of the Asturias has been confirmed, have gone to Leon: and I have a report from Gen. Silveira of the 25th June, stating that the enemy had, on the 19th, evacuated Astorga.

By accounts from Valladolid, it appears that Marshal Bessières had quitted that place on the 12th with all the troops he could collect, and went to Rio Seco, from whence he moved on the 15th towards Benavente. A party of guerrillas were consequently in sight of Valladolid on the 15th; and it is reported that they attacked that place on the 16th. This description of force appears to be increasing in numbers, activity, and boldness, in all the northern parts of Spain.

I have no authentic accounts of Gen. Blake's movements since the 27th June, on which day his head quarters were at Alosno, in the Condado de Niebla, and his advanced guard, under Gen. Ballesteros, at El Cerro.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I have the honor to transmit a duplicate of a memorandum of field equipment required for the use of this army, the original of which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 1st April last; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that these things may be sent to Portugal without loss of time.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

I send to England by Mr. Sydenham, who leaves this to-morrow, the

eagle of the 39th regt., which was thrown into the river Ceira, near Foz d'Arouce, on the night of the 15th March last, when the 6th corps of the army of Portugal, which formed the rear guard of the army posted on the other side of the river, were driven across that river by the 3d and Light divisions of the British army, under the command of Major Gen. Picton and Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 4th July, 1811.

In addition to the intelligence contained in my dispatch, I have reports from Badajoz and from Marmont's head quarters at Merida, stating that the Spaniards had entered Seville on the 28th. If this should be true, and Blake has, as I advised him, destroyed every thing there, it will make a most important alteration in the state of affairs.

1st; It will show that the Spaniards can do something, and we may venture to depend a little upon operations combined with them.

2dly; It will lead to raising the siege of Cadiz more effectually than any other operation that could be undertaken.

The operations of that siege depend entirely upon the supplies received from the foundry and arsenal at Seville, which the Spaniards contrived to abandon in a complete state of equipment; and, if the stores at Seville should be lost, the siege may as well, and will, be given up, as it is hopeless to endeavor to collect again what would be necessary to carry it on. If, however, the siege of Cadiz should be given up, we in this country shall have upon us, in addition to what we have already, the small portions of the army still remaining in Andalusia; and I doubt whether the assistance which we might expect to receive from the Spaniards, in consequence of their being relieved from that weight, will compensate for the additional pressure upon us.

The great army in our front must, and will probably soon, separate, having effected nothing excepting the relief of Badajoz; for which object they have weakened themselves every where; have lost Astorga and the Asturias; and the greater number of them would have been destroyed, if all the Spaniards were like the lower orders. However, we must have patience, and we may yet be able to root them out of this country.

I enclose you some copies of Joseph's interesting letter, certified by Bardaxi.*

The A.G. to Major Gen. Baron Low, K.G.L.

4th July, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that the Commander of the Forces, taking the general good character of quarter master — and all the circumstances of his case into consideration, has been pleased to release him from his arrest, and to direct that he may return to his duty.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Howard, 2d division.

4th July, 1811.

In reply to your letter enclosing, 1st, an application for Capt. —, 71st light infantry, to serve in the Portuguese army, I am to acquaint you, that as there are not a sufficient number of effective Captains in the regiment, it cannot be permitted. 2nd; You will be pleased to acquaint Capt. —, of the same corps, that his Excellency will not enter into any explanation of the circumstances which induced him to recommend officers for promotion. He is much concerned not to

* See Appendix, Vol. IV. No. XXXVIII.

have it in his power to recommend Capt. —; and the Commander of the Forces must further observe, that the action at Fuentes de Oñoro afforded only a small part of the grounds for recommending any body.

The A.G. to Mr. Egerton, Whitehall, London.

4th July, 1811.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter stating your having sent the copies of the G. O. to Mr. Penn, in Downing Street. On my receiving the books, I will enclose you a draft on Messrs. Greenwood and Cox for the amount of your bill, which I shall charge in my contingent account.

I wish you to forward to me the 'Army List' of the last year, and the latest edition of the 'General Regulations of the Army,' with several copies of the 'Articles of War:' these to be sent to Mr. Penn, at the War Department Office, in Downing Street, who will forward them to me. I shall also be glad to have the 'Monthly Army List' sent in future as soon as it may be published.

P.S. I wish to have a book of the 'Cavalry' as well as the 'Infantry Regulations,' and two Orderly Books, large 8vo. size, bound in Russia leather.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 5th July, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 5th.

The enemy appear to have drawn off entirely from this neighbourhood; and the right of the '*Armée de Portugal*' is at Montanches, the left and head quarters at Merida; the right of the army of the south at Lobon, and the left at Zafra. I believe they have sent one division into Andalusia.

Blake crossed the Guadiana on the 22d or 23d. He failed in an attack upon Niebla, where the French had only 300 men, on the 30th at night; and he is, I believe, going to embark at Huelva.

I keep our troops still in their camps, meaning, if Soult leaves Marmont alone, to endeavor to give Marmont a blow. However, I doubt that Soult will leave that in my power.

The French have taken a great deal of cannon out of Badajoz. They have blown up Olivença.

I have sent to Hamilton about Mr. C. Monk.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 5th July, 1811.

I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy respecting the store houses. The house you mention would not answer for us, as the communication with it by land is very awkward and inconvenient. I hope, however, that, by the improvements in the mode of stowing the store houses, we shall have no want of store room at Lisbon and the neighbourhood.

I hope that we shall have a sufficiency of bridge at Villa Velha. I don't understand what the Portuguese government want with pontoon boats. We shall have plenty of pontoons for as many bridges as we can require any where; but, as we have already so much bridge there, I don't propose to remove there any of our pontoons; indeed the Tagus will be very soon fordable almost every where.

I congratulate you upon your son's promotion. I have not yet heard of March this morning, but will add a line if I should receive any intelligence of him before the post shall go out.

I have omitted to tell you that I have written to my brother regarding the money, and have requested that it may be sent only in the ships which you send for it periodically.

Au Général Dumouriez.

Quinta de S. João, ce 5 Juillet, 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 6 Juin; et je suis bien aise d'avoir l'avantage de votre opinion sur les affaires de ce pays-ci.

Il y a presque trois ans à présent que je conduis les opérations de la guerre la plus extraordinaire qu'il y eût jamais. Quoique les alliés soient chez eux, et que tout le monde (en Portugal sans exception quelconque, et presque sans exception en Espagne) soit ennemi des Français, les alliés ont rarement eu plus que la moitié de la force de l'ennemi, et jamais, même à présent, plus que les deux tiers. A ce désavantage il faut ajouter que nous sommes alliés; que nous n'avons pas de tête; qu'il n'y a ni généraux, ni officiers d'état-major, ni troupes disciplinées, et point de cavalerie parmi les Espagnols: que ces deux gouvernemens ont commencé la guerre sans magasins ou ressource militaire d'aucune espèce, et sans argent ou ressource de finance; et que ceux qui ont été à la tête des affaires sont des individus aussi faibles que les ressources à leur disposition sont pauvres; et vous serez étonné que nous puissions continuer la lutte même avec espérance de succès définitif.

Je crois que ni Buonaparte ni le monde n'a compté sur les difficultés de subjuguier la Péninsule, étant opposé par une bonne armée en Portugal. Il a fait des efforts gigantesques, dignes de sa réputation, et des forces dont il a la disposition; mais il n'en a pas fait assez encore; et je crois que l'ancien *dictum* de Henri IV., que 'quand on fait la guerre en Espagne avec peu de monde on est battu, et avec beaucoup de monde on meurt de faim,' se trouvera vérifié de nos jours; et que Buonaparte ne pourra jamais nourrir, même de la manière Française moderne, une armée assez grande pour faire la conquête des Royaumes de la Péninsule, si les alliés ont seulement une armée assez forte pour arrêter ses progrès.

Pour ce qui est d'aujourd'hui, les Français ont réuni en Estremadure toutes les forces qu'ils avaient en Andalousie, et dans La Vieille et La Nouvelle Castille, pour m'obliger à lever le siège de Badajoz; à quoi ils ont nécessairement réussi. J'ai rassemblé mon monde à deux lieues de là dans une assez bonne position près de Campo Maior; et ils n'ont pas voulu me toucher: et j'ai prié le Général Blake avec les Espagnols, 10,000 à 12,000, de repasser la Guadiana à Mertola et de se porter sur Seville, où sont l'arsenal, la fonderie, les magasins, et tout ce qui leur est nécessaire pour le siège de Cadix, qu'après ce coup ils auraient été obligés de lever. Il passa la Guadiana le 22 Juin, le jour même que Soult et Marmont m'ont reconnu à Campo Maior. Mais il n'a rien fait jusqu'au 30 au soir, quand il a essayé de s'emparer de Niebla, qui n'est rien comme place forte, et où il n'y avait que 300 hommes de garnison; mais le coup a manqué. En même temps les Français se sont retirés d'ici. Ils ont envoyé une division d'infanterie et quelque cavalerie en Andalousie; et je crois que Blake va s'embarquer pour retourner à Cadix.

On croirait que quand toute la force disponible de l'ennemi est rassemblée en Estremadure, on couperait la gorge aux Français éparpillés dans les autres parties de l'Espagne; et que tout le monde étant ennemi des Français (comme je le crois vraiment), il y aurait insurrection générale. Pas du tout! voilà l'extraordinaire de cette guerre! Voici la troisième fois, en moins de deux ans, que toute la force Française disponible s'est

réunie sur moi ; mais personne n'y gagne excepté les guerrillas, qui pour un moment prennent possession du pays ouvert de la Castille ; les administrateurs Français tenant toujours les grandes villes. Cette fois-ci cependant ils ont été obligés d'abandonner quelques points importants, comme les Asturies et Astorga ; et les guerrillas, ayant plus de force et d'expérience, leur ont porté quelques coups qui doivent leur faire du mal.

Par ce petit exposé des faits vous verrez quelle est l'espèce de guerre que nous faisons. Il faut de la patience, de la grande patience, pour la faire ; mais j'attends tout du temps, qui donnera l'expérience, des Généraux, et des armées, à mes amis les Espagnols ; et il n'est pas possible que l'Europe puisse se soumettre bien plus long-temps à la tyrannie dégoûtante dont elle est opprimée.

A moins que Soult et Marmont ne se séparent de manière que je puisse porter un coup à l'un ou à l'autre, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait à espérer que les Français se porteront sur l'Ebre ; et si Blake s'embarque, il n'y a pas de raison pour qu'ils se séparent, à moins que Soult ne veuille tâcher de s'emparer de Carthagène, à quoi il vise, ou veuille pousser vigoureusement le siège de Cadix.

Je suis bien aise d'avoir pu faire ce qui vous était agréable sur le sujet du Comte de St. Martin ; que j'ai mis au service Portugais, conservant toujours sa commission Anglaise.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 5th July, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 26th June, and I now enclose my last dispatches to the Sec. of State.

Castafios, in one of his letters to the Spanish government, says that the armies of the enemy have separated, and so I believed on the 2d ; but I have since learned to a certainty that they are still united, but, being at a greater distance from us, they are more extended than they were. We had a report that Ballesteros had entered Seville on the 28th ; but we hear this morning that there is a courier from Blake of the 2d, who does not mention the circumstance.

Col. Austin had all the means prepared for Gen. Blake to cross the Guadiana, and his infantry crossed on the 23d, and his cavalry on the 24th, at Mertola. Austin tells me that he believes the ships sent to the mouth of the Guadiana are to carry Blake off, which I think not unlikely. I don't think the French have yet sent more than one division back into Andalusia, and not much cavalry.

Now that Leval is returning, I hope that the correspondent will give better intelligence. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their little successes, and to diminish those of the enemy, and the reports of their numbers, is evident in the last papers which you have sent me. Soult's advanced guard 'destroyed near Los Santos,' was a little affair between 30 of our hussars and 70 French dragoons, in which the former had the advantage and took some prisoners.

I don't think that the British government have set to work in the business of the mediation in the manner in which they ought, in order to bring it to a successful termination ; and it appears to me that it will never answer any purpose.

P.S. Will you mention to Gen. Graham, or, if he should be gone, to Gen. Disney, that I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send vessels to Cadiz for the 95th and the dismounted hussars.

The Admiral has desired me to request that, as he sends a vessel periodically to Cadiz, to bring the money which is procured there for the Commissary General's bills, you will be so kind as to send the money always in the ship sent by him, and retain the money till this ship shall arrive. I shall be obliged to you if you will give these directions to Mr. Duff.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 5th July, 1811.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I find that there is no truth in the report that Blake had got into Seville. He made an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla on the night of the 30th, in which place the enemy had a garrison of 300 men, and he failed; and I understand that he was about to embark at Huelva for Cadiz, and was going upon some other expedition, the object of which I don't know; nor indeed does it appear that my brother, from whom I have heard to the 26th June, had any knowledge that Blake was about to embark. I have not heard from Gen. Blake myself, but I have this intelligence from Castaños. There is an end, therefore, to any expectations from this expedition.

It is reported that the French have retired from Benavente towards Valladolid. However, I have not this report from any of my people on whom I can rely.

The A.G. to Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

5th July, 1811.

The Commander of the Forces has been pleased to grant Major —, of the — regt., 2 months' leave of absence to England, which you will be pleased to notify to that officer, as the same will not appear in G. O.

The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.

5th July, 1811.

Herewith I transmit you a letter and 24 *Louis d'or*, which you will be pleased to deliver to Capt. Begurne, 47th regt., prisoner of war, and transmit me his receipt. You will be pleased at the same time to make known to him that his portmanteaus could not be removed from the house of the curate at Lumbrales, and that the distance of the army now prevents my taking measures for their removal.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de S. João, 6th July, 1811.

I don't recollect whether I sent you a copy of the enclosed letter to Mr. Stuart at the time I wrote it; but I shall be very much obliged to you if you will attend to its contents, and refer to me all applications which may be made by officers or others for goods to be landed duty free.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Quinta de S. João, 7th July, 1811.

I omitted to mention to Pakenham that, in making arrangements for drafting the 2d batt. 88th regt. into the 1st, it would be expedient to leave in the 2d batt. the boys, whose numbers I don't recollect, who were left at Lisbon when the battalion marched, as being unfit, from weakness, to take the field.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 7th July, 1811.

I received last night a letter from Austin, enclosing one from Blake,

which shows that it is the intention of that General to embark his troops forthwith, having failed in an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla, and having heard of the return of some of Soult's troops to Seville: he does not say how many; but Austin says that he has heard of two columns of 14,000 men. I have heard from this side of only one division and a few cavalry. The removal of cannon from Badajoz has continued; but yesterday I received a report that troops and cannon were returning this day. It was rather loose, to be sure; but I had it from two different quarters.

I conclude that you have desired Bacellar to have Almeida examined, to see whether any thing can be done to render it a post tenable against a *coup de main*. The destruction of this place comes upon us in every way.

I have no account from Salamanca, and therefore nothing that I can rely upon in respect to the enemy's movements in Castille and Leon. The last report was that Bessières was retiring from Benavente upon Valladolid. If this be true, he has been obliged to reinforce that town and the northern parts of Castille, in consequence of the increased activity of the guerrillas in that quarter; but, if he assembles his force upon Valladolid, he will soon get the better of the guerrillas, and we must eventually look to his threatening the frontier, either of Upper Beira or Tras os Montes; and, although there may be militia in those provinces in sufficient numbers to defend them in the absence of the army, no reliance can be placed on their efforts; nor indeed can they be counted as troops at all, till the regiments shall be embodied, each in its own district.

Then comes the question of finance, upon which I must say, that, from all I hear, we are as badly off as ever; for I understand that, notwithstanding what Mr. Stuart states of the increased receipts, the officers of the army have not been paid for 4 and 5 months. But supposing the money has been collected, and is in the Treasury, like other articles necessary for the army on the frontier, it has not legs, and cannot travel without means of transport, and arrangements made to apply them; and, if it be true that the revenue has risen, the continuance of all the evils of poverty must be attributed to the inefficiency of the civil departments of the army. However, we must watch very narrowly that force of Bessières, and take care to call out the militia of Beira, and Tras os Montes, and the Minho, in time. In the mean time, some intelligent Staff officer should turn his mind to the means of collecting these regiments in the shortest possible space of time.

I have sent to Mr. Stuart my opinion on the proposed regulations for the commissariat, and have stated generally the principles on which the establishment should be founded, and the objects of the regulations for its guidance. This being done, it will be easy to draw up the regulations, which ought to be few and simple, and applicable to general circumstances. It is very obvious that the various duties, at different times, of the several officers of the commissariat must be the subject of particular directions from the Commissary Gen., and cannot be that of general regulations, which can apply only to general circumstances. On this ground, I conceive that nearly the whole of the compilation which I read is useless, and, a great deal, much worse.

I find that we are drawing like cart horses upon Elvas for provisions for

Hamilton's division, &c. However, I have called for a return of the stores there, and I will take care that they shall not get too low.

Let me understand what you wish in respect to the disposition of the Portuguese cavalry; what part of it is to belong to the garrison of Elvas, and what brigade to be stationed near Elvas, with the particular object of supporting the cavalry of the garrison, of keeping up the communication between Elvas and Campo Maior, and preventing the enemy's cavalry at and near Badajoz from annoying the garrison and its communications.

P.S. I have spoken to Fletcher to send to Almeida a British engineer, to report on the damages; but you may as well send them a Portuguese.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Houstoun, 7th division.

7th July, 1811.

Your letter and enclosures, from Major Gen. Sontag and Lieut. Col. Eustace, have been laid before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to desire you will refer Col. Eustace to the conversation the Commander of the Forces had with him, and the verbal directions his Excellency gave him at Villar Formoso.

The Commander of the Forces has suffered so much inconvenience from the continual desertion of the Chasseurs Britanniques, that he will not suffer another man of the corps to approach the army, neither is it convenient that the men now at Cadiz should be brought from thence. His Excellency therefore directs that the men now in Portugal may be formed into 10 companies, of which the detachments now at Fort S. Julian may be considered as 2 integral companies, or as detachments from the 10 companies in Portugal. The men now at Cadiz may be formed into, and considered as the 11th and 12th companies of the regiment, with supernumeraries; and the officers and non-commissioned officers of those companies must be sent to Cadiz to join them. The accounts of the men must be settled forthwith, and you will be pleased to order Col. Eustace to report to Gen. Sontag, once a week, what progress has been made in the settlement.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 8th July, 1811.

I don't hesitate a moment in answering your letter of the 6th, which I have just received. In arranging the departments of the Portuguese army,

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 8th July, 1811.

7. The Commander of the Forces refers the General officers of the army and the Commanding officers of regiments to the orders of the 17th June, 1809, No. 5, and to those of the 11th Aug. 1810, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, regarding the cutting and carrying away the forage.

8. That which the country produces must be realised for the use of the army, but it must be done without waste and with regularity, and the owners of what is taken must be paid for their property.

9. Although the customs of the service do not allow of servants or bāt men from the ranks for the officers of the Medical Staff, yet the Commander of the Forces, adverting to former regulations in this country, and to the practice as well in the Mediterranean as in other parts where His Majesty's forces are employed, directs that an allowance of one dollar a week shall be made for servants in the proportion, and to the officers of the Medical Staff stated underneath, viz.

Inspector of Hospitals	2	Surgeon	1
Deputy Inspector of Hospitals	1	Apothecary	1
Purveyor	1	Deputy Purveyor	1
Physician	1		

10. Those Hospital mates, for whom the Inspector of Hospitals shall certify that a servant is necessary to enable them to perform their duty, are likewise to have an allowance for one servant each.

11. The allowance is to be drawn only by those officers who have actually in their service a native of the Peninsula for their servant.

12. The officers of the Medical Staff, who, under this order, are permitted to draw an allowance for a servant, are likewise permitted to draw a ration of provisions for him under the same conditions.

13. The officers of the Medical Staff are referred to the G. O. of the 29th Nov. 1809, for the mode of making the demand for payment for their servants.

I must take care not to engage to perform that which is impossible, and thus take upon me responsibility for what does not belong to me. I can't engage to pay £600,000 or £700,000 a year in cash to the Portuguese government, besides feeding their army: they shall have from time to time as much money as I can give them. I can't allow Mr. Kennedy to undertake either to supply the forts of Abrantes and Elvas, or to feed any more Portuguese troops than he feeds at present, unless those Portuguese troops should be infantry, and actually serving in a British division.

I shall be much concerned if my unwillingness to pledge myself, or the British departments, to perform that for which I can have not only no certainty, but upon which I can have no grounds of calculation, should delay your arrangements; but I will not involve myself in concerns in which I have nothing to do; and I know well, that if the Portuguese ministers choose to work, and to make others work, the arrangement can be made without calling upon me for such a pledge.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de S. João, 8th July, 1811.

I enclose a letter, &c., which I have received from Mr. Stuart; and I request you to see the gentleman mentioned by him, and inquire who he is, whether he has any recommendation for me, or any other officer, and what his business is in Portugal.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 8th July, 1811.

The system proposed for arranging the Portuguese departments just goes to throw all the work, all the expense, and all the responsibility, upon the British commissariat and me; and to relieve the Portuguese government from it entirely. To this I object, and I cannot concur in any part of the arrangement proposed.

I shall feed the troops we now feed, but no more, unless it should be Portuguese infantry serving in British divisions. I will have nothing to say to Elvas and Abrantes, or to any concern jointly with the Portuguese government; and I will not, because I cannot, pledge myself that any particular sum shall be paid in each month to the Portuguese chest. I can only say, that the sum shall be as large as I can make it.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

8th July, 1811.

In reference to your letter and enclosures from Major Pelly, of the 16th light dragoons, I am to acquaint you that the same have been referred to the Military Secretary as a matter of money, and his Lordship has received directions to order the Commissary Gen. to pay for the bullocks in question their full value, to be shared by the party who captured the same.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

8th July, 1811.

I have laid before the Commander of the Forces Col. Arentschildt's letter relative to the officers of the 1st hussars, K. G. L., being permitted to take horses out of the remount as chargers, refunding government the usual allowance; and I am to acquaint you, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, that under the particular circumstances of the regiment, the Commander of the Forces will not object to the same. But it must be clearly understood that the officers of the 1st hussars are not to sell these horses out of the regiment at all, or to an officer of the regiment, without the permission of the Commanding officer.

The A.G. to Capt. Goodman, Dep. Judge Advocate.

8th July, 1811.

I herewith enclose the charges against quarter master — and Assist. Surgeon —, which are approved and signed. You will be pleased to summon Commissary —, if his evidence is necessary on the former trial.

Your letter is gone to Major Gordon; and as I expect an answer from Col. Ross of the 52d to-morrow, with more information as to the officer who commanded at the outposts when the flag of truce came in with the French officer who mentioned Lieut. Burke's desertion, I shall, perhaps, be able to send you more evidence. You will consider if Col. Pakenham's attendance, with any memorandum or information he has, as D.A.G., is necessary.

I am likewise to inform you that the Commander of the Forces is in possession of a circumstance in some degree in favor of the prisoner; and it is but justice to Lieut. Burke to state this to him, in case he should be disposed to summon the Commander of the Forces, in which case you will enclose me the regular letter.

I annex a list from Capt. Colleton, Royal Staff corps, about private —, by which he appears to have no strong evidence against him, and I think the case not worth the cognisance of a General Court Martial.

To Major Gen. Dunlop.

Quinta de S. João, 9th July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 6th. The affairs of the Peninsula have always been, and are still, in such a state of uncertainty, that it is impossible for me to give any opinion, whether it would be convenient, or otherwise, for the General officers of the army to go home; they must decide this matter for themselves; and if they wish to go, fix the period at which they will apply for leave. I must inform you, however, that not only the public, but the Commander in Chief, and government, were highly displeased that so many General officers were absent from the army during the last winter; and that it will be desirable to me, as well as to the General officers who may wish for leave in future, that I should consult the Commander in Chief before I allow of the departure of any one, excepting on account of ill health.

I am very much obliged to you for your kindness to Lord March.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 9th July, 1811.

I enclose the state of the provisions in Elvas and La Lippe, the former on the 6th, and the latter on the 1st inst.: you will see that they draw very handsomely on Elvas.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 9th July, 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions will have the troops under their command exercised occasionally in divisions as well as brigades. He refers them to the circular letter and memorandum addressed to General officers commanding divisions* from the Adj. Gen.'s office at Cartaxo, 28th Feb. 1811. He requests, however, that unless it should be necessary, the troops should not be kept out in the sun after 8 o'clock in the morning.

4. The celerity and accuracy of the officers and troops in manœuvring are however so essential in all operations, the Commander of the Forces particularly requests that no battalion in this army may at any time be dismissed from a parade without performing some one or other of the manœuvres prescribed by His Majesty's regulations.

6. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the General officers commanding divisions to make arrangements for the preservation of the reserves of biscuit in charge of the several regiments under their command respectively. When the army broke up from the Rio Maior in March last, it was found the soldiers had in general consumed the three days' advance of biscuit which had been given them to keep.

7. Whenever the troops shall halt, this advance ought to be kept in custody of the quarter master of the regiment or of the pay serjeants of companies, and it should not be issued to the soldiers till the day previous to the march. Thus, excepting immediately previous to a march, no soldier should receive more in any one day than one day's provisions.

* This circular letter and memorandum have not yet been found.

I cannot understand the difficulties said to exist in keeping the military chest supplied with the money said to be wanted for it in every month : for instance, the sum required for the expense of the whole army is 30,000,000 of *cruzados per annum*, or 2,500,000 of *cruzados per mensem* : the revenue, according to Mr. Stuart's letter to me of the 10th June, is 730 *contos* in a month, 1,825,000 *cruzados*. The supplies we already furnish your troops cost about £40,000 *per mensem*, or 350,000 *cruzados* ; and I should suppose that the Portuguese government could well receive supplies in kind at Lisbon every month to a similar amount, which would be monthly 700,000 *cruzados*. There would remain to be provided for, monthly, 1,800,000 *cruzados*, to which it appears that the revenue would be more than equal ; but there are some other little items of accounts which would increase the payments by us, and of course decrease the payments to the military chest ; one of them is the whole expense of the pay and food of the 20th regt. at Cadiz.

After we should have thus given in provisions to the Portuguese troops, or in kind at Lisbon, to the value of £80,000 *per mensem*, or, in round numbers, £1,000,000 sterling *per annum*, there would remain £1,000,000 sterling of the subsidy to be made good, of which sum Mr. Stuart thinks he can venture to promise to throw into the military chest every month between £50,000 and £60,000, or 500,000 *cruzados*. Upon adverting to Mr. Stuart's statement of the expenditure of the government, I find that it amounted to 113 *contos*, exclusive of arsenals ; and to about 160 *contos*, or 400,000 *cruzados*, in the month, including arsenals, besides military expense : if, then, the government will put the whole of these receipts every month into the military chest, and take from us £1,000,000 in provisions and kind, and trust to what we can pay monthly of the subsidy for the expenses of the civil government, the military chest will be amply provided for ; and in the course of the year, doubtless, the money payments of that part of the subsidy to be received in money will not be much in arrear, nor of course the charges of the civil government.

What I object to in the plan which came to me yesterday was, that, under pretence of forming a commissariat arrangement, it threw all the labor and all the responsibility upon the British army and British Commissariat ; while, at the same time, we were to supply, that which is the most difficult, the greatest part of the subsidy in money ; and the Portuguese government, who alone can get the money which is necessary to carry on their affairs, and who are most interested in carrying them on, were not to make every exertion in their power. I will make no exertion, and come into no arrangement which is not founded upon the positive stipulation that all the powers of the government are to be really and duly exerted, and all their means fairly applied to carry on the war : when that is done, they will find me ready to labor in the cause, and to make every sacrifice, and do every thing else to forward it.

I see that some of the officers have not been paid even gratuity since January, others not since February ; some of the troops have been paid only to the 31st May : if they had all this money, surely some might have been sent to pay the troops.

The A.G. to the Commissary General.

9th July, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that your letter and enclosures of yesterday's date have been laid before the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency is happy Mr. — has been put under an arrest, as he had no authority nor no occasion to strike one of the inhabitants of Peniche. It is his Excellency's pleasure that he remains in arrest till the Commander of the Forces can have the matter inquired into. You will be pleased to use your own discretion as to the expediency of having another Commissary sent to Peniche to do the duty there.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 11th July, 1811.

I send with this my dispatch to government, which I beg you to show to Gens. Graham and Beresford.

I enclose a statement showing the periods to which the officers and soldiers of the Portuguese army have been paid pay and gratuity. I am

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 10th July, 1811.

1. The Commanding officers at the several hospital stations are requested to pay particular attention to the G. O. of the 24th June, 1809, regarding the march of detachments of convalescents, and regarding the delivery of copies of these orders to the officers commanding detachments of convalescents on their march.

2. The Commander of the Forces having received orders to draft the 2d batt. 88th regt. into the 1st batt., the following arrangement is to be made for that purpose.

3. All the private men belonging to the 2d batt. 88th regt. in Portugal and Spain are to be drafted into the 1st batt., and are to be distributed into companies in the 1st batt., with the exception of boys deemed at present unfit for service in the field.

4. All men missing from the 2d batt. are to continue on the strength of the 2d batt.

5. The transfer is to be made as soon as convenient, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for their men up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt. to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order.

6. When the transfer shall be completed, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batt. are to proceed to Lisbon preparatory to their embarkation for England.

7. The Commander of the Forces begs the 2d batt. of the 88th regt. will accept his thanks for their services since they have been in the Peninsula; he has had every reason to be satisfied with their good conduct since they have been under his command, and he hopes soon to have them again in renewed strength.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 11th July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces being desirous of having a daily state of the army, each regiment will send in every morning to the Commanding officer of the brigade, a morning state, in the form of a weekly state, without the proof table, and accounting for the regiment or battalion in one line.

2. The Brigade Major of each brigade will make up from the regimental morning states sent to him, a morning state of the brigade, accounting for the strength of the brigade in one line, to the Assist. Adj. Gen. with the division.

3. The Assist. Adj. Gens. of divisions are from the brigade states to send to the Adj. Gen. a daily state of the division to which each is attached, made up as follows: the British troops in one line; the Portuguese do. in another; the third line, total of the division.

4. If there are troops of only one nation in the division, the Assist. Adj. Gens. will make up the morning state of the division, accounting for every body in one line.

5. The Brigade Majors of Brig. Gen. Pack's and Brig. Gen. Barbacena's brigades, which are not attached to any division, are to send their brigade states direct to the Adj. Gen.

6. The Assist. Adj. Gens. of divisions, and the Brigade Majors of Gen. Pack's and Gen. Barbacena's brigades, must send their states by mounted officers, from the divisions or brigades, so as to arrive at the Adj. Gen.'s office as soon as possible each day, the object being to give the Commander of the Forces a knowledge of the daily strength. In case of delay, the Assist. Adj. Gens. of divisions will be called on to account for the cause of it.

7. On the back of each divisional state, the return of the Artillery in one line to be stated.

8. It must be clearly understood, these daily states are in no degree to interfere with the other regular returns of the army, which are to be made up and sent in as usual.

concerned to observe that my representations upon this subject have had as little effect in procuring for these unfortunate gentlemen what is due to them as my representations to the government have upon other subjects.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 11th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch (No. 39) relative to the grant of a medal to Col. Sir R. Wilson.

I have already had the honor of reporting to the Sec. of State my sense of the services rendered by Sir R. Wilson while under my command in the year 1809; and I see no reason why they should not be distinguished by the grant of the medal.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 11th July, 1811.

The enemy continued in the positions reported in my dispatch of the 4th inst., till the 7th, when they moved a large body of cavalry, and about 2 battalions of infantry, from Montijo, towards the Gevora; and from thence upon Villar del Rey, La Roca, and Alburquerque. The object of this movement was apparently to cut off our detachments employed in observing the enemy on that side, in which, however, they did not succeed; Major Cocks having retired with all his detachments upon San Vicente, still keeping communications open with Arronches and Portalegre. The enemy's troops retired from Alburquerque on the 8th, and Major Cocks again entered that town with his parties on the same day.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' are again in the same positions on the right of the Guadiana which they occupied when I addressed your Lordship on the 4th inst. It appears by a letter of the 1st inst., from Marshal Marmont to the Prince de Neufchâtel, that Soult has returned into Andalusia, leaving with Marshal Marmont the 5th corps and the greater part of his cavalry. Marmont appears to entertain the intention of posting his army on the Tagus at Almaraz, where he has a bridge, and maintain an intermediate post between his army and Badajoz, probably Truxillo, where I understand that the enemy are at work upon the ancient castle.

Excepting from this intercepted letter, I have had no reason to believe that the enemy had sent back so large a body of troops into Andalusia. But it is almost impracticable to procure intelligence of the enemy's movements in this part of the country; notwithstanding that I believe the inhabitants are as well disposed towards the Spanish government as those of any other part of Spain.

If the battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the regiments in the 5th corps, have made good the losses sustained by the latter in the battle of Albuera, I should conceive, from the returns I have, that the 5th corps consists of 12,000 effective infantry; which, added to the army of Portugal, would leave under the command of Marmont from 36,000 to 40,000 infantry, and between 5000 and 6000 cavalry, besides artillery. The allied army under my command consists of 42,000 effective infantry, and 4000 cavalry, of which 3000 are British cavalry, and this strength will in a short time be considerably increased.

Gen. Blake made an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla on the night of the 30th June; in which place the enemy had a garrison of

about 300 infantry. I am sorry to say, that this attempt failed; and he remained before the place till the 2d inst., and then retired towards the Guadiana. On the 6th 2 divisions of infantry, and the cavalry of the 5th army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, were crossing the Guadiana on a bridge constructed for them at San Lucar by Col. Austin. The artillery was embarked at Ayamonte, and Gen. Ballesteros, with the advanced guard, remained upon the river Piedra; but I think it probable that Gen. Ballesteros would have been obliged to retire, as a division of the enemy's troops which had moved from Seville had arrived at Almendro on the 6th, and had turned off from thence upon Cartaya. It appeared to be Gen. Blake's intention to embark his troops for Cadiz; but neither Gen. Castaños nor I have heard from him since he marched from Juruménha, on the 18th June.

In the north, Gen. Bessières has returned again to Valladolid from Benavente; and in the end of the month of June the enemy assembled at, and in the neighbourhood of, Valladolid, a considerable body of troops. Gen. Bonet, however, still remained in the neighbourhood of Leon and Benavente with the troops under his command; and I have received from Gen. Silveira a report of the defeat of the French in an attack made upon a Spanish detachment from the army in Galicia, in front of Astorga, on the 25th June. The guerrillas likewise continue their operations, and besides the alarm given to Valladolid on the 15th, reported in my last dispatch, Don Julian gave a similar alarm to Salamanca on the 29th June; but a considerable party of guerrillas belonging to different chiefs, which had taken a convoy at Peñaranda, were afterwards surprised there on the 30th June, and dispersed; about 200 having been killed, wounded, and made prisoners.

I wish that I could report to your Lordship that some more beneficial advantage had resulted from the collection of the enemy's troops in Estremadura to raise the siege of Badajoz, and better calculated to reconcile us to the disappointment upon that occasion. But I am apprehensive that, till the Spanish government shall reform their military system; till the officers shall be instructed and the troops disciplined; till regular resources shall be found, and faithfully applied to the support of their armies on an expedition; and till the armies shall be equipped as they ought for the service required from them, the history of every attempt on our part to alter the nature of the war, on any general combined plan, will be the same as the last.

The enemy will collect to oppose us a larger body of troops than the allied British and Portuguese army can bring into the field, and will oblige us to take the defensive; and they will experience no danger, or even inconvenience, from their weakness in all other parts of the Peninsula, in consequence of their collecting their whole force to oppose us, because the Spanish armies are neither disciplined nor provided or equipped in such a manner as that they can perform any operation, even of the most trifling nature, if there should be any opposition on the part of the enemy.* The only chance, therefore, is to watch for opportunities of undertaking important operations of short duration, with the means at our own disposal, till the Spanish armies shall be in a better state.

* See Appendix, No. VI.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 11th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 22d June, in which your Lordship desires to have my opinion as to the restrictions which it may be expedient to put upon the grant of medals to British officers, for distinguished merit displayed upon such occasions as the battles of Vimero, Coruña, Talavera, and Barrosa.

My opinion has always been, that the grant of a medal to an individual officer ought to have been founded originally, partly on the importance of the occasion or action which it was intended to commemorate, and partly on the share which the individual officer had had in the action to be commemorated; and that medals should have been granted for important actions only, and to those engaged in them in a conspicuous manner, whatever might be their rank in the service. It was decided, however, that medals should be granted on the same principle only, but following strictly the example of the grant of medals to the navy, notwithstanding that an action on shore is very different from an action at sea; and the merit of the different classes of individuals is likewise entirely different. At the same time, this principle was departed from in some of the grants made.

If the principle adopted in the grant of medals to the navy is adhered to in the grant of medals to officers of the army, and that medals are to be granted to General officers, and Lieutenant Colonels commanding regiments, on an occasion to be commemorated, because, on a similar occasion, they would be granted to Admirals and Captains of ships of the line, it is difficult to restrict the grant, or to make a selection of officers to whom they should be granted to commemorate the battles at Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro, if government determine that these actions should be commemorated in that manner. If, however, that principle is departed from, it is not difficult to make out a list of the names of officers already reported to your Lordship, who were at the head of corps or detachments upon these occasions, and who had a conspicuous share in the event which it is the intention of the government to commemorate in this manner. It is not probable, however, that the adoption of this principle will decrease the number of those to whom the honor would be granted; but, as I have already represented to your Lordship, I don't think this important: that which is important in the establishment of the principle on which the grant of this honor should be made, is, that every officer should feel that he shall receive the mark of distinction, if he should be in the place to distinguish himself, and should act in the manner to deserve to be distinguished, whatever may be his military rank. It may be contended for by me, that the officers of the British army don't require an honor of this description to stimulate their exertions, and that the grant of the medal is therefore useless; but, however, those who contend for this principle must admit that a selection of those who have had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in an action is a less objectionable mode of granting it than the grant of it by classes, whether the individuals composing those classes have distinguished themselves or not.

I have now the honor to enclose lists of the names of the officers who, on the principle of selection, ought, in my opinion, to receive medals for

the battles of Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro, if government think proper to distinguish these battles by medals. In respect to the battle of Albuera, I was not there, and I am not able to give an opinion upon it. One brigade of the 4th division of infantry, however, was not in the action, nor Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of cavalry. The brunt of the action was on the right; but some of the corps of infantry, I believe, and certainly Gen. Otway's brigade of cavalry, on the left, were not engaged. At all events, these troops were not engaged, as far as I understand, in a greater degree than the whole army were at Busaco, and every corps on the field at Fuentes de Oñoro.

I mention these circumstances only to point out to your Lordship, that, in every action on shore, however severe, there must be some to whose lot it does not fall to have an opportunity to distinguish themselves; and that the principle of selection, without reference to ranks, ought to be adopted in every instance of the grant of medals to the army.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 12th July, 1811.

You will have seen from Austin's report of the 8th inst. that it is probable Blake is off (for we know nothing of him), and that the Algarve is left very much to itself. I don't think it very probable that the enemy will make any serious attempt upon that province, but straggling parties might do a great deal of mischief; and I think you would do well to send into Algarve the Setuval and Alcacer militia, to be under Austin's orders, and to prevent any thing small from insulting him: we can easily get them back by land, or by water, when we shall require them.

I have at last got a statement of the regiments in the '*Armée de Portugal*,' but not their numbers: there are 6 divisions of infantry, and in each division 4 complete regiments, besides the Légion du Midi, Hanoverians, Prussians, and Irish. The regiments had, last campaign, 4 and 5 battalions each, including those brought in by the 9th corps, which have now joined them, and I should think this cannot now have less than from 1000 to 1200 men in each regiment: I am convinced, therefore, I am under the mark in supposing each division only 4000 infantry. They have one new regiment, the 130^{me}, of which I have no account. They have 11 regiments of the cavalry which was in Portugal, which had 44 squadrons; and they have 3 regiments of 4 squadrons each, which passed the winter in Castille, and are in capital order: supposing the old cavalry to be reduced one half, or to 22 squadrons, they must have now 34 squadrons. There is another fresh brigade of cavalry belonging to this army still in Castille, for which I have got the letter which Marmont has written.

The devil is in the French for numbers!!! A deserter came in yesterday, and told me he heard Broissard say to another officer, that the two armies had 60,000 infantry, and nearly 10,000 cavalry! I made them from 48,000 to 50,000 infantry, without the garrison of Badajoz, and 7000 cavalry.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 12th July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces will see the 2d, 4th, and Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division under arms, to-morrow morning, at half past 5 o'clock. He requests that they may be in contiguous close columns of brigades, the right in front, in the open ground, in the rear of the wood in which they are encamped, at half past 5 in the morning, in marching order, and the close columns will face to the wood.

Our army continues very healthy, indeed more so since the nights have become warmer. I think you will do well to send us up your men as soon as they will be fit to join.

To Col. Austin.

Quinta de S. João, 12th July, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 8th. I write to Marshal Beresford to request him to adopt measures to send you a force into Algarve at present. In the mean time, I request you to take measures to force the boats on the Guadiana to keep on the right of the river as much as possible. I don't think it probable that the enemy will venture to make any serious attempt upon Algarve, particularly if you keep the boats out of their way; but it is as well that you should have some force.

The A.G. to Capt. Goodman, Dep. Judge Advocate.

12th July, 1811.

I herewith annex the General Court Martial held on 3 privates of the — regt., for committing a robbery at Elvas; and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire you will order the Provost Marshal to have them put in irons and strictly guarded: you will also proceed to their place of confinement, and read to them their sentence, awarded by the General Court Martial, and confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces. You will then state to them that it is his Excellency's intention to have the same carried into effect, unless they should reveal where the stolen property now is, and what became of it. It is not perhaps possible to get back the money; but the Commander of the Forces is desirous that the people should recover their gold ornaments, diamonds, silk, &c., and other property. If the prisoners, conscious of the precipice on which they stand, and desirous of making the best atonement now in their power for their heinous offence, should communicate to you such particulars as might tend to recovering the stolen articles, I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency would in such case extend his gracious pardon to the culprits; but unless this discovery is made, it is his fixed intention to have the sentence of the Court Martial put into execution.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 10th to Lord FitzRoy Somerset; and I am very sorry that Capt. — has been guilty of a very great irregularity, in taking upon himself to do himself justice at Espinhal on the 11th May last, for which I must bring him to trial. I beg, therefore, that Capt. — may be put in arrest at large, and inform him that he will receive the copy of the charge on which he will be tried in due course.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 10th.

You will have seen from my letter to the Sec. of State, which I requested Mr. Stuart to communicate to you, that affairs are in such a state that there can be no reason why you should put yourself to any inconvenience to come to the army sooner than you would otherwise.

Nothing has occurred since I wrote to the Sec. of State, excepting that Gen. Blake has embarked, leaving Gen. Ballesteros, with his division, and the cavalry of the 5th army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in the Condado de Niebla.

P.S. I have just received a letter of the 10th from Campo Maior, from which I find that the Spaniards have not sailed yet, and some of Loy's

cavalry have not embarked, but the French have retired from Castillejos and Gibráleon.

Memorandum for Don F. X. Castaños.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

The Captain General Castaños informed me yesterday, that Gen. Ballesteros had remained with a division of infantry, and the cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in the Condado de Niebla; and that he (the Capt. General) intended to recommend to Gen. Ballesteros to retire across the Guadiana, into the kingdom of Algarve, in case he should be so pressed by the enemy as to render his retreat from the Condado de Niebla expedient. In consequence of this information, I recommend that Gen. Ballesteros may be requested to communicate confidentially with Col. Austin, who commands in Algarve, on all matters relating to his operations, in order that Col. Austin may be prepared to assist Gen. Ballesteros with the means of crossing the Guadiana with expedition, in case that measure should be expedient. It is also desirable, in order that Col. Austin may be able to adopt measures to have the troops under Gen. Ballesteros supplied with provisions during the time which it may be necessary that they should remain within the kingdom of Algarve. I propose to send Col. Austin a copy of this memorandum, in order that he may be prepared to attend to Gen. Ballesteros' want of assistance to pass the Guadiana, and to his wants in provisions while he may be in Algarve.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I received yesterday your letter of the 10th; and I am much concerned that I cannot take upon me to answer for your having the supplies of money wanted to make up the sum which you require to have in the chest every month. If you find that this failure, on the part of Great Britain, to be able positively to assure a certain sum every month, will prevent the accomplishment of the arrangement which you think necessary, you ought to report your opinions officially to the British government; and I shall be very glad if they will make any arrangements by which I can be relieved from all concern in the money transactions of Great Britain with the Portuguese government. I also think that if you are of opinion that the reserves of provisions cannot be supplied for the forts by the Portuguese government, you should state officially that opinion, and then our government will know upon what they are to reckon. I should think, however, that Elvas being entirely supplied, you would be inclined to alter that opinion, unless indeed you should think that the Portuguese government will not be able to supply the current consumption of the garrisons, and that they will immediately begin to consume the reserves.

I acknowledge that the suspicion that this would be the case, and the discussions in which that question would involve the departments of this army, are the reasons why I positively refuse to have any thing to say to the garrisons.

If the government act according to their own regulations, and will really put them in force, and really punish those who disobey them, there can be no difficulties about means of transport; but I don't see how these difficulties would be removed by our Commissaries supplying the reserves of

the garrisons, and the Portuguese Commissaries the current consumption. I have done a great deal in the way of supplying the consumption of the Portuguese army, and probably have undertaken far more than I shall be able to accomplish in all situations ; but this is very certain, that I cannot venture to undertake to do more.

Gen. Castaños has promised to garrison and refit Albuquerque, which is a great object in these times. He is going to send Don Carlos de España to Castille ; and I am thinking of fitting up a little depôt of ammunition, &c., for him, in Monsanto, in which he will put 200 or 300 men, if the Portuguese government will have no objection to his holding that place. I shall be much obliged to you if you will inquire. He is also desirous of having a similar depôt north of the Douro. I know of no place in Portugal which would answer his purpose ; but, as well as I can recollect, Monterey would. Do you recollect any thing of Monterey ?

P.S. Gen. Picton tells me that the outwork at Campo Maior is finished, and ready for the palisades.

The artillery are much in want of mules, to which I hope you have adverted in your communication with government ; so much so, that I think it might be advisable to send away the 6 pounder brigade in Hamilton's division, and to have only 9 pounders, and to employ all the mules in equipping them as they ought to be. Your brigades of infantry are likewise miserably deficient in provision mules.

I saw the 2d and 4th, and Hamilton's division, this morning. The 13th is a very fine regiment, in very tolerable order. I am sorry to say that Ashworth's brigade have fallen off in their marching ; all the rest capital. These Albuera divisions were very strong again.

I have desired Mr. Kennedy to give the chest 50,000 dollars in coin.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811, 7 P.M.

I have just received your 2 letters of the 11th.

I have not yet seen the complaints of the officers of our commissariat at Coimbra, but when I see them I shall write upon them. Our Commissaries are not allowed to give protection to individuals of any description, but they must have assistance from the country ; and it will not answer the purpose of the Portuguese government to prevent them from having it. All persons employed by us belonging to Spain are protected from the requisition. I suppose the Portuguese government will not refuse to give the same countenance to the British army that is given by the Spaniards.

I don't exactly understand the letter of the government on the fortification of Elvas. In answer to the last paragraph, however, I must express a wish that Mr. Stuart should send it home. I do every thing in my power to forward the cause ; and I wish that the Portuguese government should try whether their affairs could not be improved by a change of hands. Nothing could be more satisfactory to me than such a change.

I shall attend to your wishes in the distribution of the cavalry. You did not send me the report on Almeida.

I sent Mr. Stuart a statement of the period to which the officers of the army are paid. Mr. Kennedy can easily, and I shall desire him to-morrow

to send an estimate of his disbursements for the Portuguese government, which it is probable they will not much amend; and he can send a monthly account, and a quarterly account; because in the former he cannot include the disbursements at Cadiz. You can likewise send your demand upon England, which ought to have been sent by the government as long ago as March; but I cannot say that the balance will be paid in money, or at what periods it will be paid; and upon that point I sincerely wish that you should come to an explanation with the British government, and not with me.

I have not now money to answer the demands of the British army; and it is rather too much that the Portuguese should insist that I should fix the sums which they are to receive every month, out of the sums at my disposal, already not sufficient for the British army; to which add, that occasional assistance is wanted for the Spaniards, and that there is no man, however anxious for the prosperity of Portuguese concerns, who will not admit that this assistance should be given. However, I have no desire that matters should continue as they are. Let government provide only decently for the British army, and I shall be satisfied; or let them take the whole concern out of my hands, and I shall be happy to resign it. Just to show you how we stand in respect to money, I mention that we have not even a shilling in the chest to pay the demands of the officers of the 2d batt. of your regiment, upon the 1st being drafted by orders from England.

To Col. Austin.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I send you the copy of a memorandum which I have sent to Gen. Castaños, which will explain itself. You will act as therein stated, if so required by Gen. Ballesteros; and I beg you to let me have an account of any expense you may incur on account of provisions or boats for Gen. Ballesteros' division of troops.

You might as well have prepared a magazine, with 6000 or 8000 rations, for Gen. Ballesteros, in case he should cross the Guadiana upon you suddenly; but it may be as well not to let him know of it, otherwise you would not keep it long.

To Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and its enclosures; from the tenor of which last I suspect Mr. — to have been in the French service, and probably to be a spy. The phraseology of his letter to you is evidently that of a person who has been in the service of the French: and I beg you to communicate with Mr. Stuart in order to have him released from confinement in gaol, and send him to head quarters under charge of an assistant provost and a guard; but let his reasonable convenience be provided for.

I beg you also to send me any letters or papers, or the memorandums of any interrogatories to him, which can throw light upon his conduct or intentions.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I enclose certain papers which I have received on the subject of the

misconduct of certain officers at Espinhal, on the 11th May last, adverted to in a letter from you of the 10th June; and I have to inform you that I have ordered Capt. — in arrest for his conduct, and I shall keep him in arrest during one month, in hopes that the government will, in the course of that time, adopt measures to enforce the attendance of the evidences against Capt. —. If they should not do so, I shall be under the necessity of relieving Capt. — from his arrest.

I mention this, because I observe that, as usual, there is great readiness to complain of the injury done in this case, but no desire to prosecute; as it is obvious that the complainant not only knew the name of Capt. —, and the regiment to which he belonged, but that he did not belong to the hussars. The consequence of his concealing the name of Capt. — is that much time has elapsed, and I have been obliged to look through all the march routes given to troops in the month of May, before I could discover who was complained of.

I shall likewise observe on this case, that although Capt. — will be brought to trial for having taken upon himself to do himself justice, I am not astonished when an officer of the British army is guilty of this conduct. They scarcely ever enter a village in which they or their men are not robbed, and they can get no redress on the spot; and, as for punishment for any crime committed, I repeat that, since I have been in Portugal, I have not known any man punished, excepting those suspected of being French partisans. But whatever may be the conduct of the Portuguese government, I shall not allow the British army to commit irregularities with impunity, and Capt. — shall certainly be tried, if, within a month, any evidence should be produced against him. It is useless to inquire whether any steps have been taken against the criminal confined for the robbery.

I beg you to return the enclosed papers as soon as may be possible.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 13th July, 1811.

I enclose my last dispatch to the Sec. of State.

I have got a statement of the regiments in the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which amount to 24, and 4 or 6 battalions of foreign troops and 14 regts. of cavalry. I have an officer who counted 25,000 infantry, coming through Baños, and there were some that passed through Lagunilla. They must be between 24,000 and 30,000 infantry, and the cavalry between 3000 and 4000 at least. They have one regiment that was not in Portugal; and when one considers what that army was last year, and the reinforcements it received, allowance is made for very handsome losses, in supposing them reduced to the numbers above stated. I think these numbers agree tolerably well with what I saw of the army at Fuentes, allowing for the detachment to Andalusia of 19 battalions of the 9th corps. It is said in the French army that they have, between the 2 armies lately brought into Estremadura, 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. I believe the latter exaggerated by about 3000 men, although they had at Badajoz 27 regiments of cavalry, but the former but very little, and not at all if the garrison of Badajoz is included.

We are increasing in strength. I have received at Lisbon 2000 cr

3000 men from England. Our wounded, &c., are coming about, and we shall soon have not much less than 60,000 effective men, Portuguese and English.

The A. G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A. A. G.

13th July, 1811.

I have received your two explanatory letters, and the states of the cavalry, which I must beg leave to return, observing that the G. O. of the army must be complied with, and that it is entirely useless to send me an incomplete or incorrect state, as you are too well acquainted with the duties of this department, in an army of near 50,000 men, not to be satisfied that I can only look to the A. A. G. of each division for a rigid compliance with the G. O.

The first day of an order there is much excuse for any tardiness in complying with it; but it is absolutely necessary that the D. A. A. G. of the 2d division of cavalry, and the Brigade Majors of cavalry, should know that if they do not perform the duties ordered, his Excellency will not retain them in their Staff situations. As the morning state of the 5th division was received in due time from Portalegre, it certainly is somewhat singular that the morning state ordered on the 11th by the G. O. from the cavalry, who have such rapid means of communication, should not be received up to the present moment, viz., 12 o'clock on the 13th.

I am aware of your zeal in executing your duties, and I beg you will not consider this letter as a reproach in any manner, but only to point out the total uselessness of sending me incomplete returns; and inasmuch as the Commander of the Forces will not accept an incomplete return from me, so am I unable to receive one from any division that the A. A. G. is not satisfied is correct. I must return my daily state without the cavalry to his Excellency, remarking I have no complete state from them, and I should recommend you to adopt such measures as will prevent a recurrence of omissions on the part of any of the regiments. I require from you now the morning state of the 12th complete, agreeably to the G. O. of the 11th, and the morning state of the 13th.

The returns of the cavalry must be detailed as follows in 4 lines :

1st division, British
2d division, do.
Portuguese
Total

The A. G. to Major Gen. Dunlop.

13th July, 1811.

I have laid your letter relative to the difficulty of exercising the 5th division at Portalegre, according to the G. O., from the want of convenient ground, &c., before the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you, that although it cannot be conveniently exercised in this hot season from the distance the troops would have to march, still his Excellency desires the division may be marched at least twice a week, at a very early hour in the morning, so that the troops should not be kept out in the sun after 8 o'clock.

The A. G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

13th July, 1811.

I have not failed to lay your letter and enclosures from the Purveyor of hospitals, relative to the expense of the interment of soldiers at Lisbon, before the Commander of the Forces, and his Excellency considers the charge therein specified of 4s. 8½d. reasonable; and the Purveyor is hereby authorised to charge the same against the Captain of the company of the regiment to which the soldier dying belongs, and the same is forthwith to be made good.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Quinta de S. João, 14th July, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 12th. The horses to which you refer have been sent here by the government at my request, in order to supply the wants of the officers of the cavalry, who ought to have each an English horse; but they had not been able to purchase any in the country, and I requested the Sec. of State to send them out.

I conceive that it is equally necessary that a General officer in your situation, coming from a place in which you could not get the horses you require, should be provided by some public arrangement; and therefore I beg you to take such number of those horses as you may think proper. I don't exactly recollect whether the price is £50 or £60 each, or whether Sir S. Cotton settled that they should be paid for according to a valuation of each, the whole amount covering the expense of their purchase incurred by government; and I shall not delay this answer to your letter till I shall have had time to inquire. Let me know the number you will take, in order that I may write to England to have them replaced for the service of the officers of the cavalry.

There is nothing new this day, excepting a report from Caceres that Marmont has commenced his movement, which, however, has not yet been confirmed by any thing from our outposts.

P.S. I enclose an order to the officer commanding the cavalry dépôt, to deliver to you as many of the horses purchased for the officers of the cavalry as you may require.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 14th July, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 8th, after I had sent off the dispatch of yesterday.

I never entertained such an opinion as that attributed to me by Don E. de Bardaxi, viz., that, if the mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her colonies should fail, we ought to go hand in hand with the Spanish government in carrying on hostilities against the colonies. My opinion has invariably been, that, in all the concerns of Spain, Great Britain ought to take the liberal line of policy, and to lay aside, at least during the existing war, all considerations of mercantile profit; and it appeared to me that, in this question of the colonies particularly, this line would suit equally with the military policy and the mercantile interests of Great Britain, and add greatly to the general estimation of our character.

I am, and have always been, of opinion, that the notions of our merchants of the vast profits to be made by an immediate direct intercourse with the Spanish colonies were erroneous. That profit was to be made by this intercourse there is no doubt, and that eventually the extent and value of the commercial intercourse with the colonies will be very great I am certain; but this value must be the effect of time, of the increase of riches, and of the growth of luxury in the colonies, and the period of its arrival at its highest state is likely to be checked by the extravagant speculations of our merchants. I think that, whatever may be the final relative situation between Spain and her colonies, Great Britain must be the gainer. The result must be the relaxation, if not annihilation, of the colonial commercial system, and a direct allowed intercourse between the colonies and all other countries, in which Great Britain must be a partaker and the greatest gainer. In expectation of this ultimate gain, the policy of Great Britain ought to have been liberal throughout, as I hope it will turn out upon examination to have been. The wild speculations of the colonies ought to have been checked; the authority of the mother

country ought to have been countenanced; and the endeavors of our traders and captains of ships to separate the colonies from Spain ought to have been suppressed.

On these principles I approved highly of Lord Liverpool's letter to the Governor of Curaçoa, which circumstance may probably have given Don E. de Bardaxi a notion that I thought we ought to go all lengths with Spain in subduing the spirit of independence in the colonies; but I conceive these principles are by no means inconsistent with the conduct of the British government since Lord Liverpool's letter was written, at least as far as I have any knowledge of it; and what has occurred since does not appear to me to be inconsistent with that letter.

When the colonies, at least some of them, had manifested an inclination to separate from the mother country, it was necessary for the British government to consider, not only what Spain could do, but what Great Britain could assist Spain in effecting. Knowing what I do of the Spanish government and its means and resources, and the employment for them, I am certain that they have not the power to reduce to obedience even one of the weakest of the colonies which is disposed to separate. I am equally certain that to make the attempt would be the grossest folly and misapplication of means; and I will go further, and declare that I believe that Great Britain could not, in justice to the greater object in the Peninsula, give Spain any assistance from which any good effect can be expected.

I am afraid that it is but too true, that if distant colonies choose to separate from the mother country they will effect their object; and at all events it would have been the height of madness, in these times, for Spain to have endeavored, by force, to prevent such a separation, or for Great Britain to have encouraged and aided in such an attempt. The conduct which Great Britain ought to have followed was to endeavor, by influence and advice, to prevent matters from coming to extremities, if possible; and at all events not to direct her force to an object which was quite unattainable.

Nothing can be so absurd as to suppose that Spain, with two frigates, could prevent the separation of the Caraccas, or that the reception in London of the deputies from that colony prevented that *great effort* from having its effect. If the deputies had not been received in London, they would have gone by the first packet to France; and the truth, however disagreeable, which I have above stated, would have been discovered.

At last Great Britain has offered her mediation in the dispute, which I wish had been asked for; and it remains to be considered on what terms the offer ought to be accepted. I have already pointed out that Great Britain is a fair mediator, as our interests, well understood, as I believe they are, are not inconsistent either with the well understood interests of Spain, or of the colonies, in their existing situation; and it would have been better if the mediation had been accepted in the spirit in which it was offered, and that the Spanish government had come forward with a full but confidential declaration of their intentions respecting the colonies in future, both on the subject of constitution and of commerce. Great Britain would then have had something to mediate upon and to arrange

between the two parties ; but under present circumstances there is nothing for her to do, excepting to procure the submission of the Caraccas and Buenos Ayres ; and, if Great Britain does not succeed in these impracticable objects, she is to aid Spain in forcing their submission ! And I am supposed to approve of this condition, and to think that Great Britain ought to join in this war between mother country and colonies ! One would really believe that Don E. de Bardaxi had never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, and to the objects which they have to acquire at home, or to the efforts making here by Great Britain, and that he thought I had considered of these subjects as little as he appears to have done !

Great Britain cannot agree to this condition. In respect to a constitution the Spanish government has gone a great length ; but I doubt that they have gone so far as the colonies, some of them at least, will require. I think they will ask to have separate local representative bodies for the management of their interior concerns, of the same description with our colonial assemblies, leaving in the Cortes more or less authority in imperial and general questions, and having in the Cortes a representative or not, according to the nature of the authority remaining with the Cortes, and the mode in which it will be exerted. But this question, however important, does not appear to have been considered.

In respect to commerce, the Spanish government have said nothing. There is nothing more certain, however, than that the commercial intercourse between Spain and her colonies cannot continue to exist as it has hitherto. The consequence of what has already been done, and of what is offered in this proposed treaty of mediation, must be to place the colonies, in respect to trade, on the same footing with the mother country, and to allow the colonies to trade, as it may suit their interests, with all parts of the world, in the same manner as any province of Old Spain. If this consequence does not follow what has been done, it is useless to talk to the colonies of equal rights, and interests equally well attended to. It will be obvious to the inhabitants of the colonies, and they will feel, that their interests are sacrificed for the supposed interests of the mother country, on the old system of colonial policy.

I admit, however, that the mother country will lose immediately (though probably not eventually) very largely in revenue, and its inhabitants in commercial profits, by these commercial concessions to the colonies ; and although probably these losses are the unavoidable effects of the circumstances of the times, the mother country has a fair claim to participate in the advantages which the colonies will enjoy, particularly in the existing moment of her distress. This is an object to which the treaty of mediation should have adverted. The Spanish government should have made known to Great Britain, confidentially, on what system it was proposed that the commerce of the colonies should be carried on hereafter ; what duties should be levied on the imports of goods of foreign countries into the colonies ; *and what proportion of those duties should be paid to the mother country for general imperial purposes ;* and what to remain in the colony for local objects.

With a system thus formed, Great Britain might have gone to work

with some prospect of success in making an arrangement which would have permanently united the colonies to the mother country, by providing for their mutual interests on just and fair principles; and which at all events, by putting an end to the existing disputes, would have removed the uneasiness which they occasion, and would have increased the means and resources of Spain to carry on the war against the common and *only* enemy. And you will observe that in the establishment of this system Great Britain would have done, in every point, that which suits her own interest.

But I am apprehensive that the Spanish government have not taken an enlarged view, either of their own situation or that of the colonies, or of the two relatively with each other; and till they do so matters will only grow worse and worse daily, and it is useless for us to interfere in them; and after a long contest, which will only tend to the weakness of the mother country, and will deprive her of all the resources which she could otherwise derive from the colonies in her war with France, the business will end in the separation of the colonies from Spain.

You are now in possession of my opinion upon this whole subject; and you may inform Don E. de Bardaxi that there is nothing so far from my thoughts as that it is possible for Spain to prevent the separation of any one colony that chooses to separate, and that nothing could be so absurd or so injurious to Spain herself, as for Great Britain to divert any of her military resources from the war in the Peninsula to the impracticable object of reducing to obedience even the smallest and least powerful of the colonies of Spain disposed to separate.

There is nothing new, excepting a report that Marmont is in motion to take up his proposed position on the Tagus.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

14th July, 1811.

I am favored with your letter by ——— and enclosure. I was under the necessity of reporting officially to the Commander of the Forces, that up to this period, 12 o'clock, 14th July, I have received no general daily state from the cavalry agreeably to the orders of the 11th inst. His Excellency has ordered me to place you under an arrest; but upon my strong representation to him of my conviction you have done your utmost, he is of opinion you are bound to find out the officer who has failed in his duty towards you, and whether it be ———'s neglect, or the D.A.A.G. of the 2d division, the officer who has been remiss in his duty is forthwith to be placed under an arrest. You will satisfy yourself of the proof of the officer's neglect, and the Commander of the Forces will take measures accordingly. No return can yet be made out on account of the cavalry, and I am particularly desired to call your attention to its being the only part of the army from which correct daily reports have not been made up, even up to this day inclusive; and his Excellency thinks nothing but extreme mismanagement and neglect could occasion this circumstance.

I return the enclosures, not being conformable to the G. O.; and I shall wait with anxiety for the states of the 13th and 14th, agreeably to the instructions you have received.

With respect to Brig. Gen. Madden's incorrect state, the Lieut. General commanding the cavalry can give Brig. Gen. Madden such orders as he thinks proper on the subject; and I only refrain from stating his Excellency's opinion, as I think it comes more properly through the General officer under whose immediate command he is. But if your cavalry returns from any part of the cavalry command are incorrect, I presume the Lieut. General will notify the same strongly in his divisional orders.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 15th July, 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you would look at the last paragraph of Dom M. Forjaz's last letter, on the subject of the repairs of the forts, in which he refers to the payments of the subsidy.

As I believe that the Portuguese government have received, up to the present day, more than the old and new subsidy, and that we have been at all times in advance to them, those assertions respecting arrears of subsidy ought not in my opinion to go unanswered. At all events, as far as I have any knowledge, they have no right to make any official reference to the new subsidy, as they have not been officially apprised of it.

The A.G. to the A. A. Gs. of divisions.

15th July, 1811.

I have particularly to call your attention to the daily states of the division to which you are attached. The inaccuracy or incorrectness of any state completely prevents the return of the army being made up for the Commander of the Forces, as, when the divisional states arrive at this office, it is too late to send them back for correction, consequently a single error prevents the execution of his Excellency's orders to me. You will be pleased to impress strongly on the minds of the Brigade Majors the exactness with which they should examine every regimental return with the preceding returns in possession. An increase or decrease must most accurately be accounted for in the alterations, as well as all promotions and transfers, and all these bearing on the general effective number, and the general total must be duly attended to. In like manner I have to beg you will most scrupulously and minutely examine the brigade states previous to your making up your divisional state, and satisfy your own mind that no error exists of the most minute kind prior to your dispatching the divisional return to my office.

The above instructions become absolutely necessary from the great inaccuracies that exist in the states transmitted, on the 13th and 14th, by the cavalry, 3d division, and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of Portuguese, and some others of more trifling moment. I should hope by a due attention in future correctness may be obtained.

The A.G. to Major Melliish, A. A. G.

16th July, 1811.

In reply to your letter of yesterday evening, I conceive the 2 serjeants (although they are Staff serjeants) should be of course returned in the column of serjeants, and consequently accounted for as joined. I am not clear whether the drummers in the return are yet right, but I shall know when your return of this day arrives. With regard to the suggestion of allowing the states to be made up at night and forwarded early the next morning, I have to acquaint you that this already occurred to me, and where divisions are situated at the distance of the 5th division at Portalegre, it has been directed; but where the camp of any division is so near head quarters as the Light division and the rest of the army, and where the object of the Commander of the Forces is to have the state of the army made up to the very latest moment he can, there seems no reason whatever why your divisional states of the morning cannot arrive here at 12, 1, or even 2 o'clock in the day (if from being at field exercise they are prevented being sent sooner). My object is to have them in the course of the day, so that in the evening I can send his Excellency the general state; and if you require time in making your divisional return, there is also time wanted for the general state. If the states of the preceding day were only to be received, the Commander of the Forces, instead of having an account of the army as far as possible on the day, would merely have it for the foregoing one; and although there might be little alteration, still, as his Excellency's orders are positive on the subject, and as it has been complied with by all the divisions hitherto (though not with the accuracy it will ultimately be brought to), I have no grounds on which I can move the Commander of the Forces to make any other arrangement.

The form of the Portuguese weekly state, as to columns, &c., should be the same as our own.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

16th July, 1811

It is with considerable satisfaction I received your letter, dated this day at noon, as, from my conversation with the Lieut. General commanding the cavalry, I almost believed from what he stated that we never should arrive at a correct state with the Portuguese cavalry. I am aware it has been very difficult, and I am persuaded no possible blame can attach to you; but while I do you this justice, I think you will be equally disposed to allow, that if it had not been for our unremitting correspondence, we should not, up to the present period, have arrived at that correctness which, having once obtained, I feel convinced we shall adhere to. All I desire is to have the cavalry state as soon in the day here as it can be made out; and if it arrives even by 3 or 4 o'clock, provided it is correct, I shall be satisfied.

I have endeavored to express to the Lieut. General my anxiety that you should know I completely exonerate you from all neglect; and the only thing I could animadvert on, as far as you were concerned, was the incorrect state coming without that remark, which afterwards, on its being returned, you put upon it when in possession of the Lieut. General. If all had exerted themselves as you have, the states would have been long ere this correct.

On sending your letters and correct states to the Commander of the Forces, I represented Sir S. Cotton's opinion, that the Adjutant of the —th was in general a very excellent and attentive officer; and I have received his Excellency's orders to desire you will state to the Lieut. General that this officer may be released from his arrest, and permitted to return to his duty.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 17th July, 1811.

I have received your letters of the 12th and 13th. The breeze about the subsidy is a very curious circumstance: I really believe that, up to the present day, it has been overpaid to the amount of about £200,000 sterling; and last year they received above a million in hard cash: within the last 2 months they have received above £200,000 in money, allowing 25 *per cent.* for discount upon paper.

The losses at Albuera, and the substitution of 1st for 2d battalions, will render it difficult to place even one brigade in Gen. Hamilton's division. I intended to have placed there 2 brigades, and to have formed his division like the others, with only one Portuguese brigade, which we should then have been able to provision; but we should not be able to provision 2 Portuguese brigades, with the means attached to one British brigade, in addition to the British brigade.

There is also another point to be adverted to in the consideration of this subject, and that is the growing deficiency of means of transport with all the Portuguese brigades in our divisions, particularly in the 5th division; they have not mules sufficient to carry their ammunition; in the 3d, 28 mules were driven away by their drivers 2 days ago, and in others there are deficiencies. I suspect that the Portuguese Commissaries don't take care to feed the people attached to the mules; for their life must latterly have been an easy one, and they have had but little to do, excepting to carry forage for their own beasts. Whatever may be the cause of desertion, however, the evil is a serious one, and must increase the difficulties of supplying the Portuguese troops by our commissariat, and in case of a march it will be quite impossible.

I see that there are some troops in motion in Castille towards Ciudad Rodrigo, which is, I believe, with a view to provision the place, which Don Julian had kept tolerably closely blockaded.

You may depend upon it that the return which I sent to Mr. Stuart of the state of the payments to the Portuguese troops was correct, as I received it from the regiments. Joaquim da Costa covers himself under the usual Portuguese subterfuge, that he has sent the money; but it has been applied to some other purpose, and the troops have not received it.

I have just received your letter of the 15th. As Ballesteros remains in Niebla, it is not so necessary to send militia into Algarve. I think we become more healthy every day.

I enclose you a daily state, which will show you how we stand now in cavalry and infantry. I have had a great deal of trouble in getting this state, particularly from Madden's brigade, in which I believe no return was kept; however, I believe it is at last right and regular. March is gone to Lisbon, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give him house and table room at Cintra, where he proposes to go.

As Marmont has moved, I shall move into cantonments also to-morrow, having our right about Estremoz, and our left at Castello Branco. I shall go to Portalegre, and remain there for a short time, till all I expect join us, when I have 2 or 3 different designs in contemplation.

P.S. I enclose a paper with but bad news.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de S. João, 17th July, 1811.

The horses of the 9th light dragoons are to be landed and given in charge to the men of the 2d hussars, K. G. L., and others who may be at the depôt at Belem, until they shall be hereafter distributed to regiments under orders from Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton.

The men and officers of the 9th light dragoons, with their appointments, &c., are to be embarked in infantry transports, and to proceed to Sicily; * for which purpose I request you to make the necessary application to Adm. Berkeley for transports, as well as for a sufficient number of horse transports to carry to Sicily the horses belonging to the officers of the 9th light dragoons.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 17th July, 1811.

In order to explain the orders which I have received from the Sec. of State, regarding the 9th light dragoons, in the readiest way, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the orders which I have given to Gen. Peacocke; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order ships to convey this regiment to Sicily, and horse ships to convey the officers' horses. I have been likewise directed to request you to send back to Plymouth the horse transports which brought out the 9th light dragoons.

To Messrs. Brown and Reid.

Quinta de S. João, 17th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th inst., and I have referred to the consideration of the Commissary Gen. the offer which it contains, of the sale of certain oats, barley, and hay. I must inform you, however, that in every case of this description I consider myself

* A subsequent arrangement was made, and the 9th light dragoons served in the Peninsula until they returned to England in the spring of 1813.

obliged to act for the public as I would for an individual, that is to say, to purchase what the army require at the cheapest rate at which it can be procured, without any reference whatever to the loss of the seller.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de S. João, 18th July, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have just received, which shows an alteration of plan about the 9th dragoons, and probably it may not be necessary for Sir William to go to Lisbon just at present; however, it is possible that the packet may bring the account of another change.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 18th July, 1811.

Madden, who formerly complained of hard work, now that he has no work, complains of starvation: 2 days ago his horses had been 6 days without corn; and, having inquired on this subject from Mr. Thomas, I enclose his letter to Major Harvey.

One of Madden's brigades was to cross the Tagus in the new distribution of the army; but if they cannot be fed at Campo Maior, they cannot any where; and it would really be much better to draw all this cavalry to the rear, and feed them there, than keep them in front starving and plundering, and consuming that which our own horses will want yet, viz., straw.

P.S. Barbacena's cavalry, and Nos. 6 and 9, are to go to Elvas.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 18th July, 1811.

Since I had the honor of addressing your Lordship on the 11th inst. I have received a particular account of the regiments composing the '*Armée de Portugal*.' It consists of 24 regiments of French infantry, of which one, the 130th of the line, was not in Portugal during the last campaign, and 4 regiments of foreign infantry, and 14 regiments of cavalry, 3 of which were not in Portugal last campaign. All the troops which were in Portugal last campaign are now in this army, with the exception of 17 battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to regiments serving in the corps composing the army of the south, and 3 or 4 battalions of the 8th corps, also of the same description.

Allowing very largely for the losses of the French army in the late operations in Portugal, I cannot suppose the regiments of French infantry to be reduced below from 1000 to 1200 men each, or the foreign infantry below 500 men each; and on this ground I should suppose the '*Armée de Portugal*' now to consist of from 28,000 to 30,000 infantry: 16 of the regiments of cavalry which were in Portugal last campaign cannot now exceed from 200 to 250 men each; but the 3 which were not in Portugal arrived from France in the last autumn, passed the winter in Castille, and now consist of 400 or 450 men each. According to this estimate the cavalry would amount to from 3500 to 4000 men.

These estimates of the numbers of the '*Armée de Portugal*' agree with the reports I have received of them from a very intelligent officer, Capt. Grant, of the 11th regt.,* who saw them march through the Puerto de Baños, and with what I saw of them at the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, after

* Employed in observation between the advanced posts of the armies. He afterwards commanded the 54th regt. in the East Indies. He died at Aix la Chapelle.

allowing for the deduction, from the force opposed to us on that occasion, of the battalions of the 8th and 9th corps, since detached to the army of the south, and for the cavalry of the Imperial guard still remaining in Castille. The estimate of numbers also agrees with what the enemy have stated of their own force, and with the accounts which I have received of the numbers of particular divisions.

The '*Armée de Portugal*,' however, may be stronger than I suppose, as I have only a list of the regiments and battalions, and their distribution in divisions, but not a return of their strength. I know also that there are 3 more regiments of cavalry belonging to this army still in Castille, making the cavalry of the '*Armée de Portugal*' 17 regiments of 4 squadrons each.

From the returns which I have of the army of the south, and supposing that the troops which joined Marshal Soult from Castille, with Gen. Drouet, amounted to only 6000 men, I have estimated that the force of infantry which he brought into Estremadura amounted to 25,000 R. and F., and 13 regiments of cavalry, making a total in the two armies of from 50,000 to 55,000 infantry, exclusive of the garrison of Badajoz, and 27 regiments of cavalry, or about 7000 cavalry, besides artillery. This estimate of the numbers of the army of the south likewise agrees with the accounts which I have received of them from different quarters.

In my dispatches of the 11th inst. I apprised your Lordship that the 5th corps *d'armée*, and the greatest part of the cavalry of the army of the south, had been left in Estremadura, in communication with the '*Armée de Portugal*;' and that from the returns I had reason to believe that the 5th corps consisted of 12,000 effective infantry. This would leave in Estremadura at present about 40,000 effective infantry, exclusive of the garrison of Badajoz; and between 5000 and 6000 cavalry, besides artillery.*

In the situation which Marshal Marmont will take upon the Tagus he may assist or may receive assistance by his right from Marshal Bessières in Castille, as well as assist or receive assistance from the 5th corps *d'armée* in Estremadura, and that is the motive for taking up this position. I should imagine that Marshal Bessières could bring together about 10,000 men, including Bonet's division, now in Leon, &c., and the Imperial guard.

I have now the honor to enclose to your Lordship the last weekly state of the British troops in Portugal, and the morning state of yesterday morning of the troops composing the allied army actually in the field, from which your Lordship will observe that there are 44,810 R. and F. of infantry; and, taking the number of cavalry from the horses, 4299 cavalry, of which 3073 are British, besides artillery. In this state are not included the 68th, 77th, 32d, and 26th regts., which have not yet joined the army; nor the 12th light dragoons; the whole of which, with recovered men from the hospitals, may be expected to add 5000 men to our numbers in the course of the next fortnight.

With this force it becomes a question whether any and what operation shall be undertaken. With the fine and well equipped army which we have, and with our cavalry in such good order as it is, and with the prospect of the renewal of hostilities in the north of Europe, I am most anxious not to allow this moment of the enemy's comparative weakness to pass by, without making an effort to improve the situation of the allies in the

* See Appendix, No. VI.

Peninsula ; and I proceed to inform your Lordship of what I think of the different courses of operation which we may pursue. In the present season of the year it is quite impossible to undertake the siege of Badajoz. The loss of men from the heat of the weather and the unwholesomeness of the climate in Estremadura, if the troops should be obliged to perform any labor during the ensuing 6 weeks or 2 months, would exceed what might be expected in a general action. Besides, if this operation were to be attempted, Soult could without difficulty increase the army in Estremadura from 10,000 to 15,000 men, and the enemy would again have the superiority of numbers in the field.

I had intended to endeavor to fall upon the '*Armée de Portugal*,' if left to itself by Soult's movement to the southward in consequence of Gen. Blake's operations : but from what I have stated to your Lordship of the relative numbers of the two armies now existing in Estremadura, you will observe that ours are but little superior ; that we are inferior in that principal arm in this open country, cavalry ; and therefore that any success which we might derive in a general action, to which I might bring the '*Armée de Portugal*' and the 5th *corps d'armée*, would not be very decisive ; and that, on the other hand, the loss which we should sustain, by the heat of the weather and by the length of the marches which we should be obliged to make, in order only to get water, would be very great.

The attempt to relieve Cadiz would certainly not succeed. The 5th *corps d'armée* and the '*Armée de Portugal*' would follow our movements to the south, if they did not attempt some offensive operation on the Portuguese frontier in our absence ; and we should meet in Andalusia the whole force which lately obliged us to raise the siege of Badajoz, with the addition to it of the force which was left before Cadiz.

The next operation which presents itself is the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, for which I have so far prepared as to have our battering train on the Douro. It would be necessary in this case to leave 10,000 or 12,000 men in Alentejo, to watch the movements of the 5th *corps d'armée*, which would reduce our force to about 45,000 men, to which Marmont and Bessières would be equal, and superior in cavalry ; and if the 5th corps were to be moved to the north of the Tagus, to co-operate in the endeavor to oblige us to abandon our object, our troops in Alentejo would follow the movement. But still the enemy would be equal to us in numbers, and superior in cavalry.

This enterprise, however, upon the whole promises best. We can derive some assistance from our militia in the north in carrying it into execution, and the climate in which the operation is to be carried on is not unfavorable at this season. If it should not succeed, the attempt will remove the war to the strongest frontier of Portugal ; and, if obliged to resume the defensive, the strength of our army will be centrally situated, while the enemy's armies of the north and of the south will be disunited.

Under all these circumstances I am tempted to try this enterprise. But I beg your Lordship to observe that I may be obliged to abandon it. In a case in which the relative force of the two armies will be so nearly balanced as in this, and particularly in an operation in the Peninsula of Spain, it is impossible for me to foresee all the events which may lead to

this result. But the arrival of reinforcements to the enemy, or further information of the enemy's force, which should show them to be stronger than I now imagine them to be, or the falling off of the strength of our army, owing to the sickness of the troops, which I don't now expect, would necessarily oblige me to abandon the enterprise.

My intention, now, is to canton the army on the two banks of the Tagus, until the reinforcements have joined. In the mean time the train will be moved up the Douro, and the preparations will be made for transporting it to Ciudad Rodrigo; and, when these are completed, I propose to put the army in motion to attempt the siege of that place, if I should find that circumstances afford a chance of success.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 18th July, 1811.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' broke up from their position on the Guadiana on the 14th inst., and have moved towards Truxillo.

I have not yet heard that any troops had passed that town towards Almaraz, or that the cavalry which had been about Talavera and Lobos had retired farther than Merida. But their intention is certainly to take a position on the Tagus, which shall be central to the north as well as to the south, from which they could move with facility to either quarter to which our operations may be directed, and in which they can receive the assistance of the troops in Old Castille or in Estremadura, if they should require it. They are fortifying the old castle of Medellin, as well as that at Truxillo, from which circumstance I judge that the communication between the '*Armée de Portugal*' and the 5th corps d'*armée* will be carried across the Guadiana, by the bridge of Medellin.

As the circumstances which induced me to occupy the position in which the army now is no longer exist, I propose to canton the troops for the present along the frontier, in those towns reported to be healthy, with the right at Estremoz, and the left across the Tagus, at Castello Branco; and the troops are already in movement with that object in view.

Gen. Blake embarked his corps in the mouth of the Guadiana on the 6th, leaving Gen. Ballesteros' division of troops, and the cavalry of the 5th army, still in the Condado de Niebla. The troops sailed on the 13th; and Gen. Ballesteros was near Ayamonte by the last accounts. As soon as Gen. Blake's corps embarked, the body of the enemy's troops which had marched towards the Guadiana, and by the last account I sent your Lordship had turned towards Cartaya, retired from the frontier towards San Lucar, having heard probably that one of the objects which Gen. Blake had in view when he embarked was to make an attack upon that place.

I understand that the troops belonging to the 4th corps, which Marshal Soult had brought into Estremadura, had marched towards Granada, so that there remain in Andalusia the 1st corps and the reserve; the 5th corps and the greatest part of the cavalry being in Estremadura.

I have heard nothing more of the action which it was reported had been fought near Astorga; and I have reason to believe that there was no foundation for the report upon that subject which Gen. Silveira forwarded to me.

There is nothing new on the side of Valladolid, excepting that King

Joseph had returned to Spain, and it is said arrived at Burgos with an escort of about 3000 men on the 5th inst. It is reported that he was to be followed by large reinforcements; but no troops had arrived at Bayonne when I last heard from thence.

A detachment of about 1000 men of the garrison of Salamanca had marched towards Bejar on the 10th, apparently to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, which place Don Julian had for some time held closely blockaded.

Memorandum for Cols. Framingham and Fletcher, and Mr. Kennedy.

Quinta de S. João, 19th July, 1811.

1. The heavy ordnance and stores, and engineers' stores, now embarked in the transports in the Douro, being required at Ciudad Rodrigo, measures must be adopted to remove them thither.

2. They must be removed into boats at Oporto, and carried by water to Lamego.

3. At Lamego they must be landed, and the ordnance removed at once by 384 pairs of bullocks to Trancoso. The stores, that is to say, 350 rounds for each 18 pounder and 24 pounder gun, and 160 rounds for each 10 inch mortar, to be removed to Trancoso, on 892 country carts.

4. The engineers' stores to be removed to Trancoso upon 200 country carts.

5. The 892 carts, mentioned in No. 3, to be unloaded at Trancoso, and to return to Lamego, to bring up to Trancoso the remainder of the stores.

6. Upon the arrival of the 2d quantity of stores at Trancoso, the whole ordnance, and the stores for 350 rounds a gun and for 160 rounds each mortar, on 892 carts, and the engineers' stores on 200 carts, to move to Ciudad Rodrigo.

7. The ordnance stores to be unloaded at Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 892 carts to return to Trancoso for the 2d convoy.

G. O.

Quinta dos Banhos, 19th July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the Commanding officers of regiments will report to the Q. M. G. whether the clothing of their regiments has arrived at Lisbon.

2. They are likewise requested to report to the Q. M. G. their opinion at what time it will be necessary that it should be brought to the regiments to be issued to the troops.

3. * * * * *

4. The suspension of quarter master — is to commence this day.

5. The Commander of the Forces desires that Mr. — may be called upon the parade of the 2d batt. — regt., to be formed for that purpose, and may be informed that when Mr. * * * declined to supply him with the means of conveyance which was necessary to enable him to perform the duty on which he was detached from his regiment, he ought to have reported the circumstance to his commanding officer, and ought not to have been guilty of disobedience of the orders of the army, and an act of violence which led to other disorders by the party under his command, and to improper behaviour towards his superior officer, Lieut. —, of which the General Court Martial have found him guilty.

6. One of the motives for the repeated orders which have been issued that the soldiers might not be employed in pressing articles from the country, is to avoid the abuse of which they are generally guilty in forcing money from the inhabitants for the release of what they have taken by violence; but whatever may be the cause of the issue of any order, obedience is the safe mode of proceeding in every instance, and the officers of the army must, long before this time, have been aware of the necessity of attending to the G. O. of the Commander of the Forces.

7. Inconvenience may be felt at times by some individuals by their operation, but it must be suffered in an extended service as that is on which the army is employed, and it is trifling in comparison with the general interests and individual convenience for which these orders are calculated to provide.

8. Mr. — is hereby reprimanded.

8. Col. Framingham to order from Lisbon to Oporto 1600 barrels of powder, to complete the quantity at that place to what will be sufficient for the shot and shells with the battering train.

9. Major Dickson is requested to proceed to Oporto, in order to superintend the removal of the ordnance and stores from thence, and Col. Fletcher will send there an officer of the engineer department.

10. These officers will communicate with the gentlemen employed by the Commissary Gen. to collect the necessary boats and carts; and the matter should be arranged in such a manner as that the stores would be at Lamago at the time the carts would be ready to remove them.

11. The 2 companies of British artillery now at Lisbon to be ordered to Oporto by sea.

12. Probable time these operations will take:

12 days for Major Dickson's journey to Oporto.

6 .. for the removal of the stores and ordnance to the boats.

6 .. from Oporto to Lamago.

8 .. from the boats to Lamago.

4 .. from Lamago to Trancoso.

4 .. carts to return and load.

4 .. 2 trips to Trancoso.

6 .. to Ciudad Rodrigo.

6 .. to return to Trancoso.

6 .. to bring the 2d quantity of stores.

62 days.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Quinta de S. João, 19th July, 1811.

I request you to apply to Adm. Berkeley for transports to convey to Oporto 2 companies of the Royal British artillery, which you will direct to embark when the transports shall be ready, and, on the arrival of these companies at Oporto, they are to place themselves under the orders of Major Dickson.

To Major Gens. Picton, Campbell, and Slade. Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that Don Carlos de España has been appointed to command and to superintend all Spanish affairs in Castille, and that part of Estremadura north of the Tagus; and I request you to communicate with him on the public service, and to give him countenance and support as far as may be consistent with the instructions which you will have received.

I request you to forward to head quarters any letters that he may send to you for that purpose.

To Rear Adm. the Hon. A. Legge.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th, announcing your arrival at Cádiz, to relieve Adm. Sir R. Keats; and I assure you that I shall have great satisfaction in communicating and in co-operating with you, to forward the public service. Mr. Wellesley will make you acquainted with the state of affairs in this quarter.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

In the existing situation of affairs I think it not impossible that I may be able to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, although the prospect that I should be able to effect that operation is become less favorable since the accounts have arrived of the fall of Tarragona. However, we shall have a very fine army of little less than 60,000 men, including artillery, in the course of about a fortnight; and I don't see what I can do with it, to improve the situation of the allies, during the period in which it is probable that, the enemy's attention being taken up with the affairs of the north of Europe, we shall be more nearly on a par of strength with him, excepting we undertake this operation. I have, therefore, at all events, ordered the battering train up the Douro, and the preparations to be made for moving it from Lamego; and Dickson goes to Oporto to-morrow to superintend these arrangements. There would be no difficulty in them if we had been able to save Almeida: however, it is useless to lament what cannot be easily remedied.

It will be necessary that the militia of the *Tras os Montes*, at least of the northern provinces, should be under arms during this operation, and that we should have the assistance of all that, in Beira, whether for work or for other objects. These regiments should, therefore, be immediately embodied in their districts, and they can afterwards be assembled in large corps. I expect that in 7 weeks I shall have matters in preparation for this enterprise; but before that time it will be necessary to have troops on foot in Beira, to cover the movement of stores, &c.: this will give the army something more than a month in cantonments.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 16th. In respect to the protections from the recruiting laws of persons in the private service of individuals in the British army, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what is the law, and the practice under the law, in regard to the private servants of the Portuguese officers, and the nobility and the gentry, and I shall desire to have the same exemptions in favor of persons in the private service of individuals in the British army.

I think I may reasonably claim the same exemption for them, because, generally speaking, every man thus employed saves a man to the ranks. There may be abuses on our side; but I believe I can prove there is oppression on that of the Portuguese government. The officers of the government in general have been very uncivil to our officers lately, and there exists a very general disposition among them to quarrel and complain for very trifling causes, and that disposition is not a little encouraged by the government. I should not like to see the convenience which an officer derives from his servant depend upon any Portuguese authority; as, in their present disposition, I should be certain that the servant would be obliged to march, unjustly perhaps, whenever it should suit the Portuguese authority to manifest his dislike.

I have received your letters of the 17th and 18th.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811, 7½ p.m.

We have with our train at Oporto one half of the powder which is necessary for our enterprise, which I communicated to you this day; and I cannot discover exactly whether or not we have any more at Lisbon, or how much we have received from England of the different quantities for which I have written, or what we have done with any portion of it. We ought to have received 4000 barrels, besides what we had with our train. I believe we received 6000 barrels, and I know that Gen. Howorth told me we had 7000 barrels when I ordered the last 2000 barrels for Elvas, and we ought to have therefore now 5000 barrels; but I can get no information upon any thing here. I therefore request that upon the receipt of this letter you will make inquiry what quantity of powder either we have, or the Portuguese stores have, or the Admiral has to spare, and send off to Oporto without loss of time 1600 barrels: there must be a large quantity of powder in the works which could be brought down, and it is desirable that this quantity should be sent as soon as possible from any place to Oporto.

On the 6th June I wrote to England for 4000 barrels of powder, 2000 to be sent immediately, and 2000 hereafter; and, if you should not be able to send any powder from Lisbon, I beg you to explain the circumstance to the Admiral, and ask him to order a vessel to cruise off Oporto for the powder ships, and to take them in there.

In case you should not be able from our stores, from your stores, or from the Admiral's, to send any powder to Oporto, I beg you to get the Admiral to send the enclosed letter to England by an express vessel.

P.S. It occurs to me that there is a very large quantity of powder in the British stores at Cadiz; and I beg you to inquire upon this point from Gen. Graham, and, if there should be any, to send it immediately, and to order to Oporto what we want, if our wants cannot be supplied from Lisbon: it can easily be replaced when ours shall arrive from England. I have written to my brother to have preparation made to send off the powder as soon as your requisition shall arrive, for any quantity not exceeding 1600 barrels.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 15th, and I now enclose my last dispatch, and a confidential dispatch which I wrote to Lord Liverpool on the 18th. The fall of Tarragona will make some difference in the calculations on which my design is founded; but I have ordered the preparations for it, and I shall continue them till I find the plan to be impracticable.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the state of affairs in Murcia to decide whether it is right or necessary to increase the army in that quarter. You may depend upon it, however, that that army cannot be increased to such a degree as to enable it to make any effectual or useful progress even against the 4th corps, which Soult has reinforced, by sending back the division belonging to it which he had brought into Estremadura, much less such a progress against the whole army of the south. But it might be necessary to reinforce the army of Murcia, to enable it to hold its

ground, which, however, from all that I have heard of the country, I am inclined to doubt. The reinforcement of the army of Murcia, therefore, is neither more nor less than a rank job, and a very dangerous one in these times.

In my opinion the most interesting points at present in Spain are the Sierra de Ronda and the Condado de Niebla. The former, if the Spaniards should be obliged to act alone, is the fittest scene of their operations, and they would always have a retreat upon Gibraltar: the latter, if they are to combine their operations with ours, is the best, because the communication is shorter and more certain, and they would have a secure retreat into Portugal. In either case they could be supplied with facility from Cadiz, or they could be drawn thither if the enemy were to prepare for a serious attack upon that position.

A corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, well equipped, in the Sierra de Ronda, or the Condado de Niebla, would be a thorn in the enemy's side, to which he must pay attention; would be an effectual diversion for our operations; and, if in the latter, would be ready either to join us through Portugal, or to march upon Seville, if we should be able, in a later period of the season, to make another attack upon Badajoz. It may be depended upon that, if the allies can only get hold of Seville for a few hours, the enemy must raise the siege of Cadiz; and therefore it would appear most desirable for the Spaniards to turn their attention seriously to that object. But it must be *seriously*. It must be attempted with a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, well equipped with what is necessary to obtain success, and in some degree disciplined; and, if they once make such an establishment in one of those quarters, not only is their retreat secure, but the enemy must attend to them, or must give up Seville and the siege of Cadiz.

This is the object I had in view when I proposed to Gen. Blake to go to the Condado de Niebla, when he declined to join himself to us, after the last siege of Badajoz. But he has since embarked, and he looks to other objects, which are quite impracticable, as he may depend upon it are all offensive operations with the Spanish troops in their existing state; and he will find that not only they are impracticable, but that he removes himself and his troops from the real scene of action, in which he might be of some use, if he would remain quiet. I have not talked with Castaños or any body upon this plan. The truth is, that it is impossible for any rational man to talk to any of them. They are visionaries and enthusiasts, who will not look at things as they really are; and, although they can't be ignorant of the truth of all we say of the miserably inefficient state of their army, they talk and act as if it was an army, till some dreadful disaster happens, and they are highly offended if in any discussion the truth, which ought never to be concealed in such a discussion, is even hinted.

I make you acquainted, however, with my intentions, and my opinion of the mode in which the Spanish force under Gen. Blake could assist me most effectually, and you will judge from circumstances whether the subject can be brought forward usefully at all, and in what manner.

Austin, who has some sources of intelligence in Andalusia, tells me

that the French intend to make a serious attempt upon Cadiz. The removal of the cannon from Badajoz looks like that plan, but it may be also with a view to the attack of Carthagera, which Soult had in contemplation. I understand that the Spanish government, with their usual want of foresight, discontinued the works for the defence of the Isla and the communication with the Isla, as soon as they were able to send some of the troops away in the end of February last, and have not yet resumed them! The thoughtlessness of this nation is too bad!!

What do you mean should be done about the 47th regt.?

P.S. Just to show you what kind of people even the best of these Spaniards are, I mention that Abadia, who took leave of me at Elvas about 7 weeks ago, after having remained in that neighbourhood nearly 3 weeks, is still at Lisbon. They say he is sick; but a journey would recover him. If he had gone when he ought, his army would now have been ready for action. As it is, the season for any operation on the coast will be over before he will reach Coruña, and then there is work for 2 months in organization, &c.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I am rather apprehensive that I shall want from 1200 to 1600 barrels of gunpowder, to complete the equipment necessary to enable me to carry on the operation which you will find, in my letter of the 18th, to the Sec. of State, I intended to carry on. I have desired Beresford, who is at Lisbon, to apply for assistance to the British stores at Cadiz, if he should not find what we want in our or the Portuguese stores, or in the Admiral's ships; and I request you to tell Gen. Cooke that I beg that any quantity of powder which may be in the British stores at Cadiz (not exceeding 1600 barrels) may be shipped and ready to be sent off at a moment's notice, when he shall receive a requisition for it from Sir W. Beresford. I will replace what he will send.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

Since I wrote to you on the 18th inst. I have had reason to believe that we have not in Portugal the quantity of powder necessary to enable me to carry on the enterprise which I then informed your Lordship I intended to undertake. I therefore trust that your Lordship will have ordered out immediately 2000 of the 4000 barrels of powder which I requested to have on the 6th June; and if they should not have been sent before your Lordship will receive this letter, I beg that you will send them to Oporto without loss of time.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, in which he has desired that the number of medical officers attached to the Portuguese army may be increased from 12 to 20, and that measures should be taken to replace those become non-effective on account of ill health.

I would beg to recommend on this point the adoption of the rule which I have made in respect to Staff appointments attached to the British army, viz., that those who hold them shall receive no emolument on account of

them, if absent from their duty on account of their health for a greater length of time than 2 months, unless their absence should have been occasioned by wounds. However severe it may appear to deprive an officer of his emoluments, whose absence may be occasioned by illness acquired in the performance of his duty in a bad climate, still, advertg to the abuse of sick certificates, and considering the right which the public have to expect that those paid for performing the duty of a Staff employment shall be efficient, I conceive that the justice of the rule will be found to preponderate over its severity.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 20th July, 1811.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, in which he has enclosed one from Mr. Wellesley, conveying the offer of the Spanish government to appoint Sir W. Beresford a Captain General in the Spanish army, in testimony of their approbation of his conduct in the battle of Albuera, upon which I request your Lordship to state the pleasure of H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

The A.G. to Capt. —, — regt.

20th July, 1811.

It is with much concern the Commander of the Forces has received the enclosed reports from the officers commanding the — and — regts. respecting your conduct at Abrantes. His Excellency feels great regret that an officer in your situation should have charges of such a nature preferred against you; but he owes it equally to your character and the service that a public investigation should immediately take place of the circumstances that have occurred, and his Excellency will be happy if you can exonerate yourself from such allegations as have been made. I have written to Col. Langley, as senior officer at Abrantes, to place you under an arrest preparatory to your trial commencing, which will take place on the arrival of the head quarters of the army at Portalegre, to which place you will repair when desired by Col. Langley. You will deliver over to the next senior officer all details, instructions, and correspondence belonging to the hospital station, of which he will assume the charge until further orders. I should recommend you to collect all your evidences and documents on the cases in point, to have ready for the Dep. Judge Advocate, with whom you may communicate.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

I have received your note about Col. Barnard. Pakenham consented to the arrangement you proposed as soon as it was proposed to him; and I intended to send him to your division, but I waited till I should receive the report of the medical board on Beckwith's case. I am not certain, however, that the most convenient arrangement for the public service will not be that which you have proposed for the temporary command of the brigade, and Pakenham will do with pleasure whatever I wish him to do.

To Gen. Leite, Governor of Elvas.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

I send herewith a soldier who was concerned in the robbery of the house of Joana Euphemia Rita Silveira, in Elvas, about which I wrote to you in the month of March last, and who can point out the persons who bought from him some flax stolen in the said house. I request you to send an officer with him, to have the person pointed out who bought the flax, and that you will have this purchaser of property, which he must have known was stolen, dealt with according to law, and that the owner of the property, J. E. R. Silveira, may have her property again.

To Col. Austin.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

Adverting to my letter to you of the 13th, requesting you to form a magazine upon the Guadiana, for the supply of the Spanish troops, in case they should be obliged to retire into Portugal, I have to inform you that I have desired Mr. Kennedy to send from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana a supply of flour and of forage corn for the magazine, as, under existing circumstances, it is much more easy for us to send these articles than to send money to purchase them. They will be entirely at your disposal.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

I have received your note of the 19th; and I conceive that the same circumstances which render it expedient that you should be supplied with horses, by some public arrangement, apply to your aides de camp, Captains Hope and Stanhope; and I beg you will take as many of the horses sent out for the officers of the cavalry as you may think proper.

You will have seen in my dispatch of the 18th that the enemy have moved; the cavalry left Merida on the 17th, when Cocks arrived there, and the army of Portugal are going into cantonments on the two banks of the Tagus. It is said that the 5th corps have moved likewise; but this I doubt. We are going into cantonments likewise; and, as we are becoming very strong, I propose to endeavor to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo. Some time will elapse before the train, which is on the Douro, can be brought up; in the mean time the troops may as well be out of the sun.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

The letter from Dom M. Forjaz, to which I referred in mine of the 14th, is written to Marshal Beresford, and is dated the 1st July. It relates principally to the forts of Elvas, Campo Maior, &c.; but the last paragraph, to which I refer, and of which I now enclose a copy, goes to assert that the subsidy has not been regularly paid. This I deny; and the assertion ought to be contradicted.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

I beg you to inform the Portuguese government that it is my intention to repay to the government the sums which have been advanced by Gen. Silveira by my desire. The delay which has taken place in transmitting an answer has been occasioned only by the necessity of putting the transaction into an official shape, and of making those who have received the advances from Gen. Silveira accountable through the several departments in which they are serving.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de S. João, 21st July, 1811.

It appears by accounts which I have received from Mr. Wellesley, dated the 15th inst., that Tarragona was taken by storm on the 28th June; the 47th regt., and the other troops which Gen. Graham had lately sent to that quarter from Cadiz, having arrived on the preceding day in the roads. I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to Gen. Graham's dispatch of the 14th June, and its enclosures, upon the subject of sending to Tarragona

the 47th regt., and the plan of recruiting, and other arrangements connected with that measure, upon which I request to have your Lordship's orders.

I likewise beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the future arrangements for the command at Cadiz, the troops at which place are now considered part of this army. The General officer in command there has, however, always reported directly to the Sec. of State, and received his orders immediately from your Lordship; and I have not always been made acquainted with your Lordship's instructions; nor have I known whether the measures adopted there have been founded upon them. As long as there was in command at Cadiz an officer of the rank and character of Gen. Graham, I had no objection to this system. But I beg to inform your Lordship, that I cannot conceive myself responsible for the acts or conduct of any General officer on whom the command at Cadiz may devolve, unless the correspondence with the Sec. of State is carried on through me, and I am made acquainted regularly with your Lordship's wishes and intentions regarding that place. It appears to me that the best plan would be to consider the troops at Cadiz, as those at Gibraltar are, a distinct command.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Langley, R. W. Train.

21st July, 1811.

His Excellency the Commander of the Forces, having directed that Capt. —, of the — regt., shall be forthwith brought before a General Court Martial at Portalegre for inflicting corporal punishment upon 2 soldiers for supposed offences not committed within the view of the Assist. Provost Marshal who put the same into execution, I have to request that this Assist. Provost Marshal, private — of the 1st batt. 3d Guards, private — of the 42d regt., and any other evidences who may have a knowledge of the fact, may be ordered to proceed to Portalegre with the least possible delay.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de S. João, 22d July, 1811, 8 A.M.

Tell De Grey to send me the usual certificate of his health. I can't allow any officer to quit the army on any plea whatever, excepting that of ill health.

In regard to —, surely no man can contend that the want of a daily state for so many days was not a ground of complaint. Upon that ground I ordered the person responsible to the Adj. Gen. (of whom in the first instance I complained) to be put in arrest; and, upon being informed that —'s inferiors were in fault (for fault there was), I said, let them be put in arrest. I don't think there is any thing unreasonable or harsh in all this; and with every good disposition towards —, he must not expect that I shall recall any thing I have ever authorised to be written respecting any body, on any omission of duty in the army.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de S. João, 22d July, 1811.

Brito was with me last night, and told me that he was obliged to go to the sea coast for the sake of bathing, upon which subject he will probably apply to you. He leaves at Elvas a person who has always assisted him in giving intelligence, who he says is capable. Do you mean to promote Brito? It is certainly hard upon an officer to employ him out of the line of his profession, and then not to promote him in his turn; at the same

time it does not answer to promote those who have no knowledge of their duty. However, the practice of *aggregado* and *gradação* may enable you to overcome the difficulty which certainly exists in this case.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de S. João, 22d July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 20th inst., and, in consequence of the orders brought out by the *Herring* schooner, it is expedient to suspend the arrangement which I had proposed in my letter of the 17th, for sending to Sicily the officers and men of the 9th light dragoons. I think it probable, however, that the arrangement, as originally proposed, will be resumed as soon as it shall be known in England that I have brought from Cadiz to Lisbon the dismounted hussars of the 2d K.G.L., to be mounted on the horses of the 9th light dragoons.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de S. João, 22d July, 1811.

I return the letter to Marshal Beresford, in which I have marked the paragraph of which I complain. I sent you a copy of it yesterday.

I observe that Dom M. Forjaz's last note contains the same unfounded statement, viz., that the subsidy has been in arrear, which I positively deny; and what I aver, viz., that it has always been in advance, can be clearly proved by a reference to the state of the payments at any one period since June, 1809.

We cannot negotiate a loan here without the authority of Parliament, which is a very short answer to Dom M. Forjaz's proposal to raise money by loan. Besides, if we could raise money in that manner, the British army must have their share of it.

The question of money becomes more serious every day; so much so, that Mr. Kennedy is going down to Lisbon to endeavor to effect an improvement. If this improvement cannot be effected, we must become bankrupt, as we have not a shilling.

We have got but very little for the Algerines besides my subscription; but that little shall be sent to you.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de S. João, 22d July, 1811.

I have received another account this day of the enemy's preparations at Seville; which it is reported are intended either to push with vigor an attack upon Cadiz, or to destroy Freyre; the latter would lead to an attack upon Carthagera, which we know Soult has in view.

It is very extraordinary that we should hear of these designs, and not the Spanish government; and particularly that they should have had no intelligence, and have taken no notice, of the collection of heavy ordnance at Seville from Badajoz. They may depend upon it that this equipment has not been brought to Seville for no object, and that, if it begins to move upon Cadiz, it is the enemy's intention to make a serious attack upon the position there. You will of course send me the earliest intelligence you will receive of this design, and I will take care to reinforce Cadiz in time with some of our troops. But the Spaniards must look themselves a little to this subject, and must complete the works.

To the Juiz de Fora, at Borba.

Quinta de S. João, 23d July, 1811.

I send herewith a soldier in the British army, who was lately concerned in committing a robbery at Elvas, in the house of Joana E. R. Silveira; and he sold some of the articles stolen, viz., sheets and a table cloth, for 5 dollars, to a woman at Borba, whom he will point out to you. I beg you to attend, and see this person, and that you will recover the sheets, and send them to Elvas to the woman. I likewise request you to carry into execution the law against the woman who purchased the sheets, &c., as she must have known them to be stolen.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

I am sorry to observe that the government continue so unwilling to adopt the measures which you think necessary to supply what is required for their army, and at the same time to save as much as possible the expenditure of money; but there is one very easy remedy, and that is, to order from England the articles which you think it necessary to have, and when they arrive their value shall be carried to account as so much subsidy.

If the government don't choose to adopt measures to feed their cavalry, and the brigades of infantry, on the Portuguese establishment, I wish they would say so, in order that we might send these troops to the rear, and that I might not be supposed to have 50,000 men, when in reality I have not 40,000 for action. It would also be but fair towards me, if the members of the government would explain to the Prince Regent of Portugal that they can't maintain their army upon the frontier, that His Royal Highness might lay aside some of the prejudices which he has imbibed against me.

In respect to Madden and Colman, I confess I think the latter has the better claim to obtain his British rank of the two. I think it as well to leave both till an opportunity shall occur for the Portuguese government to make the request from the British government.

G. O.

Portalegre, 23d July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces recalls to the recollection of General officers commanding divisions and brigades the orders which have been repeatedly given out respecting the use of bullock cars to convey baggage; he trusts that he shall not have occasion to observe any deviation from the orders in future.

2. The medicine panniers of the surgeons of regiments are not to be carried on the cart destined to carry the packs of any men who may be taken ill on a march. The surgeons of regiments are allowed for a mule to carry the medicine panniers, which must be used for this and no other purpose.

3. The officers commanding regiments are requested to take care not to require more clothing, &c. from their stores at Lisbon than they can deliver out to the soldiers; and the carts employed to bring up these articles must forthwith on their arrival at the cantonment of the regiment be delivered over to the Commissary attached to the brigade.

4. It is impossible to supply carts to draw after the regiments the superfluous clothing which they may have had brought up from Lisbon.

5. The Commander of the Forces again requests the attention of the General officers commanding the divisions and brigades of cavalry as well as of infantry to the discipline of the troops, Portuguese as well as British.

6. The accuracy of all formations and movements of large bodies depends upon the officers of the staff; and the Commander of the Forces expects, when he sees any division of troops exercise (and he will take every opportunity of seeing them), to find the mounted officers of all ranks are able to take ground for them, in all situations in which it may be necessary to place them.

To Don F. X. Castaños.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 23d. I don't think that the intelligence which I have received from Cadiz tends to prove that the enemy are about to carry into execution the plan which Soult had in contemplation for the attack of Carthagená. The execution of this plan must be connected with the march of heavy artillery and stores from Seville, which does not appear to have been sent yet; and I am therefore inclined to believe that Soult will use the force of which he has the command at present in making a serious attack upon Cadiz. It is difficult, however, to form a decided opinion upon this subject, without having better information than I possess. It is obvious that the removal of the heavy artillery from Badajoz was connected with a plan to attack either Carthagená or Cadiz; and, if the people who gave information from Seville would watch the progress of this heavy artillery, the Spanish government must be acquainted with Soult's design.

One division of infantry, which belonged to the 4th corps, and came into Estremadura with Soult lately, has certainly returned to Granada; but it might have been desirable to reinforce the troops in that quarter, without reference to any plan of offensive operation, and Soult would still have a sufficient number of troops for the execution of his design against Cadiz. I request your Excellency to let me know whether you have received any intelligence which states that the division of the army of Portugal, which Col. Grant informs me arrived at Plasencia on the 20th, had marched on for Ciudad Rodrigo. Col. Grant mentions that part of it was intended to march in that direction by Coria, but not that these troops had marched.

I sincerely wish that your Excellency had an army with which you could carry into execution the plan of operations of which your Excellency has given the sketch in your letter. I have always found that, when I have undertaken an operation which has removed me to a distance from the magazines of the army, the troops have starved. I have likewise found that when I have undertaken an offensive operation of great extent, and connected with the operations of the troops of Spain, the whole disposable force of the enemy has been turned against me with impunity.

If I were to take the proposed position in the Sierra Morena, if my troops could survive the starvation which they would suffer, I should have Marmont, with the whole '*Armée de Portugal*,' to act on one side of me, and Soult, with the whole army of the south, on the other, leaving a division to maintain the blockade of Cadiz, and another at Granada to observe Gen. Freyre's corps, in the same manner as during the late expedition into Estremadura for the relief of Badajoz. And this collection of troops would be made with impunity, as the late collection was. Instead of alarming King Joseph in his capital there, I should be too happy to be able to reach again the frontiers of this Kingdom, in order to save my army.

An army under the command of your Excellency might be more successful in all these respects: but your Excellency may depend upon the truth of what I have repeatedly had the honor of stating to you in con-

versation, and that is, that until the Spanish armies shall possess regular resources, by which they can be supplied during any operation which they may undertake; until they are equipped in such a manner that casual or trifling difficulties will not impede their operations; and until the troops are disciplined, as all other troops are which are produced to meet an enemy in the field, it is useless to think of plans of co-operation between this army and those of Spain, which must be founded on the active offensive operations of all parts of the armies of all the nations. I should deceive myself, and you, and the governments of both nations, if I were to encourage such a notion; and, if I were to undertake the execution of such a plan, I should incur the risk of the loss of my army for no object whatever.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. French, complaining of want of room at the depôt at Belem.

This complaint has suggested to me an improvement in our arrangements of the depôts, which I have long had in contemplation, which is, to divide the depôt, having one part of it, consisting of men most nearly fit to join the army, at S. Julian or Cascaes, or any large healthy building in that part of the country; and the other part, consisting of men just dismissed from the hospital, in the barracks at Belem. Both parts of the depôt might be under the superintendence of the Commanding officer of the depôt at Belem; but he might have a Commanding officer under him, stationed at that part of it which would be in the neighbourhood of S. Julian.

I beg you to endeavor to arrange this plan; and you will fix with the medical officers at Lisbon what part of the medical department shall attend that part of the depôt near S. Julian.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22d inst., enclosing a complaint of some officer, whose name is not stated, for his conduct, and that of some soldiers, in enforcing a billet for Lieut. Gen. Graham, granted by the competent authority, on the house of Senhor de Salles, at Lisbon.

A billet is a legal order, from a competent authority to the person to whom it is addressed, to provide lodging for the bearer of it; and Senhor de Salles, to whom this order was addressed, refused to obey it; and the complaint is, that the British officer, whose name is not stated, enforced the legal order of the Portuguese authority. I am at a loss to know what I am to do upon the statement of this case by the complainant himself, and by his friends, the Judge of the Police, the Magistrate of the Barrios, and the Sec. of State.

It is impossible that the case can be made worse than it is by those who have already inquired into it; and there may, and probably will, be denials, justifications, and reasons given for much of the imputed misconduct; but I have no hesitation in declaring, that if I were to pronounce judgment, even upon the aggravated statements which I have read,

all of them on one side of the question, I should honorably acquit this unknown officer. I am ready to admit that it is very disagreeable to receive strangers into the house in which a family reside; but it must also be admitted that it is very disagreeable to become the prey of the conqueror, and to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' to the common enemy of mankind. On the other hand, it is not very agreeable to come to a foreign country to seek the enemy in defence of that country, and to leave our houses and our properties in order to assist in saving the houses, the properties, and the honor of strangers.

The law of Portugal has provided that officers and soldiers shall be billeted upon private houses, and has inflicted this inconvenience upon individuals as one of the burdens resulting from the contest in which the country is engaged to save all from the tyrant; and during the whole time that I have been in Portugal, in every town in which thousands have been billeted, I can recollect but one complaint on the subject of billeting, excepting at Lisbon. Having read, however, the inflammatory report of the Judge of Police, and of the Juiz dos Barrios, and of the Sec. of State, on the complaint of Senhor de Salles, I am not astonished that complaints on this subject should be frequent at Lisbon, where, if they did not receive encouragement from these high authorities, there ought, and would be none. This complaint, however, has at last brought the point to issue, which I discussed in my letters to you of the 31st Dec. 1810, and of the 3d Jan. 1811. There is law in Portugal, or there is not. If there is law, it must be enforced in respect to the inhabitants of the country, as well as in respect to the British army.

The inhabitants of Portugal have duties to perform, and obligations have been imposed upon them by the law, in the critical situation in which their country is placed, of which one is to furnish lodging to the officers and soldiers of the army upon the orders, called billets, of a magistrate. I beg to know from the government whether the performance of these duties and obligations is to be enforced; or whether the people of Lisbon in particular are to be exempt from them, and are to be encouraged by the magistrates to resist the law and the performance of these obligations, where the convenience of a British General officer is concerned.

I have long seen the inutility of complaining to the government on the conduct of any of the public servants. Indeed I have found it an useless waste of time to address them on any subject whatever; and therefore I shall not trouble you to make any complaint of the conduct of the Judge of the Police in this transaction, who, instead of endeavoring to conciliate in a case in which a General of the ally of the Prince was concerned, or, as was his duty, instead of enforcing the necessary law of the billets, has done every thing in his power, in his report, to aggravate the supposed cause of complaint, and has become an advocate instead of a judge. The case, however, is so flagrant, and the conduct of the magistrate has been so improper, and there has been manifested a spirit so hostile to the alliance, and so different from that which ought to exist, that, if I could entertain any hopes that the truth would reach the Prince Regent of Portugal, I would address His Royal Highness upon the subject.

I only hope that the time is not far distant when the British army, tired

of such conduct, will impart to the British nation the disgust which it must occasion, as well as the desire to leave to its fate a country in which, by the government and the higher orders, they have been so unworthily treated.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a list of the names of the officers of the K. G. L. who have subscribed 279 Spanish dollars for the liberation of the Portuguese captives in Algiers. I likewise subscribed the sum of 500 dollars; and I have directed the Commissary Gen. to pay these sums to the Portuguese government.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 18th. From the intelligence which you have enclosed, I don't think that Soult's design is quite clear. The Spaniards are as extraordinary in their mode of acquiring and detailing intelligence as they are in every thing else. The whole world have seen the letters from Soult, in which he detailed his plan of operations in case he should be reinforced. He has been reinforced, and he has besides at his elbow the '*Armée de Portugal*.' But they forget this plan of Soult's; and the people who are employed to procure intelligence, and those who receive it, are as wild in their notions as if they had not the advantage of a knowledge of the enemy's design from himself. I acknowledge, however, that I have not yet received any intelligence which makes it quite clear whether Soult is about to push his attack upon Cadiz, or to make one upon Carthagena. But the march of the 5th corps, which has certainly quitted Estremadura, will show what his plan is.

I enclose a letter which I have received from —, and my answer. This gentleman is as loose and as light as any Spaniard I know. He possesses all the defects of the Spanish character, with better temper and better manners than the Spaniards have in general; but in want of foresight he beats them all.

In respect to money for the Spaniards, I beg you will recollect that you don't expend a shilling at Cadiz which does not take so much from the military chest of this army, from which disbursements to a considerable amount are likewise making constantly on account of the Spanish government. We have never been in such distress as at present, and I can devise no means of relieving it. The Cortes and Spanish government, if they could look at their real situation, ought before now to have adopted a plan for the relief of their finances, instead of which it is a subject of joke for Castaños. We have forced this measure upon the Portuguese government, and in the course of a very short time their finances will be in a very flourishing state, if I can contrive to pay them any part of the subsidy in money with any degree of regularity. But this is impossible, and still more so to support our own army, if we are to give money to the Spaniards, either by way of loan or of gift. There would be no difficulty in either if the Spanish government would arrange the American questions; but they will not do this; and in my opinion to give them specie is impossible.

I am much afraid that it is too late to call in the Princess of Brazil to the Regency; but, as I before told you, I approve of that measure, having altered my opinion upon it. I don't think there is any reason to apprehend evils from her influence over the Portuguese government. 1st; I don't think that she would have any influence; and next, if she had, I have brought matters almost to that state that it is nearly indifferent what the Portuguese government do; and indeed I never give myself the trouble of writing to them, or of consulting their opinion on any subject whatever.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

24th July, 1811.

In reference to a letter I have received from Lieut. Col. Elley, enclosing charges preferred by Major —, 1st hussars, K. G. L., against Major — of that corps, I am to acquaint you the Commander of the Forces is desirous that this matter should be inquired into a little, and such measures should be taken as you in your judgment shall think fit to settle the difference that has occurred between the two officers in question, without a General Court Martial being resorted to. His Excellency is of opinion that it would be a pity to lose a good officer, which Major — is said to be, by a momentary fit of passion, which has produced this conduct. I enclose the papers, which you will be pleased to return, being originals.

The A.G. to Lieut. —, D.A.A.G.

24th July, 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 16th inst., I beg to acquaint you that the manner in which you return men as missing, without being able to give any further explanation, is very unsatisfactory to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces. Having received a party in charge, you ought to be able to account most clearly for every man belonging to it; and unless you take steps to find out what is become of those men you have returned missing, you will be obliged yourself to go in search of them.

To Major Gen. Houstoun.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I am concerned to receive so bad an account of your health; but you must go, if you can't stay; and I have only to lament that we are so unlucky as to lose you. Including yourself, we shall have 9 General officers gone, or going immediately, and 5 more want to go. As, however, the regulations of the army are applicable to all, I request you to send me the usual application for a medical board on your case, after whose report the whole transaction will be in a regular train.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I enclose the answers to two complaints from Coimbra, which you recently transmitted to me, against Capt. —, of the — regt., and Mr. —, of the Commissariat, from which you will observe, that there was originally but little ground for complaint, and that, as usual, the Portuguese authority that complained never intended, and did not wish, to substantiate his complaint.

While writing upon this subject, I can't avoid observing, that the persons in authority at Lisbon have appeared to me lately to encourage these frivolous, and generally groundless, complaints from the officers of the government, to which I am induced to attribute the number of them which I have lately received; at the same time that those who make them manifest the usual disinclination to substantiate them. I have strong reason to believe that they are generally without foundation; as I have for some time observed a visible improvement in the conduct of the soldiers towards

the people of the country, and certainly, those crimes, for which so many soldiers of this army have been executed, now occur but rarely. It can't be credited that the soldiers who shared their provisions with the inhabitants of the country, to save them from starving, should afterwards ill treat the same inhabitants; and I am therefore very apprehensive that the frequency of groundless complaints lately is to be attributed to the excitement of the spirit of complaint by the government. However, I shall continue, as I have hitherto done, to inquire into every case brought forward which appears to afford ground for inquiry; and I hope that the Portuguese government will discover, before it is too late, that the mode of saving their country is not to excite discontent against the British nation, by whose assistance alone they can be saved.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

In my opinion, it is necessary that Austin should continue to incur the expenses for intelligence.

I have called for fresh returns of payments to the army, and have informed Mr. Stuart that I shall never cease to represent upon this subject till the whole arrears are cleared off.

I am so confused with the numbers of the regiments of the Portuguese cavalry, that I don't know one from another, or what regiments are in brigades together. I understood that the 6th and 9th cavalry were at Estremoz, and were the cavalry allotted for the garrison of Elvas, to which place it was desirable they should go, as Estremoz is in the line of our cantonments. Barbacena's brigade is in our 2d division of cavalry, and has been put into Elvas and Campo Maior, as its cantonments, and to assist the cavalry of those garrisons in preserving their communications.

The militia of Lower Beira must continue assembled; but I have no objection to half a company at a time having leave, provided the other half company remains with the regiment complete.

I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about our parade; we shall now be complete in every thing.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I have received your 2 letters of the 22d inst., and I am much obliged to you for the information which they contain.

I have directed that the train and stores may be disembarked from the ships in the Douro; but it is desirable that the ships should remain for the present in that river. The ship of war which convoyed them thither might be employed on any other service you might think proper. I am obliged to you for sending the detachment of artillery to Oporto.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

The Prince of Orange is about to take advantage of the army being in cantonments for a short time, to visit Cadiz, and even, eventually, Gibraltar, if the winds should be favorable. He proposes to go to Cadiz by Ayamonte; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to have a ship of war at Ayamonte to take him to Cadiz, and thence to Gibraltar, if it should be expedient for him to go there, and to

bring him back to Ayamonte; the same vessel to take our money at either, or both places, if there should be any at Gibraltar. The Prince of Orange will be at the mouth of the Guadiana about Thursday or Friday next, and I shall recommend him to the Commanding officer in Algarve, Col. Austin.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

Cadogan has desired me to write to you about his brother, a Captain in the 71st regt., whom he is very desirous of having sent out here, in order to do duty with his regiment. He is very low down among the Captains, and, as Commanding officer of the regiment, Cadogan cannot order him to join the battalion in Portugal. But, if he could be sent out in any manner, he would be very glad to have an opportunity of instructing him in his duty.

I have got the army under cover from the sun for a little time, till the reinforcements shall come up and some of our numerous wounded shall recover, and while the preparations are making for an enterprise which I intend, if possible, to try; and, as usual, all the officers of the army want to go home, some for their health, others on account of business, and others, I believe, for their pleasure.

Gen. Spencer is going, because Gen. Graham has come from Cadiz; Gen. Nightingall is gone; Gen. W. Stewart, Gen. Lumley, Gen. Howorth, and Col. Mackinnon, likewise, on account of their health; Col. Beckwith likewise going for the same cause: Gen. De Grey has asked to go, because he has put his shoulder out; and I have this morning an application from ——— for leave to go, as his spleen is out of order. To this list add Gen. Dunlop, Gen. Hay, Gen. Cole, and Gen. Alex. Campbell, who have applied to go to settle their affairs; and you will see how we shall stand for want of General officers. Gen. Leith still absent. I have also innumerable applications for leave from officers of all ranks. Till we can get the minds of the officers of the army settled to their duty we shall not get on as we ought.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

Lieut. Col. Colborne of the 66th regt. (who also, by the bye, is going home for his health) has sent me word that he is very desirous of remaining with this army; and with this view, of effecting an exchange with Lieut. Col. Ross, of the 52d, who it appears is going to Ceylon with Gen. Brownrigg. I don't know any body so fit to succeed Ross in the command of the 52d as Colborne, Arbuthnot being, I am afraid, in such a state of health as to render it hopeless that he will ever be able to take the command of the regiment in the field.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22d, enclosing a paper regarding arrears of pay to the Portuguese troops; and I have called for returns to show whether the statements in that paper are correct, and for returns to be made every 3 days of the state of the payments, till the whole of the arrears are paid off. As the British government

supply the pay for 30,000 officers and men, and the gratuity for the officers of the army, and the subsidy, is not, and has never been, in arrear, the pay of the 30,000 officers and men, and the gratuity to the officers of the army, ought never to have been in arrear, whatever may have been the financial distresses of the government, if the subsidy had not been misapplied. I shall continue to give you information on this subject till I shall find that the arrear is entirely paid off.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 23d; and I entirely concur with you, that, till the *Junta de Viveres* are abolished *in toto*, the new subsidy cannot be given to the Portuguese government. You may proceed on the principle of all the letters which I have written to you on this subject, with a certainty that I shall concur with you.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I wrote to you on the 20th to request that you would urge the Commanding officer at Cadiz to have 1600 barrels of gunpowder embarked, and in preparation to be sent to us, if Sir W. Beresford should require them. I find that we shall not want this powder; and I shall be obliged to you if you will tell the Commanding officer at Cadiz that the preparation may be discontinued, and that the powder may be relanded.

To Lord Eldon, Lord High Chancellor.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy and translation of a letter which I have received from Gen. Blake, in answer to one which I wrote to him, to transmit the resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons of Great Britain and Ireland of the 7th June, on the subject of the battle of Albuera.

[*A letter in similar terms to the Rt. Hon. the Speaker of the House of Commons.*]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, likewise the morning state of the troops in the field of the 23d inst.

The 12th light dragoons, the 26th, 28th, 32d, 77th, 3d batt., and 95th regts., are not included in the latter, not having yet joined the army.

I have given leave to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer to go to England, at his own desire, in consequence of Lieut. Gen. Graham having arrived at Lisbon to join the army in the field.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

The enemy's cavalry left Merida on the morning of the 17th, and Major Cocks' piquets were in that town shortly afterwards.

The enemy have since continued their march upon Almaraz; and, on the 20th, one division of infantry had arrived at Plasencia, which town, I imagine, will be the farthest advanced of their cantonments on the right of the Tagus. On the same day Marshal Marmont was at Almaraz, and other divisions had marched from Truxillo, in the same direction. One division of infantry and some cavalry still remained at Truxillo, according

to the last accounts. The 5th corps had broken up in Estremadura, and marched towards Andalusia.

The allied army under my command have taken up the cantonments towards which I informed your Lordship in my last dispatch they were marching.

I have reason to believe that the French troops did meet with a check in an attack which they made on a detachment from the army of Galicia at Puente de Orvigo, on the 24th of last month.

There is nothing new in the north. King Joseph was at Valladolid on the 10th, and proceeded on the 12th on his journey towards Madrid.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the letter which I addressed to your Lordship on the 6th June, in regard to the want of powder in this country. It is very desirable that the 4000 barrels therein required should be sent out at an early period, and that arrangements should be made to send out hereafter 2000 barrels in addition to that quantity.

The A.G. to Capt. —, D.A.A.G.

25th July, 1811.

In consequence of the enclosed report from Lieut. Col. Elley, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be more attentive in the conduct of the duties of the 2d division of cavalry in future, otherwise his Excellency will be obliged to adopt more serious measures.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

25th July, 1811.

I have written this day, by order of the Commander of the Forces, a reprimand to Capt. —, D. A. A. G., for his neglect of duty in the 2d division of cavalry, and I trust it will be a sufficient warning to him in future.

In reference to your last state, I am aware that you made it out by brigades, in consequence of the new arrangement in the cavalry; but in future you will send it as has been already pointed out. Major Gen. Slade has been regular in his returns; but I have heard nothing of Brig. Gen. Madden's, and have written to him strongly accordingly.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

25th July, 1811.

In reply to your letter and enclosures from Major Gen. —, his certificate has been referred to the Inspector General of hospitals, who will order a Medical board to report on his case on the Major General's arrival at Cabeça de Vide, or Lisbon, and he may repair to either place, as is most convenient. I am directed also to remark, that the regulations on this head of service are made not only for the inferior ranks of the army, but the Commander of the Forces will not allow any General officer to go to England whose health has not been certified by a Medical board.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

I write just to let you know that the powder, deficient of the quantity necessary for our object, will be sent from Lisbon to Oporto without loss of time.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 24th. The placing the 77th in your brigade is only a temporary arrangement, to make it of due strength till the 1st batt. 5th regt. shall arrive, when that battalion will be sent to you, and the 77th removed.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

I enclose two letters, which I beg you to send by an officer to the Juiz de Fora at Sabugal, and desire the Juiz de Fora to send a trusty person with one to Almeida, and another person, on whom he can depend, with that for Don J. Sanchez to Fuente Guinaldo, where will be found a detachment of his troops.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

The scene shifts in this extraordinary war so frequently, and so many unexpected circumstances occur affecting our situation, that it is difficult to say at what period it is possible to allow an officer to quit the army.

I have now an enterprise in progress, which, in the course of a short time, will bring us all out of our cantonments, and, if it should be successful, will give a new turn to affairs. You ought not to go now, therefore. Whether you can go in winter will depend upon circumstances and events, for which I cannot answer, and upon which you had better delay to determine till you shall see how affairs stand.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

I concur entirely with you about Dickson's merits,* and I will endeavor to get for him the rank of Major. The manner in which he was employed at the two sieges of Badajoz, and that in which he is now employed, will make a distinction in his case, of which I will avail myself in my recommendation of him to head quarters.

I shall leave two divisions in Alentejo, unless the 5th corps should cross the Tagus to co-operate with the '*Armée de Portugal*' in impeding our enterprise.

We are a good deal embarrassed in our cantonments by your sick horses. Would it not be desirable to move away every thing of this kind as far to the rear as Evora, where they would be well supplied, and quite out of our way?

I hope to send up the account of your commissariat expenses for feeding the Portuguese troops to the 24th June, from the 25th April. This will give the best estimate of the expense for future months.

In the mean time Mr. Kennedy has furnished me with an estimate of the expense of feeding 2000 men and 2000 horses for 30 days, which amounts to 41 *contos* of reis, £11,050 sterling. If we feed 16,000 men and 1600 horses, the expense will be £88,000 *per mensem*, which is something more than double the amount of the charge for April, in which was not included transport to the expense magazine. However, the actual charge will probably not amount to this sum.

1st; we don't feed 1600 animals: and 2dly; some of the articles estimated are not always paid for, such as wood; and others, such as wine, and sometimes forage, are not always issued: but I should think that the actual charge would not amount to much less than £70,000 *per mensem*.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

I enclose my last dispatch. Since writing it I have received accounts

* See note at p. 91.

that Bessières had brought 10,000 or 12,000 men to Benavente, in consequence of which Santocildes had retired one march behind Astorga.

The Prince of Orange is going to Cadiz, and I shall give him a letter of introduction to you.

The A.G. to Col. Waters, A.A.G.

26th July, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose you a communication I have just received from the Military Secretary to the Commander of the Forces; and I recommend most strongly to all the officers of the department a very careful revision of the copies of G. Os. that are sent from the office with the original, in order that no error should arise which gives the character of inaccuracy to our mode of conducting the business of the department.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

I am very much annoyed by ———'s conduct. By this unfortunate obstinacy he will be in a bad scrape, and he deserves that an effort should be made to save him; but no man can be allowed to insult his Commanding officer.

I did not recollect that I had told you that Capt. Byrne should go home. I am convinced there is no reason why he should go; but if I told you he should, he shall go; and I must write to the Sec. at War by next post, to say that I had allowed him to go. He must have leave, however, for only 2 months.

I am concerned to hear of the bad condition of the 13th dragoons. I must make a movement to our left, and place the greatest part of the army, and at least your division of cavalry, on the other side of the Tagus; but, if the 13th dragoons are in such bad condition, they must be left behind, and we must take the 14th instead. I must take some decided steps about the 13th dragoons. It is too bad that they in particular should be so unfit for service.

To Col. Austin.

Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 21st. Gen. Castaños certainly informed me of the intention of the cavalry of the 5th army to return through Portugal into Estremadura; but I concluded that of course they would wait for a military route before they would march, and that, till that was called for, I did not think it necessary, or rather it did not occur to me, to apprise you of this march.

I now enclose you the route, and beg you to fill up the days, and ap-

G. O.

Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces is happy to have it in his power to pardon ———, ———, and ———, not only because these men have made every restitution in their power to the owners of the property stolen, but likewise because he has great satisfaction in stating that offences of this description are now but rarely committed.

3. The conduct of the 57th regt. also in the battle of Albuera, on the 16th May, has likewise rendered the Commander of the Forces anxious to be able to pardon these men, in order that the regiment might avoid the disgrace of their public execution.

5. Upon reference to the Mutiny Act, the Paymasters and Commissaries of the army will see that they cannot swear to their accounts before the Dep. Judge Advocate; and upon reference to their instructions, Paymasters of regiments will see that they may swear to their accounts before the magistrate of any town, but not before the Dep. Judge Advocate.

prise the British Commissary at Beja, &c., when they will pass each place, that they may be prepared.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 24th last night; and I write to let you know that there is no reason why you should hurry yourself from Lisbon.

Upon a comparison of the strength which we can bring upon one point with that which the enemy can collect in Castille, I think I have a chance of succeeding in taking Ciudad Rodrigo, and the preparations are in progress for that enterprise. I can certainly undertake nothing else at present which would at all improve the situation of the allies in the Peninsula; and, adverting to the facility with which the French march corps from one side of the Peninsula to the other, and to the little detriment to their interests which results from the abandonment of a province or Kingdom to collect a large force against us, I must consider it not improbable that I shall be obliged to abandon the enterprise. The preparation for it, however, will take up a considerable time, and you will see that there is no occasion for your hurrying yourself. We have reports, as usual, that Ciudad Rodrigo is but ill supplied with provisions, for which I believe there is no more foundation than for these reports in general. It may be advisable, therefore, that we should approach the place a little earlier than I at first intended; and with this view, and because the whole of Marmont's army have crossed the Tagus, I am sending more troops across, and I have it in contemplation to make a general movement to our left.

Soult certainly intends to avail himself of the large force he now has in the south to make an effort against the position of the allies at Cadiz, or to obtain possession of Carthagera. I don't think it quite clear which plan he will follow. He has certainly sent to Granada the division of the 4th corps which was lately in Estremadura, and, it is said, some troops under Latour Maubourg; but I believe these last are cavalry only, which would not be of much use in an attack upon the Isla de Leon. These reinforcements may have been sent to enable Leval (who I believe now commands the 4th corps) to keep Freyre in check, as this last General had lately made some progress, and had got as far as Guadix. I am inclined to believe he will attack Cadiz, as I have not heard that any of the heavy ordnance moved out of Badajoz has been sent from Seville towards Granada, and I suspect that it is going down the Guadalquivir unobserved by those who are employed to procure intelligence for the Spanish government.

I have written to my brother about the state of the works on the Isla de Leon; but, from all I see and hear, I am very apprehensive that the affairs of Spain are nearly irretrievable. There is no money, and there are no means of getting any, and there are no disciplined troops. Even if we should strike a fortunate blow, I fear that we should do them no good.

Till Soult's design upon Carthagera is manifest, nothing can be more absurd than to send Blake's corps into Murcia, where they have already 20,000 men opposed to 5000 French, which may have been increased to 12,000 by the first reinforcement from Estremadura, and probably to

14,000 by the last. My opinion is, that Blake's corps should be employed either in the Sierra de Ronda or in the Condado de Niebla, as this may be depended upon (although the Spaniards will not admit it), that they may increase the corps in Murcia to any extent they please; but they will not be able to drive the French out of Granada. The strength of their corps in Murcia, therefore, ought to be fixed with a view to a defensive war in a very strong country, and should be increased in proportion as the enemy, by the increase of his force, and his other measures in that quarter, should manifest a design to attack Carthage.

A force stationed in Niebla, or the Sierra de Ronda, would always have a secure retreat. From either situation they would threaten Seville, which is the foundation of the enemy's existence in the south of Spain. In Niebla they would be in direct communication with us, and they might be equipped in such a manner as to render it quite impossible for Soult to move all his troops, with impunity, upon us; and from Niebla or La Ronda the troops might be brought to Cadiz, with facility, if wanted. But this plan will not be adopted, because it does not afford ground for any body to boast for a few days that the enemy will be overthrown, and that the southern provinces of Spain will be relieved.

The A.G. to Lieut. Burke, late 45th regt.

27th July, 1811.

In answer to your letter addressed to the Commander of the Forces, I am to inform you that you are a deserter from the army, and as such are not entitled to pay from the period of your desertion, and you forfeit what was due to you previous to your committing that crime. At your own desire, after you had been superseded, the Commander of the Forces intended to have brought you to trial before a General Court Martial for your offence, in hopes you would have been able to justify yourself; but when the Court was assembled, they could not proceed to your trial, as you said you were insane. Under these circumstances the Commander of the Forces has ordered you to Lisbon, meaning to send you to England by the first opportunity, as after what has occurred his Excellency cannot consider it proper that you should be at large near to the enemy's army. On arrival at the dépôt in England, the Commander of the Forces concludes H.R.H. the Commander in Chief will permit your going about your own concerns.

The A.G. to the A.G. of the Forces, Horse Guards.

27th July, 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to enclose to you for the information of H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, a letter that has been received from Lieut. Burke, late of the 45th regt., who was superseded some time since for desertion to the enemy, but has since fallen into our hands again, as also the copy of an answer this gentleman has received. I have further to state that Lord Wellington has ordered him to Lisbon, from whence he will be sent to the dépôt at the Isle of Wight, his expenses home being defrayed; and on arrival he will wait such further instructions as H.R.H. the Commander in Chief may think proper to give concerning him.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Lord Blantyre, 42d regt.

27th July, 1811.

I have laid your Lordship's letter and enclosures from Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., before the Commander of the Forces; and you will be pleased to acquaint Capts. — and —, that his Excellency feels much concern that they are in bad quarters, but the same disagreeable circumstance happens occasionally to every officer in the army, and frequently to have no quarters at all in the situations in which his duty obliges him to be: and the only rule which his Excellency knows of for quarters is, that every officer must be where his duty requires his presence, whatever may be the accommodation afforded at that place, or the nature of it compared with the accommodation of others. When large bodies of

troops are quartered in a town, the detail would be endless if the quarters for regiments and companies were not allotted by streets, and every officer in this case must be quartered in the streets of his company and regiment. However, the Commander of the Forces will be glad if your Lordship sees any arrangement that can be made to render the accommodation of the above gentlemen comfortable.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Portalegre, 28th July, 1811, 11 A.M.

The orders were sent from hence, I believe, 2 days ago, for you to march, not exactly with a view to a mere change of cantonments, but to a service which I think it probable you will be able to perform: I will explain it more fully when I shall see you, which will probably be in a day or two. The fact is, that I am about to move the whole army farther to the left, and I want to get your division in your old place at the head of our cantonments. Murray will send the orders by your aide de camp; and I wish that, if you can with convenience, you would go to-morrow.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Portalegre, 28th July, 1811.

Upon referring to your letter of the 28th to Murray, I observe that you complain that the soldiers receive their *balances* at the *depôt* at Belem. I rather think that you must be mistaken with regard to this fact. They may receive money, necessaries, &c., at Belem; but I conceive that they can't, under existing orders, receive the *balance* due on their accounts. Let me know how this fact stands.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Portalegre, 29th July, 1811.

Lord Blantyre has written to me to propose to transfer to the navy a boy by the name of — —, who is so prone to desertion that they can't keep him with the 42d regt. I have sent him to the Provost at Lisbon; and, if you have no objection to taking him, I request you to desire Gen. Peacocke to send him on board any ship you please, and I will discharge him from the 42d. He will not be at Lisbon for some days.

The A.G. to Major Gen. R. Craufurd, Light division.

29th July, 1811.

In reference to your letter and enclosure from Lieut. Col. M'Leod, of the 43d regt., there is no document in this office, or any *Gazette* notification of the appointment of the officer alluded to; and it never has been permitted by his Excellency that any officer should leave the army until his promotion has been made known to him through the official channel.

G. O.

Portalegre, 28th July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that means may be adopted in all the cantonments of the troops to keep them clean and healthy.

2. The offal of the animals killed for food should be destroyed by slack lime, and if that article cannot be procured, it should be buried.

3. One or more necessaries should be made for each regiment, to which all the men should be obliged to resort, and slack lime should be thrown into them every second day.

4. The streets occupied by each regiment, and the communications with them, should be swept every morning, and the heaps of dung and filth in the unoccupied spaces in all the towns in Portugal should be destroyed by slack lime.

5. Sentries should be placed over the several fountains in the towns, in order to prevent persons from dirtying the water, or from accumulating dirt in their neighbourhood.

6. The Commissaries attached to the several brigades are requested to procure a quantity of slack lime, for which the quarter masters of the several regiments are to make requisitions for these purposes.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

I am very much distressed by the contents of Lieut. Bell's letter of the 28th to Gen. Murray; and I beg that in future the G. O. of the army may be attended to in the Light division, which require that, when a soldier is so unwell as to be unable to march, he should be sent to the general hospital. I am perfectly aware of the inconvenience and loss of numbers attending this order, but I am also aware of the impossibility of finding conveyance for the removal of an accumulation of sick with the several divisions of the army, at the moment it may be necessary to order them to march; and I am convinced that the loss of numbers would eventually be greater than it can be under the system which has been ordered.

I would also beg to draw your attention to the order which was issued only on the 23d inst., in regard to the immediate issue of clothing, &c., brought up for the troops. Obligated, as we are, to bring from Lisbon every article of food, and of equipment of all descriptions for the troops, it is impossible to find conveyance to draw after the regiments the clothing, &c., which they may require. What the troops want should be issued to them as soon as it reaches the regiments, and the means of conveyance should be delivered to the commissariat, to be applied to other purposes. Obedience to this order may sometimes be attended by inconveniences, but they are trifling in comparison with the inconveniences which all would suffer from a disobedience of it. If the troops in the Light division are to disobey these orders, others will do the same; and we shall end by being obliged to employ the means of conveyance which we can get in removing sick, when the General officers commanding divisions should choose that they should be sent away; and in carrying clothing, which the Commanding officers of regiments may find it convenient to bring with their regiments; and the movements of the army must be cramped.

It is very desirable that the General officers commanding divisions should understand that the divisions under their command respectively are only parts of an army, which must be governed by system and rule; and that every departure from the system ordered, and the rule laid down, however convenient to the particular division, must be inconvenient to the army at large, and therefore detrimental to the service.

I have ordered that the men of the Light division left at Castello de Vide may be removed to the hospital at Abrantes, and that the clothing belonging to the 43d may be sent after the regiment; and I beg that it may be issued to the soldiers the day it reaches the regiment.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

I have received another letter from Gen. Picton respecting the state of Arentschildt's mules. You will be good enough to equip the 9 pounder brigade; as the others are nearly useless, and there are not enough for the 6 pounder brigade, it would be better to send these away.

It is very desirable that we should send to a distance from the army all useless animals incapable of work. Cries of want of forage are coming from all parts; animals with sore backs, or useless from want of condi-

tion, eat as much hay and straw as others ; and there are numbers of the Portuguese army of this description mixed up with the troops. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order all the disabled horses of the Portuguese cavalry, and the disabled mules of the artillery, to Evora, which will be out of every body's way, and they will get forage there, and recover.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

Although anonymous letters in general deserve no attention, and I feel but little inclination to attend to the complaints of the people of Lisbon about billets, still, when a fact is stated against any officer, it is fit that it should be inquired into. I therefore enclose you the extract of an anonymous letter which I have received regarding the conduct of the Paymaster of the — regt., in a house in which he was lately billeted at Lisbon ; and I request you to find out what house it was, and to go or send to the owner, and find out whether there was any, and what, cause to complain. If there was any ground for complaint, I beg you to have the story of the complaint taken down in writing, and to send it to me.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

I did not explain myself sufficiently in my letter to you on the subject of the division of the depôt at Belem. I am desirous that it should be divided if possible ; and that the soldiers who are nearest to being fit to join the army should be sent to a distance from Belem, as proposed in my former letter. I request, therefore, that you will endeavor to arrange a plan for the division of the depôt, notwithstanding that you have procured a building in the neighbourhood of the barracks at Belem which will hold 800 men.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Castello Branco, 1st Aug.* 1811.

As Mr. Kennedy had written to the Commissary in Chief regarding our want of money, I did not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship upon that subject ; nor should I do so now, if I did not feel the utmost anxiety upon it, particularly as these wants will materially affect any prospect we may have of carrying on the war offensively. The army subsist at present almost entirely upon supplies brought from the sea-coast, and either imported from England, or purchased at Lisbon with bills drawn upon England, not to be negotiated in the Peninsula. Your Lordship may conceive the detail and labor, and expense of transporting all that such an army consumes, excepting meat and straw, so great a distance, by land and water conveyance, and will judge how these must be increased by the increase of distance, particularly of land carriage. The land carriage is also materially increased in this season, in consequence of the rivers ceasing to be navigable for a great part of the course for which they are usually navigable till July.

Notwithstanding the saving of the demand for money, which has resulted from the mode in which we have subsisted the army hitherto, I am

* Lord Wellington was promoted to the rank of General in Spain and Portugal on the 31st July, 1811.

sorry to say that we have not had enough to pay the army to the 24th June, whereas they ought to be paid, according to His Majesty's regulations, to the 24th Aug. The båt and forage allowances due to the officers of the army in March last have not been yet paid, and the winter båt and forage allowances will be due in September; and the Spanish muleteers, by whose aid alone we can exist at all under the system which we have been obliged to adopt, have generally not been paid for 6 months.

It may be depended upon that no supplies can be procured in Spain without ready money to pay for them; but your Lordship will see that we have no means of purchasing supplies in Castille, or any fertile district near which we may be able to carry on our operations; and that we must still rely solely upon the long, complicated, and laborious communication with our magazines upon the coast, which will become more difficult and precarious in proportion as the distance will be increased. Under these circumstances, notwithstanding that I am convinced that His Majesty's government have done every thing in their power, I venture again to draw their attention to the subject. If so small a sum as 100,000 dollars in specie could occasionally be sent to this country, I am convinced it would have the best effects, if only in enabling the Commissary Gen. to keep down the rate of exchange, and increasing the confidence of monied men in the resources of Great Britain.

I have heard that 2 millions of dollars for the merchants of Cadiz have lately arrived from Mexico; a part of which sum, I have no doubt, will be secured for the use of the army: but the whole of this sum would scarcely defray the demands upon the military chest which I have above detailed to your Lordship, which must be paid in specie, besides the others of a contingent nature, depending upon the possibility of assuming the offensive; and at all events the supplies of specie to be procured for bills would be increased, and would be procured at a cheaper rate, if it was known that any sum whatever in specie (the amount of which need not be stated) was periodically received from England.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Castello Branco, 1st Aug. 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 25th July I have received intelligence which has induced me to believe that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo was very ill supplied with provisions; and that Don J. Sanchez had been more successful in preventing the introduction of supplies from the country than I had imagined the limited force under his command would have enabled him to be. I have therefore moved the whole army to their left, with the intention, if I should find the intelligence which I have received to be well founded, to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo immediately. If, however, I should find it otherwise, or if, as I imagine, the enemy have within these last 2 days introduced a supply of provisions into the place, I propose that the army shall take up its cantonments in Lower Beira instead of Alentejo, till all the preparations will be completed for the further operation which I intend to carry on against Ciudad Rodrigo, if circumstances should permit it.

I propose to leave Gen. Hill, with the 2d and Gen. Hamilton's divisions

of infantry, and part of Sir W. Erskine's division of cavalry, in the Alentejo, to observe the enemy's movements on that side.

I had been misinformed respecting the movements of the 5th corps when I addressed your Lordship on the 25th July. They had not then quitted Estremadura; but I understand they are now in march towards Andalusia. The '*Armée de Portugal*' remain in the positions which I informed your Lordship that they occupied in my dispatch of the 25th July, excepting that the division at Plasencia has extended through the mountains to Bejar and Baños.

By a letter from Gen. Silveira of the 21st July, which I received on the 26th, I learned that Gen. Santocildes had retired with the army of Galicia from the neighbourhood of Astorga to Manzanal on the 17th, in consequence of Marshal Bessières having collected at Benavente a force, consisting of 11,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry. Gen. Santocildes intended to endeavor to maintain himself at Manzanal; and, although I have not heard from that quarter since the receipt of Gen. Silveira's letter of the 21st, I imagine that the enemy have been satisfied with obliging Santocildes to retire to the mountains, as I learn from Don Julian, from Ledesma, on the 26th, that a detachment of Bessières' troops, consisting of 6000 men, had arrived on that day at Salamanca; and I have since heard from other quarters that these same troops had moved with a convoy towards Ciudad Rodrigo. These two last reports, however, have not been confirmed from any other quarter, or by any accounts from Don Julian since the 26th.

It is reported that Marshal Soult is gone to Granada; but this report has not been confirmed.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Castello Branco, 2d Aug. 1811.

It is very evident to me that you have not before you a true statement of the case regarding the payment of soldiers in the depôt at Belem; and I beg you therefore to delay to give any orders, or, if you have given orders upon the subject, to recall them, till I shall have inquired how this matter really stands. It can't be as you suppose it is.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Castello Branco, 2d Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 29th. In all the discussions which we have with the Portuguese, as well as the Spanish government, on the subject of the resources for the war, one would imagine they had no

G. O.

Castello Branco, 2d Aug. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces observed that the baggage of some of the officers of the — is conveyed upon carts, which is positively contrary to repeated orders, and he desires that this may not happen again.

2. The Commander of the Forces is likewise concerned to observe the number of soldiers belonging to the —th division straggling on the march yesterday, belonging particularly to the — regt. and to the —: he refers the officers to the orders on this subject.

3. These irregularities on the march lead to many disorders of which the consequences are felt in the subsequent sickness of the soldiers, and the weakness of the regiments. They have lately plundered honey, than which nothing can be more prejudicial to their health at this season, and the use of it by the men ought to be prevented by the officers as much as possible.

interest, or a minor interest, in carrying it on; and that we were the principals, and that they were conferring an obligation upon us in doing what is necessary, not only to preserve their independence as nations, but their lives and fortunes as individuals. I protest against such notions; and I declare again, that if I find the Portuguese government don't allot every shilling of the revenue which can be so allotted to carry on the military operations, don't improve their resources to the utmost, and don't carry into execution the laws to bring forward the resources of the country for the army, I will not consent to give the increase of subsidy, and I shall recommend to the British government to give no more than the subsidy of 1810. I have long been convinced that there is no chance of success in this war, unless the governments and people of the Peninsula should exert themselves really for their own salvation; and I shall be satisfied with no half measure. I shall be obliged to you if you will hint these sentiments to Dom M. Forjaz.

The mules which we have bought have cost us lately 150 dollars each.

I don't understand the answer of the Portuguese government to my proposition respecting Monsanto. Don Carlos de España was desirous of having a place in which he could lodge ammunition, &c., to be delivered to the guerrillas, and which would afford him a secure retreat for the depôts of corps, and the recruits raised in Castille and Estremadura, in case the enemy should advance; for which purpose I proposed that Monsanto might be given over to him. This place has long been abandoned by the Portuguese government: they will not, and have it not in their power, to garrison it, and the enemy consequently had possession of it last summer; and yet they say that Don Carlos de España shall have the place, provided a Portuguese governor and the Portuguese civil authorities shall remain in it. There is neither Portuguese governor nor garrison, and I suspect only a Juiz Ordinario. The question is, whether the government will give the place over to the charge of Don Carlos de España and a Spanish garrison, or whether they will not; upon which I should be glad to have an answer in the affirmative or the negative, as soon as may be practicable. Of course Don Carlos will have nothing to do with the place, and I shall lodge no ammunition in it, under the circumstances proposed by the Portuguese government.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Castello Branco, 2d Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 26th July, and I now enclose the copy of my dispatch to government of yesterday.

The opinion which you say prevails at Cadiz is very little promising; but I don't see in what manner you can combat it, or, if you could, that it is any concern of yours.

Great Britain did not bring Spain into the contest. On the contrary, the war, in its commencement, and throughout its progress, has been carried on by the Spaniards without reference to our opinions, and generally in direct contradiction to our recommendation; and then we are to be blamed and abused, because, contrary to our own judgments and the plain dictates of military expediency, we don't choose to enter upon wild and visionary schemes which we have not the means of accomplishing.

The Spaniards forget that, by the folly and treachery of their own officers, they have been brought to the state in which they now find themselves; and we don't remind them sufficiently often of these circumstances; and that the cause for which we are contending is theirs essentially, whatever may be the degree of interest which we feel in it. Who lost the battle of Ocaña, contrary to our advice and intreaties, and consequently Andalusia? Who gave up Badajoz treacherously, when we were moving to their assistance? Are we to blame if the Spanish armies are not in such a state as that they can be opposed to the enemy? or if the Cortes have neglected their duty, have usurped the powers of the executive government, and have misspent their time in fruitless debates? Are we in fault because, by the mismanagement of the American colonies, the world has been deprived of its usual supply of specie, and Great Britain in particular can't find money to carry on her own operations, or aid the allies?

Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the inexperience and folly of the principal people in Spain will be manifest. I apprised — of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and him alone; the success of which depends principally upon the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from the enemy. Some Spanish women at Portalegre were apprised of the plan by him, and it must reach the enemy!!! Yet — is one of the best of them. Look at Abadia's conduct in respect to Galicia. Examine any transaction in which they have been concerned, and it will be found characterised by delay, weakness, folly, or treachery! And then we are to be told that our political object is to ruin Spain! It is rather a curious circumstance that I have received, in the report of a conversation between two French Generals at Salamanca, the account that the French attributed to us the same motives.

I have already apprised you of my opinion of the practicability of assisting Spain with money; and I now enclose you the copy of a dispatch which I wrote to Lord Liverpool yesterday, upon our own wants. How we are to get through an operation upon the frontier I don't know; and if the muleteers should leave us, which they ought, there is an end to the war, as far as we are concerned in it, as it will be quite impossible to carry it on at a distance from the points at which the rivers cease to be navigable.

I don't think it quite clear that Soult has left Seville, though Austin, who has the best intelligence, says he has.

The A.G. to Dr. Frunch, Inspector of hospitals.

2d Aug. 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that if it should appear expedient to you, to prevent slight cases of illness proceeding so far to the rear as Abrantes, and probably to Lisbon, to establish a receiving station here, or to remove the greater proportion of the depôt at Niza to this place, his Excellency has no objection to the same, and directs that you should make the arrangement that will best answer under present circumstances. I shall be glad when you have determined to know the result, to apprise the several divisions accordingly.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I received yesterday your letter of the 1st, and the enclosure from

Lieut. Mackworth; and I now enclose the letter for Marmont, which he desires to have, and which I request you to forward to Truxillo if you can; if not, to Badajoz.

Desire the officer who goes with the letter to be very cautious in his communications with the French officer respecting the movements of the army. He may say, if asked, that the cantonments have been altered, and that my head quarters are in a quinta near Portalegre. He must say that he belongs to my Staff; and, upon the whole, both because it would be difficult to get to Truxillo, and because it might be discovered at that place that we had marched, I consider it best that he should go only to Badajoz. I write this letter to Marmont only because you desire it; but I am positively certain that it will answer no purpose whatever.

I have been moving pretty quickly, and have not yet had time to write you instructions applicable to the different cases which may occur while we may be separated, but I will do so this day or to-morrow if I can.

Au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

Au Quartier Général, ce 4 Août, 1811.

Ayant reçu hier une lettre de la part de M. le Lieut. Mackworth, qui est prisonnier de guerre à Truxillo, par laquelle il m'apprend que votre Excellence était disposée à le renvoyer à l'armée Anglaise si j'en faisais la demande, en échange pour un officier du même rang, prisonnier de guerre en Angleterre, qui serait renvoyé de suite en France, j'ose vous prier de faire cet arrangement, et de me nommer l'officier prisonnier en Angleterre que vous désirez soit renvoyé en France, et je m'engage qu'il sera renvoyé de suite.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 31st July. It is quite impossible to allow Gen. Harvey to go to England at present.

The officers of the corps of guides must of course not be promoted over the heads of the seniors. I only wish that when their seniors shall be made Lieutenants, they may be made Lieutenants *aggregados*.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

Major Gen. Lumley's state of health requiring his immediate return to England, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that he may be accommodated with a passage in the first man of war which may sail for that country.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I have this day received your letter of the 30th July. I consider it desirable that the battalion of Royal Marines, under the command of Major Williams, should still be detained at Lisbon, but that all the marines belonging to the ships of the squadron under the command of your Excellency should be sent to their ships.

To Major Gen. Needham.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 8th July. I concur in the recommendation of Lieut. Col. Sutton to be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant

Colonel in the service of His Majesty, because Lieut. Col. Sutton had distinguished himself in the Portuguese service, and he deserved that promotion.

Major Offley, who has retired from the Portuguese service, is likewise a very good officer, and may distinguish himself likewise when he shall have an opportunity; but he has not yet had the opportunity; therefore I can't recommend him for promotion.

I am sorry that Major Offley should feel hurt at the promotion of Lieut. Col. Sutton; and particularly so, that I cannot with justice to others attend to your request that I should recommend Major Offley for promotion.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d July, regarding Lieut. — of the — dragoons.

I beg to observe, that in an army so large as that under my command, and so dispersed as it is in general, and the communications between one part of the country and the other being so difficult as they are in Portugal, it is not at all times possible to collect the members of a Court Martial, and the witnesses who it is necessary should attend it; and, when a General Court Martial is assembled, its proceedings must necessarily be suspended when the army, or that division of the army to which the members belong, are in operation against the enemy.

Lieut. — was brought to trial in the month of September last at Niebla, upon charges preferred against him by Col. Sir Granby Calcraft, before a General Court Martial, of which Major Gen. Slade was President. Before the Court could conclude its proceedings the movements of the enemy obliged it to adjourn, and the members to return to their duty; and, shortly afterwards, Capt. Percy, one of the members, was taken prisoner, and two others, Major Butler and Capt. de la Motte, were obliged to quit the country on account of their health; and the number of members was reduced to a President and eleven. It then became a question, upon which doubts were entertained, in what manner it was legal, just, and proper, to proceed to the trial of Lieut. —, upon which I forwarded the enclosed memorandum to the Judge Advocate General.

When his answer arrived the army was again engaged in operations against the enemy. The regiments to which some of the members of the Court Martial, the prosecutor, the prisoner, and some of the witnesses belonged, were detached to the frontiers of Andalusia, while others were on the frontiers of Old Castille; and it would have been impossible to assemble all the parties till the army collected in the end of June on the frontier of Estremadura. In the mean time, Lieut. Fox, the principal witness for the prisoner, was killed; and I then received the letter from Col. Lord E. Somerset, and its enclosure from Lieut. —, which I now transmit.

Upon receiving that letter I deemed it proper to pardon Lieut. —, and to order that he might be released from his arrest, in a letter, of which I enclose a copy, from the Adj. General; notwithstanding that, His Royal Highness will observe, by the perusal of the copy of the proceedings of the Court, as far as they had gone, that Lieut. — was not entirely free from blame.

I am much concerned if any officer suffers from delay in bringing him to trial, or in bringing his trial to a conclusion. It can be no object to me to delay a trial; on the contrary: but I must take care that the trial, when it does take place, is one in earnest, and that all the witnesses who can throw light on the charges are present to give their testimony, and that the law and the Articles of War are attended to; and also that the members of a General Court Martial are with their regiments and brigades at the time the troops are engaged in operations against the enemy.

If the mode of trial by Court Martial is inconvenient on active service, the fault is in the law, and, I hope, not in the mode in which it is carried into execution.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 16th, with the enclosure from Col. Hamilton.

Our cavalry were in very bad order, because they were very hard worked, in very bad weather, in a country in which there was very little forage. All the arrangements of carts could not have remedied this inconvenience.

Mr. Kennedy, as Commissary General, is at the head of the transport department, and is perfectly capable of conducting it, and does conduct it as well as any man can. I should not wish to have any body sent out from England to perform the duties now performed so well by Mr. Kennedy.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pedrogão, 4th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 17th July, in which you have enclosed the copy of a memorandum of the 13th July, which you had received from H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, in regard to the enlistment of Portuguese recruits for the British regiments.

The people of Portugal agree remarkably well with the British soldiers. I have never known an instance of the most trifling disagreement among the soldiers or officers of the two nations. The Portuguese soldiers eat the same food, and, as military men, adopt the same habits as our soldiers, including, in some instances, their disposition to intoxication; and therefore I should think it a preferable mode of introducing them into the British service, to place them indiscriminately in the same companies with recruits raised in His Majesty's dominions. Each individual would then be more likely to conduct himself on every occasion, and in all circumstances, as a British soldier. However, there is no reason to believe that the Portuguese soldiers, if collected in separate companies, would behave otherwise than well in any situation; and, if that mode of incorporating them be preferred, I see no objection to it.

I am apprehensive, however, that your Lordship is much mistaken if you imagine that you could increase your numbers to any great extent by the adoption of this measure. It could not be attempted without the consent of the Portuguese government; and I don't think that they could be prevailed upon to give their consent to our enlisting a single man.

Your Lordship is probably not aware that the whole military force of Portugal is raised by a conscription, not very different from that which prevails in France; and that, according to the ancient constitution of Portu-

gal, every individual is obliged to serve in the regular army, in the militia, or in the Ordenanza, as an officer or a soldier. Those who might enlist to serve in the British army therefore, would, in proportion to their numbers, decrease the number of those liable to be called upon to serve in one of the Portuguese military establishments; and this plausible reason would afford the Portuguese government ground for a refusal to grant permission to enlist recruits in Portugal, to which they would adhere. But if the Portuguese government should, contrary to my expectation, grant permission to enlist recruits, I believe that we should get but very few, notwithstanding the known attachment of the people to us.

The people of Portugal, in general, are agriculturists, and, like those of the same description in all other countries, are very little disposed to military service. As I have before stated, they are obliged by the ancient law of their country to serve, otherwise I believe that very few of them would be found in the ranks; and they are very much addicted to desertion (not to the enemy) in their own country, as well as in Spain. In Lisbon and Oporto some recruits might be got; but, to show your Lordship how few, I may mention that an attempt was made, under the patronage of the present Patriarch, to raise the Lusitanian Legion by enlistment, instead of by conscription, and two battalions were never completed; and their losses by desertion were so great, and their gains by recruiting by the mode of enlistment so small, that in a very few months after they were raised it was necessary to give up the mode of recruiting by enlistment, and to allot the Lusitanian Legion to one of the provinces, to be completed with recruits raised within the same by conscription. The recruits for the Lusitanian Legion, however, were raised principally at Oporto, and some might be raised at Lisbon; but to show your Lordship how few, and how difficult it would be to detain in the service those enlisted there, and how unlikely the government would be to consent to our enlisting recruits there, I may mention that, even with the assistance of the conscription, they have never been able to keep the Lisbon regiments complete, notwithstanding that, with their usual partiality to that city, they have not allotted the number of regiments which it ought to keep complete, according to any fair comparative estimate of its population; and the recruits sent to those regiments desert as soon as they reach them.

From this statement your Lordship will be able to judge of the expediency of pressing this subject on the Portuguese government.

The A.G. to Capt. — , D.A.A.G.

4th Aug. 1811.

Your letter of the 31st ult. has been laid before his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you that it appears to his Excellency that, from some cause or other, Lieut. Col. Elley did not receive the states of the division to which you are attached at the time he ought to have done, and therefore there was blame or accident somewhere that required explanation. Lieut. Col. Elley is considered as responsible for the duties of the Adj. General's department with the cavalry, and it is incumbent upon him to report where the accident or cause for blame occurred.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Penamacor, 5th Aug. 1811.

As I never reported to your Lordship that I entertained any intention to repair the fort of Almeida, I did not think it necessary to apprise your

Lordship that that intention had been frustrated; nor should I now advert to the subject, only that I observe that the measures adopted at Almeida, under the directions of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, in the commencement of June, have attracted the attention of the public of England.

The mines which the French Gen. Brenier had prepared, when he was about to evacuate Almeida, entered the rampart on a level with the *terre-plein* of the fort, and were carried along the exterior *revêtement*. Many of these mines did not explode, and those which did explode did no more mischief than to throw into the ditch of the place the exterior *revêtement* of the rampart of that part, as low down only as the *terre-plein* of the fort. The effects of the mines were so ill calculated that the ramparts and parapets remained entire, and, with but few exceptions, the guns in their places in the embrasures in the latter, and the destruction could not be perceived in the inside of the fort. The stone and rubbish, however, which were lodged in the ditches by the fall of the exterior *revêtement* of the rampart afforded practicable passages into the place, nearly at all the points at which the mines had exploded; but, with this exception, and the destruction of one outwork in the same manner, the works of the place were in as good order as when I had seen them in the year '1810.

Under these circumstances, I proposed to the Portuguese government a plan of putting the place immediately in a state to be tenable against a *coup de main*, in order to afford time for consideration whether the expense should be incurred thereupon for re-establishing it entirely. Although I was aware of the utility and importance of having Almeida as a secure post for the operations which I had in view for the campaign, yet I thought it not improbable that I should be obliged to remove the whole army from that part of the country; and, for that reason, and because I knew from experience that the Portuguese government would adopt none of the measures necessary to put the place in a state to be held against a *coup de main*, if they entertained any hopes that I should do the work, I thought it proper to intimate to them that the work must be done by the means which they should collect themselves, and that I must have their determination, and that they must collect the people immediately.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to Mr. Stuart upon this occasion, on the 13th May, in answer to which I was informed that the Portuguese government would readily undertake the proposed work.

On the 16th May I quitted Villar Formoso to join the troops in Estremadura, having previously detached 2 divisions from the army in Castille; and I left with Sir B. Spencer the enclosed memorandum, written on the night of the 15th.* It provided for his operations, in case the enemy should make an irruption into Portugal upon hearing of my departure with the 2 divisions of the army, and for the necessity of his retreat; and particularly specified that Almeida should be destroyed when abandoned by Gen. Pack, but that it should not be abandoned 'till it should be necessary.' On the 29th May† I made Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer still further acquainted with my views respecting Almeida, in a letter which I wrote to him in answer to one in which he had informed me that he had set Gen. Pack's brigade to perform the work which I had

* See p. 22.

† See p. 55.

thought necessary to render the place tenable against a *coup de main*. On the 1st June I wrote another letter* to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, directing the movements which he should make in the event of the enemy moving to the southward; in which letter I particularly specified that Gen. Pack must remain at Almeida, till relieved by the expected militia garrison.

It will thus appear that I ordered, on the 15th May last, that Almeida should be effectually destroyed, if it should be necessary to abandon it, when I contemplated the possibility of the enemy's endeavor to return into Portugal, and of the necessity for the retreat of the troops from the frontiers of Castille; and that on the 1st June I ordered the movement of the troops on the frontiers of Castille to the southward, when I thought it probable that Marmont would make the movement to the southward, with the exception of Gen. Pack's brigade, which I desired might remain at Almeida till relieved by the militia, and of the 5th division, in the cantonments on the Upper Coa. It did not occur to me that, in the event of the enemy's movement to the southward, it would be necessary to withdraw from the frontier, or to abandon Almeida, and therefore I did not advert to this possibility in my letter of the 1st June.

It appears that Marmont made the movements in the beginning of June contemplated in my letter of the 1st of that month, and Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer made those directed for the troops under his command; but, on the 7th June (the day on which Marmont marched to Moras Verdes, after having thrown provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo), Gen. Pack withdrew from Almeida by order of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, and completed its destruction, leaving still one battalion in the neighbourhood of that place; from which it would appear that the abandonment of that place was not necessary: and I have the honor to enclose the official report which I have received from Sir B. Spencer, of the 14th June, on that subject, in answer to a letter which I wrote to him on the 11th June.†

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Penamacor, 6th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 2d Aug. I don't recollect the proposal made against Lemos; but I suppose it was some trick by the government. It appears to me that we are going backwards in the way of influence with these gentlemen. Let me know it officially if they refuse to adopt the measure you propose in respect to the military chest, &c.

I enclose the state of the ammunition with the several brigades of Portuguese artillery on this side of the Tagus, from which you will see how things stand. I think I shall soon have a sufficient quantity of artillery to attach a British brigade to each division, excepting Hamilton's, so that you may then keep the whole of this artillery in reserve.

I rather think that I shall immediately close up Ciudad Rodrigo. It will depend upon what I shall hear this day.

I beg you to let me know what orders you have given about the militia of Beira and Tras os Montes, and to what places I shall send orders for each of the regiments.

* See p. 62.

† See p. 62.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Penamacor, 6th Aug. 1811, 9 A.M.

I have received your note of the 5th. I don't know whether you received a long letter which I wrote to you from Portalegre nearly a fortnight ago, in which I explained the object of our movement to this side of the Tagus.

I have not yet received the intelligence which I expect at every moment, which will enable me to determine whether I shall move on upon Ciudad Rodrigo immediately or not. From the tenor of that which I have received, however, I think I ought to move on, and I therefore recommend to you to come here to-morrow. If I should leave this place, I shall send a note to Pedrogão in the morning early, where you will do well in that case to halt, and you will be able to overtake me at Sabugal the next day.

To Col. O'Lawlor.

Penamacor, 6th Aug. 1811, 8 P.M.

I have just received your letter of 5 P.M. yesterday. I don't exactly understand the paper which you have sent me.

The enemy have certainly not got provisions for 2 months in Ciudad Rodrigo, if they have no more than you state; but I suppose what is stated has been introduced lately, and, with what was there before, makes an amount sufficient for 2 months; but this notion does not agree with my other accounts. I wish, therefore, that you would make further inquiries what quantities they really received, what quantities they had before, and for what time they have now; and the strength of the garrison, of what force of each description of troops. I shall be to-morrow at Sabugal, and next day, probably, in front of that town.

It is very desirable that some arrangement should be made for securing for us all the provisions of that part of the country, as, if we are to blockade that place, we must not starve.

To ———.

Penamacor, 6th Aug. 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 20th July, in which you apprise me of the impression so unfavorable to me in a certain quarter, from my having omitted to make my acknowledgments of the support I had received, and particularly for having been allowed to recommend a certain number of officers for promotion.

You were quite correct in stating that I had expressed my acknowledgments to the office from whence the communication had proceeded; and, if reference is made to the office of the Commander in Chief, it will be found that on the 14th May I did express what I felt upon the particular subject of the promotion of the officers, not in cold terms.

It may be wrong to consider public arrangements not as matters of favor to any individual, and therefore not fit subjects for the acknowledgments of that individual; and, at all events, I don't see in what manner, or in what terms, an individual like me is to address the head of the nation upon such an occasion. Even if I had received a mark of personal favor, I should doubt the propriety of my addressing my acknowledgments direct to so high an authority; and, if it be true that the support of the war in the Peninsula is a public arrangement, I should be apt to

consider an address of acknowledgment from me as misplaced, if not something very near impertinence.

It appears to me to be now too late to write any thing more on the subject of the recommendations for promotion; but you may depend upon it, if another occasion should offer, I shall not fail to do what you have informed me would be well received. I hope that His Royal Highness will believe that he has not in his service a more zealous or a more faithful servant than myself. I shall serve him to the best of my ability as long as he may think I can promote his service; and His Royal Highness will find that I shall not ask for his favor at all for myself, and, I hope, not unreasonably for those under my command, who have a right to expect that I should make known their pretensions.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., Cavalry.

6th Aug. 1811.

I am under the necessity of again drawing your attention to my original instructions upon the subject of the daily states of the Cavalry divisions. The late daily states forwarded from the cavalry I now enclose you, and you will perceive the total impossibility of my complying with the wishes of the Commander of the Forces in making up a general daily state of the army, when the divisional states are forwarded in so very irregular a manner. In order to prevent a recurrence of this irregularity, which is attended with such very serious inconvenience, I beg in the first instance that you will give directions to all the corps in your divisions to transmit (whatever may be the distance) their daily states direct to you, from which you will have the goodness to cause your daily state of the divisions to be made up agreeably to the form already pointed out. To enable you to comply with this, I now enclose you a copy of the last state, as entered in my general return; and should unavoidable delay exist, in your receiving the states from the several brigades or corps, you will, as regularly as opportunities may admit, forward to my office a copy of your last state, thereby enabling me to complete the general one for the Commander of the Forces. Although at one moment the disposition of the army and particular situation of the cavalry may present a facility in infringing upon the established rules laid down for observance, yet these innovations cannot fail to cause inconvenience and delay in forwarding the public business of a department.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Sabugal, 7th Aug. 1811.

From what I have heard of the state of the provisions, and of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, I propose to shut it up as soon as I can, unless, before I can do so, I should receive positive intelligence that the information which I have already received is erroneous. It must be expected

G. O.

Sabugal, 7th Aug. 1811.

1. The Provisional battalion, consisting of the Buffs, 29th, 31st, 57th, and 66th regts., is to be broken up, and the Buffs and 57th are each to resume their separate formations in the usual manner.

2. The officers and men present fit for duty in the 29th, 31st, and 66th are to form a provisional battalion, under the command of the senior officer of the three who shall be present fit for duty; and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates present fit for duty of the 29th and 66th are to be formed into three companies of each regiment, and of the 31st into four, for the purposes of this battalion.

3. The Commanding officer of the provisional battalion above ordered, will fix upon the number of officers and non-commissioned officers belonging to the three regiments composing it, which are to go to Lisbon, in order to superintend the equipment of the soldiers of those regiments as they will come out of the hospital.

4. The officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the provisional battalion are to continue to belong to the respective companies in their regiment, the companies in the provisional battalion being formed only to answer a temporary purpose.

that the enemy will adopt all the means in their power to oblige us to desist from our object; and we must be prepared to adopt measures to resist them wherever they shall attack us.

One of their plans will be to collect the whole of their force; that is, Bessières' army of the north, the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and the 5th corps, and fight a general action, to oblige us to relinquish our object. If they do this, I shall bring Hill's corps to this army.

Another plan will be, to manœuvre with the 5th corps on the south of the Tagus, whilst, with the army of the north and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' they attack us. This we shall oppose with Hill's corps on the south of the Tagus.

Another plan will be, to manœuvre with the '*Armée de Portugal*' on the north of the Tagus, and through Lower Beira, and, with the 5th corps on the south of that river, thus, if possible, to oblige us to raise the siege or blockade, and the army of the north would then relieve the place.

Against the execution of this plan I propose to make the following disposition:

1st; I propose that all above 10,000 men of Hill's corps shall form a reserve, to be stationed at Castello Branco: and, 2dly; in the disposition for the blockade or siege, I propose that the 4th division shall be between Penamacor and Sabugal. This division, with what Hill can spare, will give nearly 10,000 men for the position of the Ocreza, besides Le Cor's militia. On the other hand, the 4th division will be at hand to join the army, in case the '*Armée de Portugal*' should join the army of the north to attack us. I propose to make Le Cor occupy Monsanto, which will confine the enemy in some degree, and, I believe, Penagarcia, and also Sortelha.

It will be very desirable that the garrison should be in readiness to be thrown into Abrantes, as well as that the militia of the north, and of Beira, should be ready to play such part as may be allotted to them in these operations.

It will also be necessary that the government should be prepared to feed the militia, and that money should be sent to the Commissaries of Madden's and Otway's brigades of cavalry, and of Pack's brigade of infantry, and of the brigade No. 5 caçadores and 13th infantry, in order that something may be purchased for them in Spain, otherwise they will starve; or I must relinquish the operation.

I have just received your letter of the 4th. I wait to give any answer about the servants till government shall have decided upon your reference. You have forgotten to send me the enclosures mentioned in your letter.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Sabugal, 7th Aug. 1811.

I request you to give directions that every man, and every thing, coming from Lisbon for the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions of infantry, may be sent by sea to the mouth of the Mondego, and thence by Coimbra to the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Sabugal, 8th Aug. 1811.

My intention is to blockade, and even to attack, Ciudad Rodrigo, if it

should be in my power; and I am now about to inform you of the mode in which I should wish you to co-operate in what I shall do.

You are aware that what is called the '*Armée de Portugal*' is stationed upon the Tagus, with its right at Plasencia and its left at Truxillo; and the 5th corps, under Drouet, is at Zafra, having, I believe, one division in the Condado de Niebla. This corps consists of 2 divisions of infantry of about 10,000 men, and, I should think, not less than 2000 cavalry.

My wish is, that you should observe the movement of the 5th corps. If that corps should move to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, you will then move to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and proceed on by Castello Branco to join the army.

I propose that your corps in Alentejo should be joined by the 9th light dragoons. Barbacena's brigade of cavalry already belongs to it; and it will further be joined by the 28th regt., and detachments arrived for the 57th and other regiments, and others that are expected every moment, including cavalry and infantry. I should not wish you to keep more men in Alentejo than 10,000, and that the remainder should be eventually detached to Castello Branco, in order to form the foundation of a corps to be formed there to keep up the communication with the army.

In a view to this detachment, I would wish you now to send one brigade of British infantry from the 2d division, and one regiment of Portuguese infantry from Gen. Hamilton's division, to Portalegre. This brigade of British infantry should be supplied by its commissariat, and Major Gen. Hamilton will take care that the Portuguese regiment is well supplied with provisions by the Portuguese commissariat. Hereafter, when the proper time shall come, I will order these troops to cross the Tagus to Castello Branco.

If the 5th corps should, instead of crossing the Tagus, manœuvre upon you in Alentejo, I request you first to move upon Portalegre, and there either stand their attack or not, as you may think proper, according to your notion of their force compared with your own. If you should not stand their attack, you will retire by Gavião towards Abrantes, and thence across the Zezere, taking the line of the Tagus, with Santarem upon your right. When you shall pass Niza, you will pick up the bridge of Villa Velha, and either send the boats down to Abrantes or destroy them.

It is possible that the army of Portugal, instead of moving to attack us at Ciudad Rodrigo, may manœuvre on the right of the Tagus by Zarza la Mayor and Castello Branco. I shall in that case join the 4th division of infantry with the detachment from the 2d, and Gen. Hamilton's division, which will be at Castello Branco, and with Le Cor's militia, and shall endeavor to stop them in the position of the Ocreza. In this case it would be desirable that you should maintain yourself at Portalegre as long as possible, and that you should not retire from Gavião in a hurry; and that you should maintain yourself upon the Tagus, with your left upon the Zezere, till these troops should have joined you.

This is the general outline of what I intend; and I shall be glad to hear from you whether I have made myself clearly understood by you.

I have desired Murray to establish a daily communication with you by

means of mounted guides; and I beg that you will have the dispatch sent from your quarters daily at the regular hour.

P.S. I send a letter for Marmont, which I beg you to forward to Badajoz.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Sabugal, 8th Aug. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what regulation you have made for the payment of the soldiers at the depôt at Belem, as the officers commanding companies in many regiments of the army complain that the soldiers being paid their balances at Belem, for a period to which the estimates of the regiments of the army have not been discharged, come up to their regiments in debt.

I don't recollect that the regulations of the service, or the G. O. of the army, would allow of more money being drawn for a soldier in the depôt at Belem than would be absolutely necessary to sustain him, or than would be required to supply him with necessaries. But I should be glad to know what the order and practice is at Belem, before I give any further order upon the subject.

I shall be obliged to you if you will have the men reported to be fit for duty at Belem examined from time to time, to see whether any of them have become fit for service in the field.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Sabugal, 8th Aug. 1811.

I wish to draw your attention to the situation of the Prince of Orange with this army. I have appointed him, with his own consent, to be one of my aides de camp, and it is impossible for any body to conduct himself with more propriety than he does in every respect.

I think, however, that if His Highness was promoted in the course of a short time to be a Colonel in the army, I could attach him to a brigade, in a situation in which he would have a better opportunity of seeing how the detail of the army was conducted, and how the duty was done, at the same time that it would be more suitable to his rank and situation in life.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will consider of this subject. The Prince is now gone to Cadiz, and I expect him in about a fortnight.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Sabugal, 8th Aug. 1811.

I enclose the morning state of the 5th inst. of the troops in the field. The 32d and 77th regts. are not included, not having yet joined the divisions to which they belong.

I am sorry to say that the young troops have not stood their march very well, although the marches were purposely made very short, and they were never exposed to the sun at a later hour than 8 o'clock. The diseases, however, are very slight, and, with the exception of some few of the Walcheren soldiers, the old soldiers are remarkably healthy.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Sabugal, 8th Aug. 1811.

I have continued to move the troops to their left since I addressed you on the 1st inst., as I did not, till last night, receive any accounts upon which I could depend of the state of the supplies in Ciudad Rodrigo. I

have now reason to believe that a sufficient supply to last the garrison for 2 months was introduced into the place about the 28th July, and the troops which escorted the convoy returned again to the north about the 2d inst.

Gen. Silveira writes on the 28th July, that Bessières' troops, and those under Gen. Santocildes, still maintained the positions which he had reported on the 21st that they occupied respectively; and he says that Bessières has under his command, including the garrisons of Zamora and Toro, not less than 20,000 men. This force is larger than I imagined he could collect, and renders it improbable that I shall be able to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. I observe, also, that the French are collecting large magazines at Vitoria; from which circumstance I should imagine that the reports which they have circulated of the early arrival in Spain of reinforcements have some foundation.

These circumstances, combined with a knowledge which I have obtained, that the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo had received information of our march in that direction, have induced me to continue it, and to take up our cantonments in that neighbourhood. At present I think it more doubtful than it was that I shall be in a situation to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but the movement which I am making may lead to some operation by the enemy which may afford an opportunity of striking an advantageous blow; or, if reinforcements are not expected from France, the enemy may be induced to draw some troops from the eastern coast of the Peninsula, or from the southward, to impede our progress, and thus a seasonable diversion will have been afforded to those of the allies who are at present the most pressed.

In all my considerations upon this subject I don't at all reckon upon the operations of the corps under Santocildes, because I am quite convinced that if the enemy should think it expedient to collect their forces, to fall upon the allied British and Portuguese army, not only they will not be prevented from doing so by any apprehension of the operations of the corps under Gen. Santocildes, but that the operations of that corps are not likely to be of the description to give them any reasonable grounds for uneasiness.

All the movements of Gen. Santocildes, from the moment he would leave the hills of Galicia, would be cramped by his apprehensions of the enemy's cavalry opposed to his undisciplined infantry, and he would probably not be able to get possession even of Salamanca.

I learn that a part of the 5th corps still remained at Zafra on the 2d of this month, and one division only had gone towards the Condado de Niebla.

All accounts agree in stating that Marshal Soult has gone towards Granada.

P.S. I have received a report from Valladolid, stating that Marshal Bessières has returned to France, and that Gen. Dorsenne now commands the troops in the north.

Au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

Au Quartier Général, ce 9 Août, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer une lettre que je viens de recevoir de l'Angleterre, par laquelle votre Excellence verra que M. Ville sur Arce, au sort duquel votre Excellence s'intéressait, a été envoyé en France.

To J. Duff, Esq.

Casillas de Flores, 9th Aug. 1811.

I was in hopes that I should have heard from you after the arrival of the *Minho*, to inform me of your success in procuring for the army some of the money which has arrived in that vessel. I assure you that we were never in such want of money as we are at the present moment; and I hope that you will spare no effort to send us, as soon as possible, the largest supply that can be procured.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Casillas de Flores, 9th Aug. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Sec. of State. I am very apprehensive that there are some symptoms of Buonaparte's coming to Spain, of course with a large reinforcement, notwithstanding that I hear from Salamanca that the report there of a war with Russia was more prevalent than ever.

I write to Duff by this opportunity, to request him to spare no means whatever to increase our supplies of specie; you may depend upon it that every shilling you get for bills upon England, and advance to the Spanish government, is so much out of our military chest. I conceive that we now get every sum which any individual is willing to advance for a bill upon England, excepting those sums which you get, and that we should get these sums likewise, if you did not take them. I don't mean to say, however, it is not as necessary to supply the Spaniards with money at times as it is to supply our own troops, and I have more than once supplied them from our military chest; but still the supply of specie by you at Cadiz diminishes the supply of the military chest of this army.

To Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Aug. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Stuart.

I beg that you will go to the house occupied by Staff Surgeon —, and that you will ascertain whether it is true or not that Mr. — had the door of a room broken open at the —'s, at Coimbra.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Aug. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 6th; and I am concerned to find that the government persist in an erroneous system of taxation, notwithstanding all that we can represent to them upon the subject. However, the government of Brazil being determined to annihilate the influence of the servants of the British government in the concerns of Portugal, it is almost useless to remonstrate; and, in my opinion, you should confine yourself to the limit of telling them individually and privately, that unless they introduce the reforms in all the branches of the administration

G. O.

Casillas de Flores, 9th Aug. 1811.

1. Lieut. Gen. Graham, having joined the army, is to take the command of the 1st division of infantry.

6. The Commander of the Forces requests that whenever a soldier is sent with a letter, the person who sends it will require a receipt for it. He also requests that officers will recollect the cover of a letter is not a receipt; and that by the practice of giving soldiers the covers of letters which they have brought as the evidence to be produced of the delivery, they afford opportunities for neglect of duty, and frauds to conceal the neglect.

which have been recommended to them, they must not expect the increased assistance of Great Britain. This intimation will have, at all events, the effect of strengthening the hands of our friends.

You are quite in the right to adhere strictly to the orders you have received respecting the settlement of the accounts of the subsidy.

I believe there was some mismanagement on the part of the gentlemen who ordered the preparations for the feast at Mafra; but I was intolerably cheated, as will appear when I state that I found the meat, fowls, wine, &c., and the Commissary Gen. carried the things to Mafra for me, and yet the feast, in addition to these, cost me £1200. I referred the bills to the police. I don't know what their decision was; but, as they were certainly exorbitant beyond measure, I determined to defer the payment till it should be perfectly convenient to me. I don't know whether it is yet so, not having had time to look into my accounts; but I should imagine not, as the situation which I fill is not only not a sinecure, but not remarkably well paid. I can't, however, think it any hardship to oblige people to wait for their money who have asked three times at least more than they ought; and, at all events, I can't allow you to incur an inconvenience which I can't at present incur myself. I can certainly pay some of the money, and I shall make Sodré begin the settlement immediately.

I desired Mackenzie to remove my wine from Bandeira's, because Bandeira, after having invited me and all my family to consider his house as our own, and to go there when we pleased without billet, had a breeze with Campbell the other day, because he went to live there without a billet, and was nearly coming to blows in the street. I was very glad to have so good an opportunity of divorcing myself from Bandeira. I desired that a house might be taken for me, in order in some degree to mortify the government and the principal people of Lisbon, and if possible to make them feel a little respecting their conduct about billets. I am slaving like a negro for them: I have saved the people in Lisbon, particularly, from the enemy, and I take nothing from them, while they continually torment me with their frivolous complaints on subjects on which they ought to have no feeling.

I shall not make use of the palace of Bemposta, or of any thing else belonging to the Prince; nor will I lie under any obligation to any Portuguese for my private convenience. I shall pay rent for the house, which I want only to hold my wine, and to receive the officers of my family when they go to Lisbon. I shall not be sorry if the government and principal people of Lisbon know the reason why I take this house; viz., that I will not lay myself under an obligation to any of them.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Aug. 1811.

In consequence of the reports which I received, that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo were in want of provisions, which reports were not contradicted in time, I have brought the army to this quarter sooner than I intended; which circumstance may, I think, injure our enterprise.

I have received your letter of the 6th, but not that of the 1st: every thing appears to me to be going on well, and I should hope that we shall not be materially wrong in our time.

To Major Gen. H. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 12th, in respect to Capt. Boyce's leave. I beg you to show to Capt. Boyce the enclosed letter which I have received from the Horse Guards, upon the numerous applications from the officers of the army for leave of absence, and also to point out to him the inconvenience to his own regiment which must result from his absence at present. I have felt this inconvenience so strongly, that I have sent my own aide de camp, Capt. Canning, to do duty with the regiment.

Under these circumstances, I am under the necessity of declining to give leave of absence to Capt. Boyce; and, even if he should send in his resignation, I can't allow him to quit his regiment till his successor shall be appointed. I am very sorry to be obliged to refuse Capt. Boyce; and I hope that his good sense will point out to him the injury which will result to himself from the step which he states he intends to take. I can only say, that, if any officer is sent from England to relieve Capt. Boyce, he shall have immediately the leave which he solicits.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 8th. The acquittal of the Conde de Sabugal is very extraordinary, his honorable acquittal still more so; as, if I recollect rightly, I sent to the government undoubted proof of his belonging to the '*Légion d'Honneur*,' and of his being an officer in the service of France. Indeed, I have his name in the *Emplacement* of the army as a Lieutenant Colonel. I should think Beresford will not allow him to join any regiment as an officer.

I don't know whether I have the power to depute any person to administer an oath, which I am required by the auditors to administer, or in what form I ought to make out the deputation; but you will do well to make inquiry from the auditors on both points.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 9th, regarding the sending to France the disabled prisoners of war. I can have no objection to their being sent; but, as the French government will in all probability pay no respect to the Portuguese flag of truce, I should recommend that these prisoners should be sent to England, and that you should address the Transport board to have them sent to France by an English flag of truce.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

I enclose a complaint, and the translation of it, which His Majesty's minister at Lisbon has transmitted to me, of the damage done to the barracks at Evora, by the British troops lately stationed there under ———, of the Buffs.

It distresses me much to find that, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken for such a length of time, the troops can't be detached from under the immediate view of their General officers without doing some damage to the buildings in which they may be quartered, or mischief to

some individual. I cannot but attribute the cause which is thus given for these constant complaints to the inattention of the officers of the regiments. I beg that ——— may be called upon to report upon this complaint, and particularly to state whether the G. O. of the 29th May, 1809, were obeyed when the detachment under his command was at Evora; because it appears to me that if they had, these causes for complaint could not have been given.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

I have this day received your letters of the 9th, but not yet that of the 1st, which, however, appears to be very interesting, as you had communicated in it some opinions and wishes respecting roads. I beg you to send me a duplicate of it.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811, 5½ P.M.

I have not sent you instructions regarding your situation at Martiago, because I have not yet been able to acquire all the information which I want regarding the country on the right of the Agueda. It appears to me that you have nothing to apprehend in your front. Don Julian has detachments in Tenebron, Santi-espiritus, and I believe Moras Verdes; and I have this evening desired Murray to request that you would place a detachment of infantry at Las Agallas, and one of cavalry at Monsagro, to observe the roads leading through the Sierra on that side, and to communicate with Capt. Grant, who was at Aldea Nueva de la Sierra yesterday evening: you will do well to communicate with him, and open all letters to me coming from him or others on that side. I would likewise recommend to you to place a party of cavalry at Zamarra, and let them communicate with Don Julian's people, Tenebron, &c., and know all that is going on.

A. G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

1. Hours of departure of the guides and dragoons, at the stations between head quarters and Villa Viçosa:

DAILY.

From Head Quarters . . . 8 A.M.	From Villa Viçosa . . . 8 P.M.
.. Aldea da Ponte . . . 11 Assumar . . . 1½ A.M.
.. Sabugal . . . 2 P.M.	.. Portalegre . . . 3½ ..
.. Penamacor . . . 5½ Niza . . . 7½ ..
.. S. Miguel . . . 9 Villa Velha . . . 10 ..
.. Castello Branco . . . 1 A.M.	.. Castello Branco . . . 2 P.M.
.. Villa Velha . . . 5 S. Miguel . . . 6 ..
.. Niza . . . 7½ Penamacor . . . 9½ ..
.. Portalegre . . . 11½ Sabugal . . . 1 A.M.
.. Assumar . . . 1½ P.M.	.. Aldea da Ponte . . . 4 ..
.. Villa Viçosa . . . 7 Head Quarters . . . 7 ..

The above stations, and hours of daily departure, are published in orders, for the information of the officers commanding the troops on or near the line of communication; but no packet is to be forwarded by this mode of conveyance, nor letters, except to or from the following departments:

Military Secretary.
Adjutant General.

Quarter Master General.
Commissary General.

2. Major Scovell is appointed to superintend all the communications of the army; and the post master sergeants, at head quarters and at Lisbon, will place themselves under his orders, as likewise Senhor Oliveira, the Director of the Portuguese posts. The messengers, likewise, will receive their orders from Major Scovell.

You have nothing to apprehend from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, where there is no cavalry, and only 1500 infantry; you must only observe well the enemy's movements below the mountains, and give me the earliest intelligence of them. I propose, if possible, to keep the troops in their cantonments, and to prevent any thing from getting into Ciudad Rodrigo; and after I shall have completed my reconnoissance on the right of the Agueda, the day after to-morrow, I shall be able to tell whether I shall succeed. It would be impossible to throw the troops permanently across the Agueda.

The 5th division observe Gata, Perales, &c., on your right, and behind you; but you must observe those on your side of Gata. I have ordered Slade's brigade to be relieved by the 1st hussars and the 11th.

P.S. Have you ordered from Gallegos the commissariat stores belonging to your division, which I told you were there?

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 31st July, and I recommend to you to make government acquainted (in a private form) with the circumstances which have come to your knowledge. It appears to me that something is wrong, though what I can't say, as I can't conceive in what manner those most likely to be discontented with the continuance of the war, viz., the landed proprietors, emigrants to Cadiz, can have, or can suppose they have, the power to deliver the place to the enemy by any negotiation of theirs. It is obvious, however, from the intelligence sent from the Puertos, that the French believe they have a chance of obtaining possession of the place; and this intelligence tends to confirm the truth of that which you received of the meetings of the American deputies. These deputies met because they found that there existed an inclination somewhere to submit to the French, which fact is confirmed by the intelligence from the Puertos; and the turn which the deliberation took is natural, and can be accounted for only by the belief that they considered the submission of Cadiz to be probable.

My own opinion is, that several will be inclined to submit to the French as soon as they shall find them in possession of Valencia. Almost all the grandees have estates in Valencia, upon the rents of which they have subsisted since they have been deprived of the estates in the other provinces by the operations of the war, and they will of course feel sorely the loss of these their last means of subsistence; but their influence at Cadiz is not great, much less paramount; and I should think that the merchants and people of that town would not submit on any account. However, you should inform government of what you have heard, and either propose to them some plan of proceeding, in case matters should come to the worst, or desire that they should leave the decision upon the occurrences which may arise to the authorities upon the spot.

I don't understand your meaning in one part of your letter, in which you say that our government will have to decide whether 'to take up the cause of the people, and abandon the government altogether, or continue to support a system which must in the end prove fatal to the cause.' I have always thought that we supported the existing government in

Spain because it was the choice of the people: if that is not the case, we are acting on a very mistaken principle.

I enclose my dispatch of this day.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d July, regarding private ———, of the — regt. This soldier was tried by a General Court Martial, for desertion, on the 14th June, 1810, and was sentenced to be transported, as a felon, for 7 years, and at the end of that period to be at the disposal of His Majesty.

I enclose an extract of the G.O. of this army of the 22d June, 1810, by which it appears that this sentence was confirmed; and, having been published in G. O., it can't be believed that the sentence of the General Court Martial was not made known to the prisoner.

The Dep. Judge Advocate's papers of the year 1810 being at Lisbon, I can't at present show that the proceedings of this General Court Martial were transmitted to the office of the Judge Advocate General; but Capt. Goodman declares that he believes they were, in the same manner as the proceedings in all other trials are; and, although I can't find the copies of the letters written to the Adj. Gen. and to the Commandant of the depôt at the Isle of Wight, I enclose the copy of a letter written on the 19th Sept. 1810, by Major Gen. Stewart to Col. Darroch, respecting ———, — regt., from which it appears that the sentence of the General Court Martial on ——— had been communicated to the Adj. Gen., and to the Commandant of the depôt.

As it is necessary that His Majesty's pleasure should be taken upon sentences of transportation, in order that they may be carried into execution, I have latterly considered it proper to transmit to the Judge Advocate General, to be laid before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, for His Royal Highness' commands, all proceedings of Courts Martial on the trial of soldiers on whom that sentence may have been passed.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

The enemy have made no alteration in the position of their several corps since I addressed you on the 8th inst. The '*Armée de Portugal*' were in the same positions in the valley of the Tagus, and about Plasencia, on the 12th inst.; and the army of the north and the 5th corps on the 8th inst. It appears that Soult has certainly proceeded to Granada with a large body of troops.

I have cantoned the allied army in the country on the sources of the Coa and the Agueda, and between those rivers, in situations from which I can collect them at any point at which it may be desirable. In the mean time the train is moving up the Douro, although but slowly, owing to the difficulties which attend all operations of that description in the Peninsula.

I have received a report that reinforcements, consisting of about 10,000 men, of which 800 were cavalry, were assembled at Bayonne in the last week in July; but I have not yet received any intelligence of their farther progress.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, and the morning state of the troops in the field of the 11th inst. The 32d and 77th regts., and the detachment of the 3d batt. 95th regt., are not yet included in the latter.

I am sorry to observe, however, that there is a diminution of the effective strength of the troops which have marched, to the amount of about 1000 men, in the last three weeks, notwithstanding the care which was taken to move them by short marches. The sickness has fallen principally on the troops lately arrived; but I understand that it is not of much importance.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Sontag, 7th division.

14th Aug. 1811.

In reply to the letters transmitted by Brigade Major Olfermann, relative to the Paymaster of the 51st regt. objecting to carry the stationery chest and books of the Adjutant on the mule allowed by the public to the former, I am directed to acquaint you that, under the regulations, the Paymaster's mule can only be appropriated to his own use, and for the service which his official documents require; and the commanding officer of the regiment cannot call upon him to carry the Adjutant's papers or books, unless it is by his own free consent, when, of course, he must incur at his own expense all risks which the accumulation of burthen may produce on the animal.

The A.G. to the A. A. Gs., 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions.

14th Aug. 1811.

I herewith transmit a return of men of the — division who have been employed as artificers on the works before Lisbon, and who have been sent to the dépôt at Belem for the purpose of joining their regiments, which you will be pleased to notify to the regiments concerned accordingly.

To Major Gen. Dunlop.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811, 8 A.M.

Gen. Craufurd has sent me a report which he has received from Robledillo, stating that a division of the enemy were yesterday marching between Santivañez and Villa de Torre, as they said, on their road towards Gata. It is also reported that there were cavalry marching towards Cilleros. If this intelligence be true, I conceive it can be only a reconnaitring party; but I shall be glad to know whether you have heard any thing of them.

I ordered that hussars might be placed in observation in Gata, Perales, Cilleros, Acebo, San Martin, Villa Miel, and Valverde del Fresno, so that nothing ought to move in that part of the country without your being informed. You should fix upon a bivouac upon the top of each of the passes of Gata, Perales, San Martin, and Valverde, to assemble your troops from their cantonments, in case the enemy should move that way.

To Major Gen. Dunlop.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811, 7 P.M.

I have just received your report of this day, which is very satisfactory. I agree with you that Payo is a most important point; and I would recommend to you to keep as many troops there as you can cover, and probably one battalion in bivouac, which might be relieved occasionally. Of course the troops must not be moved to the heads of the passes till the enemy's designs shall be manifest: probably Payo would be the best alarm post for them all, and the troops to be moved there in the first instance in case of alarm.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of this day. I have Gen. Dunlop's report of the enemy having been at Gata last night with about 1200 men. They left it this morning, and had parties in all the villages at the bottom of the passes of Perales, Acebo, and San Martin, and they were out of all early in the day, excepting San Martin, from whence Dunlop had not heard when he wrote.

To Col. the Hon. E. Capel.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

Gen. Graham gave me your letter of the 28th June some days ago, and I mislaid it by accident, or I should have answered it at an earlier period. When Col. Macdonald went home, an application was made to me by Lord Aylmer, who had been an A. A. G. with this army, to be appointed D. A. G. at Cadiz, and I recommended him to Gen. Graham. In the mean time, however, Gen. Graham had appointed Ponsonby, who was already attached as an assistant to the staff at Cadiz, and Lord Aylmer's appointment did not take place.

Lord Aylmer is now in England for the recovery of his health, and it is possible that he may not return to the Peninsula, or that, if he should return, he may not now wish to go to Cadiz: in either case, as far as I am concerned, nothing would be more satisfactory to me than that you should be appointed D. A. G. at Cadiz; but you must see from what I have stated to you respecting the part which I had taken to procure the appointment for Lord Aylmer, long before you had come out, that it would be impossible for me to interfere in your favor, till it should be decided that Lord Aylmer either could not, or declined to, receive the appointment. I understand that you are now A. A. G., doing the duty of the office at Cadiz; and I recommend you to remain in that situation till we shall see what Lord Aylmer will do.

P.S. Since writing the above I have seen Gen. Graham, from whom I learn that you are not on the staff at Cadiz; and I beg you to let me know whether it would be agreeable to you to be appointed an A. A. G. there, under the circumstances stated in this letter.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 8th inst., for which I am much obliged to you. I shall attend to the enemy's operations towards Cadiz, when he shall direct them to that quarter.

I don't understand that the battalion of German recruits at Cadiz is one to which an officer could get his original commission in His Majesty's service, although being in His Majesty's service he might be appointed to act with it. I shall, therefore, recommend Mr. Fox for a commission in one of the regiments of the line, and it will then be possible to appoint him to do duty with the battalion of German recruits at Cadiz.

Capt. — cannot be appointed a Captain in the army.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

Mr. Kennedy having arrived, I have applied to him for the vouchers and receipts for the provisions delivered to the Portuguese troops, and they

shall be sent to you. I have ordered that £100,000 in paper may be paid into the chest; likewise 100,000 dollars in specie, of a sum which ought to arrive at Lisbon about this time from Cadiz.

You will have observed from my dispatch to government, that I had heard of the reinforcement expected in Spain. I heard of it from my friends in Salamanca; but, as I have invariably found that they diminish the numbers of the enemy in their accounts, I am inclined to believe that the reinforcement consists of the numbers stated to you from Coruña.

I hope to be able to send you, in a day or two, further accounts of the supplies to the Portuguese troops to the 24th June. Mr. Kennedy tells me that the Portuguese government refuse to take from us wheat, barley, or oats, or any of the articles which they are daily purchasing with money in the market of Lisbon. This is a rank job of the *Junta de Viveres*.

I am not in general very suspicious, but I begin to suspect the government of treachery. Nothing can be so fatal to the cause as to distress us for money, and yet all the measures of the government appear to have that sole object in view.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

I enclose a petition which I have received from the keeper of a coffee house at Lisbon, on the subject of a regulation supposed to have been recommended by me, that the coffee houses at Lisbon should be closed at a certain hour every evening.

If this regulation was adopted, and still exists, in consequence of my recommendation, I beg you to represent to the government that I recommended the regulation at a period when the enemy were advancing into the country, and when disturbances were expected in that city. But unless there is a reason to suspect an inclination to disturb the peace of the city, in the disaffected class of the inhabitants under existing circumstances, I see no reason why the regulation should be continued.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letters of the 3d and 8th. All accounts appear to agree in stating the fact that there exists a very bad spirit at Cadiz. Gen. Graham has shown me 2 very impudent publications, one of which, the *noticias*, in the *Seminario* of the 1st Aug., is, I understand, published by an agent of the government.

It is a curious circumstance that I, and not Gen. Castaños, should be blamed for the plunder of Alburquerque, as if it was my business, and not his, to occupy that fort: what makes this abuse still better is, that I urged him repeatedly to occupy this place, in which he had his hospitals. As for the French expedition to Alburquerque, you will see the account of it in my dispatch to the Sec. of State of the 11th July. They were at Alburquerque one evening; and, unless I had extended my posts to that town, I could not have prevented what happened, and this extension did not suit my plan at the time. Besides this answer to the abuse, I have another to give, which is, that when I enter Spain, I quit my magazines, and my troops and their horses starve. Will the government or Gen. Castaños set this to rights? Even Cocks' parties of observation, which

saw the French enter Alburquerque, found it difficult to subsist so far from the magazines. What would the army itself have found?

I agree with the Spanish government, that it would be very desirable to them that we should be bound by certain stipulations to perform certain operations for them, which they cannot, or will not, perform for themselves; but, in general, there are two sides to a bargain or contract of this description; and it would be very desirable that the Spanish government, who will be one side in this contract, should state which part they will perform in any one operation which can be undertaken. When they come forward with a statement of this description, which will satisfy my mind, and in which I can have confidence, the government will not find me backward in engaging myself in any operation.

I am obliged to you for the pains you have taken about our money. I approve highly of Green's proposition to have supplies of arms, ammunition, provisions, and corn, in the ships of war on the coast of Catalonia, for the use of the Spanish armies there. Green appears an intelligent fellow; and I shall begin now to read with some interest the accounts of the war in that quarter. I return his and Doyle's letter.

P.S. Just to show you the kind of people the Spaniards are to deal with, I mention that I can't station even a corporal's party, or send a patrol, into the Sierra de Gata, or the Sierra de Francia, without giving the corporal money to pay for rations for the horses and men of his party, while the French take every thing in the same districts for nothing. The inconvenience does not consist in paying for these articles, for which I am willing to pay, but in being obliged to make every corporal who goes with a patrol a purchasing Commissary.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

I have received an application from Capt. L. Ruman, of the 97th regt., who has been for some time employed within the Spanish territory with Lieut. Col. Fraga, in obtaining intelligence of the enemy's movements for the Marques de la Romana, Castaños, and myself, that I should request the Spanish government to appoint him a Lieutenant Colonel in the Spanish army. I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay this request before the Spanish government; and I assure you that they can't promote a more deserving officer, or one who has rendered more important services to the cause than he has.

In general, I have objected to the grant of rank in the Spanish army to British officers; but in this instance it is really a duty to promote the wish of Capt. Ruman to receive this mark of distinction from the Spanish government.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

I enclose some letters on the claim of the acting Adj. Harvey, of the 66th regt., to receive the pay of that appointment during the period that he has been doing the duty for the Adjutant, who has been absent since the year 1809, on account of his health.

I conceive that it is not intended that the officers of the general Staff of the army, or those attached to regiments, shall have leave of absence,

excepting on account of their health; and it remains a question how long they shall be entitled to their pay, when their bad health requires that they should be absent from their duty. I have established a rule in this army, that any officer of the general Staff, absent from this country for more than 2 months for the recovery of his health, shall forfeit his Staff pay, unless his bad health shall have been occasioned by wounds received in the service; but I don't conceive that I have authority to extend the operation of this rule to the regimental Staff.

It would be desirable, however, that some general rule should be made upon this subject, and that it should be clearly understood how long an officer on the staff of a regiment may be absent, and continue to receive his staff pay.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th Aug. 1811.

I have at last received your letter of the 1st Aug.; and I have desired Gen. Murray to have the road repaired which leads down to, and up from, the ford of the Coa, immediately above the bridge of Almeida. I have no objection to your avoiding Trancoso entirely, and proceeding by any other route that you may prefer. You will in this case fix upon the place for the first depôt on that road, letting me know which it is, and giving information to the Commissary Gen.'s officers, in order that they may collect there the necessary provision of forage, &c.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th Aug. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 12th. I think the 24th regt. should be in the brigade with the 13th and the 5th caçadores. I propose to move these last towards the lower parts of the Coa, in order to be nearer the Portuguese magazines on the Douro. I don't think it would answer to relieve the 20th regt. by any thing but a good and well disciplined one. I don't know what can be done respecting the 22d regt., excepting that the government should render the law more efficient in respect to the discovery and punishment of desertion. I am concerned to find that the government still go on so slowly.

Our train is moving up gradually, though I much fear that I shall not be able to accomplish my object; particularly if it be true that 17,000 men have entered Spain lately. It is as well, however, to be in some degree prepared to undertake it, if circumstances should favor its accomplishment.

P.S. I believe we shall want the assistance of some Portuguese artillery, besides the artillery with the several brigades, for the siege, and it would be desirable that you should send 200 or 300 to the army. I propose to attach a 9 pounder brigade to the 6th division, so that the 6 pounder short brigade with them may be put down.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th Aug. 1811.

Having lately made an arrangement for the better conducting of our military posts, my attention has been drawn in a very particular manner to the enormous expense which we are incurring on this head every month for the Portuguese government.

The post office is a branch of the civil government, from which, in

every well regulated country, the government derive a revenue, of course after defraying all the charges attending upon it; and the Portuguese government, as well as others, enjoy this revenue. One of the charges against this profit was, I believe, peculiar to this country. The government not only engaged to pay the usual price for the use of the post mules to transport their posts and messengers, but likewise half a dollar a day for each mule, to the number of 6 kept at each post stage. It is true, that they never performed the engagement above referred to; and the only profit the keepers of post horses derived was from the hire of their horses or mules to carry the messengers or the mails. Before the last French invasion we paid, for any extraordinary post which the service of the armies required, only the expense of the hire of the post mules which carried it; and I understand that the keepers of post mules were perfectly satisfied with this payment, as well on account of its regularity as because the constant daily employment of the mules afforded means to subsist them, and sufficient profit to replace any that might have been worn out in the service.

Since the French invasion, however, circumstances have altered; and, although the British government derive no profit from the post, we have incurred enormous expenses on this account. 1st; While the head quarters were at Cartaxo the Commissary Gen. of the British army was obliged to supply with rations all the mules and postilions posted on the road from Lisbon to that place, besides paying the hire of the mules for the carriage of our messengers and posts. 2dly; Since the French have retired from Portugal, the Commissary Gen. of the British army has supplied with rations all the mules and postilions on all the roads leading to the army, on which that mode of communication has been established, besides paying the expense of their hire for our messengers and posts.

The expense of these rations is enormous, and at all events, ought not to fall upon the British government; and, in my opinion, we do a great deal when we pay the expense of any particular line, or of more frequent communication which the military operations for the defence of Portugal may render necessary.

When the British government sent an army to this country to aid in its defence, and gave Portugal a subsidy, it did not contemplate the possibility that it was not to have the use of the ordinary establishments of the country, or that the expense of the maintenance of those establishments was to be paid out of the military chest, while all the profits resulting from them were to go to the Portuguese government: my opinion, therefore, is, that the expense of these rations is properly a charge against the Portuguese government.

When first the French retired, it may have been necessary to give rations to the mules and postilions established at the several post stages, and the same necessity may still exist in some parts of the country; but it is still desirable to revert to the old system as soon as possible. Accordingly, I have this day directed, that wherever it may be possible, half a dollar a day for each mule kept at each post stage in all the military communications may be given instead of rations, which will of course be

charged against the Portuguese government; and besides that we shall pay, for our couriers and extra posts, the usual hire of the mules.

I beg you to inquire from the Portuguese government, whether this arrangement is satisfactory to them. If it should not be so, I beg them to take care that the post mules are established and kept up as usual on the roads; and I will use them as before the late French invasion, paying the usual hire for those which I use.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Aug. 1811.

I heard of the misfortune which occurred to one of your brigades of mules; but I hope it is not so extensive as you imagine. The Commissary Gen. will remedy it. I don't know how they came to pass by San Martin, and it is still more difficult to account for the surprise of our piquet there; but I understand that the whole party, German, English, Spaniards, and muleteers, were looking at a procession when the French entered the town. It is very unfortunate that the cavalry, whom I had ordered to Gata, were not sent to that place; if they had been, this misfortune would not have occurred, and I should have known of the enemy's being at Gata sufficiently early to attempt something upon them.

I heard last night (but not from good authority) of a party being collected at Granadilla, probably for another reconnoissance.

I am going over to Sexmiro this morning, in order to look at the country on the other side of Ciudad Rodrigo, and I shall not be back till tomorrow; but, if any thing comes near enough to you to enable you to strike a blow without incurring much risk, I wish you would do it.

You see, by Grant's account of the 16th, how the last reconnoissance got off: I think the next would be directed more towards Escarigo. It is not impossible but that they might wish to open a communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; in which case, I mean to assemble the army about Pedro de Toro, and you might collect your division at once at Zamarra, and be in readiness to fall upon any thing not too large for you, which should attempt to cross the plain. I consider Monsagro to be a point at which you ought to have an intelligent officer, who would be able to give you information of all that passes in the Sierra on that side.

P.S. I had a report from Sir S. Cotton yesterday, that there was a squadron of hussars at Ciudad Rodrigo. I rather believe that he must have mistaken Don Julian's people for Frenchmen: Don Julian's people are about the place in all directions; and I heard from the town yesterday, that there was no cavalry there.

To ———, — regt.

Sexmiro, 18th Aug. 1811.

Major Gen. Campbell has informed me that he had placed you in arrest, on charges, copies of which will be transmitted to you in the usual course by the Adj. Gen.; and he has communicated to me a correspondence which has passed, upon which he has founded those charges. I am very desirous, if possible, to prevent these charges coming under the consideration of a General Court Martial; and as it appears to me that you have not considered the subject in its true light, I trouble you with this letter, and I send it direct to yourself, because your commanding officer is the other

party in the question, and I am desirous to avoid influencing the final decision by a Court Martial, by any opinion of mine, in case I should not succeed in convincing you that you have taken a mistaken view of your case.

It appears that you imagine that you have reason to complain of an order issued by your Commanding officer, Major Gen. Campbell, and you have remonstrated upon this order. I put out of the question, for the present, the consideration of the justice and the injustice of this order; or whether you had ground, or otherwise, to remonstrate, as bearing in no manner upon the case. It is obvious that if you address your superior officer upon any subject, you must make use of respectful terms, and must avoid the use of those which are offensive. This necessity exists in the common intercourse of life, in which nothing offensive is tolerated, either by the rules of society or by the law; much less is any thing offensive allowed in the intercourse among military men, particularly in the communications of an officer, of whatever rank, to his Commanding officer. I observe that in your letter of the 9th Aug., addressed to the A. A. G., you state that from the papers you transmitted, 'it must appear that the orders of that day, as applicable to the regiment and yourself, are *totally destitute of foundation*;' that it is '*proved that it is the reverse of what has been stated*;' and that, if allowed to remain on record, it will be a *gross injustice to yourself* and the regiment. You sent the letter containing these expressions, notwithstanding that the A. A. G. and Major Gen. Burne had refused to forward it to the Major Gen., because it contained offensive expressions.

I believe it will be admitted that the use of such expressions would not be tolerated in private life; nay, the law would protect any individual from them, whatever might be the ground afforded for the use of them; much less can the use of them be allowed from an officer to his superior, upon an order issued by such superior. I would also observe, that the use of these expressions was entirely unnecessary for the purpose of your remonstrance: your legitimate object in that remonstrance was to show Major Gen. Campbell that he was mistaken, and that his order ought not to have referred to the — regt.; you were to effect this object by the papers which you enclosed; and to add your comments upon these papers was not necessary for your purpose: but when those comments were conveyed in offensive terms, it would appear that they were added only for the purpose of offending. On this ground I am most anxious that you should not appear before a General Court Martial on such a subject. The discussion of it cannot lead to any good effect, whatever may be the result; and if the General Court Martial should view it in the light which I do, in concurrence with the opinion of Major Gen. Burne, and of the A. A. G., you will be in a situation in which I shall be concerned to see any officer of your rank. I request you, therefore, to reconsider the subject, on the ground on which I have placed it; and I assure you that nothing will give me more satisfaction than to have succeeded in prevailing upon you to recall expressions which nothing should have provoked you to use to your Commanding officer.

P.S. Since writing the above Major Gen. Stewart has brought me the

papers which you had sent to him, which, as I have above informed you, I had already seen.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Sexmiro, 18th Aug. 1811.

I have received your two letters of the 13th. The delays of the Portuguese government are most provoking. I must again draw the attention of our government to their conduct. It appears to me that we have lost all influence over them.

The clothing for 30,000 men, and arms, sent to Portugal, are in addition to the subsidy, and must not be charged against it.

I concur entirely with you regarding the persons chosen to compose the committee at Lisbon. I don't know Dr. Bonifacio, but I dare say he is a proper person; the others certainly are so.

I don't know how you are to get money for the purposes proposed. However, that is never thought of in England.

To Major Gen. Dunlop.

Fuente Guinaldo, 19th Aug. 1811.

I understand that there was, on the 16th, a French officer of the 47th regt. prisoner in Acebo, whom the magistrates were inclined to set at liberty. I beg that, as soon as possible after you shall receive this, you will send a patrol into Acebo, and demand this French officer, and send him and the magistrates of the town to me. If he should be gone, send the magistrates of the town.

P.S. I enclose a letter from Gen. Alava to the magistrates.

To Lieut. Col. Framingham, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th Aug. 1811.

I request you to order Lieut. Col. Fisher to deliver to the Spanish Ambassador at Lisbon 2000 stands of arms, for Col. Downie's Estremadura legion, which are to be forwarded to the orders of Gen. Castaños; likewise 1200 stands of arms for the regiment *La Princesa*; and 2000 stands of arms for the use of new levies in Castille. These two last mentioned 1200 and 2000 stands are to be delivered to the orders of Major Gen. Don Carlos de España.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th Aug. 1811.

I enclose a copy of a report which I received from Fletcher, respecting the present state of Almeida. It would be really worth while to have the men collected, and that done which he recommends.

To Gen. Abadia.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th Aug. 1811.

This letter will be delivered to you by Col. Sir H. Douglas, who has been appointed by the British government to reside in Galicia, and to communicate such matters, for the information of H.R.H. the Prince Regent, as it may be interesting for His Royal Highness to know; and to deliver to your Excellency such supplies of arms, &c., as the British government may have it in their power to forward to you. I beg leave to recommend Sir H. Douglas to your attention.

To Lieut. Gen. Calvert, A. G. to the Forces.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the , and I am very much obliged to H.R.H. the Duke of Kent for the trouble which he has taken to remove from my mind the uneasiness which I felt, under the notion that His Royal Highness believed that I could do otherwise than forward his views, in respect to his regiment, by every means in my power. I shall be much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of stating to His Royal Highness how sensible I am of his graciousness.

To the Officer commg. the Artillery, Lamego.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

I have received a letter from Mr. Pipon, informing me of the illness of Major Dickson, of the artillery; and I have now to request that you will have the ordnance and stores brought up to Lamego, and that you will remain there till Brigade Major May shall arrive with my further orders.

I beg to hear from you what progress has been made in the operation of the removal of the ordnance and stores from the boats to Lamego.

To Major Gen. Dunlop.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811, 3 P.M.

I request you to send to Acebo a patrolle; and to send here, to wait upon Gen. Alava, Don Josef Almazara, *Commandante del Rey* of Plasencia, who is established there. You had better send a few infantry with the party, lest this gentleman should think of resistance.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

I have directed that —— may be sent back to Lisbon; and I beg that after his arrival there he may be sent to England by the first opportunity that may offer.

I enclose the duplicate of a letter to the Sec. of State regarding this person, and I beg that you will give it to the Captain of the ship in which he shall sail, and request him to send it to the Sec. of State, from the port at which he will land, informing the Sec. of State at the same time that he is landed.

I beg you to have him comfortably accommodated on his passage, and that you will give the Captain of the ship £10, to be given to him when he shall be put on shore in England.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

I have written a long letter to the Portuguese government, to endeavor

G. O

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

3. All the private men of the 2d batt. 28th regt. are to be drafted into the 1st batt., excepting those invalided on Belem duty, who are to remain on the strength of the 2d batt.

4. The transfer is to be made as soon as it may be convenient, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for their men up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt., to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order.

5. When the transfer shall be made, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batt. 28th regt. are to proceed to Lisbon, where they will receive further orders.

6. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to part with Lieut. Col. Abercrombie and the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 28th regt., with whose services he has had every reason to be satisfied, and he hopes he shall have the benefit of their assistance again, in renewed strength.

to prevail upon them to adopt the arrangements for the conduct of the civil departments of the army recommended to them.

I shall send you in a day or two the accounts of our demands to the 24th June. They will amount to above £80,000; and besides this there is a demand for above 400,000 dollars, for provisions for the 20th regt. To this add £100,000 in paper, and 100,000 dollars in specie, which I ordered to be paid to the chest the other day, and it will turn out that the subsidy is pretty well in advance according to my account.

You will have heard that — is arrived at Lisbon, and by all accounts he appears to be 'a liar of the first magnitude.'

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th July. Since I wrote to you in June, Sydenham has been at head quarters, where, with his usual ability, he acquired a great deal of information upon many points, which will be very useful to the government in England. While he was with me I arranged all the details of a system for all the departments of the Portuguese army, and he and Beresford went to Lisbon in the end of June, to endeavor to prevail upon the government to carry them into execution. Beresford has been there ever since, and nothing is yet done.

In the mean time the Portuguese revenue has increased so much, that in the month of July it realised more than £300,000 sterling, so that there is no longer the excuse of want of money; and yet commissariat matters go on so ill that I have been obliged to send 4000 troops to the rear, because they can get no food in a forward position; and these are the only troops they have to feed with this part of the army. I have written a remonstrance to the Portuguese government upon the subject, of which I will send a copy to England.

I think that you have done well to send Mr. Bissett out to see what the nature of the duties of the Commissary Gen. is, before he undertakes to perform them; but I anxiously hope that Mr. Kennedy will not leave us. In promoting Mr. Bissett, you have put him over the head of Mr. —, who is with this army. I have tried Mr. —, and he certainly was not, and, I should think, is not, fit to be Commissary Gen. to such an army as this; but he is a very meritorious public servant, and has performed his duty very much to the satisfaction of Mr. Kennedy, and I have no doubt would be equal to the management, as Commissary Gen., of a concern on a smaller scale, which should be attended with less difficulty than is experienced in this. I am apprehensive that he will be a little annoyed that Mr. Bissett is put over his head; and probably you might be induced to promote him likewise, as he really deserves it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

Sir H. Douglas arrived here 2 days ago; and, having had a conversation with him, he has set out for Galicia, through the northern provinces of Portugal.

At his desire I have permitted Capt. Douglas, of the 51st regt., to accompany him; and I enclose to your Lordship a letter which I have received from Sir H. Douglas, in which he requests me to give a staff

allowance to Capt. Douglas, upon which I request to have your Lordship's commands.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

I beg to recommend that 15,000 sets of accoutrements may be sent to Lisbon, in order to enable me to supply the Spanish levies with accoutrements from time to time. I have in the stores at Lisbon about 15,000 stands of arms, but no accoutrements now remaining.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

I received information from Major Gen. Peacocke some time ago, that a British subject, by the name of — —, was confined at Lisbon, by order of the Portuguese government, on suspicion of being a spy; and, upon a perusal of the report of his examination and of the letters he had written, having been of opinion that there was some foundation for the suspicion, I requested the Portuguese government to deliver this person over to me, in order that I might examine him. They readily complied with this request, and — — was brought to head quarters in charge of the Provost Marshal; and, having had two conversations with him, he appears to me to be able to give but a very unsatisfactory account of the motives for which he came to this country, where he knows nobody; and his account of his former life in England is by no means consistent. I have therefore deemed it best to send — — back to Lisbon, and to direct Major Gen. Peacocke to send him to England by the first opportunity that will offer after he shall reach Lisbon.

Since the works between the Tagus and the sea were commenced I have directed that they should not be inspected by any body, from a desire to prevent not only a description, but a plan of them from being given to the public and to the enemy. — — was found near the works at Alhandra, and had questioned the peasants in the neighbourhood respecting the number and calibre of the guns in them, the number of men, &c. &c.; and he was arrested by the guards of the Ordenanza, stationed in the works.

In his examination before the magistrates of Lisbon and by me, he stated that he had come to Portugal with a view of serving in the German hussars; and it appeared that the ship in which he said he had come had returned to England, and he knew nobody at Lisbon.

From the terms in which he addressed Major Gen. Peacocke I was inclined to believe that he had been in the French service, and that he intended to enlist into the hussars, in the belief that he would be able to desert from that corps with the intelligence which he should have procured more easily than from a British regiment; but, on examining him, I did not find any cause to confirm the suspicion that — — had been a soldier. But as he had no business in Portugal, and could not give a satisfactory account of himself, I thought it best to send him to England.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Aug. 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 14th inst. I have received from different quarters reports of the movement of reinforcements into Spain, the num-

bers of which have been stated to be from 14,000 to 24,000 men. The accounts which appear most deserving attention state that a *corps de réserve*, amounting to 24,000 men, is to be formed in the northern part of Castille, consisting principally of battalions belonging to regiments already in Spain, filled with recruits of the late conscription. But, besides these battalions, I have reason to believe that some of the old troops are coming into Spain. The 5th light infantry in particular, which were at Cherbourg, are, I know, upon their march into the Peninsula; and this circumstance will serve to show that the collection of troops in the camp of Boulogne has the same object in view as the formation of an army of reserve in the north of Castille, viz., to form the newly raised conscripts. If the collection at Boulogne had any other object in view, the 5th light infantry would not have been brought from Cherbourg into Spain. I have not heard how far the reinforcements have advanced into Spain; but they had not reached Valladolid on the 15th inst.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th. On that evening a detachment, consisting of about 1200 infantry and cavalry, arrived at Gata, which is on the south side of the mountains which separate Castille from Estremadura, and on the following morning they surprised a small piquet in San Martin de Trebejo, under Lieut. Wood, of the 11th light dragoons, whom they made prisoner, with 10 men, and went off that evening to Moraleja, and on the next morning to Monte Hermoso.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' have nearly exhausted that part of Estremadura in which they are now stationed, and it is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the miseries which they have inflicted upon the people of the country, there is no resource or service which they require from the inhabitants that is not instantly afforded. Such is the effect of the terror which they have inspired, that they draw resources even from some of the villages in which the guerrillas are stationed.* I have, however, no doubt of the attachment of these people to the cause of their country.

There is no doubt of the enemy being much distressed for want of money. I have reports from all quarters that the troops have not been paid for several months, and their departments are much distressed. They endeavor to relieve this distress by levying contributions on the country in every manner that can be devised. But the relief to be obtained in this manner is trifling; and the Spaniards will at last learn, from the repeated oppressions of the enemy, that their only chance is determined resistance or flight.

I have not heard of any movements by the troops in the north, or in the south, since I last addressed your Lordship.

To Major Grey,† 5th Foot.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811.

There are two modes in which officers have been permitted to serve in the Portuguese army: 24 officers obtained one step of promotion in the British army, in which they are considered as unattached officers, not

* See Appendix, No. VII.

† Major Gen. Sir J. Grey, K.C.B. He had been a subaltern in the 33d regt. when Lord Wellington commanded it. He commanded a detachment of the army of Bengal at the battle fought at Punniar, near Gwalior, on the 29th Dec. 1843, and was made K.C.B.

having a regimental commission, and these are doing duty in the Portuguese regiments, with one step of Portuguese rank senior to that which they hold in the British service.

Officers belonging to British regiments, principally with this army, we allow to enter the Portuguese service, still holding their commissions in their regiments in the British service: these obtain no step of British rank on entering the Portuguese service, but they obtain one step of Portuguese rank; that is, a British Major is made a Lieutenant Colonel of a Portuguese regiment, still continuing Major of his regiment in the British army; but as long as he holds his Portuguese commission he will command all Lieutenant Colonels appointed after he shall have been appointed.

Since March, 1809, when the 24 officers first referred to were appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, and promoted, the officers selected to fill vacancies among those 24, and to receive one step of British rank, have been taken from among those serving with the Portuguese army, of the other description who had not received British rank upon entering the Portuguese service.

From this statement you will see that Marshal Beresford can't recommend that you should be made a British Lieutenant Colonel upon entering the Portuguese service. You will be a Portuguese Lieutenant Colonel; and if there should be a vacancy in the 24, you will have the same claim with others of being promoted, more particularly if fortune should favor you by giving you an opportunity of distinguishing yourself.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811, 9 a.m.

I am much obliged to you for the information contained in your letter of yesterday. There are certainly not more than from 10 to 20 cavalry in Ciudad Rodrigo. I have written in Bell's* favor, and I will repeat my recommendation of him. We have accounts of reinforcements having arrived in Spain, the head of them at Valladolid.

Au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

Au Quartier Général, ce 22 Août, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence le reçu de M. Ville sur Arce pour l'argent que vous lui avez envoyé.

J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 13 Août, et je vous suis bien obligé d'avoir renvoyé M. le Lieut. Mackworth. J'ai écrit en Angleterre pour faire renvoyer en France sur parole M. le Capitaine d'artillerie, Gravelle; et je suis bien aise de pouvoir faire quelque chose qui vous soit agréable.

Je vous propose de faire l'échange de cet officier pour le Capitaine Lutyens, 11^{me} régt. de dragons; et je vous prie de nommer un officier du grade de Lieutenant que je pourrais renvoyer en échange pour M. le Lieut. Mackworth.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811.

I enclose a letter for Marmont, which I beg you to forward to Badajoz as soon as you can. I likewise enclose Marmont's letter to me, from

* See note at p. 13.

which you will observe that Mr. Mackworth is not exchanged, but only allowed to come in upon his parole; but if Marmont does not name an officer to be exchanged for him, in answer to my letter, I shall send one in, and will give Lieut. Mackworth his cartel.

I have lately made an alteration in the system of our ordnance; and I propose to have with each division of infantry one heavy brigade of 6 pounders, or one brigade of 9 pounders, and to have no artillery in reserve, excepting with the infantry and the Portuguese artillery. You have with the 2d division 2 brigades, one of heavy 6 pounders, and one of 9 pounders; and I wish you would keep which you choose, and send the other across the Tagus to join the 5th division. Murray will send the route for it.

There is in Gen. Howard's brigade a company of the 3d batt. 95th regt., which Sir B. Spencer detained last year, as the regiment was his: I wish this company to join its battalion, and that one of the companies of the 60th, in the brigade with the Buffs, &c., should be in Gen. Howard's brigade; this brigade, having the 71st in it, requires light infantry less than any of the others.

The company of the 95th may move with the guns.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 17th. I agree with you, that you ought to recommend an officer in the room of M'Mahon; but I am afraid it ought to be —, instead of * * * *. — is the senior of the two in the same brigade, and although * * * * is undoubtedly the best and the most deserving, — has by accident been the most distinguished; and it will increase the bitterness of the pill which has already been administered to him in too great a degree if * * * * should be preferred to him, the claims of both being grounded on services performed while both were in the same brigade. There is time for you to consider this suggestion before the post goes next week, and I therefore make it to you; but if you should still prefer * * * *, I will of course recommend him.

In my opinion there are no officers who deserve promotion better than Carroll, Whittingham, and Roche. It was a job originally to place them among the 24 destined to discipline the Portuguese army; for I believe they could not get them promoted to the rank of Major in any other manner: but, having been placed in that situation, there are no officers who have led such a life as they have, particularly Carroll. However, I think that Hill, or Doyle, Le Mesurier, and Campbell, have claims likewise; and I have no objection to bring them forward: but I think it better not to say any thing against the promotion of the other three. I have taken the opportunity of Pack's wants to write a letter to the government about the delay of the arrangements, which I hope will have some effect.

Mr. Stuart informed me that Redondo and Forjaz are inclined to refer their dispute to me; if they do, I shall decide upon it by return of post.

I sent you Fletcher's opinion about Almeida. If the masons and people are assembled for the work proposed by Fletcher, I shall send him an

English engineer over to have it executed : it is an inconvenience of the first magnitude not having that place in order.

You will hear that the French are getting in reinforcements, and they appear to threaten Galicia. My position here, however, must keep them in check ; at the same time that they must prevent the execution of the design which brought me here : that I can't help, and I shall not be dissatisfied if I can save Galicia. In the mean time, although I scarcely hope that I shall be able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, I allow the train to come on as far as the neighbourhood of Trancoso, in case the French should enter Galicia, that I may be in a situation to proceed at once, and vigorously, with the siege. As for Marmont, I think I am more than a match for him singly ; but not if he has 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry upon the Duero to join him, of which number the northern army now consists. From this statement you will see what a convenience it would be to have Almeida in a state of security.

If I find that the troops move forward from Rio Seco, I shall order Silveira to collect his forces.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811.

I quite agree in opinion with you regarding the military chest. It should be entirely under the control of the General, or of the minister in the war department : I rather believe of the latter ; at the same time, that the heads of departments who receive funds from the military chest should be accountable in the usual manner to the department of finance. But when the parties shall refer their dispute to me, I shall draw a memorandum upon the subject, which will settle the mode in which the business shall be conducted.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 11th. We have in the British stores at Lisbon no planks for gun and mortar platforms, nor any of the articles which you require, which are not wanted for the service of the army ; and I believe that they can't be procured at Lisbon at a cheaper rate than you can procure them at Cadiz : but I recommend you to send to England a regular requisition for every article of store that you require.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Aug. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. Since I wrote it I have heard that about 5000 or 6000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry, have arrived at Valladolid ; these are said to be the garrison of Pamplona, &c., who have been replaced by the lately arrived reinforcements. The French appear to threaten Galicia ; but it is said that, hearing of our position here, they are about to detach to Salamanca. It will be impossible for me to attack Ciudad Rodrigo while this large army shall remain on the Duero, and another on the other flank at Plasencia : but I shall not be dissatisfied if by our position we shall save Galicia ; and I don't propose to give up all thoughts of attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should be possible.

It is again said that Soult is not gone from Seville, and I should be glad to hear from you on that subject. I believe he is gone.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Aug. 1811.

I don't want to renew the discussion of the other day ; but I enclose the account of the cause of the issues to the Royal dragoons since the 1st Aug., at the head quarters only, without counting what they had picked up at the out quarters. This quantity is very insufficient, and I hope such deficiencies will not occur again ; but there is some difference between this account and that of 15 lbs. in 15 days given by Slade.

When supplies are deficient, there is a loose way of talking of them, which may be very excusable ; but it should not be taken for an official report.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Aug. 1811.

Just after you went away, Mr. Kennedy brought the enclosed returns, which revived me a little ; from which it appears that, since the date of your returns, the 16th has been supplied, and have in hand to the 25th.

However, the 100 mules which left Loza the 22d can't be back till the 27th or 28th at soonest ; and I am afraid that, unless they manage their stock now in hand, they will be again without for a day or two.

À Don Carlos de España.

À Fuente Guinaldo, ce 23 Août, 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 22. Je ne pourrais pas, sans grand inconvénient, étendre mes postes à Ledesma, malgré que ce point soit important. Je vous conseille de ne rien risquer pour le maintenir ; à moins que les Français ne se renforcent considérablement sur le Tormes, je ne crois pas qu'ils s'établissent à Ledesma ; mais il y a une grande différence entre s'établir dans un poste et y laisser s'établir la force ennemie. Ainsi malgré qu'ils n'y resteront pas à moins que les renforts ne viennent sur le Tormes, ils pourront bien tâcher d'en chasser les troupes de Don Julian, et si vous trouvez qu'ils en ont le dessein je vous conseille de les en retirer.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Aug. 1811.

I have received Dom M. Forjaz's letter and the enclosures respecting the military chest, to which the answer is written, and will go this night, if M. Sodré can translate the papers in time.

I observed that one of the proposals in the Conde de Redondo's plan is that we should begin a new account of the subsidy from the 1st Oct. ; and that all arrears or debts previous to that time shall be settled hereafter ; how, is not stated. I have taken no notice of this article in my observations, excepting that the regulation thereof has nothing to do with the formation of the military chest ; but I recommend to you to take notice of it, and not to increase the Portuguese debt, at least till the 1st Oct.

I have desired Mr. Kennedy to pay to the chest 100,000 dollars in specie of a sum lately arrived from Cadiz, which is 200,000 dollars in specie, and £100,000 in paper, which I have ordered to be paid to the chest within these last 8 days ; and I intend to give another 100,000 dollars in specie of a sum which I expect from Cadiz in the end of the month..

P.S. I enclose the accounts of issues to the Portuguese troops to the

24th June, and the accounts of issues to the regiment at Cadiz, amounting to £163,800.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 24th Aug. 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Picton, regarding Champelmond, to which I beg to draw your attention. It states generally the purport of a conversation which I had with him the day before yesterday on the same subject, with this addition, that I told him I believed I was the cause of Champelmond's disgrace, by having reported to you the manner in which the sick of his brigade were sent from Nave d'Aver in the commencement of the month of May. In answer, he told me that Champelmond had brought to punishment the officer and Surgeon who had gone in charge of these sick; and he then mentioned that he had ordered Champelmond off the field on the 3d May, in consequence of his being entirely unfit for duty from sickness. All this being the case, you will probably think him worthy of being promoted to be a Brigadier General.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 24th Aug. 1811.

M. Sodré has finished the translation of my papers on the military chest; but, as I cannot tell whether the translation accurately explains my meaning, I send you the original drafts, which I beg you will return to me as soon as you shall have done with them; if there should be any doubt, you can explain my meaning from these papers.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 24th Aug. 1811.

I forward a letter and its enclosure which I have received from the officer who commands at the hospital station at Coimbra.

I am inclined to believe that — must have made a mistake, and that she intended to make the complaint of * * * * which she has made of † † † †. * * * * is in the Portuguese army. If, however, she should be of opinion that she has any reason to complain of † † † †'s conduct, I shall have him put in arrest, and shall bring him to trial before a General Court Martial, if she will order the witnesses to attend it.

I have likewise the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. Gen. Hill, with a report from Lieut. Col. Stewart, who commanded the troops lately occupying the barracks at Evora, on the damages stated to have been done to those barracks.

It is very desirable that some means should be adopted of verifying these complaints. It is obvious that this complaint is much exaggerated, if not entirely destitute of foundation; and, at all events, Lieut. Col. Stewart having manifested an inclination to attend to any complaints made of the conduct of the troops, it appears that it would have been more friendly if the magistrates or barrack master at Evora had complained in the first instance to that officer, instead of to the Sec. of State.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 24th Aug. 1811.

Having received the directions of the Sec. of State to pay to —, late of the Lusitanian Legion, certain allowances from the 29th June, 1808 to the 23d Feb. 1809, I beg that you will ascertain for me

whether any allowances had been issued by the Portuguese government to the Lusitanian Legion during that period.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th Aug. 1811.

I wish that you would speak to Dom M. Forjaz about the practice which prevails of publishing, in the Lisbon newspapers, the intelligence received from Salamanca by Gen. Silveira, and forwarded by him to the Portuguese government, from which papers it is copied in the English newspapers. Our correspondents there will certainly be discovered if this practice is continued. Indeed they will be lucky if their own indiscretion does not bring some of them to the gallows.

What do you think of one of them going to Ledesma the other day and dining with Don Carlos de España and Don Julian, which was known publicly, and talked of at Salamanca; and, having escaped hanging upon that occasion, they wanted to have a meeting with Alava and O'Lawlor!!! However, they are so very useful to us, that we should take care that they are not discovered by our means. You may depend upon it that if this intelligence from Salamanca, as published in our newspapers, is observed in Paris, and it becomes an object to discover who gives it, our friends will be discovered and hanged.

I think that Marmont is about to move;*and if he approaches us alone, or not sufficiently supported, I should not be surprised if we were to come to blows in a few days. However, it is not to be expected that he will approach us, excepting in great strength, as they are very strong upon the Duero.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th Aug. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose to you an extract of a letter of the 14th Aug., which has been transmitted to me by Marshal Sir W. Beresford; from one paragraph of which it appears that the Portuguese government has decided a question respecting recruiting persons in the employment of the departments of the British army, upon which I intended to address you as soon as I should have ascertained exactly how the law stood upon this subject.

It is impossible for any army to keep the field without having some assistance from the country; and assistance of this description is particularly necessary to the British army in this country. It might have appeared desirable to the Portuguese government to know how far we could do without this assistance, particularly as the greatest part of the Portuguese army are fed by the British departments.

I beg likewise to mention that the Spanish government, to whose troops we don't at all times give this assistance, have exempted from the laws of the conscription all the persons in the employment of the British army.

I am far from wishing to interfere with the laws for recruiting the army; but I beg you to inform the Portuguese government that, if they don't recall the words marked in pencil in the enclosed letter, I beg that they will take measures to feed their own troops, as the British departments can feed them no longer.

The inconvenience which the army will feel from the want of the

* See Appendix, No. VIII.

services of these people would be so great, and the conduct of the government in depriving us of their services in this sudden manner, without previous notice, is so unfriendly, compared with the conduct of the Spanish government on the same subject, that I must submit it to the consideration of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Great Britain.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd,

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th Aug. 1811.

Having been out all the morning, I have only now received your 2 notes of this day.

I did not know that Don Julian's party had been withdrawn from Zammarra; and I suppose they have also withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the place, as they sent no report either of the party that went to Zammarra or of that which went likewise to Pastores.

In consequence of Major Gruben complaining that his party had too much to do, I have ordered another squadron to be sent to you; but I think it would be advisable to place some of your infantry in Zammarra. I think you had better not send them any farther forward at present.

Memorandum for Lieut. Col. Framingham, R.A. Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

1. Capt. Macdonald's troop of horse artillery to be ordered to be prepared to march as soon as possible, and, when ready, they are to march to join this army.

2. One of the 2 companies of artillery, now with the battering train, to be ordered to Castello Branco, to take charge there of the brigade of 6 pounders lately belonging to the German artillery. The drivers at Coimbra, and all other spare drivers with the army, likewise to be ordered to Castello Branco.

3. When the heavy 6 pounders shall arrive from Lisbon at Castello Branco, the company of artillery, ordered by No. 2 from the heavy train, are to be attached to them, and the brigade of heavy 6 pounders there to be equipped from the horses, &c., of Capt. Thompson's brigade, and are to join the army.

4. Capt. Thompson and his company are to go to Lisbon with the German light 6 pounders, either drawn by bullocks or worn out horses, according as may be provided hereafter.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

I enclose a letter from the Engineer at Almeida; from which it appears that he has neither money nor people to proceed with his work, for which he desires to have my instructions. It is useless to instruct him under such circumstances.

I have ordered Lieut. Craufurd, of the 91st regt., to place himself under your orders. I have no particular anxiety respecting the German serjeant you mention in your letter of the 23d.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th Aug. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to learn that the Portuguese troops plunder the people going with provisions to the different villages in which the divisions are cantoned; he desires that the General and other officers, in command of Portuguese brigades and regiments, will prevent this practice. If it should be continued, the Commander of the Forces will be under the necessity of directing that the rolls of the Portuguese troops may be called every hour of the day and night.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 21st Aug. My opinion is, that there will be no inconvenience in equipping at Oeiras the soldiers who are fit to join the army; and, when equipped, they might be embarked at Paço d'Arcos or elsewhere, and sent up with the tide as high as Sacavem, from whence they might proceed. It will not do, to send them to Oeiras, and to bring them back to Belem to be equipped, and keep them there in confinement. It is much better, though a little more troublesome, to equip them at Oeiras. However, the great difficulty will probably consist in the Commissary's sending out to Oeiras the articles of equipment which they will require; but I dare say that he will not find it impossible to overcome this difficulty.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

I have desired the Commissary Gen. to pay to the chest of the 'Aids' 150,000 dollars of a sum of money recently arrived from England.

The conduct of the Portuguese government in refusing to receive from the commissariat articles which were tendered to them, and afterwards purchasing those articles in the market at Lisbon, and covering this transaction by a falsehood, viz., that they did not know that the commissariat would supply the articles wanted, is of a nature so injurious to the alliance, and to the very existence of the contest, and is so mean and dirty in itself, that I earnestly request of you to represent it to Lord Wellesley, and to inform the Portuguese government that I have made this request.

The Portuguese government are, or ought to be, aware of the difficulties in which Great Britain is involved, in order to procure not money's worth, but money,—specie,—to maintain the contest, of which the probable want alone renders the result doubtful. In order to avoid this want they are making the most gigantic efforts, at an enormous expense, to send to this country every article that an army can require, in hopes to save the demand for, and expenditure of, specie in the purchase of these articles in the country; and the Portuguese government, instead of seconding their laudable efforts, set themselves against them, and, for the sake of a dirty job in Lisbon, purchase there the articles with which the commissariat have been supplied from England, and which were tendered to them.

Either the Portuguese government are entirely ignorant of what is going on in the world, or they are the friends and partisans of the enemy to the utmost of their power. I defy them, in their situation, to aid the enemy so much as by increasing the demands of specie upon the British government. I declare that I have no patience with such conduct.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st, enclosing a note of the 17th from Dom M. Forjaz, on the subject of a complaint from the Postmaster at Estremoz.

This complaint does not mention the name of the person complained of, or the regiment to which he belongs, or even the date of the occurrence which is its subject, or any one circumstance by which it could be

traced and investigated. It is impossible to give redress when the complaints are so vague.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 8th Aug.

* * * * *

Any severe loss or serious check to our cavalry might have an influence on the result of the war; and adverting to the enemy's superiority of numbers, particularly in that arm, I have always been unwilling on this account, as well as for other reasons, to risk large bodies at the same moment.

* * * * *

By reference to the states which I send you by this post, your Lordship will see how we stand in respect to British cavalry. As for the Portuguese cavalry, I am afraid that, owing to starvation, they are worse than useless, and we must not reckon upon more than the British. I am very confident that, even with the numbers which I have now with me, no accident can happen to us; but we have not enough to take the field on a decidedly offensive plan.

In my letter of the 18th July I reckoned the French cavalry actually with the '*Armée de Portugal*' about 3500 men. Recent reports state that the army of the north have 2500 cavalry. These are already double the numbers which we can produce, on this frontier, of British cavalry. But I believe there is also, in Castille, a brigade of light cavalry belonging to Marmont's army; at least he mentions it in a letter which we have intercepted. When, in my letter of the 18th July, I mentioned 3500 as the number of cavalry with the army of the south, I meant the cavalry which had come into Estremadura, and had joined with that of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' According to the returns which I have of Soult's army of the south, he has 7774 cavalry, of which he brought only the number above mentioned, as I believe, into Estremadura. From this statement, your Lordship will see how unlikely it is that you can make us equal to the French in cavalry for a decidedly offensive operation.

It has never been possible for us to assemble our whole army on this frontier, more particularly since the fall of Badajoz and the destruction of the Spanish army of Estremadura. We are nearly twice as far from Lisbon at this spot as Badajoz is. The Tagus is fordable nearly every where from Abrantes to below Santarem; and if I were to leave the Alentejo without a respectable body of troops, the enemy might and would move the 5th corps through that province, and they would be at Lisbon as soon as I should hear that they had passed the Guadiana. It is as necessary to leave cavalry with that corps in Alentejo as it is to leave infantry; and accordingly your Lordship will see that some of the British cavalry remain there. These, however, are not the most efficient regiments.

There is another point also to be considered in the assembling of these large bodies of cavalry, and that is, their food. It is impossible to describe the difficulty with which food is procured for them. The cavalry

collected with this army are now 50 or 60 miles distant, in order to get food, and I trust to be able to assemble them when I shall want them. If I should bring them together too soon, or keep them together too long, the horses would starve.

At the same time I am of opinion that we cannot have too much British cavalry. We can certainly do nothing without them in a general action out of our mountains; and, from all that I can learn, the expense of feeding the horses is not greater than it is in England, as the hay or grass they eat is seldom paid for, and the straw, when they get it, is not nearly so expensive as the hay is in England. An augmentation of cavalry, therefore, should the season be favorable, and the country which is the scene of our operations produce forage, will give us great advantages; and even if we should be obliged to keep part of our cavalry in the rear, from the want of forage, it will enable us to relieve those in front occasionally, and thus always to have a body of cavalry in good condition. I am therefore very glad that you have sent Le Marchant's brigade.

I am almost certain that I shall not be able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, and I think it is doubtful whether I shall be able to maintain the blockade of that place. However, I shall not give up my intention until I am certain that the enemy are too strong for me in an action in the field. The place, although weak in itself, and though the ground on which it stands is badly occupied (the French have improved it in some degree), is in the best chosen position of any frontier fortress that I have ever seen. It is impossible to do any thing against it, either in the way of siege or blockade, excepting by crossing the Agueda, and of all the ravines that I have ever seen this is the most difficult to cross, excepting close to the fort; and in winter it cannot be crossed at all, excepting at the bridges, of which the only practicable one for carriages is under the guns of the fort. We must fight the battle, therefore, to maintain this blockade, with our backs to this river, over which we should have to retire in case of check; and this would be an awkward position, in which I ought not to involve the army, unless the numbers are so nearly equal as to render success probable. You will observe that these circumstances all favored the French when they attacked the place from Spain. However, there is one thing very clear, that if we cannot maintain this blockade, the enemy must bring 50,000 men to oblige us to raise it; and they can undertake nothing else this year, for they must still continue to watch this place, and we shall so far save the cause. In the mean time, if they offer me a favorable opportunity of bringing any of them to action, I shall do it.

I hear reports of peace from all parts of Spain, and it is a subject of common conversation and general joy among the French officers. I know that some of them have received accounts from Paris, stating that peace was likely to take place. We have certainly altered the nature of the war in Spain; it has become, to a certain degree, offensive on our part. The enemy are obliged to concentrate large corps to defend their own acquisitions; they are obliged to collect magazines to support their armies (Marmont says he can do nothing without magazines,* which is quite a new era in the modern French military system); and I think it probable,

* See Appendix, No. VII.

from all that I hear, that they are either already reduced, or they must soon come, to the resources of France for the payment of those expenses which must be defrayed in money. As soon as this shall be the case, and as soon as the war will not produce resources to carry itself on, your Lordship may be certain that Buonaparte will be disposed to put an end to it, and will submit to any thing rather than draw from France the resources which must be supplied in order to keep together his armies. I think it not unlikely, therefore, that peace is speculated upon in France.

We have a great many officers and men sick, but none or very few seriously so. It is astonishing how easily the officers and soldiers of our army are affected by sickness, and the little care they take of themselves. In some situations also the effects of the climate are terrible. Very recently the officer commanding a brigade of artillery encamped them in one of the most unwholesome situations, and every man of them is sick. However, the weather will soon become cool in this part of the country, and I hope there will be an end of the sickness.

P.S. I enclose the morning state of the 25th, with a note on the back, showing the state of the army in cavalry and infantry in Castille and in Alentejo.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

I enclose a letter, and its enclosure, from Mr. Stuart, and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me have your opinion upon the latter. It appears to me to afford another instance of the desire of some of the members of the Portuguese government to interfere in every thing; it regulates those matters which have been regulated already 50 times; it interferes, by way of civil regulation, in that which can be the result only of military order, &c. &c.: however, let me have your opinion upon it.

P.S. However desirable it may be that the Portuguese government should take from us articles in kind, instead of money, Mr. Dunmore must not be allowed to give any thing whatever without reference to you.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

I have received your note of this day: the reports which you have received agree with those which I have. I rather imagine that the whole of the cavalry had gone forward towards Salamanca, but I suppose now that only part is gone to open the communication with the army of the north. A reinforcement has arrived at Valladolid, and the army of the north is very strong, and is apparently about Leon, Benavente, Rio Seco, and Valladolid. The '*Armée de Portugal*' are apparently collected in the different passes of the Sierra, Baños, Tornavacas, and El Pico, and thereabouts; and they will pass the mountains probably when the army of the north approach the Tormes, unless they have in view some plan of greater extent, founded upon the arrival of larger reinforcements than I have yet heard of.

It appears from intercepted letters that great preparations were ordered at Valladolid, Burgos, &c., in the end of June, for the arrival of reinforcements which were to be at Bayonne early in August; and these were

of such an extent, and the orders so detailed, that I think that the Emperor then intended to be of the party. The recall of Bessières, in July, would prove an alteration of plan; but whether he comes or not, or whatever may be the extent of the reinforcement now come, or coming, it is certain that there is now a very large army north of the Duero.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

I enclose you the draft of a letter which I have written this day to Bacellar, and I rather think that the intelligence which I have received since I wrote this letter ought to induce me to go further, and to collect his troops immediately.

You will see the dispatches to government, but I have no doubt that unless the design has been altered since the end of June and beginning of July, we shall have the Emperor in Spain and *hell to pay* before much time elapses.

I have my train well in hand, and can have it on board again in a very few days.

To Lieut. Gen. Bacellar.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

You will have received from Gen. Silveira accounts of the enemy's progress, and of their positions on the frontiers of Galicia and Tras os Montes. I have no doubt that their design, whatever it was, has been suspended, in consequence of the position of the allied army under my command on the frontiers of Castille; but as it is difficult to foresee what movements the enemy will make, and as at present the provinces of Tras os Montes and the Minho are in a very defenceless state, I wish you to give orders that all the officers and soldiers of the militia in those provinces should join their corps; and you will direct Gen. Silveira, Gen. Trant, and Col. Wilson, to be in readiness to perform those operations which were directed by Marshal Sir W. Beresford last year, in the event of the enemy's invasion of the northern provinces by the different northern passes.

The enemy's position at present at Benavente, Leon, &c., would indicate a movement by the northern passes; and it might be expedient that Gen. Silveira should assemble his cavalry, and 2 or 3 of the nearest battalions, at Braganza, from whence he would observe the movements of the enemy, and could adopt such further measures, according to the instructions of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, as the movements of the enemy might render necessary. My opinion is that the enemy will immediately move their whole force towards the Agueda; but as I may be mistaken, and as a large force is certainly collected about Benavente and Leon, I think it proper to direct you to adopt these measures of precaution.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th inst. I will appoint Col. Skerrett to be a Colonel on the Staff, from the 4th May, till the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent shall be known.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

I have this day received your letter of the 21st, and I now enclose copies of 2 dispatches to government of this date. Nothing can be more interesting than the intercepted letter and the return you sent me; and I shall be much obliged to you for every thing of that kind that you can send.

I always reckoned the Imperial Guard at 6000 infantry and 900 cavalry!! But there is nothing like the Spaniards for exaggerating their own force, and diminishing that of the enemy. I am convinced from these papers that Buonaparte intended to come to Spain himself: the departure of Bessières for France may be a sign that that intention has been relinquished. He certainly will not come unless he has a most commanding force.

Au Général Dumouriez.

À Fuente Guinaldo, ce 28 Août, 1811.

Je vous suis bien obligé de votre lettre du 5 Août que je viens de recevoir. Vous avez vu la manière dont nos tentatives sur Badajoz ont fini, et vous allez voir comment celles que j'avais l'intention de faire sur Ciudad Rodrigo vont finir.

J'étais bien content de faire passer mes troupes à la droite du Tage pendant les chaleurs d'Août et de Septembre, et je menaçais Ciudad Rodrigo pour faire une diversion pour les Espagnols, et j'avais l'intention d'en faire le siège, si j'eusse eu en tête une force contre laquelle je pouvais me tenir. Tout de suite, voilà tout le monde que se rassemble sur moi. Marmont passe en Castille; l'armée du nord, renforcée par des troupes dernièrement arrivées, arrête sa marche sur Santocildes, et j'attends à chaque moment les nouvelles de son arrivée sur le Tormes.

Vous verrez que Santocildes, ou plutôt Abadia, qui commande en Galice à présent, ne pourra rien faire, faute de ressources et n'ayant point de cavalerie, malgré qu'il soit entièrement dégagé par nous.

Vous verrez aussi que l'armée de Blake qui est allée en Murcie ne fera rien. Peut-être même que Blake sera battu par Soult, qui a avec lui le 4^e corps d'armée et la réserve, et quelques bataillons du 1^r corps, ayant laissé le 5^e corps en Estremadure, et le restant du 1^r corps devant Cadix. Mais si Blake n'est pas battu, soyez sûr que faute de ressources et de discipline et d'arrangement, jamais il ne fera la marche que vous avez indiquée. Pour Silveira, il ne commande que la milice, qui fait très bien pour une défense pour le Portugal, mais ne peut pas entrer en opération en Espagne.

Ainsi vous voyez que votre perspective d'une guerre offensive n'est pas encourageante; mais je ne perds pas courage. Tant que nous ne serons pas battus, les Français ne peuvent rien faire de ce côté-ci; et à la fin les Espagnols verront qu'il est nécessaire d'organiser et de discipliner leurs armées et de leur fournir des ressources; et alors les affaires iront mieux.

Je serais bien aise d'avoir le plaisir de vous voir, si vous passiez dans ce pays-ci; mais je ne vous le conseille pas. Vous verriez bien des choses qui vous dégoûteraient de ces guerres révolutionnaires, malgré que les malheurs de notre temps les rendent peut-être nécessaires.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

A considerable body of troops arrived at Valladolid, by forced marches, on the 16th and 17th of this month, and turned off towards Rio Seco, from whence I have not yet heard of their moving. These troops, in number about 7000 or 8000, are stated to have been drawn from the garrisons in the north of Spain, having been relieved by the reinforcements which have lately arrived from France. I have likewise learnt that about 1500 dragoons, belonging to the regiments with Marmont's army, who had been sent to France in the spring, dismounted, have returned to Valladolid with their horses.

I have not yet heard that the enemy had made any movement in the north. Gen. Santocildes wrote on the 15th from Astorga, that the enemy were in considerable strength in his front; and he proposed to retire into the mountains of Galicia. But as they must have heard about that time that the allied army were upon the frontiers of Castille, it is probable that the execution of their plan was suspended, more particularly as the march of the reinforcements, which had been forced as far as Valladolid, was stopped about the same time at Rio Seco.

Marmont has likewise broken up his cantonments in the valley of the Tagus, and his army are in the mountains which separate Castille from Estremadura; but excepting a small body of cavalry, apparently destined to open a communication with the army of the north, none have yet passed into Castille. I conclude that he will not pass the mountains till the army of the north shall have approached the Tormes, and that then the operations of both will be directed against the allied army under my command.

The division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' which was cantoned at Jarai cejo and Truxillo, in breaking up has, I hear, had some success against a small Spanish corps under Gen. Morillo, and the Estremadura legion under Col. Downie, which had removed on as far as Montanches. I have not yet heard that this French division has passed the Tagus.

I have received no late intelligence from the south of Spain. Gen. Ballesteros was still in the Condado de Niebla by the last accounts, there being no vessels to remove his troops to Algeziras.

The enemy are exerting themselves in an extraordinary manner to raise contributions in Spain. They have demanded one fourth of the crops from the cultivators of the land; and, in order to procure money, they sell the grain, even by retail, which is thus forced from the people by way of contribution.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Aug. 1811.

Since I closed my dispatch of this day to your Lordship, I have received some very interesting papers which have been intercepted from the enemy. It appears by a return of the 10th July, that the division of Guards alone, which are in Castille, amount to above 15,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry; and as far as I can judge from the accounts which I have of the enemy's strength, they had besides, in the army of the north, at least 16,000 infantry and some cavalry, before the late reinforcements arrived.

These papers contain very particular and detailed orders for equipping the '*Armée de Portugal*' with a very large proportion of cannon, and

with horses to draw it, and for the junction of all detachments. There are also detailed orders direct from the Emperor for the collection at Burgos and Valladolid of the contents of particular magazines; and a communication is made to the Duc de Raguse on the 19th July, that the Emperor had on that day reviewed a very fine body of troops, destined to reinforce the armies in Spain; which country and Portugal it had been determined to subdue. From all these circumstances, I should be inclined to believe that the Emperor was coming to Spain in person.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811, 3 p.m.

I have just received your 2d letter of this day, and at the same time one of the 28th from Don Carlos de España, which does not mention the enemy's arrival at Ledesma; neither do I believe Col. Barnard's account of the arrival of the convoy.

I have an intercepted letter this day in cypher, which shows that the army of the north, and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' will join to attack us, as I supposed.

If the Spanish peasantry will not trust us for a short time, they must keep their wheat for the French, and we must eat our biscuit. I can't get up money in sufficient sums to pay ready money for all our provisions, and the pay of the troops likewise.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811.

I find that the militia in Beira are not supplied with arms, and it is desirable that you should immediately turn your attention to that object.

I find that the government has supplied the Superintendent of Transports, who is to buy mules for the artillery, with paper money only. He will not get one mule in Spain for the whole sum in paper that he has in his hands.

I am in hopes soon to have with each of the 5th and 6th divisions a 9 pounder, or a heavy 6 pounder brigade; and I propose then to send away your 6 pounder artillery for these divisions, and you might apply the mules to render Arentschidt's and Dickson's artillery quite complete: or if they can be completed otherwise, it would be very convenient to have these 2 brigades in reserve with the army, in case it should be desirable to move any division by mountain or narrow roads; for either one or the other purpose, they will both be disposable in the course of a short time, I hope.

To H. S. H. the Duke of Brunswick.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811.

I have delayed to reply to your Highness' letter of the 27th July, regarding Lieut. —, till I should receive an answer to a reference upon the subject which I made to Col. de Bernewitz for information, and I have now the honor to enclose to your Highness a letter which I have received from Col. de Bernewitz. I recollect to have refused leave of absence to Lieut. — after the siege of Badajoz, or to accept his resignation without your Highness' consent, because I was not aware of the circumstances which occasioned the request for leave, or the offer of the resignation, and I wish to adhere to the rules which I had made to allow

no officer in your Highness' regiment to resign his commission and return to Germany, without your Highness' special permission; but if I had been made acquainted with the circumstances which had occurred, I should have thought it desirable that Lieut. — should quit the service, and should in the mean time have leave of absence.

My reason for entertaining this opinion is, that the instances of want of spirit among the officers of the army are very rare, and the example of punishment for this crime is not required. This being the case, I should wish to avoid giving the soldiers, and the world, a notion that an officer, particularly one belonging to a foreign nation, can behave otherwise than well in the presence of the enemy; and if there should be an unfortunate person who fails in this respect, I would prefer to allow him to retire to a private station, rather than expose his weakness.

On these grounds, I would still recommend to your Highness to accept the resignation of his commission, which Lieut. — has offered. Your Highness will observe that he has absented himself from his regiment without leave, for which crime I propose forthwith to order him in arrest; but I beg to recommend to your Highness to accept his resignation, and to allow him to return to Germany, as being in every respect an officer unfit to serve His Majesty in your Highness' regiment, at the same time that it is not expedient to expose his weakness by bringing him to trial before a General Court Martial.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th Aug., in which you have enclosed one of the 23d from Dom M. Forjaz, desiring to have my opinion of a proposed regulation on the subject of means of transport, and of supplies of provisions for the troops.

As the Commander in Chief of the British army, I have nothing to say to any Portuguese regulation, excepting to obey it, as far as may be in my power, and as far as it may not be inconsistent with the orders and regulations of His Majesty. I am sorry that there are parts of the proposed regulation which are inconsistent with those regulations, viz., all the arrangements included in the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th articles. I can't allow any person to give receipts for provisions excepting those who receive them; nor can I allow the Commissary Gen. to pay for provisions delivered to the British troops on the production of any document, excepting the receipt of the person who received the provisions.

If I am desired, as the Marshal General of the Portuguese army, to give my opinion of the proposed regulation, I answer that the regulation appears to me to be entirely useless in many parts, and in others injurious to the public service.

There is already a Superintendent of Transport in each province, whose duty appears to be of the same description with that prescribed for the Inspector General of Transport and of Provisions in the 1st, 2d, and 3d articles of the proposed regulation. I don't see the use of 2 officers to perform the same duty. The lists of means of transport to be made, under the 4th article of the regulation, were actually made and completed in all the provinces of the Kingdom, in consequence of a proposition made by

me as long ago as November, 1809, and I have now copies of them. It might be very proper to order that new lists might be made in parts of Beira and parts of Estremadura, in consequence of the invasion of those provinces last year; but the lists of the means of transport, &c., in the other provinces ought still to be complete.

All that is required to render the existing system perfect is to enforce the law.

1st; To oblige all magistrates, upon whom requisitions should be made for means of transport, to issue their orders to the owners of means of transport to produce them at a certain place, at a certain time.

2dly; To oblige the magistrates to levy a penalty on those who should omit to obey this order; and,

3dly; To punish all magistrates who should omit to levy the penalty if the means of transport should not be produced as ordered.

I beg to observe that this is the law of England, and the practice; and it is notorious that more attention is paid in England to the rights of private property than in any other country. But, on the other hand, every person is obliged, under a penalty, to assist the public cause; and the magistrates are obliged to do their duty, or they are punished according to law.

If this system be carried into execution, it will be necessary that the Portuguese government should pay regularly the hire of the means of transport which are required for the service, and then the odious and oppressive system of *embargo* may be put an end to throughout the country. But I wish the government to understand that, unless the owners of means of transport are forced to produce at the place and hour ordered the means which are required; unless the magistrates are forced to do their duty; and unless the Portuguese government shall pay regularly for the means of transport required for the Portuguese army, either the odious system of *embargo* must continue in all its rigor, or the Governors of the Kingdom must make up their minds to lose the country.

I see that the 5th article goes to suspend the powers of the Special Commission and of the magistrates, in regard to the proprietors of lands; which, in my opinion, is not advisable. The proprietors of lands are those most able to supply means of transport. They are the persons most interested in the defence of the country; and yet the effect of the regulation would be to protect these very people from punishment, for neglecting to supply the means of transport which are necessary for its defence, and which they alone have in their possession.

The 6th article is as objectionable as the others. The question is, whether means of transport are required for the army or not. If they are required, they must be made to go the distance ordered, unless relieved. They cannot be relieved unless a fresh set of magistrates and fresh inhabitants should do their duty, and produce fresh means of transport required from them. Upon this subject a new regulation is not required.

I have always objected to the plan of the government crowding different objects into the same regulation. I have already stated the objections to the remaining articles of the proposed regulation as referrible to the British army; and understanding that there is now under consideration a plan for

regulating a Commissariat for the Portuguese army, the consideration of this part of the subject should be deferred till the Commissariat should be established, to which it essentially belongs. I am convinced that the proposed regulation in the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th articles must be altered when the Commissariat shall be established, or it will be very inconvenient to that establishment.

I request you to lay this letter before the Portuguese government, as containing my opinion on this regulation.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811.

I was obliged to send off the dispatch to you at an early hour this morning, in order to catch the post at Elvas, and I did not reply to a very interesting part of your letter of the 21st inst.

I am quite convinced that the majority of the officers of the Spanish army would prefer submitting to the French to allowing us to have any thing to say to their troops. In truth, they are by no means convinced, or at all events will not allow, that our officers know any more of their profession than they do themselves; and we may depend upon it that we should always have them acting against us, and that all of their class in this country would follow their example.

I think it probable, but I am not quite certain, that we should get some of the lower orders of the people of Spain to serve in regiments officered by British officers; but I am convinced that if the authorities of the country should set their faces against the measure, we should get but few. Then the discipline through which a soldier must pass, that in which he must be kept, and the privations to which every soldier is exposed, don't render his life a very happy one; and this circumstance, added to the reproach which every soldier under the command of our officers would have to endure from the Spanish officers and people of that class, would occasion desertion to a degree scarcely credible. We have already experienced it in the Chasseurs Britanniques, in which regiment there were some Spaniards, but they have all deserted.

If we trace the history of the establishment of British officers in the Portuguese army, it will be found that two circumstances occasioned it. 1st; the absence of a great number of the efficient officers of the army with those corps which were, and are still, in France, and the suspicions which attached to those which were returned to Portugal. 2dly; the murder of the Commander in Chief, Bernardin Freire, in a mutiny of the soldiers, and refusal of all the Portuguese officers to take the command of the troops.

To this add, that it had not been unusual to call foreign officers to the command of the Portuguese armies; and circumstances which had recently occurred had tended very much to raise the reputation of our officers at that time in Portugal, while the conduct of the foreign officers in the service had tended to sink theirs.

None of these circumstances exist in Spain; and it must not be expected that we should find the Spanish soldiery inclined in the same degree to submit to our discipline.

You will then say, what is Great Britain to do? I answer, persevere

in the contest, and do the best she can, while she endeavors to prevail upon the Spaniards to improve their military system.

The contest is expensive, and affords but little or no hopes of success, excepting by tiring the French out. After all, military success probably could not reasonably be expected in a contest between the powers of the Peninsula and Great Britain on one side, and the French on the other, which had begun by the French seizing the armies, the fortified places, the arms, and the resources of the Peninsula. These are circumstances to which the people don't advert in general, but they bear upon every event of the contest; and the folly and treachery of the Spaniards in the loss of battles and strong places have increased our difficulties, but still I am not without hopes. We have already, in some degree, altered the nature of the war and of the French military system. They are now in a great measure on the defensive, and are carrying on a war of magazines. They will soon, if they have not already, come upon the resources of France; and, as soon as that is the case, you may depend upon it the war will not last long.

We may spend 10 millions a year in this country; but it is a very erroneous notion to suppose that all that expense is incurred by the war in the Peninsula. Our establishments which we have here would cost very near half that sum if they were kept at home, and the surplus only should be charged as the expense of this war. I don't mean to say that that expense is not great, but it must be borne as long as the Spaniards and Portuguese can hold out, or we must take our leave of our character as a great country.

I enclose an intercepted letter which was in cypher, which shows that I have not mistaken the enemy's plan of operations.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of private ———, of the 52d regt., whom the Court have recommended *in the body of their sentence*, in which recommendation I entirely concur; but as that mode of recommendation adopted by the General Court Martial is not regular, and has been forbidden by His Majesty's orders, I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial on this trial, and request that that part which recommends private ——— may be struck out from the sentence, and may be the subject of a separate letter.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have some mode arranged of feeding your detachments on the roads to the army. They

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

4. The Commander of the Forces is happy to have it in his power to pardon ———, who, it appears, was taken prisoner when absent from his regiment, without leave, in search of wine. The same misfortune has happened to other soldiers; and the Commander of the Forces trusts the soldiers will at last discover that it is better to be satisfied with their allowance of wine than to absent themselves from their regiment in search of more, and thus incur the risk of being taken by the enemy, and to lose their reputation as soldiers by being deemed deserters.

come through our cantonments invariably starving, and they are fed by our Commissaries, which, in addition to our own detachments, is an increase of consumption not provided for; and it prevents the accumulation of supplies which is necessary in order to enable the army to do any thing. In the march routes to the detachments from this army, it is particularly specified at what places, and from whom, they are to receive provisions; and very few, and very small, magazines are sufficient for the purpose.

It would be very desirable if an arrangement of the same description were made for the march of the detachments of the Portuguese army. I have complaints from our cantonments on the high road from Castello Branco of the consumption of the supplies for these detachments, and it comes to be a serious object.

A Don Carlos de España.

À Fuente Guinaldo, ce 30 Août, 1811.

J'ai donné ordre qu'on donne à l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Lisbonne 2000 fusils et autres équipemens pour être à vos ordres; et 1200 fusils et autres équipemens pour le régiment *la Princesa*, pour être pareillement à vos ordres.

Vous me demandez à présent 1000 fusils, et je voudrais savoir si vous en voulez 1000 outre les 3200. Je vous prévien que je n'ai pas d'équipemens, les ayant envoyé tous à Cadiz. Vous me demandez aussi de les envoyer à Oporto. C'est dommage que vous n'ayez pas pensé à Oporto plutôt, si vous voulez y avoir les 3200, parceque les fusils auront été donnés il y a quelques jours à l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne, et les départemens Anglais ne peuvent plus s'en charger après qu'ils ont été donnés à l'Ambassadeur. Mais je ne doute pas que si vous écrivez à M. l'Ambassadeur, il vous les enverra à Oporto.

Il paraît que l'ennemi va se rassembler en assez grande force sur le Tormes. Quand je saurai leur force, je verrai ce que nous pourrons faire.

To Gen. Abadia.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th Aug. I had already requested Col. Sir H. Douglas to apprise your Excellency of the state of affairs in this quarter, and I have now to inform you that we remain still in the same positions as when he left this.

The enemy heard on the 14th inst. of our arrival here, and it appears that from that time they altered their design in the country north of the Duero, whatever it was. I understand that the troops which arrived at Valladolid about the middle of the month, by forced marches, halted at Rio Seco; and I learn that there was another detachment of about 7000 very fine troops still at Valladolid on the 22d. Marmont at about the same time commenced collecting his troops in the Puertos, and on the 28th and 29th his advanced guard passed through the Puerto de Baños, and arrived on the 29th at Tamames.

I understand from an intercepted letter that it is his object to effect a junction with the army under the command of Gen. Dorsenne, which is that beyond the Duero, and the 2 to move to attack this army. This junction, which I cannot prevent, will necessarily frustrate my object, more particularly as I see by your account of the state of your army, that

you can't move from Galicia; and I propose to act according to circumstances and to the strength of the enemy. It is very obvious, however, that unless the enemy should be very largely reinforced, they can't undertake any thing serious against you, so long as I can keep my army collected and entire, unless they should give up Ciudad Rodrigo.*

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 25th and 26th. I see that, even by their own accounts, the Portuguese government are debtors to us, after bringing in the charge for the 20th regt., and for the supplies to the latest period; and they will be debtors for a much larger amount when the accounts shall be settled, as they ought to be, on the principle fixed by us. You did quite right to send your note, marked A, in your letter of the 26th.

I don't understand what offence the Spaniards can have taken with my brother's letter to Bardaxi.

I am afraid that Beresford has been rather in a hurry in his application to the Portuguese government about Colman and Madden. I applied some time ago to the Horse Guards to have these officers restored to their rank in the British service, and received an answer stating that hereafter it might be granted upon an application from the Portuguese government. The time for the application was not stated; but it appears to me that the proper time for such an application would have been the moment at which the allied army should have obtained any success, if again they should gain such. It would then certainly have been successful: success is now doubtful, and a second refusal of the application may affect its final success.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

A Portuguese of the name of ——— passed through here some days ago, on his way to Lisbon from Madrid, respecting whom, since he has gone, I have entertained some suspicions. It appears by his papers that he was appointed to be an officer of the Secretariat by Senhor Araujo, and was employed in the embassy at Madrid, where he has remained ever since the revolution. He told us some few *lies* here, but that is nothing. What strikes me as extraordinary is, that he should have been able to find his way from Madrid, through the French armies and the guerrillas, bringing with him some valuable baggage, and a kind of suite, consisting of his sons, servants, &c. If I have a correct notion of the state of things at Madrid, he could not have passed with this train from that city to the guerrillas without the connivance of the government, and, if that is the case, he has come for some sinister purpose. He talked to me of his intimacy with Dom M. Forjaz. I rather think that the guerrilla Avril, who first took charge of him, has not a good opinion of him.

To Major Gen. R. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 31st Aug. 1811, 11 a.m.

I have received the reports of Lieut. Bedell and Major Gruben; and the letters which I received last night gave me reason to believe that the enemy had not come to Tamames. There is no convoy coming to Ciudad Rodrigo. The convoy which left Salamanca on the 27th, or was about to

* See Appendix, No. IX.

leave it, was one of artillery for the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and its route is between the Tormes and the Duero.

I have constant intelligence from Salamanca, the last letter dated the 27th; and there was no convoy for Ciudad Rodrigo then thought of.

To Major Gens. Slade, Anson, and Alten, and Col. Sir G. Calcraft.

Fuente Guinaldo, 31st Aug. 1811.

Arrangements have lately been made, which I hope will be carried into execution, to attach to each of the regiments of cavalry under your command such a number of mules as will secure for them a constant supply of corn; but I am desirous to carry this arrangement still further, and, if possible, that each of the regiments should at all times have in its cantonments a supply of corn to last the horses for 6 days. A large supply of corn is shortly expected from the magazines in the rear; but it is obvious that this quantity can be gained upon the daily consumption only by reducing the allowance, if the horses should be in good condition, and while they don't work, and if they should be well provided with other forage.

It is impossible for me, or for any body who does not see the horses, to judge of these points; but I request you to reduce the quantity of corn to be issued to the horses of the regiments in the troops under your command, to 8, or even 7, pounds a day for each horse, if you should be of opinion, from the circumstances above referred to, that you can do so without injury to their condition, in order, with what shall arrive from the magazines, to gain upon the consumption a store of corn, to remain in the cantonments of the regiments, which will last the horses at the full allowance 6 days. When this store shall have been accumulated, I should then wish that, at all events, the issue of the full allowance should be recommenced.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 31st Aug. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will talk to Dom M. Forjaz about the state of the bridges on the Alva, on the Ceira, and on the Mondego, which were destroyed in the last campaign, some by the French and some by Gen. Bacellar.

Among other excellent establishments in Portugal still existing there is a fund for the construction and repairs of roads and bridges, which, like all others, is, I believe, entirely misapplied; and then, as usual, when it becomes necessary to do the work the expense falls upon us.

It becomes necessary to repair these bridges forthwith. In the course of the month of October the rains will commence, and the safety of the army may depend upon the passage of these bridges being secured. I have already sent an officer to look at them, and, whether the government will repair them or not, I must have them repaired; but I am determined that the expense shall be charged against the subsidy.

It is too bad, that with funds existing in the country for all these purposes, and with persons capable of executing them, I can get nothing done excepting by my own officers; and then we are involved in the greatest difficulties to get the people necessary to work, and the materials to enable us to perform the works which we are obliged to undertake.

I beg you to tell Dom M. Forjaz that I desire to know, by return of post, whether the Portuguese government will or will not undertake to repair the bridges on the Alva, the Ceira, and the Mondego, in such a manner as that they will be passable in October; and that, if they will not, I request them to write orders to the Governor of Coimbra, and the magistrates of Arganil, Goes, Louzão, Ponte da Murcella, Foz d'Arouce, &c., to give every assistance that Capt. Macleod may call for, either in workmen or materials, to enable him to repair them.

P.S. Gen. Bacellar, who destroyed the bridges on the Mondego, should be ordered to repair them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st Sept. 1811.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 20th July. In case the unfortunate event, which you mentioned, should occur, I am at a loss to know how I shall employ Herbert Taylor with this army, excepting in the situation of D. A. G., now held by Gen. Pakenham, but which he would resign, I know, if I could make any other convenient arrangement for the performance of its duties.

Employment with the Spaniards would not suit him at all. Sir H. Douglas is in the only situation of that description in which he would feel any interest; and he is too low down among the Colonels of this army to give him the command of a brigade.

If you should think that the situation of D. A. G. would suit him, I shall be obliged to you if you will offer it to him. Major Gen. C. Stewart generally goes home every winter, when the business of his department would fall upon him; and, in the event which would leave him at liberty to accept the situation, it is probable that it would be necessary to Stewart to be absent for a great length of time, in order to ensure his election to Parliament.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st Sept. 1811.

* * * * *

Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces regrets that an officer of the rank of ——— should have placed himself in the situation in which that officer now finds himself; and should have persevered in the error which he had committed, notwithstanding that its nature and the consequences likely to result from his conduct were repeatedly represented to him; and that he was earnestly urged by those whose opinions ought to have had an influence over him to recall the improper letters which he had addressed to his Commanding officer, Major Gen. Campbell.

3. If the extreme sensibility to the censure of his Commanding officer, which was the pretext for the disrespectful and offensive conduct of which ——— has been found guilty, had been of that good description which induces those who feel it to avoid censure by attending strictly to their duty, by obeying with zeal and precision the orders which they receive, and by upholding the discipline and subordination of the army, ——— would have attended to the advice he had received to withdraw his offensive letters, rather than incur the risk of receiving a stronger censure under the sentence of the General Court Martial.

4. The Commander of the Forces hopes, however, that that sentence will convince ——— that whatever may be his feelings, he cannot with impunity express them to his Commanding officer in terms of disrespect and offence, even when he thinks he has reason to complain of his Commanding officer's conduct; and that he will recollect, in future, that a General Court Martial will enforce the rules of the service which protect every officer from disrespect and insult on every occasion, but most particularly when in the execution of his duty.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d Sept. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 29th Aug., regarding the conduct of 2 marines on duty at Fort S. Julian, and I am very sensible of the kindness of the motives which have induced you to refer this case for my consideration. I have directed the Judge Advocate to draw charges against these men founded on Major Dickenson's report.

I am much obliged to you for sending the newly arrived detachments to Figueira.

I agree entirely with you about the sea sand on the platforms at S. Julian. It will undoubtedly render the water brackish collected in the tanks from these platforms, and fresh sand bags can be placed at any moment.

Have you heard any thing of Lord March?

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

2d Sept. 1811.

In reply to the letter of the D.A.A.G. of the 4th division of the 30th ult., I have to call your attention, by direction of the Commander of the Forces, to the proceedings therein mentioned not being in conformity to the system laid down by his Excellency, or to the usual mode of proceeding with regard to sick leave. The certificate of ill health should in the first instance be forwarded by the General officers commanding divisions; and in extraordinary cases of emergency, from the illness of the individual, or from the march of the division or corps, the officer, whose certificate is sent, may proceed to the nearest hospital station. But the assembly of a Medical board is only directed by an order from the Commander of the Forces, signified to the Inspector General, who orders the same at the nearest hospital station where the officers arrive after being permitted to leave their corps. And it is not intended that Medical boards should be held in the several divisions without going through the usual forms, nor that leave of absence should be granted but by the G. O. of the army. I have forwarded Capt. Egerton's letter to Dr. Franck, directing Medical boards to report on the officers' cases alluded to on arrival at Abrantes.

To Lieut. Col. —, —th regt.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d Sept. 1811, 9 P.M.

I return your letter of this day's date, as it contains a request to which I can give no reply, unless the letter should be transmitted in the channel prescribed by His Majesty's Regulations.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d Sept. 1811.

I write to inform you that the Spanish army has been obliged to retreat from its positions at La Bañeza and Puente de Orvigo, and has fallen back at least as far as Villa Franca.

I am not exactly informed of the circumstances which occurred previous to the retreat of the Spanish army of Galicia, but I believe they must have sustained some check.

A considerable proportion of the enemy's troops, which were in their

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d Sept. 1811.

5. The Commander of the Forces observes that both — and — were made prisoners going in search of wine, and afterwards enlisted into the service of the enemy, in order, if possible, to make their escape.

6. This is a dangerous experiment; and very possibly those who attempt it may find themselves engaged with their countrymen and comrades before they can carry this design into execution. The soldiers will thus see the disgraceful situation in which they are liable to fall by their irregular endeavors to get more wine than their allowance, or than can do them any good.

front, have arrived at Salamanca, with a view to operations in this quarter, in concert with the army of Marmont; and it is stated that 25,000 men, belonging to the army of the north, will be assembled there in the course of a few days: at all events, it is obvious that the enemy have at present no design to extend their operations in that quarter, and therefore it appears to me desirable that Gen. Silveira should place his corps of observation for the present at Freixo de Espadacinta, or Torre de Moncorvo, rather than at Braganza.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d Sept. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from the Conde de Aguiar, and its enclosures, from which I learn that H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer upon me the title of Conde de Vimeiro, and the Grand Cross of the Order of the Tower and Sword, and a pension of 20,000 *cruzados per annum*.

I beg that your Lordship will lay these letters before H.R.H. the Prince Regent, and request that His Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to permit me to accept of the favors which H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer upon me.

Having considered it my duty to urge the local Portuguese government, almost with importunity, to increase the disposable revenue of the state to the utmost, by every measure in their power, as well of increased taxation as of reform of abuses in the collection and management of the revenue, and of economy in the grant of salaries and in every branch of the expenditure, as the only measures by which the expenses of the war could be provided for by the necessary sums of specie, I have thought it proper not to accept of any allowance from the Portuguese government for the office of Marshal General of the army, which I fill.

In case H.R.H. the Prince Regent should think proper to allow me to accept the favors conferred upon me by H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal, I propose in like manner to decline the acceptance of the pension offered to me during the continuance of the existing war for the independence of the country.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept. 1811.

I received your letter yesterday evening. You are quite right to go on the staff to the East Indies, if you think it will suit your views; and I can only say that I shall be very sorry to lose your assistance here.

I hope that you will soon get well of the ague: you had better move up to this high ground for a day or two.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept. 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 31st, I state that I conceive you will act correctly in not making over to the Portuguese government all the money which the Commissary Gen. gives to you. I order him to give to you money whenever he can spare it, specie particularly. You must be the best judge whether the money ought to be given to the Portuguese government. Their debt to us is now so large, and daily increasing so fast, that I conceive that you ought not to advance any more money,

unless it is obvious that the money can't be got from any other quarter, and that the service suffers from the want of it. You will observe that there will be a very heavy demand for the provision stores lately required, and a demand for the provisions issued to the troops from the 25th July to the 24th Sept.

P.S. I return the list of persons who receive newspapers. I know nothing of any of them, excepting of those who are officers of the army, and of course can form no judgment whether any of them send the newspapers to the French army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept. 1811.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch* from Gen. Foy, who commands the division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' at Truxillo, to Gen. Girard, who commands a division of the 5th corps at Zafra, which was intercepted and deciphered, and shows that the plan of the enemy is exactly what I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 28th Aug., that I believed it was.

That this is the plan is further confirmed by an intercepted letter of the 1st inst. from Gen. Wathier, at Salamanca, to the General commanding at Ciudad Rodrigo, of which I enclose an extract,† announcing the intention of the General commanding the army of the north to collect 25,000 Guards at Salamanca in the course of 6 days, and to move to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo in concert with the Duc de Raguse.

Your Lordship will observe that Gen. Wathier states that the army of the north had had some considerable success against the Spanish army of Galicia. I have received no accounts of these operations, excepting that the troops which had been halted at Rio Seco, towards the middle of the month, had afterwards moved forward upon Benavente about the 23d or 24th. No attack had been made as late as the 26th; and Gen. Dumoustier's division of Guards arrived at Salamanca on their return from the expedition on the 1st inst.; so that it is not probable that the check received by the troops in Galicia was of the important description stated by Gen. Wathier.

I enclose a letter, however, of the 15th inst., received from Gen. Abadia, who commands the army in Galicia; from which your Lordship will observe that they are in want of every thing, and that I did not form an erroneous calculation when I stated, in my dispatch of the 8th Aug., that I could not believe that this army could make any movement to assist us. I don't believe that they have been defeated, as stated; but I shall consider it very fortunate if Gen. Abadia should be able hereafter to sustain himself in Galicia.

Some detachments of convalescents, amounting to about 2000 men, belonging to the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which had been left in Castille, have lately been sent to join their regiments; and this army has likewise been reinforced by the dragoons lately returned from France with their horses. I likewise believe that some of the reinforcements (of the number I am not accurately informed) which have lately entered Spain have

* See Appendix, No. VIII.

† See Appendix, No. IX.

been sent on from Valladolid to join this same army. Your Lordship will see from Gen. Wathier's letter the strength in Guards expected from the army of the north, which must either be exaggerated, or the Guards have been reinforced since the return of the 10th July, adverted to in my dispatch of the 28th Aug.

The '*Armée de Portugal*,' however, reinforced, and the Guards, even according to their state on the 10th July, united, would be too strong for me to think of maintaining the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo on the other side of the Agueda, under all the disadvantages attending the communication across that river. I therefore propose to take a position on the left of the Agueda, if I should find the enemy to be really in such strength as that it is not advisable that I should attack them, and leave it to them to attack us if they should think proper.

In consequence of the statement in Gen. Foy's letter, that a body of troops from the army of the centre were to take the ground of the '*Armée de Portugal*' at Plasencia and Almaraz, I have desired Gen. Hill to detach a body of troops, which had before been prepared for that purpose, to Castello Branco, to keep up the communication between him and the army, and to station himself with the 2d division of infantry at Portalegre.

I have received reports that a division of the 5th corps had moved upon Gen. Ballesteros near Ayamonte. The General retired to the Isla de la Canela, in the mouth of the Guadiana; and the enemy were in Ayamonte, but in small force, on the 24th Aug. As the ships had arrived to carry off Gen. Ballesteros to Algeiras, I imagine that the enemy will have retired again from Ayamonte.

According to accounts from the south east coast, which I have received from Mr. Wellesley, it appears that the Spanish army of Murcia had retired early in August to its position at Lorca, one of the divisions having received a check on its retreat. Gen. Roche reports, on the 14th Aug., that the French had in front of this army only 14,000 men; and if this report be true, it is probable that Soult has returned to Cordova with a part of his force, which is generally reported throughout the country.

P.S. Since closing this dispatch I have received a letter from Gen. Silveira of the 1st inst.; from which I learn that Gen. Abadia had retired in the best order from La Bañeza and Puente de Orvigo, and that he was preparing to resume his position in front of Astorga, in consequence of the retreat of the enemy.

I enclose the morning state of the 1st inst.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of this day. Since writing it I have received a letter from Silveira, of the 1st, which affords ground for belief that Abadia managed his matters remarkably well; and that, instead of having retired to Coruña, he was about to advance again to occupy his ground at Astorga. I don't give any credit to the account of Mina's affair. I must have heard of it if there had been any foundation for the report.

I believe I can send you 3000 or 4000 stands of arms, but no accoutrements.

—— having determined to quit the French service without any

engagement being entered into with him, there does not appear any occasion for making such an engagement at present.

I will apply to the Sec. of State regarding him after I shall have inquired from some of our officers whether he really did behave well to them when they were taken at Talavera, as I am sorry to say, that I have heard from some of them, that the Irish officers in the French service behaved particularly ill to them.

I have not often seen so absurd a paper as ———'s. It would do very well for the Encyclopædia; but there is not one word in the whole paper applicable to the present situation of Valencia.

To Brigade Major May, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th Sept. 1811.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 2d, which I have just received. Every thing appears to me to be in a very satisfactory state; and I only wish that matters were also so satisfactory in other quarters as to give me hopes that I should be able to derive all the advantage from your arrangements which they are calculated to afford.

P.S. I had thoughts of attaching to each troop of horse artillery one of the iron 5½ inch howitzers, instead of the small brass howitzer they have now. Let me have your opinion whether the carriages, &c., of these iron howitzers are so complete as that this arrangement would answer. We could contrive to give them another ammunition car to carry spherical case for this howitzer.

The A.G. to R. H. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

5th Sept. 1811.

I have communicated the contents of the enclosed letter to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, and he is of opinion the cars should be allotted, agreeably to the arrangement of the Inspector of hospitals, to the several divisions as they may arrive, by an officer of your department, and afterwards to be sent to the Commissaries of each division as appropriated. The Commander of the Forces desires that these officers should then take them in charge, keeping lists of their names and places of abode, treating the drivers well, and giving fair notice to them that if they desert the Commander of the Forces will never cease to have them followed until he catches them, and that the severest punishments will follow. The Surgeons of divisions will make regular requisitions on the Commissaries of divisions for the cars as they are wanted.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.

5th Sept. 1811.

I am to acquaint you, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., that 4 bullock cars per brigade for the cavalry will be allotted for the transport of the sick by the Commissary Gen., in lieu of the spring waggon; and the Commissaries of the cavalry will receive and take charge of the same, granting them upon the regular requisitions made for them by the Surgeons of the cavalry.

The A.G. to Dr. Franch, Inspector of hospitals.

5th Sept. 1811.

I herewith enclose a copy of a letter I have written to the Commissary Gen. on the subject of the distribution of the cars to the several divisions for their sick, and you will be pleased to acquaint the respective Staff Surgeons of the mode in which they are to apply to receive the same. I shall acquaint the General officers of divisions with this arrangement.

An order has been issued to the several divisions to send 6 camp kettles per division to the care of the Assist. Surgeons of the respective divisions, at the hospital station at Castanheira.

The A. G. to the A. A. Gs. 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and Light divisions.

5th Sept. 1811.

I am to acquaint you, for the information of the officer commanding the — division, that a proportion of bullock cars, viz., 10 to each division, will be allotted by the Commissary Gen., and sent to the Commissaries of each division, in lieu of the spring waggon, for the transport of the sick. The Staff Surgeons of divisions will apply to the Commissaries for what they require.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st Aug., and I am much concerned to find there is any difficulty upon a subject on which, of all others, it appears to me that there ought to be none.

The establishment of post mules on the roads for the conveyance of letters is one of the ordinary establishments of the country, of which the government have at all times borne the expense; and the question is, whether the government or the military chest are to defray this expense in future. It is very possible that I may be mistaken in my notion that profit is derived from the establishment of the posts in Portugal, and that, owing to the usual mismanagement, what is profit elsewhere becomes loss in this country; but that is no reason why the military chest of the British army should defray the expense of the Portuguese posts; neither can any ground be found for such an extraordinary conclusion in Senhor Sodré's correspondence with the Sec. of the Post Office.

When the army pursued the enemy to the frontiers of Castille, there were no means on the roads of communicating by letter with Lisbon, and Senhor Sodré wrote to Senhor J. S. Gomez, to urge that measures might be taken to have post horses placed at the stations at which they had formerly been; for which horses Senhor Sodré was authorised to say that the Commissary Gen. of the British army would provide forage, and also rations for the postillions, as the only mode by which either could be provided with subsistence in those days.

An advance was made by the Portuguese government to the post masters of 6 *contos* of *reis*, to enable them to purchase and place mules upon the roads, in order to provide the means of communication. I believe it will be admitted that it was the interest and the duty of the Portuguese government to provide these means without loss of time; and they accordingly made this advance, which the post masters were to repay out of the sums due to them, of 400 *reis* each mule *per diem*, for keeping the mules.

It now appears that not only the government refuse to pay the expense of the rations given to the men and animals placed on the roads, by which alone they were kept alive, but that a claim is stated against the military chest for the advance of 6 *contos* of *reis* for purchasing them, in order to keep up the communication, for which it is the peculiar duty of the civil government, in every civilised country, to provide. And this claim is made at the same time that it had been settled that the post masters were to repay these very advances!

I am willing to pay from the military chest the usual price of 200 *reis* a league for every post horse or mule used for the service of the British army on the ordinary lines of communication of the country; and, besides, to pay half a dollar a day for each horse or mule kept at the post stages

on the lines of communication established purposely for the service of the army; but the government must pay the expense of all the rations which have been delivered to the postillions and post mules, or of the 400 *reis per diem* which have been given for each mule kept on all the ordinary lines of communication of the country, of which I shall send you the account.

I beg to have an answer to this proposition by return of post, and that you will inform the government if they don't acquiesce in this proposition, I request they will provide posts for the Portuguese army, and for the civil correspondence in all parts of the country, as well on the direct as on the cross lines of communication; for if any proposition so unreasonable should be insisted upon, as that the military chest of the British army is to defray the expense of all the Portuguese posts between the Tagus and the Douro, I give notice that I will not allow any Portuguese correspondence of any description, whether civil or military, to be carried on by those posts of which I shall defray the expense.

I beg that you will lay this letter before the Portuguese government.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept. 1811.

This letter will be delivered to you by Gen. Carrera, of the Spanish service, who is anxious to proceed immediately to Cadiz; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will forward his wishes, by providing him with a passage in a man of war, whenever an opportunity may offer.

To Lieut. Col. —, — regt.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst., in which you have desired that I should give you leave of absence for 2 months to go to England, 'where business deeply involving your future prospects requires your presence.' As I have been under the necessity of declining to comply with all the requests of this description which have been made to me lately, I cannot comply with yours; and I observe that you must have been prepared for this answer, by the answer which I learn from Major Gen. Campbell that he had sent to the letter which you had written to him upon the same subject.

As you have stated to me in a former letter the nature of your business in England, and as it appears not only that it can, but that if you were in England you would be under the necessity of transacting it in writing, and therefore that it can be transacted with equal advantage from this country, I feel the less concern at being obliged to refuse to comply with your request for leave of absence.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept. 1811.

So much time elapses before soldiers who have been in hospital in this country recover sufficiently to be able to undertake a march to join their regiments; and being under the necessity of making them invariably march under the command of an officer, to keep them in order, whereby the march of even those who are sufficiently recovered is necessarily frequently delayed till the party becomes so large that an officer can be afforded to take charge of it: this has occasioned very large depôts

of convalescent and recovered men and officers at all our hospital stations, but particularly at Lisbon.

It is impossible to allow the command and charge of these depôts to fall into the hands of any Captain of the army who may happen to be the senior of the convalescent officers, or the senior of those who may have been sent to the hospital station in charge of sick; as the charge, at all times one of importance, is sometimes of great magnitude, as, for instance, there are now at Lisbon not less than 8000 sick and convalescent soldiers.

Under these circumstances, not being able to spare Field officers for the duty, I have been obliged to select a Captain to place at the head of each of these depôts, who is generally the best in his regiment, and necessarily one of long standing. Of course this is an inconvenience to the regiments, and a detriment to the service; and it occurs to me that there might be found in England Field officers who would be glad to undertake this charge, who would have sufficient intelligence to conduct it well, but who are unequal to the more active and arduous duties of the field.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention the subject to His Royal Highness; and if he should consent to the plan proposed, if you will endeavor to find 4 intelligent Field officers, to be sent out here, to be at the head of our principal depôts of convalescents.

I allow the Captains when employed on this duty 9s. 6d. a day.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept. 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing the copy of one which he had received from the Conde de Aguiar, acquainting him that the Prince Regent of Portugal had been pleased to confer upon him the title of Conde de Trancoso, and the Grand Cross of the order of the Tower and Sword.

I beg your Lordship to lay these letters before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and to request the permission of His Royal Highness for Sir W. Beresford to accept the honors conferred upon him by H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.

7th Sept. 1811.

I am directed to desire that no time should be lost in arranging such books and papers belonging to the department as have been sent to Lisbon, and which may hereafter be transmitted from head quarters as they accumulate here. To carry this intention into effect, you will be pleased immediately to deliver to a good bookbinder in Lisbon, 1st; The letter books of this office as you may have received them, or as they may be sent, commencing the 1st May, 1809; these books to be bound anew, as neatly as possible, with their indexes attached, making each volume to contain the letters of 6 months.* 2dly; All the return books, in which monthly

* On the return of the army from the Peninsula, in 1814, the boxes containing the papers of the Adj. Gen.'s department were sent to the Adj. Gen.'s office, Horse Guards. There being no room there, these boxes were sent to the stores in Tooley Street, and subsequently removed to the Tower, where they were placed in store above the Armory which was destroyed by the fire on the 30th Oct. 1841. The letter books, however, had been taken out of these boxes in 1822, from the store in Tooley Street, by Lord Downes, the Storekeeper General, by order of the Duke of Wellington, then Master General of the Ordnance, for the purpose of making some reference to them, and, fortunately, they were not returned. They were discovered at the Ordnance Office in Pall Mall, in 1844, and a selection has been made from those letters relating to detail, discipline, &c., for the purpose of being inserted in this work.

returns and weekly states are entered, to be bound in like manner, numbered, and the periods marked on the back of the volume. 3dly; All letters or other papers sent to Lisbon to be classed, and put into portfolios under their proper heads, and carefully assorted: nothing that can ever be called for, or that can be of use, to be destroyed.

I hope to get the G. O. of this army in a short period into a proper state; and I am desirous that the utmost exertion should be used to carry these instructions into effect. I shall direct all the letter books and return books, &c., to be forwarded to you forthwith; and if you can procure some good clerks or persons to assist in completing this service, you will be allowed to charge for them in your contingent account. You will not fail to acknowledge the receipt of this, and the measures adopted in consequence, and the progress you make. I understand Lieut. Crompton has much knowledge of this sort of business, and I should esteem it as a particular favor from him if he would assist in the arrangement.

The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

8th Sept. 1811.

In answer to your letter of yesterday's date, relative to an issue of money being made to the medical gentlemen at the hospital at Castanheira, for the purpose of procuring vegetables, &c., for the sick, I have to remark on the extreme inconvenience and confusion in the men's accounts that such a proceeding gives rise to; as also to express the Commander of the Forces' desire, that no divisional hospital should exist under any general arrangement from this department: if such are ever formed, it must be solely managed by the Commanding officer of the division. His Excellency therefore desires that the hospital at Castanheira should be established as a general hospital from the 12th inst., and taken under general hospital regulations; and I have received the Commander of the Forces' directions to apprise you that he will not allow me to take cognizance of any hospitals that are not on the general establishment. You will be so good as to acquaint me if it is necessary to send a commandant to Castanheira. I shall delay doing so, until I hear a further report upon the state of the malady at that place, which I conclude will determine you in retaining the hospital there, or removing it elsewhere.

The A.G. to R. H. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

8th Sept. 1811.

In consequence of a representation from Dr. Franck relative to the lamentable state of the inhabitants of Castanheira, not only from having a bad fever amongst them, but also from a want of the actual necessities of life, I have the directions of the Commander of the Forces to desire you will send instructions to the officer of your department at the above place to issue such quantities of meat and wine, for the use of the inhabitants, as the medical gentleman at that station may point out as necessary.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Belem.

9th Sept. 1811.

Your letter of the 5th inst. and enclosure has been submitted to the Commander of the Forces, and I have to communicate the following additional instructions relative to forming the dépôt at Oeiras:

1st; The order of the army is, that when 30 men of any regiment or brigade are sent to the hospital, an officer of the brigade shall be sent with them, who shall be responsible for the men's accounts, &c.; and that a Captain shall be sent when 100 men go to hospital. One officer to be sent back to the army in charge of 40 men; and all convalescent officers to join the dépôt, so that a sufficient number of officers would always remain with the dépôt.

2dly; By another order of the army, money was to be drawn for the use of the soldiers at the convalescent dépôts only in proportion to their wants. The officers drawing the money were to be responsible for the sums they drew to the Paymasters of the several regiments to which the men belonged for whom the money should be drawn.

3dly; It is proposed to have 2 dépôts for receiving soldiers from the hospitals at Lisbon, viz., one at Belem, and another at Oeiras; and it is proposed that both should be under the superintendence of the officer commanding at Belem, in order that he may regulate what there should be at each, and what men and at what periods they should go off from each to the army.

4thly; It appears to the Commander of the Forces that the mode in which the men should be selected for Oeiras should be as follows, viz.: Men who should have recovered their strength at Belem so far as that they should be able to walk about, and would be likely by their disorderly conduct to become ill again, should be sent to Oeiras; men who upon coming out of hospital should be already in such a state of health, as that the same apprehension might be entertained respecting them, should be sent to Oeiras.

5thly; According to this mode of selection, if the weather on one day should not be such as to allow of the landing at Paço d'Arcos, it will probably on another; and it will be indifferent on which day the men shall go to Oeiras. When ordered from Oeiras to the army, if the weather should not permit of their embarking at Paço d'Arcos, they can march direct from Oeiras upon Lumiar without passing through Lisbon.

6thly; There must be a Commanding officer and Staff at Oeiras; and those proposed for this duty are approved of.

7thly; It does not appear necessary that the officer in charge of the men at Oeiras should have an account with the Paymaster Gen.

8thly; If the men in the depôt at Oeiras should first have passed through the depôt at Belem, the officer belonging to the brigade or division, who will have been in charge of them, will have been accountable for the sums drawn on their account; and when he will hand them over to the officer of the brigade or division, who is to take charge of them at Oeiras, it will be with a return of necessaries; and the officer who will receive charge of them at Oeiras will begin a new account with each man of each regiment, on his own account, in the same manner as he will for each man going direct to Oeiras from the hospital, instead of passing through Belem depôt.

9thly; However, as the depôt at Oeiras is to be under the direction of the Commandant at Belem, it will be better that all the parts of which it is composed should be parts also of the depôt at Belem; and that the senior officer of each regiment, brigade, or division, whether residing at Belem or Oeiras, should draw the money from the Paymaster Gen. for the men of the brigade, regiment, or division, and be accountable for it; and that those in command of the detachment of the regiment, brigade, or division, at which he will not be resident, should be responsible to, and act under his orders in every respect.

I return the enclosure in your letter of the 5th; in it is marked what cannot be allowed. You will communicate these instructions to the Commandant at Lisbon, and report to me, for his Excellency's information, what further occurs on this head of service.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th Sept. 1811.

I enclose a sealed paper, which contains a letter of the 8th inst., which I received last night, from Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt.

I beg that you will return this paper to Lieut. Col. —, and inform him, that although the Regulations allowed of his applying to me direct for leave of absence, on an occasion on which his immediate superior had declined to forward his application, it is inconsistent with the spirit, as well as a breach of the letter of the Regulations, that he should forward complaints of his immediate superior, on various subjects, under pretence of continuing a correspondence on the subject of his request for leave of absence.

I hope that the feelings which Lieut. Col. — expresses upon the censure which he has received will induce him to avoid that conduct in future, which may expose him to it. The object of His Majesty's Regulations, on the mode to be observed by officers in forwarding their applications, and stating their complaints, is not less to support the discipline and preserve the subordination of the army than it is to bring to the knowledge of the Commander in Chief the truth, by which knowledge alone he can do justice to all parties.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 30th, and I now enclose my dispatch of this day. I have no news which that dispatch does not contain, excepting a report that Suchet is collecting his troops at Çaragoça.

Is it true that Monserrat is taken ?

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter, enclosing one from Lord Wellesley of the 24th Aug., relative to the omission of Dom M. Forjaz to make known to the Prince Regent of Portugal the names of the officers who had distinguished themselves in the service in this country; to which I have to reply, that Dom M. Forjaz receives from me every week a dispatch, containing an account of the operations of the army during the preceding 8 days, in which dispatch the names of those officers of both services who have distinguished themselves are mentioned. These dispatches are intended for the information of the Governors of the Kingdom; and I conclude that they communicate their contents, or possibly transmit the originals, or copies, to H. R. H. the Prince Regent in Brazil.

Dom M. Forjaz has no authority from me to recommend any officer, nor any means of acquiring information regarding the services of any officer, excepting from these weekly dispatches.

As the contents of these dispatches, particularly those parts of them relating to the services and merits of different officers, are published in the *Lisbon Gazette*, I should think that it might have been discovered that the names of the officers, British and Portuguese, who had distinguished themselves throughout the war, were already known to His Royal Highness, and that, without any great effort, Dom M. Forjaz might have been screened from the imputation of neglect and disobedience upon this occasion. But I am concerned to have again to remark that, in addition to all the other difficulties which prey upon me in this country, the support of the British government is not given to that officer of H. R. H. the Prince Regent's government in Portugal, who was selected by His Royal Highness, and upon experience has been found to be the most fit of all His Highness' servants to carry on the arduous concerns with which he is charged.

I say 'found upon experience,' because I don't hesitate to acknowledge that I entertained against Dom M. Forjaz prejudices of the same description as appear to be entertained against him in Brazil; but I altered my opinion of him upon experience of his abilities, his zeal, and his integrity; and I think I have reason to complain that this officer, who is thus preferred by me, after a prejudice against him, and upon trial, has not received the support of His Majesty's government in Brazil, and that he is consequently at this moment on the point of being driven from his office in disgrace, and all the details of the military department to be placed in the hands of a person certainly less capable, but probably entirely incapable, of conducting them, and this in the middle of a campaign.

I had recommended to Dom M. Forjaz to resign his office, and had determined to make no effort to induce the Prince Regent to retain him

in his service ; because His Royal Highness, in his letter to me of the 7th Feb. last, expressed his displeasure with him in such strong terms, that it appeared to me to be useless, and likely only to be injurious to Dom M. Forjaz, to endeavor to protect him against the powerful party in Brazil, who appeared determined to remove him from his office, and, if possible, to destroy him. The accusations against him also are so inconsistent with each other, and so contemptible, that it is obvious they are only the effect of malice and of the spirit of party, which could have been contended against successfully on the spot alone.

Dom M. Forjaz is at one time accused of being a partisan of the French. He is then accused of disobeying the Prince's orders, of opposing himself to his Prince, and of founding his opposition on the support he received from His Majesty's servant in this country, and of boasting of this support, forgetting that Dom M. Forjaz, who is the Secretary of the Local government in Portugal, will neither obey nor disobey any orders but those of the Local government. He is then accused of an intrigue with *me*, forgetting that I have something else to do and to think of besides the petty intrigues of Lisbon ; that, excepting the Patriarch, I never spoke to any member of the Portuguese government ; that I don't know even by sight the majority of them ; and that it is quite impossible that I can feel any interest in their proceedings, excepting as they affect the operations of the war : and lastly, to crown all, Dom M. Forjaz is accused of disobeying the Prince's repeated orders, in omitting to bring under His Royal Highness' view, in order to receive marks of His Royal Highness' favor, the names of his friends, the English officers, of those friends on whose support he relies to keep him in office against the wishes of his Prince. But this last crime is, I conclude, committed in his quality of French partisan.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 24th Aug. Gen. Campbell had already consented to stay some time longer.

When I wrote to you in February last in regard to Clinton, things were in a very different state from what they are now, and the opinions of people very different.

I object to the mode which our officers have of adopting an opinion upon a subject before they can entirely understand it ; and each then acting as if it were necessary that he should produce by his conduct an alteration of measures in an army, as he would in the House of Commons. Every man has a right to form his own opinion, and to retain it if he thinks fit ; but I expect, what I don't always find, viz., that when he comes to the army, he shall act according to my opinion, I being alone responsible for every thing. However, matters are so altered, and it is so little likely that there can be any difference of opinion about what is going on, or what may go on, that not only I have no objection, but I shall be glad to have the assistance of Gen. H. Clinton. As for former subjects of difference of opinion, they are gone by, and are not worth considering ; neither would I ever think of them under existing circumstances.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 21st Aug., regarding the intention to request the Prince Regent of Portugal to return to this country; and I can only assure your Lordship that the government shall be made acquainted with the opinion which I have been able to form upon that subject, as His Royal Highness' return will affect the situation of affairs here and in Brazil.

It is my opinion that a change of government in Portugal is become absolutely necessary. The Prince Regent's servants have in fact no influence over the proceedings of the Local government; and it appears to me that approbation is claimed from Brazil, in proportion as all the measures proposed by the Prince Regent's servants are opposed. None of the reforms proposed in the civil departments of the army are yet carried into execution; the Local government have positively refused to adopt some of them, and they have done every thing in their power to defeat the effect of others, by the mode in which they have proposed to carry them into execution; and they would not have discussed even one of the plans proposed, if I had not positively refused to allow a shilling of the additional subsidy to be paid till they were adopted.

It is a matter of astonishment that such a spirit should exist among people who absolutely depend for their existence upon the continuance of His Royal Highness' protection of their country, but so it is. The truth is, that they have been ashamed of the degree of influence and power which they had been induced to give to British officers in their army. The contrast of the conduct of the Spaniards is perpetually occurring to them; the Spaniards reproach them that they have no country, and that there are no Portuguese; and the object of the Local government appears to be to diminish the reputation and the influence of the British officers as much as they can, after they have given them the command of their armies, and to raise that of Silveira, and of others of this description; and with this view they oppose every measure proposed by us, and I suspect have gone even farther, and have employed more than the due proportion of the resources of the government to support the little desultory operations of these officers, in preference to those of the army. I believe there was never a more flagrant instance of the perversity of the human mind!! I believe that if ——— had cordially supported the measures of the King's servants here, that the government would have been changed long ago; as matters are, however, there is no chance of a change of government, or of an alteration of its conduct for the better.

Without more knowledge than I have of the character of the Prince Regent of Portugal, it is difficult for me to determine what effect would be produced by his coming to assume the government. The endeavors to raise the national character would probably be redoubled, to which, however, I have no objection whatever, if the measures for improving, and for the better application of the resources of the country recommended by me, are carried into execution; and as I believe fear is the predominant feature in the character of the Prince of Brazil, I think that a sense of the danger which would result from a neglect of the measures

proposed would secure his support of them; but it would be necessary to have about him a British minister, who, at the same time that he should conciliate His Royal Highness' confidence, would act cordially with the officers in command of the army.

It might be necessary to insist with His Royal Highness that all the engagements entered into with Beresford when he took the command of the army, regarding the promotions of the army, punishments, &c. &c., should be strictly performed, otherwise the *Fidalgos* would soon annihilate all discipline, and ruin the army.

The presence of His Royal Highness in Portugal would have many good effects in respect to the contest, if it should produce no very bad effect in respect to the authority which we now have over the operations of the army.

1st; it would give fresh spirit to the exertions of all the Portuguese, many of whom look very anxiously to the future state of their country, even if it should get through the existing crisis. 2dly; it would have some effect of the same description throughout the Peninsula, as well on the Spaniards as the French. It would show both that Great Britain was not only determined to persevere, but considered success to be certain, if the Portuguese should continue their exertions in union with us.

I am not so certain of the effect that will be produced by this change in Brazil, and indeed I don't understand the subject so well; but it is my opinion, that the British government ought to consider even this branch of the subject as it will affect the interests of Great Britain through Portugal, and not as one affecting the mercantile interests of His Majesty's subjects.

Brazil will be reduced from the situation of an independent country to that of a colony, which the inhabitants of Brazil may not much like; and, considering all that is going on around them, some of them (unless they are well managed, as we may be certain they will not be) may be induced to oppose; but even in this extreme case of the loss of Brazil, I should think it the interest of Portugal, and of course of Great Britain, that the Sovereign should reside in Portugal.

I am not entirely convinced that Portugal can do without Brazil; but it is not impossible, in my opinion, to conciliate the interests of Brazil, and of Portugal, the Sovereign residing in the latter kingdom. It cannot be done, in my opinion, by bringing back Brazil to the state of restraint of a colony in point of trade; and if the trade is left as it is, the mercantile interests of Brazil, and of His Majesty's subjects, will not be injured by the removal of the government to Portugal; but in this case it would probably be necessary to arrange that a proportion of the duties on imports and exports paid in Brazil, should be transferred to the treasury of Portugal.

If this object should be effected, the political and financial interests of Portugal will be conciliated with the mercantile interests of the colony and of the British merchants. It is impossible for me to say whether it can be effected or not; I only state what is desirable, and what must be effected at some time or other, if the result of the contest should be successful, and we should be able to maintain the independence of Portugal

against the enemy; neither is it possible for me to judge whether the inhabitants of Brazil would be content to return to the situation of a colony, their trade being left independent, paying to the mother country a part of the duties levied upon it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 21st and 23d Aug., regarding specie for this country.

Since I wrote to you on the 1st Aug. we have received more money than usual from Cadiz, and we have got some at Oporto, which, with the sum which arrived very opportunely from England, relieved our distresses. You may depend upon it that there is no scheme for raising a shilling which can be suggested which is not considered; and, when it comes to be closely examined, it generally turns out that it would not answer any purpose, except to interrupt for a time the success of the existing mode of raising money.

The only thing that has ever occurred to me that it might be practicable to try, and which might produce the effect of bringing some money into the chest, which would not come into it otherwise, is to lodge in the hands of the Commissary Gen. a certain sum, £100,000 for instance, in exchequer bills, and to enable him to issue them when he should think proper, with the consent of the Commander in Chief, and to pay and charge the interest of them in his accounts when issued.

We might possibly, at some periods, get some money in this manner, and we might save the issue of some specie in the payment of our debts, by paying them in exchequer bills.

In the discussions for the formation of a military chest for the Portuguese army, to which Sydenham was a party, it was pretended that some difficulty was experienced in the arrangement, because I would not engage to pay a specified sum every month from the military chest to the King's minister, to enable him to pay the subsidy; but this was nonsense. I proved that the payment of the subsidy was in advance; and, in point of fact, when all accounts shall be settled, I have no doubt that it will be found that we are in advance, on account of the subsidy, not less than £400,000.

The difficulty on the subject of specie, as well as that felt on every other subject, originates with the government; and, till a new government is formed, and acts upon better principles, the increase of subsidy, even accompanied as it has been by an increase of revenue, will produce no effect.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

Referring to the assembly of troops on different points on our frontier, and to the accounts which I receive from the Admiral of general naval preparations, I should wish that, till the equinoctial rains have filled the Tagus, we should be tolerably strong in fleet, either at Cadiz or Lisbon.

I think we have nothing to apprehend on shore, and nothing on shore and afloat, if the Tagus should be in a state to afford us a barrier; but, being fordable every where just now, and there being a chance of an

attack by land and by sea at the same time, I think it proper to mention that we ought to have some maritime strength, particularly if the government give any credit to the reports of the great maritime preparations by the enemy which are in circulation.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I have received lately from the Duke of York several orders to send regiments home, &c. &c.; upon which I should wish to be informed what is the practice of the service.

If His Royal Highness directs me to draft 2 battalions into one, there is no material diminution of force here, and I understand that the arrangement is to be carried into execution; but he has lately desired me to send home the 85th regt., which I intended to do as soon as it should be relieved, or immediately, if there had been no prospect of an early operation; and by the last post the 29th and 97th regts., the whole of which would make a diminution of about 600 R. and F. of infantry, which becomes a little important.

I don't know whether I am right or wrong, but I consider your Lordship responsible for the force I have here; and although I should be sorry to be the cause of any unpleasant explanation on a subject of this kind, I think it right to inform you that I have received these orders, and that I consider that I must obey them; but if it should be possible, it is desirable that you should come to an understanding with His Royal Highness regarding the recall of troops from this country.

I have written to him this day, to tell him that I had detained the 85th, and should detain the 29th and 97th till relieved, in consequence of the sickly state of some of the regiments, and the prospect of an early operation, unless I should receive his orders to send them home immediately at all events.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

The plan of operations of the enemy's armies, or the period of its execution, appears to have been altered since the 1st inst., as the Guards have not been collected at Salamanca, at least as far as I have heard; and Marshal Marmont has undoubtedly removed his head quarters back again to Plasencia, and Foy's division of infantry of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which he announced in his letter in cypher to Girard, of the 20th Aug., was to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, still remains in Lower Estremadura. The enemy, however, are actively employed in raising contributions in Castille and Estremadura; and a detachment of the Guards and of the Lanciers de Berg, which arrived at Salamanca on the 1st inst., drove Don Julian's troops from Ledesma on the 4th, and have since obliged them to retire across the Yeltes. They have, however, themselves again retired towards the Tormes.

Either these operations or increased vigilance of the police at Salamanca have prevented my receiving any intelligence from my correspondents in that town since the 3d inst., and I am therefore not fully informed of all that has passed lately, and is passing, on the Tormes and the Duero. I am very apprehensive that their silence may be attributed

to the latter cause, and even that some of them may have suffered for their attachment to us, as the intelligence which they sent to Gen. Silveira having been constantly published in the Portuguese, and afterwards copied into the English newspapers, must have attracted the notice of the enemy; and it is more than probable that if any great operation is in contemplation, particular orders have been sent to increase the vigilance of the police, and to put an end to all intercourse which I may have had with the interior of Spain.

The enemy appear not only to have altered the plan of operations which they had formed for the army of the north, and for the '*Armée de Portugal*,' for the first days of this month, but also the general plan for the campaign of the year. Soult certainly marched to attack the Spanish army of Murcia, and his intention was to endeavor to obtain possession of Carthagena. He left in the blockade of Cadiz 2 divisions of the 1st corps, and in Seville and about Zafra, in Estremadura, the 5th corps. He had some success, as reported in my last dispatch, against one division of the army of Murcia, on the 9th Aug., and the army of Murcia took a position near Lorca. It is generally reported that there had been another action on the 14th Aug., in which the French suffered considerable loss; but Mr. Wellesley has transmitted to me a letter from Gen. Roche, from Alicante, of the 18th, in which he does not mention that event, and I therefore give no credit to this report. But it appears that Soult, instead of following his success against the army of Murcia, has returned to the westward; and I have a report that a detachment had arrived on the 2d inst. at Llerena, in Estremadura, and that he was about to assemble a force there. It is so difficult to obtain intelligence in the south of Spain, that I can't be certain of the truth of this report. Mr. Wellesley has transmitted me another, received from Gen. Campbell, of the 26th Aug., which the latter had received from Gen. Beguines, that the enemy had moved upon Malaga.

These 2 reports are not entirely inconsistent with each other. It was probable that the intelligence of our movements upon Ciudad Rodrigo would induce the enemy to turn all their attention to this side of the Peninsula; and that the desire that Girard should occupy the position of Truxillo, which it is very necessary for the enemy to secure, would occasion the march of additional troops to occupy the country about Zafra; and this would impede the execution of all the great plans in the south east part of the Peninsula, at the same time that Soult would still be sufficiently strong to carry on his operations in the Campo de Gibraltar.

If the alteration of the plan, or of the period of execution by the armies immediately in my front, is connected with a plan for a general movement of all the armies towards the frontiers of Portugal, the movement stated would be made upon Llerena; but probably as large a force would be assembled at that place as could be drawn from the southern provinces of Spain; in which case the movement upon Malaga could not be made.

This is the plan, the execution of which would probably be attempted, if the Emperor were to come to the Peninsula; but since the receipt of the intercepted letters, adverted to in my dispatch of the 28th Aug., and which were dated in the end of June, I have had no reason to believe he

was coming; and as Bessières and other officers have been called to France suddenly in the end of July, and from intelligence lately received from Bordeaux, I am inclined to believe he is not coming; and I don't think the execution of this plan would be intrusted to any of his officers now in Spain.

The French retired from Ayamonte on the night of the 24th, and a detachment proceeded to make an attack upon the castle of Paymogo, in which a small Spanish garrison had been left by Gen. Ballesteros. The enemy were repulsed.

The detachment of Spanish troops in Estremadura, under Gen. Morillo, joined with Col. Downie's legion, and the cavalry of the 5th army, the whole under the Conde de Penne Villemur, have had some success in an attack which they made upon a detachment of Foy's division, at Cáceres. They drove the enemy in a very creditable manner from that town, and took some prisoners.

P.S. Since I wrote this dispatch, I have received a letter of the 7th from Salamanca, which has relieved me from the anxiety which I felt respecting my correspondents in that place. It appears that the enemy have not collected on the Tormes the troops which they had intended to collect early in the month.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

I enclose the weekly state of the 1st, and the morning report of the 8th inst.

I am sorry to say that our young soldiers are sickly; but the disorders are not very violent; and I hope that at the end of this month they will be less prevalent. It is melancholy, however, to see the effect which the Walcheren fever has had upon the constitutions of both officers and soldiers.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Sept. 1811.

Major Gen. Don Carlos de España has informed me, that, upon the recent movements of the enemy between the Tormes and the Yeltes, he had been under the necessity of sending across the Duero the battalions of Spanish recruits which he was forming on the left of that river, and that one battalion, consisting of 1300 men, under the command of Lieut. Col. Don M. Bendito, had gone over from Fermoselle to Bemposta, and that another battalion, consisting of 600 men, under the command of Don F. Baxona, had gone over from Saucelle to Freixo de Espadacinta. I request that these troops may be received with hospitality within the Portuguese frontier.

Don Carlos de España has informed me, that he had sent over, from Saucelle and Fermoselle, magazines of corn for the support of these troops; but, as they may be under the necessity of remaining in Portugal longer than those magazines will provide for their subsistence, I beg that you will give directions that the Superintendent *de Viveres* in the province of Tras os Montes may take measures to supply them with provisions, for which I will pay from the military chest of the British army, until a British Commissary can be sent to supply them.

I beg that you will inform the Superintendent *de Viveres* of the pro-

vince of Tras os Montes, that I hold him responsible for a due obedience to this order, and that there shall be no ground for complaints on the part of the Spanish officers and troops.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Sept. 1811.

I enclose a list of the Portuguese subjects in the service of the medical department, and a list of those also in the commissariat of the British army, whom I wish to be exempted from the operation of the recruiting laws.

In the list of persons employed by the Commissariat the names of several laborers are included. These I should have directed to be struck out, if I had observed any system or justice in the mode of executing any of the laws of this description in Portugal. But I know that the magistrates invariably neglect their duty, generally from corrupt motives; and, when called upon to perform it, would lay their hands upon these laborers in the service of the commissariat as the persons most easily got at, and the commissariat might, at the most important and critical moment for the country, be totally without the necessary assistance of this description.

I don't write without information when I accuse the magistrates of Portugal of performing their duties corruptly. At this moment I have under consideration a complaint from the people of Lamego, that a requisition which I had lately made for carts had been complied with entirely by forcing the poor to supply their carts, and by totally exempting the rich from supplying theirs.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th inst., containing one from ———.

Upon perusal of the judicial papers enclosed, it does not at all appear that Mr. ——— is the person of whom Madame ——— complains. At all events, as she does not choose to prosecute him before a Court Martial, it is impossible for me to take any steps on the subject of her complaint.

If she chooses to order or allow the witnesses to attend to give testimony, I will bring him to trial before a General Court Martial, and whatever punishment for his conduct the Court may sentence shall be carried into effect. But I can't do any thing so unjust or so inconsistent with the laws and customs of our country as to adopt any measures to punish or censure an officer, who declares that he has not been guilty of the offence imputed to him, without a previous trial.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst., containing a complaint of the conduct of 2 soldiers (names not mentioned) belonging to the — regt., at Leiria, on the 1st inst. As soon as those soldiers join the army they shall be tried for the alleged offence, and whatever sentence may be passed upon them shall be carried into execution; but I request you again to represent to the Portuguese minister, that unless the witnesses attend the trial of the offenders, and give their testimony upon oath, *vivâ voce*, the offenders will not be convicted, and it will not be in my

power to punish them. The feelings which induce the people of Portugal to refrain from giving evidence against criminals are those of false humanity. They prevent the punishment of the robber and the murderer, who is thus by impunity encouraged to continue his depredations, and many innocent people suffer because those who complain will not come forward to prosecute. I have frequently represented this circumstance, but in vain. I should be glad to have proof that either officer or soldier of the British army embargoes carriages and demands money for their release. I know the latter do so; but without proof of the fact I can't punish them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Sept. 1811.

Since I wrote to you on the 11th, on the return of the Prince of Brazil to this country, I have received from Mr. Stuart a letter, of which I enclose an extract, which speaks volumes on the subject on which you desired to have my opinion.

These complaints of ours, referred to by the Conde de Linhares, are of want of provisions, and means of transport for the Portuguese troops, and of the latter to assist the British troops in defence of the Kingdom of Portugal; and the confidential minister of the Prince of Brazil, upon reading these complaints, instead of urging the Local government to adopt energetic measures to prevent the existence of ground for these complaints, recommends 'greater energy in their replies to them,' and that the King's servants here (that is to say, I) should be made responsible for the failure of the Portuguese departments.

After obtaining a knowledge of the sentiments of the Conde de Linhares, I can't recommend that the Prince of Brazil should be invited back to Portugal. Bad as things are now, they would certainly be worse if he were in the country; and unless the British government take up the subject, and bring these gentlemen to a proper understanding of the nature of their situation and of their duties, we must only jog on as we can, exposed to all the inconveniences and risks, and incurring all the expenses, of this contest. If government would follow my advice, however, they would make the Prince of Brazil understand, that great as is the interest of the British government in maintaining the contest for the preservation of his dominions, his own interest is greater; and that if he and his ministers, and his servants in this country, did not exert themselves, the assistance of the British, both in money and troops, should be withdrawn.

I have already fought one battle on this frontier with defective equipments of all kinds, owing to the neglect of the Portuguese government, and I am on the eve of another; but this will not do: there is not another officer in the service who would go through what I daily endure to keep the machine together, and it can't last.

Your Lordship may depend upon it, that with all our efforts and good will we can't save this country, if the sentiment of the Conde de Linhares and of the government should become the prevalent sentiment of the country, and it should be imagined for a moment that the interest in the contest is ours, and that the Prince of Brazil and the Portuguese nation have but a minor interest in it, and need make no exertion. This is

exactly what I have been contending against since I first landed in Portugal, and that one sentence which I enclose is sufficient to undo all the good that we have done to this moment.

Whatever measure government may adopt upon this subject, I trust that they will not make it known that the intelligence of the existence of this dispatch from the Conde de Linhares was received from ———.

The A.G. to Capt. —, D.A.A.G., 2d division of cavalry.

13th Sept. 1811.

I am sorry to be under the necessity of remarking the little attention that is paid to the returns required from the 2d division of cavalry; and the enclosed remonstrance from Lieut. Col. Elley, as well as the observations made at this office, clearly prove that the regiments in the division are neither attentive in making out the returns and accounting for their casualties, nor the Staff officers, whose business it is to examine and discover the errors previous to their being forwarded, anxious to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner. I am unwilling to urge his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to resort to any strong measures, so long as there is a hope of my obtaining the returns correctly, by pointing out these continued negligences; but as the general returns of the army are not only materially delayed, but wholly arrested, by the errors of any one division, I must earnestly enjoin you to cause the minutest explanation to be afforded to every Commanding officer relative to their returns, and the strictest investigation must be made by you previous to their being transmitted, as it is impossible for me to call any one but you to an account for the mistakes, omissions, and neglects that arise. You will not fail, with the least possible delay, to send the returns back corrected to this office.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.

13th Sept. 1811.

I have laid before the Commander of the Forces your application from Col. —, of the — regt., for the Paymaster of that corps to proceed to Lisbon; and while his Excellency accedes to an officer of that corps going to Lisbon for the purposes specified, I am desired to express his extreme surprise, that a regiment so recently arrived with the army should find itself under the necessity of making an application of this nature.

The A.G. to Capt. Mitchell, Abrantes.

13th Sept. 1811.

The enclosed complaints having been submitted to the Commander of the Forces, I am to desire you will find out the person alluded to by application to the Governor of Abrantes: and if it turns out to be a British officer, you will inquire if the quarter referred to was allotted to him by billet from the magistrate of the town; and if not, you will place the officer under an arrest for disobedience of orders, and send him to the army for trial.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 13th, enclosing one of the 12th from Lieut. Col. — to Major Gen. Burne, and I beg that Lieut. Col. — may be informed that I cannot give him leave of absence.

I have not received, through the channel prescribed by His Majesty's Regulations, any statement of the injuries of which Lieut. Col. — complains. Till the Lieut. Colonel will adopt that mode of transmitting his statement, it will be impossible for you to know of what he complains, or for me to form a fair opinion on his complaints.

As I returned the letter which Lieut. Col. — wrote to me on the 8th inst., in a cover, sealed up and directed to Lieut. Col. —, I conclude that it reached him in the state in which it left me, and therefore that you could not have seen it.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

We have no chance with Col. —, excepting we proceed regularly, and you may depend upon it that at last he will be brought to act as he ought. He will give me a great deal of trouble, but that is my misfortune, and I should have much more trouble by departing from the regular mode pointed out by the Regulations. When he sends his statement of injuries to you, you will of course write your observations, your answer, and the defence of yourself, on each injury stated, and forward it to me; when that paper shall reach me I shall determine what I will do.

I have sent you a cask of Lamego.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

1. The frequent complaints which the Commander of the Forces receives of the conduct of the officers principally of the Commissariat and Medical departments, both in the mode of taking their quarters and in their conduct towards their landlords when employed at a distance from the army, oblige the Commander of the Forces to publish over again the orders which have been repeatedly given and enforced upon this subject.*

2. Those who do their duty with their regiments, or with the army, are well aware that at times they can have no quarters at all, and at others very indifferent quarters; and the Commander of the Forces is happy to say that he has received no complaints of them, but exclusively of those at a distance, who cannot be satisfied even with the better accommodation which the circumstances in which they are placed enable the inhabitants to give them.

3. It is obvious that the orders above referred to can be applicable only to the city of Lisbon; and in regard to other large towns, the Commander of the Forces requested by his orders of the 28th Dec. 1809, that the General officers commanding divisions would settle with the magistrates in what houses General officers, field officers, captains, and subalterns respectively should be quartered, and those of the departments of the army of corresponding ranks; and he has written to the government of the Kingdom to request that, as far as may be practicable, the magistrates will carry this arrangement into execution.

4. No officer whatever is allowed to quarter himself, if marching with a body of troops; he must receive his quarters from an officer of the Q. M. G.'s department, or from the quarter master of his regiment. If proceeding alone on any duty, or on account of sickness, or with a detachment in which there is no quarter master, he must receive his quarters by billet from the magistrates of the town or village in which he may be.

5. The officers of the Q. M. G.'s department, or the quarter masters of regiments, must, in every case in which they require quarters for either officers or soldiers, receive them from the magistrates of the towns or villages, and afterwards allot them to the several regiments or to the several officers and troops, as the case may be.

6. It is to be clearly understood that no officer has a right to demand more from his landlord than house room and stabling for his horses, if the building shall afford any; and it is obvious that in no town in Portugal or Spain can officers expect the accommodation allowed by the orders of the Commander of the Forces of the 14th March, 1809, at Lisbon, to the several ranks; and they must be satisfied with what the town or village, in which they may be quartered, can afford to those of their rank, and must not on any account seize more than is given to them.

7. The Commander of the Forces has always found, and believes the inhabitants of both countries to be disposed to give to every officer and soldier of the British army such accommodation and comfort as their houses will afford; but it must be clearly understood that every accommodation and comfort beyond houses and stable room must be the result of the good will of the inhabitants, and nothing like compulsion must be used.

8. The Commander of the Forces declares it to be his intention to bring under the consideration of a General Court Martial every complaint which he may receive of the conduct of an officer in his quarters, and to carry the sentence of the Court Martial, whatever it may be, into execution.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

2. As it appears by the proceedings of the General Court Martial, that the prisoner did not very well know what he was about when he committed the crime of which he has been convicted, the Commander of the Forces is induced to pardon him, and he is to be released from confinement, and return to his duty.

* See vol. iii. p. 555. G. O., Lisbon, 14th March, 1809.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of G. O. which I have issued this day on the subject of billeting the officers and troops, which I beg you to lay before the Portuguese government, and urge them to give orders that the arrangement proposed in the 3d paragraph may be carried into execution, as far as may be possible, in all the large towns in the Kingdom.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Sept. 1811.

I received your letter of the 6th in time to write to Lord Liverpool by the last post, to apprise him of my opinion that we ought, under existing circumstances, to have a larger fleet in the Tagus than we have; and indeed I think that we ought at all times to be at least safe on that side.

I also wrote to Sir W. Beresford, to apprise him of my opinion that the sea batteries ought again to be armed.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 12th.

Our horses are bought in England for 25 guineas each, and I calculate that it costs £10 to bring every horse to this country, making his price here 35 guineas, or thereabouts.

I could not with propriety make a contract with an American to supply horses for the army without the consent of government, and it would scarcely be worth while to make one for such a saving as 5 guineas for each horse.

In all probability, the expenses of the officers in America to approve of the horses would cost as much as the difference of expense of the horses. There is also another objection to this plan, which is, that although horses might be very fit for the service in Passamaquoddy Bay upon their embarkation, the voyage would probably make such an alteration in their condition, particularly under American care, as might make them very unfit for service on their arrival here, more particularly as this American care would be bestowed upon the horses with a certainty that, after the inspection previous to embarkation, they must be taken, whatever may be the state of their condition on landing.

We don't use horses for bât, but mules; and these, dear as they are, are cheaper than the American horses would be under the proposed contract, and answer the purpose equally well, if not better.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept. 1811, 1 p.m.

I have just received your letter of the 15th, and that from Gen. Cooke. The orders of this army specify that when a Lieut. Colonel is named in orders to command a brigade, he is to receive a staff allowance equal in amount to his pay; but those who hold the command in a temporary manner, without being named in orders, as many do at this moment, don't receive the allowance.

I think the best way would be to consider the regulations of this army applicable to the troops at Cadiz, and to give to those officers named by you to command brigades, and in Cadiz, the allowance during the time they shall exercise their command respectively. Upon the same ground Lord Proby ought to have the allowance likewise.

When I settled this arrangement, the same objections were made by several of the seniors here as are now made at Cadiz ; but, in my opinion, it is very injurious to the service to remove an officer from a situation of which he performs the duty well, viz., the command of his regiment, for any temporary purpose, such as the command of a brigade, till a General officer should be sent from England to command it. I resisted these pretensions on these grounds, and I must do to officers the justice to say that they ceased to bring them forward. Lately I have not appointed in orders Lieut. Colonels to command brigades, and I believe there are none in this army who receive the allowance.

I shall write to England respecting the battalion of foreign detachments. I have a great objection to foreigners in this army, as they desert terribly ; and they not only give the enemy intelligence which he would find it difficult to get in any other manner, but by their accounts and stories of the mode in which deserters from the French army are treated by us, some of them well founded, they have almost put an end to desertion. I would therefore prefer not to have any of them here. I have sent orders to the 39th to join this army, and the Chasseurs de Watteville to go to Ireland, according to the orders of the Sec. of State.

Of course, Capt. Hamilton cannot be more than a Deputy Assistant till he shall be promoted to be a Field officer.

I send you a letter of the 10th from my brother, from which you will see the intelligence he had up to that period.

P.S. I enclose some interesting papers just now received.* I rather judge that Montbrun, in his '*Patente Jaune*,' states that the convoy will commence its march on the 20th or 21st. It is obvious, from the letter from Salamanca, that it will not on the 15th.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst., regarding the establishment of the posts.

I have no authority, and never had the intention, to pay from the military chest for any Portuguese civil or military establishment. I have taken upon myself at times to assist the Portuguese government by making advances from the military chest for the support of their establishments, for the benefit of the service ; but I never conceived it possible that any hesitation would be made about repaying these advances, whether made by way of ration or in money ; and I can only say, that if there is any hesitation about complying with a proposition so reasonable as that the Portuguese government should repay the advances made in ration and money for the support of the post horses and mules on the ordinary lines of communication of the Kingdom, I must throw myself on the mercy of my own government for forgiveness for having been so improvident as to make these advances under a confidence in the honor of the Portuguese government that they should be repaid.

I can make no arrangement to pay half or any proportion of the expense of maintaining post horses and mules on the ordinary lines of communication in Portugal.

* See Appendix, No. IX. and No. X.

If the Portuguese government choose not to support the post horses and mules on the ordinary lines of communication, I must take measures to establish and support a communication with Lisbon for the use of the British army, till I can receive the orders of my government upon such an extraordinary determination by the Portuguese government, as that the military chest of a foreign army is to defray the expense of one of their ordinary, domestic, civil establishments. But I repeat, that I will not allow one Portuguese letter to be carried by the communications which I shall support.

I beg to have a decided answer upon this subject by return of the post, in order that I may lose no time in apprising my government of the fault I have committed in trusting to the honor of the Portuguese government, in making advances for the support of one of their civil establishments, and in requesting the forgiveness of the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland for this improvidence.

I beg that this letter may be laid before the Portuguese government. The government shall have the account of the rations issued to the post horses and mules, and postillions, as soon as it can be made up.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst., conveying complaints from Dom M. Forjaz, on the subject of means of transport, which you state that you would not have forwarded to me if Mr. Dalrymple had sent you an answer upon them. It is my duty to attend to all subjects of this description; and you may depend upon it that I shall give every attention in my power to the subject now brought under my consideration. I am sorry, however, to have to observe that these complaints on the part of the Portuguese Commissaries are generally the pretences for some neglect of duty, and I cannot recollect one of them which has contained a plain statement of facts. It generally turns out, upon inquiry, that some fact, material to the consideration of the case, has been grossly misrepresented, and that no ground of complaint does in reality exist. It will not excite surprise, therefore, that I should have called for explanations from Mr. Berard, Mr. Pratt, and Mr. Drake, before I should decide upon the complaints which have been made against these gentlemen respectively.

When the allied army are acting together, it is necessary that some rule should be established for the distribution of the means of transport, &c., which the country affords, and which are generally required for the service. Under the 2d and 3d articles of the arrangement of the 10th June, 1809, it has been settled that the Commissary Gen. of the British army shall make that distribution; and accordingly, during the campaign of 1810, the distribution of the means of transport, both by land and water, was made under my directions, according to the number of troops of both nations then in the field.

It was found, however, that great inconvenience resulted from this distribution, because the British commissariat paid, and the Portuguese commissariat did not pay, for the means of transport which each used; and in the campaign of 1811, the boatmen, in particular on the Mondego, insisted, as a condition on which alone they would put their boats in a state to per-

form any service, that they should not be handed over to the Portuguese commissariat. The distribution of the means of transport, therefore, has not gone on so regularly this year, and it appeared to be a matter of but little importance, as so large a proportion of the Portuguese army was fed by the British Commissaries.

My attention, however, has lately been drawn to this subject by Mr. Kennedy, in consequence of a large requisition for carts for the movement of the heavy train having been made at Lamego. The Portuguese Commissaries immediately discovered that they could not carry on the service unless they had some carts on the road from the army to Lamego; and, upon reference from Mr. Kennedy, I decided that upon every 15 carts received from the Superintendent of Transport at Lamego and on the Mondego, the Portuguese Commissaries should have one.

I made this distribution by referring only to the number of rations for men and horses which the Commissary of each nation had to issue, and putting entirely out of the question the movement of the battering train from Lamego, or the field stores from Coimbra, which falls exclusively upon the means of transport allotted to the British Commissary Gen.

In considering this subject, I only request the Sec. of State to consider that the British commissariat feed the largest proportion of the Portuguese troops, and that the transport of the equipments for all the operations of the war falls upon the means of transport allotted to the British Commissary Gen. Lately, indeed, he has been feeding not only the regular troops, but the militia who are escorting the battering train, because nobody else will perform that duty.

I have frequently repeated that, of which I am firmly persuaded, if the call for means of transport for both armies were twice as large as it is, the country possesses the means of supplying it without inconvenience, if the government choose to enforce their own laws and regulations.

I have lately had an opportunity of seeing how the French conduct these concerns in Castille, in which Kingdom neither the Spanish nor the British army could ever procure adequate means of transport, any more than the British or the Portuguese army can now in Portugal. The Prefect issues his orders to the several heads of districts, directing that a certain number of carts, drawn in a certain manner, and a certain number of mules, belonging to the district, each cart and each mule attended by its owner or his servant, shall be at a certain place, at a certain hour, on a named day. The head of the district either sends a similar order to the heads of villages, or makes the detailed distribution by name throughout the district.

This is the mode of proceeding pointed out by the law of Portugal, but the difference in the mode of executing the law is the cause of the difference of effect. Notwithstanding the dislike to the French, and the reluctance with which the people of the country serve them, and that they are never paid, not a cart or mule required is missing at the named hour, not an owner of a cart or mule is absent. But in Portugal, where the government will not carry into execution their own laws, means of transport are always deficient, the service is always cramped, and so it will continue until some dreadful misfortune happens, and the French are enabled to establish themselves in Portugal, to carry into execution the law, as they do in Spain.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst., regarding the assistance to be given to the poor inhabitants of Portugal who are sick, from the fund arising from the bounty of the British Parliament, or the charity of individuals in England.

The knowledge which I have of this country induces me to request that you will suggest to the gentlemen appointed to manage and distribute these funds, the expediency of attending to the districts on the banks of the Coa, from its source at least as far as Pinhel.

These districts were the seat of war during the months of July, August, and September, 1810, when the harvest of that year was reaped, the whole of which was consumed by the enemy; and again in the beginning of April of this year, when the little they had sown began to appear above ground, and was consumed.

The inhabitants of these villages are reduced to subsist upon a small quantity of millet which they have contrived to save; but the food is not of a description, nor is the quantity sufficient, to subsist them through the winter. Money distributed in these villages would enable them to procure some food from Spain; and if the British army should canton for any time in these districts, the inhabitants will gain something by the services they will render the army. However, the distressed state of these people deserves the attention of the managers of these charities.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Hill.

16th Sept. 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to enclose you a communication that has been received from the Commissary Gen. relative to a complaint preferred by Mr. Roberts, Acting Commissary of the 13th light dragoons, against Capt. —, of the — regt.

The practice of embargoing the transport mules of the army is so prejudicial to the public service, and the Commander of the Forces has so often animadverted upon it, that his Excellency is determined to bring Capt. — to a General Court Martial. I enclose herewith the crime to be preferred against him, and the Acting Dep. Judge Advocate will warn Mr. Roberts to prosecute him before the General Court Martial now assembled.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th Sept. 1811, noon.

I shall recommend the arrangement you propose for the command of the 16th by to-morrow's post.

I had thoughts of reducing the establishment of all the regiments in this country to 3 squadrons, being certain that we shall thereby lose no effective numbers, and that it will be a great convenience to the regiments; but I have delayed the measure till I should see you, and till the horses should arrive. The latter are arrived, I understand; and you might as well prepare your returns and statements of men and horses in each regiment, and after the expected *bustle* I will settle the business.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and I enclose the copy of my dispatch of this day to the Sec. of State.

I don't believe that Suchet came to Burgos, although Castaños swore that he was there; and I am quite at a loss to know what Soult is doing.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept. 1811.

Neither the '*Armée de Portugal*,' nor that of the north, have made any movement of importance since I addressed you on the 11th inst. Both, however, have been concentrated in a greater degree than they were: the '*Armée de Portugal*' being between Bejar and Plasencia, with their advanced posts on this side, at Val de Fuentes; and the army of the north on the Lower Tormes, and between that river and the Duero.

Both armies are employed in collecting supplies of provisions; and I enclose the deciphered copy of a letter in cipher, from Gen. Montbrun to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo,* from which it appears that it is the enemy's intention to endeavor to introduce large supplies of provisions into that place from the side of Plasencia, as well as from that of Salamanca. The dates being all in cipher, and not having been able to discover that part of the key, we don't know exactly on what day the operation is to commence, but I should imagine about the 20th or 21st.

From what I have stated to your Lordship in former dispatches regarding the enemy's strength, and the difficulties and risks attending any operation on the right of the Agueda, you will not have expected that I should be able to prevent the introduction of this convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo.

Since I last addressed your Lordship, I have heard that the '*Armée de Portugal*' had received a reinforcement of 4000 men from Valladolid, recently arrived from France, besides one of between 2000 and 3000 convalescents, which had before joined from Salamanca; and many horses, as well for dragoons as artillery. All accounts, however, concur in stating that there are a vast number of sick in this army; and I may be mistaken in my estimate, as well of their numbers as of those of the army of the north, although founded on the best information in regard to the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and upon actual returns of the army of the north.

I propose, therefore, to keep the allied army in such a situation as long as I can, as that I may see the enemy, and form an opinion of their strength from a view of them when collected. If I should not be able to prevent the introduction of the convoy, I shall at least have had the satisfaction of obliging the enemy to collect all their troops for the purpose of escorting it, and thus of contributing to save the army and the Kingdom of Galicia.

I have not yet received from Gen. Abadia an account of his operations; but I enclose the copy of a letter which he wrote to Don Carlos de España on the 8th inst., and the extract of a letter from Gen. Walker of the 4th, and the copy of a letter from Gen. Abadia to the Junta of Coruña of the 31st Aug., the whole of which, with the account of Gen. Wathier to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo of the 1st Sept., transmitted in my dispatch of the 4th, will give your Lordship a notion of what occurred, and of the existing state of affairs in Galicia. I don't transmit a letter of the 5th inst. which I have received from Col. Sir H. Douglas, as he has your Lordship's directions to send home copies of all his communications to me. In my opinion, Gen. Abadia made his retreat in good order, notwithstanding that it was made under circumstances of disadvantage, in consequence of its having been commenced too late. On this account he

* See Appendix, No. X.

lost the great communication with Coruña; and if the enemy had been able to persevere, they would have gained possession of that town and of Ferrol.

Your Lordship will have seen the account of events in Murcia subsequent to the 9th Aug., from which it appears that the army of Murcia also lost the great communication with Lorca and Murcia by a similar error; and that the several divisions were separated, and sustained severe loss.

I have not yet received accounts, upon which I can rely, of the direction of Soult's operations, since his success against the army of Murcia, as it is so difficult to procure intelligence in the south of Spain which can be relied upon; but it is certain that none of his troops had arrived at Llerena, as reported to me; and I believe equally so that they had not been directed to establish the authority of the French government in the Campo de Gibraltar.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept. 1811.

Major Gen. Cooke has written to request that some arrangement may be made for the disposal of the battalion of foreign detachments doing duty at Cadiz. This battalion consists of some men belonging to the Chasseurs Britanniques, and of some recruits enlisted for general service, either at Gibraltar or on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, and not yet allotted to any regiment, and therefore but ill provided with clothing and appointments. Major Gen. Cooke states that he has understood that these men are dissatisfied with the uncertainty of their situation, and he expresses an anxiety that they should be disposed of in regiments. I am not at all anxious to have any of them with this army. The number of foreigners with this army is a serious inconvenience, as they not only convey intelligence to the enemy, which they could acquire in no other manner, but they have nearly put a stop to desertion from the enemy's ranks by their accounts, unfounded or exaggerated, of the manner in which deserters are treated and disposed of in the British service.

Those men who do desert now, therefore, prefer to take their chance with the Spanish levies to coming to us; and they earnestly intreat that they may not be sent to us, as they have been informed by the deserters from our army that the deserters from the enemy are sent to the West India islands, and have no chance of ever returning to Europe.

I would beg to recommend, therefore, that those men of the battalion of foreign detachments at Cadiz, not belonging to the Chasseurs Britanniques, should be formed into a battalion of the German Legion, or of the 60th regt., and that officers should be sent to take charge of them, and that they should be clothed in the usual manner.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state of the British army, and the morning report of the army in the field of the 15th Sept.

I am concerned to say that the sickness of the newly arrived troops, and of those which were in Walcheren, still continues. Some of the regiments lately arrived have not now in the ranks fit for duty half of the

number of men they landed in this country; and the daily diminution of numbers from these, and the regiments that were in Walcheren, is such, that the numbers of the army for duty are scarcely kept up by the daily arrival of reinforcements. The officers also are as sickly as the soldiers. The army is situated in good cantonments, in the most healthy part of the country. The troops have undergone no fatigue, and have been remarkably well fed.

The disorder is generally of the intermittent description, and not very severe, and the deaths not numerous. I am in hopes also, that as there has been a favorable change in the weather within these last few days, the troops will soon regain their health and strength.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.

18th Sept. 1811.

The resignation of Capt. —, of the — regt., will be sent to England, and the Commander of the Forces will permit him to proceed thither so soon as he shall believe the Commander in Chief will have accepted his resignation.

His Excellency considers the duties of the army equally require the presence and attendance of the officers; and if an officer can remain with his regiment for one description of duty, for the performance of which he thinks he can derive a little credit, he can also remain for the performance of others, for which, if the presence of officers is necessary, there can be no reason why the public should incur the expense of maintaining them. You will be pleased to make these sentiments known to Capt. —.

The A.G. to General Officers commanding divisions.

19th Sept. 1811.

In transmitting the 1st volume of the printed G. O. of the army, for yourself, the General officers in your division, the officer of the Adj. Gen.'s department, and the Commanding officers of the regiments under your immediate command, I am to convey to you his Excellency's pleasure that the same are to be considered as belonging and for the use of the actual officers in command, and are to be handed over, in case of absence, or resignation, or otherwise, to whomever may succeed to the immediate command of the division, brigade, or regiment, for whose use the copy of G. O. is intended. Should you or other officers require hereafter for their personal use a copy of these regulations, the same are to be applied for; and so soon as there are a sufficient number of copies arrived, his Excellency's pleasure will be taken as to their being furnished: but as it is of the utmost importance, so long as the army is in the Peninsula, that none of these books of G. O. should be carried away by the changes of the officers in the different situations in the army, the Commander of the Forces desires that the above orders may be strictly complied with, which you will be pleased to notify accordingly in your division orders.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 16th.

I think you had better send to England the papers which have passed between you and the government regarding Dom M. Forjaz.

I wrote by the last post to Lord Liverpool on the conduct of the government of Brazil, and I hope that the subject will be taken up and handled with some vigor.

The A.G. to R. H. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

20th Sept. 1811.

I enclose herewith an extract of a letter from Lieut. Col. —, —th regt., and I have to request you will cause immediate inquiry to be made of the Commissary at Abrantes, why he has presumed, without authority, to detain the corporal and party alluded to; and you will report to me the result for the information of the Commander of the Forces. The party are forthwith to join their regiment.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of this date, enclosing one of the 8th inst. from Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., containing a narrative or statement of complaints against yourself. I am much concerned that Lieut. Col. — should have thought it necessary to bring forward these complaints at this period; but as he has done so, it is my duty to take them into consideration, and to decide upon them.

Before I advert to the complaints made by Lieut. Col. — of the language which he asserts you used to him and the — regt. on the morning of the 11th May, I shall consider of the others contained in the statement enclosed in his letter.

Your report of the transactions of the 11th May does not appear to me to afford any ground of complaint to Lieut. Col. —.

1st; Lieut. Col. — does not know what that report contains.

2dly; It contains nothing regarding the conduct of Lieut. Col. —, excepting that he crossed the bridge of Barba de Puerco in pursuit of the enemy, contrary to your intentions, which is acknowledged by himself in the papers which he transmitted to me enclosed in a letter to the Adj. Gen. of the 24th May.

But this report occasioned what Lieut. Col. — calls a most severe censure on his conduct from me; upon which I have only to observe, that the censure was directed to that part of Lieut. Col. —'s conduct which is acknowledged by himself; a conduct, of which there had lately been other repeated instances in the army, from which the public interests had suffered, and I thought it proper to record every flagrant recent instance of it in the notice which I took of it addressed to you, but intended to be circulated to the officers of the army at large.

It is not necessary that I should explain to Lieut. Col. — the reasons for which this paper was not circulated to the army, as I had intended; but they were not founded on any conviction produced on my mind by Lieut. Col. —'s letter of the 24th, that the conduct of Lieut. Col. — had been misrepresented to me; because, on the contrary, Lieut. Col. — avowed in the papers which he enclosed, that he did cross the bridge of Barba de Puerco, and attempted to justify that measure; but without producing any conviction on my mind of its propriety.

Neither do I think that your division order of the 9th Aug., adverting to the number of men of Major Gen. Burne's brigade who were not in the ranks on the march, and to the mode of messing in those regiments, affords any ground of complaint to Lieut. Col. —.

1st; I observe that there is nothing harsh in the mode of expression used in this order; and that it prescribes nothing that can be too often repeated to the regiments composing this army.

But, 2dly; I observe that it was called for, and rendered necessary; 1st; by your own observation, and the report by the Brigade Major, of the number of both regiments of the brigade who were moving with the baggage, instead of in the ranks of their regiments, which report I have in my possession: and, 2dly; by what you had seen of the mode of messing of both regiments, and by the conversations which you had had on that subject with Major Gen. Burne.

I would also add, that from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry of the 14th Aug., held by Lieut. Col. —, it does appear that the soldiers of the — regt. were not at all times messed in the manner pointed out by your order: a question was asked, 'Have the men of your companies been messed according to this rule?' to which the answer was, 'Invariably, in stationary quarters, and at all other times that *circumstances allowed it to be practicable.*'

I am not aware of any circumstances in which the — have ever been placed, in which it was not practicable to mess the soldiers as directed in your orders, and the standing regulation of the service; and if that mode was departed from in any one instance, it was not only right, but you would have neglected your duty if you had omitted to notice it; and it would have been more becoming in Lieut. Col. — to have explained the cause of the deviation from your order in so important a matter, in order to avoid censure, than to have complained in the terms he did of a division order, of which the object was to correct this irregularity.

I postponed the consideration of the complaints first stated in Lieut. Col. —'s narrative, because it appears to me, that till he conceived he had other grounds of complaint, he must have considered the language which he states you used to him and his regiment on the morning of the 11th May of very little importance, or else deserved; and that he has complained of it now only to aggravate the other complaints which he has made. Harsh and ungentlemanlike language by a superior does afford ground of complaint to an inferior officer; but the complaint of it ought to be made at the moment at which the feelings of the inferior have been injured. It would undoubtedly be better if language of this description were never used, and if officers placed in the situation in which you were on the morning of the 11th May, could correct neglects and errors likely to be attended by consequences fatal to the public interests, in language which should not hurt the feelings of the person to whom it is addressed; and with a manner divested of vehemence.

But, unfortunately, there are some of us who can't avoid to feel warmly for the success of the operation of which we have the charge; and to express ourselves with vehemence, and in language not perfectly correct, on the mistakes and neglects which are likely to impede it: and although I consider every officer responsible for language of this description, the complaint of the person to whom it is addressed ought to be made immediately, in order that all the circumstances under which it was used may come fairly before those whose duty it may be to inquire into the subject; and that it may be seen whether there was any and what provocation in error or neglect for the language used.

Conceiving, therefore, that Lieut. Col. —'s feelings could not have been hurt by the language now complained of, or that he could not have allowed 4 months to elapse without making his complaint; and that it is now made only to aggravate his complaints on other subjects, which afford him no ground at all for complaint, I don't think it proper to make his complaint on this head the subject of farther inquiry.

I beg that you will communicate this letter to Lieut. Col. —, and that you will inform him that I cannot give him leave of absence.

To Brigade Major May, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 15th, and I am very much obliged to you for having staid with the train when Major Dickson was again unfortunately taken ill.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 18th. I imagine that Marshal Beres-

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Sept. 1811.

'Movements to take place this afternoon:

'Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry is to be placed in bivouac at Espeja, and to have outposts at Marialva, Carpio, and upon the roads which lead from Ciudad Rodrigo upon Campillo.

'Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry is to be placed partly at El Bodon, and partly in the wood which is on the right hand of the road coming from El Bodon to Fuente Guinaldo, as near El Bodon as a good situation for bivouacking can be found.

'The outposts of this brigade are to be at Pastores on the right, and are to communicate on the left with those of Gen. Anson's brigade.

'The 6th division of infantry is to be placed in bivouac immediately behind Espeja, and is to give such support as may be requisite to Major Gen. Anson's cavalry.

'The 3d division is to be assembled at El Bodon, and in the nearest bivouac in rear of that village. It will continue to occupy also Encina and Pastores, and will give such support as may be necessary to Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry.

'Major Gen. Don Carlos de España will be pleased to place his infantry at Alameda, and his cavalry in the villages of Villar de la Yegua, Barquilla, Sexmiro, &c., to watch the fords of the Lower Agueda. Don Carlos will have a post also at Barba de Puerco. Major Gen. Anson will place an officer and detachment of his brigade with the Spanish cavalry, to make reports to Espeja.'

'Movements to take place at daybreak on the morning of the 23d Sept.:

'The 1st division is to be assembled at Nave d'Aver, and in the bivouac at Pozo Velho.

'Brig. Gen. McMahon's brigade of Portuguese infantry is to move to Fuentes de Onoro.

'Brig. Gen. Madden's and Brig. Gen. Otway's brigades of Portuguese cavalry to move to the wood between Fuentes de Onoro and Pozo Velho.

'The artillery now with these brigades is to remain, however, at Azinhal.

'Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of infantry will move to Campillo and bivouac there. Gen. Pack may move the brigade this afternoon, if he pleases, to Gallegos.

'The 4th division will move to Fuente Guinaldo, and bivouac in the neighbourhood.

'Major Gen. Slade's brigade of cavalry and Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery will move to Ituero.

'Major Gen. De Grey's brigade of cavalry and Capt. Le Febvre's troop of horse artillery will move to Puebla de Azava.

'The 7th division will move to Alamedilla, the reserve of ammunition to Aldea da Ponte.

'The Light division is to remain in its present situation, but Major Gen. Craufurd will be in communication with the troops at El Bodon; and in the event of these troops being drawn back, he will immediately move back also to Robleda.

'The 5th division will continue at Payo and neighbourhood till further orders.

'When the army is placed as above mentioned, the infantry at Espeja and at Nave d'Aver, and all the troops which are to the left of that line, will be under the immediate orders of Lieut. Gen. Graham.

'The several divisions and regiments will keep live cattle sufficient to supply them with meat to the 26th inst. inclusive, and will send the remainder of their cattle to the rear, as follows:

'The infantry at Espeja and at Nave d'Aver, and all the troops to the left of these, will send their cattle to Miusilha.

'The 4th division and 7th division will send theirs to Rendo.

'The other divisions and regiments will send their cattle to Soito and Quadrazaes.

'The men are to carry each 3 days' bread, and the horses of the cavalry are to carry 3 days' corn.

'The remainder of the supplies of bread and forage are to be carried by the mules attached to the divisions and regiments, and these are to be sent back as they are unloaded, to renew their supplies.

'The sick and lame horses of the cavalry are to be sent to Celorico.'

ford's objection to salt fish, equally with salt meat, is principally that those articles are more expensive than fresh meat, and require large means of transport to move them to the troops, and because he could leave no discretion with the *Junta de Vivieres*, who purchase salt fish as a job, and issue it constantly at any inconvenience; and he prohibited the issue of it entirely.

Salt fish, however, and salt meat are very necessary for the garrisons. They would also be very necessary if the troops should again be obliged to retire to the neighbourhood of Lisbon; and I recommend that you should converse with Beresford upon the subject, and let what he may think necessary for the garrisons, &c., be retained in store, not to be issued without his orders, and the remainder be disposed of as you propose.

The French army has moved upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Sept. 1811.

You will have seen Mozinho's report of the 16th Sept., 10 o'clock at night, containing an account which he had received from a friend at Badajoz, of the enemy's intention to augment that garrison considerably, with a view certainly to annoy our frontier.

I have long been astonished that they had not done something of this kind, more particularly as they must know that Campo Maior and Ouguela are very indifferently garrisoned, and that those points are very important to us, in case we should take any position on the frontier.

I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will send an officer over to Campo Maior and Ouguela, and see how those places are supplied with provisions, &c., and garrisoned. Let me know whether the new outwork at Campo Maior is yet palisaded, and what is the state of the works at Ouguela. The Commanding officers of those places should likewise be on their guard against surprise.

I don't recollect exactly how Gen. Hamilton's division are cantoned; but it might be desirable to move them to Sta Olaya, S. Vicente, &c., in order to give protection and countenance to these places, in case any dash should be made at them.

The French have moved; and I think that by to-morrow we shall have a very large army in our front.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept. 1811, 7 A.M.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received the enclosed copy of a letter in cipher, from Marmont to Girard, which has been intercepted. Marmont is mistaken; and I don't think that Girard has a force to annoy you. I reckon that you have about 11,000 men; and he can't have 6000, of which 1100 or 1200 are cavalry. If he moves forward, I beg you will fall upon him, if you think you can do so with any prospect of success.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 19th. I have not got by me at present the memorandum which I sent for the formation of the military chest; but it appears to me that the *Portaria* will answer tolerably well.

I don't understand the plan of giving up the new *decima* in order to

obtain means of transport. Is it intended that the produce of the *decima* should be allotted to the payment for means of transport? If it is, the produce of the *decima* ought to go into the military chest. Or is it intended to remit the *decima* to the inhabitants as a bonus, in consideration of their supplying means of transport? If that is the plan, the abuses will be greater than ever, and the Portuguese government will get neither *decima* nor means of transport. The rich, who will gain all by the remission of the *decima*, will, as usual, throw the burden of supplying the means of transport upon the poor, who will gain nothing; and the odious system of *embargo* will in a manner be legalized, as the officers of government will have a kind of right to the use of the means of transport of every man, which they will exercise upon the poor in that manner.

Is it intended to remit the *decima* and to pay the present price for means of transport likewise? If it is, the price of an article, or rather for a service, which is paid for by no other army excepting ours and the Portuguese, will be enormously increased. We already pay more for the common transport by the country carts than we should for the carriage of the same weight in England; and I believe that the transport even by mules is not only more convenient, but little more expensive. You may depend upon it that the price paid is full compensation for the service, and it is, in fact, all clear gain.

The French have not yet appeared, but I think they will before evening. I shall have my hands very full of business for the next 3 or 4 days, and shall not be able to dispatch the mail on Wednesday, and I therefore request you to detain the packet till I shall write to you to dispatch it.

The Q. M. G. to Major Gen. Craufurd.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept. 1811.

You will be so good as understand, from the instructions transmitted to you yesterday, that it is not intended that any part of the army should be seriously committed with the enemy, unless particular orders are given to that effect.

You will be so good, therefore, as to withdraw your advanced posts behind the great ravine between Zamarra and Martiago as soon as you see occasion for it; and retire also with the whole division upon Robleda whenever it seems expedient to do so, even although the troops at El Bodon may not have been withdrawn. In such case you will, of course, apprise the officer commanding at El Bodon, as expeditiously as possible, of your being obliged to move back upon Robleda, reporting, at the same time, to head quarters likewise.

The Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept. 1811.

In the event of the enemy advancing in superior force upon Espeja, Gallegos, or any other point, threatening the left of the army, Lieut. Gen. Graham will draw back the troops that are placed under his immediate orders, as follows:

The British and Portuguese troops to be concentrated at Nave d'Aver.

The Spanish troops under Don Carlos de España to fall back upon Freneda and Castello Bom; and should the enemy continue to press on, the troops at Nave d'Aver will retire, when necessary, upon Villar Maior and Aldea da Ribeira, and maintain the strong ground in the neighbourhood of these places till otherwise instructed.

Lieut. Gen. Graham will also hold Malhada-sorda and Arifana with a part of his infantry, as long as he may deem it safe to do so.

The Spanish troops will cross the Coa when it becomes necessary to do so, and will occupy Castello Mendo and neighbourhood, and defend the bridge of Castello Bom.

Don Carlos de España will also detach parties of cavalry to watch the bridge and ford of Almeida and the other intermediate passes of the Coa.

Major Gen. Anson will conform to the movements of the troops under Lieut. Gen. Graham.

As it may become expedient to-morrow to move Brig. Gen. M'Mahon's brigade of Portuguese infantry towards the right of the army, Lieut. Gen. Graham will be so good as not to dispose of that brigade in any way that might impede such a movement, except in the case of the left of the army having to retire as above mentioned.

Lieut. Gen. Graham will be so good as communicate to head quarters all events of importance that occur upon the left of the army, as also all movements or changes of position which he finds it necessary to make.

The Q. M. G. to Don Carlos de España.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose, for your information, an extract from the General Instructions issued to the army in regard to the position it at present occupies.

I have to request that you will be good enough to communicate to Lieut. Gen. Graham, as well as to head quarters, all information respecting the force and movements of the enemy which may concern the left of the army in general, as well as all occurrences of importance that take place in the particular quarter where you command.

The Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept. 1811.

A separate instruction has been given to Lieut. Gen. Graham respecting the movements of the left of the army, in the event of its becoming necessary to retire in that quarter; and Lieut. Gen. Graham has been informed, that in that case the cavalry under Major Gen. Anson will conform to his movements. I have to request, therefore, that you will give orders to Major Gen. Anson to that effect.

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th Sept. 1811.

Issued immediately after the affair at El Bodon:

‘The army is to be in the following position to-morrow morning at daybreak, or as soon after it as the troops can reach their several destinations:

‘The infantry of the 5th division to be concentrated at Payo.

‘The Light division and other troops with Major Gen. Craufurd will pass the Agueda at the ford on the road from Peña Parda to Fuente Guinaldo, and will halt about a mile from the ford towards Fuente Guinaldo. Gen. Craufurd will be so good as send forward to head quarters to report the progress of his march, and when he has reached his destination. He will send his baggage to Ligosia.

‘But if Major Gen. Craufurd should perceive that the troops retire this day from Fuente Guinaldo, he will in that case continue to fall back, by the right bank of the Agueda, and pass the river, either at Puente Villar, or higher up, as he may find expedient.

‘The 3d and 4th divisions, and the cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Fuente Guinaldo, will be under arms to-morrow morning half an hour before daybreak.

‘The 3d division will send off its baggage to-night to Casillas de Flores, and from thence to Furcalhos.

‘The 4th division will send its baggage to Albergueria.

‘The cavalry will send their baggage to Albergueria.

‘Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade will move up from Ituero, so as to be at daybreak in rear of the left of the 4th division; the baggage of the brigade is to be sent to-night to Albergueria.

‘Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry is also to be at daybreak in the vicinity of Fuente Guinaldo from Castillejos de Azava.

‘The baggage of head quarters is to move off half an hour before daybreak to Casillas de Flores.

‘The 7th division is to be at daybreak at Albergueria, and Brig. Gen. Colman's brigade is to be detached from thence to Casillas de Flores. Brig. Gen. Colman will report his arrival there to head quarters.

‘The baggage of the 7th division to be sent to Aldea da Ponte; and in case the division should be ordered to retire from Albergueria at any time to-morrow, Major Gen. Sontag will send to the rear whatever baggage of other troops is then at Albergueria.

‘Lieut. Gen. Graham will be so good as move back the troops on the left of the army to Nave d'Aver, and, if it should be necessary, will continue to retire as pointed out in the general instructions of the 22d inst.

‘He will be so good as order back, also, the Spanish troops under Don Carlos de España, as pointed out in the general instructions above referred to.’

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Quadrazaes, 29th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 24th, 26th, and 27th.

Don't be too early in putting troops in Arronches. It is, in summer, the most unhealthy place in Alentejo; that is, before the Caya runs plentifully.

I promised Gen. Castaños a month's provisions for the garrison of Albuquerque; and I beg you will give them to him.

I could not prevent Marmont from relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, and we have retired to this neighbourhood; but we had two little affairs with him, in which the troops behaved remarkably well, particularly the 2d batt. 5th regt., 77th, and 21st Portuguese regt., and Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, near El Bodon, on the 25th.

The French have gone back.

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'Fuente Guinaldo, 26th Sept. 1811.

'The army is to move into a new position as follows:

'The 1st division to be at Bismula.

'The 6th division between Bismula and Aldea da Ribeira.

'Brig. Gen. M'Mahon's brigade to be at Ribeira.

'Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and the Portuguese cavalry under Major Gen. Madden, to be in the most convenient ground near the 6th division.

'The Spanish troops under Don Carlos de España to be at Castello Mendo, and to guard the other passes of the Coa, as mentioned in the general instructions of the 22d inst.

'Lieut. Gen. Graham will send orders to the 2 brigades of Portuguese artillery at Azinhal and adjacents to move without delay to Miusilha, and report their arrival there.

'Lieut. Gen. Graham will be so good as arrange the outposts of the left of the army along the line of the Villar Maior rivulet, holding also Malhada-sorda and Arifana in the first instance with infantry posts, and communicating on the right with the outpost from Aldea da Ponte and neighbourhood.

'The cavalry on the left will keep a look out as far in advance as circumstances permit. Lieut. Gen. Graham will put the troops in motion to carry into effect the above arrangement at daybreak to-morrow morning.

'Head quarters will be at Nave.

'The cavalry (except Major Gen. Alten's brigade) will move off at 9 o'clock to-night to Albergueria, and will fall back from thence to-morrow morning, covering the rear of the infantry, which will then move also from that place.

'Sir S. Cotton will have parties out to the rear to observe the enemy's motions, and will arrange the cavalry outposts in front of Aldea da Ponte, communicating on the left with Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and on the right with Major Gen. Alten's.

'The cavalry will bivouac to-morrow between Alfaiates and Aldea da Ponte.

'Brig. Gen. Pack will move at 10 o'clock to-night to Castillejos de Azava, and thence to Albergueria.

'The 3d division and the 4th division will move off at 10 o'clock to-night; the former by the road which will be pointed out by an officer of the Royal Staff corps to Furcalhos; the latter by the usual road through Casillas de Flores to Furcalhos.

'The piquets of these 2 divisions are to be assembled at 11 o'clock, and to fall back upon Fuente Guinaldo, and join the Light division.

'The Light division will move off at 12 o'clock, and will march by Casillas de Flores to Furcalhos.

'Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry will join and remain with the Light division until further orders.

'The 3d division will move from Furcalhos by the direct road to Alfaiates, and will halt between that village and the Aldea da Ponte rivulet.

'The 4th division will move from Furcalhos to the convent of Sacaparte, and there halt.

'The 5th division will move at daybreak to-morrow morning to the heights above Aldea Velha on the road to Alfaiates.

'The 7th division will move from Albergueria at daybreak to the heights between Alfaiates and Nave.

'Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade will move at the same time from Albergueria to Rebolosa.'

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quadrazas, 29th Sept. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th.

I recommend the measure of arming the forts, not on any suspicion of the enemy's intentions founded on intelligence, but from the suggestions of my own mind, reflecting upon what it was probable the enemy might attempt. I am certain, that if Buonaparte does not remove us from the Peninsula, he must lower his tone with the world; and I am equally certain that he will make every effort to avoid this necessity. He has a fleet, and does not want for armies; and he is just the man to sacrifice his fleet, and to make a great effort with his armies, to effect this object. I fear the results of neither the one nor the other, if we are prepared; but as we are not prepared with a fleet at Lisbon, which, in my opinion, we ought always to be, I thought it proper to desire that the sea forts might be armed, as

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Head quarters, Nave, 27th Sept. 1811.

- The army will be placed to-morrow in the following position:
- The 5th division on the heights between Soito and Quadrazas, with 1 brigade at Val d'Espinho, which will observe the roads from Navas Frias and Aldea do Bispo.
- The Light division will be in the woods behind Soito, and Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry will continue with that division.
- Major Gen. Slade's and Major Gen. De Grey's brigades of cavalry will be in the neighbourhood of Quadrazas, and between Quadrazas and Soito.
- The 3d division will be near Quinta do Cardeal, on the left of Quadrazas.
- The 7th division will be in second line to the 3d division.
- The 4th division will be at Pocafarinha.
- Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade will be at Villaboa.
- The 1st division and the 6th division will be at Rendo, as will also Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry.
- Lieut. Gen. Graham will be so good as place 1 brigade of infantry at Rovina, and have outposts in front of that place communicating with those of Major Gen. Craufurd at Nave.
- Brig. Gen. McMahon's brigade will be at Rapoula de Coa.
- Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry will be at Miusilha; and will watch the fords of the Coa in front of that place, and communicate on the left with the Spanish troops at Castello Mendo.
- The 2 brigades of Portuguese artillery now at Miusilha will march to Marmaleiro, and will report their arrival there to Lieut. Gen. Graham at Rendo.
- The military departments of head quarters will be at Quadrazas; the civil departments at Sabugal.
- The dépôt of reserve ammunition will be at Urgueira, near Sabugal.
- The several divisions, and also separate bodies of troops, will establish communications with those next to them in the new position of the army.
- The troops are to move as follows:
- The 5th division will move at 2 o'clock in the morning, passing by Val d'Espinho, but sending its artillery with 1 brigade by Soito. Major Gen. Dunlop will, however, leave a detachment in observation near Aldea Velha, where it will remain till one hour before daybreak.
- The 7th division will move as soon as the men have cooked, and will march by Nave.
- The 4th division and Light division (with Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry) are to move off as soon as Major Gen. Cole and Major Gen. Craufurd can make their arrangements for doing so.
- Both these divisions are to retire by the great road from Alfaiates to Soito; the 4th division leading.
- The outposts of the above 2 divisions are to be called in as soon as the rear of the Light division has got into the road.
- The cavalry will move off immediately on receipt of this order, and march by Nave to their destinations.
- The 3d division will fall back to Nave as soon as the 4th and Light divisions have got into the Soito road; and when the 3d division arrives near Nave, Major Gen. Picton will halt it, and send an officer to Lord Wellington to know when he is to continue his march.
- Head quarters will move from Nave as soon as the cavalry have passed through the village, and will proceed to Quadrazas.

the only measure in my power at the time it was supposed probable that he was coming himself to take the command of his armies.

The mail was robbed by some of my vagabond soldiers.

The packet may sail when you please. I shall send off another dispatch on Wednesday, to sail by the packet of Sunday.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quadrages, 29th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th.

It is very reasonable and proper that the Portuguese officers should manage the Portuguese concerns, and I hope the Portuguese government do me the justice to feel that I interfere in no concern of theirs, excepting by their desire, and to give them assistance. I sincerely wish that it was never necessary to interfere even in this manner.

In respect to the Post office, I don't desire to have any concern with it, provided they will really manage it. I shall run my own *parté*, and pay 200 *reis* a-league, and manage that by my own officers on the ordinary lines of communication; and I will pay all the expenses, and manage by my own officers all the concerns, of the extraordinary lines. I hope, however, that the government, who are so tenacious about their right to manage this concern, will really conduct it as it ought to be conducted, and not allow it to be neglected as every thing else is.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quadrages, 29th Sept. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st, and I am much concerned to observe that my letters upon the subject of the posts are not yet understood by the Portuguese government. I wish them to pay for nothing but the ordinary establishment of posts, and I will pay from the military chest for all the extraordinary lines of communication rendered necessary by the course of the operations of the war. I shall state what I conceive to be the ordinary lines of communication, and how many mules at each stage, and what the extraordinary lines, by the next post.

Although it is not my business as Commander of the British army to observe upon the intention of charging the expense of the posts of the Kingdom to the Portuguese military chest, I beg leave to draw your attention to it.

If I understand the reason for forming the military chest, it is to have at command, and distinct, the funds for defraying the expenses of the army. But not only will those funds not be distinct, but they will be very insufficient for their purpose, if the ordinary expenses of the civil establishment of the government are to be defrayed from it.

The Portuguese government might as well defray the expenses of the salaries of the Juiz de Fora from the military chest as the expenses of the Post office.

I shall make a representation to the government on this subject, as Marshal General of the army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quadrages, 29th Sept. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, and the last morning report of this army.

We are really almost an army of convalescents. There is no serious

sickness among the troops, and but very few die, but I never saw the army capable of bearing so little; nearly one half of all those recently arrived from England have gone into the hospitals. You will see that we were hard pressed on the 25th, but I never saw the troops behave so well, or so steady.

The French produced an immense army.

P.S. I shall write to you on Wednesday respecting my plans in future. I propose to try something of the same kind as what I have done lately, that is, to draw every body upon myself, and relieve other parts of Spain; but I shall first allow these armies to separate, and in the mean time the equinoctial rains will fall, and I hope that our troops will become more healthy.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quadrazaes, 29th Sept. 1811.

The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar, and from Salamanca on the 21st inst., and on the following day I collected the British army in positions, from which I could either advance or retire without difficulty, and which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the strength of the enemy's army.

The 3d division, and that part of Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry which was not detached, occupied the range of heights which are on the left of the Agueda: having their advanced guard, under Lieut. Col. Williams, of the 60th, on the heights of Pastores, within 3 miles of Ciudad Rodrigo; the 4th division was at Fuente Guinaldo, where I had strengthened a position with some works; the Light division on the right of the Agueda, having their right resting upon the mountains which separate Castille and Estremadura. Lieut. Gen. Graham commanded the troops on the left of the army, which were posted on the Lower Azava; the 6th division, and Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, being at Espeja, and occupying Carpio, Marialva, &c. Don Carlos de España observed the Lower Agueda with Don J. Sanchez's cavalry and infantry.

Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, with Major Gen. Slade's and Major Gen. De Grey's brigades of cavalry, were on the Upper Azava, in the centre, between the right and left of the army, with Gen. Pack's brigade at Campillo; and the 5th division was in observation of the Pass of Perales, in the rear of the right, the French General Foy having remained and collected a body of troops in Upper Estremadura, consisting of part of his own division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and a division of the army of the centre; and the 7th division was in reserve at Alamedilla.

The enemy first appeared in the plain near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 23d, and retired again in a short time; but on the 24th, in the morning, they advanced again in considerable force, and entered the plain by the roads of Santi-espiritus and Tenebron; and before evening they had collected there all their cavalry, to the amount of about 6000 men, and 4 divisions of infantry, of which one division was of the Imperial Guard; and the remainder of the armies were encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo.

On the morning of the 25th the enemy sent a reconnaissance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of about 14 squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. They drove in our posts on the right of the Azava, but having passed that river, the Lanciers de Berg were charged by 2 squadrons of the 16th, and one of the 14th light dragoons, and driven back; they attempted to rally and to return, but were fired upon by the light infantry of the 61st regt., which had been posted in the wood on their flank, by Lieut. Gen. Graham; and Major Gen. Anson pursued them across the Azava, and afterwards resumed his posts on the right of that river. Lieut. Gen. Graham was highly pleased with the conduct of Major Gen. Anson's brigade; and Major Gen. Anson particularly mentions Lieut. Col. Hervey, and Capt. Brotherton, of the 14th, and Capt. Hay and Major Cocks, of the 16th.

But the enemy's attention was principally directed during this day to the position of the 3d division, in the hills between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores. About 8 in the morning, they moved a column, consisting of between 30 and 40 squadrons of cavalry, and 14 battalions of infantry, and 12 pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo, in such a direction, that it was doubtful whether they would attempt to ascend the hills by La Encina, or by the direct road of El Bodon, towards Fuente Guinaldo; and I was not certain by which road they would make their attack, till they actually commenced it upon the last.

As soon as I saw the direction of their march, I had reinforced the 2d batt. 5th regt., which occupied the post on the hill over which the road passes to Guinaldo, by the 77th regt., and the 21st Portuguese regt., under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, and Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, of which only 3 squadrons remained which had not been detached, drawn from El Bodon; and I ordered there a brigade of the 4th division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards from El Bodon the remainder of the troops of the 3d division, with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too distant.

In the mean time, however, the small body of troops in this post sustained the attack of the enemy's cavalry and artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking 2 pieces of cannon which had been posted on a rising ground on the right of our troops; but they were charged by the 2d batt. 5th regt., under the command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately retaken.

While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack was made on the front by another regiment, which was repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th regt.; and the 3 squadrons of Major Gen. Alten's brigade charged repeatedly different bodies of the enemy which ascended the hill on the left of the 2 regiments of British infantry, the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of their right.

At length, the division of the enemy's infantry which had marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo; and seeing that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to withdraw our post, and to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 2d batt. 5th regt., and the 77th regt., were formed into

one square, and the 21st Portuguese regt. into another, supported by Major Gen. Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese artillery.

The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward, and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment; and the 5th and 77th regts. were charged on three faces of the square by the French cavalry, but they halted and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined the remainder of the 3d division, also formed in squares, on their march to Fuente Guinaldo, and the whole retired together in the utmost order, and the enemy never made another attempt to charge any of them; but were satisfied with firing upon them with their artillery, and with following them.

Lieut. Col. Williams with his light infantry, and Lieut. Col. the Hon. R. Trench with the 74th regt., retired from Pastores across the Agueda; and thence marched by Robleda, where they took some prisoners, and recrossed the Agueda, and joined at Guinaldo in the evening.

I placed the 3d and 4th divisions, and Gen. Pack's brigade of infantry, and Major Gen. Alten's, Major Gen. De Grey's, and Major Gen. Slade's brigades of cavalry in the position at Fuente Guinaldo on the evening of the 25th, and ordered Major Gen. R. Craufurd to retire with the Light division across the Agueda, the 7th division to form at Albergueria, and Lieut. Gen. Graham to collect the troops under his command at Nave d'Aver, keeping only posts of observation on the Azava; and the troops were thus formed in an *écheleon*, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo; and the right upon the Pass of Perales; and the left at Nave d'Aver; Don Carlos de España was placed on the left of the Coa; and Don J. Sanchez was detached with the cavalry to the enemy's rear.

The enemy brought up a second division of infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo in the afternoon of the 25th; and in the course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo; and not deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I retired about 3 leagues, and on the 27th formed the army as follows: viz., the 5th division on the right, at Aldea Velha; the 4th, and light dragoons, and Major Gen. Alten's cavalry, at the convent of Sacaparte, in front of Alfaiates; the 3d and 7th divisions in second line, behind Alfaiates; and Lieut. Gen. Graham's corps on the left at Bismula, having their advanced guard beyond the Villar Maior river; and Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton's cavalry near Alfaiates, on the left of the 4th division, and having Gen. Pack's and Gen. M'Mahon's brigades at Rebolosa, on their left. The piquets of the cavalry were in front of Aldea da Ponte, beyond the Villar Maior river; and those of Gen. Alten's brigade beyond the same river, towards Furcalhos.

It had been the enemy's intention to turn the left of the position of Guinaldo by moving a column into the valley of the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear of the position by Castillejos; and from this column they detached a division of infantry and 14 squadrons of cavalry to follow our retreat by Albergueria, and another body of the same strength followed us by Furcalhos. The former attacked the piquets of the cavalry at Aldea da Ponte, and drove them in; and they pushed on

nearly as far as Alfaiates. I then made Gen. Pakenham attack them with his brigade of the 4th division, supported by Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, and the 4th division, and by Sir S. Cotton's cavalry; and the enemy were driven through Aldea da Ponte, back upon Albergueria, and the piquets of the cavalry resumed their station.

But the enemy having been reinforced by the troops which marched from Furcalhos, again advanced about sunset and drove in the piquets of the cavalry from Aldea da Ponte, and took possession of the village.

Lieut. Gen. Cole again attacked them with a part of Gen. Pakenham's brigade, and drove them through the village; but night having come on, and as Gen. Pakenham was not certain what was passing on his flanks, or of the numbers of the enemy, and he knew that the army were to fall back still farther, he evacuated the village, which the enemy occupied, and held during the night.

On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind Soito; having the Serra de Meras on their right, and the left at Rendo, on the Coa; about a league in rear of the position which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also retired from Aldea da Ponte, and had their advanced posts at Albergueria; and as it appears that they are about to retire from this part of the country, and as we have already had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period of the equinoctial gales, I propose to canton the troops in the nearest villages to the position which they occupied yesterday.

I can't conclude this report of the occurrences of the last week, without expressing to your Lordship my admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affairs of the 25th inst. The conduct of the 2d batt. 5th regt., commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can effect in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of the 77th regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Bromhead, was equally good; and I have never seen a more determined attack than was made by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these 2 weak battalions. I must not omit also to report the good conduct, on the same occasion, of the 21st Portuguese regt., under the command of Col. Bacellar, and of Major Arentschildt's artillery. The Portuguese infantry were not actually charged, but were repeatedly threatened, and they showed the utmost steadiness and discipline, both in the mode in which they prepared to receive the enemy, and in all the movements of a retreat made over 6 miles of plain in front of a superior cavalry and artillery. The Portuguese artillerymen were cut down at their guns, which were for a moment in the enemy's possession.

The infantry upon this occasion were under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville; Lieut. Gen. Picton having remained with the troops at El Bodon; and the conduct of Major Gen. Colville was beyond all praise.

Your Lordship will have observed by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of the 1st hussars and 11th light dragoons of Major Gen. Alten's brigade.

There were not more than 3 squadrons of the 2 regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the cavalry for the outposts of the army, and they charged the enemy's cavalry repeatedly; and notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained if I had not preferred abandoning it to risking the loss of these brave men by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of 14 battalions of infantry into the action, before the support which I had ordered up could arrive. Major Gen. Alten, and Lieut. Cols. Cumming and Arentschildt, and the officers of these regiments, particularly distinguished themselves upon this occasion. I have also to mention that the Adj. Gen., Major Gen. the Hon. C. Stewart, being upon the field, gave his assistance as an officer of cavalry with his usual gallantry.

In the affair of the 27th, at Aldea da Ponte, Brig. Gen. Pakenham and the troops of the 4th division, under the orders of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise conducted themselves remarkably well.

H. S. H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange accompanied me during the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship, and was for the first time in fire; and he conducted himself with a spirit and intelligence which afford a hope that he will become an ornament to his profession.

The enemy having collected for the object of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo the army of the north, which were withdrawn from the attack they had commenced on Gen. Abadia in Galicia, in which are included 22 battalions of the Imperial Guard, and Gen. Souham's division of infantry, composed of troops recently arrived in Spain from the army of Naples, and now drawn from the frontier of Navarre, where they had been employed in operations against Mina, together with 5 divisions and all the cavalry of the army called '*de Portugal*,' composing altogether an army of not less than 60,000 men, of which 6000 were cavalry, with 125 pieces of artillery, I could not pretend to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor could any effort which I could make prevent or materially impede the collection of the supplies or the march of the convoy for the relief of that place. I did all that I could expect to effect without incurring the risk of great loss for no object; and as the reports as usual were so various in regard to the enemy's real strength, it was necessary that I should see their army in order that the people of this country might be convinced that to raise the blockade was a measure of necessity, and that the momentary relief of Galicia, and of Mina, were the only objects which it was in my power immediately to effect.*

I have had no reports from the north since I addressed your Lordship last, nor from the south of Spain.

Gen. Girard had collected at Merida a small body of troops, I believe with the intention of making an incursion into Portugal, under the notion that I had withdrawn Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps from the Alentejo, for the purpose of maintaining the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo; but I imagine that he will break up this collection again, as soon as he shall hear that Gen. Hill is at Portalegre.

P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the 25th and 27th inst.

* See Appendix, No. XI.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in an affair with the enemy on the heights of El Bodon on the 25th, and near Aldea da Ponte on the 27th Sept. 1811.

	Officers.	Non - commis- sioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	1	1	40	40	42
Wounded	16	13	156	63	185
Missing	—	1	33	9	34

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

30th Sept. 1811.

In reply to your letter and enclosure herewith returned from Brig. Gen. Blunt, I am to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces will not order Mr. — to be tried on charges so loose and general as those made out by Gen. Blunt. The Brig. Gen. must specify the act or acts in the charge on which he founds the prosecution, and the time and place where the crime was committed, it being entirely inconsistent with the Articles of War to bring an officer to trial on such general accusations as are contained in the 1st and 3d of the charges enclosed.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Richoso, 1st Oct. 1811.

I received your letter of the 20th, and I am happy to find that you are so well.

The Portuguese commissariat must feed the militia wherever they can. If they cannot feed them our Commissaries will, but the Portuguese government shall pay the expense.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Richoso, 1st Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter, No. 4, of the 19th Sept. I request you to send me either the originals, or accurate copies, of all the letters and papers which may be intercepted from the enemy.

I concur with you in the expediency of supplying the chiefs of guerilla corps with mountain artillery. I supplied Don J. Sanchez with the only guns of this description that I had, which he unfortunately lost; but they were very useful to him.

I concur entirely in your opinion regarding the inexpediency of raising corps of deserters from the French army. They will be worse than useless to Gen. Abadia. They will desert and convey intelligence to the enemy, probably at critical moments, when the enemy could not otherwise obtain any; and they will augment the evils resulting from the disorganized state of the military force.

I beg you will inform Gen. Abadia that I had it not in my power to prevent the enemy from throwing a supply of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo. I delayed them, however, as long as I could; and they were induced to cross the Agueda with their whole army, in hopes that I should wait to be attacked in a bad position at Fuente Guinaldo. They withdrew from this part of the country only yesterday; the army of the north taking the road to Salamanca, and the '*Armée de Portugal*' the road of Baños and

Plasencia. It is said that the former are going to Valladolid, which I should think not unlikely, with a view to collect supplies.

We had two partial actions with them, one on the 25th, and one on the 27th Sept.; on both which occasions our troops behaved remarkably well, and manifestly showed their superiority.

Although the army of the north may now go to Valladolid, it is certain that their intention is to endeavor to obtain possession of Galicia. As soon as I shall learn that these two armies are separated decidedly, I shall commence some operation which will, if possible, bring them upon me again; and I shall in this manner do every thing in my power to create a diversion in favor of Gen. Abadia, and give him time to form his army.

I have enclosed your observations on Valença to Marshal Sir W. Beresford.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Richoso, 1st Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 28th Sept. and I shall consider of Dom M. Forjaz's plan for transport. From the first appearance of it, however, I am decidedly against it.

I forward a note and its enclosure which I have received from Col. Grant, who is prisoner at Plasencia, regarding the Marquez de Ponte de Lima and the Marquez de Valença. Let me know what the government wish that I should do respecting these noblemen.

Gordon says that Pamplona's aide de camp told him that he wished to come in, and he thought he said Gen. Pamplona likewise. Gordon says that he answered him that he knew nothing about the mode in which he would be received; and that all the information he could give him was, that Mascarenhas had been hanged, and the Conde de Sabugal acquitted.

P.S. The French retired yesterday from Ciudad Rodrigo.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Richoso, 1st Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch (No. 49), regarding a plan proposed by Brig. Gen. Carroll for raising 7500 men in the Spanish service, to be called the Irish brigade.

I beg to refer your Lordship to my dispatch of the 15th Dec. 1810, regarding the means which the regiments of this army possess of affording officers to assist Brig. Gen. Carroll. Since that dispatch was written, the officers of the British army have been so sickly, that there are with the regiments not sufficient numbers to do the duty, particularly of those regiments recently arrived in this country.

I have in store at Lisbon some arms, but no accoutrements or clothing, or necessaries. Excepting in arms, therefore, it is impossible for me to give to Brig. Gen. Carroll the assistance which he requires. In referring to my dispatch of the 15th Dec., I beg your Lordship to advert to the opinions it contains regarding the policy of giving assistance of the description required by Gen. Carroll to raise corps in Spain.

Col. Downie, and particularly Gen. Carroll, are more fit to command corps than many, or perhaps than any, of the officers to be found in the Spanish service; and I conceive that the British government cannot apply their resources allotted for the support of the cause in Spain better than

by supplying arms, clothing, accoutrements, and necessities for the troops to be raised and commanded by those officers. I have no doubt that they will make as good use of this assistance as it is possible to make, and that the result will be as beneficial to the cause as it has been under any other mode of distributing this description of assistance. But I beg to observe to your Lordship, that when a number of soldiers have been raised, armed, and accoutred, and even disciplined, but half the business to be done, in order to derive any effectual service from them, is effected. Means must be found of paying and supporting them, at least of supporting them while engaged in operations against the enemy in the field; and, till these means are found, the other expense incurred cannot produce much of the benefit expected from it. The employment of British officers would make no difference in this respect. The corps of troops to which they should be attached would be better disciplined possibly; but it would be equally useless as a military body in large operations; and indeed it is doubtful whether these officers could attempt to discipline, or even to command soldiers neither paid nor fed, even if they were willing to serve without pay themselves.

In whatever way British officers are employed with the Spanish troops, the measure will be viewed with jealousy, and will occasion some disgust among the national officers. If it should not be completely successful, as it appears to me impossible that it should be, unless means of paying and feeding the troops are provided, it is certain that the want of success will not be concealed, and that it will be attributed to the want of skill in the British officers, or to any rather than the real cause. Under these circumstances I recommend it to your Lordship not to allow British officers to serve with the Spanish troops, till adequate means of paying and providing for those troops, at least when engaged in operations with the enemy, shall be found.

But there is another view of this subject to which I wish to draw your Lordship's attention. When the British officers would enter the Spanish service, they would have prejudices and opposition of all descriptions to contend with, as well on the part of the soldiers as of the officers of the national service. They could perform their duty only by receiving the steady support of their own commander, whose character must be of that description to command the respect of the Spanish authorities. If their commander should omit, or should not be able to support them in their exertions and their authority, they must fail.

I must also observe that British officers require to be kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service, has shown me that there must be an authority, and that a strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the officers whom they should be destined to assist, and the country in whose service they should be employed.

Neither Brig. Gen. Carroll nor Col. Downie are persons of that character in the military profession to be able to protect and support the British officers in the performance of their duty in the Spanish service, or

to preserve due subordination among them, in relation to the Spanish officers and authorities.

I therefore earnestly recommend to your Lordship not to allow any officers of the British army to serve with Gen. Carroll's corps, under existing circumstances.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Richoso, 1st Oct. 1811.

Adverting to your Lordship's dispatch of the 3d Sept., regarding the grant of medals to the officers of the army, it occurs to me that an improvement might still be made in the system: for instance, many officers in the course of service become entitled to 2, or 3, or more medals. In my opinion they should receive but one; but for every additional action deemed worthy of the medal, in which any officer having a medal should be present, he should be warranted to have the name of that action engraved on his medal, and that in that case the fresh medal for that action should be given to the officer next in command in the regiment, who was present, and distinguished in the action.

The A.G. to Capt. —.

1st Oct. 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 18th inst. I am to acquaint you the Commander of the Forces is surprised that any British officer should write such a letter as you have done on the subject of the complaint at Abrantes. If this communication contains your real sentiments, it is not a matter of astonishment there should be complaints from that place, and the Commander of the Forces thinks you are entirely unfit for your situation. When you found a house occupied in which you wanted to quarter Capt. —, you ought to have applied to the magistrate or the government of the town to have the Intendant removed from the house; but ought on no account to have suffered either Mr. — or the Assist. Provost Marshal to be guilty of so gross a military outrage in a garrison as not only to attack, but to take off their post and imprison two Portuguese sentries. There is no evidence whatever that these sentries were posted for the purpose of insulting British officers, but the strongest evidence that the British officers and Provost Marshal insulted the Portuguese authorities and their sentries.

This letter is to be entered into the orderly books at the station at Abrantes, and it is to be communicated to Governor Lobo, and a proper apology must be made for the insult offered to the Portuguese authorities.

The Commander of the Forces disapproves of the Commandant exercising the power of quartering officers, &c., where he pleases. The magistrate at Abrantes must do his own duty, and must give billets for quarters when they are wanted. I am again to state the decided disapprobation of the Commander of the Forces of your conduct and that of Mr. — in this transaction, and his desire that circumstances of this nature do not occur again.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 2d Oct. 1811.

I enclose the last morning state.

Your Lordship will be concerned to observe the number of sick it contains; but I am happy to say that there is no serious disorder, and that that which prevails is principally a return of the Walcheren fever, or a disorder of the same description produced among the newly arrived troops by previous derangement of their bowels, in consequence of their eating unripe fruit, and drinking to excess, on their arrival in this country.

I yesterday saw the 4th dragoon guards. Of 470 men, they could produce only 230 mounted; and these looked more like men come out of the hospitals than troops just arrived from England. These men have to take

care of the horses of the whole regiment; and allowing that one man can take care of 3 horses, they could not produce in the field for any service at this moment above 110 men. All the newly arrived regiments of cavalry are in nearly the same state.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 2d Oct. 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 29th Sept., I have learned that the enemy retired from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the army of the north towards Salamanca, and it is said Valladolid, and the '*Armée de Portugal*' towards Baños and Plasencia.

Girard's division of the 5th corps, which I informed your Lordship had

G. O.

Richoso, 2d Oct. 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces is desirous of drawing the attention of the army to the conduct of the 2d batt. 5th and 77th regts. and the 21st Portuguese regt., and Major Arentschildt's Portuguese artillery, under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, and of the 11th light dragoons and 1st hussars under Major Gen. V. Alten, in the affair with the enemy on the 26th ult. These troops were attacked by between 30 and 40 squadrons of cavalry, with 6 pieces of cannon, supported by a division consisting of 14 battalions of infantry, with cannon.

4. The Portuguese artillerymen were cut down at their guns before they quitted them; but the 2d batt. 5th regt. attacked the cavalry which had taken the guns, and retook them. At the same time the 77th regt. were attacked in front by another body of cavalry, upon which body they advanced, and repulsed them.

5. While these actions were performed, Major Gen. Alten's brigade, of which there were only 3 squadrons on the ground, were engaged on the left, with numbers infinitely superior to themselves. These squadrons charged repeatedly, supporting each other, and took above 20 prisoners; and notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy, the post would have been maintained, if the Commander of the Forces had not ordered the troops to withdraw from it, seeing that the action would become still more unequal, as the enemy's infantry were likely to be engaged in it, before the reinforcement ordered to the support of the post could arrive.

6. The troops then retired with the same determined spirit, and in the same good order, with which they had maintained their post; the 2d batt. 5th regt. and 77th in one square, and the 21st Portuguese regt. in another, supported by Major Gen. Alten's cavalry and the Portuguese artillery. The enemy's cavalry charged three faces of the square of the British infantry, but were beaten off; and finding, from their repeated fruitless efforts, that these brave troops were not to be broken, they were contented with following them at a distance, and with firing upon them with their artillery, till the troops joined the remainder of the 3d division, and were afterwards supported by a brigade of the 4th division. Although the 21st Portuguese regt. were not actually charged by the cavalry, their steadiness and determination were conspicuous; and the Commander of the Forces observed with pleasure the order and regularity with which they made all their movements, and the confidence they showed in their officers.

7. The Commander of the Forces has been particular in stating the details of this action in the G. O., as, in his opinion, it affords a memorable example of what can be effected by steadiness, discipline, and confidence. It is impossible that any troops can, at any time, be exposed to the attack of numbers relatively greater than those which attacked the troops under Major Gen. Colville and Major Gen. Alten on the 25th Sept., and the Commander of the Forces recommends the conduct of those troops to the particular attention of the officers and soldiers of the army, as an example to be followed in all such circumstances.

8. The Commander of the Forces considers Major Gen. Alten and Major Gen. Colville, and the Commanding officers of the regiments under their command respectively, viz. Lieut. Col. Cumming, Lieut. Col. Arentschildt, Lieut. Col. Bromhead, Major Ridge, and Col. Bacellar of the 21st Portuguese regt., and the officers and soldiers under their command, to be entitled to his particular thanks; and he assures them that he has not failed to report his sense of their conduct, in the action of the 25th Sept., to those by whom he trusts that it will be duly appreciated and recollected.

9. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, will take measures to prevent the soldiers from eating the unripe grapes and other fruit: the old soldiers must be aware how pernicious it is to their health; but those lately arrived are not aware of it, and he begs that measures may be taken to prevent their getting it.

been collected at Merida, has retired from thence, and has again been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Zafra.

I likewise learn that Gen. Foy, who had advanced as far as Zarza la Mayor, in the valley of the Alagon, with his own division, and one of the army of the centre, has retired towards Plasencia.

The allied army are cantoned on both sides of the Coa, having their advanced posts on towards Ciudad Rodrigo.

I enclose the copy of a letter of the 19th Sept., which I have received from Gen. Abadia, which will show your Lordship the state of affairs in that province.

The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are of the 14th, from which it appears that Marshal Soult was on his return to the westward.

The A.G. to W. Hogg, Esq., Deputy Inspector of hospitals.

2d Oct. 1811.

The Commissary Gen. having submitted a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, to the Commander of the Forces, I am to acquaint you that his Excellency approves of the arrangement therein pointed out, and orders have been issued to Mr. Kennedy to direct that the same may be carried into effect. You will be pleased to aid this arrangement, and instruct the medical officer at Castanheira not to send away the spring waggons from thence farther back, as has been done of late, to the extreme inconvenience of the service. When the sick are moved from this station, they must be upon mules or the cars of the country.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Freneda, 3d Oct. 1811.

Having learned from the enclosed letter from Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, that Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., intends to lay before the Commander in Chief the circumstances of a complaint of his commanding officer, Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, which he has lately brought under my consideration; and thinking it probable, from the length of time which has elapsed since he announced his intention of making this complaint, that he has either forwarded it, or proposes to forward it direct to

G. O.

Freneda, 3d Oct. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces refers the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments, to the G. O. of the 17th June, 1809, 11th Aug. 1810, and 8th July, 1811, regarding the mode of foraging.

2. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that there is not an officer or soldier in the army, who, adverting to what the people of this part of the country suffered from the enemy in the summer of 1810, would wish to deprive them of any part of their property without paying for it, or to take more from them than is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the equipment of the army in an efficient state.

3. The Commander of the Forces trusts that the officers in the several cantonments will take care that the orders above referred to are regularly carried into execution, in order that the people may receive payment for what is taken from them.

4. A sense of the interests of the army, combined with feelings for the distresses of the people, should prevent all waste of forage or of any other articles, and the Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the officers to this point.

5. The Commander of the Forces has received the orders of the Commander in Chief to send to England the 29th regt., the 85th, and the 97th. These regiments have all been distinguished since they have belonged to this army, particularly the 29th and 97th, which have been with the army so long. The 29th regt. landed with the army 3 years ago, and they have been distinguished in every action that has been fought in that period; and the Commander of the Forces is happy to add, that the conduct of all these troops has been equally regular in their cantonments and camps, as it has been gallant in the field.

9. Under these circumstances, the Commander of the Forces parts with these regiments with regret; but the events of the war, and the different actions in which they have been engaged, having reduced their numbers, the only chance of recruiting is to send them to England.

His Royal Highness, and that it might be convenient to His Royal Highness to be made acquainted with all that has passed here relative to this complaint, I trouble you upon this subject.

When the garrison of Almeida escaped on the morning of the 11th May last, I received a report from Major Gen. Campbell, of which I enclose the extract regarding the conduct of Lieut. Col. —, stating the losses which had been incurred, in consequence of the imprudence of Lieut. Col. — in passing the bridge of Barba de Puerco. Upon receiving this report, I wrote a letter to Major Gen. Campbell, in which I pointed out the evil consequences which had resulted from Lieut. Col. —'s conduct, and adverted to instances which had recently occurred of similar conduct, which had been attended with similar unfortunate results.

I had intended to circulate copies of this letter to all the divisions of the army; but on the night of the day on which I wrote it, I received the intelligence of Soult's movement into Estremadura; and I commenced my journey, in the morning, to that province, which was continued at such a rate, that my papers could not keep pace with me. When they arrived in Estremadura, I was employed in other concerns; in re-organising the divisions which had fought the battle of Albuera, in preparing for the siege of Badajoz, &c. &c.; and the circumstances adverted to in the letter to Major Gen. Campbell of the 15th May, had no longer that degree of attention from the officers of the army, to render its circulation so beneficial as it might have been.

About a fortnight or three weeks after this letter was written, I received the enclosed, of the 24th May, from Lieut. Col. —, which only tended to prove that his conduct at Barba de Puerco had been as represented by Major Gen. Campbell, and I therefore returned him no answer.

I conceive that my letter of the 15th May contains no censure upon the conduct of Lieut. Col. — which was not justified and even rendered necessary by the circumstances which had occurred.

It appears to be quite a novel notion in the military profession, that an officer is to commit an imprudence, by which some loss is incurred, and more is risked; and that I, who am responsible for the faults and neglects and imprudences of all, shall not be allowed even to notice such misconduct.

I heard no more of this complaint of Lieut. Col. —'s, till the month of August, when Major Gen. Campbell issued a division order, of which I enclose a copy, on the 9th Aug., in which he noticed the mode in which the regiments in Major Gen. Burne's brigade made their marches, and that in which they messed.

This order drew from Lieut. Col. — letters to his commanding officer, Major Gen. Campbell, for writing which he was placed in arrest, and brought to trial, and convicted of writing improper letters to his commanding officer. The proceedings on the trial of Lieut. Col. — are at the office of the Judge Advocate General; and I enclose a copy of the G. O. of the 1st Sept., which contains the reprimand which he received.

Before I ordered that Lieut. Col. — might be brought to trial, I made an effort to bring him to a sense of the impropriety of his conduct

in a private letter which I addressed to him on the 18th Aug., of which I enclose a copy. His Royal Highness will see in the proceedings of the General Court Martial the use which Lieut. Col. — makes of this letter.

After the trial was over, I had the correspondence of which I enclose copies, with Major Gen. Campbell, on Lieut. Col. —'s wish to go to England, as he said, to complain to His Royal Highness of Major Gen. Campbell, and to take legal advice in respect to his conduct; and having at length, on the 20th Sept., received his complaints of Major Gen. Campbell in the prescribed channel, and Major Gen. Campbell's reply to his complaints, of which I enclose a copy, I wrote to Major Gen. Campbell the letter upon them, of which I enclose a copy, on the 21st Sept.

I have only to add to this letter the report which Major Gen. Campbell gave me, which he had received from the Brigade Major of Gen. Burne's brigade, of the number of men found straggling from their companies on the march on the 9th Aug.; on which report his order of the 9th Aug. was founded. When it is considered that the —th regt. had not 400 men under arms, it did not appear to me to be unreasonable in Major Gen. Campbell to require that they should not have as many as 60, besides Major Gen. Burne's orderlies and guard, marching with the baggage.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 3d Oct. 1811.

I enclose copies of my last dispatches; and have no news to give you in addition to that they contain.

The equinoctial rains have begun here. They are probably general; and if so, Abadia is, I hope, safe for this winter. But I shall try something for him as soon as the weather shall settle.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 3d Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th Sept., in which you enclosed one from Dom M. Forjaz, and a copy of a proposed *Portaria*, regarding means of transport.

It is not in my power, as Commander of the British army, to make an advance of £150,000 upon a speculation which has in view to procure means of transport for the army, even though I should be convinced that it would be successful. I am convinced, however, not only that the proposed scheme will not produce any good effect, but that it will aggravate all the existing evils.

It is not necessary that I should trouble you with my reasons for entertaining this opinion, as what I have stated above is a sufficient answer to the proposition made to me as Commander in Chief of the British army; but if the Portuguese government should think proper to call for my opinion on this proposed *Portaria*, they shall have it.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 3d Oct. 1811.

I enclose a letter of the 28th Sept., from Mr. Barnard, containing a complaint of the conduct of the Capitão Mor of Abrantes, in seizing certain persons while employed by him in transporting corn for the cavalry.

When the exception to the laws of the conscription was under discussion, I stated to Sir W. Beresford the probable result of leaving per-

sons in the employment of the British army at the discretion of the magistrates of the country. It was quite certain that, as soon as these magistrates should find any persons liable to the laws of the conscription actually in the employment of the British army, they would immediately seize them, to show their activity, and in hopes that by our subsequent interference these people might be released.

The recent occurrence at Abrantes is a practical example of this conduct. The Capitão Mor had it in his power to seize those persons, as recruits for the army, before they quitted Abrantes in the service of the British army, but that would not suit his purpose. The men must have served, and his activity would not have attracted notice. But by delaying the measure he puts the British army, and of course the service of the country, to the greatest inconvenience.

It is absolutely necessary that while persons are in the actual service of the British army, they should not be seized in this manner.

The A.G. to Capt. —, Celorico.

3d Oct. 1811.

In reply to your letter and enclosure from staff surgeon —, I am to convey to you the Commander of the Forces' most positive directions that none of the sick shall be sent from Celorico to the rear who can possibly be kept there. From the difficulty of getting back to the army those sent away from the advanced hospital stations, on slight grounds, it becomes absolutely necessary to impress these commands of his Excellency most strongly on your mind; and you will convey these directions to the staff surgeon at Celorico, who will also receive similar instructions from Dep. Inspector Hogg. There will be no difficulty, if the sick are too crowded in Celorico, on a communication with the A. Q. M. G. of the 1st division, in sending any of the convalescents to the rear, under a proper proportion of officers, into any of the villages which the 1st division does not occupy. By clearing the hospital station in this manner, there can be no doubt of there being accommodation at Celorico for the number of sick according to your last return.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 4th Oct. 1811.

I write to let you know that I have received accounts through my brother at Cadiz, stating that Soult returned to Seville about the 18th of last month, bringing with him some of the troops which he had taken to the eastward, if not all of them: he was making requisitions for carriages, and it was generally supposed was about returning into Estremadura.

Inform Gen. Castaños of these circumstances, and if you should have reason to think them confirmed, let me know it, and send orders to the brigade of the 2d division, and the regiment of Gen. Hamilton's division (which are gone to Castello Branco), and the 2d hussars, to cross the Tagus, and join you.

P.S. Could not you get some man to go to Zafra, and discover for you whether the enemy have there any, and what quantity, of heavy artillery?

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 4th Oct. 1811.

I enclose the proceedings and sentence of a General Court Martial, which I have confirmed, on the trial of privates — and —, of the Royal Marines, doing duty on shore at Fort S. Julian.

I beg you to peruse these proceedings; and as it appears that the property which was taken from the woman was restored, and as it was the

first and only complaint which has been made of these troops, I propose, if you see no objection, to pardon these two soldiers.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 4th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th Sept., in which you have enclosed one of the 28th from Dom M. Forjaz, in regard to the attendance of witnesses upon British Courts Martial. I beg that you will inform Dom M. Forjaz, that when a British soldier is accused of an offence against the laws of Portugal, I have no means of punishing him, excepting by giving him over to the Portuguese tribunals for trial, or by bringing him to trial before a Court Martial.

If the Portuguese government desire it, offenders of this description shall be given over to the Portuguese tribunals; but from what I have seen of the proceedings of these tribunals, I am afraid that they will not be punished, excepting by confinement in a miserable prison, without trial, and that you will be obliged to interfere in their favor, as His Majesty's subjects, in order to soften the rigor, alleviate the miseries, or abridge the duration of their confinement.

If offenders of this description are to be tried by Court Martial, the Court must by law have the best evidence of the case which circumstances will admit. The law of England prefers *vivâ voce* testimony to all other; and if that can be got, and is not produced, the Court will acquit the prisoner. On this account I am always obliged to require the attendance of witnesses on the Courts Martial.

It would be impossible to assemble a Court Martial at Leiria, for instance, or in every place in which a British soldier should be accused of an offence. All that can be done is to assemble a General Court Martial at head quarters, and to summon the witnesses of a fact which is the subject of complaint, to attend and give their testimony *vivâ voce*; and if they will not or cannot attend, I am sorry to say that it is not in my power to punish.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 5th Oct. 1811.

Let me know what orders you have given respecting the disposal of the remount horses recently arrived at Lisbon.

I wish to have the 2d hussars mounted as soon as possible, and that the 3d squadron of the 9th light dragoons should join their corps.

P.S. Gen. Le Marchant having arrived at the army, the 4th dragoon guards had better be left under his command.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 5th Oct. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a list of the stages at which mules ought to be kept, for the purposes of the ordinary communication between the frontier and Lisbon, and a statement of the number of mules to be kept at each stage. The same number of mules have been at all times kept at the same stages, by the Portuguese post office.

I likewise enclose a list of stages, and a statement of the number of mules to be kept at each stage, which are necessary for the communications of the army, and where mules have not been usually kept; and as

they will be placed there for the convenience of the army, I propose to pay their expense from the military chest.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, commg. a brigade in the 2d division. 5th Oct. 1811.

A complaint having been received by the Commissary Gen. from the Assist. Commissary Gen. at Castello Branco, that certain mules laden with stores from Pedrogão for that place were violently seized upon by you and forced from under the Commissary's protection and left in the village of S. Miguel, the mules proceeding empty to Castello Branco, I am directed to acquaint you of the extreme impropriety of your interfering in any manner in the regular conducting of the commissariat duties by the officers of that department. The Acting Assist. Commissary also alleges that he has been threatened with arrest, and impediments thrown in the way of his executing his duties. I request you will report to me on these circumstances for further consideration.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Freneda, 6th Oct. 1811.

I am very sorry to hear that you are unwell, particularly as I had put you on a Court Martial to try — — for an act of insanity. If you are not well enough to sit on the Court Martial, let me know it, and I will order Hulse for the duty.

I have been very well during the late *bustle*. Pray let me hear how you are.

P.S. I have written to the Adj. Gen. a detail of — —'s concerns, which I should wish you to see before it goes. I'll send it to you, if you can't come here before Wednesday.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Freneda, 6th Oct. 1811.

It is absolutely necessary that there should be a sufficient number of workmen and artificers at Almeida to complete the works at that place, and that there should be a guard of militia with the heavy train. You will make such dispositions as you may think proper for these purposes, but it is really time that a work, which was ordered above two months ago, should at length be seriously commenced.

The enemy have retired from this neighbourhood, and it is necessary that the Conde de Amarante should observe their movements to the northward. If he should find that they are about to attack Gen. Abadia in

G. O.

Freneda, 5th Oct. 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces observes, however, from the perusal of the proceedings of the General Court Martial, that his orders regarding the removal of sick men from the regiments to the general hospital have not been carried into execution by the regiments in the — division of Infantry.

4. When a soldier is so sick that he cannot march, he should invariably be sent to the general hospital, for which there are always means of transport by the daily communications with the Commissariat stores in the rear. If the sick are kept with the regiments, contrary to these orders repeatedly issued, and the regiment should receive an order to move upon a short notice, either the sick must be left behind, or the whole business of the Commissariat must be deranged, by pressing means of transport, and applying those intended to supply the consumption of the troops, to carry sick soldiers on the march with their regiments who ought to have been sent to the hospitals long before.

5. In this case it was necessary to press the mules attached to supply the consumption of the 13th light dragoons, to carry the sick detained with the regiments of infantry contrary to orders; and the 13th light dragoons and other troops, even some of these very same sick soldiers being at Monforte, had consequently no bread for 2 days.

6. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the Commanding officers of regiments to this subject, and they will see the inconvenience and derangement which are the consequences of disobedience of orders.

Galicia, he will put his corps of observation at Braganza, or at Chaves, and he will endeavor, without risking his infantry beyond the frontier, to divert their attention from Gen. Abadia by light movements of his cavalry and by threatening their communications.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 6th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter. I have not leisure to read Senhor —'s works, nor have I inclination to contend with him, whether he or my officers have the merit of the plans by which Lisbon and the country were saved from the enemy.

I think that I have reason to complain of Senhor —'s plans and memoirs as having misled me, and occasioned inconveniences and expenses which would not have been incurred, if I had not had them in my hands. I am not desirous of making any complaint of Senhor —, and I give him credit for being a good draftsman, and for having taken some pains to acquire information in the country, which was the object of our researches; but it would be just as possible to discover the longitude in his papers and plans, as that degree of accuracy and information on which alone any good system could be founded.

If Senhor — wants a reward for his plan and memoir, I have no objection to his getting it, and I shall be silent, or even recommend it; but if he pretends to have any thing to say to what has been done by our officers, I must expose his ignorance, and the negligence with which he made his survey and report, and the consequences which would have resulted by attending to either, whatever trouble such exposition may cost me.

I can only tell you that I reconnoitred the ground in October, and depended for some facts upon his report, and formed my plans accordingly. Afterwards Fletcher and our engineers found that these facts were represented erroneously; and I was obliged to travel again to Lisbon in February, 1810, and to alter the whole plan, and to undo all that had been done, in consequence of the erroneous information in —'s memoir. You know that I was at Lisbon in February, 1810, as you followed me to Thomar; and that was the reason of the journey. From this statement, which refers only to one point, you will judge of —'s merits.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Long.

6th Oct. 1811.

The Dep. Judge Advocate being absent from head quarters on account of sickness, the Commander of the Forces has considered your letter of the 4th inst. and enclosure. There is no doubt of the right of a prosecutor to alter his charges, or bring fresh charges in any stage of the proceedings; and the Court must proceed on the trial of those charges, if the Commander in Chief orders them to do so. I have been directed by his Excellency to sign Lieut. Col. —'s 5th additional charge, and it is herewith enclosed; but it is to be understood that if that charge has been framed with a view to meet a particular description of evidence already before the Court, or the opinions of certain members which have casually been disclosed, the Court are not to proceed on the trial of Lieut. — on the 5th charge, for, if the Commander of the Forces were certain that such evidence had been given, or that such opinions had been casually disclosed, he would not have ordered the Court to try Lieut. — on this charge.

It appears to the Commander of the Forces that there is not much foundation for the distinction between the 3d and 5th charges, or for that which relates to

the period at which the injury to the service should arise. An officer is charged with a crime, and every military crime with which an officer can be charged is founded upon its tendency to injure the service, either immediately or remotely. This officer is charged with injuring the service by taking away with him the money belonging to a company in his regiment. The questions for the consideration of the Court would appear to be: 1st; whether he committed the fact: 2dly; whether he did it with bad intentions, of which the evidence would be admissible and good, that he withheld the money after he had had opportunities of restoring it, even though those opportunities occurred after he had been put in arrest, and the charges had been given in against him. The Court will see the truth of this reasoning forcibly by supposing the words 'injuring the service' omitted in the 3d charge, which they might as well have been, as these words imply only the consequences of the fact with which Lieut. — is charged, and on which his guilt or innocence on this head of charge will turn.

To Senhor José Clementi Pereira.

Freneda, 7th Oct. 1811.

I received by the bearer your two letters of the 4th, from Cañaverl. I beg that you will acquaint the two gentlemen, to whom one of your letters relates, that in consequence of a communication of their wishes to me through another channel, I have applied to the Portuguese government in their favor. I expect the answer at every moment, and as soon as it shall arrive, I will send it to them through you.

P.S. I enclose letters for those two gentlemen, but they shall hear from me again as soon as I receive a letter respecting them from the government.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 7th Oct. 1811.

I understand that the greatest number of the dismounted men of the 2d hussars are at Lisbon, with their appointments; and if they are to receive the horses of the 12th and 9th, they should be ordered to some station with their appointments, to which station the horses of the 12th and 9th should be ordered likewise.

G. O.

Freneda, 7th Oct. 1811.

1. The veterinary surgeons and farriers of all regiments of cavalry are to be entitled, from the date of the landing of their regiments in Portugal, to the allowance granted to veterinary surgeons and farriers by the G. O. of the 15th July, 1809, No. 1; and paymasters of regiments will receive their allowances at the end of every month, from the Assist. Com. Gen. attached to their regiments respectively, instead of their being paid by a warrant from the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions will take the opportunity of the fine weather of the present moment to exercise the troops under their command respectively, according to his former directions.

3. It would tend materially to improve the health of the troops, and would keep them in the habit of marching, if, besides the exercise, they were to march a few miles on the road once or twice a week.

4. A working party, consisting of 200 R. and F. of British troops, and 200 R. and F. of Portuguese troops, with officers and non-commissioned officers in proportion, of the 6th division, are to proceed to-morrow morning to Almeida, to be employed on the works of that place. The party are to take their arms, &c. with them, and the Commissaries of the 6th division will take measures to supply them with provisions. This party are to work on the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, on which last day a similar party are to be sent to relieve them, and they are to return to their quarters on the 13th, and the relieving party will likewise be relieved after 4 days' work.

5. These men are to receive working money at the rate allowed to the soldiers of the several nations; and this working money is to be paid to the officers before the men march away, after being relieved by the officer of engineers under whom they shall be employed.

6. Such of the party as are bricklayers or stonemasons will be employed as artificers, and will receive double pay.

7. It is to be clearly understood, however, that those who do not work will get no pay.

In regard to the transfer of horses from one regiment to another, we must go by some general rule; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make an official report of all your proceedings on this subject, as I must report on them to the Horse Guards. The general rule which I would lay down is, that every regiment shall have one tenth of the number of its rank and file dismounted. Afterwards, if you find a regiment very sickly, you may dismount more if you think proper, and transfer the horses to other regiments whose men are more healthy; but I wish you to begin with the adoption of that general principle.

The horses which the officers of the cavalry will not take at the price stated, must be sold by public auction for the price bid for them.

I don't like to weaken the light cavalry in the Alentejo just now, as Soult is at Seville, and preparing for some movement.

P.S. Clinton is sick at Lisbon. I should prefer that the desire to join his regiment should come from himself, rather than the order from me, and I wish you would write to him about it. The 16th, however, will not be badly off when they get Lord C. Manners, which is likely before Clinton can join.

The A.G. to Brig. Major Offermann.

7th Oct. 1811.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, unless you wish to resign your staff appointment, there is no intention of removing you from it, and you need not proceed to England with your regiment, having the Commander of the Forces' sanction to your remaining as a Brigade Major in this country.

The A.G. to Major Gen. R. Craufurd, Light division.

7th Oct. 1811.

I am honored with your letter of yesterday's date and enclosures herewith returned, which have been laid before the Commander of the Forces; and his Excellency is pleased to concur in Capt. —, of the — regt., being released from his arrest, trusting the impressive lesson which he has received will prevent a similar disobedience of orders on his part in future. I am especially directed to inform you that every part of your letter to Lieut. Col. — meets the fullest approbation and concurrence of the Commander of the Forces.

The A.G. to officers commanding at all the hospital stations.

7th Oct. 1811.

It having been represented that the town of —, and the avenues, and streets, and unoccupied houses are in a most filthy state, enough to engender disease, I have to call your serious attention to this subject, and to refer you to the G. O., in which you will see it strongly laid down that all cantonments occupied by the troops are to be kept in the cleanest possible state. There can be no objection, under the sanction of the staff surgeon, to employ the convalescents in keeping the town, &c., in a decent state; and you will not only enforce this at —, but in all the other villages where convalescents from hospital may be sent. You will not fail to visit them occasionally yourself, and be certain the officers do their duty under you. I trust the regularity of the parading of the convalescents, &c., and their cleanliness, as well as that of the sick, are attended to, agreeably to the standing regulations of the hospitals, and that the hospitals are in the best order.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Freneda, 8th Oct. 1811.

I have had some conversation with the Q. M. G. regarding the mode in which the barracks occupied by the 5th dragoon guards were recently given over to the Portuguese barrack department, and your orders to Capt. Mackenzie, to which I wish to draw your attention.

There is no doubt that it is absolutely necessary that a Staff officer should attend upon every occasion in which a regimental officer is to hold official intercourse with any of the departments of the Portuguese army, particularly if the regiment should recently have arrived in this country. I am sorry to say that our officers are too much disposed to treat with contempt all foreigners; and I have seldom met with a Portuguese from whose story the truth can be discovered, if he should have reason to complain. It is very proper, therefore, that an officer of the Q. M. G.'s department should superintend the delivery of barracks to the regimental officer who receives them, and their restoration to the Portuguese department, of which restoration he should give notice to the Portuguese department, as he is the person who conveys to the regiment their orders to march, and to quit the barracks which they have occupied. So far is necessary.

But your order, by letter of the 31st Oct., goes to a weekly inspection of the barracks in Lisbon and Belem, under the inspection of the officer of the Q. M. G.'s department. It is quite impossible that he should really execute this duty, and the others required from him; and if the weekly inspection is necessary, it is necessary that it should be made without his superintendence, and exposed to all the evils of an intercourse between a Portuguese department and a regimental officer, without such superintendence.

I conceive, therefore, that it will be better that this weekly inspection should not be made, and that the matter should be left as it now is; viz., that the officer of the Q. M. G.'s department should superintend the delivery and the restoration of the barracks alone.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Campbell, brigade of Guards.

8th Oct. 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 6th, orders have been sent long since, so soon indeed as the army was settled, for the recovered men from Celorico to join their battalions: this is never omitted the moment it is practicable to carry it into effect, but in the late operations it was impossible to know to what point to order recovered men for the purpose of joining their battalions. The Commandant is quite correct in stating that he cannot permit men to go from the hospital station without an order from head quarters, it being in his instructions. Capt. Barrow shall be ordered to join, if he has not done so, with the recovered men. I will communicate the pleasure of the Commander of the Forces to the military Commandant at Celorico relative to the convalescents of your brigade whom you require to have in the villages occupied by you. The accumulation of sick at Celorico these last 10 days is easily accounted for, as all the divisions sent back to that place their sick upon their march, which, contrary to repeated orders, they are still in the habit of retaining with the divisions until the last moment. I enclose a return of your sick at the several hospitals.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

I also thought, at one time, that horses were come out for the 2d hussars; but if you have no official report of it, it can't be true.

I agree with you that the 12th ought not to lose any more horses; and I leave it to you to give such orders as you may think proper about turning some of their horses to grass.

I don't think the 9th dragoons ought to have more than 40 dismounted men altogether. It appears by your return that they have already 20 men dismounted, and they might give 20 more horses to the 2d hussars.

I shall accordingly desire Murray to order 20 men with their appointments of the 2d hussars to come up to Abrantes, and I think it would be well to order as many more without their appointments, as would mount the effective horses of the regiment. When the sick shall recover, they might either go to the depôt at Belem, to wait for horses from England, or they might return to their horses, and the men to be now ordered from the depôt might return to Lisbon. Let me know how many men would be required from Belem according to this scheme, and Murray shall send the route.

How do the 13th stand in respect to men and horses? Could they give any to the 2d hussars? The 2d hussars have left Pedrogão, and have returned to the Alentejo. It is necessary to keep Major Gen. Long's division in strength just at present.

I was yesterday at Celorico, where, among other irregularities, I saw that the soldiers of the cavalry carry to the hospital their corn sacks, which are filled with baggage on their return. I had one of these sacks, belonging to a man of the 16th dragoons, examined, and found that it contained his bags, 3 blankets, a jacket, &c., havresack, accoutrements, pots, pans, &c. &c.

It is very reasonable that the soldiers of the cavalry should have means given them of carrying to their regiment from hospital their bags, and probably their cloaks: but their accoutrements and clothes they might carry themselves on the march, as well as one blanket; and at all events the corn sack, one should think, ought to remain with the horse. Will you check this practice? The consequence of it is increased difficulty in procuring conveyance to carry those articles which ought to be carried, viz., the men's bags and cloaks.

I beg you to write to Sir W. Erskine about drafting the horses from the 9th, when the men of the 2d hussars shall arrive at Abrantes, respecting which Murray will apprise you.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 1st, and I now enclose my dispatch of this day. I have no other news for you excepting a general report among the French, that Buonaparte left Paris to take the command of his army in Germany, on the 12th Sept. This report receives some confirmation from a letter which I received by the last mail, from the Duke of Brunswick, dated the 10th Sept.; in which he tells me that that

G. O.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

1. Surgeons of regiments will send a daily state to the Inspector of Hospitals, at head quarters, of the sick of the respective regiments, specifying disorders.

2. This state to be accompanied by a report stating what men were about to be sent off to the general hospital, specifying to which of the hospitals.

3. In the present situation of the regiments in the 1st division, they are to keep their sick with their regiments, and the convalescents belonging to the regiments in the 1st division will be ordered to their regiments.

4. It is necessary to regulate the mode of getting supplies of provisions due from the Commissariat, either for the hospital, or for the convalescents no longer in hospital, or for sick or convalescents about to be removed. The return of the quantity of provisions and supplies of any kind required from a Commissary, should invariably be made on the day preceding that on which they are required, in order that the Commissary may have time to kill the meat and make the other preparations for the delivery at an early hour.

event was expected, and he wished that his regiment might be sent to England, in order to go to Germany.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst. and its enclosures, containing a correspondence which you have had with Major Gen. Peacocke and with the Sec. of the Portuguese government, regarding the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Borel, the cashier of the Paymaster Gen. at Lisbon.

From this correspondence it appears that Mr. Borel has been arrested and imprisoned without cause assigned, without notice to any British authority, contrary to the stipulations of treaty, and to the principles of the alliance, and even to the common forms of civility, in consequence of orders from the Prince Regent in Brazil that certain persons of that name should be arrested. I request that you will inform the Portuguese government that if they don't either give some better reason or more satisfactory explanation than that already given for the arrest and imprisonment of this person, I shall consider it my duty to order all persons attached to the British army to place themselves in security till the orders of the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland can be received.

I am perfectly aware of the consequence of the measure which I shall adopt upon this occasion; of the want of confidence and terror which it will create at Lisbon, throughout Portugal, and even throughout the Peninsula. But if those under whose immediate directions this violation of all the decent forms of civility has been committed don't think it necessary to advert to these consequences, there is no reason why I should; and I shall certainly endeavor to prevent these sudden and arbitrary arrests of persons confidentially employed by the departments of the British army without cause assigned; and shall make known to the public my reasons for the adoption of these measures of precaution and security.

I beg to be understood as not giving any opinion on the cause of the arrest of Mr. Borel. This gentleman, equally with others in the British service who have been arrested and imprisoned, either by the Portuguese government with notice to me, or by me in consequence of the desire of the Portuguese government, may have been guilty of crimes which deserve punishment; but I complain of the insult, of the mode in which this measure has been carried into execution, to which, as the commanding officer of His Majesty's troops, I will not submit.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

The army of the north have cantoned along the Duero, having some troops at Benavente, and some at Valladolid: they have likewise one division, that of Gen. Souham, at Alba de Tormes, and a stronger garrison than usual at Salamanca.

The division at Alba is probably destined to preserve the communication with the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which have taken up their cantonments again about Plasencia.

Soult arrived at Seville about the 18th of last month, and some preparations were making there, apparently for a movement into Estrema-

dura, by the troops which he brought back with him from Granada. I conclude that his return to Seville and these preparations were occasioned by the notion which was generally entertained by the French officers, that I had drawn Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps out of Alentejo for the purpose of aiding in our design upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

It is probable, therefore, that the movement will not be made, unless it should be necessary with a view to protect the march of a convoy for Badajoz, as soon as it shall be found that Lieut. Gen. Hill was still in Alentejo, and that the convoy had been introduced into Ciudad Rodrigo. I have also heard this day that Gen. Ballesteros had defeated on the 25th Sept., near San Roque, a French division of 3000 men which had been sent against him, which renders it more probable that there will be no reinforcements to the troops in Estremadura.

The position of our troops for the last two months has undoubtedly deranged all the enemy's plans for the campaign, and they have been able to effect nothing, excepting to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, notwithstanding that they have received very large reinforcements. I don't think it probable that at present they will undertake any thing of importance, excepting to endeavor to force Ballesteros to embark, which he can always effect, having a secure retreat upon Gibraltar.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Brig. Gen. Trant, containing the copy of one which he has received from H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal, stating that His Royal Highness has been pleased to confer upon him the order of the Tower and Sword, in the degree of Commander.

I beg that your Lordship will lay these letters before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and that you will request the permission of His Royal Highness for Brig. Gen. Trant to accept the honor conferred upon him by H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

I enclose the last morning state. You'll see that our sick don't decrease yet; but, excepting the inconvenience of having the men sick instead of well, it is not of much importance: very few die, and those are generally old Walcheren patients; and I believe the sickness is occasioned entirely by the irregularity of the young troops on their march to join the army. By eating the unripe fruit they acquire complaints in their stomach and bowels, and then get a slight intermittent fever, from which they recover almost immediately.

I have not entered upon my future plan of operations, because, as long as the enemy remain in their present situation, it is impossible for me to do any thing, excepting to keep them in a state of inactivity. Indeed our army is so sickly, that I can scarcely venture to wish that an opportunity should offer of doing any thing.

The A.G. to Capt. —, — regt., Celorico.

9th Oct. 1811.

The Commander of the Forces is so much dissatisfied at the state of the hospital

station at Celorico that an officer has been appointed to relieve you in charge of it. On his arrival you will deliver over to him all correspondence, details, and instructions in your possession, and you will proceed to join your regiment.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 10th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 8th.

It is difficult to give credit to the accounts which we receive from Gen. Castaños of the operations of the enemy's southern armies, as I believe he has very little, if any, intelligence on which he can rely; and I know that the desire to involve us in operations in Estremadura, with a view to cover a certain extent of country, in order to draw provisions from it, gains credit for intelligence very little deserving of any, which is afterwards communicated to us as true.

It is not easy to believe that Soult is coming with any force into Estremadura, now that the object which would have brought him there is gone by, and that one of his detachments has met with a serious check by Ballesteros, near San Roque, on the 25th of last month. It may be true, however, as we know that Buonaparte has ordered that a garrison of 6000 men should be placed in Badajoz, and it is probable that Soult may find the presence of a large body of troops to be necessary, in order to throw into the place the supplies which it will require for that number of troops.

There is likewise another and a larger view of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, in which Soult's presence, and that of a large force in Estremadura, would be expedient. The enemy's plan for the campaign has certainly been interrupted, and possibly prevented by our recent operations, and it is not unlikely that they may be desirous of resuming part of it, viz., that part which had for its object the conquest of Galicia.

In my opinion the army of the north could not venture to invade Galicia, leaving Castille and the '*Armée de Portugal*' at our mercy, as there is no doubt that this army is much stronger than either the army of the north or the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and the consequences of such a measure might be fatal to the whole French system. The only mode in which the invasion of Galicia can be resumed with safety, is for Soult to bring a large army into Estremadura, and either alarm us for the safety of the frontier of Alentejo, or to be in a situation to join the '*Armée de Portugal*,' in case we should attack them. The former is the plan which the enemy would most probably adopt. Or the enemy may have another plan; they may intend to employ the '*Armée de Portugal*' in the execution of that part of their plan for the campaign which had the attack of Valencia in view; in which case also they would assemble a large corps in Estremadura, and Soult would come there himself. I have taken this view of the enemy's intentions, in order to render my intention more clear to you; and I shall add to it the certainty I feel that there exists at present no

G. O.

Freneda, 10th Oct. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in publishing to the army the following extract of a letter, with which H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has honored him, expressing His Royal Highness' approbation of the conduct of the troops during the late operation in Portugal:

'I desire you to make known to the army how highly I appreciate their merits and services, as having, under your command, accomplished that happy result with which Divine Providence has crowned with glory the arms of the allied nations.'

serious intention of making an attack upon any of the Portuguese possessions, excepting probably the post at Ouguela, or that at Campo Maior.

If your corps and this army could both be so strong in cavalry as that both could venture into the plains, there would be no difficulty in our concerns. Unfortunately neither of us is so strong as we ought to be, and I can therefore venture upon the little offensive which I can undertake only in one quarter. If you had cavalry, you certainly have infantry in sufficient numbers to beat the 5th corps out of Estremadura; but your cavalry is not sufficiently strong. I think, however, that you are strong enough to prevent the 5th corps from doing any thing, even though Soult should add to it another division.

In attempting this, however, you must proceed with great caution, and endeavor to have the best intelligence of the force Soult brings with him. I recommend to you to canton your troops, as soon as you find that the enemy are serious in their advance upon Badajoz, nearly on the ground which we occupied with the army in the end of June and beginning of July, having one Portuguese and one British brigade, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, and some Portuguese cavalry, cantoned in Campo Maior, but ready to take post on the heights behind at a short notice, and the others at S^{ta} Olaya, Quinta del Obispo, &c. &c.

If you should find that Soult collects in too great force for you, you will retire upon Portalegre, and thence, if you should find it necessary, upon Gavião and Abrantes, sending down our bridge from Villa Velha. It appears to me, however, to be scarcely possible for Soult to bring such a force as to be able to attack you at Campo Maior, or to cut off your communication at the same time, both with Elvas and Portalegre; and unless he can do that, you have always a secure retreat, and he must give up his plan, or fall between your corps and the army.

If Soult should bring a large army into Estremadura, with a view to enable the '*Armée de Portugal*' to co-operate in the invasion of Valencia, I shall reinforce your corps with some infantry, and nearly all the cavalry, and I think we shall soon have back again the '*Armée de Portugal*.' If he should come only to throw provisions into Badajoz, I am afraid that we cannot prevent it, under existing circumstances.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 10th Oct. 1811.

Having transmitted to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole your letter of the 9th ult., containing the complaint of an outrage committed at Leiria, by 2 soldiers of the — regt., with directions to bring these culprits to trial when they should join their corps, I have the honor to forward to you, to be laid before the Portuguese government, the accompanying letter and its enclosure, which I have received from the Lieutenant General, by which it appears that the 2 soldiers have been convicted and punished for the crime they have committed.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 10th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 6th.

I think you had better entirely confine your efforts to the measures recommended in my letters of the 26th March, and of the 8th April. The

commissariat and military chest being now in hand, should be carried through; and then we can take up the arsenal and medical establishment.

I have written to you officially regarding Mr. Borel, and I have written to the government to desire to see the Prince's orders on this subject.

Whenever we get a sum of money from Cadiz or from England, I always desire that a proportion of it may be given to you; and I have besides ordered at times that paper money should be given to you. You are the best judge at what period to pay these sums to the Portuguese government, but I would advise you not to pay any more till the military chest be established; and not to pay into the military chest in any one month more than £100,000, whatever may be the sum in your hands.

I have omitted telling you that I have recommended to the Portuguese government to pay the interest on their paper money from the 1st July last, and to call in that now in circulation; and to issue paper of the same numbers and for the same sums as those now in circulation, of a better description and not so likely to be forged. These two measures together will raise the value of the Portuguese paper so high, as nearly to overcome all our financial difficulties in this country. It will not cost above £100,000 every 6 months to pay the interest, and the rise in the value of the paper, and the consequent saving in the price of every article purchased for the army, will more than cover the expense. But I much fear that the government will not adopt the measure.

The A.G. to Col. —.

10th Oct. 1811.

I have not failed to lay your memorial, dated the 6th inst., before his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you in reply, that from the General officers who have returned to England, and from the want of more in this army, his Excellency has been induced to give those Colonels, in command of brigades, staff allowances for the expenses of their situation. The Commander of the Forces does not conceive your position to be the same as that of an officer in charge of a brigade, and desires me to call to your recollection both the cases of Col. Murray and Col. Pakenham, who had junior officers to themselves, with staff allowances, placed in the command of brigades. Under these circumstances it is not in his Excellency's contemplation to place you, as Colonel, on the staff of this army.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 11th Oct. 1811.

I enclose a letter from Mr. Kennedy, containing various papers from Mr. Pratt, Mr. Drake, and Mr. Berard, in answer to complaints of these gentlemen by the Portuguese government and commissariat forwarded to me by you on the 12th Sept.

The perusal of these papers will show you the degree of confusion which prevails in the transport department of the army, and the uncertainty in all our operations which must result from it, and the corruption of the Portuguese commissariat; and the tyranny and oppression under which the people labor.

Unless I determine at once to move the army down to Lisbon, and thus put a stop to our demands for means of transport, it is impossible that any orders I can give can apply a remedy to these evils. It must be very evident to any person who reads these papers with attention, that the British Commissaries are not in fault; indeed, Mr. Pratt has no troops at

his command to carry on the war against his adversary the Portuguese Commissary at Escaroupim ; and the alleged seizure of boats by that gentleman was nothing more than the employment of a certain number of boats, already in the service of the British government, to perform a particular service, viz., to remove sick and wounded men to Lisbon. Nothing but the desire to complain could have occasioned any complaint against Mr. Drake or Mr. Berard.

I have already repeatedly pointed out the only remedy to all these evils. It is for the government to enforce their own regulations, by adequate punishment of the magistrate who refuses or neglects to issue his warrant or order to the owner of a boat or cart, at a particular time and place for the service of the army ; and by adequate punishment of the owner of a boat or cart, who shall refuse to attend and to continue to attend so long as his services shall be required.

This is the law and practice in Great Britain and in all parts of the world ; it is the practice in those parts of Spain occupied by the enemy, and the consequence is that although they don't pay, they never want means of transport of all kinds ; and until the Portuguese government shall abandon their view of false popularity, and shall protect the people over whom they are placed from the horrible tyranny and oppression under which they are laboring, by enforcing their own regulations by adequate punishments, the system of *embargo*, with all its evil consequences, including these corruptions, disputes, &c. &c., must be continued, or the army must go down to Lisbon.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 11th Oct. 1811.

Having caused inquiries to be made regarding the state of the people on the Coa, with a view to the distribution of the money which you informed me in your letter of the 27th Sept. last that the committee intended to intrust to me to be distributed, some measures have occurred to me which it would be expedient that the Portuguese government should adopt with a view to the relief of these unfortunate people.

1st ; It is very desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the transit of provisions as well from Spain into Portugal as from one part of Portugal into another ; and that duties on all kinds of goods passing in or unto Upper or Lower Beira should be excused. The government will lose but little revenue by this measure, as the army being exactly on the frontier, it is impossible that it can be collected ; but the existence of the revenue regulations gives an excuse for a system of oppression on the part of the Portuguese revenue officers which must prevent Spanish dealers from bringing provisions to the Portuguese markets.

2dly ; It is desirable that all duties should be excused on the sale of goods in the fairs and markets of Upper and Lower Beira.

3dly ; It is desirable that the prices of provisions, and indeed of all other goods, in all the towns and villages of those provinces should be left free, and find their own level.

By these measures we may hope that the people will have something that they can buy with the money that will be given to them.

From what I hear, I am much afraid that the distribution of money to the Bishops has not been and will not be of much service. The Bishops and great convents in Portugal and Spain have always been in the habit of distributing provisions daily to the poor; and the consequence of this system is the establishment in the neighbourhood of their palaces and convents of a number of idle people of both sexes, who perform no labor, and live upon what they thus receive and can procure by begging from strangers. I understand the Bishops have added the sums sent to them respectively by the committee to what they already expended in this manner, by which proceeding the relief it affords is but partial. That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious exertions to procure a subsistence, by small advances of money; and I propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money intrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able to provide for their own subsistence.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 13th Oct. 1811.

I hope you do me the justice to believe that if I had the slightest notion of the circumstances under which the sick of the 2d division had been detained with their regiments, or that you had had any thing to say to that measure, I should not have noticed it in the manner I did in the orders of the 5th inst.

The ignorance of their duty of the officers of the army who are every day arriving in this country, and the general inattention and disobedience to orders by many of those who have been long here, increase the details of the duty to such an extent as to render it almost impracticable to carry it on; and owing to this disobedience and neglect, I can depend upon nothing, however well regulated and ordered. I have lately, therefore, endeavored to correct this inattention by pointing out to officers in G. O. its consequences; and you will observe that the G. O. of the 5th, to which you refer, does no more than advert to these consequences. I adopt this measure very much because I am convinced that the disobedience of which I complain is not wilful, but is the consequence of inattention, and the bad military habits which our officers acquire when they enter the service.

G. O.

Freneda, 13th Oct. 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the Commanding officers of regiments to the annexed return of ball cartridges found among the heavy baggage of regiments recently transmitted to the stores in Great Britain.

* * * * *

4. The Commanding officers of regiments are invariably directed to send to the Ordnance department all ammunition beyond 60 rounds per man, in their possession, on their arrival in this country; and by the G. O. of the 12th Jan. 1810, No. 4, they were directed to send to the Ordnance department the ammunition belonging to soldiers sent to the hospital. The Commander of the Forces cannot conceive how ammunition could be found among the regimental baggage, if attention had been paid to the orders; and he has again to lament the continued inconvenience which is the consequence of inattention to what is ordered.

5. It is desirable that the Commanding officers of regiments which have accoutrements in the regimental stores at Lisbon, should leave these accoutrements at the disposal of the officers of those regiments stationed at Lisbon.

In this part of the army, even under my own eye, the same thing is occurring daily, and is attended by the most disastrous consequences. Although we had recently been in expectation for a fortnight of the necessity for moving the troops, the sick were left with the regiments, contrary to repeated orders; and they were at last sent to the general hospital at Celorico, at the same moment, to the amount of about 2000: the consequence was that the people at the hospital were not prepared to receive so many at a time; and it happened to be bad weather, and above 50 died in one week, and the others were in a very uncomfortable state: to this add, that by keeping the fever cases, as they do, till the fever approaches to, or is in, or has passed, the crisis, the danger of death is increased by removal; whereas by removal in an early stage of the disorder, the patient is generally improved. However, all this never occurs to these gentlemen, who think of nothing but their regimental convenience; and yet if they witness any of the inconveniences which uniformly result from their own or the disobedience of their brother officers, they are not the last to cry out; as for instance, my friend — of the — dragoons, in the case of Capt. —.

However, you may depend upon it that I had not any the most remote intention to advert to you; and if it will be any satisfaction to you, or you wish it on any account, that this should be explained in G. O., I have no objection to doing so.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 13th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th inst., and I think it would be desirable to make use of the *Agincourt* to carry to England the 29th, 85th, and 97th regts., with the addition of such transport tonnage unemployed as may be necessary for the accommodation of these regiments.

I purpose to write to the Sec. of State by the next mail, to suggest the expediency of sending back the troop ships to the Tagus.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 13th Oct. 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 9th, I can only assure you that I wrote to the government upon the wants of Gen. Pack's brigade, in consequence of his complaints to the Q. M. G., and being determined to bring officially under their view every deficiency of this description which occurs.

I am inclined to think that the continuance in circulation of the Portuguese paper, if it should rise in value, will be a convenience; and I could not now advise that the debt should be funded, but rather that the interest promised should be paid upon the circulating paper, and that the quantity in circulation should not be increased.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 13th Oct. 1811.

I am afraid that you did not understand my letter respecting the Marquez de Ponte de Lima, and the Marquez de Valença, as I intended you should. I intended that you should apply for an answer to the application of these two noblemen to be allowed to return to Portugal; and I mentioned at the same time the application of Pamplona's aide de camp to

Gordon, which I did not intend should be forwarded to the government, but as a matter of information to yourself.

As the government, however, have answered the applications of the Marquez de Valena and of the Marquez de Ponte de Lima, with that of Pamplona's aide de camp, it might happen that the latter might be hanged by the French if I were to send the copy of the note, which I should wish to be able to do to the former. If Valena and Ponte de Lima should not like the answer, which it is probable they would not, they might possibly inform against Pamplona's aide de camp, and there is no reason why they should be made acquainted with his secret.

There appears to me to be a clear distinction between the case of Ponte de Lima and Valena, and that of Pamplona's aide de camp.

1st; Those noblemen were forced to go to France; whereas the aide de camp went voluntarily, I believe, since the restoration.

2dly; Those noblemen have never served in any military capacity, and I believe were never in the service. The aide de camp has served in Portugal, and against his country.

I wish, therefore, that the answer of the government should be confined to the cases of the Marquez de Valena and the Marquez de Ponte de Lima. In regard to the aide de camp, I propose, if possible, to make a spy of him, under a promise that, if he gives good intelligence, I will, at some time or other, endeavor to obtain for him a pardon.

The A.G. to Major Gen. —.

13th Oct. 1811.

The Commander of the Forces has directed me to express his extreme surprise and his regret that after the repeated orders that have been issued to the army, any brigade should omit to send in their returns, agreeably to the frequent directions they have received on this head, especially a brigade under a General officer so long in the country as yourself, and certainly so well acquainted with the rules of the service. The enclosed letter will put you in possession of the omission there has been in sending the states of the — dragoons and — light dragoons. I am sorry to say it is not the first instance that has occurred of Brigade Major —'s neglect: if that officer is ill and unable to perform his duties, you will be pleased to report accordingly; but I am especially to inform you, that if the smallest delay occurs in the performance of this necessary part of duty in future, the Commander of the Forces will remove Brigade Major — from his situation, as unfit for the performance of what is required of him. I am especially to remark the monthly return of the — light dragoons only arrived this morning, and the weekly state of the army of the 1st could not be made up until the 11th, for want of the states of the 1st from your brigade.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 14th Oct. 1811, 10½ P.M.

I have just received your letter of the 13th. I think, upon the whole, that you had better not move Col. Byng's brigade from Niza, unless you should have a reason for doing so, which you did not know when you wrote to me on the 13th.

My opinion is, that Marmont has only gone in search of provisions, and not to attack Valencia. However, we shall see in a few days, and I shall determine how to annoy and derange their projects again.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.

14th Oct. 1811.

The Commander of the Forces having determined that Capt — of the — regt. is unfit for the situation of Commandant at Celorico, I have his Excellency's

directions to desire that a very active, and intelligent and capable officer of the same rank may be selected by you from your division, to proceed forthwith to the above station, and relieve Capt. — in the duties thereof. It is needless, I am sure, to express how very desirable it is to the army at large that the selection should be a proper and an advantageous one for the important duties of the hospital station. You will be pleased to report to me the name of the officer. He may proceed forthwith to Celorico, where he will receive further orders, communicating his arrival to Capt. —.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, commandant, Castanheira.

14th Oct. 1811.

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, and you will be pleased to convey to Lieut. Berkeley, 43d regt., the Commander of the Forces' approbation of the active exertions he has used in his situation since he has had charge of the depôt of sick at Castanheira. Had his Excellency the intention of permitting subalterns to remain as permanent Commandants at the stations, Lieut. Berkeley certainly would not have been removed; but on many accounts it is desirable the Military Commandant should not be under the rank of Captain. I trust Lieut. Berkeley will feel sufficient reward for his exertions in the above decisive testimony of his Excellency's approbation.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 15th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 11th.

I am astonished that, since the British engineers have been employed between the Tagus and the sea, the government should have employed any officer to make a plan without reference to me; and I wish that neither plan nor memoir had been sent home to Lord Wellesley.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inform Dom M. Forjaz of these my sentiments, and that I object to the recommendation of Senhor — to the Prince Regent, for a work in which he had no share whatever.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 15th Oct. 1811, 9 A.M.

I have been turning over in my mind what you stated in a late letter about the horses for the officers of the cavalry; and I am very much afraid that if we don't take measures to insure to government the price that they have paid for the horses which they have sent, the officers of the cavalry will not have the advantage of getting horses in this manner in future.

The horses cost government £50 each; and I have put the price of £60 upon each, in order to defray the expense of loss by deaths, &c. It is reasonable to suppose that some of the horses are worth more than £60,

G. O.

Freneda, 14th Oct. 1811.

The Commander of the Forces pardons —, upon the recommendation of the General Court Martial. He likewise pardons —, because that soldier told the truth to the General Court Martial, and thereby saved his comrades, who were, by mistake, charged with the offence of which he has been convicted.

5. The Commander of the Forces is concerned, however, to observe the commencement of the practice of robbing houses. The soldiers must be aware that the unfortunate inhabitants of this country, having been twice pillaged by the enemy, have but few of the conveniences, or even the necessities of life; and the Commander of the Forces had hoped that the British soldiers would have endeavored to alleviate rather than aggravate their sufferings.

6. Although the circumstances which have appeared and have occurred at the trial, have induced the Court Martial to recommend one of the soldiers convicted, and the Commander of the Forces to pardon both, he desires it may be clearly understood that he will spare no pains to discover and bring to trial those who may injure the inhabitants of the country, and that whatever punishment the Court Martial may sentence shall in every case be inflicted.

and others may be worth less, but they would all run the chance of getting the good; and even the bad, probably (as they are bought by the best judge in England), would not be worth less than £50.

If they were all taken at £60 each, I think the government would have no reason to complain; but if some are taken, and others are to remain upon my hands, I think it but fair that the government should have the advantage of a larger price for the better horses, as it will incur the risk of receiving a smaller, in a sale by auction, for those not so good. If, therefore, the officers of the cavalry will not take the horses, after all the pains which it has cost me to get them for them, I shall request you to get Lieut. Col. Elley, and two other good judges, to fix a price upon the several horses which will come up; and the officers who choose to take them may have them at the price fixed. Those they don't choose to take shall be sold by public auction; and, in the mean time, till the period of the auction shall be fixed, I shall be obliged to you if you will have the horses taken care of.

I shall request Gen. Graham to show his horses to Lieut. Col. Elley, and the officers you will appoint to fix the price of these horses, and they shall likewise fix the price which he is to pay for those which he received.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811, 5½ P.M.

I am glad that the plan which I proposed for the horses will answer. In fact, Gen. Graham chose only out of the first lot of horses, and not out of the whole; but it is fair that, having had the choice, he should pay; and the price shall be fixed by Col. Elley, &c., who will, of course, do justice between the public and individuals. The payment for the horses shall be made easy to them.

I was convinced that there was a mistake in Mr. Macleod's return of your forage. You should not allow your aide de camp to draw for the commissariat mules attached to the cavalry staff; or if you do, they should be separately mentioned, and not called yours. The orderlies appear to be separately accounted for.

I enclose you the Commissary Gen.'s note respecting the 4th dragoon guards. I hope they have not 10 days' supply of rye bread, or 40 days' of bad meat.

P.S. I see Tweeddale's hounds are just arrived. I hope you will come over and take a hunt some day or other, or we will draw your way when you like it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811, noon.

I am concerned to hear that the 4th dragoon guards don't get better, and particularly that their continued sickness should be attributed to that extraordinary circumstance in this army, 'bad food.' However, that is very easily remedied; and I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy this morning both about that and their want of corn, and of salt. Col. Sherlock applied to keep the Commissary they have. The Commanding officer should apply for money if he wants it. The regiments which have long been with the army are much in arrear, and those which arrive are generally in advance; but I never refuse to advance to the latter whatever sums they

may require on the estimates, for months to which the rest of the army have not been paid. This is a case that has occurred frequently.

I have no objection to the quarters of the 4th dragoon guards being changed; but I think they are in as healthy a situation as any in the country.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811, 2 P.M.

I received this morning your letter of the 14th, and I have since seen the papers transmitted by Col. Offeney. I have no doubt but that the object of the French is to throw a convoy into Badajoz, which we cannot prevent under present circumstances.

Girard commands only one division of the 5th corps; and we may depend upon it that if there were more than one division on this side of the Guadiana, besides cavalry, Drouet, who commands the corps, would have been with it.

You have done right to order up the troops from Niza.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th.

I am very desirous that the sick should not be removed from Coimbra, excepting those belonging to the 29th, 85th, and 97th regts., and such men as it may be necessary from time to time to send to England, as I find that it is almost impracticable to get up to the army from Lisbon a soldier who has recovered from sickness.

I write this day to request the Sec. of State will order the troop ships of war to the Tagus, and will send out 12 coppered transports, drawing 9 or 10 feet water.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of this date. I have no other news for you, excepting that Dr. Curtis, the Rector of the Irish College of Salamanca, and the Provider of the Bishopric, both connected with my correspondents there, have been arrested by the French.

We hear that there is *hell to pay* at Cadiz; but I don't understand about what.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811.

I am obliged to trouble you again upon the old subject of General officers. I was obliged to give Gen. Dunlop leave to go home, and I doubt his coming out again; and he is really a loss. Gen. Sontag is so ill as to be obliged to go away, and I imagine will never again be fit for service.

Leith is not come, and we have no commanding officer for the 5th division; I understand that Houstoun will not return, and there will be none for the 7th; and Gen. Campbell's departure will leave the 6th division without a Commander. We have a brigade or two without officers also, in consequence of Beckwith's continued absence (and we are told he will not return), and Mackinnon's. But these I can manage.

I don't know whom to propose for our divisions. Clinton shall have one, either the 5th or 6th; Leith, if he comes, another; and I wish I could get back Dunlop, or some respectable person, if Houstoun does not return, for the 7th. Let me know whether Leith comes or not, and also whether Houstoun returns.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811.

There has been no material alteration in the position of the enemy's troops since I addressed you last.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' are cantoned beyond Plasencia, having one division at Plasencia, with their advanced posts on the Alagon; and the cavalry on the north side of the mountains which divide Castille from Estremadura, about Peñaranda. I imagine that they communicate with the infantry in Estremadura by Congosto and the Puerto del Pico, the road through which was repaired by the enemy in the year 1809, after the battle of Talavera.

It is reported that 3 divisions of Guards belonging to the army of the north have gone to Valladolid, which, however, requires confirmation. The other troops of the army of the north are upon the Tormes.

I learn from Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, that the enemy are fortifying the posts which they occupy in front of the army of Galicia; from which I judge that they have no intention of attempting to penetrate into that kingdom during this winter.

In Lower Estremadura the enemy appear to intend to introduce a convoy into Badajoz, which it is impossible for the allies to attempt to prevent. With this view, probably, one division of the 5th corps, with a considerable body of cavalry, have crossed the Guadiana at Merida, under Gen. Girard; and the remainder of the corps was to the south of that river. But I understand that Soult remained at Seville.

I have received a report that Don J. Sanchez yesterday carried off a large proportion of the cattle grazing near Ciudad Rodrigo, and destined for the supply of the garrison; and he made prisoner the governor, Gen. Renaud, either by surprise, or in consequence of the latter having endeavored to save the cattle with a very inadequate force.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811.

Adm. Berkeley has at different times sent to England, either with convoys or to carry troops, all the troop ships of war named in the margin, and the *Agincourt* is now going with the 29th, 85th, and 97th regts., but none of these ships have returned. As it is very desirable that we should have the service of these ships, particularly during the winter months, I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if they can be returned.

It would also be very desirable, and a saving in the hire of craft, if there were attached to this army 12 coppered transports, drawing from 9 to 10 feet water, which could pass the bars of the rivers Mondego and Douro. If these could be sent, a proportionate quantity of the tonnage detained in the Tagus according to my dispatch of the 21st March might be sent home.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 16th Oct. 1811.

I enclose the last fortnight and weekly states of the British army, and the morning state of the allied army of the 13th.

You will see that we are not much better in respect to the number of sick; but the disorder continues to be of a very mild description. I was twice last week at the hospital at Celorico, and I saw no bad cases, but the numbers are astonishing. In the 4th division there are as many sick, absent and present, as there are men fit for duty. The 40th regt., out of 1419, have only 652 fit for duty; and the whole number of their recruits, recently arrived from England, are in the hospitals. The 77th regt. arrived in Portugal 2 months ago, about 800 men, and in the action of the 25th Sept. they had 250 R. and F.; by the return of the 8th, they have 287 fit for duty, and 414 in the hospitals.

The 2d division, which have been all the summer in the Alentejo, are, and have been, the most healthy of all, notwithstanding they suffered so much in the battle of Albuera, which shows how little reliance is to be placed on general reports of the unwholesomeness of climates.

The French have seized Dr. Curtis, of the Irish College, and the Provivor of the Bishopric of Salamanca, who are two of the people with whom my correspondents there communicate. I suspect that they have had orders from Paris to cut us off from all intelligence.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 17th Oct. 1811, 11 A.M.

I received in the night your letter of the 15th. I concur entirely in your giving assistance to Gen. Castaños, and should approve of your adopting a measure which should be more effectual, and should drive Girard from Caceres across the Guadiana again, if you think you can do it without risking the safety of Campo Maior and Ouguela. It appears to me that you are too strong for Girard in every way, if the other division of the 5th corps have not crossed the Guadiana.

If Gen. Castaños, or his troops, enter the Portuguese frontier, our commissariat must provide for them, keeping a regular account of what they issue to them, but only as long as they remain within the Portuguese frontier.

The A.G. to Capt. —, D.A.A.G.

17th Oct. 1811.

Your letter of the 16th inst. has been laid before the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency desires me to acquaint you, that as you have expressed a desire to withdraw your resignation, and a wish to remain in the department, he will not object to the same. I am, however, especially directed to inform you that it is his Excellency's opinion, that if you are so extremely sensible to censure, it is much better you should resign your office, as you may depend upon it that his Excellency will never cease to censure when he sees cause.

There can be no dispute respecting the exertions or delays as to warning evidence, &c., in the trial of Major —, before the General Court Martial; and it is quite a novel principle that the Commander in Chief, or Adjutant Gen. of an army, in censuring neglects, is to look to orderly dragoons or serjeant majors, or Adjutants of regiments, and not to the superior officers of the Staff. It is the most important duty of the latter to see that the others do what is required of them, and to notice any neglect, omission, want of exertion, or delay; and if this duty is not performed satisfactorily in the opinion of those who issue orders, the officer of the Staff must expect to be censured. Having expressed these sentiments of his Excellency, I have only to add that, however much I felt both the

disrespect and impropriety of your manner of expressing yourself to me on the evening of the 12th, I feel perfectly satisfied with the apology you have made.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

17th Oct. 1811.

I have received the enclosed letters from the Commandant at Abrantes, and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to suggest, that in future any communications to the military stations, of the nature of the enclosed, should be made through this office, as, although it may occasion a little more delay, it is absolutely necessary I should be apprised of the removal of officers from any station, to be satisfied that they are replaced by such divisions as are entitled to give them, which, from the general hospital returns, can best be known here. It is quite clear that all commanding officers wish to have their officers with their battalions; but it is also evident that, unless the sick and convalescents are looked after at the hospitals by officers, indiscipline and disorder will be established.

* * * * *

From the above detail you will clearly perceive how inconvenient any divisional application and orders to the general hospitals must be. All representations forwarded here will be duly investigated, and the Commander of the Forces' pleasure taken upon them; but the Commandants of hospitals must receive their orders solely from head quarters.

The A.G. to Capt. Ahmuty, D.A.A.G., 6th division.

17th Oct. 1811.

I have to request you will immediately, upon the receipt of this letter, send an officer to report himself at my office, and he will receive instructions relative to his taking charge of Gen. Renaud, the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, who, the Commander of the Forces has directed, will be sent from hence to-morrow, on his road to Lisbon. It will be an object that the officer who is to be sent to Lisbon on this duty should speak French: he will have 2 dragoons as an escort for his prisoner.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Freneda, 18th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th Oct., containing three queries from Gen. Conde de Amarante.

In answer to the first, I beg you will inform the Conde de Amarante, that it is not my intention to prohibit him from passing the frontier in all cases, but, on the contrary, that I wished him to pass the frontier (taking care not to risk his infantry) on any occasion on which he should think he could make a useful diversion with his cavalry in favor of Gen. Abadia, without risking the loss of his cavalry.

The second question is answered above.

In answer to the third query, I beg that the Conde de Amarante may understand, that the troops under his command are destined principally to defend the frontiers of Portugal. He must not enter upon any operation combined with, or joined to the Spaniards, which may remove him from the object for which the force under his command is principally destined. Under present circumstances it does not appear probable that the enemy will attack Gen. Abadia.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.

18th Oct. 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to call your attention to the neglect of duty on the part of the officers sent with the working party. He has received reports that these officers neither attend nor remain with their men. It is his Excellency's pleasure, therefore, that a field officer always accompanies the working party from the division; and you will be pleased to apprise the officers that if the Commander of the Forces has occasion to animadvert again on their want of zeal and attention in these essential duties, he will not only do so in public orders, but he will report to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief the names and

regiments of all officers who do not execute the service as they should, for the purpose of their promotion being stopped in their several corps.

I am also to desire that the division order in which his Excellency understands it is stated the serjeant's guard there should receive pay be cancelled, as it is his Excellency's pleasure that no men receive pay but those who work, and work diligently. It is further the Commander of the Forces' order, that there should be always a complete relief, and that no masons, or any other artificers, remain beyond the rest of the party, over the time which they are directed to work. I am to add that the inattention complained of, in the foregoing part of this letter, more immediately relates to the subalterns of the party, as the Captains have been stated to be more attentive.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Freneda, 19th Oct. 1811.

This letter will be delivered to you by Gen. Renaud, late governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, who is going to Lisbon, on his way to England, as a prisoner of war on his parole.

I beg leave to recommend him to your attention, and I request you to take an early opportunity of forwarding him to England, either in a ship of war, or a transport, or the packet; and that you will desire the Captain of the vessel in which he will go, to apprise the Commissioners of transports of his arrival as soon as he shall reach any port in England.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 19th Oct. 1811.

This letter will be delivered to you by Gen. Renaud, the late governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, who is going to Lisbon, on his way to England. I beg leave to recommend him to your attentions as long as he may remain at Lisbon.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 20th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and I concur in opinion with you, that you have done right in resuming your seat at the Regency.

I have received a most handsome letter from the Prince in answer to mine of the 7th May, upon which I have addressed the Governors of the Kingdom. These will go, I hope, by this post, so that I shall not trouble you further upon them.

I have recommended Gen. Renaud, the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, to you; you will find him a very intelligent fellow.

To the Governor of Almeida.

Freneda, 21st Oct. 1811.

Major Sturgeon, of the Royal Staff corps, being employed by me upon the public service, I request that you will let him have from the old carriages, &c., any axletrees or other iron which he may want, brass boxes from wheels, &c., which he may require; likewise the use of the grinding stones and smith's forges in Almeida, and a certain quantity of timber for the construction of a pile engine, and of a trustle.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 21st Oct. 1811.

I received yesterday your letter of the 17th. It is very obvious to me, both from the Prince's letter and from every thing that has passed, that he will not dismiss Principal Sousa; and the orders which have been lately received here, and the promise which the Prince makes to receive favor-

ably the services of Dom M. Forjaz, render the dismissal of the Principal an object of less importance. I have therefore taken advantage of the receipt of the Prince's letter, to put an end to the uncomfortable state in which I have so long stood in respect to the government. We shall now start fresh, and we must endeavor to carry the business on as well as we can. The recent orders of the Prince certainly give us great advantages, which we have never till now possessed.

In respect to the military chest, you will be able to judge whether the delay to form it by the 1st Nov. is necessary; whether that necessity has been produced by the real magnitude of the concerns of the *Junta de Viveres*, or by design, or by neglect to settle the accounts of the late *Junta de Viveres*; or whether the delay is not unnecessary. As far as I can judge here, the delay cannot be necessary; because, whether the Commissary Gen. or the *Junta de Viveres* are to supply the wants of the army, the money might as well come from the military chest, as direct from the Treasury. However, if you should think the delay necessary, I recommend to you to be sparing in your issues of money, as there is no reason for abandoning any principle on which we have hitherto acted.

As I wish to put an end to the whole difference between the Portuguese government and me, and am not desirous of carrying on the war in Brazil when peace has been made in Portugal, I beg you not to transmit to England my letter on the subject of ———'s charge against Dom M. Forjaz, which is certainly now unnecessary, and would tend only to revive old disputes, and that if you have sent it, you will write to Mr. Hamilton to request that it may be retained.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will speak to the members of the Regency regarding the case of Borel. I shall be sorry to commence the era of peace by a *coup d'état* such as that which I had in contemplation on this subject. But it must be obvious to the government that the Prince did not mean that this person should be arrested; and even if he did, the mode in which the arrest was made was such that I cannot submit to it, and I must adopt some measures which shall show to the public my sense of it. *Among friends* this is better avoided.

P.S. Upon referring to my dispatch to you of the 11th Sept., I conceive that down to the words 'neglect and disobedience upon this occasion,' in the third paragraph, might go to England; the rest of the dispatch will only tend to revive the dispute.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. ———, — regt., 1st division.

21st Oct. 1811.

I have laid your letter of the 19th inst. and enclosure before his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, and I am to acquaint you that his Excellency never heard any reports of the conduct of the — regt. in the action at Fuentes, except to their advantage. The Commander of the Forces reported favorably of their conduct to H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and his Excellency will not allow any inquiry to substantiate the truth of a report of the behaviour of a regiment in an action in which his Excellency was personally present.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 22d Oct. 1811, 8 A.M.

I received your letter of the 20th, last night. I think you had better not pass Caceres with your head quarters and main body. When you

have driven off Girard, replace the Conde de Penne Villemur at Caceres, and bring back again your troops towards the frontier.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Freneda, 22d Oct. 1811.

I received by the last post your letter of the 22d Sept., and I am very much obliged to you for what you have done for Mr. Dalrymple. I propose to keep him here, notwithstanding that I am afraid that he will be unwilling to stay when Mr. Kennedy goes. This misfortune will happen very shortly, but I hope he will return soon, as he promises. I have too much reason to complain of Mrs. Kennedy and her sister.

I am very much obliged to you also for the notice you have taken of Campbell, and particularly for allowing him to come to this army. You will find him a very zealous, hard working fellow, who will at least do his best. He is the only person who knows any thing about my concerns, and I have no time to attend to them myself. He is, besides, very useful as a Staff officer, particularly in an affair.

Au Général Dumouriez.

A Fréneda, ce 22 Oct. 1811.

J'ai reçu par la dernière poste la lettre que vous m'avez écrite le 23 et 24 Sept., et vous aurez vu que nos manœuvres du côté de Ciudad Rodrigo ont attiré sur nous tout le monde; que nous avons sauvé le Général Abadia et le royaume de Galice; que les divisions Françaises, récemment venues du royaume de Naples, ont été amenées des frontières de la Navarre, où Mina a été laissé en liberté de faire ce qu'il a voulu; et que Soult même est retourné à Seville de son expédition à Grénade. Je n'ai rien pu faire de plus, car l'ennemi était au moins d'un tiers plus fort que moi, et les intérêts qui dépendent de la conservation de cette armée sont trop importants pour être risqués dans un combat inégal, avec une place et une rivière difficile à passer, sur le dos.

Le Général Abadia travaille bien en Galice, et j'espère qu'avant que l'ennemi puisse l'attaquer, ces arrangemens dans ce royaume l'auront mis hors de danger. En attendant, l'armée Française du Nord est cantonnée le long du Tormes, ayant sa gauche aux montagnes qui séparent la Castille de l'Estrémadure; celle de Portugal a sa droite aux mêmes montagnes, et sa gauche sur le Tage; quelques divisions étant bien en arrière, mais qui communiquent avec celle de l'armée du Nord par le Puerto de Pico. Le 5^{me} corps d'armée est dans la Basse Estrémadure, et communique par Almaraz avec l'armée de Portugal; et Soult est à Seville.

Par les derniers rapports, Suchet avait attaqué le royaume de Valence, que Blake défendait, je ne suis pas sûr avec combien de monde. Je ne peux pas en attirer sur moi plus que j'en aie; mais je compte tenter quelque chose si je trouve qu'on détache à l'aide de Suchet.

Je suis bien fâché d'avoir à vous faire savoir que votre protégé, St. Martin, est mort dernièrement à Celorico. Nous avons eu tout lieu de nous louer de lui depuis qu'il était placé à l'armée Portugaise, et il est vraiment une perte.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 22d Oct. 1811

Since I wrote to you last month, respecting the Portuguese government,

some circumstances have occurred which have made a material alteration in the state of affairs, and would probably alter the opinion of His Majesty's ministers on this subject.

The Prince Regent of Portugal has written positive orders, to his government here, to carry into execution all the suggestions of the British authorities in regard to the civil departments of the army; and they have called upon us for our suggestions in detail. I have also received a very civil letter from the Prince Regent of Portugal, in answer to one which I wrote to him in May last, in which he assures me of his entire confidence; and although he declines to remove Principal Sousa from his service, he promises his countenance and favor to Dom M. de Forjaz, as long as he shall conduct himself to my satisfaction; and he begs me to endeavor to put an end to the spirit of party in his government. I have taken advantage of this letter to try to reconcile myself with the government, and I am in hopes that, under the Prince's recent orders, I shall be able to get on tolerably well, even with the present government.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 22d Oct. 1811.

I have received your Lordship's letters of the 19th and 20th. I am very much obliged to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief for thinking of us. I shall be glad to have the other brigade of cavalry, which he has directed to be in readiness, as it is in that arm alone that the enemy can be much superior to us, and by which they can do us much mischief, if we should be able to go into the plains.

I have had with me, for 2 days, ———, from whom I have received a good deal of useful information. He is a very intelligent fellow, who likes talking.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

22d Oct. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of General Courts Martial on the cases of privates ———, ———, and ———, of the Chasseurs Britanniques, as also of ——— of the same regiment. These men are all now in the Provost at Lisbon. By some accident the within proceedings were sent to England, and the men above mentioned have been now long in confinement: his Excellency taking this circumstance into his consideration, has been pleased to pardon the above offenders, and you will be pleased to make known to them this especial act of favor, after their having been sentenced to death for their heinous offences. You will be pleased also to direct the men to be released from the Provost, and to remain doing duty with the detachment of the corps at Fort S. Julian, and they are not to be allowed to join the army. After having made the men acquainted with their sentences, you will be pleased to send the Courts Martial to the Deputy Judge Advocate now at Lisbon.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Picton, 3d division.

22d Oct. 1811.

In answer to your letter and enclosures of this date, I have to acquaint you the Commander of the Forces approves of the soldiers of the 74th and 45th regts. being practised in firing ball cartridge, the troops that may be in the cantonments near being apprised of the same.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.

22d Oct. 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 20th, the Commander of the Forces consents to Lieut. Col. ——— proceeding to Lisbon: on his arrival there he will appear before a Medical board, which will be ordered to report upon his case. It is not usual nor consistent with G. O. (*vide* 7th and 20th Sept. 1809) for the certificate of an

officer's ill health to state the necessity of removal to Lisbon. A Medical board is to be ordered by the Inspector of hospitals, upon a certificate, at the nearest hospital station; and upon the report of such board an officer is permitted to remove as far as Lisbon if necessary, but not upon certificates of Medical officers of the division. However, the Commander of the Forces has consented to Lieut. Col. — now proceeding there, when a board will further report on his case.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 23d Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th, and I am much obliged to you for the measures which you have adopted to send to England the 29th, 85th, and 97th regts.

Major Gen. Cooke found it necessary to detain at Cadiz the Regiment de Watteville, after he had sent to Lisbon the horses belonging to the Field officers of that regiment; and I have desired that application might be made to have those horses sent back to Cadiz, with which I shall be much obliged to you if you will comply.

I have written to England to have small transports sent out, which will be capable of passing the bars of the Mondego and Douro; but, in the mean time, till they shall arrive, it is very desirable that we should have vessels capable of entering those rivers.

I entirely concur with you in the expediency of occupying the Fort Bugio with a detachment of the battalion of marines, and of the marine artillery, and of relieving the detachment every week.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 23d Oct. 1811.

As the soldiers of this army frequently sleep out of doors, and as, even when in houses, they are obliged to sleep in their great coats, that article of their equipment is worn out in a much shorter period of time than that specified by the regulations (3 years) that it should last, and there are no means in this country of replacing them. I therefore request your Lordship that 10,000 great coats (as recommended in the enclosed memorandum) may be sent as an article of store, to the Commissary Gen., to be issued to regiments as they may have occasion for them; and regular accounts shall be kept of their issue, and forwarded from time to time to the Sec. at War, in order that the price of these great coats may be charged against the great coat fund of the several regiments.

I beg leave to recommend that your Lordship should order that 20,000 stands of arms and 20,000 sets of accoutrements may be sent to Lisbon, in order to supply the casual demands of the army, as well as those of the Portuguese and Spanish governments, there being at Lisbon at present only 1000 stands.

I likewise beg leave to recommend to your Lordship to order that a division of infantry, now raising in Castille, under Don Carlos de España, to which I have supplied arms and accoutrements, and to which he is paying great attention, may be supplied with blue clothing. It amounts to 4000 men, and it is desirable that this blue clothing should be sent to Oporto, consigned to the British Commissary there, as soon as possible.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 23d Oct. 1811.

The enterprise of Don J. Sanchez. to carry off the cattle from

Ciudad Rodrigo, adverted to in my last dispatch, was very well conducted and very successful. During the night of the 14th he posted his troops near the places at which he had been informed that the cattle from the garrison were usually brought to graze in the morning; and he expected that they would come to the ground on the left bank of the Agueda, between the hills on the El Bodon road and the fort, and he placed two detachments of cavalry behind these hills. The governor, Gen. Renaud, had come out of the fort and across the Agueda, attended by some Staff officers, and escorted by a party of about 20 cavalry, and he was surrounded by Don Julian's detachment as soon as he entered the hills, and was taken, with 2 of his escort, under the fire of the guns of the place. The remainder of the escort escaped; one of the officers attending the governor having been wounded. Shortly afterwards Don Julian's detachments on the right of the Agueda drove off the greatest number of the cattle which had been sent out to graze, under the guns of the fort, on that side of the river.*

The enemy's troops in front of this army have made no movement of importance since I addressed your Lordship last. A detachment of the army of the north, which had crossed the Tormes with a view to plunder the country between that river and the Yeltes, have returned to their cantonments without deriving much advantage from this expedition.

I have directed Gen. Hill to endeavor to force Girard's division, the 5th corps, to retire from Caceres, as in that position they distress for provisions the troops under the Conde de Penne Villemur and Gen. Morillo, belonging to Gen. Castaños. Gen. Hill was to move from his cantonments on this expedition on the 22d.

By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz to the 15th inst., I learn that Marshal Suchet had entered the kingdom of Valencia, from Tortosa, with 20,000 men, and had advanced as far as Murviedro. He made 3 attempts to obtain possession of the fort of Saguntum, near that town, by escalade, on the 29th of last month, in all of which he was repulsed with considerable loss, and left behind him his ladders. He was still at Murviedro on the 4th inst.

In the mean time Gen. Blake had thrown himself into Valencia, with 23,000 men, composed of the divisions which he had brought with him from Cadiz and from Murcia, and other troops; all the strong holds in Valencia were occupied, and the greatest efforts were making to bring a large force into that kingdom, in order to annoy the enemy's communication with his rear. The utmost confidence appears by the accounts to be placed in Gen. Blake, and the people of Valencia appear determined to co-operate in resistance to the enemy.

The enemy have not detached from their force in front of this army to aid Marshal Suchet. As far as I have been able to learn, they expect, in addition to the reinforcements which have already joined, 65 battalions of infantry, being the 4th battalions of the regiments now in the Peninsula. Some of these are of course destined for the regiments in the *corps d'armée* in the south; and others for the regiments in Catalonia and Aragon, and now in Valencia; but the greater number for the regiments in the army of the north and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and in the 5th

* See Appendix, No. XII.

corps, which are more immediately opposed to the allied British and Portuguese army; and I understand that they don't purpose to move till these reinforcements shall arrive.

I learn from Major Gen. Cooke that he had detached 1200 men from Cadiz, under Col. Skerrett, to land at Tarifa, and in co-operation with a Spanish corps under Gen. Copons, likewise to be detached from Cadiz, to endeavor to create a diversion in favor of Gen. Ballesteros, against whom the enemy appear to have detached from the lines before the Isla de Leon and from Seville a considerable force. Gen. Ballesteros has taken a position near San Roque, and there is reason to believe that Col. Skerrett, who sailed on the 10th, will have reached Tarifa; but Gen. Copons' force did not sail so soon, and had been obliged by the weather to return to Cadiz, and had been re-landed when the accounts came away on the 15th.

There has been no movement in the north since I addressed your Lordship last.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 23d Oct. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, and the morning state of the troops in the field of the 20th. The troops are becoming more healthy; and as the weather is now colder, I am in hopes that they will recover entirely.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 23d Oct. 1811.

I have omitted to answer your letter about the Prince of Orange. When I informed him of the arrangement which had been proposed for him, and of the favor which H.R.H. the Prince Regent was disposed to confer upon him, he told me that he preferred to continue for some time longer in the situation in which he is now placed, in order that he may have time to learn a little more before he is placed in a higher situation. He is really a very fine young man. He conducts himself remarkably well, and is much liked by every body.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 25th Oct. 1811.

I received yours of the 23d last night, and I now enclose a duplicate of my last note, in case by any accident the original should have miscarried. There is nothing new on this side.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 25th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 21st Oct., and I shall refer to the consideration of the Commissary Gen. the paper regarding money and supplies from the commissariat, which you enclosed. Beresford and Dom M. Forjaz know their own concerns best, certainly; but, in my opinion, the military chest is a separate concern from the commissariat, and it would be a convenience that it should commence first.

Let the government send me the bill for the labor in the arsenal. I rather believe it is for the ordnance on the fortified ground between the Tagus and the sea.

I have heard of the exportations of silver by the Americans, which it does not appear to me to be possible to prevent, excepting by laying such

high duties upon the import of all articles, including corn, the produce of America, as shall prevent the Americans from resorting to the Portuguese markets. When the Americans sell their corn at Lisbon, they must receive payment in money; as, owing to the uncomfortable state of affairs between Great Britain and America, they can't take bills upon England, because that which they would purchase with those bills in England would not be admitted into America. The only remedy, therefore, excepting that of a settlement between Great Britain and America, is for Portugal to lay high duties upon the import of the produce of America. The question upon this remedy, which will exclude the Americans from the Portuguese markets, is whether the Portuguese can do without the produce of America? or in other words, whether Great Britain and Ireland, the Barbary States, and the Greek islands, can supply the demands of Portugal for provisions? If these demands can be supplied, I should recommend this measure; but it is desirable that you should write to the British government upon the subject, to let them know how the matter stands. I shall also mention it to Lord Liverpool.

Adverting to the mode in which business is done in Portugal, I should doubt whether to affix a stamp upon the Portuguese paper in circulation would be equivalent to the substitution of a new paper instead of the old. The stamp would be the easiest mode of proceeding, but great care should be taken to examine the paper; not to stamp any numbers that have been destroyed, and not to stamp two numbers of the same denomination. I would likewise recommend, that for each 100 numbers there should be a different stamp, the difference to be known only to particular persons. For instance, one stamp from No. 1 to No. 100, another from No. 101 to No. 200, and so on. This is more troublesome, but it increases the difficulty of forgery, which is the object.

To the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal.

Freneda, 26th Oct. 1811.

I understand that you have again seized 9 mules, and 4 mule loads of cheese, and have taken 8 dollars from some Spaniards who were going to sell their cheese to the army. You may be right, for aught I know, in committing this act of oppression, but I apprise you that your conduct shall be inquired into by the Special Commission, and if you have exceeded your authority, or what the law directs, you shall be punished.

I also hereby order you to have the 9 mules, and the cheese, and the money, taken care of, in order that the whole may be returned in good order to the Spaniards, in case the Governors of the Kingdom, to whom I have written upon this subject, should so direct.

To the Juiz de Fora of Gouvea.

Freneda, 27th Oct. 1811.

I have to inform you that I have ordered for trial, before a General Court Martial now sitting at Guarda, the corporal and private soldier of the — regt., who you complained to me had committed an outrage in pressing cars at Gouvea; and I desire that you will be prepared to send to Guarda, to give testimony before the Court Martial, all the persons who were witnesses of the facts of which you have complained, when the officer acting as Judge Advocate with that Court Martial shall send to you for them.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 27th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st Oct., in which you enclosed one of the 19th Oct. from Dom M. Forjaz, regarding the number of foreigners in the service of the British army now in Portugal. In answer to which, I beg you will inform Dom M. Forjaz, that any regulation which the government shall make upon this subject, which it may be practicable to carry into execution, shall be strictly obeyed.

I request the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom, however, to the following considerations. It appears by the statement of the magistrate of Santarem, enclosed in Dom M. Forjaz's letter of the 19th, that the number of persons employed, even in that town, is very inadequate to the performance of the several duties already imposed upon them; and that these persons can scarcely exist. It is notorious that this is the case in this part of the Kingdom. The magistrates of the towns and villages have no longer any of that description of business for the performance of which they received fees, by which they were enabled to live; and they are now starving: they are indifferent about the tenure of their offices, and they perform their duty with negligence.

This is a subject deserving the consideration of government, upon which, if they desire it, I will give them my opinion; but in the mean time, till a remedy is applied, it is desirable that the duties of these same magistrates should not be increased.

Before the first French invasion of Portugal, the laws respecting the passage of strangers throughout the country were very strict, and were put into execution with some vigilance. Whether they were at that time necessary or not is not now the question, but whether it is expedient to revive them and increase their severity at the present moment.

I have been concerned with the affairs of Portugal for more than 3 years, and I have never known an instance in which any thing was to be apprehended from strangers in the Kingdom; and, in my opinion, the Governors of the Kingdom have given too much importance to persons of this description. The policy of Great Britain, or of other countries upon this subject, does not at all bear upon the question, as it may be very necessary to restrain the intercourse of foreigners with the natives of these countries; but it is, in my opinion, quite unnecessary in Portugal.

There is another view of the subject which is peculiar to Portugal, to which the Intendant of Police has not adverted, and that is, there is in Portugal, for its defence, a large foreign army, which must have foreigners of all descriptions attached to it, and following it; and every restriction upon the intercourse of these foreigners with the country must increase the difficulty of defending the country.

The Governors of the Kingdom don't appear to be aware of the immensity of the machine which has been formed in this country for the support of the Portuguese, as well as of the British army, conducted in all its branches by foreigners. Any restriction upon the passage of these foreigners through the country would be very inconvenient to the military system, unless the restriction could be removed by passports. But passports, it is well known, are liable to abuse and fraud, as well as every other institution: and if the description of the person to whom they are given is included in them, in order to guard against fraud, they are

attended by such an increase of the detail of business in the departments of the army, as well as in the offices of the several magistrates, who are to examine the passports and the bearers of them, as would render the operations of the war almost impracticable.

For instance, not only every officer and his servants, but every conductor and his muleteers must have passports describing the persons of each, which passports must be examined at every stage, and signed by the magistrate examining them. If this is not done, no object will be gained; and I beg the Governors of the Kingdom to consider whether they can prevail upon the magistrates of the country, under existing circumstances, to perform this duty; and whether there are any evils existing or to be apprehended, to avoid which will compensate for the loss of time and the trouble which will be the consequence of this system.

I request you to lay this letter before the Governors of the Kingdom.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Graham, 1st division.

28th Oct. 1811.

In reply to the application for leave of absence to England for Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., the Commander of the Forces acquiesces in the same, provided Col. — will not attempt to renew his leave in England, which is granted for 2 months, with the additional condition that Col. — leaves his horses at Lisbon to come up to the army immediately on his return. I have, however, the Commander of the Forces' directions to remark, that it is very extraordinary that an officer who has been but 3 months in the country should require leave so soon, more particularly as the Secretary of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief has informed Lord Wellington that all the officers who have been lately sent to this country have had notice that no leave of absence would be granted them, and that their affairs should be settled before they left the country.

To Senhor José Clementi Pereira.

Freneda, 29th Oct. 1811.

I enclose you the copy of the answer which I have received to the application which I made to the Governors of the Kingdom some time ago, in favor of the Marquez de Ponte de Lima, and the Marquez de Valença, which I beg you will forward to those noblemen in the most secure manner; you will at the same time inform them, that if they should come here, they will be treated with every attention which I can show them, and that I have no doubt of their safety, if they can prove the case which they stated in their first address to me. Tell them, that if they should experience any difficulty in making their escape, I may be able to assist them, by putting them in communication with one of the parties of Spanish guerrillas, but that in that case they must do exactly what the guerrilla chief may desire them to do.*

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 29th Oct. 1811.

About the end of last month, when Soult arrived at Seville, Girard came forwards towards the Guadiana, and Gen. Drouet, with the other division of the 5th corps, to Zafra, from Andalusia. That movement appeared to be connected with Marmont's objects, and Girard afterwards retired. He has since come forward again, however, and at first I

* Afterwards escorted from Tamames by Lieut. Gurwood, 52d, then employed in observation in the Sierra de Francia.

thought his object was to throw a supply into Badajoz, which we could not prevent; but he has besides pushed forward to Caceres, and has driven Gen. Castaños' posts beyond the Salor, by which he has distressed him much for provisions and forage, and it was necessary either to prepare to receive these vagabond troops in Portugal, or to replace them at Caceres. I therefore desired Gen. Hill to make a movement with his troops, and to threaten Girard's communication with Merida by his right, while with the remainder of his troops he attacked him at Caceres.

I have a letter from Gen. Hill of the 26th, informing me that Girard had that morning retired from Caceres on Torremocha. Gen. Hill was at Malpartida, and intended to move on the 27th to Aldea del Cano. As soon as Girard should cross the Guadiana, Hill would return to his cantonments, leaving the Spaniards in the country about Caceres, &c. As Soult will hear of these movements much about the time that he will feel the necessity of reinforcing the corps sent against Ballesteros, I am in hopes that they may be of some use to Ballesteros.

There is nothing new here this morning.

To Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

Freneda, 29th Oct. 1811.

I was much concerned to receive this day your letter by which you apprised me of the necessity that you should go to England for the recovery of your health; and this concern was occasioned not less by my feelings for you personally, than by my sense of the inconvenience and injury which the army and the public interests will suffer by the loss of your valuable services. I don't, however, yet lose all hope that you will be able to return to us; but if you should not, and you should think that I can be of any use to you to forward your views in England, I beg that you will let me know it; and you will always find me ready to state my sense of your services and merits.

Gen. Stewart will send you the official leave for you to go home.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 29th Oct. 1811.

I enclose you a paper on the Portuguese finance, in answer to the paper of the Portuguese government on the same subject, transmitted in your letter of the 24th. I beg that you will lay this paper before the government.

You will see by my letter to them of yesterday, that I have insisted upon their establishing the military chest, although not prepared with other arrangements. My opinion upon this subject need not prevent you and Beresford from acting on it as you please.

MEMORANDUM.

In considering the paper on the subject of Portuguese finances of October, 1811, it is necessary to advert to the state of the Kingdom and its credit, the probability of success in the war, and the chances which exist that Portugal may again become the theatre of the operations of the war.

It is not necessary that I should enter into details on all or any of these

topics ; but it is obvious that the plan which the paper contains of ameliorating the credit of the government, is founded upon a favorable view of all and of each of them ; which view, it is probable, would not be taken by those individuals who must be induced by their own sense of their private interests to adopt the schemes proposed in this paper for the amelioration of the credit of the state.

The object of the government being to pay its debts, and to revive the credit of the state, is a most laudable one, and they shall have every assistance which I can give them to carry it into execution.

In the present situation of the Kingdom, however, the first object, even with a view to re-establish the credit of the state, is obviously to secure the funds for carrying on the war. In this view, and with a view to aid the efforts of Great Britain, I proposed to the government to pay the interest upon paper money, including the *Apolices Grandes*, from the 1st July last ; to which proposition the government have added the objects adverted to in the paper of October, 1811.

I am apprehensive, however, that it is impossible at present to go farther than I proposed, and that, however honest and desirable it would be in the government to find means of paying the arrears of interest on the paper money, and the *Apolices Grandes*, and the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, and of the Marine, it is impracticable, and at the same time to carry on the war.

It is not a matter of indifference to propose a plan to the public for the payment of debts and for the restoration of credit, which shall fail to produce its object. For instance, the government will propose that certain individuals, creditors of the state, shall have the option of purchasing the lands and estates proposed to be sold in the paper under consideration. I will suppose that these creditors are not satisfied with this discharge of the debts ; that they think the lands, under existing circumstances, are worth nothing ; and, above all, that it would not suit their interests to risk a farther capital in their improvement.

The consequence must be, that the government not only will not have paid their debts in the opinions of these persons their creditors, but they will have incurred the farther discredit of having endeavored to induce the public to take that in payment of debts which was in reality worth nothing.

On these grounds I earnestly recommend to the government to proceed in these measures with the utmost caution and circumspection : to propose no measure to the public of which they are not certain that the public will entertain a favorable opinion ; and to confine themselves in the first instance to those measures which are absolutely necessary to place their credit in such a state as to enable them to carry on the war, and to aid their ally.

It appears generally admitted that the first of these measures is to pay the interest on the paper money in circulation from the 1st July last, and with regularity from thence forward.

The paper money in circulation bearing interest, including the forged paper, is stated to be 17,250,000 *cruzados*, upon which the half-yearly interest would be 431,250 *cruzados*. Besides this sum, there is some

paper in circulation without bearing interest; and the total amount in circulation, including forged paper, is 20,500,000 *cruzados*.

The effect of this measure, combined with others to secure the public against forgery, and the future exactness of the Treasury, as well in paying the interest upon the paper, as in issuing paper in its due proportions to money, according to law; viz., half money and half paper in every transaction, will raise the value of the paper in the market to such a degree as will affect the price of all commodities, and by that means save to government in its purchases the full amount of the interest which will be paid.

It would likewise be desirable to add to this measure a declaration on the part of the government that no new paper should be fabricated.

I am not quite certain whether the government have it in contemplation to pay the arrears of interest on the paper money beyond the 1st July. This does not appear to be necessary; and I wish here to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to a principle which applies more forcibly to this description of paper, but which may probably with justice be applied to the arrears on the *Apolices Grandes*.

The paper money has always been a circulating security, and has generally (particularly of late years) been at a considerable discount. It is therefore not probable that the individuals who now hold any portion of it, held that portion in 1808 or 1809, or at any very distant period for which the government might be disposed to pay the arrears of the interest; nor, adverting to the rate of discount which the paper has borne in late years, can it be supposed that any person who has purchased paper has ever had in contemplation the probability that the arrears of the interest would be paid, and has taken that advantage into consideration, in the price which he paid for the paper. The government will find the paper money generally in the hands of dealers in bills of exchange or of speculators, who will have bought paper upon hearing of the intention of government to pay the interest; and the arrears of interest which government will pay beyond the term stated, viz., the 1st July, will be so much money gratuitously put in the pockets of these individuals, not one of whom, most probably, is the individual to whom the interest for the past period is really due.

Neither would this measure have any effect in raising the credit of paper money beyond the first moment. If the interest should hereafter be paid regularly, such an accumulated debt on account of interest could never again be incurred, and the public would have no reason to expect such an advantage in future.

The measure next for consideration is the payment of the interest on the *Apolices Grandes*. It appears that the securities of this denomination, which are extant, as I understand, besides the paper money, amount to 11,818,065 *cruzados*, the half yearly interest of which appears to be 295,452 *cruzados*; which, added to the half yearly interest on the paper money, 431,250 *cruzados*, would make a total of interest half yearly amounting to 727,702 *cruzados*. From this sum the 10 *per cent.* income tax would be to be deducted, being 72,670 *cruzados*, which would leave the charge upon the public 654,032 *cruzados*. It appears to me that the

public revenues would be able to defray this sum, and I would therefore recommend to government to pay the interest from the 1st July on the *Apolices Grandes*, as well as on the paper money, and hereafter regularly.

They ought, by a public act, to allot a particular denomination of the public revenue to defray these demands of interest regularly every half year, and, if possible, a small addition to form a sinking fund, to discharge the principal of the *Apolices Grandes*.

I now beg the government to apply the principle to which I have above referred, in respect of the payment of the arrears of interest on the paper money, to the payments of the arrears of interest on the *Apolices Grandes*. If these securities are generally in the hands of the original lenders to the state, it would be a matter of justice, if it were practicable, to pay the arrears of interest due upon them; but I believe it will be found that these securities, as well as the paper money, have been transferred at a very low price; that the present holders were not the original lenders to the state; and that in the price which they paid for the securities, they never considered it probable that the arrears of interest would be paid. If this be the case, to pay the arrears of interest on the *Apolices Grandes* would be a useless waste of public money. But supposing these securities to be now in the hands of the original lenders to the state, I think there are some considerations to which prudence should induce the Governors of the Kingdom to advert, before they venture to bind themselves to defray the arrears of interest beyond the 1st July.

1st; It is my opinion, that the plan proposed in the paper will not answer at all; that the security proposed to be given will be deemed worth nothing; and would not raise a shilling in any money market in the world.

2dly; It is my opinion that the revenues of the state cannot now afford to pay the interest on a new fund to be created, amounting to 1,350,252 *cruzaos*, in addition to the interest on the paper money in circulation, and on the *Apolices Grandes*.

3dly; This measure must be attended by the creation of a new paper, which will do more harm to credit than the payment of the arrears of interest can do good.

4thly; I would beg the government to advert to the crisis through which the nation has passed; that it was actually in possession of the enemy, and all the debts of the state wiped away as with a sponge; that it has been three times invaded; and that the war, with its chances, still continues. The holders of *Apolices Grandes*, even though they are the original lenders to the state, are not unaware of these circumstances, and the Governors of the Kingdom may depend upon it, that there is not one of them who will not consider himself too happy in receiving payment of the current interest; and that there is not a thinking man in Europe who will not be of opinion that the Governors of the Kingdom will have acquitted themselves handsomely by the creditors, and will have redeemed the credit of the state, by the payment of the interest of their debts from the 1st July.

The next subject for consideration is the payment of the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, and of the Marine; and I acknowledge that I consider

this measure more important to enable the government to carry on the war, than to pay the arrears of interest of the *Apolicies Grandes*. Accordingly, I recommend to the government that if, upon a review of their income and their expenditure, they should have reason to believe that a sum can be spared to pay these debts, they should allot it to their payment in certain proportions by instalments.

One of the consequences of the loss of credit is the increase of price of every article which is purchased, far beyond its real value; by which increase of price the seller endeavors to compensate to himself for the delay in receiving payment for the interest of his money during the period of delay of payment, and for the risk which he incurs that he will never be paid at all. The Governors of the Kingdom may therefore be satisfied that they will do strict justice to these creditors of the state, if they can find means of allotting a sum to liquidate their demands gradually by instalments, proportionate to the amount of their several demands. The first step towards settlement should be to ascertain the amount of the debts, and this alone will increase the credit of the government. If it should not be possible to allot a sum to defray these debts by instalment, when their amount should be ascertained, I would rather recommend to mortgage that part of the revenues of Brazil which has lately been made over by the Prince Regent of Portugal to the assistance of this Kingdom, to raise a loan in England which should liquidate the whole.

In regard to the other measures adverted to in the paper, they would be beneficial at any other time than the present, but at present they are impracticable, without mixing up these questions with those of public credit, which are so very delicate. The government can easily ascertain the truth of my opinion upon these subjects.

Let the lands to be brought into cultivation, or the estates of the crown, be advertised for sale, with all the advantages proposed to be granted to the purchasers; and the government will find that at present no man will purchase. If no man would purchase, what man would lend his money upon the security of these same lands, or of their produce from cultivation?

I am not acquainted with the law adverted to in the paper, which has for its object to prevent the exportation of specie; but I am apprehensive that it can't be put into execution. The exporters of specie, to the great distress of the army, and the ruin of the country, are the American merchants, who have brought to Portugal articles of the first necessity; these merchants cannot venture to take in payment bills upon England, because the non-importation law in America would prevent them from importing into their own country the goods which they would purchase in England with the produce of these bills.

They must continue, therefore, to export specie from Portugal as long as the non-importation law of America shall continue in force; unless the Portuguese government, upon finding the inconvenience of this drain of the precious metals, shall adopt measures to put an end to the importation into Portugal of the produce of America. The government should consider whether the country can do without the importation from Ame-

rica ; whether His Majesty's dominions, and his influence with the Greek islands and in the Barbary States, would procure for the country the articles of first necessity which it requires ; and if these articles can be procured in this manner, it is a measure of vital importance to put an end to the trade with America.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 29th Oct. 1811.

I think it proper to draw your attention to a subject of some importance. The Americans have lately been very active in exporting from Lisbon large sums in specie, in consequence of which the Commissary Gen. cannot get much for his bills. I attribute their conduct on this subject very much to the operation of the non-importation law. They bring provisions from America to Lisbon, and they were heretofore in the habit of purchasing bills upon the Treasury with the proceeds of their cargoes. As they cannot import into America any thing they should purchase in England, of course they are desirous of securing in specie, and of carrying home in that shape, the value of what they bring here, as this country produces but little which they want. I have desired Mr. Stuart to draw the attention of the British government to this inconvenience, and to my view of the cause of it ; and to endeavor to ascertain the amount of the imports, from America, of food and other articles of the first necessity, in order that it may be seen whether Britain and Ireland, aided by the influence of the British government in the Greek islands, and with the Barbary States, cannot supply the Portuguese demand ; and, if it can be so supplied, we must prevail upon the Portuguese government to check the importation of the produce of America into Portugal, unless the non-importation law should be repealed, or some other settlement made with America. It would be unfortunate if any conduct of this kind were to interrupt us here, as we have measures now in progress to set up the Portuguese credit and finance, which will, in a great measure, answer the purpose ; and, by the rise in the value of paper money in Portugal, aid our own financial operations.

I have had a good deal of information lately respecting the state of the French armies ;* and I have no doubt but that Napoleon is much distressed for money. Notwithstanding the swindling mode in which his armies are paid, the troops are generally 10 and 11, and some of them 12 months in arrears of pay. Provisions are never paid for, and it is acknowledged by the French officers themselves that their system has turned into a desert the finest provinces of Spain. I don't believe there are 20 acres of cultivated ground from the Coa to the Tormes, which the year before last was covered with corn. They have now ruined the vale of Plasencia, and the '*Armée de Portugal*' is obliged to look to La Mancha for food. Spain is the only country in which the French armies have ever cost any thing to the Imperial treasury ; and the state of the payments, and the slowness with which the money comes in, notwithstanding that it is well known that large supplies of money alone can put the armies in a state of activity, show how much the weight of the burthen is felt. — told me the other day that one of the resources of the Imperial finance was the death of the officers and soldiers. The regiments are regularly mustered, and

* See Appendix, No. XIII.

those alone whose names appear as present on the force of the roll are entitled to pay, for the period of the muster. Then the pay for that period is not issued probably for 9 or 10 months: and then those only can receive it who are present with the regiment. The pay of the sick in hospital, and of the dead (which generally amount to half the regiment in every campaign), becomes a saving to the Imperial treasury; and thus a million of men are put into the field at the commencement of a campaign for the pay of 400,000 or 500,000! The relations of the officers and soldiers of the army have no claim upon what was due to their relations at the period of their decease! What do you think of this by way of a new system of military finance? It is impossible that this fraudulent tyranny can last. If Great Britain continues stout, we must see the destruction of it. I enclose the last morning state, from which you will see that we are getting better.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811, 10 A.M.

I enclose 2 letters from Don Carlos, containing an account of the enemy's intention to collect a force at Frades, near Endrinal, I conclude with a view to realise the contribution in the Sierra de Francia. There is nothing new here.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th inst.

The enemy has naturally turned his attention to the occupation of Santoña and Santander, as being the only stations that can be called ports on the northern coasts of Spain, which it may be supposed might be used by the British government, either for the purpose of communication with the guerrillas, or to interrupt the enemy's communications with the frontiers of France from his armies in Castille.

In Catalonia he has likewise turned his attention to the ports on the coast, because there is no practicable road from the frontiers of France through that province excepting by the coast; and in Valencia he has done the same, because the road from Catalonia into Valencia leads by Tortosa along the coast.

But the policy and plan of the enemy's operations don't lead him to the coast; and he might be in possession of the coasts of Galicia, while his tenure of the province would be very insecure; and he might be able to maintain himself in the province, while the allies should be in possession of Ferrol, Coruña, the island of Aroza, and Vigo.

It is, however, very desirable to endeavor, in case of accident, to have the means of communicating with the inhabitants of Galicia; but adverting to the importance and known goodness of the harbour, I have always been induced to consider Vigo and the Bayona islands to be the most important point to be secured, if it should be found impracticable to secure Ferrol and Coruña. It would be very desirable, therefore, if you would take an opportunity of examining these islands, and of comparing the advantages of their situation and of that of the island of Aroza; and likewise the maritime advantages of the port of Vigo, with those of the river Aroza; and of forming some notion of the measures which

it would be necessary to adopt to defend the Bayona islands, compared with those necessary for the defence of the island of Aroza.

I am concerned to observe that Gen. Abadia meets with any difficulties from the Junta of Galicia. I have desired Gen. Alava to write to Gen. Castaños upon this subject.

Some time ago the Junta of Galicia applied to me for pecuniary assistance, to which application I wrote them the letter of which I enclose the draft, which I suspect that they have never communicated to Gen. Abadia. I beg that you will show it to him, as some of the facts and principles stated in that letter may be of use to him in his discussions with the Junta.

I enclose a letter, which I beg you will transmit to Longa.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 10th and 15th, and one from Gen. Cooke of the 18th, and I now enclose copies of my dispatches of the 23d and this day, from which you will learn the state of affairs here.

I directed Marshal Beresford to send you all the arms we could spare from this country, not exceeding 5000 stands. But we have no accoutrements. Beresford will let you know how many stands he sends you.

I don't know whether you are aware that the Spanish government are sending troops to America. Alava lately showed me a letter to Castaños, in which great credit is taken for the activity with which this force, which I understood was to consist of 8000 men, was getting ready. They have withdrawn for this service 2 regiments of 600 men each, from Galicia, who had lately been completed with arms by the British government. This was done much against the inclination of the Junta and inhabitants of the province; and much to the annoyance of Abadia, who appears to be going on well himself; but he is thwarted by the Junta.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 26th; and I beg that you will tell Dom M. Forjaz, that so long as he conducts himself in his office with the fairness and zeal which have characterized his administration since I have been in this country, he shall have my support; and in my opinion, if the Prince Regent's promise can be relied on, his services will in future be favorably viewed. At all events, the continuation of the uncomfortable situation in which I have lately stood in respect to the government, can be of no use to Dom M. Forjaz. I think I should not have been justifiable if I had not taken advantage of the Prince's letter to me, and of his recent orders respecting the military departments, to put an end to it; and I am much mistaken if the measure which I adopted will not be of as much use to Dom M. Forjaz, as to the cause in general, in the increase of our influence with the Prince, by showing him that at least on our side there is no intrigue.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

I am sorry to tell you that Dr. Franck, the Inspector of hospitals, is so

unwell as to be obliged to go home; and the department under him is so important, that if, as I fear, he should not be able to come out again, it will be necessary that we should have the most active and intelligent person that can be found to fill his station.

I am very unlucky in this respect. Excepting in the Q. M. G.'s department, I have had two, and in some instances three different persons at the head of every department in the army. Here have been three officers second in command: and General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and officers, have been changed repeatedly; and there is not one General officer now with the army who came out with it, excepting Hill, and he was at home for 6 months last year; and Campbell, and he was at home for the same period the year before last, and is now going again; and Gen. H. Campbell, who was at home for 2 years.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

The detachment of the army of the north which was at Ledesma, moved from thence towards Salamanca on the 28th inst., and it is generally supposed that the enemy are about to collect a force in the neighbourhood of the Sierra de Francia, with a view probably to realise the heavy contribution which they have laid on the villages in that part of the country. Excepting that movement, the troops of the army of the north and of the '*Armée de Portugal*' have made none since I addressed you last.

The last report I received from Gen. Hill was dated at Malpartida de Cáceres, on the 26th. Gen. Girard retired from Cáceres on that morning, and Lieut. Gen. Hill intended to move upon Aldea del Cano on the 27th. The overflowing of the rivers, in consequence of the rain, is the reason of my not having heard from him for 2 or 3 days. He will return to his cantonments as soon as he shall have placed Gen. Castaños' posts, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in possession of Cáceres.

By the last accounts which I have from Cadiz of the 18th, it appears that Gen. Ballesteros had retired under the guns of Gibraltar, and that the French were at San Roque, and had taken possession of Algeiras. Col. Skerrett's detachment had arrived at Tarifa, but the Spanish detachment under Gen. Copons, with which it was intended to co-operate, had not been able to leave Cadiz on account of the weather.

I have received no further accounts from Valencia.

It appears from all the accounts which I have received, that the guerrillas are increasing in numbers and boldness throughout the Peninsula. One party, under Temprano, lately retook, at the very gates of Talavera, Lieut. Col. Grant of the Portuguese service, who had been taken in the beginning of September in Upper Estremadura, while employed in observation of the enemy's movements. Both the Empecinado and Mina were very successful against some of the enemy's posts and detachments, when their armies were lately collected for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; and Longa was likewise very successful in the neighbourhood of Vitoria, in the middle and towards the latter end of September.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford,

containing Brig. Gen. Wilson's application for permission to accept the honor conferred upon him by H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

I beg that your Lordship will be pleased to lay these letters before H.R.H. the Prince Regent, and that you will obtain His Royal Highness' authority for Brig. Gen. Wilson to wear the Insignia of the Order of the Tower and Sword, of which H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has nominated him a Commander.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 30th Oct. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum, &c., showing the mode in which it is wished that the clothing, &c., should be made, for which I applied to your Lordship for Don Carlos de España, in my dispatch of the 23d inst.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 1st Nov. 1811, 9 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Castaños, with its enclosure from Gen. Giron, which contains the only account I have received of Gen. Hill since the 26th. He has done his business very handsomely.

I likewise enclose a letter of the 28th from Salamanca, and one from

G. O.

Freneda, 1st Nov. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that the power of the assistants of the Provost Marshal of the army has, in more than one instance, been abused; and that officers have thought themselves authorised to send orders to the Assist. Provosts, under which orders abuses have been committed, contrary to the established usages and rules of the service, and the intentions and orders of the Commander of the Forces.

2. The office of Provost Marshal has existed in all British armies in the field. His particular duties are to take charge of the prisoners confined for offences of a general description; to preserve good order and discipline; to prevent breaches of both by the soldiers and followers of the army, by his presence at those places in which breaches of either are likely to be committed; and, if necessary, he has, by constant usage in all armies, the power to punish those whom he may find in the act of committing breaches of orders and discipline.

3. The authority of the Provost Marshal to punish must be limited by the necessity of the case; and whatever may be the crime of which a soldier may be guilty, the Provost Marshal has not the power of inflicting summary punishment for it, unless he should see him in the act of committing it. If he should not see the soldier in the act of committing the offence of which he may have been guilty, a report must be made to the Commander in Chief of the army, who would give such orders upon the case as might be deemed expedient, either for further inquiry, for the trial of the soldier, or for the infliction of summary punishment, according to the nature of the case, the degree of evidence of the soldier's guilt, and the existing necessity for an immediate example.

4. The duties and authorities of the assistants of the Provost Marshals attached to the several divisions and stations of the army, are the same as those of the Provost; but the conduct of these officers and the exertion of their authority require the constant and watchful attention of the General officers commanding divisions, and of the officers commanding stations, and of the staff officers attached to them, as that of the Provost Marshal does of the Commander of the Forces and of the officers of the General staff.

5. They should attend particularly to the nature of the offences against good order and military discipline, of which the soldiers and followers of the army may be guilty at different times and under different circumstances, and to allow the Assist. Provosts to punish them in a summary manner, only when committed under those circumstances when summary punishment may be necessary for the sake of example, and in which the prevalent and continual commission of the particular crime may be injurious to the public service.

6. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be clearly understood that no officer whatever has a right to order the Provost Marshal, or his assistants, to exercise the authority entrusted to them; nor can the Provost Marshal, or his assistants, inflict corporal punishment on any man, excepting they should see him in the act of committing a breach of orders and discipline. Their duty is, by vigilance and activity, to prevent those breaches which the Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe are too common, and to punish those they may catch in the fact.

Don Carlos de España, with an intercepted letter from Souham. This last shows the object of the collection of troops at Salamanca; and I think it not improbable that Dorsenne will move with the whole of the army of the north and the Plasencia division of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' Indeed this is almost certain from the number stated in the Salamanca letter to be coming from Toro. They generally diminish numbers at Salamanca; but adding even the numbers stated to the 2 divisions already upon the Tormes, the force is a good strong one, and forms altogether no inconsiderable part of the army of the north.

I propose to endeavor to strike a blow, if possible, upon this occasion, and to bring the army up for that purpose. It is very desirable, therefore, that you should come to the front. I propose to move head quarters tomorrow to Guinaldo; but as you will have to cross one of the bridges of the Coa, notwithstanding that the river is falling, you had probably better halt at Sabugal or Alfaiates; or, if you come by the lower bridges, somewhere hereabouts. Gen. Craufurd tells me that the Agueda was fordable yesterday, but that of course was above the junction of the Vadillo. If it should be fordable below the junction of the Vadillo, I shall not move more troops to the right of the Agueda than the Light and 6th divisions; otherwise I propose to collect the troops as they come up between the Agueda and the hills.

I was very sorry to hear of Capt. ——'s conduct. I had intended to delay to make any general rule on the subject of the authority of the Provost, till Capt. **** should be tried, who has been in arrest above 3 months for misconduct of the same description. But I find that Capt. ——'s is not the only instance that has occurred of similar misconduct and abuse of authority, notwithstanding the conversation which took place on this subject, in the army generally, at the time of Capt. ****'s arrest showed that the authority and duties of the Provost were well understood, and rendered it probable that a similar abuse would not take place. Indeed this conviction, not less than the desire to leave the whole subject open for Capt. ****'s defence, induced me to delay laying down any general principle upon it.

P.S. I find that the letter from Salamanca of the 28th is not from our friends, but from a person there to one of Don Julian's commanders. It is probable, therefore, that the report is premature; but at all events there is no harm in our moving. Murray thinks that you had better cross the Coa at the Ponte Sequeiros, and come to Villar Maior or Alfaiates tomorrow.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 3d Nov. 1811, 10 A.M.

After I had written to you the day before yesterday, I went to the ford of Molino de Flores, and found that horses could pass there; and I thought it most probable that even then, but certainly if the fair weather continued, the ford of Pastores would be practicable for every thing next morning. However, upon my return home, I received further intelligence, which showed that the proposed collection of troops would not be made, and that Thiébault had set out on the 30th from Salamanca, to join the troops collected from Alba, and that they were within 6 leagues of Ciudad Rodrigo

on the night of the 30th. It was useless, therefore, to move our troops, excepting those in front, and I thought it just possible that Thiebault might have been delayed, and that we might have a choice of intercepting the convoy, by crossing at the ford of Pastores yesterday. We were however too late, as the governor and his bullocks arrived in the preceding night. Indeed I saw the enemy's fires in the Sierra de Gavilanes yesterday morning, as I was going from hence towards El Bodon, before daylight.

The troops which moved will return to their quarters this day. The enemy went off again before daylight yesterday, and took the road of Salamanca.

I have not yet received Hill's report of his affair. His brother came here the day before yesterday, and it appears that Hill completely surprised the enemy. He was at Alcuescar on the evening of the 27th, within 3 miles of them, and they did not know it; and he moved before daylight next morning, and formed for the attack within 200 yards of one of their sentries, who did not see our troops! The result is as stated by Gen. Giron. The name of the General officer is 'Brun.' They hoped to take Girard.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 3d Nov. 1811.

I beg leave to acquaint you, for the information of the Portuguese government, that I have directed the Purveyor to the forces to pay the expenses incurred by the University of Coimbra in supplying the British

G. O.

Freneda, 3d Nov. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers commanding divisions, and others under whose orders Portuguese troops are serving, to the following orders of Marshal Sir W. Beresford regarding leaves of absence to officers in the Portuguese service.

2. By his orders of the 25th July, Marshal Sir W. Beresford gave permission to General officers commanding brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments and battalions not in brigades, to give leave to officers who were sick to go to the nearest hospital station in the rear, or to Abrantes, for the re-establishment of their health; those Commanding officers of brigades or regiments first obtaining the consent of the General officer commanding the division in which the brigade or regiment should be serving.

By his G. O. of the 6th Sept. the Marshal explains the meaning of his G. O. of the 25th July to be, 'That officers commanding brigades, or regiments not in brigades, can give leave to officers who are sick to go only to the nearest hospital station.'

On the 30th Sept. the Marshal gave the following order:

'His Excellency the Marshal, in order to avoid the inconvenience of officers quitting their regiments, upon leave of absence, on occasions in which their absence might be prejudicial to the service; and as he is himself necessarily separated at this moment from parts of the army, and cannot judge of the circumstances which frequently occur to delay the grant of the applications of officers for leave; and because it is necessary that every other consideration should give way to the good of the service, desires that all officers, commanders of regiments or brigades which shall be in a division or corps under the command of an officer in the service of His Britannic Majesty, shall make themselves acquainted with the opinion of the said officer, whether it would be inconvenient for the service that the request of a particular officer for leave of absence should be granted, before they shall transmit such request for the decision of his Excellency the Marshal Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army, and such request is not to be transmitted without the consent of the officer commanding the division or corps of the army in which such officer shall be serving.

'This order does not authorise any person whatever to grant leave of absence; and the grant of permission to officers who are sick to quit their battalions or regiments is to continue as regulated by the orders of the 25th July and 6th Sept.'

3. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests that General officers and others who have officers of the Portuguese army attached to them, will observe that they have not the power of giving leave to those officers to quit their stations, excepting under the terms of the Marshal's order of the 25th July and 6th Sept., when those officers shall be sick.

hospitals, &c., the accounts which were enclosed in your letter of the 17th Sept., with the exception of the charge for bedding and utensils taken from the hospital of the city by the soldiers, which can't be admitted, as the attendants should not have permitted those things to be taken away without making a representation on the subject to the proper authorities.

To Major Gen. Peacocks.

Freneda, 5th Nov. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th Oct., regarding a ration of wine for the soldiers of the regiments in the garrison of Lisbon, &c.

I beg that you will inform the Commanding officers of regiments, that wine forms no part of the soldier's ration when he receives fresh meat. It has been issued to the soldiers of the army as an indulgence, originally, only when they made long marches, or were exposed to bad weather; but by subsequent orders of the late Commander of the Forces more frequently.

There are reasons for continuing the issue of wine or spirits to the soldiers with the army, which don't affect those at Lisbon. The pay of the soldiers with the army is unfortunately considerably in arrear, while that of the soldiers at Lisbon is regularly given to them. The former, therefore, have it not in their power to purchase any thing which might be offered for sale: the latter have not only the means of purchasing what they require of this description, but they can find something to purchase.

Upon the whole, therefore, I am unwilling to burthen the public with this additional expense, which it does not appear to me to be necessary to incur.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 6th Nov. 1811.

I hear that measures are in contemplation to alter the clothing, caps, &c. of the army. There is no subject of which I understand so little; and, abstractedly speaking, I think it indifferent how a soldier is clothed, provided it is in a uniform manner; and that he is forced to keep himself clean and smart, as a soldier ought to be. But there is one thing I deprecate, and that is any imitation of the French, in any manner.

It is impossible to form an idea of the inconveniences and injury which result from having any thing like them, either on horseback or on foot. — and his piquet were taken in June, because the 3d hussars had the same caps as the French *chasseurs à cheval* and some of their hussars: and I was near being taken on the 25th Sept. from the same cause.

At a distance, or in an action, colors are nothing: the profile, and shape of the man's cap, and his general appearance, are what guide us; and why should we make our people look like the French? A *cocked tailed* horse is a good mark for a dragoon, if you can get a side view of him; but there is no such mark as the English helmet, and, as far as I can judge, it is the best cover a dragoon can have for his head. I mention this, because in all probability you may have something to say to these alterations; and I only beg that *we* may be as different as possible from the French in every thing. The narrow top caps of our infantry, as opposed to their broad top caps, are a great advantage to those who are to look at long lines of posts opposed to each other.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 6th Nov. 1811.

I informed your Lordship, in my dispatches of the 23d and 30th Oct., of the orders which I had given to Lieut. Gen. Hill to move into Estremadura with the troops under his command, and with his progress to the 26th Oct.

He marched on the 27th by Aldea del Cano to Alcuescar; and, on the 28th, in the morning, surprised the enemy's troops under Gen. Girard at Arroyo Molinos, and dispersed the division of infantry and the cavalry which had been employed under the command of that General, taking Gen. Brun, the Prince d'Aremberg, and above 1300 prisoners, 3 pieces of cannon, &c. &c., and having killed many in the action with the enemy, and in the subsequent pursuit. Gen. Girard escaped wounded; and, by all the accounts which I have received, Gen. Dombrowski was killed.

I beg to refer your Lordship, for the details of Lieut. Gen. Hill's operations to the 30th Oct., to his dispatch * to me of that date from Merida,

* Lieut. Gen. R. Hill to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Merida, 30th Oct. 1811.

In pursuance of the instructions which I received from your Excellency to drive the enemy out of that part of Estremadura which lies between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and to replace the corps under the command of Brig. Gen. the Comte de Penne Villemur in Caceres (from which town it had been obliged to retire by the superior force of the enemy), I put a portion of the troops under my orders in motion on the 22d inst. from their cantonments in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish frontier.

On the 23d the head of the column reached Albuquerque, where I learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco and Caceres, and that the Spaniards were again in possession of Aliseda. On the 24th I had a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery (6 pounders), and some of my cavalry at Aliseda; and the remainder of my cavalry, another brigade of British infantry, and half a brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders at Casa de Castellana, about a league distant. On the 25th the Comte de Penne Villemur made a reconnaissance with his cavalry, and drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco; the enemy retired to Malpartida, which place he occupied as an advanced post with about 300 cavalry and some infantry, his main body being still at Caceres. On the 26th, at daybreak, the troops arrived at Malpartida, and found that the enemy had left that place, retiring towards Caceres, followed by a small party of the 2d hussars, who skirmished with his rear guard. I was shortly afterwards informed that the whole of the enemy's force had left Caceres, but the want of certainty as to the direction he had taken, and the extreme badness of the weather, induced me to halt the Portuguese and British troops at Malpartida for that night. The Spaniards moved on to Caceres.

Having received certain information that the enemy had marched on Torremocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del Cano and Casas de Don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and bring him to action, and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Caceres. On the march I received information that the enemy had only left Torremocha that morning, and that he had again halted his main body at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my command. I therefore made a forced march to Alcuescar that evening, where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no fires were allowed to be made.

On my arrival at Alcuescar, which is within a league of Arroyo Molinos, every thing tended to confirm me in the opinion that the enemy was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off his guard; and I determined upon attempting to surprise, or at least to bring him to action, before he should march in the morning, and the necessary dispositions were made for that purpose. The town of Arroyo Molinos is situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra de Montanches, the mountain running from it to the rear in the form of a crescent, almost every where inaccessible, the two points being about 2 miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to the eastward.

The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with that from Alcuescar, and the road to Medellin passes between those to Truxillo and Merida, the grounds over which the troops had to manoeuvre being a plain thinly scattered with oak and cork

a copy of which I enclose. I have frequently had the pleasure to report to your Lordship the zeal and ability with which Lieut. Gen. Hill had carried into execution the operations intrusted to his charge; and I have great satisfaction in repeating my commendations of him, and of the brave troops under his command, upon the present occasion, in which the ability of the General, and the gallantry and discipline of the officers and troops, have been conspicuous.

I send, with Gen. Hill's dispatch, a plan of the ground and of the operations on the 28th Oct., by Capt. Hill, the General's brother and aide de camp, who attended him in the action, and will be able to give your Lordship any further details which you may require. I beg leave to recommend him to your protection. Lieut. Gen. Hill has since returned to his cantonments at Portalegre, having left Gen. Castaños' troops at Cáceres.

It would have been useless for Gen. Hill to push his operations beyond the Guadiana, as Drouet, with the other division of the 5th corps, would

trees. My object of course was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by these roads.

The troops moved from their bivouac near Alcuéscar about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, in 1 column, right in front, direct on Arroyo Molinos, and in the following order: Major Gen. the Hon. K. Howard's brigade of infantry (1st batt. 50th, 71st, and 92d regts., and one company of the 60th); Col. Wilson's brigade (1st batt. 28th, 2d batt. 34th and 39th regts., and one company of the 60th); 6th Portuguese regt. of the line, and 6th cazadores, under Col. Ashworth; the Spanish infantry under Brig. Gen. Morillo; Major Gen. Long's brigade of cavalry (2d hussars, 9th and 13th light dragoons); and the Spanish cavalry, under the Conde de Penne Villemur. They moved in this order until within half a mile of the town of Arroyo Molinos, where, under cover of a low ridge, the column closed, and divided into 3 columns. Major Gen. Howard's brigade, and three 6 pounders under Lieut. Col. Stewart, supported by Brig. Gen. Morillo's infantry, the left; Col. Wilson's brigade, the Portuguese infantry under Col. Ashworth, two 6 pounders and a howitzer, the right, under Major Gen. Howard; and the cavalry the centre.

As the day dawned a violent storm of rain and thick mist came on, under cover of which the columns advanced in the direction and in the order which had been pointed out to them. The left column, under Lieut. Col. Stewart, marched direct upon the town. The 71st, one company of the 60th, and 92d regts., at quarter distance, and the 50th in close column, somewhat in the rear, with the guns as a reserve. The right column, under Major Gen. Howard, having the 39th regt. as a reserve, broke off to the right so as to turn the enemy's left, and having gained about the distance of a cannon shot to that flank, it marched in a circular direction upon the further point of the crescent, on the mountain above mentioned. The cavalry under Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine moved between the 2 columns of infantry, ready to act in front or move round either of them as occasion might require.

The advance of our column was unperceived by the enemy until they approached very near, at which moment he was filing out of the town upon the Merida road; the rear of his column, some of his cavalry, and part of his baggage being still in it. One brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellín an hour before daylight.

The 71st and 92d regts. charged into the town with cheers, and drove the enemy every where at the point of the bayonet, having a few men cut down by the enemy's cavalry.

The enemy's infantry, which had got out of the town, had, by the time these regiments arrived at the extremity of it, formed into 2 squares, with the cavalry on their left. The whole were posted between the Merida and Medellín roads, fronting Alcuéscar; the right square being formed within half musket shot of the town, the garden walls of which were promptly lined by the 71st light infantry, while the 92d regt. filed out and formed line on their right, perpendicular to the enemy's right flank, which was much annoyed by the well directed fire of the 71st. In the mean time one wing of the 50th regt. occupied the town and secured the prisoners, and the other wing along with the three 6 pounders skirted the outside of it; the artillery as soon as within range firing with great effect upon the squares.

Whilst the enemy was thus occupied on his right, Major Gen. Howard's column continued moving round his left; and our cavalry advancing and crossing the head of the column, cut off the enemy's cavalry from his infantry, charging it repeatedly, and putting it to the rout. The 13th light dragoons, at the same time, took possession of the enemy's

have retired before him; and equally so to remain at Merida. He would not have maintained his position beyond the Guadiana, and he would always have been liable to a hurried retreat by a movement of a superior enemy to the bridge of Badajoz. Neither could he have remained at Merida without increasing the difficulty and expense of the subsistence of the troops, and augmenting the distance from, and rendering more difficult the communication with, this part of the army. I therefore desired him to return to Portalegre as soon as he should have put Gen. Castaños' troops in possession of Cáceres.

After I had written to your Lordship on the 30th Oct., I received information on the 31st that the enemy were making preparations for the collection of a large corps at Salamanca, and for their march in this direction, with a view to convoy in safety a new governor, and a further supply of provisions and stores, to Ciudad Rodrigo, of which preparations the movement from Ledesma, reported in my dispatch of the 30th, was a part.

artillery: one of the charges made by two squadrons of the 2d hussars and one of the 9th light dragoons was particularly gallant; the latter commanded by Capt. Gore, and the whole under Major Busche of the hussars. I ought previously to have mentioned that the British cavalry having, through the darkness of the night and the badness of the roads, been somewhat delayed, the Spanish cavalry under the Comde de Penne Villemur was on this occasion the first to form upon the plain and engage the enemy, until the British were enabled to come up.

The enemy was now in full retreat, but Major Gen. Howard's column having gained the point to which it was directed, and the left column gaining fast upon him, he had no resource but to surrender, or to disperse and ascend the mountain. He preferred the latter; and ascending near the eastern extremity of the crescent, and which might have been deemed inaccessible, was followed closely by the 28th and 34th regts., whilst the 39th regt. and Col. Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry followed round the foot of the mountain by the Truxillo road, to take him again in flank. At the same time Brig. Gen. Morillo's infantry ascended at some distance to the left with the same view.

As may be imagined, the enemy's troops were by this time in the utmost panic; his cavalry was flying in every direction, the infantry threw away their arms, and the only effort of either was to escape. The troops under Major Gen. Howard's immediate command, as well as those he had sent round the point of the mountain, pursued them over the rocks, making prisoners at every step, until his own men became so exhausted and few in number, that it was necessary for him to halt and secure the prisoners, and leave the further pursuit to the Spanish infantry under Brig. Gen. Morillo, who from the direction in which they had ascended had now become the most advanced; the force Gen. Girard had with him at the commencement, which consisted of 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, being at this time totally dispersed. In the course of these operations Brig. Gen. Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry (the 4th and 10th regts.), and the 18th Portuguese infantry, joined from Casas de Don Antonio, where they had halted for the preceding night; and as soon as I judged they could no longer be required at the scene of action, I detached them with the brigade consisting of the 50th, 71st, and 92d regts., and Major Gen. Long's brigade of cavalry, towards Merida; they reached San Pedro that night, and entered Merida this morning; the enemy having in the course of the night retreated from hence in great alarm to Almendralejo. The Comde de Penne Villemur formed the advanced guard with his cavalry, and had entered the town previous to the arrival of the British.

The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out to your Lordship; their immediate result is the capture of one General of cavalry (Brun), one Colonel of cavalry (the Prince d'Arenberg), one Lieut. Colonel (*Chef d'Etat Major*), one aide de camp of Gen. Girard, 2 Lieut. Colonels, one *commissaire de guerre*, 30 Captains and inferior officers, and upwards of 1000 men, already sent off under an escort to Portalegre; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Cáceres and Merida, and the contribution of money which he had collected on the former town, besides the total dispersion of Gen. Girard's corps. The loss of the enemy in killed must also have been severe, while that on our side was comparatively trifling, as appears by the accompanying return, in which your Lordship will lament to see the name of

The reports received on the 31st afforded ground for belief that the army of the north, with one division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' were to be assembled upon this occasion, and I was therefore induced to make arrangements for collecting our army on the right of the Agueda to attack them; but the heavy rains which had fallen just at this period filled the Agueda, and the fords were no longer practicable; and the enemy took advantage of this circumstance to effect their object, by means of one division of infantry, and about 600 cavalry.

The new governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, Gen. Barrié, moved from Salamanca on the 30th Oct., and, on the 1st Nov., at night, arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo, escorted by one division of infantry, and 600 cavalry, collected from their cantonments on the Upper Tormes, and brought with him a considerable number of cattle for the garrison. The state of the fords of the Agueda, till the morning of the 2d, prevented our troops from making any movement to prevent his communication with the place, and the enemy had marched on their return before daylight.

I have before now described to your Lordship the river Agueda as a military feature in this country. It is difficult for an army to pass this river at any time; but the only road by which it is practicable for an army to pass to the eastward, when the rains have filled the rivers, is by the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the torrent of water in the Agueda during the rains is of that description, that it is impossible to overcome

Lieut. Strenuwitz, aide de camp to Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine, whose extreme gallantry led him into the midst of the enemy's cavalry, and occasioned his being taken prisoner.

Thus has ended an expedition which, although not bringing into play to the full extent the gallantry and spirit of those engaged, will, I trust, give them a claim to your Lordship's approbation. No praise of mine can do justice to their admirable conduct, the patience and good will shown by all ranks during forced marches in the worst weather, their strict attention to the orders they received, the precision with which they moved to the attack, and their obedience to command during the action. In short, the manner in which every one has performed his duty, from the first commencement of the operations, merits my warmest thanks, and will not, I am sure, pass unobserved by your Lordship.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine I must express my obligations for his assistance and advice upon all occasions. To Major Gen. the Hon. K. Howard, who dismounted and headed his troops up the difficult ascent of the Sierra, and throughout most ably conducted his column; and to Major Gen. Long, for his exertions at the head of his brigade, I feel myself particularly indebted. I must also express my obligations to Col. Wilson, Col. Ashworth, and Lieut. Col. Stewart, commanding brigades, for the able manner in which they led them.

Lieut. Col. Cameron. Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan, Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercromby, and Lieut. Cols. Fenwick, Muter, and Lindsay, Majors Harrison and Busche, Major Park (commanding the light companies), and Capt. Gore (commanding the 9th light dragoons), Major Hartmann, commanding the artillery, Lieut. Col. Grant and Major Birmingham of the Portuguese service, Capt. Arriaga of the Portuguese artillery (whose guns did so much execution), severally merit my warmest approbation by their conduct; and I must not omit to mention the exertions made by Brig. Gen. Campbell and his troops to arrive in time to give their assistance. Gen. Giron, the chief of Gen. Castaños' staff, and second in command of the 5th Spanish army, has done me the honor to accompany me during these operations, and I feel much indebted to him for his assistance and valuable advice. Brig. Gen. the Conde de Penne Villemur, Brig. Gen. Morillo, Col. Downie, and the Spanish officers and soldiers in general, have conducted themselves in a manner to excite my entire approbation.

Having now, I hope, accomplished the object of your Lordship's wishes with the troops under my command, I shall give them one day's rest at this place, and then return towards the Portuguese frontier for the purpose of replacing them in cantonments.

To Lieut. Col. Rooke, A. A. G., and Lieut. Col. Offensy, A. Q. M. G., for the able manner in which they have conducted their departments, and also for the valuable

this obstacle. I hope, however, soon to have the means of passing the river in the state in which it is usually in winter.

According to the last accounts of the 22d Oct., which I have received from Cadiz, Gen. Ballesteros was still encamped under the guns of Gibraltar. No attack had been made upon Tarifa; but the Spanish troops, under Gen. Copons, had not arrived there.

The enemy had made a second attack upon Saguntum, in Valencia, on the evening of the 8th Oct., but had been repulsed, it is stated, with considerable loss; and it was believed that Marshal Suchet was about to retire. I have since heard of the march of 9000 men by Calatayud on the 21st Oct., by one channel, on their return from Valencia; by another, that they were going to join Marshal Suchet from Aragon.

It is possible that he may have been obliged to retire by the want of provisions; and the second attempt to obtain possession by storm of a post against which he had not broken ground, affords a hope that he was distressed in this manner; but I have no doubt that the French have the means of increasing their force in Valencia to the amount stated, without detaching from the army of the north, the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and the army of the south, which are kept in check by us.

In the mean time, I see by accounts of the 11th Oct., from Valencia, that Gen. Blake began to feel distress for the want of provisions, and of money to purchase them.

No movement has been made in the north since I wrote to your Lordship last.

assistance and advice which I have at all times received from them; to the officers of the A. G. and Q. M. G. departments; to Capt. Squire, Royal Engineers, for his intelligence and indefatigable exertions during the whole operations; and to Capt. Currie and my personal staff, my warmest thanks are due.

This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by Capt. Hill, my first aide de camp, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for all further particulars.

P.S. Since writing the above report a good many more prisoners have been made, and I doubt not but the whole will amount to 1300 or 1400.

Brig. Gen. Morillo has just returned from the pursuit of the dispersed, whom he followed for 8 leagues. He reports that, besides those killed in the plains, upwards of 600 dead were found in the woods and mountains.

Gen. Girard escaped in the direction of La Serena with 200 or 300 men, mostly without arms, and is stated by his own aide de camp to be wounded.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the corps of the army under the immediate orders of Lieut. Gen. R. Hill, in the action with the French army, near Arroyo Molinos, on the 28th Oct. 1811. (See Appendix, No. XIV.)

	Officers.	Non - commis- sioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	—	7	6	7
Wounded	7	4	53	11	64
Missing	1	—	—	4	1

The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 6th Nov. 1811.

I enclose a letter* from Gen. Hill, which, besides his dispatch, shows his wishes regarding his officers. I particularly recommend to your protection his brother, Capt. Hill; and I hope that the Commander in Chief will promote his aide de camp, Capt. Currie.

It would be particularly agreeable to me, if some mark of the favor of H. R. H. the Prince Regent were conferred upon Gen. Hill; his services have been always meritorious, and very distinguished in this country, and he is beloved by the whole army.

At the passage of the Douro, he commanded the detachment which first crossed the river, after Gen. Paget was wounded, which maintained itself against all the efforts of Soult's corps; and he commanded a division, distinguished himself, and was wounded in the battle of Talavera. He has since commanded a separate corps of this army; he has shown the greatest ability in all the movements which he has made; and

* Lieut. Gen. R. Hill to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Merida, 30th Oct. 1811.

In my report which accompanies this, I have endeavored to give your Lordship as faithful a detail of the occurrences of each day as possible; and I have to request that should your Lordship deem the advantage I have gained over the enemy of sufficient consequence to send an officer to England with the report of it, my first aide de camp, Capt. Hill, may be the bearer of it.

Never did troops behave better than those which your Lordship has been pleased to place under my command, and I do feel they are deserving of any mark of approbation your Lordship may feel disposed to confer on them, either by selecting individuals for promotion or otherwise, as to your Lordship may appear most suitable. I beg, however, clearly to be understood, I have held out nothing of the kind to them.

I do again most strongly recommend to your Lordship's protection my aide de camp, Capt. Currie, of the 90th regt., an officer of 18 years' active service. From the manner in which your Lordship was pleased to favor the late memorial of this officer, I have reason to hope he has been promoted before this; but as there may be a delay, I will thank your Lordship to insure his promotion by a second application. To the zeal and indefatigable exertions of Capt. Squire, Royal Engineers, I shall ever feel indebted, and I do most strongly recommend him for that promotion which is so justly due to his merits and to the service. I can assure your Lordship that his knowledge of the Spanish language has enabled me to co-operate most cordially with the Spaniards, and that his military knowledge has contributed very much to our late success. Lieut. Bayley, 31st regt., D. A. A. G., has been long usefully employed on the Staff of this corps of the army. He is an officer of 11 years' standing, and I strongly recommend him for promotion.

I am happy to add that the greatest harmony subsisted amongst the allied troops during our late operations, and that nothing could exceed the good will and friendly disposition of the inhabitants of the district through which we passed. I mention it as a singular instance of fidelity and patriotism, that although the inhabitants of Alcuéscar in general, as also those of Arroyo Molinos, knew of the arrival of the allied troops in the vicinity of the former place on the night of the 27th, not a man could be seduced from his duty, and the enemy remained in total ignorance of our near approach. On the other hand, I was correctly informed of every thing going on in Arroyo Molinos during the night.

In writing my official report I found it difficult to state the distinct services of some officers, from the nature of our operations; but I am sure your Lordship will be pleased to hear of the extreme good conduct of Col. Cadogan and Col. Abercromby, two officers of the greatest promise. The conduct, too, of Gen. Howard has been uniformly praiseworthy. The Marquis of Tweeddale has evinced great zeal and personal bravery, and several other officers of the Staff distinguished themselves. I cannot in justice omit Capt. Blaquiere of the 60th regt., who went into the town of Arroyo Molinos in the night of the 27th, and brought me the most correct information of the enemy's situation. The Commissariat department has been well conducted by Mr. Routh, considering the circumstances under which he acted.

Lieut. Hillier, of the 29th regt., who has been employed on the reconnoitring service for some time past, has been extremely useful on this occasion, from his intimate knowledge of the country which we passed and of the Spanish language.

nobody could have been more successful than he has been in his late operation.

In recommending him, as I do most anxiously, I really feel that there is no officer to whom an act of grace and favor would be received by the army with more satisfaction than on Gen. Hill.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 6th Nov. 1811.

I enclose the last morning state. You'll see that the number of sick is diminishing; and although the troops look ill, particularly the new comers, they are certainly improving in health. It is astonishing how much the climate has affected the new regiments; the dragoons, in particular, cannot produce half the number of men for duty that the old regiments can.

I am sorry to say that I am about to lose some valuable assistance in officers. The Commissary Gen., Dr. Franck, and Gen. Pakenham are obliged to go home on account of their health.

P.S. I conclude that you know that the Duc d'Arenberg is one of the Imperial family, and a member of the Confederation of the Rhine; but lest you should not, I mention it. He married Mad^{me} Tascher, who is related to the Empress Josephine; and there was a grand ceremony at Paris on the occasion of his wedding, as for the marriage of one 'de la famille.'

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 7th Nov. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th Oct. from Merida, and I congratulate you upon the success of your expedition into Estremadura.

I beg leave, at the same time, to return you my thanks for the zeal and ability which you have manifested in carrying into execution the measures which I had recommended to your attention in that province, and I request you to take an opportunity of assuring the General officers and troops under your command, that I have perused with the greatest satisfaction your report of the patience, perseverance, gallantry, and discipline, of their conduct throughout the late expedition; and that I have not failed to make my sense of these qualities known to H.R.H. the Prince Regent, and to H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, as well as to the Portuguese government.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 8th Nov. 1811, 10 P.M.

I have just received your letter of the 7th, 4 P.M. Churchill did not arrive till the afternoon of the 6th, but the delay did not signify, as I stopped the packet, and your brother could not arrive at Lisbon till late on Sunday, or even Monday, on account of the same cause, the badness of the horses on the road. I have likewise perused your letter to Lord FitzRoy Somerset of the 7th; and you will have heard from Churchill, that

A. G. O.

Freneda, 8th Nov. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the Commanding officers of regiments will send a return to the A. G. office, as soon as possible, specifying the number of masons, of carpenters, of sawyers, of blacksmiths, and of wheelwrights there are in the regiments under their command respectively.

I concurred in the arrangements you had made respecting Brun's carriage, the guns, and the horses or mules for them.

The money which remains should be given to Gen. Castaños. The Prince d'Aremberg is a great card, being a member of the Confederation of the Rhine, and a Prince of the Imperial family; that is to say, married to Mad^{lle}. Tascher, Josephine's niece, who was to have been married to Ferdinand VII. You should take care, therefore, that in any communications he has with his brother, or other officers, he has the attendance of a sharp English officer, and the sooner he is sent off the better.

I send you cartels for the exchange of Lieut. Strenuwitz and Capt. Nixon, for Lieut. Du Bourg and Capt. Margen; and take care that our officers are at your posts when the French officers are sent in, otherwise they will play you the tricks they did to me last winter about Percy and Carden. In respect to Mackworth, he is a Lieutenant, and I cannot allow a Captain to go in exchange for him; but you may name any Lieutenant of those you have taken in exchange, for whom I will give Mackworth a cartel, and the officer you will name shall either be sent to France, or back to the army; I should prefer the former. If this will not suit, I will write to England, that a Lieutenant may be sent back to France in exchange for Mackworth, and when I shall know his name, I will give Mackworth his cartel.

Tell Capt. Larchier that I am sorry I cannot allow him to go, but that I will write to the Commissioners in England to desire that they will exchange him by the earliest opportunity. I beg that you will inform the Comte d'Erlon,* that with every desire to oblige him, I am much concerned that a regard for the interests and honor of my own country, and of the officers and soldiers placed under my command, will prevent me from complying with his desire that the Prince d'Aremberg, Col. Hudry, and the chefs de bataillon, Veiten and Voirol, should return to the French army on their parole; that I am concerned to state that the Commissioners for prisoners in England have informed me that they have sent to France several officers prisoners on their parole, not one of whom has ever returned, nor has the same indulgence ever been extended to British officers prisoners in France.

I am sorry to add to this statement, that in the course of 3 years, during which I have been opposed to the French armies in the Peninsula, the French Generals have not allowed one officer to come back upon his parole, excepting Lieut. Mackworth, who was allowed to return by the Maréchal Duc de Raguse.

I beg you also to inform the Comte d'Erlon, that I have received with the greatest concern the accounts which have reached me of the ill treatment of the prisoners of the allied British and Portuguese army taken by the French army of the south. He, who has served in the '*Armée de Portugal*,' knows how I have treated the French officers and soldiers who have fallen into my hands, and how many of them I have saved; indeed, nobody ought to know this better than Marshal Soult; yet I am sorry to say, that the officers and soldiers who have been taken by the army of the south have been treated most shamefully.

I observe Brito's intelligence regarding Soult's movement, which has

* Général Drouet.

certainly been occasioned by yours; however, you are in safety, and you have now only to attend to the instructions I sent you to watch the enemy's movements upon Campo Maior and Ouguela, and endeavor to ascertain the exact strength of the enemy in Estremadura; and I may probably request you to try what you can do with them again.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 8th Nov. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 22d, and I enclose the copy of my last dispatch and its enclosure; and likewise a private letter from Hill. He has done his business very well. I have desired him to give the guns, mules, and money taken from the enemy to Castaños, so that the Spaniards will be in very good humor with us for a day or two.

I believe we had at one time more than 17,000 sick and wounded, but 7000 to 8000 of them were wounded. I never saw any army so unhealthy. Every man that came out from England went to the hospital immediately after, if not before, he joined the army, and several of the old Walcheren cases appeared again. We lost but very few, and they are now recovering, but we have still 14,000 in the hospitals. Notwithstanding, however, that I have sent home about 1000 effective men in 3 weak regiments, we have 3000 men fit for duty more than we had when the French were here in September.

The sickness of our army might as well not have appeared in the Spanish newspapers. But the liberty of the press, as it is called, at Cadiz, is as prejudicial to us as something of the same kind is in England.

Lardizabal's story affords a curious commentary upon the modern notions of liberty. The Cortes began wrong, and they will never be right till they constitute a stout executive government, and have sense enough to confine themselves to be a branch of the legislature.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 8th Nov. 1811.

You will have seen my answer to the Portuguese government on one point of the Prince's letter about Olivença; viz., to order that the Portuguese flag might be kept flying there. In point of fact, the Portuguese and Spaniards were fighting there when the place was taken, and I arrived at Elvas last April, which matter I settled by ordering out the Portuguese, and desiring Castaños to take possession of the place. The other point I did not touch upon; because, in a discussion with the Portuguese government, I have no concern with His Majesty's arbitration of their claim upon Spain, that Olivença shall be restored to them.

But what is the nature of this claim, and what is Great Britain to arbitrate? The claim is one upon the good will of Spain, as Olivença was ceded by treaty, as formally as Trinidad was ceded by treaty to us. There is no difference about the treaty which Great Britain could arbitrate; but His Majesty will have to use his influence with Spain to make the restoration. His Majesty must take care that Spain does not on the same grounds require from him the restitution of Trinidad.

In respect to Dom M. Forjaz, it is my opinion that he ought to confine himself, in his letter of justification to the Prince, to the charges contained in the Prince's letter to me, without alluding to private reports, &c. of his

being the cause of my being on a bad footing with the government. It is difficult to say what will be successful and what otherwise, in these governments of intrigue; but in my opinion, the broad distinct line is the best. The Prince accuses him of want of zeal and love for his service, and of disobedience to his orders; and not of fomenting differences.

It is difficult, excepting by protestation, to prove the negative of the first two charges; and in respect to the last, I should recommend him to defend himself as I have defended him, by saying that he is the officer of this government, and can neither obey nor disobey, excepting by their orders, and beg that his Royal Highness will descend to facts, or justify him.

In regard to other points, he ought not to refer to them, or suppose it possible that he can be charged with causing or fomenting differences. They may clear him of the formal charges in the letter of the Prince to me, which is all that is on record against him; but if I know them at all, they never will allow that I could have quarrelled with Principal Sousa, if I had not been misled by Dom M. Forjaz. I alone can set that matter right, which I shall do in my answer to Dom M. Forjaz, which I shall send him in English.

P.S. By the bye, is it wished that I should answer Nogueira's paper?

To Col. Lobo.

Freneda, 9th Nov. 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Hay, who lately passed through Abrantes in charge of the French General, Renaud, who, it appears, having occasion to complain to the Juiz de Fora that the General's servants were robbed, was sent for by the Juiz, and abused and ill-treated by him.

It is always my wish to support the authority of the Portuguese civil magistrates, but I am sorry to say that they in general conduct themselves in so arbitrary and improper a manner towards the officers of the army, that it is impossible for me to interfere in their favor.

In this case the French General's servants were robbed in the house of the Juiz de Fora, and what was so natural as to suspect that the Juiz de Fora's servants had committed the robbery? Is it offensive to a magistrate in whose house an officer is robbed, to inform the magistrate that his servants are suspected? Is suspicion proof? Or is there any thing in such a statement which ought to disturb the temper of a reasonable man to such a degree as to induce him to call an officer before him to insult him? The fact is, that if the civil magistrates of the country expect the support of authority, they must conduct themselves as magistrates ought, and protect officers and others from robbers; and I must say that if there had been any civil police in Abrantes, the French General could not have been robbed in the house of the Juiz de Fora.

I beg that you will communicate these my sentiments to the Juiz de Fora of Abrantes.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 9th Nov. 1811.

I have not written to you since the 22d, as I had nothing new to instruct you, and I would not interrupt your operations. Nothing could be more satisfactory to me than all that you did, and I am happy that

I had determined to send home your brother with the report of your transactions, before I had heard that it was your wish that I should do so. He and Churchill will tell you how we are going on here.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 9th Nov. 1811, 10 A.M.

I have written to Gen. Graham, to request that the board of officers may see the horses which he and his staff received from the lots sent out for the officers of the cavalry; and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Col. Elley to fix the time at which he will see them.

I am very much concerned to hear such bad accounts of the —th light dragoons. It is difficult enough, God knows, to find forage for a regiment of cavalry any where; but it is not impossible, as the officers of other regiments have proved.

All depends upon the diligence and attention to their duty of the officers; and I can only say, that if any circumstances exist in the —th regt. to render them less efficient than other regiments, I must take their horses from them, and give them to other regiments who will take care of them, and send the regiment to Lisbon to do duty there, and eventually to England.

I shall be sorry to be obliged to adopt these measures by a regiment of which I have reason to entertain a good opinion; but dragoons are worse than useless if their horses and appointments are not taken care of, and we must get rid of all of this description.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ult., with enclosures, which I transmitted to Adm. Berkeley, and I beg leave to enclose his answer upon the subject of ships of war carrying money to and from Lisbon.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.*

Freneda, 11th Nov. 1811.

I am sorry to enclose a report which I have received from the 7th division regarding the want of bread by the troops. I shall be obliged to you to let me know from what magazine those troops draw their supplies; how that magazine was supplied according to the last returns; and what means of transport there are at the disposal of the Commissaries of the 7th division, particularly of Mr. Carey.

It is very desirable that the troops should have at all times in their cantonments 6 days' bread and 6 days' corn. Accidents from the swelling of rivers would then be avoided; and in case I should have occasion to move the troops, it would not be impossible, from want of bread and corn with them. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know, also, how the several divisions of infantry, regiments of cavalry, brigades and troops of artillery, now stand for supplies.

To Gen. Don Carlos de España.

Freneda, 11th Nov. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 11th inst., and I have ordered Lieut. Reid,† of the Royal Engineers, to

* Now Sir J. Bissett, K.C.H.

† Col. Reid, Lieut. Governor of Bermuda.

proceed to your Excellency's head quarters, in order to obey such orders as you will give him respecting mining the bridges of Yecla and Cerralvo.

I concur entirely in the opinion of your Excellency regarding the importance of these points, whether with a view to offensive or defensive operations; and I would occupy them, only that I find it impossible to support my troops from the magazines, at a greater distance from those magazines than they are at present.

If I had the command of money, to pay in ready money for all the supplies which a division or larger body of troops would consume in advance of the Agueda, it might not be inconvenient to occupy the Yeltes and Huelva with one of our divisions, which would effectually secure the points referred to. But I cannot at all times command ready money, and the people in Spain, however well inclined, will not part with their supplies without ready money; and it is impossible for me to pretend to supply a division at such a distance in advance from the magazines. Under these circumstances, whatever may be the inconvenience resulting from the enemy being in possession of the passages of those rivers, we must be satisfied with adopting measures to secure them which may not prove adequate to their object.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 12th Nov. 1811.

I am much distressed by Strenuwitz's coming away; however, as he had more reason than another to be alarmed for the consequences of staying with the French, I excuse in him what I would not excuse in another. However, we must put the best appearance on the transaction that we can, and I beg you to write to the Comte d'Erlon, and tell him that as I had already signed and sent to you the cartel for Lieut. Du Bourg, I would not withdraw it, but desired that that officer might be sent back in exchange for Lieut. Strenuwitz; that I beg, however, to protest against the notion that an officer who is under charge of a guard is bound, by any implied parole, not to make his escape from that guard; that the contrary has been admitted in a late correspondence which I have had with Marshal the Duc de Raguse, and that the French General officers may depend upon it, that as long as they continue the hitherto unheard of mode of confining officers under a guard, and not leaving them at liberty upon their parole, they must expect that they will take advantage of the favorable disposition of the people of Spain to make their escape.

I enclose a cartel for Strenuwitz, to be given to himself.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

12th Nov. 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 10th inst., containing explanations of the reasons that men of the 2d division have been sent into hospital without proper returns of their necessaries, I am to acquaint you that the facts stated are not satisfactory to the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency considers there ought to be at all times a roll of the necessaries of each soldier, and when such soldier goes to hospital, all that is necessary is for his Captain to ascertain that such soldier has his necessaries as specified in the roll, and to send a copy of it to the hospital. This would not take two minutes' time for any man, and might and ought to be performed under any circumstances. The consequence of the omission to perform this duty is, that the Purveyor at the hospital cannot take charge of the soldier's necessaries; they, as well as the arms and accoutrements, are lost and the soldier

when he recovers, becomes useless, excepting as a bătman, until he can be completely refitted.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Freneda, 13th Nov. 1811.

I see that Col. — has published his letter in answer to mine on the affair of the Barba de Puerco, I imagine garbled in the usual Jacobin style, and preceded by a statement, the meaning of which is (as far as I can understand it) to insinuate that I, or my friends, have published my letter. I write in hopes that this will catch you at Lisbon, to intreat you on no account to be drawn into a war in the newspapers with this fellow.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 13th Nov. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and I enclose a cartel for Lieut. Mackworth in exchange for Lieut. Miramon. I write to desire that Lieut. Miramon may be sent from England to France, in exchange for Lieut. Mackworth. Pray desire the latter not to throw himself unnecessarily in the way of being taken, till Lieut. Miramon can have arrived in France, which will be in about 3 weeks. As you have written to Drouet that you would send Du Bourg for Strenuwitz, it is scarcely worth while to write the letter which I recommended to you yesterday.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 13th Nov. 1811.

I was pretty certain that the establishment of the military chest and other measures were delayed by tricks. If they execute the former measure as I intended, it is quite disconnected with all others, and there is no reason whatever for its delay, excepting to give time for the operation of intrigue in Brazil.

I don't know what plan — had for Exchequer bills and the fabrication of paper. I have also a plan for Exchequer bills, but not at Lisbon, where they would ruin us and the Portuguese government also. As for paper, they must positively fabricate no more.

— is a very extraordinary personage: at the same time that he was in ecstasies of admiration of Mr. Pitt's plans of finance, the foundation of which is credit acquired by honest and plain dealing, and he urged these plans, right or wrong, upon this bankrupt government; he was urging upon them likewise all the wild, revolutionary plans of America and France, fabrication of paper, selling of crown lands, mortgaging estates of emigrants, &c.

I enclose the draft* of my letter to the Portuguese government about Olivença. The Princess Carlota appears to get on apace.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 13th Nov. 1811.

By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz of the 29th Oct., it appears that the enemy had retired from Algeziras and San Roque on the night of the 21st Oct. Gen. Ballesteros had pursued their rear guard, against which he had some success.

Col. Skerrett conducted with great judgment the detachment of British troops, of which he had the command at Tarifa, and his movements towards the enemy's communications must have shown them the imprac-

* This draft is missing.

ticability of their remaining in the position which they had taken. The service on which Col. Skerrett's detachment was sent from Cadiz having been effected, I propose to suggest to Major Gen. Cooke the expediency of re-calling it, and the regiment de Watteville will be sent to its destination forthwith.

I have received no further intelligence from the eastern coast since I addressed your Lordship on the 6th inst. I learn from intercepted letters that the enemy have accounts that the army of Murcia had moved upon Cuenca, with a view to co-operate with the guerrillas, in intercepting the communications of Suchet's corps; and it is reported that there has been a general insurrection in Aragon, since the troops have been withdrawn from that kingdom for the expedition into Valencia; but of this I have no certain accounts.

Nothing important has occurred either in Estremadura since Gen. Hill returned to his cantonments, or in this quarter since the governor arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy have augmented their force in Estremadura, but I imagine only with a view to introduce in security a convoy into Badajoz, as I understand that they have barricaded the streets of Merida since Gen. Hill withdrew from thence; and likewise those of S^a Marta.

It is reported that there are troops in movement towards Benavente, but I have not any intelligence of these movements on which I can depend.

It appears that the country on both banks of the Tagus as far up as Aranjuez has been made over by the Emperor to Marshal Marmont, for the support of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' This arrangement has reduced the King to the greatest distress, as the produce of that country was all that he had to depend upon; and he was actually subsisting upon the money produced by the retail sale of the grain forcibly levied upon the people. This grain having been thus levied and sold by the King, has been seized again by Marmont's orders, and taken from the people who had purchased it from the King's magazines, who have been informed that the King had no right to sell it!

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 13th Nov. 1811.

In consequence of the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 8th Aug., directing me to order the Commissary Gen. to pay to — —, Esq., the sum of £577 10s., I considered it proper first to inquire whether Mr. — — had received any money from any of the pay departments, British or Portuguese, in this country; and I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received on the subject from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, stating that Mr. — — received, besides his pay as a — — in the Portuguese service, from January to June, 1809, and an allowance for purchasing horses and mules, a sum amounting to 1,200,000 *reis*, or £337 10s. sterling, from the late Colonel of the Covilhão militia, for which sum he has not accounted.

I beg to receive your Lordship's directions whether I shall order that sum to be paid to the widow of the Colonel of the Covilhão militia, and that Mr. — — may receive the balance of his demand of £577 10s.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 13th Nov. 1811.

I send you the last morning state of the army in the field, and the last fortnight's state of the British army.

I likewise enclose a very curious intercepted letter, which was in cipher, from Marmont to Foy,* which shows how these gentry are going on; in fact each Marshal is the natural enemy of the King and of his neighbouring Marshal. Pray take care that this letter is not made public, as it would disclose that we have the key of the cipher.

We laugh at the distresses of the French, and enjoy their robberies and frauds to relieve them, but we are in great distress ourselves; however, if you have sent me the Exchequer bills which I desired to have, I think I shall be able with their assistance, and by the operation of certain financial measures which I have prevailed upon the Portuguese government to adopt, to do something.

I refer you to the statement of our financial situation, which the Commissary Gen. sends home this day, which is indeed nearly the same as that which I sent you in August; and I beg you to attend particularly to what I stated in a recent letter respecting the purchases of bullion at Lisbon by the Americans. Seven weeks have elapsed since the date of our last accounts from England.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 14th Nov. 1811.

I believe that our train and stores, and the means of moving them, are in the following situation.

The Engineer's stores, with the carts and bullocks, ready to move; the gun bullocks at Lamego, but the guns at Villa da Ponte; the ordnance stores, powder, shot, &c., at Villa da Ponte, but the carts, &c., employed by the Commissary Gen. I beg that you will order what there are the means of moving to proceed by regular easy stages to Almeida, and that you will send to Mr. Boyes for the bullocks to draw the guns; and as soon as they arrive, let them proceed likewise to Almeida. The ordnance stores must be left where they are, till the means of conveyance for the Engineer's stores can be sent back to convey them by trips to Almeida, as I fear that

* See Appendix, No. XIII.

G. O.

Freneda, 14th Nov. 1811.

10. The Commander of the Forces trusts that the example of Lieut. — will induce the officers of the army to consider the performance of their duty as their first object, from which their attention ought not to be diverted by any idle views of amusement at Lisbon, or elsewhere.

11. A moment's reflection on these subjects, on which it was Lieut. —'s duty to reflect, would have convinced him that the soldiers of his company would suffer the greatest inconvenience from his taking with him from the regiment their money; and the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, from the whole of Lieut. —'s conduct, and from his having omitted to this moment to replace the money which he had improperly taken away, that he had determined in the first instance to avail himself of any idle excuse to go to Lisbon for his amusement, for which the company's money was to give him the means of paying the expenses.

12. Lieut. —'s proceeding from Abrantes to Lisbon, on the alleged recommendation of Dr. —, was equally irregular and consistent with the rest of his conduct; he ought to have known that he could not with propriety remain absent from his regiment, on account of sickness, without the permission of the Commander of the Forces, founded on the proceedings of a Medical board, ordered to assemble in consequence of a report to the Commander of the Forces of the bad state of his health.

it will be impossible to take the cars from the commissariat for that purpose. However, if Mr. Boyes is of opinion that they can be taken without inconvenience, I have no objection; and the ordnance stores for the train may come on as fast as there shall be means of conveyance for them.

Let the company of artillery move with such part of the equipment as you may think proper.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 15th Nov. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 6th inst., and I entirely concur with you in the approbation which you have expressed of the conduct of Col. Skerrett up to the 21st Oct., when the enemy retired from his position at San Roque.

It is not my wish or intention to interfere with your discretion in detaching troops from Cadiz. When first I detached troops from this army to that station, I ordered that they should not quit the limits of the harbor; but the events of the war in that quarter may render it expedient that a detachment should be made from Cadiz, and there may not be time to receive my opinion upon the measure. In deciding upon measures of this description in future, however, I wish you to advert to the following points.

1st; That the object for which you detach the troops is specified, and important in itself.

2dly; That there is a prospect that the detachment of the British troops to be sent will have the desired effect.

3dly; That they shall be at all times in secure communication with their shipping; for which their Commanding officer must be held responsible under his instructions, whatever may be the orders he may receive from the Spanish General officer under whose command he may be placed.

4thly; That the British troops detached shall act together in a body under the immediate command of their own Commanding officer.

When you made the detachment to Tarifa, all the points above recited appeared to me to have been attended to. But I would beg you to observe, that, as soon as the French retired, the object for which Col. Skerrett was sent was accomplished; and he has remained for no specified

G. O.

Freneda, 15th Nov. 1811.

1. The frequent well-founded complaints made by officers commanding regiments of the detention of non-commissioned officers and soldiers at the hospital stations, as attendants upon the hospitals, induce the Commander of the Forces to refer the Commanding officers of the several hospital stations to his G. O. of the 23d Oct. 1810, and to desire that the principles of that order may be applied to the stations under their command respectively.

2. They are immediately to make out a list of the names of those non-commissioned officers and soldiers whom it is necessary should be employed as ward masters, store-keepers, and attendants upon the several hospitals; which lists are to be sent to the A. G., and they will be published in G. O., for the information of the regiment to which the non-commissioned officers and soldiers belong, if the Commander of the Forces should approve of them.

3. The Commanding officers at the several hospital stations are forbid to detain any non-commissioned officers, or soldiers, whose names should not appear in those lists as attendants upon the hospitals. If an additional number of attendants of any description are required upon the hospital, application must be made for them, specifying their names; and if the Commander of the Forces should concur in the necessity of this additional attendance, his orders will be given in the G. O. for the information of all concerned.

object. I would therefore suggest to you, that if there is no specified object for his remaining any longer, he should be withdrawn.

The consequences of his remaining under existing circumstances, must be to involve him and his detachment in the operations of Gen. Ballesteros, which, if they have a specified object, that General, even with the assistance of the British troops, has not the means of accomplishing; and the British detachment must in the course of these operations be exposed to be cut off from the shipping.

These operations may be very useful to the cause, and highly creditable to Gen. Ballesteros, even though they may not have a specified object, or may not be successful. But it was not my intention when I detached part of the army to Cadiz, nor is it the intention of the British government, that any detachment of His Majesty's troops should take part in those operations.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 15th Nov. 1811.

I have received your letters to the 6th inst., and I now enclose my last dispatch.

I write by this opportunity to Gen. Cooke, to suggest to him the expediency of drawing back Col. Skerrett's detachment. I know the Spaniards well, and particularly Ballesteros. They will never stop till they shall have lost that detachment. It may have been very proper to send it to secure Tarifa, or for any special object, taking care that its communication should be always secure with the sea coast. But it will not answer to allow our troops to remain in search of adventures, under the guidance of such men as Ballesteros.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 15th Nov. 1811.

I think it proper to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have written to Major Gen. Cooke, in regard to Col. Skerrett's detachment.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — light dragoons.

15th Nov. 1811.

The A. A. G. of the cavalry having complained of the extreme irregularity in the transmission of the returns of the regiment under your command, in addition to having required an explanation of the circumstances from the officer commanding the brigade, and the Brigade Major, I am further directed by the Commander of the Forces to inform you, that, from the late reports, he is afraid there must be some gross neglect in the interior of the — light dragoons, and that he shall be concerned to be obliged to take public notice of the regiment, but that you may expect he will do so.

The A.G. to Major Gen. —, cavalry.

15th Nov. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a report I have received from the A. A. G. of the cavalry, and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to observe that the irregularity in the transmission of returns must be owing to some neglect in the interior of the regiments, or to the inattention of the Brigade Major to his duty. You will be pleased, therefore, to investigate the causes of the delay complained of, and report to me thereon for his Excellency's information.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 16th Nov 1811.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and I now return Dom M.

Forjaz's papers. I agree that the last, nay, that all the papers in No. 4, allude pretty clearly to him; but excepting the last, they have all been answered.

The question is, what is Dom M. Forjaz's object? I suppose to remove from the mind of the Prince the notion that he caused and promoted a misunderstanding between the Governors of the Kingdom and me, and to obtain from His Royal Highness an acknowledgment of the erroneous judgment he had formed upon that subject. This object is legitimate, and I think it one which Dom M. Forjaz ought to endeavor by all prudent means to accomplish.

The next question is, what are these means? I must say, not the topics into which he has entered in his letter of the 8th Nov., addressed to the Governors of the Kingdom. In that letter, he has entered not only into the origin and cause of the misunderstanding, but has shown much more clearly than I was ever able to show, that I had, that the people of this country had, and that the Prince had, most just ground for complaint of the Bishop and the Principal. But I would ask, is the Prince a person upon whom such a representation is likely to have any effect? Does Dom M. Forjaz believe, that when I and the British government have failed in prevailing upon him to examine fairly these same circumstances, he is likely, even with his stronger statement, to produce a different result?

G. O.

Freneda, 16th Nov. 1811.

1. All the masons in the British and Portuguese regiments in the 6th division, and in the regiments of Gen. Pack's brigade, are to be sent to Almeida, on Monday; those of the 6th division under charge of an officer, those of Gen. Pack's brigade under charge of a non-commissioned officer, where they are to work till the following Sunday, and to return to their regiments on Monday. On Sunday the 24th inst. these masons are to be relieved by the masons in the British and Portuguese regiments in the 4th division, and by the masons in the regiments of Col. McMahon's brigade, under charge of an officer and non-commissioned officer; and these are to be relieved again on Sunday the 1st Dec. by the masons in the 6th division and in Gen. Pack's brigade, and the relief is to be made weekly in the same manner.

2. The officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of these men must be paid their working money before they quit the fort, when relieved.

3. This order is not to interfere with the execution of the order of the 7th Oct. regarding the working parties of the 6th division for Almeida; only that the number, instead of being 400, is to be 360, of which one half English and one half Portuguese.

* * * * *

5. The Commander of the Forces has seldom read the details of an officer's conduct which has given him so much cause for disapprobation and disgust as those which appear respecting the conduct of Mr. — on the proceedings of the General Court Martial.

6. Having been employed on duty at the fort of Peniche, he set at defiance the Governor, and all the Portuguese authorities in that place; he beat the people employed under him, and insulted the inhabitants of the fort by conduct and language which a gentleman ought not to have used.

7. The people of Portugal have in no instance shown their forbearance and good nature, their gratitude for the benefits they have received from the British nation, and their consideration for the follies of an individual, to a greater degree than in the case of Mr. —. But the Commander of the Forces is determined that those qualities shall not be taken advantage of, by any individual, to their annoyance and injury; and he declares that if he did not attribute much of the conduct of Mr. — to thoughtlessness and levity, he would recommend that he should be dismissed from His Majesty's service.

8. The Commander of the Forces requests Major Gen. Peacocke to read to Mr. — this reprimand for his conduct; his suspension from rank and pay is to take place from this day; and the Commander of the Forces requests the Commissary Gen. will hereafter employ Mr. — in a situation in which his conduct will be under the inspection of one of the superior officers of the Commissariat.

9. He likewise requests that Mr. —, of the Commissariat, may be removed from Peniche.

Will not his statement be contradicted, and all kinds of misstatement and sophistry be used to conceal the truth from the Prince, in this case, in the same manner as the same arts were used to blind him in regard to the statement transmitted by me a year ago? What will be the consequence? If the Prince takes any official notice of his paper, it will be to repeat the accusation that he caused the misunderstanding; and probably he will add to it that, after it had been reconciled, he endeavored to foment it again.

The worst of this accusation will be, that the world, who never half inform themselves of those matters on which they will pronounce a judgment, will sanction with their opinion this decision of the Prince. I would therefore recommend to Dom M. Forjaz to leave out of his letter of the 8th Nov. all that I have marked with pencil, and in lieu thereof, to write what I state in the enclosed paper. This will probably bring a fair answer from the Prince, and there will be an end to the business. He may depend upon it, that the other mode will not accomplish his object.

P.S. I think also the words which I have marked, in regard to the Conde de Linhares, might as well be left out of the letter, as pointing at a motive for Linhares' conduct which, however true the allusion may be, had better not be made on this occasion.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 17th Nov. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and I hope that you are as sorry to leave us as I am to lose your co-operation in our task. I was in hopes that I should have had your assistance till the end of the war; but if you are to go, government could not make choice of a successor whose appointment will be more agreeable to me.

I am particularly sorry to lose you for the concern on which you are going, as I agree with you in thinking, that you will effect no good purpose.* I shall send you the copy of a letter which I wrote to my brother Henry some time ago upon this subject, which will show you what I thought about it.

I hope it is yet possible that you will not go. The Spaniards never more than half consented to our mediation, and that only upon a condition with which it is impossible that our government can comply. If they don't now relish the measure, they will get rid of it by the usual way,—by delay; and in the mean time, I hope that you will not quit your present station.

P.S. I send you the copy of my letter to my brother,† which I beg you to return, as it is the only one I have.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 18th Nov. 1811, 9 A.M.

I just write to mention that I hear from Austin of a collection of troops at Seville, which Victoria likewise mentions in a foolish letter which I have from him.

Attend to Ouguela and Campo Maior in the first instance, and if Soult should be too strong for you in Estremadura, which I should think he can

* Mr. Stuart had been named as Chief of a Commission to settle the disputes between Spain and the Spanish American colonies.

† See letter to the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley, 14th July, 1811, p. 157.

scarcely be, and you cannot hold the position of Portalegre, you have your instructions where to fall back.

P.S. If you don't already correspond with Austin, you had better do so.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Hay, 5th division.

18th Nov. 1811.

Your letter of the 15th Nov. and its enclosures have been laid before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of Major Gen. Walker, that his Excellency can never adopt any measure founded upon the idle conversation of 2 officers at the Paymaster General's. Capt. ——— was ordered to remain at Oeiras in charge of the dépôt, by the sanction of the Commander of the Forces; and his Excellency is to judge of the relative importance of his services there, and with the 2d batt. 30th regt., and, being responsible for all, decides that he shall remain on his present duty.

I am further directed to remark upon the extreme impropriety of an officer commanding a regiment calling the Captains together, or allowing them to assemble or remonstrate upon a subject of the nature referred to, in the memorial transmitted, arising from idle conversation between 2 other officers. You will be pleased to make these sentiments known to the parties concerned.

To ———.

Head Quarters, 20th Nov. 1811.

I have received your 2 letters, and I concur with you in thinking that the only mode in which you can expiate the injury which you have done to your country, by aiding a cruel foreign enemy to invade it, is by giving me every intelligence in your power. If you do give me such intelligence, I will endeavor to procure for you a pardon for your offences; but it must be real intelligence, of a useful description, and sent with celerity, and frequently.

If you will point out the person at Alcantara through whose hands the money is to be sent to you, I will send it, or will adopt any other mode you will point out of supplying you. I gave the bearer of your letters 12 dollars, and I shall reward any person you may employ to bring me letters.

Memorandum for the Commissary General.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811.

In consequence of the difficulty of procuring carts for the service of the army in the country, Mr. Kennedy and I had arranged that a number of bullock carts should be constructed, to be drawn by bullocks belonging to the public, and to be driven by persons hired into the public service for that purpose. The patterns of the carts are fixed upon, and they are about to be constructed at Almeida, at Lisbon, and in England, and, if possible, at Oporto and Vianna. The total number required is 800. Of this number under 200 will be constructed at Almeida. The number which can be constructed at Lisbon, Oporto, and Vianna, must depend upon the quantities of materials at those places respectively. As, however, some of these carts will soon be finished, it is desirable that as soon as possible the establishments of drivers and bullocks for them should be formed.

Mr. Kennedy and I had settled that the carts should be formed into 2 grand divisions, each consisting of 400 carts, to be superintended by an officer of the commissariat; each grand division to be formed into 8 divisions of 50 carts each, to be superintended by a commissariat clerk; and each division to be formed into 2 brigades, each brigade to consist of 25 carts. To draw these carts there should be 54 bullocks, that is,

2 bullocks for each cart, and 4 spare bullocks attached to the brigade. The establishment of people attached to the brigade to load the carts, and drive and take care of the bullocks, should be, one *capataz*, at *per diem*; one smith, at *per diem*; 9 men, at 2 *pesettas per diem*; and 14 boys, at one *pesetta per diem*. These allowances to be besides their rations.

The bullocks must be shod; and the officers of the commissariat attached to the grand divisions and divisions should be directed to supply iron, &c. for that purpose to their divisions; and the carts must be greased, as the wheels are upon iron axletrees; and they must likewise supply grease. When the bullocks work, it will be necessary that they should receive, besides their forage, about 2½ lbs. of barley, or Indian corn, or rye, every day.

The first measure to be adopted, with a view to the execution of the measure, is to form one grand division of the officers and people to take charge of it. The officer of the commissariat should be appointed to it; and one or two clerks, in the first instance, to take charge of divisions in the grand division; and the *capatazes*, smiths, and drivers, should be hired to take charge of the cattle.

The cattle should then be made over to them and shod; and they should be collected in convenient places for shelter and forage till the carts should be prepared for the work. Yokes of the common kind should also be prepared.

It would likewise be necessary that sheds should be built to hold the bullocks of one division at every stage on the road between Raiva and Celorico, and at Celorico, in order to give them cover in the winter. The stages need not be less than 4 leagues, and should not exceed 5 leagues.

Memorandum for the Commissary General.

Fremeida, 20th Nov. 1811.

The difficulties which the army already experience from the want of provisions, notwithstanding the number of mules employed in transporting provisions, point out the necessity of examining, very particularly, into the mode in which those mules are employed, and into the principles on which this branch of the service ought to be conducted.

The original formation of the commissariat of this army was one Assistant Commissary, with his separate establishment of clerks, means of conveyance to each brigade of infantry, to each regiment of cavalry, to each troop or brigade of horse or foot artillery, to the head quarters of the army, and to the reserve artillery.

The brigades of infantry of the army were afterwards joined together in divisions of 2 brigades, with a brigade of artillery, and a Portuguese brigade of infantry attached, but the establishment of the commissariat was never altered. When the British commissariat was charged, in the month of March last, with the supply of the Portuguese troops, there was no alteration of this establishment. The increase of business, and the necessary separation and allotment of supplies, rendered it expedient that one person should be at the head of the commissariat in each division, and a Deputy Commissary was appointed to superintend the duties of

some divisions, while those of others were superintended by the senior Assistants with the brigades in the division.

It is desirable that this distribution of employment should continue in the commissariat, and that the means of transport for all the troops should be founded on a supposed distance of 12 leagues from the magazine. The mules will go this distance loaded in 3 days, and unloaded in less time; and it may be reckoned that the supply will be kept up at this distance, by allowing them 6 days to perform it, and allowing, in addition to the numbers required for the supply, one sixth of the number of mules to be spared.

Each mule should be made to carry, on account of the public, 200 lbs., and, besides this load, he should carry his own corn going from and returning to the magazine, which is 5 lbs. *per diem*, or 30 lbs. for the 6 days. Upon this calculation a mule should carry biscuit for 6 days for 33 men; rum for 6 days for 100; rice for 6 days for 200 men; corn for 6 days for 3 horses, and 20 lbs. over.

The Assist. Commissaries attached to brigades of infantry and of foot artillery, and to troops of horse artillery, should therefore have placed at their disposal a number of mules in proportion to the number of men and animals they supply with provisions and forage calculated upon the above mentioned principles.

The Portuguese brigades of infantry serving in the British divisions have, or ought to have attached to them, mules to carry 3 days' provisions. This is only half the number required, and these I believe are very incomplete. The state of these mules should be inquired into by the Deputy or Assist. Commissary at the head of the department in the division; and there should be placed at the disposal of the Deputy or Assist. Commissary, a sufficient number of mules to supply the Portuguese troops in the division, calculated upon the same principles as for the British troops. The expense of these mules will of course be charged to the Portuguese government in the expense of feeding their troops.

There is attached to each division of infantry and to the cavalry, a number of mules to carry musket and carbine ammunition, and there are many in the reserve of the artillery. These ought to be used, when the army halts, to carry from the depôts their own supplies of corn and provisions. As they receive only 5 lbs. of corn *per diem*, one sixth of their number will supply their corn, and but little more their bread. The bargain with them is that they are to carry ammunition only, but I have no doubt that they would be glad to carry the corn for their mules, in order to be more certain of a regular supply.

In regard to the regiments of cavalry, the necessity of keeping them amply supplied with forage induced Mr. Kennedy to allot to each regiment a mule for every two men and horses which the Commissary attached to it had to supply. This number is rather more than would be allotted to a regiment of cavalry, to keep up its supply at a distance of 12 leagues, upon the calculation above stated for the infantry and artillery; but it is better that the arrangement should continue as he has settled it.

The means of transport of the army being once arranged upon this

determined principle, it will be easy afterwards to apply them as may be thought most expedient. Some of the troops being nearer the magazine than 12 leagues, their surplus means of transport might be applied either to keep the magazines complete, or to form an entrepôt at a convenient distance for the use of those which are most distant, or in such other manner as the Commissary Gen. may think proper, observing always to keep the proportions for the supply of a certain body according to the distance the mules have to go, and the time they will take going the distance.

Thus, a mule 6 days going and returning will supply 33 men with bread; 5 days, 40 men; 4 days, 50 men; 3 days, 66 men; 2 days, 100 men; and as the number may be diminished in proportion as the distance decreases, so the number must be increased in proportion as the distance from the magazine increases.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811, noon.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Craufurd, to which I beg to draw your particular attention.

I request you to let me have a return of the number of mules employed with the Light division, and Capt. Ross' troop of horse artillery; and a return of the number of persons and animals receiving rations in that division and the troop. Likewise the state of the magazines at Celorico, between the 10th and 20th inst.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 21st ult., requesting me to inform you of the grounds upon which I had determined that no deductions for rations should be made from the pay of persons holding the situation of Assistant Provost Marshal; and I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I have always considered persons so employed to be entitled to the same advantages as Staff officers, whose pay, according to the book of General Regulations (p. 64), is not liable to deduction on account of rations.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811.

I have nothing to tell you in addition to what is contained in the enclosed dispatch, excepting that since I sent it off I have received a *Madrid Gazette* of the 10th, which contains a proclamation of Blake's to the city of Valencia, of the 26th, from which it appears that he was beat on the 25th, having left the town to endeavor to raise the siege of Saguntum! I suppose Mahy had joined him before the action.

There is nothing new from England to the 15th Oct.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811.

I have received a report that Gen. Ballesteros had made a second successful attack upon the enemy between Bornos and Xerez on the 5th inst. The details of this affair have not reached me, but I have no doubt that it took place, and that its result was favorable to the Spanish troops.

There is a report in the *Madrid Gazette*, that Marshal Suchet had beat

Gen. Mahy between Liria and Valencia on the 25th Oct., and taken prisoner Gen. Mahy, whose corps were dispersed. It was also stated that Marshal Suchet had summoned Valencia on the 27th. These reports don't appear to be official, and they are contradicted by other reports from Madrid, and by other reports which I have received from the south, which state that Suchet has been obliged to retire into Aragon. I am not exactly apprised of Gen. Mahy's plan of operations, or of the time of his march; but it appears to me that on his approach to Valencia, he would not have been on the line between Liria and Valencia, but on the right of the Chelva.

The last letters which I have received from Mr. Wellesley are dated the 6th inst., and he had not then received the accounts of Gen. Ballesteros' last success, nor of affairs in Valencia since the 11th Oct.

No movement of any importance has taken place in Estremadura or in this quarter since I addressed your Lordship on the 13th inst. By a letter of the 11th, from Sir H. Douglas, I learn that accounts had been received on that day from the Junta of Mondoñedo, stating that the enemy had entered Oviedo on the 6th inst.

I am afraid that the Spanish division in the Asturias had left the passes of the mountains unguarded, otherwise it is impossible that the French could have reached Oviedo without opposition, and that the first intelligence of their movement should have announced their arrival in that city, and should have been received from the Junta of Mondoñedo.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch of the 1st Oct. (No. 61), and I beg leave to acquaint you that the regiments named in the margin (the 29th, 85th, and 97th) sailed for England some time ago.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 20th Nov. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly and morning states. The capture of the Prince d'Aremberg has occasioned a request from the Marquesa de S^{ta} Cruz, that an endeavor might be made to exchange him for the Marques de S^{ta} Cruz, a Grandee of Spain, who was seized by Buonaparte at Bayonne, I believe in 1808, and has been confined ever since in a fortress in Italy. It would be very desirable, if possible, to effect the exchange of the Marques de S^{ta} Cruz; but I don't recommend that the Prince d'Aremberg should be given for him: he is too great a card to be so thrown away. Besides, I should suppose that if government were disposed to allow him to return to France in exchange for any person not an officer, they would name Lord Beverley.

The A.G. to W. Hogg, Esq., Deputy Inspector of hospitals.

20th Nov. 1811.

I have the honor to return you the letter of Mr. Gunson, Purveyor to the Forces, which has been laid before Lord Wellington, and I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency does not see where the difficulty arises in respect to Mr. Gunson receiving the funeral expenses of soldiers dying in general hospital. The mode of this payment to be made, and the amount, is clearly laid down in my letter of the 6th June, 1811; and unless Mr. Gunson can particularly state where exists the difficulty, and the cause of it, the Commander of the Forces is not aware that it is at all necessary to put any thing further in G. O. on the subject. (See G.O., 10th Oct. 1812.)

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 21st Nov. 1811, 9 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 20th, and its enclosures, which I return.

Upon the examination of the state of the means with the Light division, to the demands for supplies, on the principle of the memorandum which I sent you yesterday, it appears that they have 4736 men, which number would require

Mules to supply them with bread at 12 leagues . . .	144
.. .. with spirits	48
.. .. with rice, &c.	24

216

And they have 398 horses, whose corn would require . . . 116

332

To this add spare one for every six 55

387

Number with the division 340

47

Wanting

I imagine that the muleteers and their mules, as well for carrying provisions as for carrying ammunition, are included in the number of 4736 men, and of 398 horses. If that is the case, it will turn out that this division is well supplied with means of transport.

In respect to Capt. Ross' troop, they have, including muleteers, 243 men, requiring mules

For bread	71
For rum	24
For rice	12

107

And they have 206 horses, requiring mules 69

176

To which add spare one for every six 29

205

They have 97

108

Wanting

It is obvious, however, that the muleteers, probably, for the ammunition of the division, are included in the number of men, and, probably, of horses, in this return, and therefore they may be complete. I have gone into this calculation just to apply the principle of the memorandum which I sent you yesterday. Let me know how many men and horses of both these returns are hired muleteers and their mules.

But there is another view to be taken of this subject; and that is the distance which these troops are from the magazine. They are at least 15 leagues from Celorico, and they cannot be less than 15 leagues from S. João da Pesqueira. This distance will require 8, or probably 9 days,

for a communication. Some measures must be adopted, therefore, to supply these troops with one-third more of bread and corn than their mules can carry to them from these magazines, even supposing they are sufficiently supplied for a distance of 12 leagues from the magazines. And these measures are either a supply of money, or an additional number of mules, or to send them every week 3 days' supply from hence.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 18th, with the enclosure, from Mr. Boyes. I beg that you will tell Mr. Boyes that I am very much obliged to him for the zealous desire which he manifests to forward our stores, but that I cannot allow the depôt at Celorico to remain unsupplied, at least till that of S. João da Pesqueira is fully supplied. I request him to correspond on this point with the Commissary General.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

Since I wrote to you on the 9th, I have heard from Gen. Trant that there are at Oporto 59 axletrees, and 12 more can be made, and boxes for the wheels; so that I have ordered there the pattern cart, and have desired that 71 carts may be made there. I have not yet heard that there are any axletrees, or that any can be made at Raiva.

The tools are arrived, and the work is begun at Almeida. I have given Mr. Bissett a memorandum, of which I enclose a copy, for the formation of the establishment. Probably some of the brigades might be formed at Lisbon.

Marshal Beresford has been so kind as to give me over some axletrees, boxes, &c., which were found on the Zezere; and he promised to inquire whether there were any more at Lisbon. Trant tells me that 64 were sent from Oporto; and I think it probable that there will be many; and some at Santarem, and others at Pernes, where the French destroyed carriages. You had better speak to Marshal Beresford upon these subjects.

I trust that your health is improved. I have written to the Admiral to beg that he will give a passage in a ship of war to Gen. Campbell, of which you and Pakenham might avail yourselves to get to England, as I should be sorry to hear of your ending your career in a French prison.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received a letter from Sir W. Beresford, from which I learn that the greatest number of the axletrees have been used; and I am not certain that there are more than 50, even including those on the Zezere, and a few more expected from Abrantes.

You had better order Major Aird to make as many carts as there are French axletrees for, immediately. Then to set to work and make our old axletrees and boxes into carts; choosing of these, those of the first instance which come nearest to the French size. He must take care, however, in casing our axletrees, not to mount the carriage too high above the centre of the wheels.

Desire him to let me know how many French axletrees that will answer he will find in the arsenal, and how many of our old axletrees.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

I have received your letters, Nos. 9 and 10, of the 29th Oct. and 11th Nov.

Without knowing more than I do of the state of Galicia, and of the military positions in that province, it is not possible for me to give an opinion upon the plan of operations which you detailed in your conference with the Junta of Galicia. In reference to the subject generally, and with a view to what passed before in that kingdom, I believe that it would be advisable that Gen. Abadia should fall back towards the frontiers of Portugal, leaving open the high road to Coruña and Ferrol.

The enemy cannot then interrupt his communications by operations upon either of his flanks; and, unless they should be very strong, they will not like to venture as far as Coruña, or even Lugo, by the high road, if Gen. Abadia can maintain himself upon the Sil, or upon the Minho. They cannot be strong in Galicia as long as we remain here.

In regard to your opinions on the financial measures in Galicia, I am convinced that the government must raise a revenue in money. It may be very proper, besides, to make the proprietors of carts, mules, and other animals, perform certain services in their turns, either for the payment of the usual hire, or for a smaller payment, or for no payment at all. But these services ought not to be in lieu of the payment in money of the required dues to the State.

Since I have received your letter of the 11th, I have received a report that the French had retired again from the Asturias. This may be true; as Lieut. Gen. Hill's movements in Estremadura in the end of October have created a general alarm, which probably extended so far north. Dorsenne has certainly returned to Valladolid.

I can't imagine how the first report of the enemy's invasion of Asturias, and arrival at Oviedo, should have been received from the Junta of Mondoñedo, if the division in that principality made any resistance; or how the French could at this season have penetrated the passes of the mountains at all, even if the troops were in their posts.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch of the 17th Oct. from the Sec. of State, announcing that certain supplies had been sent to Coruña, which I beg you will issue to the troops under Gen. Abadia.

To Capt. — — —.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

I send you separate answers on the subject of the noblemen, and of the Capitão Mor of Zibreira.

I beg you to take care how you communicate with the Portuguese in the French army. They are in desperate circumstances; and men in those circumstances do any thing, however bad and traitorous.

Don't let any one of them know where you are, on any account; and be particularly cautious that a second individual of them does not discover that you are in correspondence with one of them. Be assured, that those who have betrayed their country are not to be trusted in any manner.

To Senhor José Clementi Pereira.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

I received this morning your letters of the 20th, and I am very much obliged to you for your intelligence, and very well satisfied with all that

you have done. Give such reward as you may think proper to the person who took the letter, and brought the answer from the two noblemen, and I will pay it; and pay likewise to the party of 'El Medico' any expenses they may have incurred, which shall likewise be defrayed by me. Assure the noblemen that they will be well received by me.

Tell the party of 'El Medico,' that if they want ammunition, or any thing that I can give them, and will send means of conveyance here for it, they shall have it.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 18th Nov. this day, and I write to the Admiral to request that he would give you a passage in a man of war.

I have no doubt that Col. — himself inserted in the newspapers the sentence of the General Court Martial, &c., in order to have a pretence for publishing on the subject. This is a regular Jacobin trick. I see also in the *Star* my letter on the business of Barba de Puerco.

I begged Lord FitzRoy Somerset to write to Arbuthnot about leave for your son: I rather thought, from Beresford's letter, that he objected to it, which is the reason that I did not press it.

I was very much obliged to you for the kindness of the letter which you wrote to me on your departure from this part of the world; and I assure you, that I lament the chance which certainly exists that I may never meet you again. I acknowledge, that with this chance before your eyes, I am astonished that you should think, at your time of life, of returning to the East Indies. With the income of your regiment, and on the staff in England or Ireland, or at Gibraltar, or Malta, or Sicily, or in America, you might live with your family. I don't think that any man's family have a right to expect that he should die a few years sooner to put a little more money in their pockets after his death; and I should think that your wife, who, in a pecuniary way, would be the person most interested in your return to the East Indies, would prefer your prolonged life to increase of pounds. After all, I am not certain that increase of pounds would be the result of your voyage there, and I think it very little doubtful, I am sorry to say, that if you do return, it will be in a state of health in which you will be very little capable of any enjoyment.

God bless you, my dear Campbell.

À Don Carlos de España.

Freneda, ce 22 Novembre, 1811.

J'ai reçu il y a deux heures votre lettre d'aujourd'hui; et j'ai envoyé des ordres à nos troupes qui sont dans ces environs de se rassembler demain matin du côté de Guinaldo, El Bodon, Pastores, etc., et celles de l'autre côté de la rivière à Zamarra.

J'irai moi-même à Guinaldo demain ou après demain matin; mais je crois après demain.

Je vous conseille de faire rassembler votre infanterie à San Felices el Grande pour être préparé à passer la rivière, ou à co-opérer avec nos troupes, si nous pouvons passer la rivière au gué de Pastores.

P.S. Je compte que l'ennemi marchera demain, et arrivera dans ces environs le 25. Don Julian fera bien de les observer.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1811.

By some accident I did not receive your letter of the 13th till two days ago, and it was necessary that I should speak to Fletcher before I could send you a satisfactory answer.

When the pontoons came from England, I applied to have with them a number of the artificers belonging to the civil branch of the ordnance; and I understand they have with them a certain number of firemen, &c.; and I intended to make up the establishment when I should want to use them, by requesting your assistance to give us a few Portuguese or English seamen. In addition to what we have, I understand that we are to have a regular pontoon master from the Ordnance; and it would be very desirable, when we shall want to use the pontoons, to have the assistance of about 20 seamen, either English or Portuguese, for whose services I shall be very much obliged.

Unfortunately, we cannot use the pontoons to form a bridge over the Coa and the Agueda. The bridge which I am constructing for the latter river is one upon loaded *chevalets*, which I hope will stand in the ordinary state of the river during the winter. When the great floods come down, we must take up our bridge; and indeed I don't propose to keep it in the river, excepting when I want to use it. I think it not impossible, however, that I may want to use the pontoons before the winter is over.

The A.G. to Capt. Poppleton, Celorico.

23d Nov. 1811.

The enclosed letter having been forwarded from the Deputy Inspector of hospitals, I am directed to desire you will take the usual means, according to the instructions forwarded to your predecessors, for the disposal of the effects, &c., of the deceased men in hospital at Celorico, the necessaries, &c., being directed to be sold by public auction, crediting the amount to the different regiments whom the men belong to, to go to their accounts. The arms, accoutrements, packs, &c., if not required by the regiments on the spot, are to be sent the first opportunity to Coimbra, from thence to be forwarded to Lisbon, to the general stores at Belem, for the above purpose.

To the Bishop of Castello Branco.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th Nov. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose some letters which I have received on the subject on which you did me the honor to write to me; from which it appears that the Commanding officer of the 3d dragoons having already had a communication with you on the subject of the conduct of the soldiers at Ninho de Assor, you had expressed your satisfaction with his explanation, and that you did not intend to complain to me. I am apprehensive, therefore, that the answers to the inquiries which I had made, which answers I enclose, do not relate to the transaction on which you wrote to me. If they do not, or if you are not satisfied with the explanations contained in these answers, I beg you to inform me of it, and I will have the subject inquired into by a Court Martial, before which it will be necessary that the witnesses should attend.

I am inclined to believe that the inhabitants of Ninho de Assor, having been displeased that the party of dragoons should have taken away their forage, misrepresented and made an exaggerated complaint to you. It is very unfortunate that the people of Portugal cannot have the advantage of

the assistance of a large foreign army to defend their country, without incurring some inconvenience. The horses of the cavalry must have forage, paying for the same, or they will die, and this country will derive no advantage from all the expense which has been incurred in bringing them here. It may be inconvenient to some of the inhabitants of Ninho de Assor to supply any part of this forage, even though it is paid for; but they must bear this inconvenience, or they must bear the greater evil of submitting to the French.

I have stated these circumstances to you as they have occurred to me, being, however, determined to maintain the discipline of the army, and not to allow the soldiers to insult the religion, or to injure the property of the inhabitants of the country.

À Don Carlos de España.

À Fuente Guinaldo, ce 25 Nov. 1811.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 24, et je serais bien aise de pouvoir aider les peuples de la Sierra de Francia, si c'était en mon pouvoir.

Il faut que je vous dise cependant que c'est avec la plus grande difficulté que je peux faire subsister les troupes dans les positions qu'elles occupent à présent. Je tire tout des magasins sur la mer. Le pays ne me fournit absolument rien. Les Espagnols ne donnent rien sans qu'on paye argent comptant, malgré qu'ils sachent bien que nous n'avons jamais manqué de payer nos dettes; et quand nous avons de l'argent, et que les Espagnols veulent nous donner quelques provisions, c'est à un prix si énorme, que nous sommes fournis à meilleur marché de la mer, malgré les frais de transport.

Il ne m'est donc pas possible d'étendre mes postes permanens dans la Sierra de Francia, où mes troupes et leurs chevaux mourraient de faim: et je vous dis la vérité quand je vous assure que je ne crois pas que les soldats ou leurs chevaux qui sont à présent à Zamorra aient de quoi manger; parceque les habitans de Saugo, Martiago, Robleda, Zamorra, Atalaya, Serradilla, &c., où nous avons dépensé tant d'argent pendant l'été, ne veulent rien donner à présent sans argent comptant. Il n'est pas facile de prévenir les courses de l'ennemi entre les avant postes des deux armées. Il faudrait étendre les postes de l'armée pour les empêcher définitivement de lever des contributions dans la Sierra de Francia; et comme je vous l'ai expliqué, je ne puis étendre les miens. Sous ce point de vue il est malheureux que les armes, pour lesquelles je vous ai donné les ordres au mois d'Août, ne soient pas encore arrivées, et que vous n'ayez pas de troupes Espagnoles à mettre dans la Sierra, auxquelles les gens du pays peut-être donneraient des vivres.

Il y a une autre raison pour laquelle il ne faudrait pas à présent s'avancer dans la Sierra. Si l'ennemi apprend que nous sommes préparés à empêcher l'entrée du convoi, il ne bougera pas de Salamanca, et nous manquerons un beau coup, qu'il est probable que nous pourrions lui porter. Cependant j'ai écrit au Gén. Craufurd, qui est à Zamorra, pour savoir l'état exact de ses vivres, afin que si je trouve que c'est possible, et qu'il n'y ait pas d'inconvénient à faire une marche sur la Sierra, je puisse lui en donner l'ordre.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Nov. 1811.

I enclose a letter from my brother, which I beg you to forward. I wish you would make the trumpeter give a detailed account of all he knows of Lieut. King's death.

I beg that you will inform the Comte d'Erlon that I had always been disposed to consider the persons belonging to the civil departments of the armies as not liable to be considered as prisoners of war when taken, till I read the correspondence between a Commissioner appointed by His Majesty, and one appointed by the French government, to regulate the exchange of prisoners, in which I see that peers of the realm, and individual travellers of all descriptions, seized in France, and in other countries, when the war commenced, were to be considered as prisoners of war, and to be exchanged as such for French officers and soldiers; that when travellers are considered as prisoners of war, I can't consider the persons belonging to any civil department of the army in any other light; and that I shall not allow one of them to be returned to the French army unless exchanged.

I have no objection to an exchange, either partial or general; but, before I consent to it, I beg to have the names, in writing, of those it is intended to exchange for the prisoners in our possession belonging to the civil departments of the French army.

I have requested Gen. Castaños to inquire into the circumstances of Lieut. King's death.

P.S. Desire Rooke to give the officer who goes in with the next flag of truce a copy of the orders upon this subject.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Nov. 1811.

I have nothing to tell you that is not contained in the enclosed dispatch. If the French had come forward with another convoy on any day after the 24th, I think we should have cut them off. We can't prevent them from making excursions to the Sierra, without occupying it with our posts, and the Spaniards will not support our troops, and I can't support them at such a distance from our magazines. As it is, I can't stay much longer where we are, and I must immediately make another distribution; but I shall remain in this quarter till the winter has fairly set in.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Nov. 1811.

Having received intelligence that the enemy were about to move towards Ciudad Rodrigo with another convoy of provisions, and having heard that a body of troops marched from Salamanca to the Sierra de Francia on the 22d and 23d inst., I ordered our advanced guard across the Agueda to Zamarra, and closed up the cantonments of the army in general, and moved the head quarters to this place. I have reason to believe that the enemy have since retired from the Sierra de Francia; and I think it probable that they will have heard of our movements; and that if they entertained the intention of moving a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, they will now abandon it till the rain shall have again swelled the Agueda. If I should find that they don't move, I propose to send the troops back to their cantonments, or to others in which it will be easy to subsist them.

Since I addressed you on the 20th inst., I have heard that Gen. Blake, having been joined at Valencia by the army of Murcia, under the command of Gen. Mahy, had moved out of Valencia on the 24th Oct., and had attacked Marshal Suchet on the 25th. He was repulsed; and, according to the French accounts, they have taken Gen. Caro and Gen. Loy, and 4500 prisoners, and some cannon. Gen. Blake states, in his proclamation to the people of Valencia, that his retreat had been made in good order. On the 26th, at night, the castle of Saguntum capitulated; and it is stated that Suchet summoned Valencia on the 27th.

The castle of Saguntum has made as brilliant a defence as any that has been made since the commencement of the war in Spain. The enemy made several attempts to obtain possession of it by assault, before they brought up their cannon to attack it regularly; and two attempts to carry it by storm, after the breach was made, previous to the action of the 25th Oct., in both of which, as well as in all the attacks before the breach was made, they were repulsed with considerable loss. The garrison conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry on all these occasions.

I have not heard what passed between the battle of the 25th and the capitulation of the 26th; but, adverting to the good conduct of the garrison, and as the enemy were ill provided with heavy cannon to support their attack, the place would probably have held out, if the action of the 25th Oct. had not been fought and lost. If I am right in this conjecture, the Spaniards will owe the loss of another kingdom, and the allies disadvantages of which the consequences can't be calculated, to the insatiable desire of fighting pitched battles with undisciplined troops, led by inexperienced officers.

By a letter from Sir H. Douglas, of the 14th, I learn that, as I had imagined, the passes of the Asturias were not guarded, and that the enemy turned by La Ventana. The troops which were in the pass of Pajares (the Spanish head quarters) retired to Campomanes. I imagine that the object of the enemy's movement into the Asturias is to disperse the assembly of troops under Gen. Mendizabal in the mountains of Santander, in which I am afraid they will succeed. If they had intended to attack Galicia through the Asturias, they would, from La Ventana, have pressed more vigorously upon the right of the Spanish troops in that principality, and would not have gone to Oviedo in the first instance.

According to the last accounts from Cadiz, Gen. Ballesteros was still at Bornos on the 13th; and I imagine that Gen. Copons and Col. Skerrett were at Casa Vieja. According to accounts from Capt. Everard, of H.M.S. *Sophia*, the enemy, on the 17th, moved a body of troops, consisting of 1500 men, from Conil upon Vejer, which will probably have obliged Col. Skerrett to retire again upon Tarifa.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Nov. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, and the last morning report.

You see that the army does not become much more efficient, notwithstanding that the number of sick upon the return diminishes. We have sent home a great number of men, besides the 29th, 85th, and 97th regts., and some have died: the troops are certainly better, however, but not in

a state to undertake any operation of magnitude. Any movement, and particularly exposure to the night air, throws them into the hospitals again.

The newly arrived dragoons are particularly inefficient, so much so, that I have been obliged to leave them all, the 5 new regiments, in their cantonments, in our recent movement, and have brought forward only the 6 which have been here during the whole service: this shows the advantage of troops inured to climate and service.

À Don Carlos de España.

Fuente Guinaldo, ce 28 Nov. 1811.

Je n'ai pas reçu de nouvelles du détachement de l'ennemi qui est venu à la Sierra depuis qu'il a quitté Alverca. Ce détachement a marché de Salamanca le 22, et est arrivé à Alverca le 24. Le 23, votre Excellence m'a écrit une lettre dans laquelle vous dites m'avoir envoyé un papier avec ces nouvelles. J'ai reçu cette lettre le 23 dans la nuit, mais le papier n'y était pas; et je n'ai rien su de l'ennemi que dans la journée du 24. C'était alors trop tard pour faire quelque chose; et d'ailleurs nous n'avions point de vivres.

Les mêmes difficultés de vivres rendent très important que je remette les troupes tout de suite dans leurs anciens cantonnemens: mais pendant que la rivière donne des gués, je crois que je pourrai empêcher que l'ennemi puisse faire entrer rien à Ciudad Rodrigo, pourvu que premièrement on vous donne avis de la marche du convoi, s'il est possible, un jour avant qu'il ne marche; et que secondement vous m'en donniez avis aussitôt que vous le recevrez.

Je changerai mon quartier général demain à Freneda. J'en donnerai avis à votre officier qui est à Lumbrales; et je ferai changer le relais qui est à présent à Gallegos.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Nov. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 19th, enclosing a regulation for the means of transport, of which I approve, excepting the 2d section of the 6th article. As I explained in my late letters to the government, it is impossible to carry into execution those provisions of any arrangement which are in favor of the owners of transport, unless the army should be sufficiently supplied, and every man should be obliged to bring forward his carriage when required. The 2d section of the 6th article should be struck out of the regulation.

I also think the penalty of non-attendance not sufficient. Half the nation would prefer to be in prison for a fortnight to going to serve with the army with his cart. The penalty of non-attendance should be the full value of the cart and bullocks, which the magistrate should be authorised and required to sell on the spot, and to report that he had done so to the head inspector.

There is likewise another very common crime not adverted to in this regulation, and that is deserting with the stores laden in the cart, after having been received into the service. The punishment for this offence ought to be the forfeiture of the cart and bullocks to the public, payment of the value of the stores, to be levied by sale of house and goods of the

owner of the cart, and banishment for years to the coast of Africa. These punishments may appear severe, but depend upon it that the only chance the people have is, that there should be the means of enforcing this regulation.

There is also another point to be adverted to in this regulation, and that is the duties it enforces upon the magistrates. The magistrates of this country are in a very unfortunate situation. They are originally charged with judicial duties; they had fees by which they gained a livelihood, their salaries being trivial. They gained nothing by the performance of their duties of police; but the bad probably gained something by the omission to perform them.

The confusion which has resulted from the different invasions of the country has almost put an end to the judicial duties of the magistrates; at the same time that the duties of police, particularly those which have relation to the operations of the armies, have been vastly increased, such as the supply of quarters, provisions, means of transport, guides, &c. &c., for which the *Juiz de Fora* is called upon at every moment. The consequence is that the *Juiz de Fora* has much to do, and nothing to live upon; and I hinted some time ago to the government the expediency of taking into consideration their situations during the continuance of the war. I think, however, that this regulation would afford an opportunity of doing something for these magistrates, without any very great additional expense to the public, by authorising them to demand and receive as a fee for every carriage they should produce at the place required the sum of 200 *reis*. This would tend to ensure the execution of the regulation, which is what is required.

I am doing a great deal to lighten the demand for carriages from the country for the service of the British army: 1st; I am building 800: 2dly; I have discovered that the Douro can be made navigable even into Spain, with very little trouble, and I have ordered the necessary work to be performed.

P.S. The regulation, when passed, should be well translated and printed, and let me have several copies of it. I shall take care to enforce it in this army. It should take effect at some short period after it is promulgated.

To Senhor J. C. Oliveira Pimentel.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th Nov. 1811.

Having lately sent an officer of Engineers to survey the Douro from S. João da Pesqueira to Barca d'Alva, he has reported to me that the river is already navigable to that point for large boats, with some inconvenience, and at certain seasons of the year; and that it might be made navigable with convenience at all seasons, by a certain degree of labor. I have given directions to Capt. Ross, of the Royal Engineers, the officer who surveyed the river, to adopt the measures which are necessary to render it navigable; and I beg you to give him such assistance as you can to enable him to perform this service.

Understanding that you have from H.R.H. the Prince Regent the power to destroy the mill dams in the river Douro, which are the principal obstruction to the navigation, I request you to co-operate with Capt. Ross in the performance of this work.

To the Juiz, or other Magistrate of Villa Nova de Foz Coa, Torre de Moncorvo, Freixo de Nemão, and S. João da Pesqueira.
Freneda, 29th Nov. 1811.

I have employed Capt. Ross, of the Royal Engineers, to perform certain works upon the Douro, in order to render the river navigable as high up as possible for the service of the army. I beg you to give him such assistance of workmen, with their tools, as he may require for this work, he paying them their hire. For this you will be responsible.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Campbell, brigade of Guards.

30th Nov. 1811.

As your letter and enclosures of the 28th inst. contained an official communication from Col. —, I laid the whole before his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you, that it is very proper that the officer commanding a brigade, or the officer commanding a regiment, should have from the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the sick men of his brigade or regiment, at any hospital station, all the information he can require; but the officers commanding at hospital stations are, and must be, responsible for the management of the hospital, the conduct of the men at the station, for sending men at the proper periods to join their regiments, and for not sending them too soon. Therefore it is not proper that orders should be sent to that officer, or to any officer or non-commissioned officer at the station, to send away or dispose of any non-commissioned officer or soldier, excepting by orders from head quarters. If non-commissioned officers or soldiers are required from any hospital station, application for them must be made to the Adj. Gen., and the request will be considered. I regret, after my first intimation, that Col. — should have thought it necessary to repeat his orders.

I had the honor of apprising you that an arrangement was making, agreeably to the G.O. of 15th Nov. 1811, to obtain exact lists of all the names of the ward masters and orderlies employed at the several stations; and these, when complete, will be forwarded for the information of the divisions.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1811.

I received at the same time your letters of the 24th and 28th, and by the same post a dispatch from Lord Liverpool, of which I enclose a copy, regarding the troop ships and small transports for the Douro and Mondego; and a letter, of which I enclose an extract, regarding the subject to which yours of the 24th relates: the last is exactly of the same purport with that which you have received from Mr. Yorke. In answer to the last paragraph of your letter of the 24th, I assure you that I shall be very sorry if any change is made in your situation, which is not wished for by yourself.

I shall write to my brother again respecting the employment of the ships of your squadron exclusively in carrying the money from Cadiz for this army.

G. O.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1811.

1. The detachments of the 6th division at work at Almeida, with the exception of the carpenters, smiths, wheelwrights, and sawyers, ordered by the G. O. of the 18th Nov., are to join their corps on the 1st Dec.

2. 180 men, with officers and non-commissioned officers in proportion, from the 1st division, and 180 men, with officers and non-commissioned officers, from Brig. Gen. Harvey's brigade in the 4th division, are to be sent to Almeida to work on the 1st Dec.; and these men are to be relieved every fourth day, according to the orders of the 7th Oct. in respect to the reliefs of the men of the 6th division.

3. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests that 50 masons from the 1st division may be sent to Almeida on the 1st Dec. to relieve the masons of the 4th division, in lieu of the masons belonging to the 6th division, by the G. O. of the 16th Nov.

4. This relief will, till further orders, be made by those numbers of the 1st inst. of the masons of the 6th division.

I observe that you have had some correspondence with Capt. Holloway, of the Engineers, regarding the construction of furnaces for hot shot in the sea batteries of the Tagus. I am desirous that this work should be performed by the Portuguese engineers, as being necessary for the completion of the old works of the country. If I were to allow our engineers to perform any work (not immediately necessary for our own accommodation) in the ancient fortifications of the country, I should have to incur an expense nearly equal to the subsidy, as there is nothing which the Portuguese government would not throw upon us. I have therefore drawn the line as above stated.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 28th Oct. and of the 3d Nov., and I am very much obliged to His Royal Highness for attending to my requests in favor of Brig. Generals Murray, Hulse, Pakenham, and Mackinnon. The arrangement for the rank of the British officers in the Portuguese service was not made according to my opinion, but I am inclined to believe

G. O.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the officers of the army to the sentence of the General Court Martial above published, and to this order; and he repeats that they have no more right to order a cart or any thing else to be embargoed, 'as it is called,' or pressed in this country, than they have in England.

4. The orders of the army are positive upon this subject. If an officer requires a cart or other means of transport, or any article of supply of any description, he is to make a regular application to a Commissary; if there should be no Commissary near, to whom he can conveniently apply, he must make an application to a magistrate in writing; and if the magistrate should refuse or omit to comply with his application, he must report in writing to his superior officer for the information of the Commander of the Forces, and the magistrate will be responsible for his omission to perform his duty, and to supply what is required.

5. The exigence of the service can seldom be of a nature to require that an officer should require to take upon himself to *embargo* or press means of transport or articles of supply, &c. without the intervention of a magistrate; and any officer, who does take upon himself such an authority, will be obliged to prove that the service rendered such an assumption of authority necessary, and that the magistrate to whom he had applied had omitted or refused to perform his duty: he must in that case go himself in command of the party which will be employed to *embargo* or press what is required; and he will in this, as in every other case, be held responsible for the conduct of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers under his command.

6. These orders are rendered necessary by the disgraceful irregularities of which the soldiers are guilty while employed on these duties, by the cruel oppression which they inflict on the inhabitants of the country, and by the misfortunes to themselves which are the consequences of their conduct. In the course of the month of October there were 2 other soldiers killed and 3 wounded, besides corporal ———, of the — regt., who, while employed in *embargoing*, as it is called, carts, committed every description of irregularity, and levied contributions on the people for the release of the same carts which had been pressed under pretence of the necessities of the service. The Commander of the Forces therefore trusts that the officers of the army will aid him in putting an end to this fertile source of these disgraceful irregularities, by a due attention to these orders; and he desires that every officer who marches with a detachment, whether from the army, from Lisbon, or from any other station, may be supplied with a copy of them.

7. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the attention of the officers of the Commissariat to these orders; and he desires that they will understand that they have no more authority to *embargo* or press any thing for the service than any other officer of the army. If they cannot procure what they require by hire or purchase, they must apply to a magistrate; and if the magistrate should refuse or omit to perform his duty, they must make a report in writing, specifying all the circumstances; and if the necessities of the service require that they should proceed on their own authority to press or *embargo* by military force, an officer of the Commissariat must proceed with the party.

it was right. It has worked well, at all events, which is the best test of its soundness; and it requires only a little attention in bringing the troops together, in order to avoid inconvenience from those parts of it which one would wish to be otherwise than they are. Any thing would be better than an alteration at present.

I am obliged to you for attending to our wants of General officers. — did not succeed very well when he was here before, but I dare say he will do so now. I have a high opinion of Gen. Kempt from all that I have heard of him. We have now more than we can well dispose of, particularly if Beckwith comes out again; and there are two with whom we could dispense with advantage, — and —. They are both respectable officers as commanders of regiments, but they are neither of them very fit to take charge of a large body. I understand that — wishes to return home to unite himself with a lady of *easy virtue*; and — has been very ill lately, and I think might be induced to go. I shall try if I can get them away in this manner, as I would not on any account hurt the feelings of either.

The A.G. to Dr. Bolton, Dep. Inspector of hospitals.

2d Dec. 1811.

I herewith enclose a communication I have received from Dr. Franck, and I have the Commander of the Forces' directions to desire you will be pleased to order the arrangement therein suggested to be carried into effect at the several hospitals. With regard to classing the patients under the different heads specified, you will be so good, when this shall have been effected, to send the lists of the men to me, taking care that their names and regiments are specified; and further directions will be sent to you with regard to a definitive arrangement for them.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — dragoon guards.

2d Dec. 1811.

Your letter of the 27th ult. has been submitted to the Commander of the Forces, and I am to acquaint you that his Excellency would be sorry to be obliged to refuse you the accommodation you request: he therefore wishes you would not ask it. Your stay on service has been but short, and private considerations induce you to leave the regiment; and as precedents might be quoted in a very large army, he will not authorise to send a horse transport to carry one horse, or allow a dragoon to go to England. The last, however, is a regimental arrangement, to which, if Col. Ponsonby consents, the Commander of the Forces will not object.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 3d Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 29th, and I concur in your giving the Portuguese government £20,000, or any sum you please. It is well, however, to continue the threat to pay no more till the military chest shall be established.

I desired that 50,000 dollars of the sum recently received from Cadiz should be paid to you.

I shall desire Mr. Bissett to receive the 24,000 dollars for the marine stores sent to Algiers.

I intended to write to you this morning, to recommend that the government should take up my proclamation of April last, as the ground of their proceeding in respect to the concealment of property by the people. This appears to be Nogueira's opinion, and I see that they propose sending me the papers on the subject, so that I shall be able to put the business in such a train as not to create unnecessary alarm.

You will have seen that the Marquez de Valença and the Marquez Ponte de Lima and Col. Vasconcellos went from Guinaldo towards Lisbon some days ago.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of this date. I have received one or two reports of a general movement by the enemy to this quarter with another convoy. They must come before long, or the place will be distressed.

Adm. Berkeley has written to me again upon the employment of the ships of his squadron to carry our money from Cadiz and Gibraltar to Lisbon. As the officers and men of this squadron perform all the duties of the army, it is but fair that they should enjoy any benefit to be derived from the service. At all events, it is not fair that they should perform all the severe and unpleasant duty, and that those of another squadron should enjoy the benefit. On these principles I settled that a ship of the Admiral's squadron should go to Cadiz periodically to bring away the money which Mr. Duff might have for us; but it has frequently happened that it has been sent in one of the vessels of the squadron at Cadiz, even though one of Adm. Berkeley's squadron has been waiting there; and in a recent instance, the Admiral says, that in the order given by —, it was stated that the vessel was sent by your particular desire. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Duff to send this money by the vessel which Adm. Berkeley will send for it periodically. If this should not be done, it would be better that we should not suffer the inconvenience of sending the vessel.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

I received only by the last post your letter of the 3d Oct. Lest it should be imagined that I have any desire that Adm. Berkeley should be relieved, I mention that it is impossible for 2 officers to be on better terms than we are. I have always found the Admiral not only disposed to give us every assistance in his power, but to anticipate and exceed our wishes in this way. I know that the Duke of Richmond and Lord Bathurst are anxious that the Admiral should remain, and I would submit to many inconveniences to gratify them; but it would really be unjust to Adm. Berkeley to say otherwise than that he anticipates all our wishes, and that we go on very well with him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

According to the intention which I communicated to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 27th Nov., I withdrew our advanced guard across the Agueda on the 29th, and again extended the cantonments of the army.

The impossibility of finding subsistence on the spot, and the difficulty of procuring means of transport in Portugal to move forward our maga-

G. O.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

1. The Commanding officer at Lisbon, or the officer commanding any station at which Capt. —, — regt., may happen to be, will be pleased to place that officer under an arrest and send him to join his regiment; he having been several months absent without leave, and having been in Portugal since the 20th Oct. last, without reporting himself, or communicating with his Commanding officer.

zines from the places at which the rivers ceased to be navigable, have obliged me at present to extend the cantonments, particularly of the cavalry, farther than would be expedient on military considerations. But offensive military operations in the present season are almost impracticable, and I hope that I have kept in this neighbourhood a force sufficiently large to prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing.

Don Carlos de España has informed me that he attacked the enemy on the 28th Nov., on their retreat from the Sierra de Francia, between Miranda and Endrinal, with a detachment of Don J. Sanchez' infantry, and a detachment of the regiment '*de la Princesa*.' On their arrival at Endrinal they were attacked by Don J. Sanchez with his cavalry, and were obliged to form in a square.

Don Carlos informs me that the enemy suffered considerable loss, and that his troops got possession of some of the money of which the enemy had plundered the inhabitants of the Sierra de Francia.

Don Carlos de España mentions particularly the conduct of Lieut. W. Reid, of the Royal Engineers, who attended him upon this expedition, having before been employed to perform a service under his directions.

I have received no intelligence either from Galicia or from Cadiz, or from Valencia, since I addressed your Lordship on the 27th Nov. It appears that the troops which have entered Asturias belong to Gen. Bonet's division of the army of the north, which division was employed to observe the army of Galicia at the period at which the army of the north and the '*Armée de Portugal*' were collected in September for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

I enclose the last morning reports. The cold weather has occasioned an increase of deaths in the hospitals lately; this was to be expected; but I have not heard of any bad description of sickness.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

I have a report that Suchet has suffered severely by a sortie from Valencia, and by an attack upon him from the Valencian peasantry, and had been obliged to retire upon Murviedro. Reports of this description have generally been the forerunner of accounts of some serious disaster to the Spaniards, and I am very apprehensive that Valencia is lost.

The loss of this place is of great importance; the greater number of the Grandes of Spain have estates in Valencia, upon the revenues of which they have subsisted since they have lost every thing elsewhere. It may be expected, therefore, that the loss of this kingdom will induce many to wish to submit to the French yoke. The probability that the fall of Valencia would immediately follow the loss of Tarragona, was the cause of the ferment at Cadiz in the commencement of the last summer. This ferment was directed against us, and the failure of the operations in which we had been engaged was stated to be the cause of it; but as the fall of Badajoz, which was certainly the most fatal event of the war, created no impression at Cadiz, notwithstanding that it was the result of treachery, it cannot be believed that the failure in retaking it was the

cause of the ferment at Cadiz, in the summer. It was the fall of Tarragona, which having opened the road to the remaining estates of the Grandees, created a wish to submit among this order and their adherents; and as this misfortune could not by any misrepresentation be attributed to the English, the attention of the public was turned with great dexterity to the operations in which they had not succeeded.

We may expect a similar ferment on the present occasion, and a more general inclination at Cadiz to submit to the French; but this is not the only view in which the loss of Valencia is a misfortune. I am afraid that, although Blake has found no resources in that province, that his army was starving, and that he could get no money to buy the provisions which were expected in the port, excepting by loans raised upon the credit of Mr. Tupper, my brother's agent there, the French will find in Valencia the resources of money and provisions of which they stand so much in need.

There is also another view in which the loss of Valencia is a serious misfortune, and that is, that this conquest, unlike the others which the enemy have made in Spain, will promote the concentration of their forces. Even if Suchet should not be able to press on farther to the southward than Valencia, and Soult should not be able to extend his troops so as to communicate with Suchet through Murcia, Suchet will be able to communicate, by a shorter route than he had, with the army of the centre and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and with the troops in Castille; he will be on the back of the Empecinado, Mina, and others, and will cut off the supplies which they have received through Valencia.

If the people of Valencia should submit as soon as the military force in the kingdom will be subdued, which, from what I hear of them, I think probable, Suchet's force will then be disposable on the left of Soult, or to support the army of the north and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' more immediately opposed to us.*

However, notwithstanding this misfortune, if it should have occurred, and its probable consequences, I don't despair of the result of the contest. Buonaparte is still far from making the conquest even of that part of the Peninsula of which he has the military possession, and the people of the country are still disposed to resist whenever they see a prospect of advantage: we shall soon find new modes of communicating with, and supplying, the guerrillas, even if the old should be cut off; and, in truth, the devastation which attends the progress of the enemy's arms, and is the consequence of their continuance in any part of the country, is our best friend, and will in the end bring the contest to a conclusion.

The whole country between Madrid and the Alentejo is now a desert, and a still smaller proportion of the land has been cultivated this winter. The argument of the people of the country is, that it is better to rob than to sow and have the produce of their harvests taken from them; and the French begin to find that they cannot keep their large armies together for any operation that will take time, and that when we can reach them they can do nothing with small bodies.

The misfortune is that we experience nearly the same difficulties; we cannot venture to undertake any thing with a small body, and a large

* See Appendix, No. XV.

body would starve. But we have advantages in the Peninsula which the French cannot enjoy; we have possession of all the navigable rivers, of which we make use to convey our supplies, as far as they will carry, and the naval power of Great Britain protects the arrival of these supplies, and the formation of our magazines on the coast. It is true that the rivers carry only to a certain distance from the coast, and we have hitherto been able to supply ourselves with difficulty on the frontiers of Portugal; but I have now in hand various measures to increase our means, and to enable us to establish ourselves still farther in the country, whatever may be the state of the local resources; one of these is to render the Douro navigable up to the junction of the Agueda, which I hope to effect in a short time.

Besides this, I hope to be able to report to your Lordship, in the course of next month, that Almeida is re-established as a military post. I found, upon examination, that Sir B. Spencer's explosion had not done so much damage as he had supposed, and indeed the injury was almost confined to the dispersion of the people collected to repair the damages done by Brenier, and to the delay, till I had again examined the place, of all measures to re-establish it.

The financial arrangements, which I hope will soon be carried into execution at Lisbon, will likewise improve our situation, and increase our resources for a forward operation. However well inclined the Spaniards are, they will give nothing without payment in ready money; and when I assembled the troops some days ago, we should soon have suffered distress if I had not separated them again, because we had no ready money; and the Spaniards, as usual, would give nothing except for ready money payments.

The object of our arrangements at Lisbon is to increase the value, raise the credit, and of course promote the circulation of the Portuguese paper. This measure will enable us to use it in our payments at Lisbon, and in the lower parts of Portugal; and we shall have for our expenses on the frontier a great part of the specie which was before expended in these payments. To this add, that the improvement in the value of the paper will reduce the money price of all the articles which we purchase in Portugal. Our situation is improving, therefore; and whatever may be the fate of Valencia, if the Spanish nation still hold out, I think they may yet be saved.

To ———.

Head Quarters, 5th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 23d Nov., and I enclose the duplicate of one which I wrote to a person who made me a communication respecting you some days ago. You appear to have written your letter of the 23d Nov. under a misapprehension. You think that the government are inclined to pardon you: so far from it, that if they can catch you, or have you caught, you will be hanged; and I therefore recommend you to keep out of the way, and to take care of yourself. In the enclosed letter I have stated the only means by which you can hope to receive a pardon for your crimes; and I can undertake to solicit your pardon on no other terms.

In order to comply with these terms, and to perform the service which I require from you, it is not necessary to put you in communication with any of the persons you mention. You have only to send your letters to the advanced posts of this army, and there is no occasion for any answer from me. I must tell you, however, that if I were to attempt to put you in communication with the Spanish officers you mention, such is their well founded detestation and mistrust of every Portuguese who has any thing to say to the French, that, notwithstanding their confidence in me, they would refuse to comply with my proposition.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 5th Dec. 1811.

I shall not move Byng from his brigade if I can help it; but we have many General officers coming out, all of whom will require commands.

I have orders to complete the 1st batt. 39th regt. to 1200 R. and F., by drafts from the 2d batt., and to send the latter home. I was actually writing you the orders to make this arrangement, when I received your letter announcing that the ophthalmia prevailed in the 1st batt.; but when they recover so far as to induce you to think that you can mix them with the other troops without danger of infection, I request you to carry these orders into execution. Let me know when you do so, that I may give out the orders.

You will do well to open all the letters coming to me from Austin.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Freneda, 5th Dec. 1811.

I was in hopes that I should have had the advantage of your assistance in this country, and I had intended to request you to take the command of the 7th division of infantry, when I thought that Gen. Macfarlane was coming likewise; and of the 6th division, when I found that he was destined for Sicily.

I was concerned to find, by your letter of the 16th Nov., which I received this day, that Lord W. Bentinck had desired to have your assistance likewise in Sicily; and as the Commander in Chief has permitted me to allow you to go there, and it appears by your letter that you are desirous of joining Lord W. Bentinck, I can't bring myself to detain you, notwithstanding that I am much in want of your assistance. I am not aware of Lord William's objects in Sicily, but if you should think it desirable to return to this country, I shall be happy to have your assistance.

I beg to be kindly remembered to Mrs. Clinton, if she should be with you.

The A.G. to Major Sturgeon, Royal Staff Corps, Almeida.

5th Dec. 1811.

In reply to your letter, enclosing a crime against ———, private, — regt., I have to acquaint you that it is his Excellency's pleasure that he, as well as the other soldiers who may have misconducted themselves, should be tried by a line Court Martial at Almeida; and so soon as the sentence shall be approved of, the same being to be submitted to head quarters to be confirmed, the Provost Marshal shall proceed to Almeida, to have the punishment inflicted before the working parties.

I have ordered back the prisoner and the two soldiers you sent in here, and I

enclose a letter to the senior officer of the working parties, to assemble and try the prisoners brought forward, directing him to report to me when the trials are over, enclosing the proceedings.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 2d. I propose that those for whose use the carts are hired, shall pay the fee of 200 *reis* to the magistrate for producing them; and I shall authorise the Commissaries, and others of the British army, to charge this fee in their accounts (properly vouched), by the same G. O. in which I shall publish the regulation of the government.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lord Liverpool, in answer to one which I wrote to him upon the effect produced upon the circulation of Portugal by the state of our affairs with America, and upon the remedy which I proposed in case those affairs should continue as they now are. From the statement in this letter, you will see that the harvest in Great Britain has been so little favorable that Portugal can't expect any supply of corn from thence. It will therefore be desirable that you should take your measures in time to keep this country supplied from the Mediterranean and from America till the next harvest.

We have always in store for our army 3 months' provisions, and I am about to order the Commissary Gen. immediately to make arrangements to get a supply for 3 months more, independently of what he may get from England.

The supply of the Portuguese army is not so important as that of the nation; and I am afraid we must submit to a drain of specie for that object. But the rise in the value of paper, and its increased circulation, owing to the financial measures, which ought not to be delayed, will, I hope, enable us to afford this expenditure of specie.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 18th and 21st ult., Nos. 12 and 13.

In regard to the first, I beg you to observe, that before the allies are called upon to protect the guerrillas by retaliating upon the enemy the injuries they do to those who are prisoners, it is proper that the Spanish

G. O.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces has received frequent complaints from officers, as well of the Portuguese as of the British army, belonging to the civil as well as the military department, and to the regiments, of the uncivil and, in various instances, insulting language in which some of the communications in writing with each other are carried on. It is impossible that the service should not suffer, if those who are to assist each other do not agree; and it cannot be expected that they should agree, if harsh, uncivil, and insulting terms are used in their necessary communications.

3. The Commander of the Forces is unwilling now to take further notice of this subject, or to draw the attention of the army to those complained of.

4. The Commander of the Forces has likewise, upon more than one occasion, received complaints of the disgraceful conduct of British officers towards the Portuguese authorities, particularly the commanders of forts, and in provinces. He trusts that this has proceeded from inexperience; but he desires that an officer in the Portuguese service, in command, may be treated in every respect as an officer in His Majesty's service in command. All officers and others belonging to the British army, passing through the limits of his command and the place of his residence, are to wait upon him, and acquaint him with the nature of the service or business on which they are going.

government and the regular Spanish armies should protect them; and that the several guerrilla parties should protect each other.

We have frequently heard of declarations that injuries should be retaliated; and but few instances of those declarations being carried into execution, notwithstanding that the French murder the Spanish prisoners every day. When the Spanish government and armies shall take up this subject as they ought, it will rest with the British government (not me) to determine whether they will enter into this system of retaliation in favor of the Spaniards.

In answer to your second letter, I concur with you in opinion that the Spaniards gave but little opposition to the entry of the enemy into Asturias. Then they call upon me to make a movement for their relief. I am perfectly aware of the advantage which the enemy derive from their position in the Asturias; but no movement which I could make could relieve that province, supposing that I could make a movement. Bonet's division, by which the Asturias has been occupied, was never brought against this army. That division observed the army of Galicia while the army of the north came to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. 'Till the army of Galicia shall be capable of moving, Bonet's division is equally well situated for observing the army of Galicia in Asturias as in Leon; and no movement which I could make could induce that division to leave the Asturias.

But it is impossible for me to move more forward than I am at present. The Spaniards invariably forget that a large army must be supplied; and although they cry out loudly for assistance, they invariably refuse and omit to supply with provisions those who go to give it to them; which same provisions are afterwards forced from them by the enemy. The British army are therefore necessarily obliged to subsist on their magazines on the rivers; and they can't communicate with their magazines at a greater distance from them than they are at present.

To B. Sydenham, Esq.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

* * * * *

I am writing without much detailed knowledge upon this subject; at the same time, I write in hopes that my reflections and suggestions may be of use.

In regard to other points, I hope that the blow will not be struck too soon; and that the Sovereigns of Europe, and all who are determined to resist Buonaparte, will enter into the plan with a determination to persevere until they put an end to the system of making war as a financial resource; that they won't proceed according to the old plan of sacrificing a part to save the remainder, but will one and all persevere to the last, and either save all or lose all; with an entire conviction that the *remainder*, as it is called, will, in the course of events, be taken from them, if they should cease to resist. I have given the Duke of Brunswick a lesson on this subject, which will not be useless if he has any communication with the Continent.

But the principal point on which I wished to write to you is the disposal of this army, supposing that there should be a general breeze in Europe. I think that you have miscalculated the means and resources

of France in men, and mistaken the objects of the French government in imagining that, under those circumstances, Buonaparte will be obliged or inclined to withdraw his army from Spain. He will not even reduce it considerably, but he will only not reinforce it. If I am right, the British army cannot be so advantageously employed as in the Peninsula. Of that, I trust, there is no doubt. If the British army is not employed in the Peninsula, that part of the world would soon be conquered; and the army which would have achieved its conquest, reinforced by the levies in the Peninsula, would reduce to subjugation the rest of the world. But that is not exactly the view which you have taken of the subject. You appear to think it probable that Buonaparte would be inclined or obliged to withdraw from the Peninsula; and you ask, what would I do in that case? I answer, attack the most vulnerable frontier of France, that of the Pyrenees. Oblige the French to maintain in that quarter 200,000 men for their defence; touch them vitally there, when it will certainly be impossible to touch them elsewhere, and form the nations of the Peninsula into soldiers, who would be allies of Great Britain for centuries.

I acknowledge that this task would not be an easy one. But the difficulties are not insurmountable; and I think it is possible, with our maritime resources, to form and maintain an army in the Pyrenees.

But there is another view of this question; and that is, what shall we do with this army if we don't employ it in the Peninsula? Government must first begin by understanding clearly that they cannot have this army in any part of the north of Europe, or in the Adriatic, in a state fit for service in less than 6 months after the resolution to alter its destination shall be passed in the Cabinet. Who can foresee the events of 6 months in these days? Who can depend upon his own foresight? But there is another consideration to be adverted to. I have a gross 50,000 men, but I have never had 35,000 fit for duty in the field. But I will suppose that government could reckon upon 40,000 British troops. These could not act separately in Germany, or in the north of Europe: they must be attached to some other army, of which no power in Europe would give the British government the command. Could the British government leave its army at the disposal of Prussia, Russia, or Austria, or of the insurgents in the north of Europe? Then comes the question of supplies. The British army must be well supplied, and might and would be well supplied in the north of Europe. But it would soon be found that the foreign army to which it should be attached must be supplied likewise. Would the British government be prepared to defray the expense of both? If they could not, the British army would starve equally with the foreign army; and what would the British public say to this?

I believe that the Court and head quarters of the army are very desirous of changing the seat of our operations, for reasons into which it is not now necessary to enter. Not so the public. But our ministers may depend upon it that they cannot establish any where such a system as they have here; that they cannot any where keep in check so large a proportion of Buonaparte's army, with such small comparative British means; that they cannot any where be principals, and carry on the war upon their own responsibility, at so cheap a rate of men and means as they can here; that

no seat of operations holds out such prospects of success, whatever may happen elsewhere, even for the attainment of those objects which would be in view in transferring the seat of the war to the north of Europe.

To the Magistrate of the Town of —.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

Complaints have been made to me that the soldiers of the cavalry sell their clothes, arms, and accoutrements, and the forage for their horses, to the inhabitants of the town of —, to obtain money to purchase wine. I have given directions that those guilty of these practices may be punished; but as there would be no sellers if there were no purchasers, I beg you to give notice to the inhabitants of the town and district of —, that if any thing belonging to a soldier of the British army is found in the possession of any one of them, the person will be sent to my head quarters, in order to be brought to trial before the Special Commission, and punished.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that a duel was fought on the 11th Nov. last, by Capt. * * * * and Capt. —, of the — regt., in which the former received a wound, of which he has since died. The duel was fought within the Portuguese territory.

I request you to lay the enclosed papers on the subject before the Portuguese government, and to inform them that Capt. — is in close arrest, and that he shall be given up to stand his trial when the government of the country shall think proper to ask for him.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

I am very much in want of such officers as Gen. Clinton and Gen. Macfarlane. One of our divisions is in itself a complete army, composed of British and foreign troops, artillery, departments, &c.; and it requires some discretion and sense to manage such a concern. But when Lord W. Bentinck expresses a wish to have the assistance of those officers for the conduct of such a business as I imagine he has in hand (for I don't know what it is), I could not think of detaining for a moment Gen. Clinton, respecting whom His Royal Highness left me an option.

Accordingly, having received a letter from Gen. Clinton by the same post with yours of the 17th, expressing his wish to proceed to Sicily, I wrote him the answer of which I enclose the copy, giving my consent to his going there.

I have given leave to Sir W. Erskine to go home to lease his estate; and Gen. Cole wants to go, and will go before long. Murray also, I am sorry to say, is desirous of going for a short time. All that I am afraid of is, that on some fine day I shall be found with this large army, without the assistance which is necessary to conduct it. However, I must do my best.

I propose to place Gen. Tilson under Gen. Hill. The 6th and 7th divisions are without Commanding officers, and the 4th will be equally destitute when Gen. Cole shall go. The cavalry with Gen. Hill is under Major Gen. Long. When I say that the 7th division is without a Commanding officer, I ought to add, that I am perfectly satisfied with Alten,

who is now the senior, and indeed the only General officer with that division. But no business can be well conducted by any body who is to conduct it only for a time. The 6th division is commanded by Major Gen. Burne, and the 4th will be commanded by Major Gen. Kemmis, when Gen. Cole shall go.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing demands of the Portuguese government against ———, and ———, late of the Lusitanian Legion.

I proposed, for your Lordship's decision, in my dispatch of the 13th Nov. 1811, a mode of settling the demand against ———; and I request to have your Lordship's decision on that subject, and on the demand against ———.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Graham, 1st division.

7th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th inst., and enclosures from Major Gen. H. Campbell and Col. Fuller, which have been submitted to the Commander of the Forces; and I am to acquaint you that as soon as Lieut. Col. Woodford joins the battalion, his Excellency will permit Lieut. Col. ——— to proceed to England.

His Excellency has always been desirous of carrying into execution the regimental orders issued in London by the Colonels of the Guards, but he conceives it is necessary likewise to pay attention to His Majesty's orders. According to these, an officer, who is promoted or removed by the course of service, from a battalion abroad to a battalion at home, is not to be allowed to quit the battalion abroad till the officer relieving him joins it. The desire that Lieut. Col. ——— should return to England has always been stated as a matter of regimental arrangement, which, as has been above pointed out, is not consistent with His Majesty's regulations on this head of service. If, however, it is essential for Lieut. Col. ———'s business, and that he wishes to go, his Excellency, taking into consideration that Col. Woodford is arrived at Lisbon, will not object to it.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 8th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 4th, and I am happy to find that the revenue holds out. I am convinced that, if the government works in earnest, we shall soon have it in a very prosperous state.

I observe that the marine cost, last month, above 500 *contos*. Surely this expense is now useless. It would be better to apply the money to pay the ransom to the Dey, and to get rid of the necessity of maintaining a navy, and of incurring this expense.

I don't know what to do with the 15,000 dollars which the committee for the charities have sent to me. 1st; Mr. Briscall, whom I charged with making inquiries, has been taken ill, and is gone to Lisbon. 2dly; I find that the rich persons, in easy circumstances, and the poor, are equally desirous, and claim a right, to partake of the charity. The curates in the villages, who are the legitimate sources of intelligence regarding the wants of individuals, declare that they are afraid to omit the names of any in a list of persons distressed by the war. They say that the rich and powerful insist upon sharing with others; and the curate of this very village says that a legacy of corn came into his hands, to be distributed to the poor of the village, in which rich and all insisted upon sharing alike.

I acknowledge that this has given me a very bad opinion of the Portu-

guess; and if I can't devise some mode of finding out who are the really distressed, I shall send the money back, with the exception of 200 dollars, which I have given to Gen. Pack to lay out for the poor people of Freixo, Azinhal, &c. Up to this moment, the people have suffered but little. They gain a good deal of money by performing little services for the troops; and there is a market in every village in which they are cantoned. This is better for the people than millions in charity.

I see in the newspapers that the Bishop of Guarda has reckoned every person in his diocese as distressed, in the same manner as my curates; and he calculates the assistance which each can receive, out of the money placed in his hands, at 5 *reis*, which is about a farthing! I am thoroughly convinced that there are 5 persons out of 10 in his diocese, who are richer

G. O.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces observes, by the returns which he has lately examined of the means of transport attached to the several divisions to convey to them supplies, that some are attached to regimental or divisional hospitals, that others are attached to regiments, others posted for the purpose of keeping up the communications of the divisions; all of which distributions diminish the means in the hands of the Commissaries to supply the troops, and are very inconvenient to the service.

2. When it is necessary that soldiers should be removed to the hospitals, and that the roads are of a description that the spring waggons cannot be used, the mules returning to the magazines for supplies must be employed to carry them to the hospitals, which have been stationed on the roads to the magazines with a view to this convenience.

3. A regiment can have no service for mules which is not provided for by the G. O. of the army.

4. The communications of the several divisions with head quarters are provided for by the arrangements of the Q. M. G.: the internal communications of the divisions must be carried on by men on foot, unless on extraordinary occasions; to provide for which, orderlies of the cavalry have been attached to the General officers commanding divisions, besides the officers of their staff.

5. Under these circumstances the Commander of the Forces requests, that all the mules employed in any manner, except in carrying supplies from the magazines, or in the carriage of ammunition, may be returned to those services.

6. If the General officer commanding a division finds it necessary to order that the means of transport attached to the brigades under his command should be employed in any manner different from that for which they are provided, he is requested to report it.

7. Notwithstanding that every brigade in the army is provided with the means of transport sufficient for the supply of the officers and troops with bread and forage, it is possible that, owing to the great distance of the magazines, and the accidents to which the transport of stores is liable, the supply of corn for the horses and mules attached to the infantry in particular may at times fail.

8. There are substitutes, however, to be provided in the country, which will keep these animals in condition, even though they should not be regularly supplied with corn; and having ascertained the price of a ration of corn, before any expense of transport is incurred, the Commander of the Forces has directed, that from the 1st Dec. to the 1st March the officers of the infantry of the army, and of the staff of the infantry, may receive 280 *reis* for each horse for every day the horses receive no corn from the Commissariat, and 140 *reis* for each mule for every day their mules receive no corn.

9. No officer is to draw for more than he actually keeps.

10. The charges on this account will be paid monthly, or as soon after as possible, by the Assist. Commissaries attached to the brigade. The bills for them must be made out for each day, and the Commanding officer of the regiment must certify that the officers for whose horses and mules the charges have been made, have, to the best of his knowledge, received no corn from the Commissariat on that day, and none from any other source for which a charge can come against the public. The certificate must be countersigned by the quarter master of the regiment, and by the Assist. Commissary attached to the brigade.

11. The officers of the army will understand that the efforts made to supply corn to the regimental horses and mules will not be discontinued, and the expenses incurred for that object will not cease, notwithstanding that this allowance is granted.

12. The Commander of the Forces hopes that these efforts will be more successful hereafter than they have been, and this allowance is given only to enable the officers during the winter to provide a substitute in case they should fail.

in money at this moment than they were in the year 1808. Their houses are probably not in such good repair, their furniture not so good or so plentiful, nor their stores so full of corn, wine, oil, and garlic, as they were then; but there is no want of money.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 6th.

I am very sorry to say that I differ from the government on all their measures of finance; and I am much afraid that they will not only defeat their own objects, but will entirely prevent me from deriving any advantage from those measures in the British finance in this country.

The first measure goes to perpetuate the circulation of fictitious paper. Is it intended that all the circulating paper money shall have the stamp of all the subordinate officers, or of one only? If of all, then the paper must circulate through all the offices before it can be worth any thing; if of one only, then it is in the power of any office to circulate any fictitious paper they please.

The *Portaria*, mentioned as the second measure, will be just as inoperative as the ancient law, if the intrinsic value of the paper, or, in other words, the credit of the government, is not improved by the measures which they will now adopt.

The third measure is not fit to be considered by a government, and shall not have one moment of my consideration. The government that jobs in stock on its own account can never acquire credit!

The fourth measure goes to debase the copper coinage. Let the copper be issued at its value, and be exchanged for paper at the regular rate of exchange, and there will be no difficulty in making it current. The measure of issuing it at a depreciated rate in respect to other coins for paper, can have the effect of raising the value of paper only for a moment.

The fifth measure will be good in 8 months hence; that is to say, in about 10 months after I had recommended it, and after the Prince had ordered it to be adopted.

If it is proper and right to pay the interest on paper money, why not pay it from the 1st July? Who will believe that the interest will be paid on the 1st June, 1812? Not I, certainly: and if the government don't adopt some serious steps to raise the credit of this paper, I have in contemplation a measure which will destroy the whole fabric at once; and that is, to give orders that it may not be received in payment for bills upon England. Why should the British army support the credit of a paper for which the government will do nothing? I had lately nearly £500,000 in this paper: that is to say, a large proportion of the whole; but unless its credit is raised, that shall never again happen.

In regard to the sixth measure, I protest against the whole of it, excepting that part to pay the interest on *Apolices* from the 1st July. I object entirely to the creation of new paper or new funds, before the old paper is provided for. As for the scheme of discriminating between the old holders and new purchasers of *Apolices*, and of canvassing the prices paid for *Apolices*, it is the most wild and extravagant, the least practicable.

the most unjust, and most inconsistent with the principles of financial policy, that has ever yet come under my view.

I beg the government to advert to my first letter to them on the 3d Oct., on the subject of the interest on paper money, which is the foundation of all their proceedings on this subject. I repeat, that unless they can improve the credit of the circulating medium in Portugal, Great Britain can't maintain the contest in the Peninsula, not for want of means, because, thank God! Great Britain was never in so prosperous a state; but because the state of the world will not allow her to procure a sufficient quantity of specie.

If Great Britain should be obliged to withdraw from the contest, or if I should think proper to adopt the measure which I have above pointed out in regard to paper money, (and I must adopt some measure of the kind, if the circulating value of the paper money is not improved,) what will become of their fine spun and stock jobbing theories for the improvement of their credit?

I can give no opinion respecting the taxes on the farmers, till I know exactly what they are. Generally speaking, it is a gross error to believe that the country is so much distressed as is stated. I would also observe upon all Principal Sousa's plans, that they are drawn with a view to a state of peace. Portugal is at war, and must be at war; and great sacrifices must be made, and every nerve and resource must be strained, to carry the country through its difficulties. It will afterwards be time to think of improvements. This is the only country in the world which, having such an enemy to oppose, and such a cause to fight for, would think of leaving any resource unapplied to the purposes of war.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 27th Nov.

The result of Gen. Ballesteros' expedition could not be different from what it has been. He advanced without plan or object, and without force sufficient to effect any thing important. He was necessarily obliged to retire as soon as a sufficient force was brought against him; and in the mean time, his own and the British troops have suffered from the privations to which they have been liable, and exposure to the weather at this season of the year.

It is a mistake to suppose that these sufferings, and the consequent deficiency of numbers, are confined to our troops. Our officers are not yet brought to consider these evils with indifference; and the trouble which the care of the sick of the British army brings upon our officers, draws their attention to the diminution of the numbers of the British troops, while no care being taken of the sick of the Spanish army, the officers know nothing about them; and although we don't hear so much of sickness, and of diminution of numbers, from the Spanish officers, it may be depended upon, that no men can bear hunger and fatigue, and the exposure to wet and cold in this season of the year, without suffering from it; that all suffer equally, probably those most who are the least clothed, and have been least fed and taken care of before.

I am concerned to observe that Col. Skerrett attributes the necessity for

the retreat of Gen. Ballesteros and himself in the end of November, to Gen. Hill's return to his cantonments in the end of October. We, in this part of the Peninsula, have never had any knowledge of the plan or object of, or the means for Gen. Ballesteros' operations; and Gen. Hill's expedition was planned without any reference to what was passing in the bay of Gibraltar. Gen. Hill had an object which he executed, and then returned to his cantonments according to the orders he received. These orders were given, because it was known that Gen. Hill could not stay any longer without uselessly exposing his troops to the wants and hardships of which Col. Skerrett complains, and which are inseparable from all operations in the Peninsula, particularly in Spain. Although we may be blamed for the necessity of the late retreat of Gen. Ballesteros, &c., it is certainly true that Gen. Daricau's detachment has arrived in Estremadura, and that there are more of the enemy's troops now in that province south of the Guadiana, than there were when Gen. Hill withdrew from Merida. So far, it will be admitted, that since Gen. Hill's operation, some troops have been removed from Andalusia; and certainly none have returned thither. I have thought it proper to advert to these opinions, which, as usual, will be used as topics of abuse against the British government, in order to make known to you these matters of fact, as an answer to them.

Mr. Wellesley has stated to me that it was possible that the Spanish government might require the assistance of 800 or 1000 men to garrison Carthage. Adverting to the importance of this place as a naval station, I have taken upon myself to allow that number of men to proceed to Carthage, till the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent can be known. Accordingly, if Mr. Wellesley should desire it, I request you to send thither the 2d batt. 67th regt., and the battalion of foreign detachments, or, in lieu of the latter, 5 companies of the regiment 'de Watteville,' if it should be your opinion that they are more to be depended upon than the battalion of foreign detachments. You will also send there one captain and 2 subalterns of engineers and one company of artillery.

Col. Lambert* is to go in command of these troops, till I can relieve him by the arrival of a General officer in this country. You will send with them an officer of the commissariat, and a sufficient number of officers of the medical department, supplied with medicines: but until further orders these troops are to be considered as a detachment from the garrison of Cadiz.

I enclose a copy of the instructions† which I gave to the detachment which was sent from this army to Cadiz, which must be the guide for the troops at Carthage, as far as they may be applicable. I wish that it should be stipulated that the British detachment should occupy the castle on the height at the entrance of the harbour, as being the most important position, that from which it is most easy to communicate with the sea, and the most healthy situation.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Lambert, G.C.B.

† See letter to B. Frere, Esq., Torres Vedras, 5th Feb. 1810, vol. iii. p. 726; and letter to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, Viseu, 27th Feb. 1810, vol. iii. p. 748.

I beg that the officers of the engineers and artillery may immediately be employed to make out and send me plans and descriptions of the place, returns of the ordnance, ammunition, and stores which it contains, and accounts of its capacity for defence. I request that the attention of the senior officer of engineers may be turned in particular to the height on the right of the entrance of the harbour; and that he will report whether that height can be occupied by field works in such a manner as to be tenable; and particularly, whether from that height it is practicable to have a secure communication with the harbour.

I likewise wish the same circumstance to be reported in regard to the fort on the height on the left of the entrance of the harbour; and the nature of the communication between the two, the breadth of the harbour to be passed, the means of passing, &c.

The attention of the medical department must be turned to the state of the health of the existing garrison and of the inhabitants of Carthage; and if the yellow fever should still prevail there, Col. Lambert must not land. The medical gentlemen must report on the nature of that disease, whether it is practicable by any precautions, such as burning infectious clothes, &c., to prevent its return in the next hot season, or to mitigate or guard against its effects. They will particularly advert to the situation of the fort which I wish the British troops to occupy, and will see whether it would be possible to prevent the communication between that fort and the town, so as to prevent infection.

If Col. Lambert should find the place attacked when he shall arrive there, he will decide to land or not, according to his view of the chances which may exist that the assistance of the detachment under his command may save the place, if there should be provisions and ammunition sufficient to last during the siege. He will likewise advert to the possibility of embarking; and, if it should be practicable, he will embark his detachment before the place shall capitulate, supposing it to be reduced to such an extremity. But if he should be of opinion, on his arrival, that the assistance of his detachment may save the place, he is not to be prevented from landing to aid in its defence by a notion of the possibility that he may not be able to re-embark. In that case he will endeavor to prevail with the governor to send away the most valuable ship timber and naval stores in the transports which will take his detachment; but if he should not succeed, or if it should be impracticable to embark those stores, he will insist with the governor, before he will land, as a condition on which alone he can land, that before the governor shall enter into any terms of capitulation with the enemy, or before he shall stand a storm, all the ship timber and naval stores, ships, craft, &c., in the place or harbour, shall be burnt.

Mr. Wellesley will give Col. Lambert the necessary letters to the governor of Carthage.

The troops must take with them 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, besides 60 rounds per man in their pouches.

To Dom M. Forjaz.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 29th Nov., regarding the mistake

which appears to have occurred in England in respect to the grant of the favors of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal to Brig. Gen. Wilson, the governor of the province of Minho.

As a British subject, Brig. Gen. Wilson could not accept the honor conferred upon him by His Royal Highness, excepting by the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland, in the name and on behalf of His Majesty; and I applied for this permission for him in a dispatch to the Sec. of State, dated the 30th Oct., being convinced, as well from the communication I had with that officer, as from the communication I had with the Governors of the Kingdom, that His Royal Highness intended to confer upon him that mark of his favor.

It is possible that His Royal Highness had likewise conferred upon Sir R. Wilson the same mark of his favor; and that knowing that he was not in Portugal, His Royal Highness did not communicate that circumstance to the Governors of the Kingdom. It might have been made known to Sir R. Wilson through his Royal Highness' Ambassador at the Court of London; and Sir R. Wilson might have obtained by personal application the permission of his own Sovereign to accept it. It is not improbable, however, that a mistake has been made in the names of the two individuals; that the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Great Britain for myself and others to accept these honors and distinctions, has been published in the '*London Gazette*' in consequence of some communication to the British government, besides those which I addressed to the Sec. of State in my own case, that of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, Conde de Trancoso, that of Brig. Gen. Trant, and that of Brig. Gen. Wilson, to all of which I have received answers, excepting the last.

Under these circumstances, it appears to me desirable that the Governors of the Kingdom should have an explanation with His Royal Highness' Ambassador at the Court of London upon this subject; and I entertain no doubt that H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal intended to confer this honor upon Brig. Gen. Wilson, the governor of Minho. I propose to address the Sec. of State upon the subject.

In regard to Marshal Sir W. Beresford, Conde de Trancoso's letter, it is proper that it should be transmitted to be laid before H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 27th, and since, those of the 18th and 30th. I believe Gen. Cooke is right in allowing Col. Skerrett to remain at Tarifa, under the circumstance which existed in the end of last month. But I don't know what the plan of the Spaniards is, and what they are about. They appear inclined to throw upon us the burthen of occupying and supplying with provisions all the places to the southward, while they are to keep the command of them; and we are to depend for the safety and honor of our troops in those places, not only upon those Commanding officers in the field, but upon the Commanding officers in the places.

We have a strong interest in the success of the war, but the people of the Peninsula have a stronger; and although I feel no inclination to refuse the assistance of the King's troops when it is necessary, I think that that

necessity should be clearly made out ; and that when it is to be attributed to the deficiency of system in the Spanish government and officers, they should be made to feel this deficiency upon every occasion on which they require our assistance. We went to Cadiz to be auxiliaries in the garrison ; and the King's troops were placed under the orders of the Governor, on the positive conditions which were agreed to, and have never been altered. One of these was, that our troops should not go beyond the harbour. We are now obliged to occupy Tarifa with part of the garrison of Cadiz. We take the field with Gen. Ballesteros upon no known plan, and with no defined object ; and then when Gen. Ballesteros and all retire upon the enemy advancing, I am told that they have retired, because Gen. Hill, who had accomplished the object of his expedition, had returned to his cantonments. I knew nothing of Gen. Ballesteros' plans or objects ; and Gen. Hill's expedition could have nothing to do with Gen. Ballesteros. Since Gen. Hill's expedition, and his return to his cantonments, the enemy's force in Estremadura have been much increased, instead of being diminished. Gen. Hill, however, did not return because he was pressed by the enemy, but because he began his operation with a defined object ; which object he accomplished ; and as usual, in Spain, he began to feel distress for want of provisions ; and if he had stayed, and the enemy had been reinforced, he might have been distressed in his retreat. .

But we are not only called upon to occupy Tarifa, but Carthage. Is it not proper to make the Spanish government, and the nation, and the world feel the shameful neglect of that place of which they have been guilty ? If 1000 men are wanting for Carthage, is it proper that our garrison of Cadiz should be called upon to supply them ? If new fortifications are wanting, ought we to defray the expense of constructing them ? These are the questions which occur every day in all our concerns with these nations of the Peninsula ; and I can only say, that if we are induced, by a sense of our own interest in maintaining the contest, to give them this extraordinary assistance, we ought to make them feel it as a favor, and we ought to represent to them the disgraceful neglect of which they are guilty, in coming upon us at this late period for assistance to garrison and fortify Carthage.

I write to Gen. Cooke to desire, that if you should require it, he will send 1000 men to Carthage, detaching at Cadiz the regiment 'de Watteville.' I particularly request, however, that these men may not be sent to Carthage unless the Spanish government should request this assistance as a favor, and that all the conditions which I made with the late Regency before I allowed the troops to land at Cadiz, are consented to in respect to the garrison of Carthage. I besides require, that our troops at Carthage should occupy the fort (the name of which I don't know) which is situated on the height which commands the harbour. I write upon these points to Major Gen. Cooke.

I have ordered 4 casks, containing 24 dozens of claret, round to Cadiz for you.

I had written to England at the request of Gen. Castaños, to desire that endeavors might be made to have the Marques de Sta Cruz exchanged. But as he is in Buonaparte's clutches, I don't think there is any chance

of success. Between ourselves, I think the Prince d'Aremberg, being a member of the Confederation of the Rhine, and married to Mad^{lle}. Tascher, the intended of Ferdinand VII., is too great a card to give up for the Marques de S^{ta} Cruz.

I will take care that Gen. Doyle's recruits shall march through Portugal by a convenient route, and shall be well provisioned on their march, whenever there are any to march. But having spoken to Gen. Castaños and Gen. Giron on this subject, they tell me, that since the embarkation of troops for America, the people of Estremadura and Castille have become more unwilling to enlist as soldiers, and particularly unwilling to go to Cadiz.

P.S. I have reports this day from Badajoz and from Salamanca, that Suchet had retired from Valencia. If this is true, it may not be necessary that we should occupy Carthagena. However, I hope that the Spanish government will not any longer neglect that place; and if they will attend to it, and ask as a favor that our troops should be allowed to go there, I have no objection to sending there 1000 men.

I have omitted to recommend to you to suggest to the Admiral to employ some of his craft with the Spanish craft at Cadiz, to observe San Lucar, and any other point at which the French can communicate with the coast of Barbary, to prevent the import of provisions. It is really most important to make their armies feel the distress which they make the rest of the world feel.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

I addressed your Lordship on the 30th Oct., and begged you to request the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, for Brig. Gen. Wilson, of the Portuguese service, to accept the honor of Commander of the Order of the Tower and Sword, conferred upon him by the Prince Regent of Portugal.

The permission of His Royal Highness has since appeared in the '*London Gazette*' of the 26th Oct., for Sir R. Wilson to accept the Order of the Tower and Sword; and the Secretary of the Local government of Portugal has written to me a letter, of which I enclose the copy and copies of its enclosures, expressing the opinion of the government that some mistake had been made. I likewise enclose the draft of my answer, which I had written before I had adverted to the date of the '*London Gazette*,' which was four days previous to the date of my letter to your Lordship regarding the honor conferred upon Brig. Gen. Wilson.

I entertain no doubt now, that the British government had received intimation of the honors conferred upon His Majesty's subjects by the Prince Regent of Portugal, through some channel besides myself; and it is possible that the Prince Regent of Portugal may have intended to confer the Order of the Tower and Sword upon Sir R. Wilson as well as upon Brig. Gen. Wilson.

But there is no doubt whatever, that the person referred to by His Royal Highness in his letters to this country, is Brig. Gen. Wilson (Lieut. Colonel of the Royal York Rangers), and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will obtain the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent

that he may accept this honor; and if you will have the mistake in the '*London Gazette*' of the 26th Oct. rectified, if the order has not likewise been conferred on Sir R. Wilson.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Graham, regarding the grant of medals to Lieut. Col. Ponsonby, Lieut. Col. Jackson, Lieut. Col. Acheson, Major Busche, and Major Hope. These officers are so highly meritorious, and their conduct has been so conspicuously good, that I beg leave to recommend them to your Lordship's consideration.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

When the enemy retired from the neighbourhood of Gibraltar and Tarifa, as reported in my dispatch of the 13th ult., I concluded that Col. Skerrett's detachment would return to Cadiz, and I directed that, according to your Lordship's orders, the regiment 'de Watteville' should be sent to Ireland. But Col. Skerrett having still continued detached from Cadiz, as your Lordship will have seen, the regiment 'de Watteville' is still at that place.

I have now the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Mr. Wellesley regarding the expediency of occupying Carthagená with a detachment of British troops, to which I have answered, that should the Spanish government request as a favor that a British detachment should be sent to Carthagená, I would consent to send a detachment.

Accordingly, I have directed Major Gen. Cooke to send there, if required by Mr. Wellesley, the battalion of foreign detachments, or 5 companies of the regiment 'de Watteville,' and the 2d batt. 67th regt., and a company of artillery, and officers of engineers, to report the state of the place, in order to enable His Majesty's government to decide whether they will keep the detachment there or not. I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major Gen. Cooke upon this subject; and I beg to have your Lordship's orders regarding this detachment as soon as may be convenient.

I should not have sent the troops to Carthagená, only that I have reason to believe, that before this time the disorder, which has prevailed there, has disappeared. Before the next summer, we shall have opportunities of ascertaining its exact nature; and whether it will be possible to prevent its return, or to mitigate or to guard against its effects by precautions. It will be in the power of His Majesty's government to withdraw the troops, if they should think proper, before the return of the season in which they would be liable to this sickness; and in the mean time the troops may save this important place for the allies.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Dec. 1811.

The enemy have made no movement of importance in this quarter since I addressed you on the 4th inst. I have received reports, that in the beginning of the month, Marshal Marmont had collected some of his troops at Naval Moral: but if these reports are correct, I believe he did

so only because he heard that our cantonments had been closed up in the end of last month. Marmont's head quarters are again at Talavera de la Reyna. I understand that the troops at Plasencia are suffering from want; but it is the common practice of the French Generals to collect in store a quantity of provisions to answer for a sudden movement, while the troops are left to provide for themselves as they can; and it frequently happens that, as in this case, the troops are suffering from want, while I know that there are considerable quantities of provisions in store.

I have received accounts from Cadiz to the 30th Nov. Gen. Ballesteros had been obliged again to retire under the protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and Col. Skerrett had retired to Tarifa. It appears that the enemy have brought some troops from Granada to act upon Gen. Ballesteros, as well as the division under Gen. Semel , belonging to the 1st corps.

The official accounts from Valencia come down as far as the 20th Nov. The enemy had not at that period made any progress in their attack upon Gen. Blake's position in front of the town. The chiefs of guerrillas, Duran, El Empecinado, and Espoz y Mina, had been very active and successful in their operations against the enemy. It appears by the accounts which I have received from the latter, which are confirmed by the enemy's correspondence which has been intercepted, that he had beaten a force sent against him, consisting of 1100 men of the garrison of Zaragoza, on the 17th Oct., and had taken 650 prisoners, and that only 3 men of the enemy had escaped. The prisoners have arrived at Coru a.

It is generally reported, that in consequence of the successes of the guerrillas, Marshal Suchet had been obliged to retire from Valencia, after blowing up the castle of Saguntum. This report has come by so many different channels, from different quarters, that I hope it is founded in fact.

To Capt. —.

Freneda, 14th Dec. 1811.

I sent you by your messenger, on the — of last month, 50 dollars, an ass, and baskets, according to your desire, and I gave him 10 dollars for his trouble. I will with pleasure make you the monthly allowance which you desire, and will pay it in such manner as you may point out; and I beg you to send me intelligence of all that passes that comes to your knowledge. It would be particularly desirable to receive it from the head quarters of the French army. You will continue to employ the old messenger till you can get a better. If I were to send you one, he might be discovered, and the consequences might be fatal to you.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 14th Dec. 1811.

I enclose a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Stuart, regarding the conduct of the Spanish minister at Lisbon, upon which I request you to have a conference with Don E. de Bardaxi.

I beg you to tell Don E. de Bardaxi at the same time, that if the Spanish mission at Lisbon will promise to discontinue the purchase of arms there, and will let me know the names of the agents they employ there for that purpose, if they should be English or Portuguese, I will give them twice

as many arms and sets of accoutrements as they can estimate they will purchase in any named time.

Return the enclosures, as I have no copies of them.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 14th Dec. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst.

As long as the person at the head of the Spanish mission at Lisbon was one of a conciliatory disposition, it was desirable that all the questions which could arise between the British and Spanish nations at Lisbon should be settled by amicable discussion between the ministers of the two Courts, without reference to the Portuguese government, in order to avoid the irritation which always attends discussions between a Portuguese and a Spanish agent. But I believe it is quite unusual to settle diplomatic matters in that manner. The British minister at the Court of Lisbon has to conduct the business of his government only with that to which he is deputed, and if he has any complaint to make of the Spanish minister, or of the conduct of any Spanish subject at Lisbon, he should make it to the Portuguese government, with whom it would rest by their interference with the Spanish minister to give redress on the matter complained of. I recommend this mode of transacting business to your attention in future, so long as the Chevalier de Salmon shall be the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. Accordingly, I request you to draw the attention of the Portuguese government to the purchase of arms and accoutrements by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon. I have reason to believe that the purchases from British soldiers are not very numerous, but each of them is very inconvenient, as it must be attended by the punishment of the soldier who sells his arms; and I would prefer to give the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires 2 new stands of arms and sets of accoutrements for each one that he could expect to purchase by continuing this practice, rather than it should continue. I have written to Mr. Wellesley on this subject, and have desired him to make this offer to the Spanish government, to induce them to order that it may be discontinued.

The Portuguese government are particularly interested in effectually putting an end to the purchase of arms at Lisbon, as it is positively a fact that no Portuguese soldier ever goes into hospital without selling his arms and accoutrements. If there were no purchasers for these articles, this practice would be necessarily discontinued, to the great advantage of the service.

In regard to the particular point of difference with the Chevalier de Salmon on the present occasion, I have communicated with Gen. Castaños, who knows that it is the common practice of all armies, that when a soldier, *unknown*, has committed an outrage, whole regiments are paraded to enable the person making the complaint to point out the person against whom he complains. It is so common a practice, and so much a matter of course in this army, that I am seldom called upon to interfere; but the Commanding officers parade their men on the first requisition. In a very recent instance, some soldiers having committed an outrage in their shirts and trousers, a whole brigade were paraded, dressed in a similar manner, to enable those complaining to know and point out those who

injured them. Gen. Castaños is so convinced that this is the practice, that he has sent orders to the officer commanding the detachments of Spanish troops at Lisbon, to show to the serjeant of the 'Chasseurs Britanniques' the men of his detachment, in order that he may point out the soldier from whom he received his wound.

According to the mode of doing business, which I recommend to you in the commencement of this letter, in relation to the Spanish mission at Lisbon, it will be necessary in future that, when Major Gen. Peacocke has any reason to complain of any of the Spanish troops, he should make his complaint to Gen. de Noronha, who will give such orders upon the subject as he may think proper, as he is the General commanding the troops at Lisbon.

If the matter is of that description that the interference of the government is necessary, it will then of course be Gen. Peacocke's duty to lay the subject before you, to be communicated to the Portuguese government.

I would recommend, however, to Gen. Peacocke, to confine his complaints on these subjects to a mere statement of facts. Reflections don't add to the force of facts, at the same time that they occasion and increase irritation between officers of allied nations, who ought to be friends.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 16th Dec. 1811, 10 A.M.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me have the state of the supplies, with the several divisions of infantry, brigades of artillery, and regiments of cavalry, to the latest period to which each can be made up.

As Gen. Graham is always liable to be called away from the 1st divi-

G. O.

Freneda, 15th Dec. 1811.

The claims sent to the Military Secretary will be referred to this Board for their consideration and decision.

2. Major Gen. Le Marchant and any two of the officers above named may constitute the Board.

3. The principles on which such claims are to be considered and decided, are as follow : No claim for a loss can be allowed which has been occasioned by a disobedience of orders, or by neglect, or omission in the party claiming for the loss, or his servant or bāt man. No claim can be allowed for a loss sustained by the ordinary occurrences of the service, such as deaths of horses or mules of fatigue occasioned by the ordinary marches of the army, the loss of accoutrements and necessaries in hospital, or by the breaking down of carts, fatigue of oxen, &c. &c.

4. As the principle on which the compensation for losses by the public is founded, is that the claimant may replace his loss, and the public may not lose his services, claims for losses on behalf of officers or soldiers who are dead cannot be admitted.

5. As the officers of the army have been restricted in the amount of their baggage by different orders, by the late and by the present Commander of the Forces, it would be inconsistent with every principle on which compensation for losses is granted, and with the practice of former Boards of Claims, if the full amount of the whole of an officer's baggage, as allowed by His Majesty's regulations, was granted to replace the baggage allowed to be carried, or actually carried, by any officer on the service in Spain or Portugal.

6. The value of the whole, and of the different proportions of officers' baggage lost, is to be rated at two thirds of the sum allowed by His Majesty's regulations.

7. The claims for regimental baggage, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost, are likewise to be considered and decided upon by the Board upon the same principle.

8. But it is to be observed that clothing, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost, can be paid for according to the practice of the service, only when they shall be replaced by new, and then only three fourths of the price.

sion, it would be desirable that he should have attached to him a commissariat establishment, with mules, &c., for the use of the General and his Staff, with bread, &c., and corn for their horses. The mules might be taken from that brigade of the 1st division, with which the General has been estimated for hitherto. It does not appear that there would be any necessity that the person with Gen. Graham should have bullocks attached to him, as he can always get meat from any division with which he may be.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 17th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose an extract* of a letter from the Sec. of State, pointing out the deficiency of the crops of corn for the consumption of the people of Great Britain in the current year, to which I request you to advert in reference to the demands for supplies of corn for the army.

Adverting to the length of time which was likely to elapse before the army would receive from England those supplies which would be procured there, after the demand for them should be made from hence, Mr. Kennedy and I had agreed that there ought to be in store in Portugal, at all times, a supply for the consumption of the army for 3 months. But as it now appears that we can't expect to procure corn from England, I recommend that you should have in store a supply of bread, corn, and forage for 6 months, and of the other articles which can be procured from England, for the period formerly determined on.

It would be desirable to have inquiries made, whether oats could not be procured at a cheap rate in Ireland. If they should be procured there, however, it is desirable that they should be shipped in bags, and not in

* The Earl of Liverpool to Visc. Wellington.

London, 21st Nov. 1811.

I am sorry to be under the necessity of informing you that, owing to a blight in the month of June, the crops of wheat and of barley (especially that of the wheat) are now ascertained to be very far below an average crop. You are probably aware that in an abundant year we cannot do more than feed ourselves; but upon the occasion of former scarcities, we have had the resource of importation from other countries, particularly from those bordering on the Baltic. In the actual situation of Europe, it is doubtful how far this resource will be available at all, probably not to any great extent; and even if available, the corn will be to be purchased by some exportation of specie, which, in other views of the subject, will be greatly inconvenient to us, under the present circumstances. I have thought it right that you should be apprised of this state of our affairs at home.

You will perceive by this statement, how little you can depend upon any supply of corn from this country. I have desired that inquiry may be made as to the quantity of rice in hand, and may perhaps be able to send a supply of this article, though not to a very large extent, but your chief dependence must be upon America, the Barbary Powers, and the Mediterranean; and I strongly recommend that no time should be lost in making the necessary arrangements for a supply from these quarters.

I am aware of the inconvenience that must arise from the exportation of specie to meet these demands. But the only remedy which occurs as applicable to this evil, is an endeavor to make the purchases by British manufactures instead of by coin. And if this could be accomplished, a double advantage might be gained. Notwithstanding the prohibition of the Americans, there are some articles of this country which must have become really matters of necessity to them, and which they must be desirous therefore of procuring at some risk. It is to be hoped, likewise, and there is some reason to believe, that the glut of British manufactures which has existed in South America for 2 or 3 years, owing to the over trading of our merchants, is in a great measure at an end; that there may be expected, therefore, a demand to a limited extent, from that quarter; and that the advantage of a trading voyage may therefore prove a strong inducement to the Americans to bring their supplies to Spain and Portugal, as on the export of their raw produce their own internal prosperity and resources essentially depend.

bulk, as is usually practised. If the latter mode of shipping them be adopted, they generally heat in the holds of the ships; and if the oats should be thus damaged, upon being landed, they would do the horses but little good.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 17th Dec. 1811, 10 A.M.

I concur with you that the report on the 39th is satisfactory, and that you should move the 2d batt. to the cantonments of the 1st, preparatory to the transfer of the drafts on the 25th inst., for which I shall give orders.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 17th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst.

The establishment of a telegraph communication from the mouth of the Guadiana to Elvas might be very convenient under certain circumstances; but, on the other hand, as the line must be carried along the frontier, it would not be difficult for the enemy to intercept it. Under these circumstances I am unwilling to recommend to the Portuguese government to incur an expense to provide for a possible convenience, with the amount of which I am entirely unacquainted.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know if you have any notion what the expense of this line of telegraphs will be.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 17th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and I recommend to you to renew your measures in America, so far as to send there bills for £400,000, to be laid out in purchases of corn; to adopt those which you propose for the purchase of rice to the amount of £200,000 in the northern provinces of Brazil; and further, to make an effort to get grain from the coast of Africa.

This grain must be paid for in bills upon England, if possible. If we can't get it for bills, we must endeavor to send money; but I can't enter into the detail of sending colonial goods or merchandise to pay for corn. The merchants of England will of course send colonial goods and merchandise where they can sell it with advantage, and they will do what they will think most advantageous with the money. We have no colonial goods to send to barter for corn, nor would it be expedient to have a store of them at Lisbon, with a view to such a traffic.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 17th Dec. 1811.

Adverting to the enclosures in your letter of the 11th, I observe that the sum for the military chest is about 5430 *contos* during the year, or about 400 *contos* a month, or about 1,000,000 *cruzados*. I very much fear that that will not be sufficient for the expenses.

I beg to observe that the demand of our Commissariat for supplies to the Portuguese troops comes to about £50,000 every month, and I have before me at this moment a demand for supplies for the Portuguese army for one month, amounting to £90,000: the two together make £140,000. To this sum must be added, as regular demands, pay and supplies to the regiments at Cadiz. The monthly amount of the subsidy,

at £2,000,000 a year, would be £166,000; so that you see that we could not pay in money, with propriety, more than £20,000 to £25,000 in any one month.

It is really necessary and desirable that you, and Beresford, and Dom M. Forjaz, should examine with minuteness every part of the estimate of the military expenditure, and see what can, with propriety, be struck off. There is a vast sum spent in the north for no reason whatever. I think also that it would be very desirable that Beresford and Dom M. Forjaz should examine very particularly the demands for supplies on our Commissariat. We feed the whole army, excepting 2 brigades here, and 2 brigades and one brigade of cavalry in the Alentejo; yet they have demanded corn and flour for bread, besides rice in lieu of bread, sufficient for above 70,000 men, for one month's consumption! Where have they 70,000 men? They have besides demanded 57,600 lbs. of salt pork, and a sufficient quantity of corn to supply 7000 horses for a month, although I believe they have not 700 horses fit for service in the world!

This must be either a joke or a mistake, or else I suspect that the Principal calls upon the Commissariat for supplies for his agricultural schemes; but it will not answer to have these supplies taken out of the military chest.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which Gen. Castaños has sent to me by Gen. Alava, in which the Spanish minister at War has suggested that you should make some movement to draw the enemy's attention from Gen. Ballesteros, and from Tarifa.

As far as I am able to judge of the enemy's position in Estremadura, they have no troops belonging to the 5th corps between the Guadiana and the Tagus. Drouet's head quarters are, I believe, at Almendralejo, and it is probable that a considerable body of the corps are near that place. There appears to be a brigade in and about Zafra, and I imagine that some of the troops are at La Serena. There appears to me no military difficulty in your advancing to Merida, excepting the want of subsistence.

The garrison of Badajoz, although, I believe, of the same strength as it has been for the last 6 months, is not so well composed, being principally German troops. It must be observed, however, that the French battalions

G. O.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

7. The Commander of the Forces begs that the soldiers of the regiments of the 1st, 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, may be employed in making fascines and gabions and pickets of the following dimensions:

2. Fascines of 1 foot thick and 6 feet in length.
3. Gabions 3 feet in height by 2 feet 3 inches diameter, of the same numbers that there will be of the fascines.

4. Twice as many pickets as there will be fascines, 3 feet 6 inches long.

5. These articles when made are to be kept at the head quarters of the several regiments; an officer of engineers will be sent round to inspect them, and will pay those who shall have made them, for the larger fascines 2 vintems each, for the gabions 4 vintems each, and for the pickets half a vintem each.

6. Lieut. Col. Fletcher will send with the engineer officer to the head quarters of each division a proportion of tools for the purpose of making fascines and gabions, which will be distributed to the several regiments, and will be returned when the work shall be finished.

which were in the garrisons have been added to Drouet's army, and increase the force of the enemy in the field. Although the garrison of Badajoz is not so well composed as it was, it will still be necessary to observe the *débouché* which the bridge of Badajoz affords, in case you should make a movement upon Merida.

In your movement upon Merida, I would likewise beg to draw your attention to the position of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' on the north side of the Tagus. There are at least two divisions of that army within a short distance of the bridge of Almaraz; and all the cavalry are cantoned between Arzobispo and Guadalupe, on the left of that river. The principal difficulty, however, which occurs to me, in making a movement upon Merida, consists in the want of supplies. I believe there is still sufficient in the country to supply the troops under your command; but the people in Spain will not give us those supplies without payment in ready money, notwithstanding that the French may come the next day to take them without any payment; and it is impossible to procure money to pay on delivery the enormous sums required for every article which the troops want. The march to Merida will increase your distance from your magazines to such a degree as to render the supply of the troops from them very difficult and precarious.

Of these matters, however, you must be the best judge; and if you should be of opinion that you can maintain your troops on the march to Merida, and during a reasonable period which it may be desirable that you should remain upon the Guadiana, in order to draw the attention of the enemy from Gen. Ballesteros, I should wish you to make this movement, adverting always to the bridges of Almaraz and Badajoz.

Upon your arrival on the Guadiana, you will be able to judge for yourself, from the accounts you will receive of the state of the enemy's force, whether it is in your power to strike a blow against Drouet; and if you should think that you can strike this blow, you have my authority to make the attempt. You will observe, however, from what I have above stated to you, particularly of the position of the division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' that it will be necessary that you should make this attempt at an early period after your arrival on the Guadiana, if you are to make it at all.

To Don F. X. Cástanos.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

Gen. Alava has delivered to me the letter which the Sec. at War addressed to your Excellency on the 4th inst., suggesting the expediency that Lieut. Gen. Hill should make a movement with his corps, to draw the attention of the enemy from Gen. Ballesteros, and from Tarifa. I beg leave to inform your Excellency that I have never received from any quarter any information regarding the objects or plans of Gen. Ballesteros' operations, or the means which were afforded to him of effecting those objects, notwithstanding that it is obvious that it might be in my power to aid them in various ways.

There exists no military reason whatever why Gen. Hill's corps should not be between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and even upon the Guadiana, taking the military precaution of observing the *débouché* of the bridge of

Badajoz, and the movements of the '*Armée de Portugal*' by the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, if the people of Estremadura would supply the troops with provisions. But your Excellency is aware that the people of Spain will not part with their supplies without payment in ready money of an enormous price for every article which the troops require, notwithstanding that experience has taught them that the British nation invariably pay their debts; and that they know that those supplies, which they withhold from us with a certainty of payment, at some future and no remote period, will be forced from them by the French, without payment at all.

It is obvious that, in the existing state of the world, and as long as the unfortunate dispute between Spain and her colonies continues, and no effort to reconcile them, it is impossible to procure specie to pay, upon receipt of the articles, for every thing the troops require. It must be equally obvious to your Excellency, that it is impossible for the British troops to subsist from their own magazines at the increased distances which it is necessary that they should move from them, in order to render to the Spanish nation the additional assistance which it is in their power to give them from time to time.

Under these circumstances, I have ordered Gen. Hill to move forward upon Merida, if he should be of opinion that he can subsist his troops during that movement, and during the reasonable time which it will be necessary that he should remain upon the Guadiana, in order to be of any use to Gen. Ballesteros. If he should find himself able to move upon Merida, he will cross the Guadiana or not, to attack Drouet, according to the information which he shall have of the numbers and position of his troops, and to his view of the chance of success.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, and Major Gen. Murray, are going to England, and are anxious to avail themselves of the safe opportunity of one of the troop ships, or a ship of war. They will be at Lisbon in the course of a week; and if any ship should be going at about that time, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will aid them with your good offices with the Captain to obtain a passage.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which has been sent to me by Gen. Castaños from the Spanish Minister at War, and the copy of my answer, and the copy of instructions which I have sent to Gen. Hill, to endeavor to divert the enemy's attention from Gen. Ballesteros, and from Tarifa.

I likewise enclose the copy of my dispatch to the Sec. of State of this date.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

I have not received any letters from Mr. Wellesley since the 30th of last month; but Gen. Castaños, who is in this neighbourhood, has accounts from Cadiz to the 4th inst. From these it appears that the guerrillas in

Aragon and Navarre, and Guadalaxara, Duran, Espoz y Mina, and El Empecinado, having co-operated in the blockade of Daroca, in Aragon, that place had fallen into their hands, with 2500 prisoners. I have not been made acquainted with the date of this event, but I believe it to be certain. Marshal Suchet, however, still persevered in his endeavors to obtain possession of Valencia, and I understand that on the 25th the enemy had opened their fire on some of the posts occupied by Gen. Blake's army for the defence of the city. From these circumstances your Lordship will observe that the report communicated in my last dispatch has no foundation in fact.

The enemy continued in front of Gen. Ballesteros, who was still under the protection of the guns of Gibraltar. It is also reported that the enemy intended to attack Tarifa. In consequence of the suggestion of the Spanish Minister at War, conveyed to me by Gen. Castaños, that Gen. Hill should make a movement with his corps, to draw the enemy's attention from Gen. Ballesteros and Tarifa, I have directed Gen. Hill to move upon Merida, if he should find that he can make this movement without distressing the troops for subsistence, while engaged in it, or during the time that it will be expedient that he should remain at Merida, in order to be of any service to Gen. Ballesteros. I have likewise authorised Lieut. Gen. Hill to attack Gen. Drouet, who commands the 5th corps, if upon his arrival at Merida he should find that he can do so with any prospect of success.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance in front of this army, nor in the north. A few battalions and squadrons have passed the Tormes, and have collected at San Muñoz, but I imagine it is with the intention of plundering the country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter, marked private and confidential, of the 21st Nov., to which mine of the 4th Dec., regarding the expected fall of Valencia, may be deemed in some degree an answer.

I am sorry to say that, notwithstanding what I told you in my last dispatch, I much fear that Valencia will fall; the guerrillas have done wonders to save that place, and if Blake had conducted his operations with as much prudence as they have theirs with skill, and if he had opposed the enemy with solid strength in front, while the guerrillas were cutting off their communication with the rear, Suchet must in the end have retired; and the expedition into Valencia, which, next to the expedition into Portugal, is the most important that the enemy could undertake, would have had a termination proportionally disastrous to them; as it is, I fear that Suchet will persevere, and that his perseverance will be crowned with success. In this case, the successes of the guerrillas will have produced no effect, excepting in the numbers of the enemy they have killed and taken. My letter of the 4th will have informed your Lordship of the effect of the fall of Valencia, and my view of our situation.

Ever since September we have continued to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo as far as was practicable, and the place has received nothing from the country, excepting by the convey which entered on the 1st Nov., when

the Agueda had filled: the consequence is, that the garrison are very ill provided with some necessary articles, and others will be expended by the 20th Feb.; at that time the garrison will have neither bread nor meat, so that you may see that this fine convoy brought but little more than 4 months' provisions for the garrison, and the army which escorted the provisions took about 120,000 rations, being 2 days' supply for themselves, or 2 months for the garrison, when they passed by on their return from the expedition to El Bodon, which reduced the stock in the garrison to what I have above stated. It has been quite impossible for us to do any thing else than blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, as we have since September. 1st; The army have not till lately been in a state of health to make any forward movement, even for a limited object. 2dly; If the troops had been in health, we have always been so cramped for the want of provisions, and the Spaniards are so unwilling to furnish any, excepting for ready money payments, notwithstanding that they know that the French will take for nothing all that they can find, that it has been with difficulty I have been able to keep the troops in the situation in which they now are, and above half the army are behind. Being obliged then to keep the troops stationary, and at certain distances from their magazines, I preferred to remain on this frontier to returning to Estremadura, after the month of September. The country on this frontier is the most healthy during the season which has elapsed; by continuing on this frontier, I have protected Abadia's arrangements, as the enemy did not and could not know that, even if they had not been on the Tormes, I should have experienced great difficulty in getting to Salamanca, nor did they know how sickly our troops were till they learnt it from the English newspapers. Lastly; By continuing on this frontier I was enabled to re-establish Almeida as a military post, and to perform other works, and make other arrangements, which will facilitate and render less expensive our communications in the commencement of the year.

As Almeida is becoming a place of security, I have brought up there our battering train; and in order to prevent the enemy from turning towards Valencia, I have directed materials for a siege to be prepared, and I propose to lay down our bridge upon the Agueda. I am also making every effort to get up the stores of our train to Almeida, and if I can succeed, I shall be in a situation to attack Ciudad Rodrigo on any day I please, without risk or inconvenience; and if the weather should permit, I will attack the place before its stock of provisions be consumed.

Whether I can take Ciudad Rodrigo or not, I think it will be expedient to remove our operations to the southward by the end of February or early in March. Our army will by that time be very healthy, and in strength. That is the season in which it will be most practicable for us to carry on our operations on the frontier of Estremadura, and in the southern countries, both on account of the plenty of forage for our horses, and of the wholesomeness of the climate; and I think it possible that if I can bring the whole army together on one point, the enemy will not be able to prevent me from getting possession of Badajoz. At that time also, I expect that I shall not only have Almeida in security as a military post on this frontier, but that Don Carlos de España's Spanish division will be formed

and equipped, and that Abadia will be able to stand alone while I shall leave him.

These are my present notions, of which your Lordship will make what use you please; but I acknowledge that I should prefer that they were not even hinted to the public, not only because they will not bear disappointment, but because they cannot go before our public in any shape, without at the same time getting to the knowledge of Buonaparte and his officers.

I enclose the last weekly and daily states. I have to apologise to your Lordship for addressing you upon this paper, but I have no other.

P.S. I am very much obliged to your Lordship for your kindness to my little boy.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 19th Dec. 1811, 5 P.M.

I find that there are at Villa da Ponte 1058 barrels and 200 boxes of gunpowder, which might be brought up to Almeida by 630 mules; and we shall want, besides, 686 barrels of gunpowder for our magazine at Lamego, which can be carried by 343 mules. Total required, 973 mules, to move up our powder. I don't exactly recollect how many mules there are with the reserve ammunition, but excepting the one sixth to go to the magazine to fetch corn for them, I should wish that as far as this number were sent to bring up this powder. If there should not be enough attached to the reserve ammunition, those attached to the ammunition with the cavalry and the 5th and 6th divisions shall be sent to assist, with the exception of the one sixth, to carry their corn to them from the magazines.

I have other plans in contemplation for the removal of our shot, so as to relieve you entirely from the weight of the removal of the stores of the train.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd, Light division.

19th Dec. 1811.

The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to learn from your letter of the 17th inst., that any of the troops under your command should have deserted to the enemy, and that you attribute this desertion to the *real* distress the men are suffering from want of clothing, great coats and blankets, and to their being frequently very badly fed.

It appears to his Excellency difficult to account for the desertion of the soldiers of the British army, which has been very large at different periods; but when the Commander of the Forces can apply a remedy, he will not allow that any soldier of this army, whether it be or not the cause of desertion, shall continue to suffer *real* distress; and, therefore, after having inspected the British regiments under your command, as his Excellency intends, to-morrow morning, he proposes to send them to the rear.

The Commander of the Forces directs that the regiments on this side of the Agueda may be under arms to-morrow morning, between Guinaldo and El Bodon, at 11 o'clock; and if it should be possible, without inconvenience to the troops, his Excellency would wish to see those on the other side of the Agueda at the same time and place. If, however, it should be inconvenient for the troops on the right of the Agueda to be at the place appointed, his Excellency will go over another day for this purpose.

To Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, 20th Dec. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 19th, and I am much obliged to you for having entered into a consideration of

that which I had the honor of addressing you on the 18th, as it is probable that your Excellency's sentiments will attract the attention of the ministers of both the allied governments.

There is nothing, however, so desirable, as that the exact state of the facts should be ascertained, particularly on a point so important as the means of subsistence of an army; and there is no point to which it is so desirable that the government and legislature of your country should turn their attention, and on which they should have authentic information. For this reason principally I trouble you with an answer to your letter.

When I stated to your Excellency, in my former letter of the 18th, that experience ought to have shown the people of Estremadura that the British nation always pay their debts, I referred to the transactions of the army which was under my command in that province in 1809. I acknowledge that it did not occur to me that the British troops under Marshal Beresford had left any debts unpaid in that province in the spring of 1811.

There may, however, be some without my knowledge, into which circumstance I will inquire, and I will let your Excellency know the result. If there are any, your Excellency may depend upon it that they will be paid in their turn. But whether there are debts of the British army in Estremadura or not since last spring, the necessity that the allied governments should know the truth, renders it expedient that the people should not be flattered on this occasion; and I declare that the province of Estremadura did not give to the army under Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford adequate supplies, or supplies at all in proportion to their means. I know that the army which fought the battle of Albuera were in the greatest distress on the 16th, 17th, and 18th May, for want of provisions; and the Capt. Gen. Blake, in a conference which I had with him at Albuera, declared to me that the troops under his command had been very ill supplied from the time he had arrived in the province. I arrived at Elvas and took the command of the army on the 19th May, and I know that the British army were supplied, from that time to the 17th June, almost every day, with bread and corn brought from the Tagus. I also know that when Gen. Blake crossed the Guadiana, he was so distressed for provisions as to be obliged to request me to supply him on the day he should arrive at Jurumenha, which I was obliged to refuse. And yet it is well known that an army of 60,000 French troops, with about 7000 cavalry, found subsistence for a month in that province, after the allies had retired from it.

I likewise recollect that when means of transport were required from the province of Estremadura for the siege of Badajoz, the supply was trifling, in comparison with the demand and want; and infinitely so in comparison with the means of the province, and in comparison with what was procured from the Alentejo. The same want of transport was felt when the wounded were to be removed from Albuera. I don't mention these circumstances as matters of complaint, but in order to make known the truth, and that the Spanish government and legislature may turn their attention to the subject, and may apply a remedy.

I am entirely convinced that there is no want of goodwill in the people; but they have no faith in our promise of payment for their property, or in their own government, and they prefer to trust to the hopeless chance of being able to preserve their property from the enemy, to giving it to the Spanish army or to the British army, on promises of payment, by which they might enable both to render the most essential service to their country; and at all events they would place resources out of the reach of the enemy. It is very desirable that the government and the legislature should turn their serious attention to this important subject.

I am likewise very much obliged to your Excellency for your observations on the proposed operations of Lieut. Gen. Hill. The corps under the command of this officer has been moved forward solely at the suggestion of the Minister at War, to divert the attention of the enemy from Gen. Ballesteros; and it remains to be seen for what object it is desirable that Gen. Ballesteros should be enabled to remain where he is.

I admit that the object which you suppose from the statements in the newspapers, for the operations of Gen. Ballesteros, is one very desirable in every point of view; and the question is, whether he has a force at all equal to attain it, in whatever degree the enemy's attention may be diverted from him; and if he has not, whether the force under his command ought not to be employed elsewhere. I can give no opinion, however, upon these points, as I have no information either of his force or of his plans. I agree with your Excellency in thinking that the only danger which Gen. Hill can apprehend, is on the side of the bridges on the Tagus, and I have instructed Gen. Hill accordingly; but I can't pretend to guard Gen. Hill from that danger sufficiently to recommend to your Excellency to detach Gen. Morillo into La Mancha.

I could guard Gen. Hill from an attack from the Tagus only, by my moving forward in the valley of the Alagon and Tietar, or by a similar movement into Castille. Both these movements are impossible under existing circumstances. All that I can do is to maintain my army in the situation which it now occupies, until I can increase the means of transport to such a degree as to insure its subsistence in a more forward situation. I am exerting all the means in my power to effect this object, and it will be fortunate for the Peninsula if the measures which I shall adopt with this view shall be accompanied by corresponding measures on the part of the government, to place at our disposal the resources of the provinces.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — regt., 4th division.

20th Dec. 1811.

Your letter of the 16th, and enclosures, have been forwarded by Lieut. Gen. Cole, and have been submitted by me to the Commander of the Forces; and I am to acquaint you, in reply, that his Excellency directs you will desire Major —, of the —, to reconsider the steps he is about to take in respect to Capt. —, Capt. —, Lieut. —, and Lieut. * * * *, of the — Portuguese regt.

After nearly 3 months have elapsed since the circumstances occurred on which Major — proposes to found the charges which he has framed against these officers, he has brought forward these complaints. At the same time, he states that it is not his wish to criminate the whole upon such serious offences; on the contrary, that if they are willing to make such public atonement as may hereafter be deemed sufficient for the outrage committed towards himself, he will readily

abandon the prosecution against them, provided they do not appear as witnesses on the trial of Lieut. ****. This last officer is now on his trial, on a charge exhibited against him by order of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, for his conduct in the affair above referred to; and the Commander of the Forces intended to refer to Marshal Sir W. Beresford the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which investigated the unfortunate circumstances of the 29th Sept., as soon as the General Court Martial which tried Major — should have done with them, in order that he might see whether there was ground on which to bring to trial any other officers in the service of the Prince Regent of Portugal.

The Commander of the Forces thinks Major — might leave to Marshal Sir W. Beresford and himself the task of vindicating the honor of the British service, if it shall appear that it has been injured by these or any other officers; and his Excellency is the more anxious that he should do so, because he is afraid that from Major —'s delay in bringing this complaint forward, and from his statement that it is not his wish to criminate 3 out of 4 officers against whom he complains, it may be imagined that he brings forward his charges at this moment, not so much that the British service should receive atonement for an injury received in his person, as that Lieut. * * * might be deprived of the benefit of the testimony of these officers on his trial, which is now going on. Adverting to all that passed upon this unfortunate subject, it is most desirable that this impression should not be made of the conduct or motives of any officer.

Memorandum for the Commissary General.

Freneda, 21st Dec. 1811.

It was intended by Mr. Kennedy and me that Major Aird should superintend the construction of as many bullock carts at Lisbon, according to the pattern lately sent down by Mr. Bissett, as there should be found materials for.

These materials are iron axletrees taken from the French carriages, of which there are 50 at present in the arsenal at Lisbon; and brass boxes taken from the wheels of the French carriages, of which there are 100 in the arsenal of Lisbon; the whole of which Marshal Sir W. Beresford assured me should be delivered over for this service to whomsoever should be appointed to construct the carts.

There are besides 25 iron axletrees and 52 brass boxes on the Tagus, which were likewise to be delivered over for this service; and I send herewith a list of articles which Marshal Beresford assured me we should have, to be employed in the same manner.

I enclose directions from Major Sturgeon, detailing the manner in which the axletrees are to be cut, and to what dimensions. The brass boxes must of course be cut to fit the nave of the wheel according to the pattern on the car. The car must be made in every respect according to the pattern.

Major Aird will report, if it should be necessary, that this work should be performed in the Portuguese arsenal, that I may write to have permission given for this purpose. But it is very desirable that, if possible, the work should be performed without applying to the Portuguese arsenal for more than the materials above referred to, and those stated in the enclosed list.

It is most desirable, indeed absolutely necessary, that no more time should be lost about this work, which, owing to unfortunate circumstances, has now been delayed for 2 months. I shall hereafter send instructions respecting making carts of the axletrees taken from the English carriages.

The A.G. to Major Gen. R. Craufurd, Light division.

21st Dec. 1811.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that description returns of the soldiers reported to have deserted, in the weekly states of the 1st, 8th, and 15th, from the 43d, 52d, and 95th regts., may be sent to this office without delay, agreeably to the G. O. of the 10th Nov. 1810.

The commanding officers of these several battalions are likewise to report when these men joined the battalions, and whether they were with the army during the operations of the month of March, 1811. They will likewise report whether any of these men who deserted had committed any crime, or were in confinement previous to their desertion, and whether they were men of good or bad character.

The commanding officers are also to be called on for a report, stating on what day the clothing now in wear with the regiment was issued to and put on the men. The same report is likewise to be made with regard to the great coats in wear.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 22d Dec. 1811.

I received your letter of the 14th only yesterday, and that of the 18th this day. It is not easy to form a precise notion of what is intended upon a financial subject, in which the detail is every thing, without having under view the proposed regulation itself.

1st; I entirely agree that whatever measure may be adopted, it is necessary that the paper money in circulation should be stamped, and the whole ought to be stamped within a limited period. I accordingly give orders that all the paper in our possession may be taken to the proper office to be stamped.

2dly; I don't understand what is meant by stamping the paper every time it passes through one of the government offices, accompanied as that measure is by the consequence of postponing the payment of interest for a year after the period at which the paper will appear by the stamp to have passed through the hands of government.

The circulation of this paper is compulsory, the law of the country making a tender of half paper and half money a legal tender; and I conclude that the meaning of this regulation is, that when the paper is paid to government under the law, the difference between the value of paper and the value of coin is compensation to the holder of the paper for his interest due to that moment. It is really impossible to reason seriously upon such a scheme.

The mode of proceeding should be to stamp the old, or make a fresh issue of good paper instead of the old, to pay the interest on all the real paper, from the 1st July, or even the 1st Oct. last, and declare the intention of government to pay it with regularity every half year in future, and to close for ever the paper manufactory, and to allot a certain fund for the payment of the interest regularly.

This is a plain, simple measure, the consequence of which would be, that the value of the paper in the market would rise, and the price of commodities to be purchased by it would fall. The price of paper would not only rise, because every man would feel that it was worth something, but because men in purchasing it, for instance, in April, would be disposed not only to give the price of the paper, but to make an allowance to the seller for the 3 months' interest which had been incurred from the 1st Jan. to the 1st April, and at last the amount of interest due would be

calculated and allowed upon every transfer of paper money, as it now is in England upon Exchequer bills.

But how will it be by this scheme of the government? No interest will be paid upon paper that passes through the offices. The amount of the interest, therefore, can never be calculated in the sale of the paper, because probably the interest will never be paid, as the paper probably will get into the hands of government, in the course of circulation, before the year will expire, at the end of which the interest might be claimed. The consequence will be, as is intended, that the holder of the paper will be inclined not to put it in circulation.

But this measure which is to have the effect of checking the circulation of the paper will of course keep down its price. The holder, who has been compelled by law to take paper, must keep it by him in order to make any thing by it. After all, he can make only 5 *per cent. per annum* by the interest; whereas, in any employment of his capital he ought to make 10 per cent., and might make above 20. If he is an individual not engaged in trade, it may be very inconvenient to him to be without his money so long as it will be necessary that he should remain in order to receive the interest upon his paper, and the consequence of this notable scheme will be, that paper will be as much avoided in all pecuniary transactions as it is at this moment, and the value of it in exchange must remain as it is, notwithstanding the expense which government will incur by paying some of the interest; for, after all, some of the interest will be demanded from them.

This scheme will not answer my purpose, and it is quite beneath a great government. If the government will adopt the simple measure which I have above proposed to them, and will pay only 3 months' interest on the paper in circulation on the 1st Jan., I will order the Commissary Gen. to give a receipt for all the interest which will be due on that day on the paper in our hands.

If they don't adopt some such plan as this, I shall certainly put a stop to the trade in paper altogether, by refusing to receive it in payment for our bills of exchange.

In regard to the *Apolicies Grandes*, I have not time to develop the effect of Principal Sousa's scheme; but it is totally inconsistent with every notion of financial policy that I have ever formed, and equally so with justice, which must be the foundation of every financial scheme.

The interest on the *Apolicies* ought to be paid from the 1st July, as well as that on the circulating paper money, and there they ought to be left. The interest should hereafter be secured and paid regularly.

I thought that you had, as you ought to have, in your possession in Mr. Bell's chest, the money in metal and paper which I had at different times ordered the Commissary Gen. to pay over to you; but from your letter I imagine that we have kept it, and, as usual, have spent it.

I have desired the Commissary Gen. to send orders to Mr. Pípon to pay you as large a sum in metal as he can, and to allow the discount of the day on all the paper he is obliged to give you, as I conceive that the Portuguese government are entitled to the subsidy in sterling money, and not in currency. In this I may be wrong.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 23d Dec. 1811.

I had some conversation yesterday with Major Gen. Anson, regarding the horses of his brigade, and it appears to be very desirable that some effort should be made to supply those of the 16th light dragoons in particular. That brigade have been on this duty for about a month, and came in good condition, and in that time they have lost 56 horses.

P.S. I think it would be desirable to look into the disposition of the mules of the 16th light dragoons, as they are not so well supplied as the 14th, although the latter are farthest off.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 23d Dec. 1811, 8 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 21st.

From all the letters which I have received from Cadiz, it appears to me to be very desirable that you should make a movement, to endeavor to divert the enemy's attention from Ballesteros and Tarifa.

I don't think that your measures at Jurumenha would answer that purpose: you might certainly cross the Guadiana at that place at present (though that is doubtful), but the enemy know well that you must recross as soon as the river will fill; and the movement of the '*Armée de Portugal*' would equally oblige you to retire, and you would find your retreat across the Guadiana by flying bridges excessively tedious. Your measures at Jurumenha, unless you could cross the Guadiana immediately, would produce no effect as a diversion for Tarifa, &c.; those of Merida may.

I believe that the road from Portalegre on Merida, by Albuquerque, passes the head of the Gevora, and of the Salor; the other river which you mention I am not acquainted with. If this be the case, your retreat from Merida would always be secure; if it should not be the case, it would only be necessary, after the first impression should be made, and if you should determine not to attack Drouet, to place your troops, on the first appearance of rain, *en échelon*, from Merida, the great body being behind the river which is to be passed, and the smaller at Merida, having all the means to pass the river by the smaller body prepared beforehand.

If the Guadiana should be fordable, I agree with you in thinking that the Jurumenha plan would answer best, as an immediate diversion; but still for your retreat and communications, I would recommend to you to turn your back upon Merida when across the Guadiana, from knowing that you can't depend upon a flying bridge on that river.

To Capt. —.

Freneda, 24th Dec. 1811.

I have received your letter. I am much concerned that you should imagine that — had been ill treated. You are certainly mistaken upon this subject. I have desired that he may be paid 10 dollars, and sent back to you satisfied. I likewise sent you by him 50 dollars in gold coin.

In respect to your pardon, you can't expect that it should be given to you immediately. I told you that I must be able to assure the government that you had served your country with zeal, and had given useful information. You can't suppose that the 2 or 3 letters which you have written to me will enable me to secure your object.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 24th Dec. 1811, 8 A.M.

Since I wrote to you yesterday morning, I have received a report that the 6th division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' moved from Plasencia across the Tietar on the 21st. I don't yet know the object of this movement. The baggage, artillery, hospitals, &c. belonging to this division had been moved some days before to Navalmoral. There are various reports respecting their ultimate destination: some that they are going to Valencia; others that they are to cross the Tagus. I will let you know if I should learn any thing positive. I have not yet heard whether the movement has been general, or confined to this one division.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

Freneda, 24th Dec. 1811.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 14th Nov.; and I am very much obliged to you for the detail into which you have entered respecting the affairs of which the conduct has been entrusted to you.

I had heard generally of these affairs before, but I have had no opportunities of acquiring information upon them, and have turned my attention but little to them; and if I could form an opinion upon them, I should mistrust it. I have, however, long considered it probable, that even *we* should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has passed in Spain and Portugal; and that *we* should be actors and advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.

Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the sword they must not return it till they shall have completely accomplished their object. They must be prepared and must be forced to make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the authority and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest which, it should be clearly understood before it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.

The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army. Above all, to form a government of such strength as that army and people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in print; but I have never known it produce any thing but confusion. In France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe, and establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in *vivas* and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged ever since as the excuse for

the rank ignorance of the officers and the indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.

I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if possible, a good government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall enforce them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures to raise it.

I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can and ought to assist with money as well as in other modes every effort of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort ought to be by the people of the resisting country.

I agree entirely in opinion with you about the foreign Austrian officers. They ought to have been taken into the pay of Great Britain bodily on the day they were removed from the service of the Emperor; and government should have adopted this measure, on the same principle that I recommended them 3 years ago to make 3 stands of arms for one they made before, and to turn Great Britain into a magazine of military stores, in order to be able to supply with officers, arms, and stores, those nations which should be inclined to resist the tyranny of Buonaparte. I entertain a high opinion of the Princes of the Austrian family; and it is entirely consistent with my notion that a person of the high birth and great qualifications of the Archduke Francis* should be placed at the head of any country disposed to resist Buonaparte. But he must understand that he must never lay down his arms, even though reduced to be the head of a gang of robbers, till he shall have attained his object.

I know as little about the politics of Sicily as I do about any thing else. It has always appeared to me that we had no right to go farther in the first instance than stop the subsidy, and at the same time maintain our position in the country. I should think that this measure would bring the Queen to her senses, if she is not in communication with Buonaparte. If it does not, we shall save our money and shall not be worse off than we are; and we shall be prepared to take advantage of the course of events. If the measure of stopping the subsidy should succeed, and you should be able to form an army in that country, I beg to draw your attention to what I have above stated regarding the necessity of making the country contribute a revenue to support its military force.

In consequence of an intimation from the Duke of York that you wished Gen. Clinton to join you, and a letter from Gen. Clinton expressing his desire to go, I have written a letter to wait for him at Lisbon, in which I have consented to his going. He has not yet, however, arrived at Lisbon.

I beg you to present my best compliments to Lady William.

* Afterwards Duke of Modena.

The A.G. to Dr. Bolton, Dep. Inspector of hospitals.

24th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to return you lists of men at the different hospitals of Celorico, Coimbra, Abrantes, Castello Branco, and Castanheira, who have been reported by medical officers as necessary to be sent to England; and I have received the directions of the Commander of the Forces to desire you will take measures for their assembly at Lisbon, and for their being sent home. You will be pleased to confer with the Commissary Gen. on the means of transport necessary for these men, from the several stations to Lisbon; and you will acquaint me if any route should be necessary for the march of the several parties from the different hospitals to Lisbon, and at what time they will be ready to set out, when I will communicate with the D.Q.M.G. as to forwarding the same. No time should be lost in forwarding the men to Lisbon for their embarkation; and you will be pleased to order that especial care is taken, on the embarkation of the men, to have them notified as invalided, and sent home to their several corps.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 25th Dec. 1811.

I have great pleasure in forwarding to you a dispatch from the Earl of Liverpool, conveying to you the approbation of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of your conduct, and of that of Col. Skerrett, which I beg you will communicate to the Colonel.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 25th Dec. 1811.

The 6th division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' broke up from Plasencia on the 21st inst., and marched across the Tietar, in the direction of Naval-moral; but I have not yet heard whether the other divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which were cantoned about Bejar, and in the province of Avila, have moved.

I can't learn the object of the movement, but it appears to have been unexpected, and occasioned by the arrival of an officer with dispatches from Madrid. I have long expected that the distress of the troops for want of subsistence would have rendered it necessary, as that part of the province of Estremadura is entirely exhausted.

I have no intelligence upon which I can rely of the state of affairs in Valencia. It is certain that no troops have been detached from this quarter into Valencia, unless the movement of the 6th division from Plasencia should be only a part of a more general movement in that direction, of which, however, I have no intelligence.

Nothing of any importance has occurred in the north of Spain. I have letters from Mr. Wellesley to the 19th inst.; but I imagine that I have not received some dispatches from Cadiz, which probably have been sent round by Lisbon.

The object of the enemy's movements in the Sierra de Ronda appears to have been to hem in Ballesteros upon Gibraltar with one body of troops, while, with another, they should attack Tarifa with heavy artillery. The enemy remained at San Roque from the end of last month till the 12th inst., when they retired to Los dos Barrios; and Gen. Ballesteros had advanced to San Roque on the 13th, Col. Skerrett being still at Tarifa. It is reported that the French had retired entirely from that part of the country; but Col. Skerrett, who wrote on the 13th, appeared to be of opinion that the enemy would still make an attack upon Tarifa, and that their movement was with a view to concentrate their force for that object, and to approach nearer to their magazines. The heavy artillery for the

attack of Tarifa was between Vejer and Facenes. It appears probable that the enemy will persevere in making their attack, which they had certainly intended.

Major Gen. Cooke adverts to two attempts made by the enemy to penetrate the pass of La Peña, in both of which they failed. I have not yet received the reports of these affairs.

I have not yet heard that Gen. Hill had moved, in consequence of the orders which I reported to your Lordship in my last dispatch that I had sent to him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 25th Dec. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, and the last morning report.

Unless the 6th division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' has been obliged to move by distress for provisions, I don't know what to make of that movement. It is reported that the troops which were at Boulogne under Ney are coming into Spain; but a letter from my correspondent at Salamanca states that 15,000 of them had arrived at Bayonne, and had returned to the northward. If this is not the case, it is possible that Ney's troops may be considered a relief for the '*Armée de Portugal*,' to keep us in check, and that the '*Armée de Portugal*' may be moving towards Valencia. Against this conjecture, however, I have to mention, 1st; That the troops in Avila, &c., have not moved, at least I have not heard of their movement. 2dly; I was informed some days ago that the 1st division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' had passed the Tagus into La Mancha, and I then imagined that they were going to Valencia; but I have since heard that they had returned.

It is reported that there was a very severe battle at Valencia on the 2d; and it is just possible that Suchet may have been obliged to retire in consequence of this loss, and of the mischief done to him by the guerrillas in Aragon. It is also said that an attack had been made upon Barcelona by the troops in Catalonia.

The desertion from Suchet's army is immense; and if he has sustained any serious loss in the action of the 2d, he would be obliged to retire; and in that case Marmont would naturally close his cantonments towards Madrid.

You will observe that this is conjecture upon conjecture, and upon report; but I can't account for these marches and countermarches in any other manner; and it is certain that if the march of the 6th division had been occasioned by the want of provisions, it would not have been so unexpected as it was by all those who give intelligence.

I am continuing our preparations to attack Ciudad Rodrigo with the utmost activity, and I shall act according to circumstances.

Memorandum for the Commissary General, Major Dickson, and the officer of the Ordnance Department in charge of the Powder. Freneda, 25th Dec. 1811.

600 barrels of the powder now in store at or near Lamego must be sent up the Douro in boats, as far as it can be brought: a careful person should accompany each boat, and see that the powder is preserved from the wet. The Commissary Gen. is requested to report the progress of

these boats. Major Dickson will send off a copy of these orders to the officer of the ordnance department in charge of the powder.

Memorandum for the Commissary Gen. and Q. M. G. Freneda, 25th Dec. 1811.

400 tents now at Coimbra must be sent up to Almeida as soon as may be practicable. They must be brought in boats to Raiva, and thence brought forward on 100 of the provision mules attached to the 5th division to Almeida.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 25th Dec. 1811, 10 A.M.

I enclose some letters received this morning from my brother and Gen. Cooke.

There are obviously some dispatches missing, as both my brother and Gen. Cooke advert to circumstances of which I have no knowledge; and from the want of the other dispatches, which are doubtless gone by Lisbon, I don't understand parts of these.

I have nothing new on this side. All accounts confirm the march of the French from Plasencia towards Navalmoral on the 21st. It is believed that they have been obliged to retire, having eaten up the country.

P.S. It appears by accounts from Madrid, which Gen. Castaños showed me, that Foy had returned to Toledo. I can't comprehend these marches and countermarches. It can scarcely be that Suchet was so roughly handled in the affair stated to have taken place on the 2d, as to have been obliged to retire; and that Marmont concentrates towards Madrid in case Blake should be tempted to move up from Valencia.

There were preparations on the 10th for the King's movement from Madrid; and you will observe that this date does not disagree with that of the arrival of the courier, and the consequent preparations at Plasencia, mentioned by my Portuguese correspondent.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 26th Dec. 1811, 9 A.M.

I enclose the letters and dispatches from my brother of the 13th, from the perusal of which you will be better able to understand those which he sent me on the 19th.

I likewise enclose Gen. Cooke's letters to the 13th.

Gen. Castaños told me yesterday that he had heard that the '*Armée de Portugal*' were to be assembled about Toledo. I imagine that this is only a report from the Alcaldes.

I write to Major Dickson at Almeida with this, to request he will let you know whether it is necessary that the mules should return to Villa da Ponte; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have them sent for another load, if Major Dickson should report it to be necessary.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 26th Dec. 1811, 9 A.M.

I have ordered that the 600 barrels of powder at Lamego may be brought up by the Douro; and I understand that 53, 53, 33, 99, and 300 mules, that is, 538 mules altogether, have gone to Villa da Ponte to bring the powder from thence. I don't recollect how much there was at Villa

da Ponte when the mules were ordered there; and I understand from Col. Fletcher, that some carts loaded with powder have arrived at Almeida since I saw you. I am therefore unable to answer a question put to me by Gen. Graham, whether the mules of the general reserve with the 1st division should make a second trip; that is to say, the 115, of which only 99 went. I have told Gen. Graham, in a letter which the bearer has in his possession, that you would let him know if it was necessary that the mules should make a second trip, and I beg you to let him know accordingly.

If you are at all doubtful whether sufficient arrangements have been made to bring up the powder from Villa da Ponte, it is better that they should go; and if you have had any of the bags made for carrying shot, about which you and I conversed the other day, you might give some of them to these mules, and let them bring loads of shot, if all the powder should be brought up, or you should be satisfied that the arrangements for bringing it up will be sufficient. In this case also, you will let Gen. Graham know that it is necessary that the mules should return to Villa da Ponte.

Be so kind as to let me know how much powder and shot there is at Almeida, and how much at Villa da Ponte; and the weight of each article at the latter.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 27th Dec. 1811, 11 A.M.

I received last night your 2 letters of yesterday. Let the quantity of powder required from Pezo da Regoa come by water, whether any has been sent to Villa da Ponte or not. I understand, that in the quantity of powder in Almeida, is included that brought yesterday by the mules of the 1st division; but that the shot which passed the Coa yesterday is not included.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 27th Dec. 1811, noon.

I enclose the report of Capt. Ross, from which you will see that the Douro is navigable to Barca d'Alva.

I have perused Mr. Purcell's letter upon the transport with the Light division. Be so kind as to refer Mr. Purcell to the G. O., from which he will see that the Surgeons of regiments have an allowance to keep a mule to carry their chests. A mule is allowed by the public to a quarter master, to carry the regimental intrenching tools; and when any of these are worn out in the public service, they have been replaced by my orders. But it is a most extravagant mode of replacing them to use the hired mules for this purpose.

I have ordered the Q. M. G. to call for returns of the intrenching tool mules with the regiments of the Light division.

I beg to observe upon the appropriation of the mules with the Light division, that in the winter it appears to me to be entirely unnecessary to kill the meat for the whole division, or a whole brigade, at one place. Much transport would be saved by killing meat at the quarters of each regiment. I would also observe that the mules employed for the carriage of the reserve ammunition might perform a part of the duty of carrying

supplies to those troops of the division which are detached to a distance, and that part of this duty might be performed by the carts of the country.

In the conversation which I had with you the other day, I told you that I thought 400 bullocks would be sufficient for the duties of the siege. I rather believe we must have the whole division of 800. 400 of them might as well bring up with them the carts which have been bought, possibly with their loads.

P.S. Considering that we are about to give our transport a little work, would it not be desirable to give them the third of a month's pay, on the plan that you and I settled some days ago?

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

27th Dec. 1811.

I have laid your letter of the 22d, and enclosure from Capt. Browne, before the Commander of the Forces, and I have to request you will state who it is proposed should take charge of the widows and orphans of deceased soldiers to England, and to receive any allowance for it.

Understanding that the late circular letter, [*from the Military Secretary of H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, limiting the issue of rations to 6 women and their children per troop and company of regiments serving in the field,*] published in the G. O. of the 8th Dec., has occasioned much distress at the depôt at Belem, I have to request you will have the goodness to acquaint me to what extent the operation of this order has affected the wives and children of soldiers now serving with the army, so far as the same can be judged of.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 29th Dec. 1811, 11 P.M.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have this day received from Lord Liverpool, from which you will learn the gracious intentions of the Prince Regent in respect to yourself, Capts. Currie and Squire, your brother, and Lieut. Baillie.

It may fall to my lot to be the instrument of conveying to you the honor intended for you, as I have acted in a similar capacity in respect to others; but I assure you that I shall perform this duty in respect to you (if it should devolve upon me) with at least as much satisfaction as I have upon any former occasion.

I have received official letters from the Sec. of State and the Commander in Chief upon your action, which I propose to publish in the G. O. of the army.

I have nothing authentic of Brenier's division, excepting that they are gone to Naval moral, and I believe higher up the Tagus. The division which was at the head of the Tormes marched upon Avila on the 26th, and it is said that the division which was at Avila was to march likewise.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 29th Dec. 1811.

In respect to the telegraphs along the Guadiana, the first thing to be done will be to have the country surveyed by one of the gentlemen of the telegraph establishment, and the stations for the several telegraphs fixed; when this shall be accomplished, we can have an estimate of the expense framed. I would beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of mentioning your wishes on this subject to Dom M. Forjaz, that he may order one of the officers of the telegraph establishment to fix the stations for the telegraphs as proposed.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Freneda, 29th Dec. 1811.

I enclose the extract of a letter from my brother, in regard to the shipment of the money for this army in the vessels of the Cadiz squadron. You will see that he is not unaware of my desire that it should always come in one of your vessels; but it is desirable that they should go to Cadiz at fixed periods.

The A.G. to Col. Trant, Oporto.

29th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th inst., relative to Mr. — being permitted to serve as a volunteer with the army; and I have to acquaint you, that the application having been laid before the Commander of the Forces, his Excellency has no objection to the same, provided you know of any commanding officer of a regiment who will receive him; but his Excellency does not choose to interfere himself, or to name Mr. — to any officer commanding a regiment.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 31st Dec. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 26th Dec. In regard to the military expenses of this Kingdom in general, it is my opinion that the Portuguese government have proceeded on a principle entirely unjustifiable, and such as never was adopted by a nation involved in war, particularly not when the war was for its existence as a nation.

The mode of proceeding generally adopted, is first to see what the military expenses really would be; and to supply all those expenses, leaving the residue to defray expenses of the civil, political, agricultural, and other departments. But the mode of proceeding adopted by the Portuguese government, has been first to provide fully for all the other expenses of the state, and to leave the residue with the British subsidy for the military expenses.

This will not answer my purpose, and for that reason I am excessively anxious that the detail of all the estimates should be particularly examined, in order that we may form a judgment of what the military expense really is; and then, if the government will not provide for it, in preference to every other expense, excepting the payment of the interest on the debt, I shall recommend to the British government to withdraw their subsidy.

I now enclose some memorandums on the estimate of the expenses to be paid from the southern treasury in January, which, of all the documents of this description I have ever seen, is the most scandalous. Nine regiments of militia, which don't give 6000 men under arms, cost nearly as much as 9 regiments of the line, 2 battalions of caçadores, and 2 regiments of cavalry!

Under the two heads 6 and 7 are included the pay of the only persons who ever do a day's duty, or who ever can be expected to fire a shot. The expense of their pay is about 30 *contos*, and the estimate for the others is 37 *contos*. I don't mean to say that many of the persons whose pay is estimated in the latter sum may not be usefully employed, and are paid even less than they ought to be. But the mere statement of the subject shows the necessity of strict examination. I believe it never before happened, that the mere pay of non-combatants and pensioners, and paymasters of a portion of any army, cost more than the army itself. For

this reason, I again recommend a most close examination of the details of all the estimates.

I see clearly the force of your objections to the existing constitution of the military chest. It ought to be formed to defray the current expenses of the military body properly so called; and the pensions and expenses ought to be defrayed from some other fund. I was aware of this defect when the formation of the establishment was under discussion; but certainly, not of the degree to which it will operate upon the funds, if 'the stay-tape and buckram' in all the estimates is to amount to the same proportion of the expense as it does in the estimate for the southern treasury. If, however, I had known of the extent of these demands, I should not have known how to manage them, without placing them in the first instance in the military chest. If I had attempted to arrange them on any other plan, I should have embarrassed the discussions on the formation of the military chest to such a degree, that that establishment would never have been formed. We must now let it work as it is formed.

Do you, and Mr. Stuart, and Dom M. Forjaz, examine with the most minute detail all the estimates, and see what expenses are necessary, and what are not. As soon as that is done, I shall propose a reform of the plan to go to such points as may appear to require amendment, and that will oblige the government to find means to pay the expenses of their army, next to the interest of their debts. It is most evident that the whole subject requires close and accurate investigation. Even you and Mr. Stuart don't understand one another upon it.

What expenses are estimated in 1130 *contos* for January? You appear to think that the expenses incurred by our commissariat are not included; Mr. Stuart must think they are included; as in calculating the means to defray the expense of the estimates, he supposes 600 *contos* the largest amount of a monthly payment of the subsidy that could be issued to the military chest from the chest of 'Aids.'

The A.G. to Brig. Major Olfermann, 7th division.

31st Dec. 1811.

I have submitted your letter of the 30th inst. to the Commander of the Forces, and I am to acquaint you that his Excellency cannot enter into your views, as to the command of the Brunswick corps, in the absence of the Field officers belonging to it; and he does not see that you have any grounds to make the application, as you do not actually hold a commission in the regiment.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — light dragoons, Lisbon.

31st Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 27th Dec., and I am to remark that your going to Lisbon without the authority of a Medical Board was incorrect.

In respect to that part of your letter communicating your intention of leaving the service, it is necessary that it should be forwarded through the regular channel to the General officer commanding the brigade, and by him to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, who will submit the application to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1811.

[The Notes to the Memorandum are in the Manuscript.]

Freneda, 31st Dec. 1811.

The last memorandum on the operations in the Peninsula brought them

down to the end of the year 1810 (see vol. iv. p. 619), when a division of the 9th corps, with other troops, which had before endeavored to join Massena from the frontiers of Castille, through Lower Beira, arrived, and took their station on the right of the enemy's army at Leiria. These troops, supposed to be from 8000 to 10,000 men, had been annoyed on their march by Col. Wilson's detachment on the Alva.*

The other division of the 9th corps under Claparède, amounting also to about 10,000 men, remained on the frontier, and by their manœuvres kept Gen. Silveira in check during the march of the division under Drouet, by the valley of the Mondego. Silveira attacked their advanced guard at Ponte do Abade, on the 30th Dec. 1810, and was defeated; and he was himself attacked and defeated at Villa da Ponte on the 11th Jan.; and he retired, first to Lamego, and thence across the Douro.† Claparède advanced upon Lamego, but Gen. Bacellar having placed the divisions of militia, under the command of Gen. Miller and of Col. Wilson, on his flanks and his communications, he was obliged to retire, and went to Guarda, to which place he had been ordered by Massena.‡

But the principal occurrence in the commencement of this year was the movement, from Andalusia, of a large force into Estremadura, in order to create a diversion in favor of Massena.

The army of the south, under the command of Soult, consisted of the 1st corps, which was engaged in the operations of the siege of Cadiz; of the 4th corps, which was at Granada; and of the 5th corps, one division of which, under Gazan, could with difficulty maintain its ground in Estremadura against the Spanish division of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, whilst the other division, under Girard, was employed in the Condado de Niebla, and in keeping open the communication between Seville and the besieging army of Cadiz. The whole amount of the army of the south could not be less in the beginning of the year than 50,000 men.§

Soult broke up from Cadiz with about 5000 men on the 21st Dec., and collected at Seville the troops destined for the invasion of Estremadura. He had with him about 20,000 men,|| including a very large body of cavalry; to oppose which there were the Spanish divisions of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, which amounted to about 10,000 men, a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 1500 Spanish cavalry, making altogether about 2300 cavalry. There were, besides, Spanish garrisons in Badajoz and Campo Maior, Alburquerque, and Valencia de Alcantara; and Don Carlos de España's brigade, about 2000 men, which was on the right of the British army near Abrantes, was considered disposable for service in Estremadura.

If this corps had been left entire, and had been prudently managed, it

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 3d January.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 17th January.

‡ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the end of January and beginning of February.

§ By a return of the 25th March, it appears that this army then consisted of 48,619 men; of which number 7744 were cavalry. This was after the battle of Barrosa, and after the siege of Badajoz, the battle of the 19th Feb., &c. It may be presumed that it was more than 50,000 men in the beginning of the year.

|| The 5th corps alone had about 12,000 infantry; and 5000 brought from the siege of Cadiz, and the cavalry, would make his army 20,000 men.

would have been fully sufficient, even though not joined by the other troops belonging to the army of the Marques de la Romana, incorporated with the British army, to prevent the enemy from passing the Guadiana, which was full at that season of the year.

But the first measure adopted by the Spanish government, on the same day, the 21st Dec., that Soult broke up from Cadiz, was to order Ballesteros, with a part of his division, into the Condado de Niebla. Notwithstanding that we received at Cartaxo, on the 29th Dec., the accounts of Soult having broken up from before Cadiz, the Spanish Gen. Mendizabal did not hear of this circumstance for some days afterwards; and the first he heard of it was from us. He was quite unprepared for his retreat, which was hurried; and he retired in a manner different, and making a different disposition, from that which was recommended and ordered.

He had been ordered to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to defend the passages of the Guadiana. He retired upon Badajoz and Olivença; and the engineer officer who was sent to destroy the bridge of Merida, instead of obeying the orders he received, made a report which was sent to Cartaxo to the Marques de la Romana, and asked for orders. The town of Merida itself was not defended; and the consequence was, that an advanced guard of French cavalry took Merida, which post 400 French troops had held, in June, 1809, against the whole Spanish army, with this additional disadvantage, that the Guadiana was then fordable, and that the Spanish troops were in possession of all the avenues to the town.*

Gen. Mendizabal, in making his retreat upon Badajoz and Olivença, threw 3000 men of Gen. Ballesteros' division into the latter, the others having marched under Gen. Ballesteros, by order of the government, into the Condado de Niebla. The division of Gen. Mendizabal retired upon Badajoz, with all the cavalry, excepting a small body which marched upon Merida.

There were various reports of the movements of the French; and in fact it was but little known in what direction, and with what object, they were moving. It was at one time positively stated, that they had passed the bridge of Merida on the 15th Jan., and that they were moving towards the bridge of Almaraz, on the Tagus; at another time it was reported that they were encamped at Caceres; but at last it was found that they did not cross the Guadiana in any force, but blockaded the troops of Gen. Ballesteros' division in Olivença.

This blockade was made on the 15th, and continued till the 23d Jan., when the garrison surrendered. Two or three attempts were made by Gen. Mendizabal to raise the blockade, but without success; and as the garrison at last surrendered, before the enemy had attacked the place, and without being distressed for provisions, it is believed that the place was sold.

During the month of January, the Marques de la Romana was taken very ill at Cartaxo, of which illness he died on the 23d of that month.

* See the reports of that period.

He had ordered Don Carlos de España's brigade to march as soon as he heard of the danger of Ballesteros' detachment from the advance of the French troops, and he afterwards ordered that the remainder of the troops which had been incorporated with the British army should move from Villa Franca, where they had been cantoned. They moved on the 20th Jan.

From the period at which we had heard of the movement of the French from Cadiz, and particularly latterly, I had frequent conversation with the Marques de la Romana regarding the situation of affairs in Estremadura; and as he was unwell, I wrote, in the shape of a memorandum, my opinions on the plan of operations to be pursued, as well for the objects of the war in general, as for the particular purpose of saving Olivença, or rather for relieving the troops in that place, respecting whom the Marques was particularly anxious.*

The Marques died 3 days after he had received this memorandum; but not till after he had circulated it among the officers under his command, and had desired them to attend to it. A reference to the memorandum, and to the letters and dispatches of that day, will show how far they attended either to the first or to the last.†

After two attempts were made to raise the blockade of Olivença, the place surrendered on the 23d Jan.; and the enemy invested Badajoz, on both sides of the Guadiana, on the 27th Jan., and broke ground on the left of the river on the 29th.‡ The Spanish Generals were not decided respecting the measures which they should adopt in the circumstances in which they stood. But at length the troops, which had quitted the allied army on the 20th Jan., were ordered to advance to Badajoz. They immediately re-established the communication between Elvas and Badajoz, obliging the French cavalry to retire beyond the Gevora; and then having entered the town, they attempted to raise the siege by making a sortie upon the enemy's works. They were driven back with loss; and having remained in the town, the communication between Elvas and Badajoz was again cut off by the enemy's cavalry.§

The Spanish troops, however, came out of the town again on the 9th Feb., and at last took the position on the heights of San Cristoval, which was recommended to them. They did not, however, adopt any measure to fortify this position, nor did they adopt any of the other measures recommended to them, particularly that of sending away from Badajoz the bridge of boats, the want of which was afterwards found to be so fatal to the cause.

The Spanish army, about 10,000 strong, and having besides about 2000 cavalry, including Gen. Madden's Portuguese brigade, remained in the

* See memorandum of the 20th Jan., in letter to Mr. Wellesley, of the 23d Jan., in the Foreign Office.

† See correspondence with Mr. Wellesley in the months of Jan. and Feb. 1811, with enclosures in the Foreign Office, viz., Jan. 6th, 13th, 23d, 26th, and 28th, all private.

See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of Jan. 5th, 12th, 19th, 26th, and 28th, and Feb. 2d.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 9th Feb.

§ If the French had sent a sufficient body of cavalry to the right of the Guadiana, they would have taken the whole army without firing a shot. See the memorandum of the 20th Jan.

position at San Cristoval till the 19th Feb., having the Gevora in their front, and that river and the Guadiana between them and the enemy, on which day they were surprised by between 5000 and 6000 French troops, and totally destroyed as a military body; their camp and artillery being taken, and the whole body not killed or taken dispersed, except the Portuguese brigade of cavalry, and a few hundred Spaniards. About 2000 of the troops escaped into Badajoz.*

An examination of the letters written at this period to Mr. Wellesley and the Sec. of State, will show my anxiety for the relief of Badajoz, and the measures which I recommended for that object. The most effectual measure of any would undoubtedly have been to detach a body of British troops to that part of the country; but a moment's reflection on the relative numbers of the two armies at that time on the Tagus, and on the extent and nature of the positions which we had to occupy, will show that it was impossible to venture to detach, from our army at least, till the reinforcements then expected should have arrived in the Tagus.

Massena had come into Portugal with 72,000 men, of which he had lost 10,000 at the battle of Busaco, and its consequences; and it is a large allowance to suppose that he had in January lost 10,000 more by deaths, prisoners, deserters, and killed, in various little affairs which had occurred. This would reduce his original number to 52,000 men; and an aide de camp of his, who was taken in December, reported that the army had that number before Drouet joined.†

To this number Drouet, in December, and Foy, in January, added about 12,000 men, making 64,000; and Claparède was at Guarda with between 8000 and 10,000 men: of the 64,000, about 14,000 may have been sick, as the army were very sickly; and there would have remained on the Tagus, fit for service, about 50,000 men.

The British army, on the 20th Jan., consisted of 41,040 men; of which number there were sick, 6715; on command, 1974; prisoners of war, 1586; and there remained present, fit for duty, 30,765. Of this number, the 2d batt. 88th (485) were at Lisbon, and the 2d batt. 58th at Torres Vedras; leaving about 30,000 for service, of which number 2655 were cavalry.

The Portuguese army, joined with the British for service in the field, at the same time amounted to about 32,000 effective men, exclusive of the garrisons of Abrantes and Elvas, in each of which there were two regiments of infantry, one regiment of infantry at Cadiz, and one regiment of infantry (the 24th) with Gen. Silveira. The object of the French General at this time was undoubtedly to pass the Tagus; and he had his choice of making the attempt in a course of about 30 miles from Santarem to the Zezere, and even higher than the junction of that river. It was necessary to guard that whole course of the river; for which it is conceived that 14,000 men could not be deemed more than sufficient.

The remainder of the army, about 40,000 men, was on the right of the

* See dispatches to Mr. Wellesley, and their enclosures, of the 2d, 3d, 10th, 17th, and 23d Feb., all in the Foreign Office.

Those to Lord Liverpool of the 2d, 9th, 16th, and 28th Feb.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 29th Dec. 1810.

Tagus, opposed to the whole French army; and it must be observed, that if the enemy had been able to advance, either with their 50,000 men, or after being joined by Claparède, they would have been opposed by very unequal numbers, as some days must have elapsed before the troops on the left of the Tagus could have been brought across the river.

The detachment which it would have been necessary to make, in order to effect any good at Badajoz, or even to have been in safety, adverting to the mode in which the Spanish troops have usually conducted themselves, ought to have been about 13,000 men; which numbers, it is obvious, could not be spared from the army from the end of January to the 19th Feb.

Reinforcements to the amount of 6000 or 7000 men were daily expected, which afterwards arrived in the beginning of March. It was hoped that the Spaniards would risk nothing, and would be able to hold out till these reinforcements should arrive, when it was intended to detach a sufficient force to effect the object at Badajoz, before any thing else should be attempted against Massena.*

The delay of all measures against Massena's position continued to be absolutely necessary on account of the state of the roads and rivers in the country; even if our force had been deemed sufficient to attack him.

The result of the battle of the 19th Feb., however, destroyed all hopes of being able, even when the reinforcement should arrive, to make such a detachment from the army as should be able to relieve Badajoz; more particularly as, the Spaniards having neglected to remove the bridge from Badajoz to Elvas, the troops which should attempt to relieve Badajoz had no choice left, in respect to the mode of crossing the Guadiana. They must have passed by the bridge of Badajoz.

It was then determined to attack Massena as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, by which time it was hoped that the roads and rivulets would become practicable. In the mean time the Governor of Badajoz was requested to hold out to the last moment. Massena, however, retired from his position on the night of the 5th March, before our troops, which had arrived at Lisbon on the 1st March, could join the army. The British troops were immediately put in motion in pursuit of the French army; those on the left of the Tagus, by Abrantes and the Zezere; and those on the Rio Maior river, by the different routes leading in the direction which the enemy had taken.

A letter was written to Gen. Leite, the Governor of Elvas, from Santarem on the 6th, to request him to apprise the Governor of Badajoz of Massena's retreat, and to assure him that support and relief would be sent to him without loss of time. This support was accordingly ordered to march on the 8th, as soon as the enemy's retreat was found to be decided.†

When the enemy retired, it appeared at first that their intention was to go by the road of Thomar and Espinhal, leaving Coimbra on their left; and it was not certain that they had taken the high road by Pombal, till the 9th. On that morning a most favorable report was received of the

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 14th March.

† See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th March.

state of affairs at Badajoz. It appeared that the garrison had not suffered; that the fire of the place was superior to that of the enemy; and that one of the enemy's 6 battering guns had been dismounted by the fire of the place. Under these circumstances, when it was found on the afternoon of the 9th, that the enemy had collected their army in a strong position at Pombal, it was deemed expedient to order the 4th division, and Gen. De Grey's brigade of cavalry (which had been ordered to march on the 10th to join the 2d and Gen. Hamilton's division, on the left of the Tagus, as soon as the bridge should be laid for them), to march upon Pombal, to co-operate in the attack which it was intended to make upon the enemy on the 11th. These troops accordingly joined, and the enemy retired; but the garrison of Badajoz surrendered on the 10th March.

The mode of the enemy's retreat on the 11th, and the fact that they were still stronger than we were, and might have taken up the position of Coimbra and the Mondego, unless hurried beyond that town, caused the continued detention of the 4th division, and Gen. De Grey's brigade of cavalry, till the operations of the 13th forced the enemy past Coimbra, and enabled us to communicate with that town.

The troops for Badajoz were immediately put in motion to return to the south, but unfortunately we that night heard of the fall of that fortress on the 10th. These accounts were accompanied by reports of the enemy immediately threatening Campo Maior; and even if it had not been desirable to prevent them from extending their conquests on that side, the fall of Badajoz facilitated to such a degree their entry into Portugal, and Badajoz was so much nearer to Lisbon than the point at which we then found ourselves, that it would have been impossible to continue the pursuit of Massena even for one march, without providing for the security of our right flank, by placing a large corps on the Tagus. Thus, then, it was still necessary to make this detachment, notwithstanding that the original object for which it was destined was lost.*

The pursuit of Massena was continued with uniform success from that period till he finally crossed the Agueda on the 9th April. Our reinforcements, however, were not all arrived in Portugal, and those which had arrived, did not join the army till the end of March. Even then we were infinitely inferior to the enemy in numbers, particularly when he approached the frontier, and was joined by Claparède's division of the 9th corps from Guarda. Our movements were, therefore, necessarily cramped, and we were obliged to proceed with caution, when the utmost activity would have been desirable.

Let any body now advert to the difference of the result of Massena's invasion of Portugal, if the operations on the Guadiana in the month of January had been carried on as they ought; if the Spanish Regency had not drawn Ballesteros from Estremadura at the moment that province was attacked; if his troops had not been shamefully sold in Olivença; if the battle of the 19th Feb. had not been lost, and the Spanish army annihilated; and, finally, if Badajoz itself had not been shamefully sold to the enemy on the day after the Governor was informed that relief would be sent to him.

* See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th, 16th, 21st, 27th March; 2d, 9th, 18th April.

As soon as the French were driven across the Agueda, Almeida was invested; and it will be seen in a subsequent part of this memorandum, that the enemy made an attempt in May to relieve the place. What would have been the result of that attempt, nay more, would it ever have been made, if we had had 22,000 men in the ranks, which were at that time in Estremadura?

If our attention had not been preferably, and with part of our army necessarily, carried into Estremadura, in consequence of the events in that province, in the months of January, February, and March, what would have been the result of an attempt to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo in May, after the fall of Almeida, by the concentrated force and resources of the allied army?

But other circumstances occurred, not yet adverted to in this memorandum, which show still more clearly the fatal effects of the Spanish system of military operations. Notwithstanding that Gen. Ballesteros was weak, and that he ought never to have been removed from Estremadura, he held his ground against a French corps which attacked him on the 25th Jan. A part of the French force in Estremadura was consequently withdrawn from that province, and the force engaged in the siege of Badajoz was reduced.*

Another event occurred, highly advantageous in all its circumstances to the state of affairs in Estremadura. In consequence of the diminution of the force before Cadiz in Dec. 1810, the British and Spanish authorities conceived that a fair opportunity offered of making an attack upon the blockading army by the besieged. This attack was fixed for the 28th Feb., but owing to contrary winds, and a variety of circumstances, could not take place till the 6th March.† On that day the battle of Barrosa was fought, 4 days before the surrender of Badajoz; and in all probability, if Badajoz had held out one day longer, the enemy would not have remained to take possession of the place.‡

The troops which were detached from the army at Condeixa on the 14th March, did not arrive at Portalegre till the 22d of that month. Campo Maior, which had been regularly attacked by the enemy on the 14th, surrendered on the 22d. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, having collected his corps, advanced against the enemy, and surprised them at Campo Maior on the 25th, which place they abandoned. Their cavalry fled into Badajoz, leaving behind them a regiment of infantry, and all their cannon. Unfortunately the excessive impetuosity of the troops (the 13th light dragoons in particular) prevented Sir W. Beresford from taking the advantage which he intended to take of these events. Some of the 13th dragoons were taken on the bridge, between the *tête de pont* and the gate of Badajoz.§

The instructions to Sir W. Beresford were to pass the Guadiana as soon

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 9th Feb.

He had further successes in an action fought in the end of February. See dispatch to Mr. Wellesley of the 3d March.

† See letter to Gen. Ballesteros, enclosed in a letter to Mr. Wellesley, of the 2d Feb.

‡ All the enclosures in the dispatches to Mr. Wellesley of the 2d, 3d, 10th, 17th, 23d Feb., of the 3d, 26th March, and 20th April, are worth reading on this subject.

§ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 2d April, with enclosures.

as he should have possession of Campo Maior, and to blockade Badajoz, till the means for attacking the place regularly could arrive. Unfortunately here again our operations were frustrated by the conduct of the Spaniards. One of the objects particularly recommended to their attention was to send to Elvas the bridge of boats that was in Badajoz.* This had been repeatedly desired before, and the reasons for urging the measure again were particularly stated in that memorandum. This was the only bridge in the possession of the allies; and if it had been at Elvas, Marshal Beresford could have passed the Guadiana, and have blockaded Badajoz on the 26th March, and in all probability the place would have fallen into our hands as Campo Maior had, or as Almeida subsequently did, as it was at that time unprovided with stores or with provisions. As it was, he could not pass the Guadiana till the 4th April, and could not advance till the 6th or 7th; and in the intermediate time the enemy threw into the place all the provisions and stores which it required to last till the enemy were enabled finally to relieve it in the middle of June.

When the French crossed the Agueda on the 9th April, they left Almeida to its fate, and it was immediately invested and blockaded by our troops. The enemy retired beyond the Tormes, some of them even beyond the Duero, and abandoned Ciudad Rodrigo as well as Almeida. Our army, however, was scarcely strong enough to maintain the blockade of Almeida, and certainly could not have maintained that of Ciudad Rodrigo.† Indeed the state of the Agueda rendered it impossible for us to draw supplies across that river.

The enemy having passed the Duero, Almeida being invested, and matters appearing tolerably quiet on the frontiers of Castille, the head quarters were moved on the 15th April into Alentejo, and arrived at Elvas on the 20th. Sir W. Beresford had crossed the Guadiana on the 4th April, and had blockaded both Badajoz and Olivença. The garrison of the latter place having refused to surrender, guns were brought from Elvas, and Lieut. Gen. Cole forced the place to surrender on the 15th April.‡

In the mean time Sir W. Beresford advanced with the 2d division of infantry, and Gen. Hamilton's division, and the cavalry, as well to force the enemy to retire from Estremadura entirely, as to give support to Gen. Ballesteros, who had been obliged to retire into that province from the Condado de Niebla. Marshal Beresford surprised the enemy's cavalry on the 16th April, at Los Santos, and defeated them with considerable loss.§

Badajoz was reconnoitred on the 22d, and the general plan for the attack was fixed. But unfortunately the rain which had fallen in the third week in April, swelled the Guadiana considerably; and the bridge which Marshal Sir W. Beresford had constructed under Jurumenha, with great trouble and difficulty, and after much delay, was swept away in the night of the 23d April. Marshal Sir W. Beresford was consequently instructed to delay the operations of the siege till he should have re-established the bridge, or till the river should become fordable. The Marshal was like-

* See memorandum of the 20th Jan., in the letter to Mr. Wellesley of the 23d.

† See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 9th and 15th April.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 25th April.

§ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 25th April.

wise instructed and authorised to fight a battle, in case he should think it expedient, in order to save the siege of Badajoz; and these instructions applied as well to the corps under Gen. Blake, which landed about this time at Ayamonte.*

All these arrangements being made, the head quarters were again transferred to the frontiers of Castille. They quitted Elvas on the 25th April, and arrived at Alameda on the 28th. Intelligence had been received that orders had arrived from Paris, for Massena to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida; in which attempt Marshal Bessières was to co-operate with part of the army of the north.†

The enemy's army was collected at Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April, but the same fall of rain which had swelled the rivers in Estremadura, likewise swelled those in Castille, and they did not advance till the 2d May.‡ They attacked us at Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3d and 5th, but could make no impression upon us, and at length retired on the 10th, and the whole were across the Agueda on that night.§

In the middle of the night of the 10th, after the blockade was completely resumed in force, Gen. Brenier, the governor of Almeida, blew up the place, and made his escape with his garrison across the bridge of Barba de Puerco. This event was to be attributed to a variety of unfortunate circumstances.

1st; The officer commanding the Queen's regiment, who was close to the place, was not aware of the nature of the explosion which he heard, or that the garrison had escaped, and made no movement.

2dly; The officer commanding the 4th regt., who had been ordered to Barba de Puerco, at 1 o'clock on the 10th, when the French retired, missed his road; and although the distance he had to march was only 3 miles, he did not reach Barba de Puerco till the morning of the 11th, after the French had arrived there.

3dly; The 8th Portuguese regt. had been ordered to march from its cantonments at Junça to Barba de Puerco, in case an explosion should be heard. These orders were obeyed; the regiment marched to Barba de Puerco, and arrived before the French, and before Major Gen. Campbell, with the 4th and 36th regts.; but finding nothing there but a piquet of

* See instructions to Sir W. Beresford in dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d May (A).

See letter to Gen. Castaños in the same dispatch.

† It is a curious circumstance, and shows what good intelligence we had, that these accounts were received at Elvas, together with accounts of the day Massena was to set out from Salamanca, and our head quarters arrived at Alameda in Castille on the day before Massena arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‡ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 1st, 8th, 10th, and 15th May.

§ The enemy never had such a superiority of numbers opposed to the British troops as in this action. They had all the infantry of the 4 corps which had been in Portugal, and all the cavalry. In addition to which they had 3 fresh regiments of cavalry, which could not have less than 1200 men, and 900 cavalry of the Guard.

We had, British cavalry	1,331
.. infantry	18,000
Portuguese cavalry	300
.. infantry	10,142

But we had two divisions, the 5th and 6th, and Gen. Pack's brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry on the left, either forming or protecting the blockade, and these troops were not engaged. The enemy had about 5 to 1 of cavalry, and more than 2 to 1 of infantry engaged.

cavalry, and the Commanding officer believing that he had mistaken the nature of the explosion, returned again to his cantonments.*

The 3d and 7th divisions were ordered off to Estremadura on the 13th and 14th; and accounts having been received on the 15th that Soult was about to advance from Seville, the head quarters were again removed on the following day to Elvas, where they arrived on the 19th. Sir W. Beresford had invested Badajoz on both sides of the Guadiana on the 4th, and he broke ground on the 8th. He lost some men on the right of the river, in front of the *tête de pont*, on the first day, and a considerable number in a sortie made by the enemy on the 10th. On the 12th, the Marshal heard of the collection of a large body of troops by Marshal Soult, in the neighbourhood of Seville, and of their march towards Estremadura, and he immediately raised the siege; and, according to the instructions and recommendation left with them, he and the Spanish Generals collected their troops on the Albuera rivulet.†

The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th May, on the ground pointed out in those instructions. That which was most conspicuous in the battle of Albuera was the want of discipline of the Spaniards. These troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but it was hopeless to think of moving them. In the morning the enemy gained an eminence which commanded the whole extent of the line of the allies, which either was occupied, or was intended to be occupied, by the Spanish troops. The natural operation would have been to re-occupy this ground by means of the Spanish troops; but that was impossible. The British troops were consequently moved there; and all the loss sustained by those troops was incurred in regaining a height which ought never for a moment to have been in possession of the enemy.‡ After the battle of Albuera, the enemy retired leisurely to Llerena and Guadalcanal.§

It was obvious, from the immense superiority of cavalry which they showed in that battle, and that, as the allies were but little superior in total strength, and had beaten them with difficulty, and could derive no great advantage from their success, it was hopeless to attack Soult in the position which he had taken at Llerena. There was nothing to prevent him from retiring upon Seville, or even upon the troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, if he should have found himself so pressed as to render that measure necessary; and the arrival of reinforcements, which it will appear he had reason to expect, would have placed in a state of risk the troops which would have obliged him to take this step. But this reasoning supposes that Soult would have considered himself under the necessity of retiring from the strong position of Llerena and Guadalcanal, in consequence of the measures which we might have adopted in Estre-

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 15th May.

† See reports of Sir W. Beresford, enclosed in a dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d May.

‡ This is stated, because it has been matter of dispute whether the Spaniards had or had not occupied the height before the French were on it. They were certainly ordered to occupy the ground, and their piquets were on it; but it is not clear that they had occupied it in sufficient strength before the French troops were on it.

§ See dispatches from Marshal Beresford, enclosed in dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 22d, 23d, and 24th May.

madura in the end of May. I believe there is no foundation for this hypothesis.

The allied troops, which were sent from the frontiers of Castille, and arrived at Campo Maior on the 23d and 24th May, were rather more than equal to the loss sustained in the battle of Albuera, and in the first siege of Badajoz. It had been obvious in the battle of Albuera, that we could not reckon upon the Spaniards in any affair of manœuvre, and therefore that we could not rely upon them in such an operation as the attack of Soult's army in the positions of Guadalcanal and Llerena.*

But the effect of these operations, even if well executed, could only be to force Soult to fall back for a time; and here the question arose whether it was worth while to attempt it. It was known that Drouet had marched with 17 or 19 battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the '*Armée de Portugal*,' from Salamanca, on the 16th or 17th May, destined for a reinforcement to Soult; and it was calculated that these battalions would join Soult on or about the 8th June.†

Under these circumstances, it was deemed better not to lose the time between the 25th May and the 8th June by an attempt to attack Soult, which appeared hopeless; and to take advantage of our superiority in the battle of Albuera, and in the early arrival of our reinforcements, to make a vigorous attack upon Badajoz. Accordingly, the place was reinvested on the 25th May, and the fire was opened on the 2d June.‡

There appeared every ground for belief that we should have been able to obtain possession of the place before the day on which it was possible that Soult could advance for its relief. It is certain that its possession depended upon the possession of the outwork of San Cristoval, which commanded the point of attack in the castle. This outwork was deemed to be in a state to be taken by storm on the 6th, and again on the 9th. Both attempts failed; and the question whether Badajoz could be taken or not in the time which remained, during which the allied army could be applied to that operation, came to be one of means, upon which we were decidedly of opinion that we had it not in our power to take the place; and therefore we raised the siege on the 10th, although we continued the blockade till the 17th.§

While the operations of the second siege of Badajoz were going on, accounts were received that Marshal Marmont was about to move from Salamanca into Estremadura, in order to aid Soult in his operations for the relief of Badajoz.|| The first movements of the army were upon Ciudad Rodrigo, into which place Marmont introduced a convoy on the 6th June. Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer retired across the Coa; and Marmont then turned about, and marched through the Puerto de Baños, to Plasencia. Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer made a corresponding movement

* See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 22d and 24th May.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d May.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 30th May.

§ I believe the failure in the attack upon San Cristoval is, like many other events, to be attributed to the want of experience in the British army: 1st; the battery to breach the wall ought to have been placed on the crest of the glacis: 2dly; if it was not, care ought to have been taken from the commencement to prevent the enemy from clearing the rubbish while the fire was continued upon the wall.

|| See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 6th, 13th, and 20th June.

on Castello Branco, at which place he received intelligence of the enemy having had posts on the Alagon, and the cavalry in Coria, and some doubts were entertained of their intention to cross the Tagus. The head of their army, however, crossed that river on the 12th, and arrived at Truxillo on the 13th; and the advanced guard was at Merida, and in communication with Soult, on the 15th.

Soult had broken up from Llerena and Guadalcanal on the 12th, as soon as he was joined by Drouet; and he moved upon Zafra, and his advanced guard to Los Santos, on the 13th. The allied army were immediately concentrated upon Albuera, with the exception of the 3d and 7th divisions, which kept the blockade of Badajoz. But the accounts of the arrival at Truxillo of the advanced guard of the '*Armée de Portugal*' having arrived at Albuera, and Soult* having made a movement from Zafra on Almendralejo, having thus shown that he knew of the arrival of that army, it was deemed expedient to retire across the Guadiana.

As far as we could form a judgment, the French had at that time assembled in Estremadura 60,000 men, of which 7000 were cavalry.

The British army consisted of

Cavalry	1,671
Infantry	11,812

The Portuguese :

Cavalry	900
Infantry	12,885

And Gen. Blake had about 8,000 men.

The head of Sir B. Spencer's column did not join till the 20th, the 5th division not till the 24th. The strength of the whole army, when collected together, was :

British infantry	25,123
Portuguese infantry	18,926
British cavalry	3,197
Portuguese cavalry	1,200†

It would have been impossible for the allies to maintain the blockade of Badajoz with the strength which they could produce against that of the enemy, in the days which intervened between the 17th and 24th June; nor could the allies pretend to attack the enemy in Estremadura, composed as they were, being, after all, even including the Spaniards and Sir B. Spencer, inferior in numbers, particularly of cavalry, and very inferior in composition.

These circumstances were stated in a conference with Gen. Blake on the 14th June, at Albuera, and in a previous letter to him; and he was urged either to co-operate with the allied British and Portuguese army, or, having crossed the Guadiana at Jurumenha, to move down the right bank, and to cross that river at Mertola, and to endeavor to obtain possession of Seville, while the enemy's attention should be drawn to us on the frontier of Alentejo. Gen. Blake preferred the last operation, and he

* Soult brought to Zafra little more than his advanced guard and cavalry. The main body of the army marched direct from Llerena upon Almendralejo and Merida.

† This account includes the 5th division and Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which did not arrive at Portalegre till the 24th June. The 5th division consisted of about 5000 men. In this account artillery is not included.

recrossed the Guadiana on the 22d June.* But, instead of moving at once upon Seville, he attempted to obtain possession of Niebla on the 30th June, where the enemy had only 300 men, in which attempt he failed;† and Soult having, towards the end of the month of June, discovered Gen. Blake's movement, and detached a body of troops into Andalusia, Gen. Blake embarked at Ayamonte on the 6th July.‡ While this was going on, the allied British and Portuguese army took a position on the 19th June between Elvas and Campo Maior. The particular object in taking this position was to protect those places, and to insure the arrival into them of the convoys of provisions and stores destined for their supply.§ The enemy reconnoitred the position of the army on the 22d June, but they never showed any inclination to attack it.||

The armies remained opposite to each other till the 14th July, when Marmont retired across the Tagus, and cantoned his army about Placencia, &c., and along the Tagus to Talavera; and Drouet removed the 5th corps to Zafra. Before these troops separated, the allies were certainly stronger than the enemy in infantry: the enemy were strongest in cavalry; but the attack of the enemy would have answered no purpose, excepting to oblige them to retire from Estremadura. That object was likely to be accomplished without incurring the risk of an attack with inferior numbers of cavalry, and without exposing the troops to the inconvenience of making long marches in Estremadura in that season.

The enemy having retired from Estremadura, the question regarding the future operations of the army was maturely considered, and it was determined to remove the seat of the war to the frontiers of Castille.¶ The grounds of that decision were,

1st; That in that season we could not venture to undertake any thing against Badajoz.

2dly; That we were not strong enough to venture into Andalusia.

3dly; That from all the information I had received, the strength of the northern army was less than that of the south, and that the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which was destined to oppose us in whatever point we should direct our operations, was not likely to be so strongly supported in the north as in the south. In this supposition I was mistaken. The army of the north, even before the reinforcements arrived, was stronger than that in the south; but it must be observed that there is nothing so difficult as to obtain information of the enemy's numbers in Spain. There is but little communication between one town and another; and although the most minute account of numbers which have passed through one town can always be obtained, no information can be obtained of what is passing in the next. To this add, that the disposition of the Spaniards naturally leads them to exaggerate the strength and success of themselves and their friends, and to despise that of the enemy, and it will not be matter of surprise that we should so often have been misinformed regarding the enemy's numbers.

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d June.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 11th July.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 18th July.

§ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 20th and 27th June, and 4th July.

|| See dispatches of the 18th and 25th July.

¶ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 18th July.

The first intention was to remain in the cantonments of the Alentejo, which had been taken up as soon as Marmont had retired, till the train and stores should have been brought up from Oporto, to make the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. The march of the troops would consequently not have taken place till the beginning of September. The movement was made in the end of July and beginning of August, for the following reasons.

In the end of July it was discovered, that notwithstanding Marshal Bessières had evacuated the Asturias and Astorga when Marmont moved into Estremadura in the beginning of July, and had thereby increased the disposable force under his command, Don Julian had been so successful in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, that up to that moment the enemy had not been able to keep open any communication with the place, or to supply it at all with provisions.

A return of the supplies in the place, when it was left by Marmont in the beginning of June, had likewise been intercepted, from which it appeared that the provisions would be exhausted by the 20th Aug.* It was therefore determined to send the army across the Tagus immediately, and to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should not have been supplied; and if it should, to canton the army in Lower Beira, till the train and stores should have arrived.† We did not receive intelligence that the place had been supplied till we went so forward as to disclose our design against the place. But there were two other reasons for taking up cantonments for the summer in Castille rather than in Lower Beira: one was, that in Castille we could procure supplies of provisions, which we much wanted, and we could procure none in Beira; the other was, that by threatening Ciudad Rodrigo, we were likely to relieve Galicia, and Gen. Abadia's army, from the attack with which both were threatened by the army of the north.

We accordingly made the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in the first week in August, and continued it from that time forward. The train for the siege would have arrived at Almeida in the first week of September.‡ But before that period, accounts were received of the arrival in Spain of the enemy's reinforcements. It was also discovered by an intercepted return of the army of the north, that they were much stronger than they had been supposed in July, when the plan was determined upon to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.§ Under these circumstances, and as Almeida was not in a state to give security to the heavy train and its stores, it was determined not to bring the equipment forward, and to confine our efforts to the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.||

In the third week of September, the enemy collected the whole army of the north (with the exception of Bonet's division, which observed Abadia's movements on the side of Galicia), and 2 divisions from Na-

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 1st Aug.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 8th Aug.

‡ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th and 21st Aug.

§ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 28th Aug. for the accounts of the enemy's reinforcements and strength. See dispatches written to Lord Liverpool in September.

|| For the account of all that passed in respect to putting Almeida in a state of repair, see dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 5th Aug. The place is now nearly entirely re-established as a *place d'armes*.

varre, which had recently come from Calabria, and 5 divisions, and all the cavalry of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' to escort a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo.* They had not less than 60,000 men,† of which more than 6000 were cavalry, to which we could oppose about 40,000. If we had fought a battle to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, we must have had the river Agueda and the place in our rear; and if defeated, a retreat was impossible.

Although we did not fight a battle to protect the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the army was assembled on the left of the Agueda, and a partial engagement, highly honorable to the troops, was fought at El Bodon on the 25th Sept. The object of taking a position so near to the enemy was to force them to show their army. This was an object, because the people of the country, as usual, believed and reported that the enemy were not so strong as we knew them to be; and if they had not seen the enemy's strength, they would have entertained a very unfavorable opinion of the British army, which it was desirable to avoid. This object was accomplished by the operations at the close of September.

Although the removal of the army from the Alentejo did not accomplish all the objects which were in view when the movement was made, it had the effect of obliging the enemy to collect their whole force for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon all their other operations and objects.‡ The army of the north were obliged to discontinue their operations against Abadia, and still further, to call to their assistance 2 divisions which had recently arrived from Calabria, and were employed in Navarre against the guerrilla Mina. Mina's success in Navarre has consequently been extraordinary, and his numbers have rapidly increased.

After the operations for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was determined to persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the disposition of their force, and to continue to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo with an attack, in order to keep a large force of the

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 29th Sept.

† Besides these 60,000 men, Gen. Foy was at Plasencia with one division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and some troops of the army of the centre, with which he co-operated with Marmont, and actually ascended the mountains by the Pass of Perales and Poyo on our right. For the state of the strength of the allied army in the field, see the *Morning Star*, sent to Lord Liverpool every week since the month of July. The 2d and Gen. Hamilton's divisions of infantry and the 2d division of cavalry have always been in the Alentejo, with the exception of Gen. De Grey's brigade of the latter, while it continued on the strength of that division of cavalry.

‡ See dispatch from Sir H. Douglas, of the 5th Sept.

There is nothing more comical than the lies published in the *Moniteur* about the expedition to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting that our newspapers don't notice them. It is not possible that either Marmont or Dorsenne could have written such nonsense as has appeared with their names affixed to it. They say that they heard of our approach to the Coa in the beginning of September; we approached the Coa on the 6th Aug., and they knew it at Salamanca on the 14th. They then say, that in consequence of this knowledge, acquired in the beginning of September, Dorsenne attacked Galicia; he attacked Abadia in Galicia on the 25th Aug. Marmont then took 4 guns on the 25th Sept.; but he forgets to say that we retook the only 2 which he had taken for a moment. The comical part of that story is, that Major Gordon, who was in the French head quarters on the 26th, offered to lay a wager that the *Moniteur* would mention that the guns had been taken, but would omit the sequel of the story. (See Appendix, No. XI.)

See the dispatches and *Morning States* sent to Lord Liverpool in October, November, and December

enemy employed to observe our operations, and to prevent them from undertaking any operation elsewhere.

To this system we were forced, not less by the relative strength of the two armies, than by the extraordinary sickness of our own troops. All the soldiers who had recently arrived from England, and all those who had been in Walcheren, and vast numbers of officers, were attacked by fever, not of a very violent description, but they were rendered unable to perform any duty, and those who recovered relapsed upon making any exertions. Even if an opportunity had offered, therefore, for undertaking any thing on this side, the unfortunate state of the army would have prevented it.

It would not have answered to remove the army to the frontiers of Estremadura, where a chance of effecting some important object might have offered;* as in that case Gen. Abadia would have been left to himself, and would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the army of the north. We availed ourselves of the opportunity which offered of striking a blow against Girard in Estremadura, by which the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana was relieved from the enemy.†

But little notice has been taken in this memorandum of the operations of the Spaniards, which having been confined principally to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, have been but little influenced by those on the western side. Tortosa was surrendered by treachery on the 2d Jan., as Lerida had been but a short time before. The troops under Suchet then prepared to attack Tarragona, which place was taken by storm on the 28th June.

In the course of the winter it had appeared, by an intercepted letter, to be Soult's intention to attack Carthage, in order to be prepared to attack Valencia on both sides in concert with Suchet. He attempted to carry this intention into execution in the month of July, after he had obliged Gen. Blake to embark at Ayamonte. Gen. Blake, however, went with his army by sea to the coast of Murcia, and landed it there in August, while Soult moved in that direction by Granada. It appears that Gen. Blake quitted the army as soon as it had formed a junction with the army of Murcia, called the 3d army, and he proceeded to Valencia, leaving Gen. Freyre in the command of the troops in Murcia. The French advanced from Granada, but the Spaniards did not retreat in time, and their loss was very great.‡ They had time, however, to re-assemble their dispersed divisions, and the people in Murcia took arms; and partly on this account, partly on account of the prevalence of the yellow fever at Carthage and throughout Murcia, and partly because the movement of the allied British and Portuguese army upon Ciudad Rodrigo rendered necessary a concentration of the French forces in the Peninsula, Soult returned to the westward, and arrived at Seville on the 17th Sept.§

In the mean time, Suchet, having been joined by reinforcements from

* See Sir H. Douglas's dispatch of the 29th Oct., in answer to a question upon that point.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 6th Nov.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 18th Sept.

§ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 9th Oct.

France, and having dispersed the troops which Gen. Lacy had attempted to collect in Catalonia, penetrated into the kingdom of Valencia.* Gen. Blake had been since August preparing for the defence of that city, and he collected there the army of Valencia, and others from Aragon and Catalonia; and latterly, Gen. Mahy marched from Murcia to join him with the troops which Gen. Blake had brought from Cadiz, and a part of the 3d army, *i. e.* that of Murcia. Suchet having gained possession of Oropesa, commenced an attack on the castle of Saguntum on the 29th Sept.† He made several attempts to obtain possession of this castle by storm, in all of which he failed; and at last, having brought up a few heavy guns, he broke ground regularly before the place, and made a breach in its wall. He made several attempts to carry the breach by storm, in all of which he failed.

As soon as Gen. Blake was joined at Valencia by the troops from Murcia, under Gen. Mahy,‡ he moved out from Valencia on the 24th Oct., and on the 25th attacked Suchet, and was defeated, with the loss of some prisoners and 8 pieces of cannon. The French immediately summoned the garrison of Saguntum to surrender, which they did upon capitulation. Suchet advanced upon Valencia, and it is understood that he opened his fire upon a part of the intrenched position occupied by Blake in front of the town on the 25th Nov.§ It is likewise stated, that on the 2d Dec. there was a severe action at Valencia, in which the French suffered considerably.

These circumstances, and the movement of Marmont's army towards Toledo, as is supposed, to aid Suchet, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. By these measures we shall bring Marmont back, and probably oblige the army of the north to re-assemble.

Since Suchet has been in Valencia, the guerrillas have been very active and enterprising in Aragon and Navarre. Mina defeated a detachment of 1100 men, sent against him, only 3 of whom escaped; and, besides other advantages of small amount, he and the Empecinado, and Duran, having joined, it is reported that they had taken the garrison of Daroca, consisting of 2400 men.

When Gen. Blake embarked on the 6th July from the mouth of the Guadiana, he left there Gen. Ballesteros with a division of troops, which likewise embarked, and went to the Sierra de Ronda on the 24th Aug.|| He has been very successful against the French by his light operations in rear of the army, blockading Cadiz; and he has always a secure retreat open upon Gibraltar.¶ In order to aid Gen. Ballesteros, and to give additional security to Tarifa, Col. Skerrett, with about 1200 men, was detached thither from Cadiz on the 10th Oct. By this measure the French were obliged to retire from San Roque on the night of the 21st Oct., in which position they had kept Ballesteros blockaded under the guns of

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 23d Oct.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 6th Nov.

‡ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of 13th, 20th, and 27th Nov.

§ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of 4th, 12th, 18th, and 25th Dec.

|| See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 4th Sept.

¶ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 23d Oct.

Gibraltar; and Ballesteros did them much mischief in their retreat, and in a subsequent attack which he made upon one of their detachments at Bornos.* He was afterwards again obliged to retire in the end of November under protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and Col. Skerrett, and the Spanish General Copons, to Tarifa. The object of the French on this occasion was to attack Tarifa, while they should keep Ballesteros blockaded.† But they had commenced to retire on the 12th Dec.

From this memorandum it will be seen, that if the Spaniards had behaved with common prudence, or if their conduct had been even tolerably good, the result of Massena's campaign in Portugal must have been the relief of the south of the Peninsula.

We had to contend with the consequences of the faults of some, the treachery of others, and the folly and vanity of all. But although our success has not been what it might and ought, we have at least lost no ground, and with a handful of British troops fit for service we have kept the enemy in check in all quarters since the month of March.

Till now they have gained nothing, and have made no progress on any side. It is to be apprehended that they will succeed in Valencia; but I believe there is no man who knows the state of affairs in that province, and has read Suchet's account of his action with Blake on the 25th Oct., who does not believe that, if Blake had not fought that action, Valencia would have been safe. Are the English Ministers and Generals responsible for the blunders of Blake?

Instructions to General officers commanding divisions employed in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Gallegos, 1st Jan. 1812.

The Commander of the Forces proposes to attack Ciudad Rodrigo; and in order that the troops may suffer as little as possible from exposure to the weather, he intends that the operations shall be carried on by each of the divisions of the army employed, alternately, for 24 hours.

Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, with the exception of the 4th caçadores, will do duty with the Light division.

The 4th caçadores will do duty with the 1st division.

* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 13th Nov.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 25th Dec.

G. O.

Freneda, 1st Jan. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in communicating to the army letters from the Sec. of State, and from H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, conveying the commands of H. R. H. the Prince Regent on the recent expedition into Estremadura, under the command of Lieut. Gen. Hill.

5. * * * * *

6. The Commander of the Forces requests the officer commanding the — regt., and the officers commanding regiments in general, to call the attention of the troops in a very particular manner to the crime of which serj. — and a party of soldiers of the — regt. under his command were guilty. It has given the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern to receive frequent reports lately of the outrages committed by the soldiers of the army on the inhabitants of the country; he is happy, however, to find, that these outrages have, in general, been committed by those who have been a short time with the army; and he trusts that when they shall become acquainted with the good qualities of the inhabitants, and when they shall have found that they cannot commit these crimes with impunity, they will cease to commit them. The Commander of the Forces is determined to carry into execution, in every instance, the sentence of a General Court Martial, whatever it may be, on any soldier who does any injury to an inhabitant of the Peninsula.

When a division is ordered for the duty of the siege, each of the battalions belonging to it is to march from its cantonments before daylight in the morning. The troops from the several cantonments of the division separately, by the shortest and most convenient route, which the General officers commanding divisions are requested to ascertain. The troops will be able to cross at the fords above La Caridad, and all the fords below the ford of Los Carboneros inclusive. The troops are to have with them a day's provisions cooked, and they are to be followed by two days' spirits, and no other baggage.

A sufficient number of men to cook the provisions for the day the division is relieved are to be left in the cantonments.

As soon as the first battalion of the relieving division shall arrive on the ground, the General officer commanding the division which has performed the duty for the preceding 24 hours, will commence the relief, by sending off to their cantonments a proportionate number of troops, those of course first which have the greatest distance to go to their cantonments, and the relief will proceed in proportion as the troops shall arrive.

The chief engineer will require daily from each division 20 miners and 30 artificers, or persons accustomed to work, with a proportion of non-commissioned officers.

These men will be fixed upon before the troops march from their cantonments, and are to be placed under his directions (with a list of their names and the regiments to which they belong) on the arrival of the troops on the ground.

Each regiment is to take along with it the intrenching tools belonging to it.

There will be orders daily respecting the working parties, covering parties, guards, &c.

The musket and rifle ammunition attached to the Light division is to be taken to the ground the first day, and remain there. The 9 pounders attached to the 4th division will likewise be taken to the ground on the first day, and remain there. The artillerymen are to be relieved daily, by those belonging to the brigades and troops attached to the 1st, 4th, and Light divisions.

The Engineers will order to the ground a sufficiency of cutting tools, to enable those men not immediately on duty to supply themselves with firewood. These tools to be handed over from the relieved to the relieving division.

Each division to be attended by the medical staff belonging to it. A place will be fixed upon to which men who may be wounded are to be carried to be dressed, and means will be provided for removing them from thence to their cantonments.

Memorandum for Mr. Bissett, Lieut. Col. Fletcher, and Major Dickson.

Freneda, 1st Jan. 1812.

1. The cars sent by Gen. Alava, now employed in collecting at Las Agallas the fascines, gabions, and pickets, made by the Light and 3d divisions, and all the cars at the cantonments occupied by the Light division and Major Gen. Colville's brigade in the 3d division, to rendezvous

at Las Agallas on the 5th, to be loaded with gabions, and fascines, and pickets on the same day, and to move on the following morning to Ciudad Rodrigo.

2. Lieut. Col. Fletcher will charge the officer of engineers at Las Agallas with the management of this concern.

3. The 90 cars unemployed and in readiness (see separate memorandum), and the 66, expected to arrive this day, are to be sent on the 2d to Almeida; 50 of them are to be loaded with the small stores required by Major Dickson, 106 must be loaded with what is required by Col. Fletcher, and to move on the 3d to Gallegos.

4. All the carts in the cantonments occupied by the 3d division, except Major Gen. Colville's brigade, by the 4th division, including those sent by Gen. Alava and Gen. Pack's brigade, by Major Gen. Stopford's brigade, and the 40 carts expected from Don Julian, are to rendezvous at Gallegos on the 5th, on which day they are to be loaded with fascines and gabions.

5. The 16 cars at Salices are to be loaded with fascines and gabions on the 5th.

6. The 50 carts which will have brought the small stores of the artillery to Gallegos (see separate memorandum) on the 3d, are to be unloaded the same day, and to be loaded at Gallegos with fascines and gabions.

7. The carts mentioned in the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th articles, are to move to Ciudad Rodrigo, loaded with engineers' stores and materials, on the 6th.

8. The mules (50) in the engineers' department to be sent on the 2d to Almeida, to be loaded with engineers' tools, and to proceed on the 3d to Gallegos, on the 4th to return to Almeida for the remainder of the tools, on the 5th to Gallegos, and on the 6th to Ciudad Rodrigo.

9.	53 mules with the 1st division,			
	48	3d ..
	51	4th ..
	68	7th ..
	102	Light ..

to proceed to Almeida on the 3d, and to be loaded with powder and shot in their proper proportions, and to proceed on the 4th to Gallegos.

10. The gun bullocks now grazing at and in the neighbourhood of Celorico to go to Almeida as soon as possible, to draw the guns from Almeida to Gallegos on the , and from Gallegos to Ciudad Rodrigo on the .

11. In proportion as the mules belonging to the reserve ammunition of the 5th and 6th divisions and cavalry shall arrive at Almeida with powder and shot from Villa da Ponte, they are to be loaded with powder and shot in their due proportions, and sent on the first day to Gallegos, and on the second to Ciudad Rodrigo.

12. The carts now employed with Major Sturgeon, and the new carts, are to be sent to Almeida as soon as he shall have done with them, to be loaded with powder and shot in their due proportions, and to carry those articles to Gallegos, there lay them down, return the following day to Almeida, and the following day bring fresh loads to Gallegos.

13. The mules mentioned in the 9th and 11th articles will be employed to carry this powder and shot forward from Gallegos to Ciudad Rodrigo.

14. The carts mentioned in the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th articles, are to return to Gallegos and Las Agallas on the day after they shall have quitted those places, to be reloaded with fascines, gabions, &c., and to proceed on the following day to Ciudad Rodrigo.

N.B. It is desirable that the mules mentioned in the 9th article should lodge the ammunition (small arm) at the following places on their way to Almeida :

That of the 1st division, Alameda.

3d and 4th ditto, Gallegos.

7th ditto, Sabugal.

Light ditto, Guinaldo.

Memorandum for Mr. Bissett, Lieut. Col. Fletcher, and Major Dickson.

Freneda, 1st Jan. 1812.

90 cars are now at Freneda, and 66 expected from Brig. Alava, to be sent on the 2d to Almeida to be loaded; 106 with engineers' stores and 50 with small stores of the artillery, to carry these articles on the 3d to Gallegos, return on the 4th to Almeida and load with powder and shot; return on the 5th to Gallegos and lay down the powder and shot, and to be reloaded with engineers' stores, to proceed to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 6th.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 1st Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a list of medicines and materials required for the service of the army in this country; and I will thank your Lordship to give directions that this requisition may be immediately attended to.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 1st Jan. 1812.

The division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' cantoned about the sources of the Tormes, broke up with precipitation on the 26th Dec., and marched in the direction of Avila; and it is reported that the division cantoned at Avila were making preparations to march likewise; but they had not marched on the 29th. I have not yet heard that the '*Armée de Portugal*' have passed Talavera. They have their posts still at Naval Moral.

I have received reports that the cavalry of the Guard had returned to France, and that the infantry of the Guard had likewise moved from Valladolid in a northerly direction. I conclude that all these movements have for their object to support Suchet's operations in Valencia; or even to co-operate with him, by keeping in check the guerrillas from whom he has received so much injury. I propose, therefore, to make an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo, in which, if I should not succeed, I shall at least bring back some of the troops of the army of the north and the '*Armée de Portugal*;' and shall so far relieve the guerrillas and the Spanish armies in Valencia.

I have had no accounts upon which I can rely, of the state of affairs at

Valencia since the 20th Nov.; but I hear from Madrid that Suchet was still before the place on the 10th of last month.

Lieut. Gen. Hill moved on the 24th and 25th Dec., but I have not yet heard of his arrival at Merida.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 25th Dec., I have received the dispatches from Cadiz which had not then reached me. It appears that Col. Skerrett had, at the requisition of Gen. Ballesteros, embarked at Algeiras on the 29th Nov., and had gone to Gibraltar to aid Gen. Ballesteros in an attack upon the enemy. He had however returned to Tarifa on the 2d Dec., having learned from an intercepted letter that the enemy's object was certainly to endeavor to obtain possession of that post. They had made no attack upon it on the 13th Dec.; and Gen. Castaños, who had letters from Cadiz of the 20th, informs me that Gen. Ballesteros was at Los dos Barrios, according to the last account.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Freneda, 2d Jan. 1812.

Mr. Stuart has communicated to me your letter to him of the 28th Dec. last, upon which I think it proper to give you some instructions.

As the officer commanding His Majesty's troops at Lisbon, you ought to have no official communication with any person, excepting myself, and the Lieutenant General commanding the Portuguese troops in the province of Estremadura, under whose command you must necessarily be, and with whom you were directed to communicate by my letter of the 23d June, 1809.

Even the Commanding officer of His Majesty's troops in this country is ordered to have no communication with the servants of the Portuguese or Spanish governments, excepting through His Majesty's minister at their Courts respectively; and I have been most cautious in abstaining from any communication with the Portuguese government, on any concern of the British army, excepting through Mr. Villiers or Mr. Stuart.

According to the rules for the conduct of the military service, all your communications with Mr. Stuart or the Admiral, or any other independent British authority, should be carried on through me; but these authorities, as well as I, have thought it most convenient for the King's service that you should communicate directly with them respectively; and it is desirable that this practice should continue.

But I am particularly anxious that the King's commands in regard to all communications with the servants of the Portuguese and Spanish governments should be strictly adhered to; and that you should have no communication, upon a public subject, with any servant of the Portuguese government (excepting the Lieutenant General commanding in the province of Estremadura) unless through His Majesty's minister at Lisbon.

In regard to the Spanish minister at Lisbon, you have nothing to say to him, nor he to you, on any public subject. If you conceive that you have any reason to complain of any Spanish officer or soldier at Lisbon, you will make your complaint known to the Lieutenant General of the province; if of any other individual of the Spanish nation, you will state the case to His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, who will make such repre-

sentations on the subject as he may think proper to the Portuguese government.

I write to the Portuguese government in regard to the Spanish troops casually at Lisbon being considered independent of the Lieutenant General commanding in the province of Estremadura.

I have sent to Gen. Castaños regarding the order to the Spanish officer commanding the Spanish detachments at that place, to have his troops paraded in order that the soldier may be pitched upon who committed the outrage on the serjeant of the Chasseurs Britanniques, and I have been assured that it was sent, and that it will be repeated.

I will, however, let you know when I shall hear that the government have settled that all the Spanish detachments at Lisbon are placed, as they ought to be, under the general superintendence of the Lieutenant General commanding in the province of Estremadura.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 2d Jan. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 28th Dec. I think the proclamation drawn by Dr. Nogueira will answer; and it ought to be completed at an early period.

I clearly understand Dr. Nogueira's plan on the paper money; and it is evident that the paper money must be stamped whenever it comes into the possession of the government; that a year's interest must be paid at a time; and that the paper must have been a year out of the hands of the government before any interest is due upon it. This is the constitution of paper money; and the holders of these securities have no right to expect that the government will alter this constitution for their benefit.

The question remaining to be discussed is, from what time the Portuguese government will resume the practice directed by the *Alvara* of the 23d July, 1797?

The first point for information is, whether the government have continued to stamp the paper in proportion as it has passed through their hands, since they have discontinued the payment of the interest. If they have, there will be no difficulty in commencing now to pay the interest on all the paper money now in circulation, excepting the want of money in the hands of the *Junta de Juros*. If they have not been in the habit of stamping the paper money, and it is now to go through the process of being stamped, it is obvious that, under the law, the measure of paying the interest, from which measure alone I expect that any advantage will be derived, must be delayed for twelve months!

I rather believe, however, that they have been in the habit of stamping the paper on every occasion on which it has passed through the hands of the officers of the government; and if this be true, I earnestly urge them to begin paying the interest due upon the paper from the beginning of this month. If they adopt that measure, I shall order that all the interest due upon the paper in the hands of the commissariat shall be remitted, or, in other words, that our paper shall go to the Treasury to be stamped.

I don't see any reason, however, why all the paper which may, at any time hereafter, come into our hands, should of course go to the Treasury to be stamped; and I shall not consent to that part of the arrangement.

In urging the government to commence paying the interest in the beginning of this month, I shall appear unreasonably tenacious of my own opinion against the clear statements and reasoning of Dr. Nogueira's paper. But I am of opinion, that when a government propose to act on the principle of good faith towards their creditors, and see the necessity of taking measures to support the credit of their paper currency, they should lose no time about it: they should carry into execution without delay the principle, whatever it is, on which they propose to act.

I am clearly of opinion that a country, in the situation in which Portugal is, should consider the maintenance of her military establishments, and the defence of the country, the first objects, because upon these depend not only the credit of the government, but the existence of the inhabitants. But after a sufficient revenue has been raised to defray the expense of the military establishments, then the pecuniary credit of the government becomes an object of anxiety. The measures to find funds to support that credit then take their natural station in the order of the duties of the government of the Kingdom; and when once it is determined to pay the interest of the debts of the state, and on the paper money in circulation, the funds to pay that interest must be first provided for.

I contend for it, therefore, that if the *Junta de Juros* have not funds sufficient to defray the interest due, some of the civil establishments should be put down in order to supply the Junta with funds sufficient, after it has been determined that it is expedient to pay the interest, of which no man entertains a doubt.

I have already informed the government how important it is to the financial concerns of this army, and to enable the British government to pay the subsidy, that the Governors of the Kingdom should come to a right decision upon this subject; and I have only to add, that if this decision does not raise the credit of the paper money, I must prevent the commissariat from receiving those securities in payment for the purchase of bills upon England.

In regard to the estimates for the army for the month of January, I refer you to a letter which I wrote on the 31st Dec. to Sir W. Beresford. I am aware that an estimate is not an account; but the only way to put a stop to extravagance and waste, is to look close into the estimate of any expense, and to endeavor to bring it as near as possible to the real expense.

I am glad to find that you reckon upon your 600 *contos* only for the expenses of January.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 3d Jan. 1812, 3 P.M.

Gen. Alava has just informed me that 45 carts have arrived here, of which we had before no intelligence. I have desired that they may go to Almeida to-morrow, to be employed next day in the manner pointed out in the separate memorandum of the 1st inst., for the cars on the 4th, 5th, and 6th inst.

Gen. Pack has been with me this day, and tells me, that unless we can assist him either with money or provisions, he must go to the rear. Could you let him have as much as 3000 dollars, which I should take care should be repaid *here* by the Portuguese government?

You are aware that we feed a Spanish battalion of 800 men in the province of Tras os Montes. Could we without inconvenience feed another battalion in the same province?

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 3d Jan. 1812.

I enclose my last dispatch. I propose to invest Ciudad Rodrigo on the 6th, and to break ground, if possible, on that night. The weather is, however, now very bad; the whole country being covered with snow. Hill was very near surprising Dombrowski at Merida on the 30th.

Since I wrote to you last, I find that La Peña's brother did not bring a letter from the Spanish government for King Joseph, but a verbal communication to the purport I mentioned. He has, however, been afraid to go and deliver the message; but I don't know for what reason he was not made to write it down, as Castaños intended he should, and then send it by another hand.

The A.G. to Capt. Poppleton, Commandant, Celorico.

3d Jan. 1812.

Your letter and enclosures relative to Assist. Provost — have been laid before the Commander of the Forces. I am to remark, that it appears irregular when an officer has been placed under close arrest for serious charges as alleged, that you should think he could be released to do his duty until the same are decided on. You will be pleased to appoint a good serjeant to act as Assist. Provost until further orders. You will likewise call on Assist. Provost — for an explanation of his conduct, reading to him the enclosed papers, and returning them to me, with what he has to urge in his defence.

I conclude that drummer — has not been punished, nor 400 lashes inflicted on him, for striking a market woman. He is not to receive this punishment, but await further orders.

To Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, 4th Jan. 1812.

I have perused the letter from Don Carlos de España, which your Excellency put into my hand yesterday, in regard to the distresses of the troops under his command; and I am much concerned that they are of a nature to induce that officer to desire to relinquish his situation, more particularly as it is entirely out of my power to adopt any of the measures which he proposes for their relief.

Don Carlos de España must have known that I had not the command of money in sufficient sums even for the wants of the troops under my command; he must have known that I have been obliged to send 3 divisions and almost all the cavalry of this army to the rear, because I am unable at present to feed them in front. And I am astonished, that on the eve of a great operation, which will require the exertion of every

G. O.

Freneda, 3d Jan. 1812.

2. The working parties, including the masons of the regiments of the British and Portuguese lines, now working at Almeida, are to join their corps to-morrow, and are to be discontinued from that time.

3. The carpenters, sawyers, smiths, and wheelwrights, working at Almeida under the G. O. of the 18th Nov., are to remain there till further orders.

A. G. O.

Freneda, 3d Jan. 1812.

The Commander of the Forces requests to have a return of the number of miners in the several regiments in the 1st, 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, and Gen. Pack's brigade. Likewise to have a list of the names of any officers disposed to act as engineers.

disciplined soldier who can be brought to the front, he should propose that I should be called upon to supply money, which he knows I have not, or food, which he knows I cannot get, for the support of 4000 recruits. 800 of these recruits are now in Tras os Montes, and are supplied by a British Commissary attached to them at great inconvenience and expense. I am willing to undertake to supply 800 more with provisions, provided they are sent into Tras os Montes, and provided a sufficient number of mules are attached to and sent with them, to carry the supplies which they will require from the magazine at S. João da Pesqueira to the station which these troops will occupy in Tras os Montes.

I have to inform your Excellency, that I have received intelligence that 4000 great coats, and other articles for 4000 men, being part of the requisition made by Don Carlos de España for these same men, have been embarked in the Thames, and may be expected daily at Oporto. I conclude, however, that as Don Carlos proposes that these men should be disbanded, he will not now require these articles.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 4th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose copies of my correspondence with Don Carlos de España in the month of November last; also of the letters which have lately passed between me and Gen. Castaños on the subject of the application of the Minister at War, that Gen. Hill's corps should make a forward movement, with the object of creating a diversion in favor of Gen. Ballesteros.

P. S. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Don Carlos de España, which Gen. Castaños put into my hands yesterday, on the subject of the destitute state of the division under his command; and the copy of my answer to Gen. Castaños.

Memorandum.

Freneda, 4th Jan. 1812.

1. 80 carts only of those which left Almeida yesterday, and are now at Gallegos, to be sent back to Almeida, to be there loaded with articles for Col. Fletcher, and to proceed to Gallegos on the 6th.

2. 40 carts of those now at Gallegos to come to Freneda on the 5th, to be loaded with stores of Col. Fletcher's at Freneda, and to go to Gallegos on the 6th.

3. The 45 carts which were sent to Almeida this morning, to be loaded with powder and shot, and to go to Gallegos on the 5th, and there remain; the powder and shot being laid down at Gallegos.

4. All the carts which shall go to Gallegos, excepting the 80 and 40 ordered away by the 1st and 2d articles of this memorandum, to be detained there, and loaded with materials and stores of the engineers' department.

The A.G. to Dr. Bolton, Dep. Inspector of hospitals.

4th Jan. 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 3d inst., relative to purveyors' clerks being allowed servant money in like manner with hospital mates, I am to acquaint you that his Excellency's pleasure has been taken upon the subject, and it cannot be allowed.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 5th Jan. 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose a letter received from Avila yesterday. According to Grant's accounts, I should imagine that there is still one division on the Upper Tormes, and at Avila.

I enclose the intercepted letter which we have not been able to decipher.

I am very much afraid that we shall not be able to invest the place till the 8th; but I shall not relinquish the intention of investing it on the 7th till I shall be certain it is impossible. I hope that there will be no further disappointments. At all events I will not move the troops, excepting the 3d division, till Tuesday.

If it should be the same thing to you, I would request you to fix your quarters at Gallegos, as I would request you to assist me in conducting the details of our operation, and it would be desirable that we should have a short communication. I shall send you this day the memorandum which I propose to circulate to the General officers commanding divisions.

I shall desire De Lancey to order the detachment of Guards to Viseu.

P.S. The mail is not yet arrived, but Batavia is taken; and it appears that the Russians and Turks are about to make peace.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 5th Jan. 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 31st, and I entirely concur with you on the measures respecting the Algerines.

As soon as the government shall pay the interest on their paper, I have in contemplation a measure to relieve us from the weight of circulating it. I doubt, however, whether it will relieve us from the loss on the exchange on our bills on England. Our money here would still cost us from 15 to 20 *per cent*.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 6th Jan. 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Salamanca, and one from my brother.

I have not got the details of the state of affairs at Tarifa, or any letter from Gen. Cooke; but I see by the papers enclosed in my brother's letter that the French still persevere in their plans in that quarter.

I have a letter from Gen. Hill of the 2d, from Almendralejo. Drouet had retired from thence, and Hill had taken at that place and Merida about 600 *fanegas* of wheat. He intended to return to Merida on the 3d or 4th.

P.S. The last of the engineers' stores left Almeida this morning, but it is impossible to say how far they will go this afternoon. If they reach Gallegos, we may invest the place to-morrow; if they do not, it would be advantageous to defer the operation till the 8th. I am going to Gallegos this day.

Since writing the above, I find that it will be impossible to invest the place till the 8th.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gallegos, 6th Jan. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 30th Dec. and 2d Jan., and I have omitted to answer the first, till I could inform you of the state of affairs at Tarifa.

I heard from my brother yesterday to the 24th Dec., and it appears by letters from Puerto Real, and Puerto de S^a Maria, of the 19th, that the enemy still persevered in their attack on Tarifa. I think it probable, however, that Drouet's retreat, combined with the bad weather, will have induced them to abandon that object for the present; it is, however, desirable that you should continue to keep up the alarm which you have occasioned, till you shall hear that they have abandoned their projects on Tarifa.

It appears to me that you have nothing to apprehend at present from the '*Armée de Portugal*.' It is very desirable that you should endeavor to discover the state of the enemy's works, and their force, at the Puente de Almaraz; it would aid all my plans very much, if we could destroy their bridge and works at that point. You will recollect that the top of the Sierra de Mirabete, where there is a tower, commands the ground the whole way down to the river.

I am about to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, in which enterprise I shall succeed, or I shall bring back towards this frontier the whole army which had marched towards Valencia and Aragon. By these means I hope to save Valencia, even if I should not succeed in getting this place; if I should get this place, we shall, I hope, make a fine campaign in the spring.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received a letter from Gen. Cooke, from which it appears that about the 20th the enemy were before Tarifa, but they had not brought up their heavy artillery.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Kempt, Lisbon.

6th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces desires you will be pleased to join the army here as soon as convenient. I have inserted Capt. Bennett's appointment as your A.D.C. in the G. O. of this day.

To Dr. Frauck.

Gallegos, 7th Jan. 1812.

I am very much obliged to you for your account of my little boy, and for your kindness in going to see him. I trust that your own health is re-established.

You will be glad to hear that the health of the troops is much improved, though not yet what I could wish it to be. We lost a great many men upon the change from warm to cold weather; but the whole of our casualties in this year, including some bloody affairs, amount only to 6000 men.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Gallegos, 7th Jan. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th Dec., on the subject of the want of guns and of shot at Cadiz.

These frequently occurring demands upon the finances of Great Britain deserve serious attention, particularly as they must be defrayed from the funds applicable to maintain this army. It would be much better for Great Britain at once to give a subsidy to the Spanish government, providing for all their wants, than thus to take upon ourselves the maintenance of small establishments, which in the aggregate cost more than any subsidy could amount to, while the obligation to Great Britain is not felt.

I beg that the Commanding officer of the artillery and engineers at Cadiz will make an estimate of what iron guns are required to arm the lines at the Isla, &c., specifying what the arsenals at Cadiz can and will afford; and you will be so kind as to make a request to the Sec. of State to send to Cadiz the overplus.

I likewise beg that the Commanding officer of the artillery will estimate what quantity of shot and shells the different guns will require, specifying what the arsenals at Cadiz and the Isla can and will supply.

I likewise beg that an estimate may be formed of the expense to be incurred in the maintenance of the artificers proposed to be maintained at the foundry on the Isla; and a calculation made of the expense of manufacturing a certain weight of shot and shells at this foundry.

I also beg you to send these estimates and calculations to the Sec. of State, in order that his Lordship may decide whether it is better to continue to support this establishment, or to export shot and shells from England.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 7th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of an answer which I have written to a letter from Major Gen. Cooke of the 24th Dec., of which he will have forwarded a copy to your Lordship, on the want of guns, shot, and shells, for the works at Cadiz and the Isla.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 7th Jan. 1812.

The contents of my last letters will have inclined you to expect that by this time I should have invested Ciudad Rodrigo. I thought that I should, after a fair calculation of the work to be done preparatory to that operation, and of the means at my disposal to perform it; but after every allowance is made, we must expect disappointments where we have to deal with Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and therefore I can't invest the place till to-morrow. What do you think of empty carts taking 2 days to go 10 miles on a good road? After all I am obliged to appear satisfied, or they would all desert!

I shall not write my weekly report till I shall return from investing the place to-morrow.

At this season of the year, and depending upon Portuguese and Spaniards for means of having what is required, I can scarcely venture to calculate the time which this operation will take, but I should think not less than 24 or 25 days. If we don't succeed, we shall at least bring back upon ourselves all the force which has marched away; and I hope we may save Valencia, or at all events afford more time to the Asturians, Galicians, &c. If we do succeed, we shall make a fine campaign in the spring.

According to your Lordship's desire I will endeavor to have a communication with Gen. Lacy in Catalonia. I have not a sufficient knowledge of affairs on the eastern coast to be able to decide whether it would be practicable to employ a detachment in that quarter with advantage, on the principles of my dispatch to Gen. Cooke, a copy of which I enclosed to your Lordship.

I have frequently turned over in my mind the practicability of making

an attack (combined land and sea) upon Barcelona, but I understand the place is one of the first order. It is sufficiently garrisoned, and an attack would require a very large and efficient force, and much time would necessarily elapse in the operations. In this time the French government would have it in their power to send, even from France, an army for its relief.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Gallegos, 8th Jan. 1812, 7 A.M.

I think you had better leave the reserve ammunition of the 1st division at Pinhel.

Have you heard any thing of 100 carts purchased by Mr. Boyes, drawn by the public bullocks? They were to be loaded with shot at Villa da Ponte, and to come on from thence. The 60 you mention had better return to Villa da Ponte for fresh loads as soon as they can.

P.S. I hear that some of your guns are moving.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Gallegos, 9th Jan. 1812, 5 P.M.

You will have heard that we carried the redoubt on the hill of San Francisco last night; and we have opened our first parallel within 600 yards of the place. Col. Fletcher expects to be ready for the guns possibly by the 11th, at night, or 12th in the morning, as he intends to begin his batteries this night.

I think it probable that the gun bullocks will have arrived this day. If they should, I beg you to make an effort to get the guns here in one day. They will certainly require a day to go from hence to the ground of the siege.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gallegos, 9th Jan. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th inst., and I beg leave to congratulate you upon the success of the detachment under Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercromby.

As your advance to Merida must by this time have had all the effect expected from it, and as I observe that Gen. Drouet has retired upon Llerena, I request you to move your corps back to the frontiers of Portugal, and place it with its right at Portalegre, its centre and your head quarters at Niza, and 2 brigades of infantry at Castello Branco.

My reason for wishing you to take this position is, that I think it probable that when the enemy shall find that I have attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, they will endeavor to divert my attention from that operation by movements, by the valley of the Alagon, towards the frontier of Lower Beira.

The effect of these movements would be entirely frustrated by your being in the position pointed out, as you will be able to cross the Tagus, at least as fast as the enemy can advance, by the vale of Plasencia.

It is very desirable to destroy the enemy's works at Merida; and I recommend to you to destroy them if you should find that you can do so without inconvenience. As you will probably move by cantonments, those troops which will leave Merida the last might be employed to perform this service. I am desirous, however, that no time should be unnecessarily lost in marching the troops to the position I have above pointed out.

I invested Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday, and broke ground before the place last night. I enclose the extract of a letter to the Sec. of State, giving an account of a very handsome operation performed by a detachment of the Light division, commanded by Lieut. Col. Colborne

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 9th Jan. 1812.

According to the intention which I informed your Lordship that I entertained, I invested Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday.

Since the enemy have had possession of the place, they have constructed a palisaded redoubt on the hill of San Francisco, and have fortified three convents in the suburbs, the defences of which are connected with the work on the hill of San Francisco, and with the old line by which the suburb was surrounded. By these means the enemy have increased the difficulty of approaching the place; and it was necessary to obtain possession of the work on the hill of San Francisco before we could make any progress in the attack. Accordingly, Major Gen. Craufurd directed a detachment of the Light division, under the command of Lieut. Col. Colborne of the 52d, to attack the work, shortly after it was dark. The attack was very ably conducted by Lieut. Col. Colborne, and the work was taken by storm in a short time.* Two Captains and 47 men were

* Major Gen. R. Craufurd to Gen. Visc. Wellington.

El Bodon, 11th Jan. 1812.

I beg leave to state to your Lordship that Lieut. Col. Colborne, in his report of the circumstances of the attack on the redoubt in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was so neatly and gallantly executed by him and the brave detachment under his command, mentions in terms of particular praise the conduct of Capt. Mein and Lieut. Woodgate, 52d regt., the latter of whom had the command of the ladder men, and the former of the leading company of the storming party. I must also, in justice to the 3d batt. of Portuguese caçadores, report to your Lordship that this battalion being ordered to open the trenches as soon as the redoubt should be carried, and being therefore not called upon to furnish a detachment for the attack, I received from them, through their commanding officer, Lieut. Col. Elder, an earnest request to be allowed at least to send a few volunteers; in consequence of which request I permitted 1 subaltern and 12 men to join Lieut. Col. Colborne's detachment, with which they went to the attack with great bravery. The subaltern who volunteered this service was Lieut. J. de M. M. Lobo. I am confident that the 1st caçadores would have manifested the same spirit, but they were still detached on the Salamanca road at the time that the detachment was formed for the attack.

Lieut. Col. Colborne, 52d regt., to Major Gen. Craufurd.

El Bodon, 9th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to report to you the proceedings of the detachment of the Light division ordered to attack the outwork in front of Ciudad Rodrigo. The 200 men conducted by Major Gibbs advanced so rapidly to the attack that the enemy had but little time to annoy them with his fire. Capt. Crampton, of the 95th regt., first formed upon the crest of the glacis, followed by the companies under the command of Capt. Travers and Lieut. M'Namara, of the 95th regt., and Capt. Merry, of the 52d regt., and fired on the enemy; whilst Capt. Duffy, of the 43d, Capt. Mein, of the 52d, with their companies, and Lieut. Woodgate, who had charge of the ladders, leaped into the ditch and escalated the work. Major Gibbs moved round the gate and prevented the enemy's escape. Two officers and 47 R. and F. were made prisoners by the detachment. I beg leave to mention that the intrepidity and exertion of Capt. Mein and Lieut. Woodgate could not be exceeded. Capt. Mein, Lieut. Woodgate, and Lieut. Hawkesly, of the 95th, were wounded; the two latter severely.

made prisoners, the remainder of the garrison being put to the sword in the storm. We took 3 pieces of cannon.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Lieut. Col. Colborne, and of the detachment under his command, upon this occasion. I am happy to add that our loss in this affair has not been severe: 6 men having been killed; Capt. Mein of the 52d, Lieut. Hawkesly, 95th, and Lieut. Woodgate, 52d, and 14 men, having been wounded.

The success of this operation enabled us immediately to break ground within 600 yards of the place, notwithstanding that the enemy still hold the fortified convents; and the enemy's work has been turned into a part of our first parallel, and a good communication made with it.

It is impossible for me to conjecture the length of time which will be required to bring the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo to a successful conclusion. Our means of transporting our stores and materials depend upon the Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and the movements of this description of persons are very uncertain. The weather, also, which may be expected at this season of the year, may interrupt or retard our progress; and the enemy may have time to bring back to this part of the country the troops which had been removed from hence in order to aid the operations of Marshal Suchet in Valencia, and I may be obliged to raise the siege. If this effect alone should be produced, we shall have rendered a great service to the Spaniards.

I think it probable that Marmont will return immediately, as I understand that great doubts were entertained by the ministers and Generals at Madrid of the expediency of his movements to the eastward, in consequence of intelligence which had been received that I had constructed a bridge on the Agueda; and that in the end of last month he had not left Madrid.

I have arranged our operation in such a manner as that, I hope, the troops will not suffer from the inclemency of the weather.

Lieut. Gen. Hill arrived at Merida on the 30th Dec. He had hoped to surprise Gen. Dombrowski (who I had been led to imagine was killed in Gen. Hill's last affair with the enemy) in that town; but his advanced guard was discovered on the 29th by a patrol from a small detachment of the enemy which happened to be at La Nava, which effected its retreat to Merida, notwithstanding the efforts of a detachment of Lieut. Gen. Hill's cavalry to prevent it. Gen. Dombrowski retired from Merida in the night, leaving a magazine of bread and 160,000 lbs. of wheat in the town, and several unfinished works which the enemy had been constructing.

On the 1st, Gen. Hill moved forward with the intention of attacking Gen. Drouet, who commands the 5th corps, at Almendralejo. This General, however, retired upon Zafra, leaving a magazine in the town, containing 450,000 lbs. of wheat and some barley. On the 3d, Lieut. Gen. Hill sent a detachment, consisting of the 28th regt., and 2 squadrons of the 2d hussars, and one squadron of the 10th Portuguese cavalry, to Fuente del Maestre, under the command of Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercromby. Our cavalry defeated a body of the enemy's cavalry which was there, having taken 2 officers and 30 men prisoners.

Lieut. Gen. Hill having found that Gen. Drouet had retreated upon Llerena, and that it would be impossible for him to follow to a greater distance, returned to Merida on the 5th, in order to place his troops in better cantonments during the bad weather. I have the honor to enclose letters from Lieut. Gen. Hill of the 30th Dec., 2d and 6th Jan., giving an account of his operations, returns of killed and wounded, &c.*

* Lieut. Gen. R. Hill to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Merida, 30th Dec. 1811.

In pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I put the troops under my orders in march from their several cantonments, and entered this province on the 27th inst. by Albuquerque, Villa de Rey, and San Vicente; and by the intelligence which I received from various quarters, I was led to entertain the most sanguine hopes that I should have been able to surprise the enemy's troops stationed in this town. I was, however, disappointed in my expectations, by finding in La Nava, on our approach to that village yesterday, with the column from Albuquerque, a party of the enemy, consisting of about 800 voltigeurs and a few hussars, being part of a detachment which had arrived there the night preceding, apparently on a plundering excursion, the remainder whereof has proceeded to Cordevillas, another village about 2 leagues distant.

A patrol from La Nava fell in with the head of our column, and gave the alarm to the detachment, which immediately commenced its retreat towards Merida, followed by the cavalry of my advanced guard, consisting of between 300 and 400 of the 13th light dragoons and 2d hussars.

As I considered the intercepting of the entire of this party to be of the greatest importance to our ulterior operations, I directed the cavalry above mentioned to make every effort to effect it, or at least to check its march until the arrival of some infantry.

The intrepid and admirable manner, however, in which the enemy retired, his infantry formed in square, and favored as he was by the nature of the country, of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting any thing against him; and after following him for upwards of a league, and making an ineffectual attempt to break him, I judged it advisable to give over the pursuit, and he effected his escape with the loss of about 20 killed, and as many wounded, from four 9 pounders, which, by the great exertions of Major Hawker, and his officers and men, got within range, and followed him for some distance, but were unable to close upon him, owing to the deepness of the country.

One wing of the 71st light infantry, under Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan, also exerted themselves in a most laudable manner to overtake the enemy, but were at too great a distance to admit of their accomplishing it in any reasonable time.

The arrival of the above mentioned party at Merida made the enemy acquainted with our approach, of which I have reason to think he was before entirely ignorant, and he in consequence evacuated the town during the night, leaving unfinished some works which he was constructing for its defence, and we entered in the course of the day.

I regret to state that we had 2 men killed and some wounded in the affair of yesterday, of which I enclose a return.

P.S. Since writing the above, it has been reported to me that 180 *fanegas* of wheat have been found in the depôt of this town, belonging to the French, besides a quantity of bread.

Lieut. Gen. R. Hill to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Almendralejo, 2d Jan. 1812.

Since my letter to your Lordship from Merida of the 30th ult., I have the honor to report, that from all the information I had received, I had reason to suppose that Drouet was concentrating his troops at this place; I consequently moved on yesterday for the purpose of attacking him. On my approach to the town, I found that the greater part of the enemy's troops had moved off the preceding day, in the direction of Villa Franca, and that his rear guard was on its march, covered by his cavalry, which skirmished with the hussars of my advanced guard, and retired after receiving a few rounds from the horse artillery. In this town we found a few stores, of which the enclosed is a return. I thought it possible the enemy might have afforded me an opportunity of doing something here.

Lieut. Gen. R. Hill to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Merida, 6th Jan. 1812.

My letters of the 2d and 3d inst. would acquaint your Lordship of my having, on the 1st inst., marched with the corps under my command to Almendralejo, in the hope that Comte d'Erion, who had collected the greater part of his troops at that place, might have given me an opportunity of coming in contact with him, as well as of my disappointment in that respect, he having previously fallen back in the direction of Llerena, leaving only a small rear guard in Almendralejo, which retired also on our approach. I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship that it was my intention to have followed the enemy, and, failing

By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th Dec., I learn that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force of about 5000 men on the 20th Dec., covering their operations against that place by another corps at Vejer, under the command of Marshal Victor. Their artillery for the

in my desire to bring him to action, to have given him every possible annoyance in his retreat; but the dreadful state of the weather, the condition of the roads (which are daily becoming worse), and the consequent difficulty of getting up my supplies, render any further operations on my part impossible for the present, without incurring risks and making sacrifices greater than could have been justified by the occasion, or by your Lordship's instructions. I therefore determined, after halting two days at Almendralejo, and occupying Villa Franca and Fuente del Maestre, to put the troops in cantonments in this town and neighbourhood; there to await a more favorable opportunity of acting; trusting that the alarm occasioned to the enemy by the movement already made will have in part effected one of the objects for which I was instructed by your Lordship to take the field. A part of the troops accordingly returned here yesterday, and the remainder are now on their march; the enemy being, by the last accounts which I have received, also in full march towards the south, his rear guard having left Zafra and Los Santos yesterday.

I have the satisfaction to enclose for your Lordship's information a letter from Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercromby, detailing the particulars of a successful attack made by some of the 2d hussars and Portuguese cavalry, acting under his orders, at Fuente del Maestre, on a body of the enemy's dragoons, which reflects the greatest credit on Lieut. Col. Abercromby who directed, and the officers and non-commissioned officers and men who executed it.

Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercromby to Lieut. Gen. R. Hill.

Merida, 5th Jan. 1812.

In obedience to your orders, I marched on the 3d inst. from Almendralejo at noon, with the column you did me the honor to place under my command, and reached Fuente del Maestre at a little after 4 o'clock in the evening of that day. On my arrival I learned that some of the enemy's cavalry were still in the neighbourhood; and having passed through the town, I halted the column, and proceeded to reconnoitre in front. About 100 of the enemy's horse were discovered on the Los Santos road, who, apparently ignorant of our force, formed squadron, and advanced towards us. The Portuguese cavalry exchanged a few shots with them until the hussars were brought up; the enemy then halted, and showed a disposition to charge: in this, however, he was quickly frustrated. The 2 squadrons of the hussars were formed on the right, and one squadron of the 14th Portuguese cavalry on the left. Instantly the enemy were charged on one flank by the squadron of Portuguese, under Lieut. Col. Campbell, and by Capt. Cleves' squadron on the other. The right hussar squadron remained in reserve. A few minutes decided the contest. The enemy being completely routed, left in our hands 2 officers and 30 men, besides several killed. The squadron which remained in reserve was then sent in pursuit, as far as prudence would allow.

No language of mine can do sufficient justice to the gallantry of Lieut. Col. Campbell, as well as that of Lieut. Hutchinson, and the other officers and men composing the squadron of Portuguese cavalry. Suffice it to say, that on this occasion the hussars under Major Busche upheld the high military character they are so universally known to possess.

This little affair has been achieved with very trifling loss on our side. Enclosed I have the honor to transmit to you a list of the killed and wounded.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing in action with the enemy near Fuente del Maestre, 3d Jan. 1812.

	Officers.	Non - commis- sioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	—	1	2	1
Wounded	1	2	17	5	20
Missing	—	—	—	1	—

attack of Tarifa had not arrived on the 26th Dec. Col. Skerrett was engaged with the enemy on the 20th, with the piquets of the British and Spanish infantry and of the garrison, and a detachment of the 95th. On the 21st Capt. Wren, of the 11th regt., with his company, destroyed one of the enemy's piquets; and, on the 22d, Col. Skerrett made a sortie from Tarifa, in co-operation with the Spanish troops under Gen. Copons, in order to oblige the enemy to show their force, on which occasion the enemy sustained considerable loss.

The object of Lieut. Gen. Hill's movement into Estremadura was to divert the enemy's attention from Gen. Ballesteros and from Tarifa; and as Gen. Drouet has retired upon Llerena, making some sacrifices, I conclude that Soult has either been ordered, or is determined, to persevere in his attack upon Tarifa.

From the accounts which I have received of that place, it appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy shall be equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the island contiguous to Tarifa, for which object Col. Skerrett's detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don't believe that the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without which the town will be entirely useless to them; and indeed if they had the island, as well as the town, I doubt their being able to retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them with which Gen. Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their neighbourhood to protect them. Under these circumstances, I have desired Gen. Hill to return to Portalegre, and to place his corps between that town and Castello Branco. My reason for giving him these orders is, that I think it not improbable that the enemy, finding that they will not have time to concert an operation between the army of the north and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and knowing that neither of those armies separately can venture to attempt the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, will try to alarm me for the safety of my communication with Gen. Hill, and with Lisbon, by movements in the valley of Plasencia, by Lower Beira.

Gen. Hill's movement towards the Tagus will check all these plans; and, whatever may happen, it will be a great convenience that he should be nearer this army during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Gallegos, 10th Jan. 1812.

I request you to inform Gen. Abadia that I am now engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which we are carrying on with the greatest activity. We broke ground before the place on the 8th at night, within 600 yards, having carried a redoubt by storm on that evening at that distance. We shall open our fire, I hope, on the 13th, from the first parallel.

It would be very desirable if Gen. Abadia would endeavor to make some movement to draw the attention of the enemy from us; as I think it probable that they will collect their whole force to endeavor to interrupt our operations.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Castanheira.

10th Jan. 1812.

I am directed to inform you that several wounded soldiers belonging to the Light division and the 1st division are forwarded to Castanheira. Upon their

arrival there, you will *immediately* send the spring waggons, conveying them to the hospital, back to the division at Gallegos. You will be pleased to take care that the Castanheira hospital does not become crowded with the wounded soldiers arriving from the frontier, and you will continue to send them on to Celorico, so that the hospital at Castanheira shall be able to accommodate the increase of wounded soldiers, daily forwarded there from the advance of the army.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., Cavalry.

11th Jan. 1812.

I have laid your application for leave of absence for Lieut. Col. —, — light dragoons, before the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you that the army are engaged in a siege, and his Excellency thinks every officer should be at his post; but as his Excellency understands Lieut. Col. — wishes to quit the service, he may have the leave to England he requires.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Hay, 5th division.

11th Jan. 1812.

In reply to your letter, and enclosures from Lieut. Col. Barnes, the Commander of the Forces acquiesces in Mr. Middleton and Mr. Strong acting as volunteers in the Royals, from the date of their arrival with the corps.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

11th Jan. 1812.

I have laid your letter and enclosures relative to the widows and orphans of soldiers, received from Capt. Browne, before the Commander of the Forces; and his Excellency desires the widows and orphans may be sent home, conformably to the orders from the Horse Guards, in the best manner that can be devised.

The A.G. to Major D'Oily, A.A.G. 7th division.

12th Jan. 1812.

It has been invariably the practice of this army, whenever a division is ordered to move, that all the officers belonging to it, whether on General Court Martial duties or not, march with their several brigades and corps. The officers, therefore, on the General Court Martial, of which Major Gen. de Bernewitz is President, are of course to march with their division, as well as the Major Gen. with his brigade.

The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.

13th Jan. 1812.

Lord Blantyre having represented that you gave Mr. — permission to take a bätman out of the convalescent barrack at Coimbra, to act as servant to him when going to Lisbon, I am to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces disapproves of such proceeding, and requests you will inform me why you used an authority with which you are not invested. You will be pleased to take care that the man alluded to forthwith joins his corps.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 15th Jan. 1812.

We have continued our operations against Ciudad Rodrigo since I addressed you on the 9th inst. We opened our fire from 22 pieces of ordnance, in 3 batteries in the first parallel, yesterday afternoon; and we opened an approach to, and established ourselves in our second parallel, 150 yards from the place, last night.

This measure had been facilitated by Lieut. Gen. Graham having surprised the enemy's detachment in the convent of S^a Cruz, close to the body of the place, on the night of the 13th. The right of our approaches was protected and secured by this operation. Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, who commands the 4th division in the absence of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise attacked the enemy's post in the convent of San Francisco last night, and obtained possession of that post, and of the other fortified posts in the suburbs, where our troops are now lodged.

Our left is protected and secured by this operation. Two pieces of cannon were taken in the convent of San Francisco.

It appears that the preparations and movements which I first made with a view to the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo, had the effect of inducing the enemy to move back from La Mancha. The divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' two of which had gone as far as Cuenca, and the other to San Clemente, returned to Toledo in the beginning of this month; and they are now on their march, it is stated, towards Valladolid, to which place Marshal Marmont went on the 5th from Talavera. One division of infantry still remained on the 12th inst. at Naval Moral, having detachments as far back as Talavera; and it is reported that a second division remained about Talavera.

It appears that the governments of Valladolid and Salamanca, called the 6th and 7th governments, have been placed under the directions of Marshal Marmont, and that what can be plundered from those provinces is allotted for the support of the troops under his command; and the army of the north are to be confined to the northern provinces.

Preparations to a certain extent are making at Salamanca for the movement of troops in this direction; and I have reports that troops were to be collected at Salamanca on this day. It appears, however, that the enemy did not even know at Salamanca that we had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo till the 13th; and it is not probable that a sufficient force can be collected to oblige us to raise the siege, at least for some days.

I purpose, therefore, to continue the siege as long as I shall think there is any prospect of success, and till I shall be certain that the enemy have brought together such a force as to render success hopeless, and the situation of the army critical. We have had, till now, very fine weather, and the troops have suffered but little from exposure to it. I enclose the returns of the casualties to the 14th inst. It is impossible for me, even now, to tell how much longer the operations will last. No time has been lost yet; and your Lordship may be certain that every exertion will be made to bring them to a successful termination.

I have received no authentic accounts of the state of affairs in Valencia; but I have reason to believe that, as late as the 24th Dec., the enemy had not been able to make any progress in their attack upon that place. It is supposed that, unless powerfully supported, Marshal Suchet must retire.

By the accounts from Cadiz to the 29th Dec., it appears to be supposed that the French had not been able to get their guns up to Tarifa, having been prevented by the bad weather, which continued to prevail generally throughout the Peninsula till the 5th and 6th of this month.

By accounts from Lieut. Gen. Hill to the 11th inst. it appears that Gen. Drouet had been reinforced from Seville, and had advanced again towards Zafra. I think it probable that Gen. Hill will have moved on the 12th or 13th towards the frontiers of Portugal, according to the orders which I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 9th inst., I had sent him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 15th Jan. 1812.

My dispatch will give you all the intelligence which I can send you

from hence regarding ourselves. I have to add to it, that I have a letter from Madrid of the 3d, stating that Gen. Darmagnac had written from the frontiers of Valencia that the Toulon squadron had been defeated. Probably he may mean that the convoy from Toulon to Barcelona had been taken. But the *squadron* is positively stated; and it is possible that Adm. Emeriau may have been caught in one of his '*promenades navales*.'

The A.G. to Capt. Poppleton, Celorico.

16th Jan. 1812.

Five hundred men of the sick at Celorico having been ordered to be removed to Coimbra, to make room at your station for men who may be sent from Castanheira and from the army, it is necessary you should exert yourself to see that this service is carried into effect.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Burne, 6th division.

16th Jan. 1812.

In reply to your letter and enclosure from Lieut. Col. Bingham, 53d regt., I am directed to inform you that it will be more regular that the boy who consented to the theft should be tried by a regimental or detachment Court Martial, as a follower of the army, and then punished by the Provost as proposed, if found guilty and sentenced to punishment; for as the Assist. Provost did not apprehend the boy in the fact, it would be against the Provost's instructions to punish him without trial.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

16th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th inst. and enclosures, which have been laid before the Commander of the Forces; and I am to desire that you will inform Capt. — that his Excellency is concerned to be obliged to say that he entirely disapproves of his whole conduct: 1st; in having entered into any altercation at all with the Juiz de Fora: 2dly; for the scene which he chose for that altercation: and lastly, for the mode and temper in which the altercation was carried on by him. His Excellency is much distressed at being obliged to pass this decision on the conduct of an officer for whom he entertains otherwise great respect, on the eve of his departure from this army for another service; but the conduct of Capt. — has been entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the G. O. of the army, and with the principles on which any service can be carried on by military men in conjunction with civil authorities.

Arrangements for the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Jan. 1812.

The attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo must be made this evening at 7 o'clock.

The light infantry company of the 83d regt. will join Lieut. Col. O'Toole at sunset. Lieut. Col. O'Toole, with the 2d caçadores, and the light company of the 83d regt., will, 10 minutes before 7, cross the Agueda by the bridge, and make an attack upon the outwork in front of the castle. The object of this attack is to drive the artillerymen from 2 guns (B) in that outwork which bear upon the entrance into the ditch at the junction of the counterscarp with the main wall of the place: if Lieut. Col. O'Toole can get into the outwork, it would be desirable to destroy these guns. Major Sturgeon will show Lieut. Col. O'Toole his point of attack. Six ladders, 12 feet long each, will be sent from the engineer park to the old French guard room at the mill, on the Agueda, for the use of this detachment.

The 5th regt. will attack the entrance of the ditch at the point above referred to. Major Sturgeon will likewise show them the point of attack. They must issue from the right of the convent of S^{ta} Cruz: they must

have 12 axes to cut down the gate by which the ditch is entered, at the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The 5th regt. are likewise to have 12 scaling ladders 25 feet long, and immediately on entering the ditch are to scale the *fausse braie* wall, and are to proceed along the *fausse braie*, in order to clear it of the enemy's posts on their left towards the principal breach.

The 77th regt. are to be in reserve on the right of the convent of S^{ta} Cruz, to support the first party which will have entered the ditch. The ditch must, besides, be entered on the right of the breach by two columns to be formed on the left of the convent of S^{ta} Cruz, each to consist of 5 companies of the 94th regt. Each column must have 3 ladders, 12 feet long, by which they are to descend into the ditch, and they are to have 10 axes to cut down any palisades which may be placed in the ditch to impede the communication along it.

The detachment of the 94th regt., when descended into the ditch, is to turn to its left to the main breach.

The 5th regt. will issue from the convent of S^{ta} Cruz 10 minutes before 7.

At the same time a party consisting of 180 sappers, carrying bags containing hay, will move out of the second parallel, covered by a fire of the 83d regt. formed in the second parallel upon the works of the place, which bags are to be thrown into the ditch so as to enable the troops to descend the counterscarp to the attack of the breach. They are to be followed immediately by the storming party of the great breach, which is to consist of the troops of Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade, is to be formed in the first parallel, and in the communications between the first and second parallel, ready to move up to the breach immediately in rear of the sappers with bags. The storming party of the great breach must be provided with 6 scaling ladders 12 feet long each, and with 10 axes.

The ditch must likewise be entered by a column on the left of the great breach, consisting of 3 companies of the 95th regt., which are to issue from the right of the convent of San Francisco. This column will be provided with 3 ladders 12 feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be pointed out to them by Lieut. Wright. On descending into the ditch they are to turn to their right, and to proceed towards the main breach. They are to have 10 axes, to enable them to cut down the obstacles which may have been erected to impede the communication along the ditch on the left of the breach.

Another column, consisting of Major Gen. Vandeleur's brigade, will issue out from the left of the convent of San Francisco, and are to attack the breach to the left of the main breach. This column must have 12 ladders, each 12 feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch at a point which will be shown them by Capt. Ellicombe. On arriving in the ditch, they are to turn to their left of the small ravelin, and thence to the breach in the tower of the body of the place. As soon as this body will have reached the top of the breach, in the *fausse braie* wall, a detachment of 5 companies are to be sent to the right, to cover the attack of Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade, by the principal breach; and as soon as they have reached the top of the tower, they are to turn to their right, and

communicate with the rampart of the main breach. As soon as this communication can be established, endeavor should be made to open the gate of Salamanca.

The Portuguese brigade in the 3d division will be formed in the communication to the first parallel, and behind the hill of San Francisco (upper Teson), and will move up to the entrance of the second parallel ready to support Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade.

Col. Barnard's brigade will be formed behind the convent of San Francisco, ready to support Major Gen. Vandeleur's brigade. All these columns will have detached parties especially appointed to keep up a fire on the defences during the above.

The men with ladders, and axes, and bags, must not have their arms: those who are to storm must not fire.

Brig. Gen. Pack, with his brigade, will make a false attack upon the outwork of the gate of Santiago, and upon the works towards La Caridad.

The different regiments and brigades to receive ladders are to send parties to the engineers' depôt to receive them, 3 men for each ladder.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812.

I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 9th, that I had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, and in that of the 15th, of the progress of the operations to that period, and I have now the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that we took the place by storm yesterday evening after dark.

We continued, from the 15th to the 19th, to complete the second parallel, and the communications with that work, and we had made some progress by sap towards the crest of the glacis. On the night of the 15th we likewise advanced from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill towards the convent of San Francisco, to a situation from which the walls of the *fausse braie* and of the town were seen, on which a battery for 7 guns was constructed, and these commenced their fire on the morning of the 18th. In the mean time, the batteries in the first parallel continued their fire; and, yesterday evening, their fire had not only considerably injured the defences of the place, but had made breaches in the *fausse braie* wall, and in the body of the place, which were considered practicable; while the battery on the slope of the hill, which had been commenced on the night of the 15th, and had opened on the 18th, had been equally efficient still farther to the left, and opposite to the suburb of San Francisco.

I therefore determined to storm the place, notwithstanding that the approaches had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire.

The attack was accordingly made yesterday evening, in 5 separate columns, consisting of the troops of the 3d and Light divisions, and of Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade. The 2 right columns, conducted by Lieut. Col. O'Toole of the 2d. caçadores, and Major Ridge of the 5th regt., were destined to protect the advance of Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade, forming the 3d, to the top of the breach in the *fausse braie* wall; and all these, being composed of troops of the 3d division, were under the direction of Lieut. Gen. Picton.

The 4th column, consisting of the 43d and 52d regts., and part of the 95th regt., being of the Light division, under the direction of Major Gen. Craufurd, attacked the breaches on the left in front of the suburb of San Francisco, and covered the left of the attack of the principal breach by the troops of the 3d division; and Brig. Gen. Pack was destined, with his brigade, forming the 5th column, to make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort.

Besides these 5 columns, the 94th regt., belonging to the 3d division, descended into the ditch in 2 columns, on the right of Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade, with a view to protect the descent of that body into the ditch and its attack of the breach in the *fausse braie*, against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose their progress.

All these attacks succeeded; and Brig. Gen. Pack even surpassed my expectations, having converted his false attack into a real one; and his advanced guard, under the command of Major Lynch, having followed the enemy's troops from the advanced works into the *fausse braie*, where they made prisoners all opposed to them.

Major Ridge, of the 2d batt. 5th regt., having escalated the *fausse braie* wall, stormed the principal breach in the body of the place, together with the 94th regt., commanded by Lieut. Col. Campbell, which had moved along the ditch at the same time, and had stormed the breach in the *fausse braie*, both in front of Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade. Thus, these regiments not only effectually covered the advance from the trenches of Major Gen. Mackinnon's brigade by their first movements and operations, but they preceded them in the attack.

Major Gen. Craufurd, and Major Gen. Vandeleur, and the troops of the Light division, on the left, were likewise very forward on that side; and, in less than half an hour from the time the attack commenced, our troops were in possession, and formed on the ramparts, of the place, each body contiguous to the other. The enemy then submitted, having sustained a considerable loss in the contest.

Our loss was also, I am concerned to add, severe, particularly in officers of high rank and estimation in this army. Major Gen. Mackinnon was unfortunately blown up by the accidental explosion of one of the enemy's expense magazines, close to the breach, after he had gallantly and successfully led the troops under his command to the attack. Major Gen. Craufurd likewise received a severe wound* while he was leading on the Light division to the storm, and I am apprehensive that I shall be deprived for some time of his assistance. Major Gen. Vandeleur was likewise wounded in the same manner, but not so severely, and he was able to continue in the field.

I have to add to this list Lieut. Col. Colborne of the 52d regt., and Major G. Napier†, who led the storming party of the Light division, and was wounded on the top of the breach.

* The wound was mortal.

† Major Gen. Sir G. Napier, K.C.B., late Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. On the return from the trenches to the cantonments of the 52d, at El Bodon, on the morning of the 17th Jan., Major Napier and Lieut. Gurwood expressed to each other their mutual desire of an opportunity for personal distinction in the event of Ciudad Rodrigo standing an

I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship the uniform good conduct, and spirit of enterprise, and patience, and perseverance in the performance of great labor, by which the General officers, officers, and troops of the 1st, 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, by whom the siege was carried on, have been distinguished during the late operations.

Lieut. Gen. Graham assisted me in superintending the conduct of the details of the siege, besides performing the duties of the General officer commanding the 1st division; and I am much indebted to the suggestions and assistance I received from him for the success of this enterprise.

The conduct of all parts of the 3d division, in the operations which they performed with so much gallantry and exactness on the evening of the 19th in the dark, afford the strongest proof of the abilities of Lieut. Gen. Picton and Major Gen. Mackinnon, by whom they were directed and led; but I beg particularly to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. Col. O'Toole of the 2d caçadores, of Major Ridge of the 2d batt. 5th foot,* of Lieut. Col. Campbell of the 94th regt.†, of Major Manners of the 74th, and of Major Grey of the 2d batt. 5th foot‡, who has been twice wounded during this siege.

It is but justice also to the 3d division to report that the men who performed the sap belonged to the 45th, 74th, and 88th regts., under the command of Capt. Macleod of the Royal Engineers, and Capt. Thompson of the 74th, Lieut. Beresford of the 88th, and Lieut. Metcalfe of the 45th; and they distinguished themselves not less in the storm of the place than they had in the performance of their laborious duty during the siege.

I have already reported, in my letter of the 9th inst., my sense of the conduct of Major Gen. Craufurd, and of Lieut. Col. Colborne, and of the

assault; and they decided to submit their intentions to their friend and Commanding officer Lieut. Col. Colborne (now Lieut. Gen. Lord Seaton). After mature deliberation, a letter was addressed to Major Gen. R. Craufurd in the following terms:

'In the event of Ciudad Rodrigo standing an assault, and that the Light division should be employed in it, the following officers of the 52d are desirous of offering their services:

MAJOR G. NAPIER to command the Storming Party.

LIEUT. GURWOOD " the Forlorn Hope."

This paper, being recommended by Col. Colborne, was carried by them in the evening to the quarters of Major Gen. Craufurd, to whom it was sent up. No answer was returned.

The order for the march of the division to the trenches, out of its turn, soon after daylight on the morning of the 19th, afforded the hope that it was to be employed in the assault; but it was only on the arrival of the division at La Caridad, when the orders from head quarters were received for the formation of a storming party of 300 men, with a proportion of officers, that the intentions of Major Napier and Lieut. Gurwood were made known, as being appointed to specific commands in the assault. It was very apparent that the same desire in many of their brother officers, checked only by the unwillingness to be taxed with presumption, had been thus anticipated; and Major Napier and Lieut. Gurwood watched, with increased anxiety, the tri-colored flag on the tower near the lesser breach, that it might not be struck, and expose their announced demonstration for self-distinction to disappointment. This was a nervous excitement, absorbing all thoughts in the soldier, who saw reputation and honor just within his grasp. Success, however, soon banished this, to give way to feelings difficult to be imagined, still more so to be described.

In the subsequent and more dangerous assaults of Badajoz, Burgos, and San Sebastian, the senior officers of each rank claimed privilege and preference; but the breaches being insulated and better defended, unfortunately none successfully survived the storm of them. (See note at p. 477.)

* Killed in the assault at Badajoz.

† The late Major Gen. Sir James Campbell, K.C.B.

‡ Major Gen. Sir J. Grey, K.C.B.

troops of the Light division, in the storm of the redoubt of San Francisco, on the evening of the 8th inst. The conduct of these troops was equally distinguished throughout the siege; and in the storm, nothing could exceed the gallantry with which these brave officers and troops advanced and accomplished the difficult operation allotted to them, notwithstanding that all their leaders had fallen.

I particularly request your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Major Gen. Craufurd, Major Gen. Vandeleur*, Lieut. Col. Barnard of the 95th †, Lieut. Col. Colborne ‡, Major Gibbs §, and Major Napier of the 52d, and Lieut. Col. Macleod of the 43d ¶. The conduct of Capt. Duffy of the 43d ¶, and that of Lieut. Gurwood** of the 52d regt., who was wounded, have likewise been particularly reported to me. Lieut. Col. Elder and the 3d caçadores were likewise distinguished upon this occasion.

The 1st Portuguese regt., under Lieut. Col. Hill, and the 16th, under Col. Campbell, being Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, were likewise distinguished in the storm under the command of the Brig. General, who particularly mentions Major Lynch.

In my dispatch of the 15th, I reported to your Lordship the attack of the convent of S^a Cruz by the troops of the 1st division, under the direction of Lieut. Gen. Graham, and that of the convent of San Francisco, on the 14th inst., under the direction of Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville. The first mentioned enterprise was performed by Capt. Laroche de Starkfels, of the 1st line batt. K. G. L.; the last by Lieut. Col. Harcourt, with the 40th regt. This regiment remained from that time in the suburb of San Francisco, and materially assisted our attack on that side of the place.

Although it did not fall to the lot of the troops of the 1st and 4th divisions to bring these operations to a successful close, they distinguished themselves throughout their progress by the patience and perseverance with which they performed the labor of the siege. The brigade of Guards, under Major Gen. H. Campbell, were particularly distinguished in this respect.

I likewise request your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut.

* Gen. Sir J. Vandeleur, G.C.B.

† Gen. Sir A. Barnard, G.C.B.

‡ Now Lieut. Gen. Lord Seaton, G.C.B.

§ Major Gen. Sir E. Gibbs, K.C.B.

¶ Lieut. Col. Macleod was subsequently killed in the assault of Badajoz.

¶ Major Gen. Duffy, C.B.

** Col. Gurwood, the compiler of this work. Lieut. Gurwood, 52d regt., led the 'forlorn hope' of the Light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor, Gen. Barrié, in the citadel; and from the hands of Lord Wellington, on the breach by which he had entered, he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the Duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service; and Col. Gurwood feels pride, as a soldier of fortune, in here offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in future wars.

The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the lesser breach is of too little importance, excepting to those who served in it, to become a matter of history. The compiler, however, takes this opportunity of observing, that Col. W. Napier has been misinformed respecting the conduct of the 'forlorn hope,' in the account given of it by him, as it appears in the Appendix to the 4th volume (first edition) of his 'History of the Peninsular War.' A correct statement, and proofs of it, have been since furnished to Col. W. Napier, for any future edition of his work, which will render any further notice of it here unnecessary. (See note at p. 477.)

Col. Fletcher, the chief Engineer, and of Brigade Major Jones, and the officers and men of the Royal Engineers. The ability with which these operations were carried on exceeds all praise; and I beg leave to recommend these officers to your Lordship most particularly.

Major Dickson of the Royal artillery, attached to the Portuguese artillery, has for some time had the direction of the heavy train attached to this army, and has conducted the intricate details of the late operation, as he did those of the two sieges of Badajoz in the last summer, much to my satisfaction. The rapid execution produced by the well directed fire kept up from our batteries affords the best proof of the merits of the officers and men of the Royal artillery, and of the Portuguese artillery, employed on this occasion; but I must particularly mention Brigade Major May,* and Capts. Holcombe, Power, Dynely, and Dundas, of the Royal artillery, and Capts. Da Cunha and Da Costa, and Lieut. Silva, of the 1st regt. of Portuguese artillery.

I have likewise particularly to report to your Lordship the conduct of Major Sturgeon of the Royal Staff corps.† He constructed and placed for us the bridge over the Agueda, without which the enterprise could not have been attempted; he afterwards materially assisted Lieut. Gen. Graham and myself in our reconnaissance of the place on which the plan of the attack was founded; and he finally conducted the 2d batt. 5th regt., as well as the 2d caçadores, to their points of attack.

The A. G.,‡ and the D. Q. M. G.,§ and the officers of their several departments, gave me every assistance throughout this service, as well as those of my personal Staff; and I have great pleasure in adding that notwithstanding the season of the year, and the increased difficulties of procuring supplies for the troops, the whole army have been well supplied, and every branch of the service provided for during the late operations, by the indefatigable exertions of Commissary Gen. Bissett, and the officers belonging to his department.

Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, and Don Julian Sanchez, observed the enemy's movements beyond the Tormes during the operations of the siege; and I am much obliged to them, and to the people of Castille in general, for the assistance I received from them. The latter have invariably shown their detestation of the French tyranny, and their desire to contribute, by every means in their power, to remove it.

I shall hereafter transmit to your Lordship a detailed account of what we have found in the place; but I believe that there are 153 pieces of ordnance, including the heavy train belonging to the French army, and great quantities of ammunition and stores. We have the Governor, Gen. Barrié, about 78 officers, and 1700 men, prisoners.

I transmit this dispatch by my aide de camp, Major the Hon. A. Gordon,|| who will give your Lordship any further details you may require; and I beg leave to recommend him to your protection.

* Major Gen. Sir John May, K.C.B.

† Killed near Vic Bigorre in 1813.

‡ Major Gen. the Hon. C. Stewart (Marquis of Londonderry).

§ Lieut. Col. de Lancey.

|| Killed at Waterloo.

P.S. I enclose a return of the prisoners and of the ordnance which have been taken on this occasion. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of the killed and wounded. I therefore transmit a list, containing the names of those who have fallen, according to the best information I could obtain, and shall forward the returns to your Lordship as soon as possible.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the returns of the killed and wounded of the troops engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which it was not in my power to transmit to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 20th inst.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing during the siege and in the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, from the 8th to the 19th Jan. 1812.

	Officers.	Non - commis- sioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	9*	11	158	178
Wounded	70	35	713	818
Missing	—	—	7	7

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812.

You will receive with this the account of the successful termination of our operation, in half the time that I told you it would take, and less than half that which the French spent in taking the same place from the Spaniards, as you will see by referring to the dispatches of that period. Marmont is collecting his army. He was to be at Salamanca to-morrow, and he talks of raising the siege with 50,000 men on the 29th.

I enclose you a copy of a letter from Mr. Stuart, which contains bad news, and a paper published at Cadiz, giving accounts of the same events. It is not true that a single man of Marmont's army, or Dorsenne's, has gone to Valencia; and if — and his army are taken, I attribute this

* Among the killed was Capt. Dobbs, 52d regt., who had distinguished himself at the bridge of Marialva, and in the affair of Sabugal, where he recovered the howitzer taken by the 43d regt., but retaken by the enemy. He was killed in the assault of the lesser breach. Capt. Dobbs was a first rate soldier; possessing qualifications which would have done honor to a much higher rank than that in which he died.

Note. 1844. Major Gen. W. Napier, in the 'Justificatory Notes' to the 6th vol. of his 'History of the War in the Peninsula,' has called in question the correctness of the foregoing note (published in the 1st edition of this work) as regards the recapture of the howitzer at Sabugal. Col. Gurwood forwarded to Major Gen. W. Napier in 1843 the authorities for the statement he had thus made. Major Gen. W. Napier has also alluded in his 'Justificatory Notes' to another statement of Col. Gurwood, in the following terms: 'This note, though put forth, as it were, with the weight of the Duke of Wellington's name, by being inserted among his Dispatches, shall have an answer,' &c. In consequence of this remark of Major Gen. W. Napier, Col. Gurwood has refrained from making this work the channel of communication of a subsequent correspondence relating to the affair at Sabugal, and the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo; but it is his present intention, as soon as he shall have completed this work, to have the documents and correspondence printed for private circulation, for the information of those who may desire to read them.

event to ——'s ignorance of his profession, and ——'s cowardice and treachery.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to transmit by Major the Hon. A. Gordon extracts of two dispatches, and the copy of one of this day's date to the Sec. of State, giving an account of the operations of the siege and of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo. I likewise enclose copies of letters from Major Gen. Craufurd and Lieut. Col. Colborne, recommending the officers who conducted the attack of the redoubt of San Francisco on the 8th inst.*

I beg leave to recommend to your Royal Highness' favor the officers mentioned in the enclosed dispatches.

To the Lady Sarah Napier.

Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812.

I am sorry to tell you that your son George was again wounded in the right arm so badly last night, in the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was necessary to amputate it above the elbow. He, however, bore the operation remarkably well; and I have seen him this morning, quite well, free from pain and fever, and enjoying highly his success before he had received his wound. When he did receive it, he only desired that I might be informed that he had led his men to the top of the breach before he had fallen.

Having *such* sons, I am aware that you expect to hear of those misfortunes which I have more than once had to communicate to you; and notwithstanding your affection for them, you have so just a notion of the value of the distinction they are daily acquiring for themselves, by their gallantry and good conduct, that their misfortunes don't make so great an impression upon you.

Under such circumstances, I perform the task which I have taken upon myself with less reluctance, hoping at the same time that this will be the last occasion on which I shall have to address you upon such a subject, and that your brave sons will be spared to you. Although the last was the most serious, it was not the only wound which George received during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo: he was hit by the splinter of a shell in the shoulder on the 16th.

To Col. Lord Aylmer.

Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812.

Your brother in law, Gen. Mackinnon,† was unfortunately blown up by the explosion of one of the enemy's magazines on the ramparts of Ciudad Rodrigo, after he had led the storm of the breach by his brigade. I have recommended his widow, and children, if he has any, to Mr. Perceval; and I have informed him that measures should be taken to apprise him of the state of the circumstances in which they have been left. You must perform this task; and wait upon Mr. Perceval, and tell him that you do so by my desire.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Gallegos, 21st Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to transmit, by Brig. Gen. Alaya, a copy of my

* See p. 463.

† He was buried at Espeja by the officers of the Coldstream Guards.

dispatch to the Sec. of State, giving an account of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Brig. Gen. Alaya having been with me throughout these operations, will be able to add such details as I may have omitted; and I beg you to inform the Spanish government that I am much indebted to him, and to Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and Don Julian Sanchez, for the success of this operation.

The people of Castille have shown on this, as indeed on every occasion in which I have had any thing to do with them, their detestation of the French yoke, and their desire to contribute to the defeat of the enemy by every means in their power.

I have given the place, and all it contains, over to the Capt. Gen. Castaños, who is in this part of the country.

P.S. I also enclose copies of my dispatches to the Sec. of State of the 15th inst., and of this date.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 21st Jan. 1812.

I have received reports stating that Marshal Marmont, having arrived at Valladolid on the 11th, had heard about the 15th of the operations against Ciudad Rodrigo. I see, by an intercepted letter, that he intended to be at Salamanca on this day, and I have been informed that he had given directions for the collection of his army on the Tormes by the 25th, and he expected to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo by the 29th. Gen. Dorsenne was to accompany Marshal Marmont to Salamanca on this day, but I have not heard that any of the troops of the army of the north were likely to be on the Tormes, excepting Thiébauld's division.

The division of infantry under Gen. Bonet has been withdrawn from the Asturias, and has been added to the '*Armée de Portugal*.' These troops are now on their march towards the Tormes, and had passed Benavente when I last heard from that quarter. The division under the command of Gen. Souham, which has always continued in Castille, between the Tormes and the Douro, since the enemy relieved Ciudad Rodrigo in September last, has likewise been added to the same army. This division is strong, and I should imagine the two would amount to about 13,000 men. These reinforcements would increase the '*Armée de Portugal*' to about 45,000 men, as it is certain that the whole have returned from the eastward, and are between Valladolid and the Tagus. These troops, with Thiébauld's division, are what Marmont can now collect upon the Tormes, and it is reported that they will amount to 50,000 men.

I am concerned to have to inform your Lordship that Marshal Suchet attacked Gen. Blake's position in front of Valencia, on the 26th Dec. The divisions of Villa Campa and Mahy, and Gen. Freyre's cavalry, were cut off from Gen. Blake and Valencia, and Gen. Mahy retreated to the position of Alcira, across the Jucar; these troops having suffered considerably in the action, and having lost all their artillery. By accounts from Alicante, of the 1st, it appears that Gen. Mahy was retreating upon that city. It is not known what had occurred in Valencia, or on the right of the army, on the 26th, but firing was heard in the city on that day and the 27th. It is stated that Marshal Suchet had been reinforced by troops

detached from Madrid; and in a report of Gen. Mahy's, from Alcira, of the 27th ult., published at Cadiz on the 11th inst., I see that he states that Marshal Suchet had been reinforced by troops from the army under the command of Marshal Marmont. But what I have above stated of the '*Armée de Portugal*' will show your Lordship that, although a part of the '*Armée de Portugal*' marched in the direction of Valencia, the whole have returned and never entered that kingdom.

By accounts from Cadiz to the 10th inst., I learn that the enemy had broken ground regularly before Tarifa, and having brought up their heavy artillery opened their fire upon the place on the 29th Dec., and immediately effected a breach in the walls. They attempted to carry this breach by storm on the 31st Dec., but were beat off by the gallant troops under the command of Gen. Copons and Col. Skerrett, composing the garrison; and notwithstanding that by a continued fire from that day to the evening of the 4th Jan. the enemy had completely laid the town open, they did not venture to assault it again, but retired in the night of the 4th inst., leaving behind them 7 pieces of cannon and 2 heavy howitzers, and all the carriages and stores collected for the siege.

I don't send your Lordship Col. Skerrett's reports, as I understand from Major Gen. Cooke that he has transmitted them;* but I can't refrain from

* Major Gen. Cooke to the Earl of Liverpool.

Cadiz, 29th Dec. 1811.

I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the copy of my last dispatch to Gen. Visc. Wellington, with the papers enclosed in it, relative to the situation of affairs at Tarifa.

I have not received any thing from thence since the 24th, at which date the French had not brought up their artillery; and there has been so much rain during the last two days that they may have met with great difficulties.

Major Gen. Cooke to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Cadiz, 27th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to transmit copies of dispatches from Col. Skerrett to the date of the 24th.

The enemy's troops, in addition to those employed immediately against Tarifa, extended across the plain to Vejer, where Marshal Victor had his quarters with a strong corps. I do not learn any thing of Gen. Ballesteros since my last.

Col. Skerrett to Major Gen. Cooke.

Tarifa, 24th Dec. 1811.

I have the honor to report that on the 20th inst. the enemy invested this town with from 4000 to 5000 infantry, and from 200 to 300 cavalry. As it was not advisable to fight so superior a force, I resisted him for an hour with the cavalry and infantry, Spanish and British piquets of the garrison, reinforced by a company of the 95th, and two 6 pounder field guns, of Capt. Hughes' brigade. The loss of the enemy was considerable. On the 21st Capt. Wren, of the 11th, destroyed with his company a small piquet of the enemy. On the 22d I made a sortie at the request of Gen. Copons, and in conjunction with his troops, with the intention to ascertain the numbers of the enemy, by inducing him to show his columns. His light troops suffered considerably from our shells. The enemy is now making his approaches at a long musket shot from the town; but the ground so completely commands us, and is so favorable to him, that our small guns have little or no effect upon him.

Major Gen. Cooke to the Earl of Liverpool.

Cadiz, 31st Dec. 1811.

I have received a dispatch from Col. Skerrett, dated yesterday, of which I enclose a copy. It appears that the enemy had brought up four 16 pounders and some howitzers, and had opened their fire against the wall on the 29th. The shipping had been driven away by the gales of wind.

Col. Skerrett to Major Gen. Cooke.

Tarifa, 30th Dec. 1811.

In my last I had the honor to state that the enemy had invested this town on the 20th

expressing my admiration of the conduct of Col. Skerrett, and the brave troops under his command, nor from recommending them to the protection of your Lordship.

inst.; since which period he has rapidly carried on a regular parallel and approach against the wall of the town, which I consider as doing much honor to the garrison.

I have several times found it necessary to drive back the enemy's advance, and to interrupt his works, in which we have met with a slight loss; and the enemy, from being exposed to the fire of a few small guns we possess on the towers, has suffered considerably. It was only on these occasions that we materially annoyed the enemy; for the wall of the town is so completely commanded, that, in a few hours' work, he has every where much better cover than ourselves.

The enemy yesterday opened his fire at half past 10, and continued to batter in breach at a distance of about 300 yards, with 4 French 16 pounders on the east wall, near the Retiro gate, and 4 howitzers, and other smaller pieces playing on the island and causeway. He continued a constant fire until night, the first and each shot passing through the wall, and through some of the houses in the rear of it. Before night a practicable breach was effected. He this day continued to widen the breach, and, I imagine, will not attempt the assault until it is extended to the tower on each flank (a space of about 40 yards). I have traversed the streets and taken the only measure by which there is a chance of preserving the place, that of defending the houses. The enemy's force employed in the siege is stated at 10,000; probably this is in some degree exaggerated. A constant fire of musketry is interchanged. I have particularly to regret the loss of the service of Lieut. Gaunter, D. A. Q. M. G., a very intelligent and brave officer, who is severely wounded.

Major Gen. Cooke to the Earl of Liverpool.

Cadiz, 10th Jan. 1812.

I beg to congratulate your Lordship upon the complete failure of the enemy's expedition against Tarifa, and to refer you to the enclosed copy of my letter to Gen. Lord Wellington, conveying Col. Skerrett's reports of the French having been repulsed with great loss in assaulting the breach which they had effected in the wall, and of their having retreated on the night of the 4th, leaving their heavy artillery and a quantity of stores on the ground.

Your Lordship will see that Col. Skerrett, and the brave troops under his command, have thoroughly done their duty. He has expressed his sense of the effectual co-operation of the Spanish troops under Gen. Copons, who in his report gives his full approbation of the conduct of Col. Skerrett, and the British troops under his orders, upon this, as he has done upon former occasions during the last 3 months.

Capt. O'Donoghue, of the 47th regt., acting aide de camp to Col. Skerrett, has charge of this dispatch, and will give your Lordship any details relative to the late events at Tarifa.

Major Gen. Cooke to Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Cadiz, 10th Jan. 1812.

I last night received a dispatch from Col. Skerrett, dated the 1st inst., of which I have the honor to transmit a copy, reporting the defeat of a strong column of the enemy on the day before, in an assault of the breach which they had made in the wall of Tarifa.

I received at the same time intelligence from Lieut. Gen. Campbell, that the French had broken up from before the place in the night of the 4th, leaving their artillery, &c., and retiring by a pass of La Peña, under the fire of the navy.

I have this morning received Col. Skerrett's report of that most satisfactory event, by his aide de camp, Capt. O'Donoghue, and I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the copies of them.

Col. Skerrett to Major Gen. Cooke.

Tarifa, 1st Jan. 1812.

In my last I had the honor to state that the enemy commenced to batter in breach on the 29th Dec., since which period until yesterday he kept up a heavy fire of cannon on the breach, and of shells on the town, causeway, and island. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 31st Dec. a strong column was seen rapidly advancing to the breach; our musketry several times checked the enemy; and the firm front and intrepid behaviour of the troops, in less than an hour, gained a complete victory. The most bold of the enemy fell near the foot of the breach, and the mass of the column made a precipitate retreat.

The situation of the enemy's wounded, with which the ground was covered between his battery and our fire, where they must inevitably have perished, induced me, from motives of compassion, to hoist a flag of truce to carry them off. Some were brought into the place over the breach; but from the extreme difficulty attending this, I allowed the enemy to carry the remainder away. Gen. Leval, the French Commander in Chief, expressed his acknowledgments for the conduct of the British and Spanish nations on this occasion, in the most feeling and grateful terms. We have made prisoners 10 officers, and 20 or 30 soldiers; the enemy's loss has been very severe. The column that attacked the breach was

The troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Hill have passed the frontiers of Portugal, and the left of them are, I believe, this day at Castello Branco. Gen. Drouet had not arrived at Merida, according to the last accounts.

The A.G. to the Officer in charge of prisoners of war, Fuente Guinaldo. 21st Jan. 1812.

I have to request that on the receipt of this you will proceed with the prisoners of war under your charge to Sabugal, at which place you will be joined by an officer having also in charge 90 additional prisoners; from thence you will proceed with the whole towards Lisbon, agreeably to the route that will be delivered to you by the above officer.

The A.G. to the Officer in charge of prisoners of war, Sabugal. 21st Jan. 1812.

I am to acquaint you that an escort of 200 men from Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps is ordered to proceed to Pedrogão to take charge of the prisoners of war on their arrival at that place, under which they are to be conducted to Abrantes. You will be pleased to hand over to the officer in command of the above escort the route for the party, and any further instructions you may have received on this head of service; particular care being taken that the officers and prisoners are made acquainted that the people of the country will shoot any one of them that attempts to escape. The escort under your command, on performing this service, will rejoin their division.

The A.G. to Governor Lobo, Abrantes.

21st Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that the prisoners captured at Ciudad Rodrigo are now on their march under escort to Abrantes, from which place I am to request a sufficient guard may be appointed to conduct them to Lisbon by water.

2000 men, composed of all the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the army. The enemy invested this town on the 20th Dec.; since which period, 1000 British, and 700 or 800 Spanish troops, with only the defence of a wall, which appears to have been built as a defence against archery, and before the use of gunpowder, have resisted an army of 10,000 men, with a regular battering train of artillery, and have at last defeated and repulsed them.

The wall of the town has the additional disadvantage of being commanded within half musket shot, and flanked or taken in reverse in almost every part.

The conduct of all the troops has been admirable; and that of Lieut. Col. Gough* and the 2d batt. of the 87th regt. exceeds all praise. Equal credit is due to the indefatigable exertions of Capt. Smith,† Royal Engineers, to whom much of our success is due. I have on all occasions received the greatest assistance from the military experience and the great exertions of Lieut. Col. Lord Proby, second in command.

We have to regret the loss of 2 officers killed, Lieut. Longley, Royal Engineers, and Lieut. Hall, 47th regt.

Col. Skerrett to Major Gen. Cooke.

Tarifa, 5th Jan. 1812.

In my letter of the 1st inst. I had the honor to relate the particulars of our proceedings here, and of our victory at the breach. Since that period the enemy has kept up a partial fire, and the breach was yesterday completely open for a space of 25 or 30 yards.

From the movements of the enemy last night, I was induced to suppose he intended another assault, and the garrison waited in eager expectation to give him another proof of British valor. To our astonishment, this morning at daylight the columns of the enemy were already at a distance, having taken advantage of a dark and stormy night to make a precipitate retreat, leaving in our possession all his artillery, ammunition, stores, &c.

I immediately ordered Major Broad, with a part of the 47th regt., to follow the enemy; he took possession of his artillery, waggons, and a quantity of stores, time enough to save them from the flames, the enemy having set fire to them. We have made some prisoners. From the number of dead found on the ground the enemy occupied, his loss on the whole must have been very great.

Marshal Victor was present in the French camp to give orders for the retreat.

We have thus seen the greatest effort the French are capable of making frustrated by

* Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Gough, G.C.B.

† Major Gen. Sir Charles Felix Smith, K.C.B., &c.

To Gen. Victoria.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812.

I received your Excellency's letter of the 8th inst. I had received the most positive information that Don João Leal, who was employed by you to get intelligence of the enemy's movements, was a spy employed by Gen. Philippon, the Governor of Badajoz. There can be no doubt of this fact, and I therefore directed that he should be arrested; and he must be given over to the person who will demand him on the part of Gen. Castaños, in order to be tried as a spy.

If I could entertain a doubt upon the fact of his being a French spy, the nature of the intelligence which he gave to your Excellency, and which you communicated to me, would have convinced me of it. I have never seen any thing of the kind so impudently false and extravagant; and it is obvious that he communicated it to you that he might have, through your protection, the means of acquiring real intelligence for the enemy.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know by return of post whether the duty at Fort S. Julian can be done without the battalion of marines now stationed there.

1800 British and Spanish troops, with only the defence of a paltry wall; and an army of 10,000 men, commanded by a Marshal of France, retreating from them silently in the night, after having been repulsed and defeated, leaving behind all their artillery and stores, collected at a great expense and by immense exertions.

I enclose a return of artillery and stores taken from the enemy.

The unremitting vigilance and exertion, the zeal and intrepidity, of every individual of this garrison, is above praise.

I have the honor to dispatch this by my acting aide de camp, Capt. O'Donoghue, of the 47th regt., who is in possession of every information relative to my proceedings at this place; an officer of great merit and considerable length of service.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing at Tarifa, from 24th Dec. 1811, to 1st Jan. 1812. (See Appendix, No. XVII.)

	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	2	—	8	6	10
Wounded	6	—	56	9	62
Missing	—	—	1	—	1

Col. Skerrett to Major Gen. Cooke.

Tarifa, 9th Jan. 1812.

In my letter of the 5th inst. I omitted to mention the unremitting exertions, and the great assistance afforded to this place for a considerable time past by Cpts. Dickson, Searle, Pell, and Carroll, of His Majesty's navy, the last of whom commanded the division of gun boats, and has on many occasions materially annoyed the enemy, and impeded his progress in bringing up his guns for the siege, in which service he has been exposed to considerable danger, which I request may be added to my report.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812, 11 P.M.

Major Gordon will have shown you my dispatch to the Sec. of State, containing the account of the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo.

It appears that Marmont is assembling his army upon the Tormes, and I saw this day an order for the preparation of rations at Baños for 20,000 men, which looks like the march of a column into the valley of the Alagon. We have not yet received your distribution, but I shall be obliged to you if you will place 3 brigades of the 2d division, including the Portuguese brigade, at and about Castello Branco, extending towards Idanha a Nova: send the heavy 6 pounders across likewise. If I should see occasion to move these troops, I shall do so by orders from hence, and you can join them afterwards, before they can come in contact with the enemy. Send a squadron or two of cavalry across the Tagus to look out to their front towards Zarza la Mayor.

I suspect, that if Marmont should move upon this army, either by way of saving appearances, or really to endeavor to regain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, before we can have put the place in order, he will turn us by the Puerto de Perales; in that case, I propose to cut off the troops which he will employ in this operation, unless they should be very numerous. I intend that you should move upon Moraleja, &c., while the troops of this army, keeping their front upon the Agueda and Bayllo, shall attack the corps which will come up by Perales, and drive them back upon you. If you should have 3 brigades at and in front of Castello Branco, and the rest cantoned in column, ready to follow, you will be fully prepared for all that I propose for you. I think it most probable, however, that when Marmont shall have heard of our success, he will not move at all. Our trenches and batteries will be effaced to-morrow, and the breaches will be in a state of defence against a *coup de main* to-morrow, or next day, and the town provisioned and in order.

Marmont was to be at Salamanca yesterday, his army was to be on the Tormes the 25th, and he expected to raise the siege on the 29th. The orders for the preparations for the march of troops by Baños, are for the 21st, 22d, and 23d; but there were no movements on the Tormes on the 20th, and none at Navalmoral on the 19th.

G. O.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces congratulates the General officers, officers, and troops engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, upon the brilliant result of their labors and gallantry, achieved on the night of the 19th inst. He assures them all that he will not fail to report their conduct to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, and to the Secretary of State, for the information of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, in the terms which it merits.

G. O.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812.

1. To prevent the inconvenience arising to officers having claims for bät and forage, and military contingencies, from the payment being made at head quarters, an arrangement has been made, that the same shall be paid by the senior Commissariat officer attached to divisions of infantry and brigades of cavalry, to whom application must be made for the same, when each Commanding officer will give notice that he has funds in his hands to liquidate such demands.

2.

* * * * *

Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

3. In consideration of the good conduct of the 88th regt. in the recent operations of the army, the Commander of the Forces remits that part of the sentence of the General Court Martial under which the prisoners — and — are to receive a corporal punishment, but they must be put under stoppages to repay the money which they took respectively.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Gallegos, 22d Jan. 1812.

Gen. Abadia will have been apprised from Gen. Castaños' head quarters of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 19th. I have been so much occupied since that I have not been able to write to you.

He will have heard from other quarters of the march of Bonet's division from the Asturias; and I conclude, that if those troops should not have been relieved by a body equally numerous, Gen. Abadia will have taken possession of that province. Gen. Bonet's and Gen. Souham's divisions are added to the '*Armée de Portugal*'; and will hereafter be employed in watching our movements. I suspect that the Guards will not be employed in the Asturias; and I doubt that Dorsenne has any other troops to send there, excepting a very bad and weak division, composed of detachments of regiments of the line, under the command of Gen. Thiébault.

Having taken Ciudad Rodrigo, it is very desirable that I should move from this quarter. If Gen. Abadia can't move forward so as to divert the attention of the enemy from me, or from other quarters, can he in the months of March and April, when all the streams will be full, defend Galicia? Pray let me hear from you in answer to this question soon.

The French are talking of moving in this direction; but they had not heard of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. If they should move this way, I hope to give a good account of them.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Colville, 4th division.

24th Jan. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you, upon the resignation of Lieut. —, of the —, herewith returned, that the Commander of the Forces cannot receive it in its present shape as dated at an advanced period of 3 months; and that officer's resignation, if forwarded, must be dated from the day he sends it in.

The A.G. to Paymaster Williams, 44th regt., 5th division.

24th Jan. 1812.

I have received and laid your letter of the 16th inst. before the Commander of the Forces, and I am to acquaint you that his Excellency, in the present instance, will admit of your excuse, but trusts that the same inattention to your duty, in absentsing yourself as Paymaster of the 44th regt., will not occur again.

Memorandum for Major Gen. Borthwick and Major Dickson, R.A., and the Commissary General.

26th Jan. 1812.

1. As soon as the gun bullocks shall have brought in the ordnance to Almeida, it is desirable that the sixteen 24 pounders carronades (howitzers) should be sent off to the Alentejo by 8 bullocks to each.

They might go by easy stages, and the 150 bullocks required to draw the bridge might accompany them, in order to assist in their removal.

2. Twenty 24 pounder guns and their carriages, and six spare carriages, with their necessary small stores, should likewise be removed from Almeida to Barca d'Alva. They should there be embarked in boats and sent down to Oporto, and thence by sea to Setuval.

3. A letter has been written to Mr. Boyes, to request him to send to Oporto all the 24 pounder shot and spherical case shot that is at Villa da Ponte, and all the powder (900 barrels) that is at Pezo da Regoa

to Oporto; to be there embarked and sent to Setuval by sea without loss of time.

4. As soon as the timber shall be brought to Almeida from Ciudad Rodrigo, and the bridge shall be brought on the transporting carriages to the same place from the neighbourhood of Gallegos, the bullocks should be turned to grass.

5. 1000 barrels of gunpowder, recently arrived from England at Lisbon, to be ordered immediately to Setuval.

Gallegos, 26th Jan. 1812.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

I have the honor to enclose two memorandums which have been given to me by Gen. Borthwick, commanding the artillery with this army; and as I concur entirely with Gen. Borthwick, I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will direct that we may receive the reinforcements of horses, of artillerymen, and of gunner drivers suggested in the enclosed memorandums.

Gallegos, 28th Jan. 1812.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

I have received your very kind letter of the 4th inst., and I beg you will take an opportunity of assuring the Duke of York that I am obliged to His Royal Highness for his recollection of me, as much as if his recommendation of me had been successful.

I should think that H.R.H. the Prince Regent must have misunderstood Lord Wellesley, when His Royal Highness supposed that he intended to convey to His Royal Highness that a military government was no object to me, and that I had other views. Lord Wellesley must have said that I had never spoken or written to him or any body else respecting such an object; but he could not have said that I had other views. Indeed I don't know what views I could have, excepting to serve the country to the best of my ability.

I have never stated to any body a wish to have a military government, because I make it a rule never to apply to any body in any manner for any thing for myself; and I have always been convinced from his known character, as well as from experience, that if it was expedient and proper that I should receive such a favor, the Duke of York would recommend me for it, without any application from myself or my friends.

I should have been very happy to receive, at the recommendation of H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, the mark of the favor of the Prince Regent which was proposed for me.

I have not much time to attend to my own affairs; and I don't know exactly how I stand with the world at present. The pay of Commander of the Forces, which is all that I receive in this country, does not defray my expenses here, while my family must be maintained in England; and

Gallegos, 28th Jan. 1812.

G. O.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that when the Paymasters of regiments are ordered to attend the Paymaster Gen. to receive the balances due on their estimates, the Commanding officers of regiments will see that they obey the order forthwith; some have not yet obeyed the last order given upon this subject, notwithstanding the inconvenience that both officers and troops have suffered from being kept without pay longer than the hitherto exigencies render necessary.

I think it probable that I shall not be richer for having served in the Peninsula. A military government, therefore, would be desirable as an addition to my income.

I believe that we shall have General officers in sufficient numbers, when those recently appointed shall arrive, notwithstanding the loss of Mackinnon and Craufurd, who died of his wounds 4 days ago. I propose to appoint Clinton or C. Alten to his situation. It will be very desirable to get rid of — and —, but not in a manner to mortify them.

Pack has long wished to return to the British service, but I doubt whether it would come to his turn to have a British brigade, even now that Craufurd and Mackinnon are gone. As soon as it shall come to his turn, I will remove him to the British service, and will apply to have him made a Brigadier General.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gallegos, 28th Jan. 1812.

The enemy have not advanced from the Tormes, and we are every day getting on with the re-establishment of Ciudad Rodrigo, so that I hope to have the place in a good state in a few days, and I propose immediately to replace the army in their old cantonments.

I am therefore turning my mind seriously to Badajoz, and Major Dickson goes off to the Alentejo on the day after to-morrow, and I hope to be in a situation to begin our operations there in the second week in March. Among other arrangements, I am sending from hence sixteen 24 pounder carronades, which answer either as 24 pounder guns or 5½ inch howitzers; and I think that by means of part of this equipment you might be enabled to render an important service, which would go a great way towards enabling us to secure our object at Badajoz.

When we shall attack Badajoz, we must expect that the '*Armée de Portugal*,' consisting of 8 divisions of infantry, the whole of which are now in Castille, and the army of the south, will co-operate to oblige us to raise the siege. The '*Armée de Portugal*' would naturally cross the Tagus by their bridge at Almaraz, and they would be obliged, at the season of the year in which I propose to undertake this operation, to go round even by Toledo, if we could destroy their bridge and other establishments at that place. This is what I wish you to attempt.

You probably went to look at the bridge of Almaraz when the army were at Jaraicejo in the month of August, 1809. As well as I recollect, the Puerto de Mirabete commands the whole ground to the river, the descent from the Puerto being about a league. The French have there three works defended by 15 pieces of cannon (8 pounders) and a howitzer; that is to say, one, I believe, at the Puerto, and two others below, to defend the bridge, one being at each side of the river. I am not quite certain, however, of the locality of the works; and some accounts have given me reason to believe that the works, besides the one at the Puerto de Mirabete, are redoubts thrown up for the defence of a small village called Lugar Nuevo, on one side of the river, and of another called Casas del Puerto, on the left side, and about a mile and a half below the Puerto de Mirabete. If this be true, it would be possible to destroy the bridge without taking the works; and at all events, if it is not true, and that the

works are near the river and properly *têtes de pont*, they must be very bad ones, as I recollect perfectly that the ground falls on the left side to the banks of the river, from the Puerto de Mirabete, and almost an equal distance on the right side.

Under these circumstances, it appears to me that you will have no difficulty in destroying the enemy's bridge at Almaraz; and I hope that you may have it in your power to destroy their stores and establishments there.

The garrison of the three works consists of 450 men, including artillerymen, sappers, &c.; and as long as the enemy remain in Castille, they can't be assisted or reinforced. If I should find that the enemy move from Castille again into Estremadura, I could easily apprise you of their movement in time to stop you, if it should be necessary.

The equipment which you should take with you for the purposes of this operation, should be 8 or 10 ladders, from 18 to 20 feet in length, about 20 felling axes, and 3 or 4 crowbars; a coil of good rope might be of use to enable you to tow the boats to a situation in which you could burn them. Besides, I would recommend you to take 4 or 5 of the 24 pounder carronades, which are going into the Alentejo for the purposes of the siege of Badajoz: these carronades are mounted upon travelling carriages, with axletrees of the same span as the Portuguese artillery and the carts of the country; they can therefore travel anywhere, they weigh the same in travelling as our 9 and heavy 6 pounders, and are drawn by 8 horses; they are now travelling with bullocks, but I will to-morrow send you the route by which they are to march, and I recommend to you to send horses belonging to your heavy brigade, or to your horse artillery, to meet and bring them up to you quicker than the bullocks can bring them; each of them has on its carriage every thing for its use, excepting shot, powder, and cartridges, and it is desirable that you should without delay adopt the following measures to procure these articles.

You should send to Elvas to have selected from the stores there, 100 *English* 24 pounder shot for each carronade that you will take. I say *English* 24 pounder shot, because any thing larger will not fit them. You should likewise draw from the stores of the army, either at Elvas or Abrantes, fifty $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch shells for each, and about twenty $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch spherical cases for each, if there are so many; the stores at Elvas will supply the quantity of powder sufficient for these shot and shells. The Commissary must get mule carts, if possible, to carry these stores upon your expedition, if not bullock carts; 30 or 40 shot or shells will go in a cart easily; that part of the equipment taken from Elvas, might be given out to be for the use of Campo Maior, Ouguela, and Alburquerque.

I should hope that all the preparations would be made by the time that the carronades would arrive at Portalegre. I would then recommend the following disposition to you: that Gen. Hamilton and the Portuguese division, and Portuguese cavalry, should observe the garrison of Badajoz; that Gens. Morillo and the Conde de Penne Villemur should observe the bridge of Merida, and the movements of the 5th corps in Lower Estremadura; while you should move with the 2d division, the British cavalry, and such part of the 6 pounder brigade, and of the horse artillery, as

should be equipped, after equipping the howitzers as above desired, by Caceres direct upon Jaraicejo, and thence upon the Puerto de Mirabete.

P.S. You will of course collect your corps from this side of the Tagus whenever you please.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Gallegos, 28th Jan. 1812, 11 P.M.

I much fear that we must send the 24 pounder guns into the Alentejo. I wish you would come here to-morrow morning at an early hour.

Memorandum on the operations against Badajoz.

For Major Gen. Borthwick, Major Dickson, R.A., Col. Fletcher, R.E., and the Commissary General. 28th Jan. 1812.

Major Dickson will proceed to Setuval in order to arrange the removal of the ordnance and stores from Setuval to Elvas, passing by Elvas. He will require to go to Elvas 7 days; to go to Evora 2 days; to Alcacer do Sal 1 day; to Setuval 2 days: in all 12 days.

Mr. Bissett will be so kind as immediately to order an intelligent Commissary to Setuval, with directions to make the preparations of boats to convey the heavy ordnance and stores from Setuval to Alcacer do Sal. The same Commissary is likewise to communicate with the magistrates of Evora and Alcacer do Sal and Setuval, to procure bullocks and carts to remove the ordnance and stores from Alcacer do Sal to Elvas.

Supposing these arrangements to be ready by the time of Major Dickson's arrival at Setuval, and that he can immediately commence removing the ordnance and stores from the transports, it will then take 7 days to remove the ordnance and stores from the transports to the boats, 4 days to arrive at Alcacer do Sal; 4 days to prepare to move from Alcacer do Sal; 12 days to march to Elvas: in all 38 days.

Au Général Dumouriez.

À Gallegos, ce 28 Jan. 1812.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir vos lettres du 19 Nov. J'aurais écrit la lettre que vous désirez sur le compte de M. St. Martin, si je l'avais fait au sujet d'aucun individu qui est mort dans ce pays-ci, pas au champ de bataille. M. St. Martin s'est toujours très bien comporté, et il était vraiment une perte. Mais plusieurs autres se sont également comportés, et leur mort doit être censée également une perte. Ce serait injuste envers la mémoire de plusieurs, si je faisais un rapport officiel sur la mort d'un seul; et on verrait bien que je l'avais fait à cause de quelque sollicitation ce que ne ferait honneur ni à moi, ni au défunt.

Vous verrez par les gazettes ce qui est arrivé dernièrement dans la Péninsule. Les affaires sont restées de la manière dont elles se trouvaient au commencement d'Octobre, jusqu'à la fin de Décembre. Alors Dorsenne, fatigué des succès des guerrillas dans la Navarre et la Biscaye, et Marmont, fatigué des retards de Suchet, se sont mis en mouvement, l'un vers le nord de l'Espagne, l'autre vers la Manche et la Valence, le 22 Déc. J'ai tout de suite fait des préparatifs pour le siège de Ciudad Rodrigo.

Marmont, arrivé à Tolède, a rebroussé chemin avec tout son monde le 31 Déc. Je ne l'ai su que le 9 Jan., mais le siège était déjà commence, et j'étais déterminé de le presser aussi loin que je pouvais. D'ailleurs,

quoique Dorsenne fut également retourné lui-même à Valladolid, ses troupes étaient encore au nord. Nous avons pris la place d'assaut le 19 Jan., Marmont n'ayant pas rassemblé son armée en Castille. On lui a ajouté 2 divisions à l'armée de Portugal, ôtées à l'armée du Nord; celle de Bonet, venue des Asturies, et celle de Souham, qui est venue de l'Italie pendant l'été: et il est toujours sur le Tormes avec ses 8 divisions.

Nous avons mis la place à l'abri d'un coup de main, et elle sera bientôt en meilleur état que jamais.

Les Espagnols tenaient toujours à Valence le 6 Jan. L'affaire du 26 Déc. a été la conséquence de la mauvaise conduite des officiers généraux et troupes Espagnoles, surtout, on dit, du Gén. —. J'ai des rapports que Blake leur avait ordonné d'avancer encore un fois. Pour preuve du peu de communication qu'ont les Français en Espagne, je vous dis qu'on ne savait rien à Valladolid de l'affaire du 26 Déc. à Valence jusqu'au 13 Jan.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

I have seen Fletcher, who says the 18 pounders will answer if we can't get 24 pounders, carronades, 9 feet long; and I have written to the Admiral, to request him to send 24 pounders to Setuval of these dimensions, if he can get them at Lisbon; if he can't, to send 18 pounders of these dimensions, each of them with 700 rounds of Carron shot.

You will do well, before you leave Almeida, to arrange that all the 18 pounder carriages, and the deficiency of 24 pounder carriages, should be put in order; and the guns taken off them preparatory to travelling.

I have sent your memorandum to the Admiral, in respect to yokes and transporting carriages to be sent to Setuval. But you will do well to write yourself to Gen. Rosa.

I write to Major Tulloh to find out if there are any 24 pounder or 18 pounder Carron guns 9 feet long at Elvas. If there are, it is of course useless for you to bring up from Alcacer more than will be necessary to make, with them and our 16 guns, 36 pieces.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

The carronades will be at Sabugal on the 2d Feb., at Pedrogão on the 5th, and at S. Miguel d'Arche on the 6th. You will do well to have horses there on the 4th, so as to be able to bring them off the moment they arrive. An officer should come with the horses, who should be able to see that he takes with the carronades all that they will require.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

I enclose my dispatch of this day.

I propose to attack Badajoz, and I think it probable that I shall be in readiness to invest the place in the second week in March. Of course I shall have collected to oppose me every thing that can be brought from the south as well as from the north. Indeed in Marmont's army they are already talking of moving in that direction.

I have always been of opinion that the best situation for Ballesteros' corps would have been the Condado de Niebla, as he would have been more

immediately in communication with us. But whether in Niebla or in Ronda, it is absolutely necessary that the whole of Soult's force should not be brought upon us with impunity.

It may be depended upon that all demonstrations towards the French lines at Cadiz are useless. They are too strong to be even looked at by such a force as that under the command of Ballesteros, or by any thing which can be added to his force. But this is not the case with Seville. I believe that Ballesteros, provided with three or four 18 pounders, and ammunition for them, scaling ladders, &c., would easily lay open any works the French may have constructed at Seville; and it may be depended upon, that if he will only be as active in destroying the stores, &c., which he will find at Seville, as I have known him to be in the destruction of property, he will raise the blockade of Cadiz as effectually as if he were to force the French lines in front of that place.

Ballesteros should be reinforced to the utmost extent without loss of time. This expedition, and the advantages likely to result from it, should be held out to him, and measures should be taken to equip him for it, either from Cadiz or Gibraltar, in such a manner as to insure his success. By well timed and vigorous measures he may be of the utmost use to us; and he need incur no risk, as he need not quit his den at Gibraltar till he shall find Soult in movement against me.

I have received from government the approbation of the orders which I had given respecting Carthagena. They have, however, called my attention to the state and safety of the Balearic islands. I believe Gen. O'Donnell has been appointed to command in those islands. I could write to him if I could depend upon this report being true; but I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate with him, and let me know in what way he may think I can be useful to him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

Major Gen. Craufurd * died on the 24th inst., of the wounds which he received on the 19th, while leading the Light division of this army to the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Although the conduct of Major Gen. Craufurd on the occasion on which these wounds were received, and the circumstances which occurred, have excited the admiration of every officer in the army, I can't report his death to your Lordship without expressing my sorrow and regret, that His Majesty has been deprived of the services, and I of the assistance, of an officer of tried talents and experience, who was an ornament to his profession, and was calculated to render the most important services to his country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

Marshal Marmont arrived at Salamanca on the 22d inst., and the 6th division of infantry of the '*Armée de Portugal*' were collected in the neighbourhood of Alba and Salamanca on the 23d and 24th. Gen. Sou-

* He was buried at the foot of the little breach. The Commander of the Forces, and all the officers of the besieging army, attended the funeral, which, from place and circumstances, was more than usually impressive.

ham's division, with about 600 cavalry and some artillery, were sent to Matilla on the 23d, and patrolled to San Muñoz and Tamames. The movement of this division was intended to ascertain the fact of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, and they retired again to the Tormes on the 26th.

I heard this morning that Marshal Marmont had moved yesterday from Salamanca, in the direction of Valladolid, with all his troops, excepting one brigade of Souham's division. But I am not certain that this report is founded. I have not heard that Bonet's division had crossed the Douro.

We have been employed in repairing the damages which our fire had done to Ciudad Rodrigo. For some days it has not been possible to take the place by a *coup de main*, and I hope that in a short time the works will be in a good state of defence.

I have the honor to enclose the account published by the enemy in the *Madrid Gazette* of the 13th Jan., of the affair with the Spanish army near Valencia on the 26th Dec.

It is satisfactory to see that, notwithstanding the unfavorable result of the action of the 26th Dec., the enemy's communication was so difficult, that accounts of that action had not reached Madrid till that late period. I have reason to believe that although the city of Valencia was closely invested, the enemy had made no progress in their attempts to obtain possession of it as late as the 7th inst., and that Gen. Blake had ordered the divisions of Mahy, Villa Campa, and Obispo, which had retired, to return to Valencia.

It appears by the enclosed report that Gen. Montbrun's cavalry were in the action of the 26th Dec.* Some of the regiments which have been under the command of that General, are now in Castille with Marshal Marmont; and I understand that Gen. Montbrun himself was a few days ago at Arevalo; but of this I can't be certain.

I have no accounts from Cadiz since I addressed your Lordship on the 21st.

P.S. Since writing the above I have received a report that the enemy had on the 26th fired a salute at Salamanca to announce the capture of Valencia, said to have taken place on the 8th or 9th inst., but no account had been published, and the fact was not believed to be true.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

Adverting to the operations which the troops may have to perform in the course of this year, I think it desirable that tents for 30,000 men should be sent to Lisbon as soon as may be possible.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

You will see from my dispatch that we are hard at work at Ciudad Rodrigo, and that place, as well as Almeida, will be quite secure by the end of next month.

I now propose to attack Badajoz as soon as I can. I have ordered all the preparatory arrangements to be made, and I hope that every thing will be in readiness to enable me to invest the place by the second week

* See Appendix, No. XVIII.

in March. We shall have great advantages in making the attack so early if the weather will allow of it.

1st; All the torrents in this part of the country are then full, so that we may assemble nearly our whole army on the Guadiana, without risk to any thing valuable here.

2dly; It will be convenient to assemble our army at an early period in Estremadura, for the sake of the green forage, which comes in earlier to the south than here.

3dly; We shall have advantages, in point of subsistence, over the enemy, at that season, which we should not have at a later period.

4thly; Their operations will necessarily be confined by the swelling of the rivers in that part as well as here.

The bad weather, which we must expect, or other circumstances, may, however, prevent us from carrying our plan into execution, but I can only assure you that I will not abandon it lightly; and I have taken measures to have the best equipments for this enterprise. I enclose the weekly and morning states.

I am happy to say that the troops employed in the siege have not suffered in their health; indeed the divisions which were not there have sent most men to the hospitals lately.

To the Duke of Richmond.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

I have not written to you lately, as I have had nothing to tell you deserving your attention.

My troops have been remarkably unhealthy during the summer and autumn, and, although numerous, were so inferior in numbers to those the enemy had in my front, that I could do nothing more than keep them in check, and prevent them, at least, from undertaking any thing against the Spaniards. At length, in the end of December, convinced, I believe, by the reports in our own newspapers, that we were too sickly to undertake any thing, they broke up from Castille and the western parts of Estremadura, and marched off towards Valencia and Aragon, the former to assist Suchet, and the latter to endeavor to check the guerrillas. I immediately pushed forward the preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; invested the place and broke ground on the 8th, and we took it by assault, as you will have seen, on the 19th Jan. Marmont returned upon hearing of our first movements, and collected about 50,000 men on the Tormes about the 23d and 24th of the month, but he has advanced only a reconnoitring party from thence; and it appears that he will not attempt to prevent us from putting the place again in a state of defence. It is already provisioned; and has been for some days in such a state as that it could not have been carried by a *coup de main*.

I have likewise restored the works of Almeida, so that I shall have this frontier as good as it ever was; and I hope to be able to get the whole army together, when I shall have a better chance with these gentlemen.

We proceeded at Ciudad Rodrigo on quite a new principle in sieges. The whole object of our fire was to lay open the walls. We had not one mortar; nor a howitzer, excepting to prevent the enemy from clearing the breaches, and for that purpose we had only two; and we fired upon

the flanks and defences only when we wished to get the better of them, with a view to protect those who were to storm. This shows the kind of place we had to attack, and how important it is to cover the works of a place well by a glacis. The French, however, who are supposed to know every thing, could not take this place in less than 40 days after it was completely invested, or than 25 days after breaking ground.

March came here about a month ago, remarkably well ; but he has had two slight attacks of fever since he arrived, from one of which he is now recovering. He is very liable to catch cold, and with the cold he always has fever. This must be a consequence of his disorder in the summer ; but I hope that he will be quite well before the hot weather shall set in. If he should not be so, I shall certainly send him home.

Pray remember me most kindly to the Duchess and all your family.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Gallegos, 31st Jan. 1812.

I request that on the receipt of this letter you will apply to Adm. Berkeley for tonnage to take to England the battalion of marines, and the marine artillery, which are at Lisbon, &c., not belonging to the ships under the command of Adm. Berkeley.

To Baron Constant.*

Gallegos, 31st Jan. 1812.

I return Sir F. d'Ivernois' books, which I have perused with the greatest satisfaction. I had never read any of his works, excepting a pamphlet upon Finance, in a book called '*Offrandes à Buonaparte*;' but I have long come to the same conclusion as he has respecting the state of the French finances, and respecting the plunder resulting from the war being the cause for its continuance. I enclose the drafts of my proclamations to the Portuguese nation on this last subject, which show my opinion upon it.

In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they called a *levée en masse* ; and put every man, animal, and article in their own country in requisition for the service of the armies. This system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation among whom such a system was established should have been anxious to carry the war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and afforded the means of success ; and with the war they carried, wherever they went, the system of requisition ; not, however, before they had, by these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the sources of national prosperity at home.

Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence at least, the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes ; in other instances, besides these articles they have received pay ; and from Austria and Prussia, and other

* Baron Constant de Rebecque, C.B., &c., afterwards Lieut. General in the service of the King of the Netherlands. He had been some time at the head quarters of the army under Lord Wellington, attached to the Prince of Orange.

parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought to be added the plunder acquired by the Generals, officers, and troops; and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest evil that ever fell on the civilised world.

The capital and the industry of France having been destroyed by the Revolution, it is obvious that the government can't raise a revenue from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new government, particularly in the newly conquered or ceded states; and to defend the widely extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and inclination must lead them to attack it. The French government, therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource; and that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French Revolution has entailed upon the present generation.

I have great hopes, however, that this resource is beginning to fail; and I think there are symptoms of a sense in France either that war is not so productive as it was, or that nations who have still something to lose may resist, as those of the Peninsula have; in which case, the expense of collecting this resource becomes larger than its produce.

One symptom of a sense of the failure of these resources is, that Napoleon has recently seized upon the territories of Rome, Holland, and the Hanse Towns, and has annexed these States to France. By these measures he has departed from a remarkable principle of his policy. In the early periods of his government he had not extended the dominions of France beyond what were called her natural limits of the Rhine, the Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. It appeared that he was aware of the dangers to which all widely extended empires are liable; and he was satisfied with governing by his influence all these States, and those of the Confederation of the Rhine. He must at the same time have made up his mind to draw no resources from these States, excepting those of a military nature, stipulated by treaty; and, indeed, the hopes of avoiding future plunder could have been the only inducement to these several States to enter into the Confederation. The futile disputes with his brother, the Pope, or the Senates of the Hanse Towns, can't have been the cause of this departure from a remarkable principle of his early policy. He might easily have settled these disputes in any manner he pleased. Neither was it the dictate of a wild and extravagant ambition. If it was, why did he not seize upon poor Switzerland? The fact was, it was not safe or convenient to plunder Austria, Prussia, Russia, or Denmark; but he wanted the resources of Holland, the Hanse Towns, and Rome, for his treasury, and therefore he seized them to himself.

As to Spain, it is completely plundered from one end to the other. The cultivation in some parts, as you must have seen, is entirely annihilated; and in all parts, by the accounts of the French officers, has much decreased. There is no commerce; and I have but little doubt that another year of diminished produce will have the effect of distressing

the French armies exceedingly, and, possibly, may be attended with more important consequences. I know that the French officers were of opinion last September that they could not last much longer.

I don't believe that the French armies in Spain have ever drawn from the country much more than their subsistence and means of transport. In some parts of the country, more productive than others, they levy from the people more subsistence than the troops there stationed can consume, and they sell the overplus by retail, at low prices; and this money defrays some of the necessary expenses for hospitals, intelligence, &c., or is carried to other parts, where, on account of the small number of troops and the difficulty of procuring provisions by requisition, they are obliged to pay for them. In other parts also they levy contributions in money; but generally in small sums, and not more than sufficient to defray the expenses which in all armies must necessarily be defrayed in money.

It appears by a letter from the Duque de Santa Fé of the 19th June, 1810, that the French army in Spain had up to that period cost the Imperial treasury 200 millions of livres. I think it probable that the whole pay of the army has within the last year at least been sent from Paris in specie; and I believe that it has for some time before; and I know that the extra allowances to General officers, and other expenses which are laid upon the *Contributions d'Espagne*, are as much in arrear as other expenses; and I have in my possession warrants to the Intendant General of Marmont's army, signed by Marmont, directing him to take by force, if it was necessary, money for the necessary expenses of the army, from the *Payeur Général*, in whose hands is the pay alone.

I have not read Sir F. d'Ivernois' former works, and I have not had an opportunity of acquiring the accurate knowledge which we all ought to have, at least of that part of the French finance of which the French government will allow us to have any at all. I don't agree, however, with Sir F. d'Ivernois, either in his estimate of the French force, or in his estimate of its expense. I think both higher than he has stated them.

I know that the French government had in 1810, before the annexation of Holland and the Hanse Towns, 700 battalions of infantry, and 600 squadrons of cavalry, besides artillery and the Guards. A battalion can't be averaged less than 500 men, nor a squadron less than 100 men. Many of both are much more numerous. This would make 350,000 infantry, and 60,000 cavalry. I know that the Guards consist of 50,000 men. I have a return of July last of those in Spain only, which makes them 22,000. The artillery can't be less than 40,000; making the active army in effectives 500,000 men.

In this estimate the Dutch troops and those of the Confederation of the Rhine, those of Naples and the Duchy of Warsaw, are not included. The Dutch troops have since been added to the French army; and I should think there are now in that army 800 battalions. Besides these troops *en activité*, there are *gendarmerie Impériale*, *garde nationale*, *gardes côtes*, &c.

It is impossible to reason upon any assertion in the truth of which confidence cannot be placed. When the Duc de Gaete, however, said that the Emperor had in his service 800,000 or 900,000 men, it may be

supposed that he included the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, of Naples, of Holland, and of Warsaw, as well as those French and foreign troops immediately paid by the Emperor. The uncertainty upon this point, which doubtless prevails at Paris, as well as among us, shows the state to which affairs have been brought in France.

In respect to the expense of the French army, I calculate that which must be paid in money to amount to about £20,000,000 sterling, or 500,000,000 livres. I calculate the mere pay of the number of men I have above mentioned as existing in the service to amount to about £6,000,000 sterling, without including hospitals, or the pay of the officers of regiments, or of the general Staff. To this sum add the clothing, the arms, accoutrements, the horses for the cavalry and artillery, the ordnance expenses, the provisions and forage, and means of transport in France and Italy for the troops in those countries, repairs and construction of fortifications, &c., and it will be found that the sum to be provided does not fall short of what I have stated. I don't include in this sum the provisions and forage, and means of transport, for the troops stationed in Germany and Spain, as those are taken without payment; but I include the pay of these troops as being provided for from Paris, or by the *recettes extérieures*.

If I am right in my notions of the numbers of the French army, as I believe I am, I don't think I am wrong in my estimate of the expenses to be paid in money; and it will be seen that the French government are more distressed than even Sir F. d'Ivernois supposed. I can't state exactly what sums are now due to the troops in Spain. Large sums have recently arrived from France; but before these arrived they were in arrear from 9 to 12 months.

As Sir F. d'Ivernois expressed a desire that I should see his work, and to receive information from me on the interesting subject to which it relates, I have troubled you with this long letter, which I hope may prove satisfactory to him, as showing that I agree entirely with him in his principle and all the main points, although I differ from him in some of the details.

I have omitted to mention, that I believe the French armies in Spain to amount to nearer 200,000 than 150,000 men. They have received in this year reinforcements to the amount of about 50,000 men.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gallegos, 1st Feb. 1812.

I did not see Lieut. Hillier's* very clear report to you of the 16th Jan. till this day, when I received your letter of the 30th. It is very obvious to me that unless you can send a detachment to the right of the Tagus, to cut off the retreat of the boats, the principal object of your expedition, which is to destroy these boats, must fail.

I can supply you with the means of sending a detachment across the Tagus; but the first point to be ascertained is, whether wheel carriages can go to the Tagus by any road excepting by that of Mirabete, or so near Mirabete that they must be perceived. As well as I can recollect of the country, it is impossible to get down to the Tagus with wheel

* Lieut. Hillier, 29th regt., afterwards Lieut. Colonel of the 62d regt.

carriages, any where between the junction of the Tietar and that of the Ibor, excepting by the Puerto de Mirabete. I beg that you will have inquiry made by Lieut. Hillier upon this point. It would also be well if he were to inquire whether the enemy have any means of moving off the 9 boats, which are under their work marked B in his sketch. If you can't get down to the Tagus with wheel carriages, excepting by the Puerto, it is not worth while to attempt the operation; for, as well as I can recollect, the enemy have in that part of the country a large quantity of oxen. If, however, you can get down to the Tagus, it would be desirable to send over a sufficient detachment to endeavor to surprise and get possession of the work C, while the castle of Mirabete, or the work A, should be attacked on the left bank, and to cut off and destroy the boats.

We have at Villa Velha 6 tin pontoons, with all their equipments, carriages, &c. They are very light, and, as well as I recollect, are drawn each by 4 pairs of bullocks; but Major Squire can tell exactly. You must desire Mr. Routh to provide bullocks to draw them, and with these you can form a flying bridge fully equal to take over the Tagus any detachment which you might think proper to send to the right bank. They would even carry over some of the carronades, if you should think proper to send them; but, from Lieut. Hillier's description of the enemy's works at the bridge, I should scarcely think it necessary to take these carronades. I should think that under the fire of your heavy 6 pounders and howitzers, and by keeping a heavy fire of musketry upon the parapet, while the storming party should advance, your troops would escalate any of these works. All the preparations, however, for the carronades, as detailed in my letter of the 28th Jan., might still go on, and Mr. Routh might get the bullocks for the pontoons, and the pontoons might be moved up to Portalegre, as they will be of use in our ulterior operations; but you will proceed upon your expedition, or not, according to the information which you will receive from Lieut. Hillier, whether or not you can get your pontoons down to the Tagus, not passing by Mirabete. I don't believe the work C is commanded by the road on which A stands; but I am quite certain that the work B is completely commanded both by the ground A and C. I was at the old castle of Mirabete; the ascent to it is very rugged indeed, but I should think that no garrison could remain in it against your howitzer.

The enemy have moved towards the Duero. I have not heard that any have gone into the valley of the Tagus.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Gallegos, 1st Feb. 1812.

I have omitted to answer your letters, No. , of the 27th Dec., and No. 41, of the 7th Jan., relating to the correspondence which you have had with the Governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders which you had given Col. Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I conclude that you referred that correspondence to the Sec. of State, with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty to recall Col. Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you should give Col. Skerrett the orders in question. From the report of Col. Skerrett and Lord Proby,

and other information which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders which you gave to Col. Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject is not at all changed by what has occurred since.

We have a right to expect that His Majesty's officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion; but we had no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery, and the walls scarcely cannon proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace, infinitely to the honor of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you should now come to an understanding with Gen. Campbell, regarding the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under Col. Skerrett.

Before you will receive this letter you will probably have received from Mr. Wellesley a requisition to send troops to Carthagena, with which you will have complied, according to my instructions of the 12th Dec. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that the troops under the command of Col. Skerrett should return to Cadiz; and if the Governor of Gibraltar should think proper to detain them, after you shall have required their return, you will let him know that he is responsible for the consequences.

In regard to Tarifa, at the same time that I have no desire, and have too much to attend to, to enter into discussions upon the subject, it appears to me that the measures to be adopted should be either to secure the heights in front of the town, or to provide cover for the troops by splinter proofs, &c., and to secure the island.

I have no doubt whatever that the measure last mentioned could be carried into execution without difficulty, and that it would be effectual. Indeed, the enemy would neither be inclined nor able to remain in the town, if the island were secured.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 1st Feb. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major Gen. Cooke, in regard to a discussion which he has recently had with the Governor of Gibraltar upon certain orders which he had given to Col. Skerrett's detachment to withdraw from Tarifa.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Gallegos, 1st Feb. 1812.

I received yesterday your letter of the 20th Jan.

I am glad to find that the Spanish government have called upon us to garrison Carthagena, and I only wish they had done so sooner. Gen. Cooke has his instructions upon this subject, and it does not appear to me to be necessary to take any further measures.

In regard to Alicante, Roche has contradicted himself in the same letter. He says that an English governor and 5000 English troops can alone save the place; and in another part he says that he and his troops can save it as long as they are supplied with provisions. Pray take him at his word. Send him provisions, and let him be charged with the defence of Alicante.

It is most desirable to keep the French employed for some time longer

on the eastern side of the Peninsula. I think it not impossible that Suchet may be obliged to return to attend to Lacy.

The A.G. to Capt. Stewart.

1st Feb. 1812.

I am directed to acquaint you, upon your letter of the 24th ult., that no change is deemed necessary in the usual and established regulations at the hospitals in this army for convalescents; and the interior management of your hospital station is left to your discretion, having a reference always to the principles laid down. Whenever you may want a further advance of money on account of the convalescents, on application for the same to me an order shall be sent that it shall be issued to you by the Paymaster Gen.

The A.G. to the Officer commanding 1st batt. 52d regt., Light division.

1st Feb. 1812.

enclose herewith, by direction of the Commander of the Forces, a communication I have received from the Commandant at Castanheira; and I am to acquaint you of the impropriety of the men alluded to having absented themselves from the hospital without leave, and without proceeding to their corps in the regular manner. You will be pleased to report if the men alluded to have come to their regiment; and you will apprise them of their breach of orders in quitting the hospital station without the consent of the Commandant.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

1st Feb. 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 29th ult., I am directed to acquaint you that the inhabitants of Portugal cannot be punished by any military tribunal. If the muleteers commit depredations on the stores, they must be made to pay their full value out of the hire of their mules. The best way of preventing the sale of forage corn is for the officers of cavalry and artillery to attend strictly to the feeding of their horses. The Commander of the Forces will write to the magistrates at Niza about the purchase of corn by the inhabitants from the soldiers. The inhabitant who has been taken up is to be sent to the head quarters of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, with a regular charge against him; and it is to be published by beat of drum in Niza, that he is sent to be tried by the Special Commission.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Gallegos, 2d Feb. 1812.

I am going over to Freneda, and enclose the only intelligence I have received since I saw you yesterday. I conclude that the messengers from Salamanca have been prevented from coming by the swelling of the rivers.

I wrote to Hill yesterday what I told you I should.

P.S. The rivers are so full, that I am afraid it will be impossible to hunt to-morrow; but if the day should be fair, the hounds will be at Pozo Velho at about 11½.

The A.G. to Dr. Bolton, Deputy Inspector of hospitals.

3d Feb. 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 1st inst., I am to acquaint you that the allowances granted to officers of the medical staff for native bat men are only to commence from the date of the last order granting the same.

The A.G. to Dr. M^r Grigor, Inspector of hospitals, on arrival at Coimbra.

3d Feb. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th ult., which I have laid before the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency is much obliged to you for the arrangement you propose, as the evil complained of is one that has drawn his attention for a considerable period.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1812.

I enclose some letters from Cadiz. I have no account whatever from Salamanca or elsewhere; and I conclude that the messengers have been stopped by the swelling of the rivers.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1812, 8 A.M.

I write to let you know that in consequence of the heavy fall of rain, and other accidents, the carronades, which ought to have been now two marches on the other side of Sabugal, are at Aldea da Ponte, two marches on this side of that place. If, therefore, you should determine to undertake your expedition, and should think the carronades necessary, you should order the officer with the horses to wait for them at S. Miguel, or to come on towards Sabugal to meet them. If you should give up the plan, according to what I stated in my letter of the 1st inst., or should not think the carronades necessary, you might recall the horses.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1812.

You omitted to enclose the intercepted intelligence from Madrid, in your letter to me of the 1st inst. That on the black paper comes, I believe, from a man employed by Mr. Stuart. I don't give much credit to it.

To ———.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter, and upon inquiry I find that your complaint is not founded, and that the conduct of Mr. ——— was regularly investigated. You have also stated another circumstance in your letter which is not true, viz., that your stable could not hold more than your own horse, whereas it appears that it is capable of holding 4 horses, besides your own horse and ass that are in it.

Portugal requiring the assistance of an army to defend the country, the Portuguese must submit to the inconvenience of having officers and soldiers billeted on their houses, and I only hope they don't believe that we quit our houses in England for the *pleasure* of being billeted in theirs in Portugal. This necessity existing, you acted wrong, and should not have resisted Mr. ——— in putting his horse in your stable, on which he had a billet, and you had no right to send the horse to another distant stable. Mr. ———, however, had no right to use force himself to enforce his billet, and for this offence I have ordered that he may be brought to trial before a General Court Martial, and you will appear as evidence against him; but his horse must remain in your stable, on which it is billeted.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 30th. I agree entirely with you that, notwithstanding all your efforts, matters are become worse, and I am almost at the end of my inventions and resources to keep them afloat. I have this day written to Dom M. Forjaz a letter which I hope he will show to the Governors of the Kingdom.

The object which I had in view for Hill was to destroy the enemy's bridge and establishments at Almaraz. By this measure I should cut off the communication between the northern and southern armies, and the '*Armée de Portugal*' would have been obliged to go round by Toledo, to raise the siege of Badajoz. This would have been important; but

nothing can rouse these people to a sense of their duty. I shall not stay much longer.

P.S. Since I wrote the above Marshal Beresford has been here, and I have gone through the estimates for January with him, which were transmitted in your letter of the 14th Jan. It is very desirable to ascertain, as nearly as can be done by estimate, what is the expense of the military establishments of Portugal, and to diminish that expense as much as possible. It is difficult to guess at the expense from the estimates for January, and it is quite impossible to say what heads can be diminished, or even entirely discontinued, without seeing the detailed estimates, upon which the general estimates, for the several divisional pay offices and departments, have been founded. I have no doubt but that the expense, real as well as estimated, can be much reduced, and I hope brought within the scope of the means of the government. But this can be done only by a strict examination into the subject.

It is impossible for me to go to Lisbon, and equally so for Dom M. Forjaz to come to me. Marshal Beresford is therefore again going to Lisbon, to examine into and settle this subject. But in order that he may not be unnecessarily detained, it is desirable that Dom M. Forjaz should have prepared for him the detailed estimates, on which the general estimates of the several divisional and departmental estimates, for January as well as February, are founded; and all the information and explanation which can be afforded upon every head of charge in the estimates. He expects to be able to allot 7 days to this examination.

I have omitted to mention that, provided the government take measures before the 15th Feb. to announce to the public, and to commence paying interest on the paper money, it is a matter of indifference to me when they begin to pay, provided it is by the 1st April.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1812, 11 A.M.

I enclose the only intelligence which I have received. It is certain that Blake is taken, and probably a very large number of men in Valencia.

P.S. The weather does not promise much; but if it should be fair, the hounds will go to-morrow morning to Pozo Velho at 11½.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 31st Jan. ——— appears to know me as little as he does you. I had a great deal of conversation with Sydenham upon various subjects, and I am not quite certain that I may not have expressed to him the sense I felt of the disadvantage under which I labored, from not having support in Brazil to the instruments which we used here for our objects, which sense I afterwards expressed in a dispatch to you. You will recollect that I subsequently requested that you would strike out from the dispatch every thing upon that subject, as, having made peace in Europe, I did not wish to renew the war in Brazil.

I am positively certain, not only that I did not desire Sydenham to make any complaint to Lord Wellesley of ———; but I will go farther, and declare positively that I desired him to tell Lord Wellesley that it was, in my opinion, best to take no further steps to endeavor to have the

Principal removed from the government, as it appeared from the Prince's letter to me, received in May, that his removal was so very repugnant to his feelings; that the matters which had been in dispute were at an end; and that I should endeavor to work on as well as I could. You may tell ——— this from me.

I don't know what to say to the order for the removal of the Principal. If it were to come direct to Portugal, I should say it ought to be obeyed, for the same reason that I said the order for his appointment ought to be obeyed. But it appears that it is sent to England, and entrusted to Lord Wellesley's discretion, who, I think it likely, will entrust it to ours. We should certainly do better without the Principal. The truth is, the man is mad, and he cannot act with common sense upon any occasion. But if he were removed from the government, it would be still composed of bad materials; and though we should go on better, as we should get rid of the perpetual talking about affairs and doing nothing, things would still not go on as we should wish. However, upon the whole, I am rather inclined to remove him, but I shall not decide until I shall have considered the matter, and shall have received your opinion in answer to this letter. My own opinion is, that the best remedy would be for the Prince to come himself; but, as Romana and I used to say of Ferdnando, '*sin muger*.'

P.S. In respect to Vasconcellos, I shall be much obliged to you if you will tell Lord Strangford that I am entirely indifferent about him. He left me and went to Brazil about his own concerns, and carried a letter from me to recommend him to the Prince's notice, as an officer who had been in my family. But I neither know nor care about him, and the Prince will do well to send him back to Portugal if he is troublesome to him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1812.

The weather has been very bad since the 28th of last month, and the roads have become so bad, and the rivers are so full, as to prevent all communication. I have therefore received no late intelligence from the interior of Castille; but I know that the enemy have no troops on this side of the Tormes.

Although I have received reports from various quarters that Gen. Bonet had evacuated the Asturias, and I have reported it to your Lordship, I am inclined to doubt the truth of these reports. It is certain that he had concentrated his troops at Oviedo, between the 15th and 20th Jan., and Porlier had occupied Gijon. Gen. Abadia had put the army of Galicia in movement on the 20th, in order to oblige Gen. Bonet to retire from Asturias.

I understand that there is in the *Madrid Gazette* of the 28th Jan. the copy of a letter from Gen. Suchet to King Joseph, announcing his entry into Valencia, Gen. Blake and 16,000 men being prisoners.

No movement of importance has been made in the south.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1812.

The very bad weather which we had lately must have put an end to all our operations and communications by sea, as it has by land; and if it

lasts, it must delay the execution of our plans in Estremadura. But I still hope I shall be able to undertake them at an early period.

I cannot promise success; but it is as well to be prepared for the consequences if we succeed; and I would recommend to your Lordship to send to Lisbon 20,000 stands of arms and accoutrements, and clothing and equipments for 20,000 men.

I enclose the morning state.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Vandeleur, Light division.

5th Feb. 1812.

I have laid your letter of the 3d before the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency is perfectly aware of the circumstances you mention with regard to the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, and he has not failed to report the same to H.R.H. the Prince Regent. When the late Gen. Craufurd went to England last spring, the Commander of the Forces did not think proper to deprive him of his command; and during his absence Col. Drummond, for a time only, exercised the command as Major Gen.; Sir W. Erskine was placed in the command of the division during the advance from the cantonments on the Rio Maior river to this frontier, in pursuit of the French army, and remained in charge of the division for some time afterwards. The Commander of the Forces would be happy if he had it in his power to avail himself of your talents and experience in command of the Light division; but he cannot avoid to advert to the inconvenience which was frequently the consequence of an officer comparatively with others not high in rank, being in command of that division. Major Gen. Craufurd came out from England in command of the troops which now principally form the Light division; and he had commanded them on a former service; and it would not have been quite fair to have deprived him of the command of these troops by any organization here; but as the Commander of the Forces is now obliged to make a new arrangement, he must attend not only to what will be most convenient to the service, but also to the claims of the senior officers of the army.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1812.

Besides the articles already in Ciudad Rodrigo, I should wish to throw in about 10,000 lbs. of rice, and about as much salt fish. I believe you have none of the former within reach, and none of the latter at all. I enclose a memorandum of what there is in the Portuguese stores of these articles; and if you should desire to receive them from those stores, I will have directions given that they may be at your disposal.

It is very desirable that you should send me the returns of the forage drawn, in order that I may at an early period put an end to the abuses which you mentioned.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1812.

In addition to the papers transmitted to you in my letter of the 26th ult., I have now the honor to forward a letter and its enclosure from Dr. Fergusson, stating that the members of the University of Coimbra disapproved of the demand made by the Vice Rector for payment of the supplies and articles of bedding provided for the sick of the British army who were left under their care; and that it had never been the intention of that body to be reimbursed for what they had voluntarily furnished to the British army.

Under these circumstances, I cannot avoid expressing my surprise that an application for the payment of this debt should have been so repeatedly made by the Portuguese government, without having ascertained the wishes of the University upon the subject.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Fandeleur, Light division.

6th Feb. 1812.

In reply to your letter for leave of absence for Lieut. Gurwood, 52d regt., the Commander of the Forces cannot grant leave of absence to any officer in the army, except for recovery of health or for the arrangement of business which cannot be settled without his presence, and the settlement of which is paramount to every other consideration in life. As Lieut. Gurwood's application solely implies private affairs as the plea, without stating their nature, it is not in his Excellency's power to comply with his request.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1812.

It is desirable that as fast as the tents shall arrive at Abrantes, they should be sent on to Elvas. It is also desirable, that as soon as the bridge, and the bullocks to draw it, shall arrive at Abrantes, it should be sent on to Elvas.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1812.

I have just received a letter from Adm. Perkeley, from which I learn that all the block carriages which Gen. Rosa has, are at Elvas. It will therefore be necessary that you should order to Alcacer do Sal from Elvas, block carriages for 20 guns besides those for the sixteen 24 pounders.

I don't think it yet decided whether we shall have 18 pounders or 24 pounders; but I rather think the former.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Salamanca, and one from Grant, received last night.

Maucune's is the 5th division; and the 25^{me} *légère* is in the 2d, commanded by Clausel, which you will see is supposed at Salamanca to be going to Talavera.

I enclose the report from Castaños' head quarters of Abadia's operations.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1812.

I beg you to send 200 men, either British or Portuguese (the latter probably can be sent with least inconvenience), to Castello Branco, and thence forward on the road towards Penamacor, till they shall meet with the carronades, when they are to relieve a similar party of the 7th division. The object of this detachment is to assist the carronades in getting on, and I beg the officer may be instructed to prevent his men from beating the bullocks, or ill treating the drivers.

I have heard that one of the enemy's divisions has moved towards Talavera, but I am not certain that this report is true; at all events, they cannot interfere with you, if you should undertake your operation.

I have long intended to write to you about Col. Inglis: as a Colonel on the Staff, senior to Byng, I must employ him to command the brigade in which the 57th are; but when the Major Generals all join, I shall be able to make an arrangement which will suit Byng equally well, and will be equally agreeable to you.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 8th Feb. 1812, 11 A.M.

Hunting appears out of the question to-day, and I send the bearer to

wait till a quarter after 12 at Pozo Velho, and to go thence to Gallegos. I return Whittingham's letter.

By a letter from Elvas, I learn that the Duque del Infantado, Villavicencio, and Henry O'Donell, Morqueira, and Priver, were appointed Regents. Agar, Blake, and Ciscar were appointed Members of the Council of State. These accounts are of the 23d, from Cadiz.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 8th Feb. 1812, noon.

I enclose you a letter from my brother; one from the Junta de Ávila, which shows that the enemy are moving troops towards Talavera; one from Salamanca of the 4th and 5th, which is silent on a report which we had received yesterday from the hussars, that the bridge at Salamanca was destroyed; and one from Madrid. I am inclined to believe the report of the capture of Tarragona, and not that of Soria; but you will see that the latter is mentioned in the letter from Salamanca.

I propose to move Stopford's brigade in a day or two after the Guards. This delightful weather will, I hope, dry up the roads; and the heavy ordnance carriages march to-morrow.

P.S. I enclose a letter from Blanckley*, received last night.

The A.G. to Col. Darruch, A.A.G., Lisbon.

8th Feb. 1812.

You will be pleased to call upon the officer commanding the 2d batt. 39th regt. to deliver up to you the copy of the printed G. O. of this army; and on all other occasions you will observe that as it is his Excellency's intention these books of orders are solely for the use of the regiments in this country, they are to be invariably given back by General officers, and all other officers, on proceeding to England.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1812, 8 A.M.

I have just now received a report from Plasencia, that Brenier's division is at Talavera, with detachments at Naval moral and Oropesa. I don't think that this intelligence need prevent your expedition, if you should think that other matters suit.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1812.

I enclose a copy of Gen. St. Pol's letter, with that part of it which was in cipher deciphered. I likewise enclose a letter from the Senate of Portalegre, upon which I request you to do what may be expedient.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1812.

In answer to your letter (No. 47) of the 25th Jan., I request that you will send Major Gen. Ross to Carthage, to relieve Col. Lambert in the command of the troops at that place.

Major Gen. Ross is to draw a table allowance of 30 shillings *per diem*.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letters to the 27th. There is nothing new here; we are going on with the works at Ciudad Rodrigo, of which, as well as of the magazines in the place, we are not only defraying all the expense, but our soldiers are the laborers who execute them. This is what is called

* Lieut. Blanckley, 23d Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

Spanish enthusiasm! But I have no doubt of the good will of the people; only of the abilities of their chiefs to call it into action.

I enclose a number of a newspaper which has lately made its appearance; and I wish particularly to draw your attention to the paragraph inserted in the last page.

The license to publish any thing upon military operations, whether true or not, which results from the liberty of the press, is a very great inconvenience, particularly to an army comparatively small, which must seize opportunities to avail itself of favorable circumstances, &c. &c. But that inconvenience is increased tenfold when a military official body publish a newspaper, containing statements and observations upon military transactions. Any editor may happen to stumble upon a fact or reasoning, of which it would be important for the enemy to have information; but the Staff, the official editors, must be supposed to have the information which they publish.

The contents of the paragraph marked in the enclosed paper are positively false; but under existing circumstances, the publication is not less likely to have mischievous consequences than if the contents were true. There is no person who knows any thing of the state of affairs in this country, who doubts, that if the French believe that paragraph, and choose to make the exertion, they must prevent us from carrying into execution our design, whatever may be the extent of the force which I shall collect. Surely, therefore, it is worthy of the attention of the government at least to prevent official bodies from publishing such mischievous nonsense.

I don't see why the Staff are to publish a newspaper at all; and if they do, surely what they publish should be strictly and literally true. Is the statement in the enclosed paper regarding the Spanish armies true or false?

The A.G. to Major Gen. Vandeleur, Light division.

10th Feb. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces consents to Lieut. Gurwood, 52d regt., having 2 months' leave to England, provided he engages not to apply for a renewal of it in England.*

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1812.

I have given directions that cattle may be purchased, to the amount of 15,000 dollars, to be distributed among the villages in this country, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know on what principle you have proceeded in your distributions.

I think I can fix the proportion to be sent to each village; but how are those sent to a village to be disposed of? Are they to belong to any particular class of inhabitants, or are they to be common property? If the latter, who is to take care of them? How are the poorer classes to get the proportion of their labor? Would it be advisable to fix a small hire on the use of them, the surplus of which, after paying for their food and the care of them, should be employed to increase the stock of the village?

Let me know what you have done on this subject.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1812.

I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of sending

* On receiving the communication contained in the A. G.'s letter of the 6th inst. Lieut. Gurwood had sent in his resignation.

before the end of April the reinforcements which you intended for this army. I am convinced that all the regiments suffered much from receiving their men late in the summer of last year.

It is also very desirable that we should soon have a reinforcement of horses for the artillery; the depôts of the cavalry will of course provide for the several regiments.

While on the subject of the artillery, I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the Engineer establishment a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this description. There is no French *corps d'armée* which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. But we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege.

I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will desire that the Storekeeper General may take some measures to insure the supply of articles by his department of a better description. Every thing in the way of intrenching and cutting tools supplied by his department is so bad as to be almost useless; and indeed all the stores supplied by this department are nearly of the same description. It would be cheaper for the public to pay larger prices, if that is necessary, in order to get better goods. The troops would be saved much inconvenience, and a vast expense would be saved, which is now incurred in transporting these stores to the army to replace those worn out in consequence of their being so very bad. It is really shameful that the public should be so badly served. I can't say that the intrenching and cutting tools supplied by the Ordnance are better.

P.S. The cutting tools which we have found in Ciudad Rodrigo belonging to the French army are infinitely better than ours. Is it not shameful that they should have better cutlery than we have?

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1812.

In order to facilitate the measures to be adopted to secure a supply of long forage for the cavalry and other horses of the army in the course of the current year, I beg leave to recommend that 1000 scythes with their handles may be sent to the Tagus to the Commissary Gen., and that they may arrive before the end of April.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812, 10 A.M.

I have received this morning from Gen. Hill a report on the road to the bridge at Almaraz, from which it is evident that the object which I had in view for his expedition can't be accomplished. There is but one road to the river Tagus between the junction of the Tietar and that of the Ibor, and that passes under the tower of Mirabete; so that it would be impossible to get hold of the boats.

I think, however, that it may be desirable hereafter to destroy the enemy's works on the left of the Tagus.

I received last night from Gen. Castaños a note, in which he tells me, that the report still prevailed at Madrid on the 28th, that Tarragona and Soria had been taken. It was not believed that Valencia had been taken, as the French had prevented all communication with that place, and it was reported that the contest there still continued on the 18th.

The extract which was sent to me of the *Madrid Gazette*, containing Suchet's letter to the King, was of the 28th Jan.

Montbrun was expected to return to Toledo on the 29th; and it is said that Foy had returned from Valencia with 2000 men. I should think this a mistake, as we had before accounts of Foy's having marched upon Valladolid.

Upon conversing with Gen. Borthwick and Mr. Lyth, regarding the horses of Capt. Thompson's brigade, they were of opinion that they could draw to Niza the 3 ammunition waggons empty. Their ammunition, therefore, and the forge cart and wheel cart, only go into Almeida. There is ammunition in Abrantes, and there are 50 French horses at Coimbra, and some at Lisbon. I hope, therefore, that we shall be able to equip this brigade again as it ought to be.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and I agree with you in thinking that you would not succeed in obtaining possession of the enemy's boats on the Tagus near Almaraz, although you might destroy their works. This last is not so important an object, and, at all events, this is not the moment at which it ought to be attempted; but it is desirable that we should keep this object in view; that we should have, as far as possible, all the preparations made for the operation; and that we should endeavor to acquire all the information to be procured on these works; but it will be desirable that you should not draw away the 6 boats from Villa Velha during the period at which the river will be swelled, and then not farther than Niza till I shall request you to do so.

I enclose some information which I have received regarding the works on the Tietar and Tagus. The drawing is by a different person from him who has sent the written account. You will see that in some trifles they don't agree exactly; but the man who made the drawing was in the works as a workman. I have examined him, and he is positive on all the points to which he has spoken. Let me have these papers again.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Lieut. Hillier to report whether the right or the left bank of the Rio del Monte is the highest at the bridge on the high road from Jaraicejo to Truxillo, as well as where the road from Deleytosa to Truxillo crosses the same stream. I shall likewise be much obliged to you if you will have the course of the different streams examined which fall into the north bank of the Guadiana, between what is called the Rio Burdalo in the map, which falls into the Guadiana above Merida, and the Gevora, and see whether any of them would afford a position which would cover the siege of Badajoz on that side of the Guadiana. The upper part of the Rio Burdalo might be looked at; the lower possibly could not; but it would be desirable to know which bank is the highest.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 8th, and I have perused with much interest Dom M. Forjaz's paper on the estimates, which is perfect as to arrangement, but not very satisfactory as to the amount of expense. The truth is, and it will very soon be discovered, that all the departments have gone on a very large scale of estimate of their expenses, and the real amount cannot now be discovered.

I see that Cardoso estimates a ration of bread at 120 *reis*, and one of *étape* at 100 *reis*. Then he estimates carriage for the whole. But the rations cannot cost this sum if he does not include the expense of the carriage.

Then I don't know how he makes out 70,000 rations to be issued, besides those issued by the British commissariat. I imagine he includes the whole effective militia as being under arms, whereas there is but little of it; and he takes the gross numbers of the army without striking off those in the hospitals, provided for in the hospital estimates, or the regiment at Cadiz; but we shall, at last, get to the bottom of this subject, and shall know pretty nearly what is the real expense of the army. The provision for it will be more difficult.

I am certain that the government will at last be obliged to set seriously to work to reform the abuses in the Lisbon Custom house. I am informed that smuggling now prevails to a greater degree than ever, particularly by the Americans. The revenue produced by the Customs, particularly of the outports, is ridiculously small; yet the Customs are the principal branch of the revenue. The tobacco contract should likewise produce much more than it does, and so should the income tax. The naval expenses must be entirely discontinued.

I rather believe it would be better for us to supply the flour, &c. required by the Portuguese commissariat, than that your bills should come into the market; but upon this point Mr. Pipon can give you an opinion. At all events we might give as much as is required at present.

If ever the Bishop should return to Oporto, he will be worse than ever he was. His return must be prevented, *coûte que coûte*; and I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this, my opinion, to Lord Strangford.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812.

The enemy have but few troops at Salamanca and in the towns on the Tormes; and it appears that Marshal Marmont has cantoned the right of his army on the Duero, at Toro and Zamora, the centre in the province of Avila; and that one division, the 6th, has returned to Talavera and the valley of the Tagus.

I have not received the reports of Gen. Abadia's movement from Galicia. I understand that he was about to attack Astorga, but that he retired to Villa Franca in the beginning of the month; and Gen. Cabrera, who had advanced to La Bañeza, fell back upon Puebla de Sanabria, in consequence of the enemy being in strength at Benavente.

I conclude that the right of the '*Armée de Portugal*' had moved upon Benavente from Zamora, and he communicated with Bonet, who it is stated had evacuated the Asturias. I am not certain, however, of this

last fact, notwithstanding that it has been so often repeated; and it is now said that some of Bonet's troops are at La Bañeza. The detachment of the Conde de Amarante's troops, which had occupied Puebla de Sanabria when Gen. Cabrera moved upon La Bañeza, have retired into Portugal, in consequence of the Spanish troops having retired.

I have not received any late intelligence from the eastern coast. I have received reports from Madrid, as well as from other quarters, that Gen. Lacy had taken Tarragona on the 18th Jan., and that the guerrillas had taken Soria; but it is impossible to give credit to reports of this description, notwithstanding that these reports have arrived from so many distinct quarters, that they would appear entitled to some credit.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812.

I have omitted to reply to your letter of the 8th Jan. regarding a successor to Adm. Berkeley. Of the 2 persons proposed, I believe that Adm. Martin would suit us best.

I hope that it is not likely we shall have to embark; and even if we should, it would be desirable that the Admiral on the station should be not only a man capable of making the necessary arrangements, but one of a conciliating disposition.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812.

I have considered the objections stated in your letter of the 18th Dec. to the proposition which I had made that a certain sum in Exchequer bills should be deposited in the hands of the Commissary Gen.; and I am still of opinion that if Parliament could be brought to consent to the measures which must be adopted in order to carry this arrangement into execution, it will be expedient to try it.

If we should be successful in our operations in the next month, our further operations will be stopped, unless we can command more specie than we have been able to command hitherto. We cannot expect to subsist almost exclusively on our magazines if we should be able to remove the seat of the war farther into Spain; and however well inclined the people of Spain, we may depend upon it that we shall get nothing from them excepting for payment in money.

I would not recommend that the Exchequer bills should be used in payment for supplies, for that would be, in fact, to pay interest for all our debts for which we now pay none, without diminishing in any degree the price of the article to procure which the debt has been incurred. But I think it not unlikely that there may be at Lisbon persons in possession of capital, who would lend it upon a British public security; and I have but little doubt that there are persons of this description in Spain. It is perfectly true that if they knew how to set about it, they may get British securities without taking them from the commissariat, but they certainly don't know how to set about it; and I am convinced that there are some riding about with their money in a portmanteau, and others with their money buried, because they don't know how to convey it to England, in which country all know that it would be safe. I may be mistaken in my expectations of getting any thing for these bills; but I think the experiment is worth a trial, and it can do no harm.

You will observe that I don't propose to use these securities in any other manner than to raise money on loan, consequently there is not much chance of their being so numerous as to be liable to forgery. Nor would they in any manner come into competition with the Portuguese paper. The Portuguese paper is forced into circulation by the law; and its price is kept up, 1st, and principally; by our receiving it in its legal proportion in payment for bills upon the Treasury: and, 2dly; by the prosperous state of the war in respect to Portugal. The price of the Portuguese paper is connected with the rate of exchange. When the discount on Portuguese paper falls, the discount on our bills on the Treasury rises, and *vice versâ*. The value of the Portuguese paper will rise when the Portuguese government shall perform their engagements and pay the interest on it; but I don't see how it can be affected by our borrowing money on Exchequer bills, unless, indeed, we should be able to borrow so much on these bills as not to render it necessary to draw upon the Treasury, which is not very probable.

Although I think we shall be able to raise some money on these bills, I don't think that the sum will ever be so considerable as that we shall experience any difficulty in paying the interest. This must of course be provided for; and we must take care to pay the interest, whatever may be the inconvenience. Upon the whole, I think there is a chance that this measure will give us a resource, and I am anxious that it should be tried.

Another measure which I have had in contemplation is to endeavor to prevail upon the merchants in Lisbon, Oporto, Cadiz, Coruña, and the principal trading towns of Spain and Portugal, to take the notes of the Bank of England as cash. This would give us a very great resource.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 13th Feb. 1812.

I agree with you and Marshal Beresford in thinking that it would be desirable to lighten the military expenses as much as possible; but to remove the payment of certain allowances, which must be paid, from one chest to another, is not lightening the military expenses, but multiplies business; and it will afford to the Treasury an excuse for not applying to the military chest all sums that can be spared from other services. I am afraid that the pensions to *reformados*, &c. must be paid; and if that is the case, they might as well be paid by one chest as another.

I am rather sanguine in my expectations, that when the actual expense of one month shall have been ascertained, and the arrear put out of the question, it will be found that we are not far short in funds.

The departments in which it appears to me that retrenchments can be made are the medical department; the public works, such as repairs and additions to Elvas, Abrantes, &c.; and the workshops under Fava. I suspect also that the pay offices estimate pay for establishments, and not actual numbers.

Le Cor did not mention the desertion of all our drivers, as he was not aware of it. They have since been replaced by Ordenanza, who were to relieve each other; but they have deserted as well as the others. It really becomes quite impracticable to carry on any service in Portugal, unless the Portuguese government will assist with their influence, and will punish those who neglect their duty.

I must report my opinion on these subjects to the British government, and I will not stay after the siege of Badajoz.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1812.

I request that the persons you mention in your letter of the 10th Feb., viz., —, —, the *sergent major des Sapeurs*, and *Adjudant des Travaux*, and —, —, a French miner, may be sent in charge of a steady non-commissioned officer, whose name I request you to let me know, to Estremoz, there to wait till I shall send for them.*

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812, 10 A.M.

I received yesterday your letter of the 12th. I have no objection to the arrangement which you propose in respect to the horse artillery, if the Captains of the troops of horse artillery have no objection. I am rather inclined to believe, however, that it would be very inconvenient to the horse artillery to have any persons attached to them who are not mounted.

You will make your own arrangements on this subject respecting the 2 troops attached to the cavalry. If you wish to attach dragoons to Ross' troop, or to the troop in the 7th division, I must give orders about it.

I have written to England respecting remount horses for the whole cavalry, and have recommended that they should come out at an early period in the season. It would be very desirable that the horse appointments should be at Lisbon, and a sufficient number of the men at least to bring up the horses as they shall arrive.

* These men were afterwards employed in the new establishment forming, called Sappers and Miners.

G. O.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to notice the misconduct of the soldiers in destroying the houses and other buildings in or near which they may be quartered, by burning, as fire wood, the beams and other timbers of which they are built, to the great inconvenience of themselves, of the soldiers of other regiments, and of the service in general, and to the injury of the property of the inhabitants of the country.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to observe, that the regiments in the — division of infantry have been frequently guilty of this practice. They burnt the town of Alcoentre in December, 1810; they destroyed the cantonments of the 3d division at Aldea da Ponte, when the army were closed up in November, 1811; and they have lately burnt the timbers in the roof of the convent of S. Francisco, to the great inconvenience of the service.

3. But the troops in the — division are not alone guilty of this practice: the Commander of the Forces has received complaints of the conduct of the British soldiers on this subject from all parts of the country; and very recently the troops, on their passage through Coimbra to the army, have burnt the timber of the convent which was allotted for their accommodation.

4. Experience has shown, that when the non-commissioned officers, and particularly the officers of regiments, do their duty, these crimes cannot be committed. It is impossible that a soldier, or any number of soldiers, can take down the large beams of the roof of a convent, or even of a house, and burn them, without the knowledge of the non-commissioned officers of their companies, and even of the officers, if the latter do their duty, and attend to their men as they ought, not upon the parade only, but in their quarters, at various hours of the day and night. By this attention on the part of the officers, the authority of the non-commissioned officers would be maintained, and they would be obliged to exert it. And as the soldiers would be prevented from committing the irregularities and crimes which render punishment necessary, the necessity for these would be avoided.

5. The Commander of the Forces now declares his intention of ordering, that when any building shall be destroyed by the soldiers of the army, it shall be repaired, and the expense of the repairs shall be charged against the subsistence of the regiment or detachments which shall be quartered in or near the building which shall have been destroyed.

I am glad to find you are getting on well with forage. I will speak to the Commissary Gen. about the full ration of corn.

I have ordered Hervey and Slade to begin their march, to go very slow, and to halt, if possible, every second day; the 4th dragoon guards not to move. I shall move the 5th dragoon guards soon into the Alentejo, in order to make room for the other troops on their march; and Gen. Le Marchant's brigade will be the first assembled. The Germans are ordered to Santarem, and will come up to Golegão.

P.S. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Capt. — to write his letters to the Q. M. G. in a legible hand. I am obliged to get them copied before I can decide upon what he reports.

To the Juiz de Fora at Niza.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

I have been informed that a person, by name —, who had been confined in the gaol of Niza, in irons, and who I had directed might be sent to the head quarters of the Portuguese army, to be tried by the special Commission, for purchasing forage from the artillerymen of Gen. Hill's corps, has escaped from the gaol, although he was in irons. I know perfectly well what that means, and that no individual could escape from gaol if the magistrates and gaolers did their duty.

I desire that, immediately upon the receipt of this letter, the gaoler who allowed this person to escape may be put in confinement in the gaol, preparatory to his trial; and if that is not done, I must adopt other measures to insure the due execution of the laws.

To Gen. Victoria.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

I have the honor to inform you that I propose to lay siege to Badajoz at an early period in next month; and I beg that, without loss of time, you will give directions that the fascines, and gabions, and pickets, mentioned in the enclosed paper, may be prepared under the direction of the officer of engineers who made those for the last siege. The persons who will make them will be paid for each gabion, for each fascine 40, for each picket *reis*; and the same sum for each will be paid for bringing them to Elvas, provided they are brought there by the 4th of next month.

In order to deceive the enemy regarding the application of these materials, in case they should hear of their being made, I request that they may be lodged near the new work which is constructing near Fort S. Lucia; but I particularly request that you will use your cavalry to prevent all persons, excepting those who will have a passport from Senhor Col. Brito, from passing the frontier, or from crossing the Guadiana between the junction of the Caya and Jurumenha, in order that the enemy may not hear of our preparations.

P.S. 1800 fascines, 6 feet long, and 1 foot thick;

1800 gabions, 3 feet long, exclusive of points, and 1 foot 6 inches in diameter;

1500 fascines, 4 feet long, and 6 inches thick;

2000 fascine pickets, 4 feet long.

To Col. de Brito Mozinho.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

I enclose a letter for Gen. Victoria, which I beg you to peruse and deliver to him.

I beg you to suggest to him the mode of performing the service therein directed in the best manner, and at the same time of keeping the design I have in contemplation secret from the enemy as long as possible.

To Gen. Don Carlos de España.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 13th inst., in regard to the wants of provisions by the garrison which your Excellency intends to place in Ciudad Rodrigo.

I would beg your Excellency to advert to what has passed upon this subject.

1st; This place having been taken by the British army, I have given it over, with all it contains, to the Spanish government.

2dly; I have placed in it a reserve of 50,000 rations of provisions, which, in addition to the quantity found in the place when it was taken by the British army, amounts to 70,000 rations of provisions, which it is agreed are not to be touched till the place shall be invested by the enemy.

3dly; The breaches in the place are under repair, and various improvements are making to the works of the place, of which I am not only defraying the expense, but the British soldiers are performing the labor. And,

4thly and lastly; Your Excellency calls upon me to supply provisions for the garrison to be in the place, for 5 months to come, having already, as you know, a large army under my command to be supplied with every necessary, to be drawn from the sea.

I mention these circumstances in this form, in order to bring under the eye of your government the state of this important place, and the manner in which it is thrown upon the resources of the army under my command; and that they and the world may see what is the real nature of the contest in which we are engaged, and what are the difficulties which are thrown upon me, in consequence of the neglect to adopt proper measures to supply the wants of the Spanish troops.

I have now the honor to enclose an order to the storekeeper of the British magazine at S. João da Pesqueira to supply to your Excellency, when you shall send for it, 156,000 lbs. of biscuit, and 25,000 lbs. of rice. The biscuit, at a pound for each ration, ought to last for 2 months; the rice is all of that description that is in store.

I beg to observe to your Excellency that I can supply no meat, nor bacalhao: we have none in our stores, not being the rations of the British troops.

To Don F. X. Castañón.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

I have perused with attention the letter from Gen. Giron of the 14th inst., which your Excellency did me the honor of putting into my hands yesterday.

When a great operation, such as the siege of Badajoz, is to be under-

taken, it would be most desirable that all the troops which the allies can bring forward should be employed in it, either immediately or in protecting it, as we may depend upon it that the enemy will employ all that they can collect to interrupt it. For several reasons, into which it is not necessary now to enter, those composing the 5th army, adverted to by Gen. Giron, and those under the command of Gen. Ballesteros, cannot be employed either in the operations of the siege of Badajoz, or directly in protecting those operations; and it remains to be seen in what manner they can be employed, so as to divert the attention and forces of the enemy from the measures which it must be expected they will adopt to interrupt the siege of Badajoz.

The army of the south, under the command of Soult, is the nearest, is that which has most interest in the preservation of Badajoz, and is that which has it in its power, from local circumstances, to make the movements most likely to interrupt the siege of Badajoz by the allies. If, therefore, the troops of the 5th army, and those under the command of Gen. Ballesteros, cannot from circumstances be employed in aiding or protecting the operations of the siege, it would be most expedient that they should be employed in operations which should divert the attention of the enemy in some degree from those troops of the allies so engaged; and at all events should produce some benefit to the country.

It is my opinion that the most interesting point in Andalusia for the enemy is Seville, and that they cannot maintain the blockade of Cadiz if they should lose possession of that point only for one day, whatever may be the result of the intended operation against Badajoz. I have therefore written to His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, to suggest that Gen. Ballesteros should be reinforced and equipped from the stores of Cadiz or Gibraltar, in such a manner as to enable him to move upon Seville, in case the enemy should weaken their force in that city.

It is my opinion that the employment of the troops under the command of Gen. Morillo, and of the cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in the Condado de Niebla, on the same object, would have the effect of still further drawing the enemy's attention from the allies engaged in the siege of Badajoz; and, on the principle above referred to, would be the operation in which they could be employed in which, at the moment, they would render most service to the cause.

I have now considered this question solely in reference to the siege of Badajoz, which is the great operation of the moment; but whether it should succeed or should fail, it appears to me that the troops above mentioned would be equally favorably situated for the plan which must be pursued thereafter.

In regard to the transfer of these troops to Castille, I would beg leave to observe to your Excellency:

1st; That it appears that the enemy are fortifying the principal posts on the Tormes and the Douro; and your Excellency is aware that neither the troops of the 5th army, nor those of the 6th army, can be equipped in such a manner as to be able to obtain possession of any of these posts. They would therefore only enter the country in order to quit it again when the enemy should return in force; and they could not by any pos-

sible chance aid in any manner, even by diversion, in the great operation which is now in contemplation.

2dly; I would observe to your Excellency, that from this time till the end of April all operations are impracticable for either party in Castille. The enemy can't attack Ciudad Rodrigo; neither could the troops under the command of your Excellency perform any operation in which they should be obliged to cross the Tormes, more particularly as the enemy have fortified all the essential posts on that river, and rendered their attainment hopeless.

3dly; I would beg to observe to your Excellency, that weak as is Don Carlos de España's division, he has not the means of supporting it. One battalion of 800 men is, and has been for several months, supported by me at Torre de Moncorvo; and Don Carlos has called upon me to supply with provisions, for 5 months, 2600 men, which he proposes to place in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, besides the reserve of provisions for the garrison in case of attack. How then can your Excellency expect to supply the troops of the 5th army when you bring them to this part of the country? I assure you that the British magazines can't afford them support.

On every ground, then, of the advantage to be derived from the operations of the troops of the 5th army in the great operation which we are about to undertake, of the state of the seasons, and of the difficulties of subsistence, I would recommend that the troops of the 5th army should be sent into the Condado de Niebla: of course your Excellency is the best judge what ought to be done.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose the only intelligence which I have received since yesterday. You will see that the 1st and 4th divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*' are on the left of the Tagus.

The mail is come to the 31st.

Alava arrived at Cadiz on the 29th, in the morning.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 18th Feb. 1812.*

I enclose a regulation on means of transport in Portugal, which I request may be strictly observed by the officers of the British commissariat.

* Gen. Viscount Wellington was created an Earl on the 18th Feb. 1812.

G. O.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1812.

3. * * * *

For desertion to the enemy, and being taken on the assault and capture of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, on the evening of the 19th Jan. 1812.

Sentence: To be shot to death, at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct. Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

4. The prisoners will be sent to their regiments, and the Commander of the Forces will send orders respecting the execution of their sentences.

5. Till further orders, the rolls of the — *caçadores* are to be called every hour; all officers attending: and if the officers do not discover the men who have committed the disgraceful outrages which have been reported of that battalion, the Commander of the Forces will turn the — *caçadores* out of the army under his command.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 18th Feb. 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Blanckley.

Marmont appears to be spreading his army a good deal.

Some of our concerns to the south are going on well: I am not quite so certain of others. Those to whom I was obliged to have recourse to get the ordnance I wanted seem to be of opinion that there is no more occasion for precision in the fire of artillery in a siege than there is in an action at sea!

I hear from Gen. Campbell that he is getting on well. I have desired that he might be told that he might give leave at Lisbon to any of his young men who would return by the 4th March.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 18th Feb. 1812.

I have received the translation of the regulation of the means of transport in the Kingdom, which I have perused, and as far as depends upon me it shall be carried into execution.

I observe, however, that although many important alterations have been made in the regulation since it was first submitted for my opinion, only one of those which I suggested has been made, viz., that by which 200 *reis* for each cart supplied should be given to the magistrates; and I am convinced that this regulation, in its existing state, will be, as it is evidently intended by the government to be, as ineffectual for the purpose of carrying on the war, as the former regulations on the same subject.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 18th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 14th, regarding Baron —. As well as I can recollect, you have an order from the Sec. of State to have that person closely observed. It is impossible to recollect every thing, but I have a distinct recollection of our being directed to be on our guard respecting this person.

Let the Portuguese government do with him what they please, excepting to set him at large.

P.S. I find that the letter which I received respecting Baron — was from Col. Torrens, written at the desire of the Duke of Brunswick. Let him be detained by all means.

It is very desirable that you should send me some more of the translations of the regulations regarding means of transport.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Blanckley, from which it appears that the 6th division only are in the valley of the Tagus, and the 2d about Avila. I likewise enclose a letter from the Junta de Avila, from which you will see how the 6th division are cantoned. All the corps mentioned belong to that division.

I likewise enclose a letter of the 3d from our old correspondents at Salamanca, and one of the 6th from another person. It appears from the latter, as well as from a letter which I have from Silveira, that Bonet has certainly evacuated Asturias, at least with part of his troops.

There are also papers of news from Tordesillas, Valladolid, and Madrid.

From the whole of these papers I have a tolerable notion of the position of 5 of the 8 divisions under Marmont's command, viz., Bonet, at La Bañeza; Souham, Zamora; the 3d division, Maucune, Salamanca, Toro, &c. (the 31st and 47th belong to this division); the 2d division, Clausel, Avila; the 6th division, Brenier, Talavera. I don't know where the 1st, 4th, and 5th are, but I should think the 5th are about Benavente, where Silveira tells me the enemy are in force; and the 1st and 4th in the rear, probably Medina del Campo, and the back parts of Castille.

You will see also that the Guards and other troops of the army of the north have marched from Valladolid, but they had assembled in large force to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo.

I send you two papers from Tordesillas and Madrid, marked \times , which contain some details not in the first mentioned. You will see how the matter stands respecting Soria.

I am just going over to Ciudad Rodrigo to see how our works are going on, and shall return to-morrow.

A packet has arrived at Lisbon, but we have not yet received the mail.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

I enclose you some news from Madrid, Talavera, and Toledo, a very interesting letter from Grant, and one from ———, giving an account of the force of the 2d division. It is stated to be much stronger than we before supposed it; and I write to ——— to request him to endeavor to account for its strength by regiments. I likewise enclose a letter from my brother, and one from Gen. Cooke. That referred to by my brother is one in which he informs me that the Cortes had made me a Grandee, which I keep to send to England.

I recommended that Ballesteros should be made as strong as possible, and should be equipped to strike at Seville, when Soult should move against us.

P.S. I enclose an English newspaper of the 9th, in which you will see the capitulation of Valencia.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, in regard to the wants of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the copy of my answer,* which I beg you to lay before the Spanish government.

It is very desirable that measures should be adopted to supply Don Carlos de España with money.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Gen. Giron to Capt. Gen. Castaños, which the latter put into my hands some days ago, regarding the plan of operations to be adopted in the month of March, and my answer,† which I likewise request you to lay before the Spanish government.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's dispatch of the

* See p. 515.

† See p. 515.

31st Jan., in which you have enclosed a letter of the 29th, from the Sec. of State, Don E. de Bardaxi, in which that minister has conveyed to the officers and troops under my command, and to myself, the thanks of the Cortes for the services which they had rendered to the cause in the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo.

I beg that you will request the Sec. of State to adopt the most respectful mode of assuring that august assembly, that the officers and soldiers under my command are highly sensible of the distinguished honor which has thus been conferred upon them, by the approbation expressed by the Cortes of their services; and I trust that by a zealous discharge of our duty, and by our exertions in the good cause in which we are engaged, we shall continue to merit the approbation of the Cortes.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

Besides the letter from the Sec. of State, Don E. de Bardaxi, of the 29th Jan., to which I have replied in another dispatch, your Excellency enclosed one in your dispatch of the 31st Jan., from the same minister, of that date, in which his Excellency enclosed the decree of the Cortes, passed at the recommendation of the Regency, by which the Cortes have created me a Grandee of Spain, and Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.*

I have transmitted this letter and its enclos^{ure} to England, to be laid before H.R.H. the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, and have requested His Royal Highness' permission to accept the honors which the Cortes and Regency of Spain have been pleased to confer upon me.

In the mean time, I beg you to request the Sec. of State to convey to the Cortes and the Regency my respectful acknowledgments for the favor with which they have viewed the services of the officers and troops under my command, and for the high honors conferred upon me, by which they have marked their sense of these services.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

You will see from my dispatch of this day, &c., what is going on. I think it proper, however, besides, to send you a very curious paper, which I received last night from Gen. Castaños. He some time ago sent me word that he requested I would supply his head quarters with provisions, as he had none, to which I consented. Shortly afterwards he fixed himself in Ciudad Rodrigo, although I particularly desired that Ciudad Rodrigo might be considered solely a *place de guerre*, and that nobody might go there excepting the garrison. When I was there the other day to see the works, I found that his head quarters were drawing from the commissariat of our 5th division, which were working there, 290 rations, besides 180 rations which another party of them were drawing from Fuentes de Oñoro. At this time there were no Spanish troops in Ciudad Rodrigo. I sent O'Lawlor over to remonstrate upon this extravagant waste at a place where it is very inconvenient to give any thing, and I enclose the papers which he brought me back.

From this you will see how these matters go on. Extravagant as we are, there is no officer with us who draws more than one ration, the same

* See Appendix, No. XIX.

as a soldier. He besides draws a ration for every servant not a soldier. Just observe, that for 123 artillerymen and 22 pioneers, making 145 troops, and some of the staff of the garrison, the Spaniards draw 269 rations! each officer drawing 3, 5, 6, 7, and as far as 16 rations!

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 12th inst., I have received intelligence that the 1st and 4th divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and part of Gen. Montbrun's cavalry, as well as the 6th division, are on the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Talavera de la Reyna and Toledo.

It is certain that Gen. Bonet evacuated the Asturias at the time I received the reports that he had done so in January, and I understand that he suffered considerably in this operation, as well from the effects of the weather as from the operations of a detachment of the army of Galicia, and of Gen. Porlier's troops.

No movement of importance has been made by any of the troops composing the '*Armée de Portugal*' since I addressed you on the 12th inst.

The reports which had been in circulation throughout Spain, that Valencia had not fallen on the 9th Jan., as stated in the enemy's gazettes, have been contradicted, and no doubt is now entertained of that misfortune. It is reported that Marshal Suchet, having left a garrison of 8000 men in Valencia, had marched in the end of January to the relief of Tarragona. The report that that place has fallen still prevails, but I have received no confirmation of it on which I can rely.

There is no doubt that the guerrilla chiefs had possession of the town of Soria, as stated in my dispatch of the 12th inst.; but the French troops retired to the castle, which the guerrillas could not take, and the latter afterwards evacuated the town.

These parties continue to increase, and their operations become every day more important. Saornil has lately interrupted the communications of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' in Upper Castille, near Medina del Campo, and he took about 100 prisoners near that town; and the party of Cuesta attacked a body of French infantry, which crossed the Tietar, and obliged them to retire with considerable loss.

My last letters from Cadiz are of the 31st Jan. The enemy was making no movement of importance on that side.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

I enclose a paper which has been sent to me by Major Dachenhausen, who was lately recommended to me by your Lordship, at the instance, I believe, of Gen. Gwyn. I know nothing of the plan it contains; but I have thought it proper to send it to your Lordship as it has been sent to me.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch from Mr. Wellesley of the 31st Jan., enclosing two letters from the Sec. of State, Don E. de

Bardaxi; one of the 29th Jan. conveying a vote of thanks of the Cortes to the officers and troops under my command for their conduct at the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo; the other of the 31st Jan. from the same minister, enclosing a decree of the Cortes, passed at the recommendation of the Regency, by which the Cortes have created me a Grandee of Spain of the first class, and Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.

I beg your Lordship will lay these letters before H.R.H. the Prince Regent, and will request His Royal Highness' permission for me to accept the honors conferred upon me by the Cortes and Regency of Spain.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

I received by the last post your letter marked 'secret,' of the 24th Jan. All my arrangements preparatory to the attack of Badajoz are in train, and, I believe, getting on well; some of the troops have marched for the Alentejo, and others will follow soon; and I intend to go myself the last, as I know that my removal from one part of the country to the other will be the signal for the enemy that the part to which I am going is to be the scene of active operations. The train which you proposed to send will not be in time, but it is as well that we should have it, in case of accidents. I am not unprovided with some means of a good description for this enterprise. The weather has latterly favored us wonderfully.

Pray let us have plenty of horses for cavalry and artillery, and the reinforcements for our infantry, as early as you can. If we should succeed at Badajoz, I propose to push our success early in the year as far as I can. I enclose the morning state.

Mr. Perceval has told me that I should receive a letter from you on another subject, which has not yet reached me.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Freneda, 20th Feb. 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose a letter from —, and its enclosure, which I believe is from the Portuguese —.

De Lancey has a letter from Offeney, stating that Foy had marched with a detachment by the Puerto de San Vicente on Guadalupe; but he had returned one march. He had not been able to bring either cannon or carriages; and I think that this was a reconnaissance to see whether they could communicate with the 5th corps by that route. There is a report that they were repairing the roads in that direction.

There is nothing new on this side. I am going to Ciudad Rodrigo to-morrow.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, 4th division.

21st Feb. 1812.

In consequence of your report, which I have laid before the Commander of the Forces this morning, it is his Excellency's pleasure that the order for the roll being called in the 7th caçadores every hour should be discontinued.

The A.G. to Capt. Meacham, Abrantes.

21st Feb. 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 18th inst., and enclosures from Lieut. Col. Stewart, of the Buffs, I am directed to inform you that you have nothing to say, as Commandant, to the articles of deceased men; they are in the Purveyor's stores, and

should be sold by auction, or sent to Commanding officers of corps under his orders. The Lieut. Col. of the Buffs has likewise no concern with the arms and accoutrements, but the arrangement should be carried into effect. Lastly, it is your duty to obey the G. O. on the subject of necessaries, &c., and you are not to mind complaints.

To ———.

Freneda, 22d Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 20th. I shall be glad to keep up the correspondence which you mention with Naval Moral, and request you to let me know what will be the expense.

I observe what you have said in your letter of the strength of the 2d division in the province of Avila, and you will observe how inconsistent that account, which I believe to be true, is with the accounts which you before gave of the total strength of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' I now enclose a list of the divisions and of their Generals, and of the regiments of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' including the divisions of Gens. Souham and Bonet, and the cavalry. I request you to inquire how many battalions there are in each of those named regiments at present, and how many men present under arms in each battalion, and where each battalion is; the name of the Colonel of each regiment, and of the chief of each battalion; how the regiments are classed in brigades, and the names of the General officers commanding brigades. You need not be in a hurry about getting this information, but you will consider it to be an object on which I want to have accurate information, and you will get it for me as soon as you can with convenience.

P. S. 23d Feb. Since writing the above, I have received your second letter of the 20th. As the money has been paid by your direction to the person who wrote the letter you enclosed, it shall be refunded by me, but in future you must not disburse such large sums without my orders. I had determined that I would give that person no more money, as he is of no use whatever.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 22d Feb. 1812.

I enclose an extract from the G. O. of the army, containing the proceedings and sentence of a General Court Martial, of which Col. Inglis is President, on the trial of Lieut. ———, of the — regt., on a complaint of the master of the 'Golden Lion' hotel at Lisbon.

At the same time I enclose an extract of the minutes of the evidence, containing the testimony of Lieut. Wright, 36th regt., showing the treatment which the officers of the British army receive in that house.

Notwithstanding that I have confirmed and put into execution the sentence of the General Court Martial on Lieut. ———, I must say that the officers of the British army have, and particularly Lieut. ———, reason to complain in being obliged to go to such a house as the 'Golden Lion,' and in being obliged to submit to the insolence and ill treatment of the landlord and his waiters.

I beg you to lay these papers before the Portuguese government, and to make my request that the police may be directed to warn the master of the 'Golden Lion,' and his waiters, of the necessity of behaving themselves respectfully to the officers of the army.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1812, 9 A.M.

In the memorandum which you gave me on Saturday last for the construction of your gabions and fascines at Elvas, you inserted the dimensions of the gabions to be 3 feet high, exclusive of points, and 1 foot 6 inches in diameter. It appears to Col. Brito, as well as to me, that this is a mistake; and I beg to hear from you immediately whether you wish that they should be 1 foot 6, or 2 feet 6 inches in diameter.

To Col. de Brito Mozinho.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1812.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have heard from Fletcher; and I find that he intended that the gabions should be only $1\frac{1}{2}$ foot in diameter; but as this appears to me to be too small, I beg that they may be made 2 feet in diameter, till you shall hear further from me.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1812.

I received this evening your letter of this day, by Capt. Canning. Probably it did not occur to you that a gabion 18 inches diameter would not cover a man. Every man, even the smallest, occupies 20 inches; and the gabion ought at least to cover him. Besides, the gabion of $1\frac{1}{2}$ foot in diameter does not contain much more than half the solid space of one of $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet.

Adverting to the reasons first mentioned, I have written to Brito to desire that the gabions might be 2 feet in diameter; and I beg to hear from you before the post shall go on the morning of the 25th, whether you continue to think that they should be $1\frac{1}{2}$ foot.

P.S. I have just received your letter of the 23d, regarding the march of a company of artificers to Elvas. I have given orders, that if any officer applies to the Q. M. G. at Lisbon for a route to Elvas for a company of artificers, he is to have it. But who is the officer to apply? Who is to give him his orders to apply?

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1812.

I received only this evening your letter of the 18th. I don't know what answer you were to expect from me upon the subject of the Russian

G. O.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1812.

3. The Commander of the Forces having received orders to draft the 2d batt. of the 52d regt. into the 1st, the following arrangement is to be made for that purpose:

4. The private men belonging to the 2d batt. of the 52d regt., in Portugal and Spain, are to be drafted into the 1st batt., and are to be distributed into companies of the 1st batt., with the exception of men deemed at present unfit for service in the field.

5. All men missing from the 2d batt. are to continue on the strength of the 2d batt.

6. The transfer is to be made immediately, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for their men up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt., to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order.

7. When this transfer shall be completed, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batt., and such private men as remain, are to proceed by route, furnished by the Q. M. G., to Lisbon, preparatory to their embarkation for England.

8. The Commander of the Forces begs the 2d batt. of the 52d regt. will accept his thanks for their very distinguished services. Since they have been in the Peninsula they have had various opportunities of displaying their gallantry and good conduct, and the Commander of the Forces has had reason on every occasion to be satisfied with their behaviour.

18 pounders. I wrote to the Admiral to express my disappointment; but there was no use in writing to you. You could not mend the matter; and there was no use in discussing with you by letter the recourses which occurred to my mind to extricate us from the scrape into which we had got, notwithstanding all the pains I had taken to avoid it.

I don't know whether the Admiral will send you English guns or not. If he should not, we must separate carefully, and mark, the English, the Russian, and the Portuguese shot; and we must use those of each nation in different batteries. The artillery officers must then calculate upon the windage of the different descriptions of shot in their charges, and the direction and elevation of their guns; and as the shot in each battery will always be the same, there will not be so much difficulty in managing these pieces as we experienced in the last siege, under similar circumstances.

I hope, however, that if the Admiral has them, he will send English 18 pounders.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 20th, and I am very sorry that any inconvenience should have been experienced in consequence of any order of mine. As, however, I am responsible for the supply of the British army, and of that part of the Portuguese army which is supplied by the British commissariat, and of that part of the Portuguese army which is not so supplied, it is natural that I should wish to be acquainted with the contents of our magazines before I order that any issue should be made; and adverting to the amount, and the causes of the demands made upon our magazines since December last, it is natural that I should not allow any issues to be made from them without orders from the Commissary Gen., after consulting my opinion.

The order which has been lately repeated to Mr. Pipon on this subject has been frequently given before. I am not aware of the exact terms in which it was lately given to Mr. Pipon; but as Mr. Pipon was aware from the communication of the paragraph of my letter to you, that it was left to him to make the advance of the grain, or to give the drafts of the money, he might have ventured to begin to make the advance of the grain without waiting for the result of further reference to head quarters. I directed, however, this morning, that the answer to the reference should be given; viz., that he was to give immediately as much of the grain of all descriptions as could without inconvenience be spared from our magazines, and the remainder of the amount of the demand when it should be convenient to us to spare it. I can do no more.

I observe the attempt of Dom M. Forjaz, &c., to throw upon us the inconvenient consequences of wanting this grain, and not having it immediately. If they had the whole of it at this moment in their possession, they could not use it, excepting for sale. *I will lay my life that they will not carry one third of the quantity from the sea coast in 6 months.*

I know nothing about the supply of money to the military chest. I am very certain that the Portuguese government have, in money and kind, received more than their subsidy from the departments of this army in the last year.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Castanheira.

23d Feb. 1812.

The reports of the state and order in which the hospital station of Castanheira has been kept under your superintendence have been very satisfactory, and I have now to convey to you the Commander of the Forces' orders that you do proceed immediately to Celorico, to assume the situation of Commandant at that place, until further orders. Capt. Poppleton will be directed to repair to Castanheira so soon as you arrive at Celorico, and you will receive from him all the necessary details. You will, previous to your departure, in like manner give up all official papers, documents, &c., to the next officer in seniority at Castanheira, until Capt. Poppleton shall arrive.

Memorandum to be submitted to Don F. X. Castaños.

24th Feb. 1812.

The British army being now in march towards the Alentejo, for the purpose of attacking Badajoz eventually, it is desirable to consider what plans the enemy may follow, and what are our means of resisting them.

1st; They may move their whole force, including the divisions of Souham and Bonet, into Estremadura, leaving Castille and Leon to their fate, as they have done heretofore; or they may move only a part of their force into Estremadura, leaving a part to occupy the principal points in those kingdoms.

2dly; Leaving the army of the south, and the 3 divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' now on the Tagus, and the cavalry, to oppose the allied British and Portuguese army in Estremadura in the best manner they can, they may attack the kingdom of Galicia with the remainder of the army.

Or, 3dly; They may attack the frontiers of Portugal by the north of the Douro.

Or, 4thly; They may pass the Agueda by the fords below Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the communication between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida: or even pass the Coa, and cut off the communication between those places and the interior of the country.

The operation which I have stated in the first instance is that which it is most probable the enemy will follow; and that they will leave the divisions of Bonet and Souham to occupy the kingdoms of Castille and Leon.

It will then become a question, what operation the troops of Galicia shall carry on, which must be decided by the relative force of the allies and of the enemy, and by the state in which the enemy shall leave the towns on the Douro and the Tormes which they are fortifying, and by the degree of equipment for attacking those works with which Gen. Abadia can provide himself.

If the enemy should adopt this supposed plan, it would be desirable not only that Don Carlos de España should take the field in Castille with all that he can venture to draw from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; but that Don Julian Sanchez, Saornil, and all the chiefs of parties of guerrillas should co-operate with him in order to do the enemy as much mischief as possible, and that the troops even in Biscay should be put in motion.

The Portuguese General officers north of the Douro have under their command of regular troops only small detachments of cavalry. These could not with propriety be moved to a greater distance from the Portuguese frontier; but the Portuguese General officers shall have orders to support with their cavalry, within reasonable limits, any offensive opera-

tions which it may be thought proper that Gen. Abadia should adopt in the case supposed.

If the enemy should adopt the plan supposed in the second instance, the Portuguese General officers, Bacellar and the Conde de Amarante, shall have orders to do as much mischief to the enemy's flank and rear as they can, at least with their cavalry, but not to push their infantry too far forwards. I imagine that if Galicia should be invaded, and Gen. Abadia should be obliged to retreat, his line of retreat would be towards the frontiers of Portugal; and great care must be taken in that case, that the Portuguese General officers, by pushing too far into Leon, do not lose their communication with his right.

If the enemy should adopt the line supposed in the third instance, Gen. Abadia would of course annoy the enemy's flank and rear, while the Portuguese General officers would oppose them in front.

If the enemy should adopt either of the plans supposed in the second and third instances, Don Carlos' division with the guerrillas might do a great deal of mischief in Castille.

If the enemy should adopt the plan supposed in the fourth instance, I propose to direct Gen. Bacellar to collect all the militia of the northern provinces of Portugal on the Coa, and to place himself in communication with the remainder of Don Carlos de España's division, which shall not be in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; and to endeavor to protect the magazines on the Douro and the Mondego, and to force the enemy into Lower Beira, if they should persevere in entering Portugal. The advantage which Gen. Abadia could take of this operation would likewise depend upon the extent of the force which the enemy would leave in his front; upon the degree to which the enemy should have fortified his posts on the Douro and Tormes, &c.; and on the degree to which Gen. Abadia can equip himself with artillery to attack those posts.

If the enemy should adopt this plan, supposed in the fourth instance, Don Carlos would of course destroy the bridges on the Yeltes and Huelva. It appears to me that it would likewise be desirable to destroy that of Barba de Puerco; and particularly, if the weather should be bad, the 3 bridges at Castillejos.*

* *Note subsequently written by Lord W. at the bottom of this Memorandum.* These bridges were not destroyed; if they had, two days would have been gained, which would have been sufficient.

To Col. de Brito Moziinho.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1812.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received another letter from Lieut. Col. Fletcher, who is anxious that the *interior* diameter of the gabions should not be more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ foot, and I request that they may be made accordingly.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters (Nos. 50 and 52) of the 6th and 14th inst., and that marked 'private' of the 9th inst.

I have already in my letter of the 1st inst. stated to you my opinion regarding Tarifa. I don't think that Capt. Smith's letter throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be the principal point to

defend, and the easiest to be defended at a small expense, and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of *Sta Catalina* can be made subservient to the defence of the island depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide only by having a local knowledge of the place.

It is very clear to me, however, that the enemy will not attack *Tarifa* in this spring; and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon either by the Spanish government, or by the Governor of *Gibraltar*, you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I made to you in my dispatch of the 15th Nov. If you should send a detachment from *Cadiz* at the desire of the Spanish government for a purpose connected with the operations of *Gen. Ballesteros*, I conceive that the Governor of *Gibraltar* has nothing to say to such detachment: If you should send one to *Tarifa* at the desire of the Governor of *Gibraltar*, or of the Spanish government, it is better not to discuss the question, whether the detachment shall or shall not obey the orders of the Governor of *Gibraltar*. He has occupied *Tarifa* permanently; and he is about to improve the defences of the place, which he conceives to be under his orders. The troops sent to *Tarifa* should therefore be under his orders; but according to all the rules of His Majesty's service, the senior officer should command the whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the island and town of *Tarifa*, which I conclude has been settled by the Governor of *Gibraltar*.

I have perused the enclosures in *Col Lambert's* dispatch of the 6th inst. I have not got *Tofino's* plan of *Carthagen*a, and I am not able to judge exactly of the situation of the different places referred to by *Capt. Roberts*. The hill of *San Julian*, however, is in every point of view a most important post to be secured, not only by a block house, as is proposed by *Capt. Roberts*, but by a good redoubt, capable of containing a garrison of 300 men, or even more, if the ground should be sufficiently spacious. As it appears that the soil is rocky, I have no objection to *Capt. Roberts* commencing by constructing the block house, which will always be an additional security to the redoubt; but the objects of our attention at *Carthagen*a should be, not only to defend the existing works, but to secure the communication of the town with the sea, without which it will be impossible to supply the town with provisions, &c., to last during the time which the works are capable of holding out, when our troops will give the

G. O.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in communicating to the General officers, officers, and troops, the vote of approbation of their conduct at the siege of *Ciudad Rodrigo*, passed by the *Cortes of Spain*:

'The General and Extraordinary *Cortes*, penetrated with the most lively gratitude for the important service which the allied army, under the orders of *Gen. Lord Viscount Wellington*, has performed for the Spanish nation, in the taking of *Ciudad Rodrigo*, have decreed their thanks to that General, and the officers and troops under his command.'

2. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers commanding regiments to the instructions which they have recently received from the office of the *A. G.* in *England*, for the establishing and conducting regimental schools.

A school is already established at *Belem* for the instruction of the children of the soldiers who are there; but if there should be any children with the regiments, Commanding officers of regiments should take measures to establish the schools in the regiments, in order that the children may be educated when opportunities may offer.

example of a determined defence. It appears to me that there will be time to construct such works as may be necessary for this object at no great expense; and I beg that they may be commenced without loss of time.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1812.

I received last night your letters of the 12th and 14th. The enclosures are very interesting.

I think that Lacy has taken Tarragona. It is generally reported that he had on the 28th Jan.; and I see by Adam's letter that he was to attack the place about that time.

It is impossible to concert operations between two bodies at such a distance as Ballesteros and I shall be. I expect to be able to invest Badajoz about the 10th. It may be expected that about the 14th or 15th Soult will receive the report, and will prepare to move to support the place. Ballesteros should be prepared to move on Seville at that same time; and should move as soon as he shall find that the enemy have weakened their force at Seville, &c., to such an extent as to give him a prospect of success. He should risk nothing; and should retire when he shall find that the enemy return to Seville in strength. It may be depended upon, that the greatest part of the army, particularly the cavalry, will be brought against us; and, therefore, Ballesteros' deficiency of cavalry in this expedition will not much signify.

You will see by the letter which I gave Castaños, of which I sent you a copy on the 19th inst., that I have recommended that Morillo's troops should be employed from the Condado de Niebla in the same manner. I believe, but he has not told me, that they are to be employed as I proposed. But even these troops can scarcely act in concert with Ballesteros. They must both act with celerity, but independently, on the same object; and communicate as soon as they can. But concert at such distances is impossible.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1812.

Since I wrote to you on the 23d, I have received the enclosed letter from Mr. Bissett with its enclosures, (1, 2, and 3,) the whole of which I request you to return to me. From a perusal of these papers, it will be seen that there is not much reason to complain of us here at head quarters. All that I know is, that when a question comes before me, I decide it before the post goes out; and always grant these demands, whether for money or supplies in kind, when I have before me the information to enable me to decide upon them.

It appears that three demands have been made upon our stores since the month of December. The first demand was a rank job of the *Junta de Viveres*; but both the first and the second were granted, and the grain in the progress of delivery; then came a demand for money or grain, to which I answered by referring to Mr. Pipon for information whether it would be most convenient to us to give grain or money; upon which letter Mr. Pipon might have acted, *if there was any press for the grain.*

In the mean time, however, he received the Commissary Gen.'s directions of the 16th Feb., upon which so much has been said. The directions are very proper in themselves, and they must be obeyed, or we can't carry on the service. Some inconvenience might have resulted from their being received at that particular moment, *if there had been any press for the grain*, and if Mr. Pipon did not choose to act upon my letter to you. But it appears that there was still a remainder on the former demands, which Mr. Pipon had positive orders to issue; and before *we* are made responsible for the consequence of delay, it would be very desirable that Senhor Cardoso should state what quantity he had in his magazines at Lisbon, and what quantity of conveyance he had to take any away from the sea coast.

I observe in the Portuguese authorities in general a very strong desire to have the management of money. I wish it were in my power to gratify them by paying in every month the exact subsidy, and thus to have nothing more to say to them. But as this is not the case, I must go through these details: at all events, I can't allow any demands upon the British departments to be complied with, unless they come in the regular channel through the head of the department, with all the information on the subject.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 26th Feb. 1812.

I have just received a letter of the 23d from the Admiral, in which he tells me that he has ordered to Alcacer do Sal 10 of the *Naiden's* 18 pounders, which are English, quite new, and he thinks will answer your purpose. I hope that you will take them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 26th Feb. 1812.

The troops of the '*Armée de Portugal*' have made no movement of importance since I addressed you last, excepting a reconnaissance by the troops under the command of Gen. Bonet, from Benavente on Monbuey, and the Puebla de Sanabria, between the 14th and 19th inst.; and a movement of the same description by the troops under Gen. Foy, from the neighbourhood of Talavera towards Guadalupe, through the Puerto de San Vicente. This last was intended, I believe, to ascertain whether it was practicable to march a column by that route from the Tagus to the Guadiana. Both have returned to their stations.

The repairs and improvements to the works at Ciudad Rodrigo being in great forwardness, and the place being out of danger of being taken, except by regular siege, and the works of Almeida having likewise been repaired as far as is possible at present, and that place having again been restored as a fortress, I have put the troops in march towards the Alentejo, in order eventually to attack Badajoz.

I have not been able to move them at the period or in the order which I wished; as I have been obliged to send several of the regiments, both British and Portuguese, to get their clothing and equipments at the station to which they were brought by the navigation of the river, not having been able to procure means of land transport to carry what was required to the troops. I trust, however, I shall not feel the inconvenience which

might be expected from their having been moved in a manner so contrary to every military principle.

The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are dated the 14th inst. It appears that the newly appointed Regency are actively employed in equipping a body of troops to reinforce Gen. Ballesteros, and in endeavors to reform the various abuses which prevail in the army.

The troops which had been detached from the '*Armée de Portugal*' into the kingdom of Valencia, in the end of December, under Gen. Montbrun, did not assist in the reduction of the city of Valencia, but marched upon Alicante.* Gen. Montbrun, at the head of a detachment of about 5000 men, summoned this place to surrender; and the governor having refused to attend to his offer, he retired on the following day.

Marshal Suchet had left Gen. Harispe's division in the kingdom of Valencia, and a small garrison in the city, and after levying a very large contribution, he had marched into Catalonia; and I understand that Gen. Lacy was obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona.

The enemy have made no movement of importance in the south of Spain.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 26th Feb. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of the dispatch which I wrote yesterday to Major Gen. Cooke, in answer to his letters of the 6th and 14th inst., copies of which I imagine he will have transmitted to your Lordship.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1812.

I have this day received your letter of the 22d. I received a letter from the Admiral yesterday of the 23d, in which he informed me that he had sent to Alcacer do Sal ten 18 pounders, English, of the best description, from the *Naiden*. I beg you to take measures to have them removed to Elvas, even though you should have brought up the Russian guns; if they should arrive before you shall have moved the Russian guns, you will of course have left 10 of the Russians.

I think you are in advance of your time; but the equipments from Lisbon, &c., are behind it.

I think it possible, from the prevalence of westerly winds for the last few days, that the communication between Lisbon and Setuval may have been stopped. I intended to have left this on the 1st, and I should have been at Elvas on the 6th; but I shall not now set out till the 2d or 3d, at all events; and not then, unless I should hear from you, that you are likely to be there, and complete on the 8th. It is very important that I should not quit this part of the country till the last moment; and that there should be no delay after I shall arrive at Elvas.

You say nothing about the Engineer's stores. Col. Fletcher tells me that the last of them had not left Lisbon on the 19th.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst., No. 5; and the allied army being in march for the Alentejo, with a view to the object which I com-

* See Appendix, No. XVIII.

municated to you in a former letter, I propose to set out from hence on the 1st March.

I enclose the draft of a memorandum which I have given to Gen. Castaños, on the probable designs of the enemy during my absence from this frontier; and on the plans to be adopted by the allies; and the draft of my instructions to Gen. Bacellar applicable to the same view of circumstances.

I request you to communicate to Gen. Bacellar at Lamego, as well as to the Conde de Amarante, all the intelligence which you may think will be useful to the officers. In case you should have occasion to make any suggestion to those officers, I beg that you will attend to the enclosed instructions.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1812.

The allied British and Portuguese army are in march towards the province of Alentejo, with a view to operations to the southward; and it is necessary that I should convey to you instructions regarding your conduct during my absence from this part of the country.

If the enemy should diminish his force in the kingdoms of Leon and Castille, so as to be necessarily on the defensive, and Gen. Abadia, from the province of Galicia, and the Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, from the frontiers of Castille, should undertake any offensive operation against any of the French posts in those kingdoms, the Conde de Amarante should support the operations of Gen. Abadia with his infantry, as far as may be consistent with the instructions which he has already received from Marshal the Conde de Trancoso and me, and with his cavalry, and that under the immediate command of your Excellency, to such extent as may be deemed prudent to advance them, taking care that they have a communication with, and secure retreat upon, his infantry.

If the enemy should retain a sufficient force in Castille and Leon to be able to act offensively, and should attack Galicia, the Gen. Conde de Amarante is to impede their progress, and to do them all the mischief he can with his cavalry upon their left flank, and eventually their rear, supporting his cavalry by his infantry; but he must take care not to push the latter too forward, or to risk its retreat upon Portugal. In proportion as the enemy shall advance into Galicia, and you shall find that he intends to establish himself in that kingdom, you will make arrangements to collect the militia of the two northern provinces of the Kingdom of Portugal to the northward.

If the enemy should attack the Kingdom of Portugal by the right of the Douro, instead of attacking Galicia, you will make the arrangements, and adopt the system for their defence, ordered by the instructions of the Marshal Conde de Trancoso in the year 1810. If the enemy, instead of invading Galicia, or the Kingdom of Portugal, on the right of the Douro, should pass the Agueda, below Ciudad Rodrigo, and cut off the communication between that place and Almeida, you will collect the troops in the provinces of Minho, Tras os Montes, and Upper Beira, on the Lower Coa; and you will, as far as in your power, protect the magazines of the allied army on the Douro and the Mondego.

Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo are in a state of defence to insure them against capture by a *coup de main*, and are supplied with provisions to last these garrisons at least during the time that the enemy could possibly remain in the country. In case you should have occasion, under these instructions, to assemble the troops in Upper Beira, I hereby authorise you to make use of the contents of the magazines of the allied army at Lamego and S. João da Pesqueira; but this authority must be made use of only in case of urgent necessity, as it may prove of the utmost detriment to the cause of the allied army, should we not have those magazines hereafter, but whatever you may use of them must be replaced without loss of time.

I enclose a letter for Sir H. Douglas, who is employed with Gen. Abadia, in which I request that officer to give you and Gen. the Conde de Amarante constant intelligence of the enemy's movements, in order to enable you to conform to my instructions. I likewise request Don Carlos de España to communicate with you constantly.

There is a daily post now between Celorico and Lamego, and I have ordered one to be established between Celorico and my head quarters in the Alentejo, and I beg to hear from you constantly.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the draft of a memorandum which I have sent to Gen. Castaños and his answer, being a report to his Excellency from Gen. Giron, the chief of the Staff, on the probable plans of the enemy in this part of the Peninsula, and the measures to be adopted by the allies, upon the march of the allied British and Portuguese army under my command to the south of the Tagus.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 29th Feb. 1812.

I request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will give directions that Lieuts. Pitts, Jones, and Vetch, officers of the Royal Engineers, and 30 of the company of Artificers, trained to sapping, may embark and proceed to Villa Real, and proceed thence, according to the enclosed route, to Elvas.

The Commissary Gen. will take measures to have these officers and men provided on their march.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 29th Feb. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., No. 53, enclosing observations by Lieut. Col. Duncan, upon one of the 7th Jan., which I had addressed to you.

Notwithstanding that I hope the lines of the Isla, and the other fortification depending on Cadiz, will never fall into the hands of the enemy, I am not satisfied by Lieut. Col. Duncan's observations, that the information which I desired might be sent to the Sec. of State, cannot or ought not to become matter of professional calculation, because it is the Colonel's opinion that the supply of ammunition 'should be without bounds;' or that the government have not a right to require from me and yourself, and we from the officers placed under us, such professional information as will

enable them to determine whether it is best for Great Britain to maintain the foundries at Cadiz, or to send from thence the articles which these foundries might be expected to supply, if worked at the expense of Great Britain.

Accordingly, I request you again to call Lieut. Col. Duncan's attention to the information required in my letter of the 7th Jan. If Lieut. Col. Duncan cannot or will not make the calculations required, I must and will; and whether he or I make them, I shall consider myself responsible that the works at the Isla and Cadiz are sufficiently supplied for any defence they can be required to make, if they should be supplied according to the calculations which will be sent to England under my orders of the 7th Jan.

In order to enable me to make the calculations which I have required (and which Lieut. Col. Duncan has declined to make, there being yet no answer from the Commanding officer of Engineers), I request to have a return of the number of pieces of ordnance, stating of what calibres, in the several works in the Isla, including the Caraccas, on the Isthmus and in Cadiz, specifying the measurement of the nation according to which the calibre is calculated.

Of course you understand that the work at the Spanish foundries is to continue til. the government shall have decided whether they will defray the expense, or send from England the materials manufactured.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 29th Feb. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th inst., enclosing one from Don José Pizarro, in regard to the wants of the place of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I beg that you will inform the Spanish government that I had already adopted the following measures for the security of that important place:

The breaches in the *fausse braie* wall have been rebuilt, and the rebuilding of those in the main wall is in progress; and in the mean time these breaches have been repaired in such a manner as to be out of danger of being carried by a *coup de main*.

Various improvements have been made in the works of the place, and in concurrence with the opinion of his Excellency Gen. Castaños, and the Spanish engineers, good works have been constructed on the *teson* of San Francisco, from which the place can be attacked with the greatest advantage; by which works the *teson* is secured at least till they will be carried. They are so respectable that they cannot be taken, excepting by a regular attack.

Works are in progress for the improvement of the convents in the suburbs of San Francisco; and a redoubt is in progress to the south of that suburb, which will add to the security of the place on that side. These works have been performed by the allied British and Portuguese troops, with the assistance of some Spanish troops in the last week, and I have paid all the expense; and I have this day left in the hands of the governor, Brig. Gen. Vives, the sum of 12,000 dollars, to defray the expense of completing, according to the plan settled, the works which have been commenced, some of which are in a defensible state, and all in a considerable degree of progress. The total expense which will have been

incurred, including the sum of 12,000 dollars above mentioned, amounts to about £4500 sterling.

I have the honor to enclose states of the ordnance, military and Engineer's stores in the place, besides which, I have ordered there 500 barrels of gunpowder from Almeida, which will be thrown in immediately; and I have sent there 355,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

I have likewise the honor to enclose states of the provisions and medical stores in the place, and of those which I have lodged in it. I have since ordered there 15,000 rations of biscuit, and 5500 lbs. of salt meat, 6000 lbs. of salt fish, and 25,000 lbs of rice. Reckoning the garrison, therefore, at 3000 men, it has already in it provisions for one month. Your Excellency will besides have seen in my correspondence with Don Carlos de España, forwarded in my dispatch of the 19th inst., the measures which had been adopted to place at the disposal of Don Carlos de España provisions for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo for 2 months.

If other means should not have been found to supply the garrison before these 2 months shall have expired, I will endeavor to adopt further measures to supply their wants.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 29th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 29th. It is impossible for me to send a regiment of cavalry to Gibraltar. Considering what I have upon my hands, I doubt whether I have as much cavalry as I shall require, notwithstanding that I have a good deal.

If I were to send a regiment to Gibraltar, it would be under the orders of the governor, to whom I have nothing to say. Any arrangement, therefore, that is made on this subject, must be by the King's government.

If I could send a regiment to Gibraltar, and could dispose of it when there, I should doubt (between ourselves) the expediency of placing it under the command of Ballesteros. It is very desirable that he should succeed, but one regiment of cavalry will not do much for him one way or other; and having seen the mode in which the Spaniards use their cavalry, and knowing how Ballesteros used some of our hussars, when he had the disposal of them for a moment, I should be desirous of avoiding to trust a regiment to his disposal. The expense of a regiment of cavalry at Gibraltar will be enormous; and as far as I have any knowledge of the scene of its operations, the Sierra de Ronda, the expense of maintaining it in the field still greater. And I doubt its being of much use, even under the best management. The fact is, that the French have so much cavalry, that unless great masses can be brought against them, it is almost useless, and is very expensive and burthensome, to have more than enough for the common duty of the outposts.

I give no credit to the shells going 5000 *toises*, which is more than 6 miles. But the French may certainly have improved upon the mortar, so as to make it throw farther than it did before. It may be depended upon that their efforts in this way are so very expensive that they will be very weak, and our success, or Ballesteros' at Seville, will put an end to them entirely.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 29th Feb. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 25th, containing certain queries from the Superintendent of the Police, on the mode of carrying into execution the law in regard to numbering the means of transport at Lisbon; and I acknowledge that among my other avocations I did not know that I was the interpreter of the meaning of the Portuguese regulations.

The object of the law is to number the means of transport, in order to be able to get at them for the service of the army; and the first question is, whether those are to be numbered which are kept by the officers of the British army, and by those employed by the British army at Lisbon. Those officers are allowed certain sums to buy the animals which are deemed necessary to enable them to perform their duty, and they are allowed forage to feed them; and then the magistrate, who is to execute this law, asks, are these animals to be numbered, in order to facilitate their being taken for the service of the army (they being already employed in the service of the army); and the minister supports the notion of taking them by proposing that the whole should be numbered and registered!

I will not insult Dom M. Forjaz by asking whether he numbers Cardoso's horses and his own, and Marshal Beresford's, and Adm. Berkeley's, because I conclude that if he numbers those belonging to the officers of one nation, he does the same to the officers of the other; but I would beg to ask him, whether the horses of the cavalry which may be at Lisbon, and of the police guard, are to be numbered and registered under the law? If the horses and animals in one branch of the public service are not considered liable to be numbered and registered, why should those in another?

I should suppose that the law is intended to apply to the horses and animals and means of transport, the property of individuals, not kept for the public service.

As for Dom M. Forjaz's plan of first registering these animals, and then excusing them from service, I know enough of the mode of executing a law in Portugal, to protest against it. It will give rise to constant disputes, and will tend to increase the disunion which is growing fast between the two nations, notwithstanding every effort of mine to prevent it. It will besides afford ample ground for the evasion of the law by the magistrates.

To the second query, I answer that if any body, whether English or Portuguese, whether in the service of the army or not, keep means of transport which he is not required to keep by orders of the army, and for which he is not allowed forage by the regulations of the service, such horses and means of transport should be liable to the law for means of transport.

I don't understand the third question. If it means the boats belonging to the King's transports and store ships, &c., I beg to refer you to my answer to the first query for my opinion upon it. If that is not satisfactory, Dom M. Forjaz had better settle that matter with the British Admiral on the station.

If I had any influence with the Portuguese government, I should recommend that the person who framed these queries should be dismissed from his station. He certainly does not mean to carry into execution the transport laws, and he is not the person who should be at the head of the police in these times.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Freneda, 1st March, 1812.

I have omitted to reply to your letter of the 28th Nov., containing your opinion and that of Capt. Sir G. Collier on the comparative merits of the Bayona islands, and of the island of Aroza, as points to be occupied by the British government.

I had yesterday a conversation with Gen. Castaños on that subject; and he appeared to be desirous to occupy the position, to which you refer in your letter of the 28th Nov., in front of the road leading from San Payo to Pontevedra. Whether he should occupy that position or not, I should be inclined to prefer the island of Aroza to the Bayona islands for the depôt; having an intermediate depôt either in the Bayona islands, or in the Peninsula of Pontevedra.

I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what is the nature and length of the position in front of Pontevedra; and how the flanks of a body of troops occupying it would be secured on the rivers of Pontevedra and San Payo.

Have you formed any notion of the expense to be incurred, and the time which will be required, to secure the island of Aroza; and by what number of men it should be occupied?

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 1st March, 1812.

I have perused the paper which you transmitted to me in your letter dated the 27th Feb., and I have examined the plan of the proposed canal from the Sado* to the Tagus.

The proposed canal cannot affect, in one way or another, the military works on the heights of Almada, and on the left of the Lower Tagus.

Adverting to the nature of the war in which we are engaged, it may be a question how far it is expedient to establish a communication by water, of which the enemy will have the command, between the port of Setuval and the Tagus; and to give the enemy the command of such a resource as that canal would give him for the transport of stores and provisions, for the attack of the works erected for the defence of Lisbon.

It does not appear to be at all probable that the canal would be of much use for the defence of Lisbon, as the line is very long, and the right flank by no means strong; and whether it could be occupied or not would depend upon the relative force of the attacking and defending troops. It would be useful to the army if it could maintain itself on the frontier. I say nothing about the expense of the undertaking, or of the expediency of commencing it at present, when the government are unable to defray the expense of their army, because such observations are useless.

* The river which falls into the sea at Setuval, and which, at different parts, is called Sado, Sadão, and Setuval.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Freneda, 3d March, 1812, 4 P.M.

I omitted to mention to you this morning that it would be very desirable that somebody, upon whom you can depend; should go to Elvas, in order to keep together there the bullocks and carts which will bring up the ordnance and stores, and have an account of them ready by the time I shall arrive. Otherwise we shall be hard run for means of transport to begin our operations, and much valuable time will be lost in getting the account of what there will be.

Mr. Routh will probably be able to arrange this for you.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Freneda, 3d March, 1812.

I have recommended to Gen. Castaños to move Gen. Morillo's and Penne Villemur's troops into the Condado de Niebla during our service in Estremadura, and I think it not improbable that I shall be able to prevail upon him to move them immediately; at least, I propose to try to-morrow at Ciudad Rodrigo, where I am going.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Mr. Routh to prepare means of feeding them at Jurumenha, Redondo, &c., towards Bejar, and thence to Mertola, where they will cross the Guadiana. They must not go by Villa Viçosa, or touch upon our cantonments. The Juiz de Fora will supply them, upon Mr. Routh giving them previous notice of the arrival of the troops, of which I will apprise you.

I propose to leave this on the 6th, and to be at Elvas on the 11th.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 4th March, 1812.

I had intended to move the head quarters from hence on their route towards Elvas, on the 1st inst., but I have been induced to delay the movement, because, owing to the difficulty in procuring means of transport, the stores for the siege of Badajoz are not yet brought up to Elvas, and because I have learnt that the enemy's troops in all quarters are preparing to move, and that the removal of the head quarters of the army, when they may hear of it, will be the signal for their march. I propose to move, however, on the 6th.

No movement of importance has been made since I addressed your

G. O.

Freneda, 2d March, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, that notwithstanding his repeated orders, references are frequently made to him of requisitions and receipts for provisions and forage, made in an irregular manner by the officers of the army; and his time, as well as that of the Commissary Gen., and of the officers under him, is unnecessarily taken up in inquiries into the justice of the claims of the holders of these irregular vouchers, solely because the officers who give them omit to obey the orders of the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers, commanding divisions, will give orders that the G. O. of the 4th May, 1809, Nos. 4, 5, and 6, and of the 7th Oct. 1809, Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, and of the 8th Dec. 1809, No. 5, may be again issued to the several regiments.

G. O.

Freneda, 4th March, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the gentlemen of the Medical department, and of the officers about to be removed into the hospital at Santarem, to his orders regarding quarters.

2. He declares it to be his intention to order that the whole shall inhabit their tents, if he should receive any reports of disagreements with the inhabitants, or of unreasonable demands on the part of the officers above mentioned.

Lordship on the 26th Feb. Our troops have continued their march, for which the weather has been remarkably favorable.

I learn from Cadiz that Gen. Ballesteros defeated, on the Feb., a detachment of the enemy under Gen. Maransin, near Malaga. It is reported that Gen. Maransin was killed.

I have a report from Sir H. Douglas of the 24th Feb., stating that Espoz y Mina had taken the garrison of Huerta on the 3d Jan., and that the governor of Pamplona, having sent out a detachment to attack Gen. Mendizabal at Sangüesa, Espoz y Mina and Longa had joined him, after the enterprise at Huerta, and engaged the French detachment in the valley of Rocaforte, on the 11th Jan. They defeated the enemy, and took from them 2 pieces of cannon, and killed 5 officers and 600 men.

One of Don Julian Sanchez's detachments has lately destroyed a small detachment, consisting of an officer and 80 men, between Alba de Tormes and Salamanca. The officer was carrying orders, which are very interesting, and show the distress of the enemy.

I enclose two which deserve your Lordship's attention. That in print will point out to you the degree of possession which the enemy have of the country, which they pretend they have conquered and settled. Your Lordship will observe that they cannot send a courier from Valladolid to Bayonne without an escort, consisting of at least 250 cavalry and infantry; and that they can secure the services of the estafette, whom they are obliged to employ, only by placing him in the centre of the escort, and by a rope to the bridle of his horse.

The authenticity of this paper will, as usual, be denied by authority, because it is necessary to continue to deceive the world regarding the real situation of affairs in the Peninsula. But I trust that your Lordship will believe that I never transmitted to you any paper which I did not know to be genuine.

The A.G. to Major Royal, 61st regt.

4th March, 1812.

It being the Commander of the Forces' intention to establish a large military hospital station at Santarem, and an officer properly qualified for the situation of Commandant for the same being required, I have his Excellency's directions to inform you, provided you are willing to undertake this trust, the Commander of the Forces will grant you the staff pay of an A.A.G. In the event of your wishing to avail yourself of the Commander of the Forces' offer, you will apply immediately for leave to the officer commanding the 61st regt. and to Major Gen. Clinton, and you will repair without loss of time to Santarem, apprising me of the same, in order that instructions may be sent to you on arrival at that place.

To Major Gen. — — —.

Freneda, 5th March, 1812, 3 P.M.

I propose to set out for the Alentejo to-morrow morning, and Gen. Leith, with the 5th division, the greater part of which has already been removed from Ciudad Rodrigo, will have marched from thence on the 9th inst. The General will probably stay there himself for a day or two after the troops, but upon this subject he will communicate with you. I send this letter to him for his perusal.

As I am about to undertake an important operation in Estremadura, which will require some time to complete it, I am anxious to take advantage as much as possible of the difficulties which the enemy experience

in obtaining intelligence to gain time. With this view, I have remained so long in this part of the country after the body of the army had marched; and I have detained here the 5th division; and I am desirous that you should remain in this part of the country for some time longer.

I beg you to circulate in the country the report that I am going to hunt on the banks of the Huelva and Yeltes, and you might even have a house arranged for the hounds at Aldea de Yeltes.

The 2d division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' has marched from the province of Avila, through the Puerto del Pico to Talavera de la Reyna; and there are now 4 divisions of that army on the Tagus. There remain, however, 4 divisions on the Tormes and Douro; viz., the 3d division at and in the neighbourhood of Valladolid, where Marmont's head quarters are; the 5th division at Salamanca, Alba de Tormes, Peñaranda (where there is a small body of cavalry), and Medina del Campo (where the artillery is); the 7th division at Ledesma, and on the road to Zamora, as far as Zamora; and the 8th division at Benavente, and in that neighbourhood.

If the enemy should advance upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or should move to cross the Agueda below the town, you will fall back across the Agueda, and thence gradually, taking care not to commit yourself, upon Sabugal, and from Sabugal in the same manner, by Penamacor, on Castello Branco.

If you should find that Marmont's head quarters move from Valladolid towards Talavera, or if the 3d or the 5th division should move to the south, or the 7th division, you will march, by easy marches, so as not to injure the horses, by Sabugal, Penamacor, Castello Branco, Portalegre, to Elvas, apprising me of your marches.

The Commissary Gen. leaves in this part of the country an officer of his department, supplied with money for the wants of the 1st hussars; and measures will be taken to supply the men and horses on the march they will have to make through Lower Beira into Alentejo, upon which a Commissary will receive his instructions from the Commissary Gen.

I beg you to desire Major Grant, of the 11th regt., who is, I believe, at Tamames, and Lieut. Blanckley, of the 23d regt., who is at Bejar, to give you constant intelligence of the enemy's movements. Desire the latter to tell the Portuguese officer who is at Plasencia, likewise to correspond with you.

I have not entered on the defence of this frontier in this letter, because I wish you to consider yourself and the 1st hussars as entirely separated from it, and belonging to the army in the Alentejo, and left on this frontier only for a particular object. I have, however, directed that in case the enemy, upon hearing of my absence from this part of the country, should collect his troops on this side of the Douro, Gen. Bacellar should collect the force now in the northern provinces of Portugal; and in Upper Beira, on the Lower Coa; so as to communicate with Don Carlos de España, and protect our magazines on the Douro and Mondego; both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida being secure from a *coup de main*. I conceive that the enemy can undertake nothing against these places, and they are not likely to pass the Coa in front of a respectable force, leaving these places behind them.

Gen. Bacellar and Don Carlos de España will both press you to remain in this part of the country, in the case supposed of the enemy's movement upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or of his passage of the Lower Agueda. You will, of course, not be in a hurry, and you will give them your countenance as far as may be in your power. But you will tell them that you were left here only for a particular object; and that you have positive instructions for your conduct in the event of the occurrence of the enemy's movement to the Agueda.

One of the corps of guides will set out from Sabugal with letters for me from Don Carlos de España, every morning at 8 o'clock. You should have a letter party in the suburbs of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one at Puebla de Azava, to carry your letters and those of Gen. Leith to the detachment of the guides at Sabugal; and the hussar should be dispatched from Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the hussar from Puebla de Azava may reach Sabugal at 8 in the morning.

The hussar from Ciudad Rodrigo should wait at Puebla de Azava, and the hussar from Puebla de Azava should wait at Sabugal till the letters shall arrive from head quarters, in case there should be any for you.

P.S. I enclose a return of the regiments composing the 3d, 5th, 7th, and 8th divisions '*de l'Armée de Portugal*,' with the names of the General officers commanding each.

To Generals Bacellar and Trant.

Freneda, 5th March, 1812.

The Capt. Gen. Castaños will pass through Lamego and Oporto, on his way to Juiz in Galicia, in a short time. I request you to pay him every attention which is due to his high rank and situation, and to the important services which he has rendered to the cause of the allied governments. I beg you to recommend the General to the attention of the military governors and civil magistrates through whose districts and towns he may pass.

To the Superintendent of Transports on the Douro.

Freneda, 5th March, 1812.

The bearer, Don Pablo Caballero, is employed by the Commanding officer of the Spanish troops in Castille to purchase flour at Oporto, with the intention of removing it, by the navigation of the Douro, as far up the river as it may be in his power; and I request you to attend to his requisitions for boats for that service, he paying the usual price for the same.

To all Authorities.

Sabugal, 6th March, 1812.

The bearer of this is Mr. Croft,* who is attached to the British Mission at the Court of Lisbon, and is employed by His Majesty's minister to distribute the bounty voted by Parliament for the relief of the inhabitants of Portugal.† The General or other officers commanding posts and detachments are requested to give him every assistance in their power, and to provide him with quarters, provisions, and forage.

In the event of troops marching into towns in which this gentleman

* Sir John Croft, Bart., K.C.T.S., who declined all remuneration, even of his expenses, for his services, which were gratefully acknowledged by the British and Portuguese governments, as also by the distressed inhabitants.

† See letter to Lord Liverpool, 27th Oct. 1810, vol. iv., p. 363.

may be residing for the purpose of executing the duty with which he is entrusted, he is by no means to be molested in his quarters; but is, on the contrary, recommended to the attention of the General or other officers commanding the troops.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Pedrogão, 7th March, 1812, 2 P.M.

I received this morning, at Sabugal, your letter of the 4th.

We have at Abrantes 600,000 rounds of musket ammunition, and 30,000 of rifle; and we have 318,000 of musket, and 148,000 of rifle, at Elvas. The Light division, and the 5th division, bring with them their ammunition; and the rifle ammunition, usually in the great reserve, is still with it. I had, besides, ordered a complete reserve to Abrantes about 6 weeks ago, so that I hope we shall not want ammunition.

I have heard nothing new since I wrote to you last. I believe I informed you that the 2d division had positively moved from the province of Avila.

I am sorry to hear so bad an account of blankets. From the returns, I had hoped that the troops would have been supplied at Abrantes with every thing.

I believe it will be desirable that the 24th regt. should move up; but if it should be so, I shall send them orders, and let you know.

To ———.

Castello Branco, 8th March, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 4th, and that which you enclosed from ———. The 2d division has certainly marched from Avila by the Puerto del Pico, and I think it not improbable that Marmont is at Avila, as ——— says. You may tell ——— that I shall be happy to hear from his brother, but that I can make him no promises, excepting to represent to the Prince in a favorable view his services, and that I can't fix the time at which either will receive their pardon.

To Capt. ———.

Castello Branco, 8th March, 1812.

I have received your letter of the ———. You will recollect what I wrote to you when first our correspondence commenced. I held out no hopes of immediate pardon, but, on the contrary, told you that I could obtain pardon for you only after long and important services. You will go to France, or not, just as you please; but if you do go to France, you will do well never to return to Portugal.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Portalegre, 10th March, 1812, 3½ P.M.

I enclose a letter from the Sec. of State for yourself, and the copy of one addressed to me, directing me to invest you with the Order of the Bath; the insignia of which I likewise send you. I go to Elvas to-morrow; and if it should be convenient to you to come there on the 12th, I shall be happy to invest you.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will request the General and Staff officers of the 1st division, and the Commanding officers of the two regiments of Guards, and Blantyre, to be present on the occasion. I will take care that there shall be quarters for every body at Elvas.

I enclose the only news which I have received since I left Freneda. I don't believe that Marmont will make an attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo; and if he does, I don't think he can succeed.

I have made arrangements to assemble the militia on the Coa, if the enemy should collect upon the Tormes.

P. S. Bring the insignia of the order with you to Elvas.

I have had a sad task to perform with poor Stewart! He is very much afflicted; and it cannot be expected that he should regain any composure for some time. I left him at Niza, and I have endeavored to prevail upon him to go to England.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Portalegre, 10th March, 1812, 3½ P.M.

I send herewith a letter from the Sec. of State, and the insignia of the Order of the Bath, and the copy of a letter to me directing me to invest you therewith.

I am going to Elvas to-morrow; and as I believe the earliest occasion will be on every account most suitable, I would invest you there on the next day, the 12th, if you can make it convenient to come over.

Pray write to the General and Staff officers of the 2d division to come over to Elvas to be present on the occasion, and to dine with me, and likewise Gens. Hamilton and Long, if they should be near you. I will take care that you shall all be quartered in Elvas.

P. S. I understand that you wish to know by what road I shall pass to-morrow. By the direct road to Assumar. Bring the insignia of the order with you on the 12th.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Portalegre, 10th March, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 2d.

I think the junta of Generals at Cadiz will do but little good. I can let you know what I wish that Ballesteros and others should do, and you can make known my wishes to the government, without the intervention of any Generals.

Gen. O'Donnell has proposed to me, through Alava, to send a General officer to Cadiz, to confer with him upon the operations of the armies; and Lord Liverpool, in a letter which I received this day, has desired me to do the same thing. It appears to me that great inconvenience would result from this mode of doing business, and that the duties of the office of the Ambassador would thereby in some degree be taken out of his hands.

I am very ready to state, upon all occasions, how my plans of operations can be aided by the Spanish troops; but it must be obvious that these plans must be founded on my own views of the state of affairs. I cannot adopt plans to forward the operations of such a corps as that of Ballesteros, or even as that of Galicia.

P. S. I shall be at Elvas to-morrow.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

I have received your letters of the 12th, 13th, and 19th Feb., for which I am much obliged to you. I had broken to Charles Stewart his misfor-

tune* before I received Lord Castlereagh's letters. He is, as you may well believe, dreadfully shocked.

I hope that we shall not require the grain which your Lordship has sent; but I am very much obliged to your Lordship for sending it.

The Portuguese troops at Mafra, &c., are recruits for the several regiments in the army. They are trained, and will join the army, I hope, soon. They have been kept away till now by the want of knapsacks and other equipments, which have not yet arrived from England. It will not answer to bring recruits to the army till they are quite equipped for the field.

I have spoken to Sir W. Beresford, and shall speak to Gen. Graham, respecting Shrapnell's shells. I have seen our artillery produce great effect on the enemy; and I have been induced to attribute this effect to the use of Shrapnell's shells. But my opinion in favor of these shells has been much shaken lately.

1st; I have reason to believe that their effect is confined to wounds of a very trifling description; and they kill nobody. I saw Gen. Simon, who was wounded by the balls from Shrapnell's shells, of which he had several in his face and head; but they were picked out of his face as duck shot would be out of the face of a person who had been hit by accident while out shooting, and he was not much more materially injured.

2dly; From the difficulty of judging of direct distances, and in knowing whether the shell has burst in the air in the proper place, I suspect that an original error in throwing the shells is seldom corrected; and that if the shell is not effectual the first shot, the continuance of the fire of these shells seldom becomes more effectual. I can entertain no doubt, however, that if the shell should be accurately thrown, and burst as it is intended, it must wound a great number of men, but probably none very materially.

I am inclined to doubt the expediency of sending to Cadiz an officer for the purpose mentioned by your Lordship. His duties would supersede those of the Ambassador, through whose medium I have hitherto communicated with the Spanish government; and your Lordship will observe, from the dispatches of the Ambassador, that I have, lately communicated with the Spanish government on the subject of operations through this channel.

I am very anxious to be as much as possible free to carry on any operation, or not, as I may think proper. On former occasions I have explained the variations of the enemy's force, which might at one time render an operation expedient, and at another very much otherwise; and I should not wish to have my judgment on the line I should adopt in any case fettered by any supposed engagement into which an officer employed by me to confer with Gen. O'Donell might have entered.

The Spaniards, and O'Donell in particular, have long pressed for a military convention for the execution of a particular plan of operations. It has always appeared to me, that as I was the only person in the Peninsula who really commanded an army, and that I command it under restrictions and instructions by your Lordship, I ought not to consent to lend myself to such a convention unless I should see an army formed in

* The death of his wife, Lady Katherine Stewart.

Spain capable, by its numbers, its equipment, and efficiency, to effect some important object in our common operations. Now there is no such army; and the consequence of entering into such a convention would be, that I should bind myself, for no reason, to perform a certain operation, even after my own judgment should have convinced me that, under your Lordship's instructions, I ought to discontinue it: in other words, I should give, but receive nothing. Accordingly, your Lordship will find, in all my correspondence with the Ambassador, that I state to the Spanish government the plan which I propose to follow, and suggest that which the Spanish troops should follow to aid my operations; but I don't bind myself to persevere to the last; nor have I suggested any plan to them to aid me, in which it will be necessary for them to persevere so as to endanger the safety of any of their armies.

Your Lordship will have seen that I sent the battalion of marines to England some time ago, according to the wish you before expressed upon that subject.

I have written to Mr. Perceval regarding my promotion in the Peerage; but I beg your Lordship will accept, and will convey my thanks to the Regent's government for the favors which have been conferred upon me.

P.S. I have written to Mr. Perceval regarding Lord Wellesley's resignation; and I can only say that I am very sorry for it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

I enclose the list of names of General officers of the British and Portuguese army, omitted in the vote of thanks of the two Houses, on the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo. They all belong to divisions which were employed in the siege.

I postpone publishing these votes till I shall hear from your Lordship that the error is rectified.

To Viscount Melville, President of the Board of Control.

Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

I received only the day before yesterday your letter of the 10th Feb.,* and head quarters have been marching ever since, and I shall not have time to peruse Gen. Maitland's paper before the post will go out.

As, however, it is probable that you will decide upon your measure before the next mail shall reach England, I will not miss this opportunity of stating to you my opinion:

1st; That the European army in the East Indies ought to be the King's.

2dly; That the 3 armies ought to continue separate and distinct.

3dly; That the Native army ought to be the Company's if the Company should continue to be the sovereign of the territory. It would be impossible to separate this army from the sovereignty; and indeed the

* Extract of a letter from Visc. Melville to the Earl of Wellington.

'I am going to do a very unreasonable thing in requesting you, employed as you are, to read the enclosed papers, which are for your confidential perusal. My apology must be the belief that you are not indifferent to the interest and character of our Indian armies, and that you will be perfectly disposed to favor me with your opinion on the suggestion contained in these papers; the subject is not new to you, and it is beginning to make some stir in this country.'

great difficulty of transferring the Native army to the Crown, and that the Crown would find in keeping it officered, as it must be, by persons exclusively belonging to the Native service, have always appeared to me the greatest in the way of the transfer of the sovereignty, or, more properly speaking, of the exercise of the sovereignty, to the Crown.

4thly; It is my opinion that the Crown should name both the Governors and Commanders in Chief at all the settlements, and should have a very efficient control over the nomination of members of Council. If the Crown do not appoint the Governor, the Crown should not appoint the Commander in Chief. I have not time now to enter into a detail of all my reasons for entertaining this opinion. They are referable principally to the experience I acquired in witnessing, and sometimes being the mediator and reconciler of disputes between the Governor and Commander in Chief. If the latter were appointed by the Crown and the former by the Company, the Commander in Chief would be too strong for the Governor.

5thly; It is my opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be vested by the law in the Governor in Council. The law must recognise no other authority in the state. The Company may and ought to instruct the Governor in Council, 1st; to leave all matters of discipline solely and exclusively to the Commander in Chief, and to interfere in them in no manner, excepting when the safety of the state should require it. 2dly; that all recommendations to military appointments, such as the staff officers of the army to commissions, promotions in the army of persons, civil or military, to fill the departments of the army, and the inferior commands, should be made by the Commander in Chief to the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to record his reasons for dissent. 3dly; the recommendations to superior commands, such as divisions of the army, should be with the Commander in Chief, when the holders of these commands exercise no civil authority or political function; and that in the case of a nomination to a higher command being vested exclusively in the Governor in Council, without the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, the Governor should be directed to consult with the Commander in Chief in making the selection.

It would be very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the Governor in Council to promote officers for meritorious services, at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, out of the usual and regular routine, as well as to pass over officers guilty of misconduct. This might be done by giving the Governor in Council the power to promote such officers, by brevet, in the first instance, who should succeed to the first vacancies in the rank to which they should have been promoted in the regiment to which they should belong.

In regard to other points, I concur entirely with you. The Court of Directors must be prevented from meddling with or peddling in the discipline of the army. It is a matter of too serious consequence to be allowed to be jobbed at the India House. You will be the best judge whether this can be effected by the authority of the control of the Crown, or whether the authority of Parliament is necessary.

P.S. I have omitted to mention that in whatever way the Commander

in Chief is appointed a member of Council, he should have the same power of voting, &c., as other members of Council on all questions.

To Viscount Melville, President of the Board of Control. Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

Since I wrote yesterday, I have read Gen. Maitland's and the Duke of York's papers on the transfer of the army in India to the Crown. The latter relates only to the mode of transfer, which is excellent, if the transfer should be determined upon. The desire to accumulate wealth, and to return to Europe, is natural and praiseworthy in an officer of the local army in India. A great majority of them can have no other object; and people who have this object exclusively are very apt to forget their duty, and the rules of subordination, when either militate with its attainment.

But I don't agree with those who think that the mutiny at Vellore is to be attributed to the prevalent existence of this spirit among the officers of the army, nor do I think that the origin of the subsequent mutiny of the officers ought to be attributed to it. I attribute the mutiny at Vellore to accidental circumstances. One of these was the arrival in the East Indies, just previous to its occurrence, of a new Governor and a new Commander in Chief, many officers of high rank, and of regiments, recently from England. The Governor and the Commander in Chief were supposed not to be on good terms, or to agree in opinion upon public affairs. This state of things did not tend to increase the respect for authority.

The officer in command at Vellore was newly arrived, and knew nothing of the Native troops; and the officer in charge of the police of the town did his duty, but badly. I believe it is known that more than one officer at Vellore had received notice of what was likely to happen, but they did not attend to the information.

If all this be true, and if it be true that there were circumstances in the G. O. calculated to create discontent, I believe it will be admitted that the mutiny at Vellore may be attributed to other circumstances besides the spirit of gain among the officers.

I don't know much of the subsequent mutiny of the officers. I believe that government never regained its strength after Lord Powis' government was broken up. The first quarrels of the persons in authority rendered it contemptible, and those of their successors brought it to the ground.

Upon the back of all this came Gen. Macdowall's orders and letters, and his conduct; and it is not astonishing that the officers mutinied. It is my opinion, from reading the papers, that the supposed fear of losing their emoluments was the pretence for the mutiny instead of the real cause.

But, will the measure proposed by Gen. Maitland apply a remedy to the evil? I answer, certainly not. If it be right to call officers serving with the Native troops in India His Majesty's local army, and to enable them as Colonels to serve the State in all parts of the world, will that diminish among them the desire of gain? I am afraid not. The object of these officers, after having gone through the period of their service, must still be to return to their own country with some sort of independence, and this is what creates the desire of gain throughout the period of the service in that country.

If the measure proposed by Gen. Maitland will not remove the cause

which he supposes has occasioned all the evils which have prevailed in the local armies in India, I am afraid it will increase those evils which, in my opinion, have occasioned them.

I say that the evil has been the weakness of the government, occasioned by the contending pretensions of the Governor and the Commander in Chief, and by the undue interference of the Company's authorities at home in the government and patronage abroad. What would become of the government if the Commander in Chief had the whole army at his back, and obeyed no authority in India? Have Commanders in Chief never advanced extravagant pretensions on the subject of lucre, and advanced those pretensions in such a manner as to endanger the public authority? Let the records be looked at, and see what would have been the consequence, upon more than one occasion, if the army had been entirely and exclusively the King's, and the Commander in Chief had chosen to carry matters to extremities, as he did, having only a part of the army exclusively under his command?

If this arrangement is adopted, the Commander in Chief of the army must invariably be the Governor of the settlement, which might be a very proper arrangement; but let it be adopted on its own ground, and not as the consequence of, and prop to, another arrangement, which I am convinced can never be adopted with advantage till the Crown shall take the exercise of the sovereignty into its own hands.

I do think it would be a very beneficial arrangement to allow officers in the service of the Company to exchange into the service of the King, and for the Company's service, as well as for the public, that His Majesty might be enabled to avail himself of the service, in Europe, of officers who had served the East India Company in India. But this arrangement might easily be effected without expense, and without adopting the whole extent of the plan of Gen. Maitland.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 12th ult. (No. 15), regarding Major Gen. Cooke's arrangements for keeping the Spanish shot foundries in activity; and I beg to refer you to the copy of my letter to Major Gen. Cooke of the 7th Jan. on this subject, which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 8th of that month.

There appears to have been some hesitation on the part of Lieut. Col. — of the artillery to furnish the estimates required by my letter, which has induced me to repeat my directions on this head to Major Gen. Cooke; and I trust that his answer will enable me to form an opinion upon the extent of the assistance to be given to the Spanish government in ammunition, &c.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

I moved the head quarters from Freneda on the 6th, and arrived here on the 11th inst.

I found every thing so far prepared for the siege of Badajoz, that I propose to invest the place on the 16th inst., notwithstanding that all the stores for the siege are not yet arrived.

Owing to the difficulties in procuring means of transport, I have been obliged to detach many regiments, both of the British and Portuguese army, to the rear to receive their clothing and equipments; but I hope that I shall be able to collect the whole before the enemy will be in a situation to interrupt my operations.

Marshal Marmont arrived at Salamanca on the 6th; but the enemy had no intelligence, on which they could rely, of the movement of our army, and it was generally known that I was still in that part of the country. I have intelligence from Ciudad Rodrigo of as late a date as the 10th, at which time the enemy had made no movement.*

The 5th division of infantry, under Lieut. Gen. Leith, marched in this direction from thence on the 9th and 10th; but I have ordered the 1st hussars, under Major Gen. — — —, to remain in their posts on the Yelves and Huelva till the General shall be certain, from the enemy's movements, that they are aware that the allied army have moved.

There are none of the enemy's troops in the field in Estremadura, excepting that part of the 5th corps not in the garrison of Badajoz, the head quarters of which are at Villa Franca; and a detachment, consisting of about a division, under Gen. Darricau, whose head quarters are at La Serena. I conclude that these troops will retire when our troops shall advance.

The enemy have improved the works of Badajoz very considerably since the place has been in their possession, and they have in the place a very sufficient garrison; but I hope that I shall be able to obtain possession of it.

The enemy have made no movement, and I have heard of no operation of importance since I addressed your Lordship last. According to the last accounts, Marshal Soult was in the lines before Cadiz.

To Major Gen. Cook.

Elvas, 14th March, 1812.

I have received orders from the Sec. of State to convey to you directions to relieve the troops at present stationed at Tarifa, by a detachment from those under your command at Cadiz; but as I am not aware of the strength of the present garrison at Tarifa, or of the numbers required for it, I beg you to send there a sufficient force, in their due proportions of British and foreign troops, under the command of an officer on whom you can depend.

In regard to the defence of Tarifa, I still entertain the opinions which I communicated to you in my letters of the 1st and 25th Feb.; and in the event of your being of the same opinion, I request that you will take measures to secure possession of the island, and that the town may be considered merely as an outpost from it, to be evacuated when the state of the enemy's preparations for attack may render the measure necessary.

I beg that a plan and description of the works prepared by the Governor of Gibraltar in the town and island of Tarifa may be transmitted to me as soon as it may be possible, and that you will arrange with Lieut. Gen. Campbell the relief of the troops which at present garrison the place.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Elvas, 14th March, 1812.

I have much pleasure in transmitting to you, to be communicated to Col. Skerrett, the duplicate of a dispatch which I have received from the

* See Appendix, No. XX.

Earl of Liverpool, conveying the approbation of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of the distinguished conduct of that officer, and the brave troops under his command, in the successful defence of Tarifa.

I request that you will acquaint Col. Skerrett that I did not fail to report, in due course, the events which took place at Tarifa; but, by some accident, my dispatch on this subject had not reached the Earl of Liverpool when his Lordship wrote to me the enclosed letter.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 14th March, 1812.

I have nothing to add to my public dispatch, which I enclose. We invest the place on the day after to-morrow.

Marmont's troops are all ready for a start; but I hope to be strong enough for a stiff affair with him and Soult, and to take the place too. I shall not give the thing up without good cause.

To Col. Austin.

Elvas, 15th March, 1812.

I have the honor to inform you that the Conde de Penne Villemur is on his march through the Alentejo with about 4000 cavalry and infantry, by the enclosed route, in order to enter the Condado de Niebla. He will be at Redondo on the day after to-morrow.

The Commissary Gen. will supply him on his march.

The object of sending the Conde into the Condado is to draw off the attention of the enemy from the operations in this quarter which are carrying on under my command.

In case the Conde de Penne Villemur should be obliged to fall back upon the province of Algarve, it is desirable that you should be provided with means of transporting his troops across the Guadiana; and that you should have collected a magazine, with 24,000 rations of provisions, to supply him during the time which, in that case, he may be obliged to remain within the Portuguese frontier.

It would also be very desirable that you should have one or two light boats fitted upon carts, in order to accompany the Conde de Penne Villemur to the Guadalquivir, in case he should think it proper to direct his operations towards and eventually across that river.

The D.A.G. to Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector of hospitals.

15th March, 1812.

In the absence of the Adj. Gen. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst., and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that orders have been given to the Commissary Gen. relative to the providing of transport for the conveyance of stores, &c. to the new hospital stations. I am further to observe that his Excellency has had a personal communication this morning with the Commissary Gen. upon this head of service, and that he is much concerned the country does not afford transport sufficient for the immediate supply of all the demands upon it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Elvas, 16th March, 1812, noon.

I enclose some letters just received from the north, a report from Lieut. Hillier, and one from Toledo, &c.

G. O.

Elvas, 15th March, 1812.

The Commander of the Forces requests that Commanding officers will send in, with the least possible delay, to the A. G.'s office, the names of any officers disposed to act as engineers at the intended siege of Badajoz.

I have desired Sir R. Hill to communicate with you to-morrow by Almendralejo, if he can; and to move upon Villa Franca next day, if Bonet should remain there. If he should not, to occupy Almendralejo while you shall be employed in pushing Bonet into the mountains.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Elvas, 16th March, 1812, noon.

Gen. Graham marched this morning, and we invest the place on the left of the river this day. I have not been able to go out, which is the reason for delaying it on the right of the river.

Gen. Graham will be at S^{ta} Marta to-morrow; and it is very desirable that you should communicate with him by Almendralejo, on your arrival at Merida.

If Drouet should have continued at Villa Franca, it is likewise very desirable that you should move on that place early on the 18th, so as to co-operate with Sir T. Graham in the attack of the enemy.

Sir T. Graham will push the enemy quite back to Llerena if he should not already have withdrawn entirely; and while he is so employed, you might as well have a part of your troops at Almendralejo, unless indeed Sir T. Graham should require your assistance.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Elvas, 18th March, 1812, 5 P.M.

I have just received a letter from Sir T. Graham, from S^{ta} Marta, written last night, in which he tells me that he intended to move upon Feria this day, instead of upon Villa Franca, towards Llerena to-morrow, and on the 20th on Llerena.

I think it probable that Drouet, finding that you were yesterday at Merida, and Sir T. Graham at S^{ta} Marta, will have moved at once upon Llerena. However, till Sir T. Graham shall return from his expedition on Llerena, it is desirable that you should keep your corps at Villa Franca, and endeavor to communicate with him. If you should find that he does not carry into execution his plan to the extent of going to Llerena, you will obey the instructions in my letter of the 16th. If, as I hope, he will have taken up the line which I pointed out to him upon Drouet's retreat, I shall then point out a position for you north of the Guadiana.

We broke ground last night, and got on well, notwithstanding the rain.

To Gen. Don Carlos de España.

Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters of the 15th, 16th, and 17th inst.

The report which you make of Ciudad Rodrigo distresses me much. I had hoped that when, by the labor of the British and Portuguese troops, and at the expense of the British government, I had, in concert with Gen. Castaños, improved and repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, so that at all events the place was secure from a *coup de main*, and had left money in order to complete the execution of what our troops had not time to complete, I should not have been told by your Excellency, that for want of the assistance of 15 or 20 British soldiers, who are artificers, and whose services are required for other objects essential to the cause of Spain, the whole business is at a stand. Is it possible that your Excellency

can be in earnest? Is it possible that Castille cannot furnish 15 or 20 stone cutters, masons, and carpenters, for the repair of this important post? How have all the great works been performed which we see in the country? But your Excellency's letter suggests this melancholy reflection, that every thing, as well of a military as of a laborious nature, must be performed by British soldiers, and it becomes my duty to bring this fact distinctly under the view of the allied governments.

I am decidedly of opinion that the enemy cannot attack Ciudad Rodrigo for the want of heavy artillery, and that they cannot get up the artillery which they require till the month of May at soonest. In that period, if I can keep my army collected, I can do much for the cause; and, to enable me to keep my army collected, I require only that the works planned and agreed upon should be continued, for which I have left the money; and that the provisions for which I had given the order upon S. João da Pesqueira on the 16th Feb. should be thrown into the place. If those provisions are not thrown into the place, it is obvious that, by placing one division between the Coa and Agueda, the enemy will, according to my calculation, in 30 days, and, according to that of your Excellency, in 23 days, have possession of the place.

I acknowledge, however, that I am a little surprised that there should be provisions in the place to last only for 23 days, even including some that your Excellency placed there.

I have always reckoned the garrison at 3000 men. Between the 26th Jan. and 17th Feb. there were delivered over to the Spanish Commissary, by Mr. McNair and Mr. St. Remy, 50,000 lbs. of biscuit, and 37,500 lbs. of salt meat. There were issued from Almeida, on the 28th Feb., 6000 lbs. of salt fish, and, on the 10th March, from the same place, 10,000 lbs. of biscuit, and 3399 lbs. of rice; and there were originally in the store at Ciudad Rodrigo 19,800 lbs. of flour, and 1000 lbs. of biscuit. Reckoning the flour the same as biscuit, there would thus be in the garrison 80,000 lbs. of biscuit, and 3399 of rice. Reckoning one lb. of rice equal to 2 lbs. of biscuit, the garrison would have 87,400 lbs. of that article, or for 29 days, and for 43,500 lbs. of salt meat or salt fish, and plenty of spirits, &c.

Mr. St. Remy was likewise directed to deliver over 5000 lbs. of flour on the 10th March, of which I have not the report.

In addition to this quantity, I gave your Excellency, on the 16th Feb., an order upon the magazine of S. João da Pesqueira, only 16 leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo, for 156,000 lbs. of biscuit, and 25,000 lbs. of rice; and yet, in one month from that date, that is to say, on the 15th March, your Excellency writes me that the place has provisions only for 23 days!!

In writing this letter to your Excellency, I don't mean to make any reproach. I wish only to place upon record the facts as they have occurred, and to show to your country and to my country, and the world, that if this important place should fall, or if I should be obliged to abandon plans important to Spain in order to go to its relief, the fault is not mine.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

According to the intention which I announced to your Lordship in

my dispatch of the 13th inst., I broke up the cantonments of the army on the 15th and 16th inst., and invested Badajoz, on the left of the river Guadiana, on the 16th inst., with the 3d, 4th, and Light divisions of infantry, and with a brigade of Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's division on the right. These troops are under the command of Marshal Sir W. Beresford and Lieut. Gen. Picton. We broke ground on the following day, and have established a parallel within 200 yards of the outwork called La Picurina, which embraces the whole of the south-east angle of the fort. The work has continued ever since with great celerity, notwithstanding the very bad weather which we have had since the 17th.

The enemy made a sortie yesterday from the gate called La Trinidad, on the right of our attack, with about 2000 men. They were almost immediately driven in, without effecting any object, with considerable loss, by Major Gen. Bowes, who commanded the guard in the trenches. We lost, upon this occasion, a very promising officer, Capt. Cuthbert, aide de camp to Lieut. Gen. Picton, killed; and Lieut. Col. Fletcher was slightly wounded, but I hope that he will soon be able to resume his duties. I have not got the returns, but I believe that our loss since the commencement of these operations amounts to 120 men killed and wounded.

On the same day that Badajoz was invested, Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham crossed the Guadiana with the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and Gen. Slade's and Gen. Le Marchant's brigades of cavalry, and directed his march upon Valverde and S^a Marta, and thence towards Llerena; while Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, with the 2d and Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's divisions, and Major Gen. Long's cavalry, marched from his cantonments near Alburquerque upon Merida, and thence upon Almendralejo. These movements induced Gen. Drouet to retire from Villa Franca upon Hornachos, in order, I conclude, to be in communication with Gen. Darcicau's division, which was about La Serena.

I have heard from Sir T. Graham and from Sir R. Hill to the 19th inst. The former was at Los Santos and Zafra, with Gen. Slade's cavalry at Villa Franca, and the latter at Almendralejo. Lieut. Gen. Hill took 3 officers and a few hussars prisoners in Merida.

I have reports from the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo of the 17th inst., and from Salamanca of the 16th inst. The enemy had sent a small detachment to Bejar, principally with a view to plunder; but there was no appearance of any immediate movement.

The 6th division had moved from Talavera through the Puerto del Pico on the 8th and 9th inst., and the 4th division from Toledo on the same days, through the Guadarrama, and the 1st division only remained on the Tagus, near Talavera. The march of these divisions was directed, as I understand, upon Valladolid; and I conclude either that the reports are founded which have been in circulation, that the Guards had been withdrawn from Spain, or that the enemy intend to endeavor to divert my attention from the attack of Badajoz, by making some movement upon Galicia, or upon the north of Portugal. The rain, however, which has annoyed us here, it may be expected, will have filled the rivers in the north; and I made arrangements, before I left Castille, to provide for any plans of that kind which the enemy might adopt. Having lost their train, they

cannot attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, at least till they shall have replaced it.

I have not heard of any movements in the south. Marshal Soult was at the lines opposite Cadiz according to the last accounts.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

I received this morning your letter of the 5th March, marked 'secret and confidential,' enclosing your correspondence with Lord W. Bentinck. I shall write to his Lordship, and to Sir E. Pellew, as soon as I can get a little leisure; in the mean time, I think it proper to apprise your Lordship that the attack of Tarragona or of Barcelona appears to me, of all the objects on the Eastern coast, to be the most desirable. I think it probable, however, that neither (most probably not the latter) will succeed. A siege requires time, and the French will move heaven and earth to save these places; and they can bring troops from France as well as from Aragon and Valencia, in addition to what they have in Catalonia. Besides, 10,000 men are not quite sufficient to attack Barcelona, where there must be 5000 in garrison. Lord William may expect some assistance from Gen. Lacy, but the foundation of his strength must be his British troops.

I don't know how I can give him any assistance from Cadiz. Your Lordship will recollect that from Cadiz we now occupy Carthagenia and Tarifa, and that there are included in the division at Cadiz and those places 1400 Portuguese troops, and about 2000 foreigners in the regiment 'de Watteville' and the battalion of foreign detachments. In fact there is no British regiment now at Cadiz to be detached, excepting the 1st regt. of foot guards, which I have not allowed to be sent into Carthagenia or Tarifa.

I would besides beg leave to draw your Lordship's attention to the result of the operation I have now in hand. If it should succeed and matters turn out as I wish, we may relieve the Andalusias. But if I should succeed in that object, I shall bring the whole of the enemy's force upon me; and I can't expect that, for some time at least, I shall receive any assistance from the Spaniards, or that they can make any material diversion in my favor. Will it not therefore be necessary to draw to this army the division at Cadiz?

If I should not relieve the Andalusias, I beg to have your positive orders respecting the degree to which I shall reduce the garrison of Cadiz, and what regiments I shall send to Lord W. Bentinck. I beg once more to repeat that it is entirely a matter of indifference to me, and always has been so, as far as I am personally concerned, whether the body of troops under my command be large or small. I shall perform service in proportion to the means placed at my disposal, in comparison with those of the enemy, and adverting to your Lordship's instructions.

We are getting on here, notwithstanding that the weather is excessively bad. The constitutions of the troops have been so much shaken with Walcheren, &c. &c., that I am always apprehensive of the consequences of exposing them to the weather. However, I have them in tents now, and I hope that the rain will not last.

Au Général Dumouriez.

Au Camp devant Badajoz, ce 20 Mars, 1812.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 20 Fév. Ayant arrangé mes affaires sur les frontières de la Castille, et réparé Ciudad Rodrigo, et remis Almeida en état de défense, j'ai pu rassembler mon armée de ce côté-ci, et je fais le siège de Badajoz. Nous avançons bien, malgré le mauvais tems. Il semble que l'ennemi a l'intention de tenter quelque diversion au nord, au lieu de rassembler leur armée pour m'attaquer. Si cela est, j'espère que nous réussirons.

Je vois que l'Isla de Leon est une position plus forte qu'elle ne vous a été représentée. Je ne l'ai pas vu depuis qu'elle a été fortifiée, mais elle m'a paru avoir toutes les susceptibilités d'être rendue une des plus fortes positions du monde. On a fait une faute en perdant le Trocadero, mais on l'a remplacé en quelque manière en fortifiant l'isthme vis-à-vis de la péninsule du Trocadero.

Je suis fâché de vous envoyer une lettre que j'ai reçue par la dernière poste sur M. de Guillermey. Son régiment n'était plus ici: je ne pouvais pas l'employer avec l'armée Portugaise, sans la permission du Commandant en Chef, que j'ai demandée, et vous voyez la réponse.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Camp before Badajoz, 21st March, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th, enclosing a complaint from Dom M. Forjaz, that the *British* troops consumed *all* the green forage at Estremoz and Monte Mór o Novo, which was the cause of the inefficiency of the post horses on the great road from Lisbon to Elvas.

I cannot but observe in this complaint the desire which has been manifest for some time past to complain of the British troops, at the same time that the government are ready enough to avail themselves of their assistance to defend the country. I repeat what I have often said before, that no country can enjoy the advantage of a large army to defend it, without suffering some inconvenience.

If I am not mistaken, the complaint of the badness of the post horses on the great road originated with yourself; and you passed up to Elvas either before there were any *British* troops at Estremoz, or, at all events, at most a day after they had arrived there. It is therefore not true that the badness of the post horses on the road is to be attributed to the consumption of *all* the green forage by the *British* troops. It is not true that there have been any *British* troops at Monte Mór o Novo.

Memorandum for Lieut. Piper, R.E.

22d March, 1812.

1. The pontoon bridge to be taken up and brought to this side of the river. A report to be made as soon as possible of the damage received.

* * * * *

2. The stage on the right of the river for the flying bridge to be replaced as soon as possible. That part of the stage on the left of the river, which is not necessary, to be taken up.

3. At all events, the planks on both stages to be taken up during the night.

4. Lieut. Piper to report whether it will be necessary to place pontoons on each side of the river to communicate with the flying bridge.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

The Sec. of State has sent me a copy of your dispatch to him, marked 'secret and confidential,' of the 25th Jan., and a copy of his dispatch to you, marked *secret*, of the 4th March, and has written me a letter on the 5th March, of which I enclose a copy to your Lordship.

The most essential object on which the troops under your command could be employed on the eastern coast of Spain would be the siege of Barcelona, or, if that could not be undertaken, the siege of Tarragona, in order to give Gen. Lacy a point of communication with the fleet. I am not very well acquainted with the state of affairs on the eastern coast. I believe, however, that Barcelona is a place of the first order, but very insufficiently garrisoned, by only 5000 men. This force, indeed, is considered only sufficient to keep the population of the city in order. In forming a plan for attacking a strong place, it will not answer to reckon upon the exertions of the population within against the garrison, at the same time that the inclination of such a population as there is at Barcelona must not be thrown aside entirely.

Upon the whole, however, I should doubt the sufficiency of your Lordship's force, even with the assistance which Gen. Lacy and Adm. Sir E. Pellew could give, to undertake such an operation as the siege of Barcelona. It may be depended upon that the enemy will make every effort to relieve the place; and I doubt the possibility of your being able to effect your object with such a force as you will have against so formidable a place, even weakly garrisoned, before the enemy will have time to come to its relief.

You are certainly much more equal to the attack of Tarragona, which is garrisoned, I believe, by 2000 men; and it is not, I understand, a place of great strength.

In considering and deciding on this subject, I request you to observe, that if you should attempt and fail at Barcelona, you will not be able afterwards to attack Tarragona. On the other hand, if you should succeed at Tarragona, your success will end there, as you may depend upon it that the enemy will immediately collect a superior force in Catalonia.

I don't recommend any operation to you in Valencia, as your success in Catalonia, and possibly even your landing upon the coast of that principality, will occasion the evacuation of Valencia. There would be no difficulty in seizing the city of Valencia at any time, even if you should fail at Barcelona or Tarragona. I don't believe that any of the fortified posts on the coast of Valencia are of a nature to make a vigorous or protracted resistance against an attack by 10,000 men, well equipped with cannon.

The great object in all sieges is to gain time. The preparation and collection of materials for a siege necessarily take many days, which might be employed in carrying on the operations, if those materials were collected and prepared beforehand.

Whatever may be the point which you may determine to attack, it is obvious that you must reach it by sea, and there can be no inconvenience in transporting with you all the materials which you may require. I would therefore recommend to your Lordship to send an officer of engineers, at an early period in the summer, to Minorca or Majorca, in

order to prepare large quantities of fascines and gabions, sand bags, platforms, &c., which you should bring with you. Intrenching tools you will of course bring from Sicily or Malta; and I conclude that you will depend upon the fleet for ordnance and stores.

In all the sieges which I have carried on in this country, I have used only the fire of guns, principally from entertaining an opinion that the fire of mortars and howitzers has an effect upon the inhabitants of a town alone, and that a French garrison, in a Spanish or Portuguese town, would be but little likely to attend to the wishes or feelings of its inhabitants. By this measure I have diminished considerably the expence and difficulty of these operations: and, at all events, whether successful or not, I have done no injury to the Spanish or Portuguese inhabitants. If your Lordship should be inclined to try the effect of a bombardment, I imagine that it will be necessary that you should bring the ordnance and stores for it from Sicily or Malta.

In regard to my own operations, I invested this place on the 16th inst., and I expect to be able to open our fire against it to-morrow. I hope that I shall succeed in taking it, notwithstanding the badness of the weather, as I think the enemy cannot collect in time a force sufficient to oblige me to raise the siege. If I should succeed, much will depend upon the plan adopted by the enemy. Marmont appears inclined to carry on operations to the northward, and I may be obliged to remove the army again to that quarter. My wish is to oblige Soult to evacuate Andalusia, which I should effect if I could be sure of the Spaniards holding their ground in Galicia.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812, 11 A.M.

The river yesterday did us so much mischief, that we cannot commence our fire till to-morrow morning.

Gen. D'Urban arrived here in the night with your letter, and it appears to me to be very uncertain where Drouet is. It is obvious from the intercepted letters which you transmitted, that he wishes to protect the communication with Cordova; and I think it probable that if he has collected a force upon Don Benito, it is with a view to protect the junction of Foy by the bridge of Medellin. I believe that Foy intended to pass the Guadiana by the Barca at Castil-blanco, but the swelling of the river, which has been so troublesome to us, will probably oblige him to come by Medellin; still, we cannot prevent, although we may delay the junction, which is a very great object for several reasons.

We are not within 20,000 men so strong on the left of the Guadiana as we ought to be; the troops are arrived and arriving every day, but unfortunately our bridge was carried away the day before yesterday. I had directed that the planks and bearers might be taken off every night, and we have saved every thing, and in two days it will be as good as ever; but if the river should continue in its present state, and the bad weather should continue, we cannot be certain of passing by our standing bridge, and I have therefore ordered the troops to commence their march by Merida. This will take some days, and it would be desirable to gain a few days for this object only, as well as for others. If the Guadiana

should fall, and I can put down the bridge, the troops will lose nothing by marching up the right of the river. On this ground, therefore, I think it desirable that an effort should be made to remove Drouet, Daricaud, &c., from Zalamea, Don Benito, &c. I don't think there is any thing to be apprehended from the high road to Seville, as it is obvious that every thing coming from the south will pass by one of the roads from Cordova.

Upon talking over roads and distances with Gen. D'Urban, it appears to me that the cavalry, and your right divisions, should arrive at Zalamea and Quintana on the day that your left division, from Almendralejo, should arrive at Oliva, and Gen. Hill at Medellin; Sir R. Hill should send a regiment of cavalry to Gen. Clinton, to look out in his front, and enable him to communicate with his right and left. We shall thus force the enemy back from the best communication across the Guadiana, and from the communication with Soult, and we shall gain some time at all events. It must be observed, however, that we cannot long maintain the position which we shall thus have assumed, as Soult will be on the right flank certainly, and, if he chooses, on the rear of your troops.

I shall either send Gen. Hill a copy of this letter, or write to him to the same purport; and if you should not hear of any movement of Soult's, which would render it inexpedient to undertake this operation, I request you to let Gen. Hill know when you move, in order that he may regulate his movements accordingly. I am not certain whether Sir R. Hill could move upon Medellin by the left of the Guadiana; if he could it would give more security to the whole operation, but I should doubt his being able to make the march at this season.

I have letters from — of the 21st, and from Salamanca of the 20th, but there is nothing new; they talk of Marmont going to Avila on the 22d.

P.S. I have received a letter of the 21st from Lieut. Blanckley, from Truxillo, who states that Foy is at Castil-blanco, and that the enemy had left Don Benito.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812, 5 P.M.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote this morning to Gen. Sir T. Graham, on a plan for obliging the enemy to retire upon Zalamea, Don Benito, &c. I shall be much obliged to you if you will be ready to march in execution of this plan when you shall hear from Sir T. Graham.

I should prefer your going to Medellin by the south of the Guadiana, if you can. If you cannot, you must go by the north of that river. As well as I recollect, we marched the distance in one march; but I believe it is 6 leagues.

To Don Carlos de España.

Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters to the 21st inst.

It appears to me to be quite impossible for the enemy to make any impression upon Ciudad Rodrigo without the assistance of a battering train, if there should be 3000 men in the place determined to defend themselves. As the pressing inconvenience and danger now is the want of

provisions, I would recommend to you to withdraw 1000 of the 4000 men you state, in your letter of the 20th, to be in the place, leaving 3000 men, upon which I always calculated. If you have had as bad weather as we have had, I conceive the blockade to be now out of the question.

I beg to refer you to what I had the honor of telling you in repeated conversations, and particularly in my letter of the 5th inst., regarding the navigation of the Douro above S. João da Pesqueira. I beg leave to recall to your Excellency's recollection, that I requested that the 24 pound British shot in Ciudad Rodrigo might be sent to Almeida, by the empty carriages going to S. João da Pesqueira for provisions, so that the removal of this shot ought not to have caused any delay in throwing provisions into the place.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

I enclose my last dispatch to the Sec. of State, to which I have but little to add, excepting that the rain has been almost constant, and has done us a good deal of mischief. We shall, however, open our fire tomorrow.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copies of a correspondence between Don Carlos de España and myself, regarding the want of provisions in Ciudad Rodrigo,* which I beg you will bring under the notice of the Spanish government.

I imagine that the difference between Don Carlos' account of provisions delivered to the garrison by the British Commissariat, and mine, is occasioned principally by the difference between the Spanish and English pound. I observe, however, that some provisions have been delivered to the garrison (those from Guinaldo for instance), of which I was not aware.

Memorandum for the Chief Engineer, the Commanding officer of artillery, and Q.M.G.
26th March, 1812.

1. Lieut. Piper to be desired to supply 6 pontoons as row boats near the flying bridge, to carry over principally powder and shot.

2. Care must be taken that they are not overloaded; not more than forty 24 pound shot to be put in each, or an equal quantity or weight of powder.

3. Plank must be placed in the bottom, and the lower part of the sides should have a plank in order to prevent the shot from rolling against them and making holes.

* See letter dated Freneda, 12th Feb. 1812.

G. O.

Camp before Badajoz, 25th March, 1812.

Fifty men having been sent to the hospital at Abrantes, under charge of serj. major —, of the — regt., without either ticket of admission or returns of necessaries; and these men having been received from Assist. Surgeon —, of the — regt., a particular report of the cause of this breach of the G. O. of 17th Dec. 1809 (No. 3), is desired by the Commander of the Forces.

G. O.

Camp before Badajoz, 26th March, 1812.

1. The following officers have been permitted by the Commander of the Forces to act as engineers at the siege of Badajoz, and are to report themselves accordingly to the Commanding officer of engineers in camp.

4. The pontoons must not be used as passage boats.
5. Lieut. Piper to be requested to mention in his report whether he has bullocks in sufficient numbers, and in good order, to move the bridge.

To Major Gen. ———.

Camp before Badajoz, 26th March, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 22d, and have one of the 23d from Don Carlos de España, from which I learn that every thing was still quiet on the Tormes, &c.

In regard to your supplies of corn, &c., I refer your letter to the Commissary Gen. He left money for the supply of your regiment, and there is still some corn in the magazine at S. João da Pesqueira, and your march is, I understand, provided for.

You have acted your part very well, and I should think that by this time the enemy must know what is going on here. Don Carlos however tells me that he expects a convoy with provisions to arrive in Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th; and it is desirable that, if possible, you should not quit your station.

We took the outwork called La Picurina last night, by storm, and we are established within 300 yards of the body of the place.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

26th March, 1812.

Col. Darroch having reported that the foreign recruits have embarked and sailed without their accounts being settled, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that this should not have been permitted, as it will entail a long correspondence from England.

To Major Gen. ———.

Camp before Badajoz, 27th March, 1812.

I have received your letter of 3 P.M., 24th inst.

If the enemy move to reconnoitre Ciudad Rodrigo, you may depend upon it that they know that I am gone, and what we are doing; and there is no reason why you should stay any longer, and you might carry into execution my instructions of the 5th inst.

I wish you, however, to advert to what I wrote to you yesterday; and it is very desirable that you should endeavor to have the provisions now on the road, and expected at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th inst., introduced into the place before you quit that part of the country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 27th March, 1812.

The operations of the siege of Badajoz have continued since I addressed you on the 20th inst., notwithstanding the badness of the weather, till the 25th inst. On that day we opened our fire from 28 pieces of ordnance, in 6 batteries in the first parallel, 2 of which were intended to fire upon the outwork called La Picurina, and the other 4 to enfilade or destroy the defences of the fort on the side attacked. I directed Major Gen. Kempt, who commanded in the trenches on that afternoon, to attack La Picurina by storm, after it was dark that night, which service he effected in the most judicious and gallant manner.

The attack was made by 500 men of the 3d division, formed into 3 detachments, the right under the command of Major Shaw, of the 74th, the centre under Capt. the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83d, and the left under

Major Rudd, of the 77th. The communication between the outwork and the body of the place was entered on its right and left by the right and left detachments, each consisting of 200 men; half of each which detachments protected the attack from sallies from the fort, while the others attacked the work in its gorge. It was first entered, however, by the centre detachment of 100 men, under the command of Capt. the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83d regt., who escalated the work at the salient angle, at a point at which the palisades had been injured by our fire. The detachment which attacked the work by the gorge had the most serious difficulties to contend with, as it was closed by not less than 3 rows of palisades, defended by musketry, and a place of arms for the garrison, musket proof, and loopholed throughout. When the attack upon the salient angle, however, succeeded, the whole got into the work.

The enemy's garrison in the outwork consisted of 250 men, with 7 pieces of artillery, under the command of Col. Gaspard Thierry, of the Etat Major of the army of the south. But very few if any escaped: the Colonel, 3 other officers, and 86 men have been taken prisoners, and the remainder were either killed by the fire of our troops or drowned in the inundation of the river Rivillas. The enemy made a sortie from the ravelin called San Roque, either with a view to recover La Picurina, or to protect the retreat of the garrison, but they were immediately driven in by the detachment stationed in the communication to protect the attack.

Major Gen. Kempt mentions in high terms in his report the cool and persevering gallantry of the officers and troops; of which indeed the strength of the work which they carried affords the best proof. He particularly mentions Lieut. Col. Hardinge, of the Staff of the Portuguese army, who attended him on this occasion, Capt. Burnet, his aide de camp, and Brig. Major Wilde, who was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot, after the work was in our possession. Likewise Capt. Holloway, Lieuts. Gipps and Stanway, of the Royal Engineers, who conducted the several detachments to the points of attack; and Majors Shaw and Rudd, and Capt. the Hon. H. Powys, who commanded the several detachments: these 3 officers were wounded, the latter on the parapet of the work, which he had been the first to mount by the ladders.* I have to add to this account the high sense I entertain of the judicious manner and the gallantry with which Major Gen. Kempt carried into execution the service which I had entrusted to him. We thus established ourselves in La Picurina on the night of the 25th, and opened the second parallel within 300 yards of the body of the place, in which batteries were commenced last night.

It is impossible that I can do justice to the zeal, activity, and indefatigable labor of the officers and soldiers, with which these operations have been carried on in the most unfavorable weather. The Guadiana swelled so considerably that, notwithstanding all precautions, our bridge of pontoons was carried away on the 22d inst., and the flying bridges were so much injured as almost to become useless. But still the operations have been carried on without interruption.

I cannot, however, avoid taking this opportunity of calling the attention

* He died of his wounds.

of your Lordship and of His Majesty's government to the neglect of the Portuguese authorities to furnish the means of transport necessary for the success of this or any other operation. My own anxiety, and the detail into which I am obliged to enter in order to find resources to overcome difficulties which occur at every moment, I put out of the question, although I believe no officer at the head of an army was ever so hampered, and it is desirable that the attention of one in that situation should be turned to other objects. But the serious inconveniences to which the troops are exposed, and the difficulties and risks which attend the execution of all services, for want of means of transport, become of such a magnitude, that no officer can venture to be responsible for them. If there was any want of means of transport in the country I should not complain, but I know there is no want; and I attribute the deficiency entirely to the defect of the Portuguese law upon the subject, and to the unwillingness of the magistrates to carry it into execution. In every country the supply of carriages for the service of the army is an obligation upon the owners of carriages; and I have repeatedly urged the Portuguese government to frame a law upon the subject, with sufficient penalties to insure obedience to it, and that the army should have means of transport. Instead of doing that, the object of the law lately made by the government would appear to be to prevent the army from getting carriages, and the consequence is that every service becomes a matter of difficulty and risk; and as the carriages of the poor alone are forced into the service by the magistrates, they suffer all the hardships which result from the law.

I had intended to commence the operations against Badajoz between the 6th and 8th March, and all the arrangements were made accordingly; but because the large and rich town of Evora, which has suffered in no manner by the war, would supply no carriages, I could not commence till the 17th, and thus the troops have been exposed to, and have been obliged to carry on the works of the siege during the rains of the equinox, which I had intended to avoid. At this moment the powder for the siege, and much of the shot, and many of the engineers' stores, are not arrived at Elvas, and we are obliged to consume the stores of that garrison. I am destroying the equipments of the army in transporting the stores from Elvas to the ground of the siege, because no assistance is given by the country, or assistance that is quite inadequate to the demand and wants of the service.

I hope that His Majesty's government will exert their influence with the Prince Regent of Portugal, to order the Local Government not only to frame a law which shall have for its object the equipment of the armies in such a manner as to enable them to defend the country, but to carry that law into execution, so that the people of the country shall understand that they must comply with its provisions.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 20th, Gen. Drouet has had his troops on the line between Medellin on the Guadiana, and Zalamea de la Serena and Llerena, apparently with the view of keeping the communication open between the army of the south and the divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*' stationed on the Tagus. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham

made a movement to Llerena on the 25th at night, but the enemy, consisting of 3 battalions of infantry and 2 regiments of cavalry, which were there, having heard of his march, retired into the mountains during the night. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill has likewise sent a detachment to La Guareña, and proposed to march himself this morning upon Medellin, in order to co-operate with Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham in obliging the enemy to remove to a greater distance, and to endeavor to destroy some of their detached corps.

The divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*' which were in Castille, and those which have lately marched thither, have not yet moved, and the object of their movement is still doubtful. It is understood to be to attempt a *coup de main* upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or to blockade the place. But I consider the success of the former impracticable, and that the latter is equally so at present, as the rain, which has been general, has filled all the rivers in that part of the country.

I am sorry to say that the Spanish authorities have neglected to transport to Ciudad Rodrigo the provisions which I had given them from the British magazine at S. João da Pesqueira, and a part of these provisions only will arrive at that place on the 30th of this month. The place has now, therefore, in it only one month's provisions for the garrison, which I had been able to give them from the stores of the army before I quitted Castille. I have transmitted to Mr. Wellesley, for the information of the Spanish government, the copies of the correspondence which I have had with Don Carlos de España on this subject, in which His Majesty's government will see the measures which I had adopted to secure this important place, and the state in which it is at present.

I have not heard from any authority that the troops have yet moved in the south, but it is reported that those at Seville had marched upon Cordova, to which point I understand that those at Granada had been brought.

P.S. I enclose the return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 18th inst. [*Included afterwards in the General return at p. 581.*]

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 28th March, 1812.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday, and a paper directed to you from Madrid, which is well worth reading, and indeed ought to be sent home. It came to me open from the Spanish General at Plasencia, who informed me that the person who brought it lost his Spanish passport.

We are going on well, and shall open our fire from 35 pieces of artillery, *en brèche*, on the morning of the 31st.

The man who brought the enclosed papers having expressed a desire to return to Madrid, I have given him 150 dollars and a receipt for them, and desired him to return.

Some of my friends in Castille have desired me to remonstrate against the ———'s appointment to be Captain General of that province. I believe he is a very bad fellow.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Camp before Badajoz, 28th March, 1812.

When I received your letter of the 27th Sept. 1811, in which you announced to me that the committee for the management of the money

raised in Great Britain and Ireland by subscription, for the relief of the suffering Portuguese, had determined to place the sum of 15,000 dollars at my disposal for the relief of the people inhabiting the country on the banks of the Coa and Pinhel rivers, I employed the Rev. S. Briscall, the chaplain to head quarters, and the chaplains to the several divisions of the army, to make inquiries regarding the state of the people in the neighbourhood of the cantonments occupied by the troops, to which these gentlemen were attached, in order to enable me to form a judgment regarding the best mode of laying out the money with which I had been entrusted for the benefit of the people. Mr. Briscall was unfortunately taken ill before he had completed his task, but not before he and the other gentlemen had made reports which, at the same time that they showed the general distress of the district, proved that no information could be obtained, according to which a distribution of the money could be made, which would satisfy my mind that I had done that which was most beneficial to the people.

I am sorry to say that I could not get from the curates of the villages, the fair source of information regarding the distresses of the poor, any account of the number in real distress, or a list of the names. All had suffered from the invasion, but not equally. The distinction of rich and poor still remained, and the former, although in a reduced state, possessed generally means of subsistence and to improve their situation, while the latter were really in want. Yet I am concerned to add that the rich in every village insisted upon their names being inserted in the list of distressed persons, in order to participate equally with the poor in the distribution of money or food; and the curates of the villages were apprehensive of the consequences of resisting these unreasonable pretensions; and the lists of the persons in absolute want furnished by the curates, were lists of the inhabitants of the villages. It would have been impossible for me to attempt to distribute the money excepting through the medium of the curates, and it was quite clear that the sum distributed to the whole population in equal proportions, would have relieved the distresses of none.

Under these circumstances I had at one time determined to return the money to the committee, to which determination I was further induced, from observing that the people were likely to overcome the distress of the winter by attending the troops in their cantonments with various articles for sale, by which they gained a subsistence, much more beneficial to them than any which charity might give them.

Nearly about this time (in the end of October) I had an interview with the Bishop of Pinhel, and having mentioned to him the difficulties which I met with in distributing the money in question, and an idea which I had of returning it to the committee, or of purchasing cattle with it, to be afterwards distributed to the people, he entirely concurred with me regarding the impossibility of distributing the money in a satisfactory manner, so as to be of use to any body; and he observed that it was not then wanted, as the people gained much from the troops, and he earnestly recommended that I should adopt the measure which I had in contemplation, and that I should buy cattle to be distributed to the people in March.

I determined accordingly to carry that plan into execution, and I enclose the account of the purchase of 276 bullocks, and the receipts for that number by the vicar general of Pinhel. I likewise enclose the distribution of 200 dollars which I gave to Gen. Pack, to be divided among the inhabitants of Freixo and the neighbouring villages, when the troops commanded by him had quitted the villages, and the people had no longer the means of gaining a livelihood by supplying the troops with what they wanted.

I likewise enclose a copy of the paper given to the Bishop of Pinhel, containing the plan according to which the bullocks are to be distributed to the villages of the district. In adopting this plan I also acted in communication with the Bishop. I was informed that the temptation of a large price had induced many to whom the bullocks had been given to sell them, and the Bishop concurred with me in opinion that the plan which I proposed, and which is detailed in the enclosed paper, would be more likely to promote the renewal of industry and agriculture throughout the district than any other; at the same time that if those entitled to the use of the bullocks should not be in possession of seed corn, or should not be inclined to make use of them, they would acquire a profit by selling their right to the use of the bullocks to the more wealthy proprietors.

I beg you to lay this letter and the enclosed papers before the committee.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 29th March, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose some letters which I have just received from my brother, from which you will see that Soult broke up from before Cadiz on the 23d and 24th, and commenced collecting his troops upon Seville. It is probable that the corps from thence will march upon Guadalcanal, in order to communicate with or join Drouet. It is very desirable that you should come back to Villa Franca, Zafra, &c., keeping your cavalry out in front; and that Sir R. Hill should come to Merida. I write to him immediately to request him to fall back.

The troops will commence crossing the river to-morrow morning.

I have received your letter of 6 P.M. of the 27th.

P.S. I don't send the enclosures of these letters, as I have not yet read them.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 29th March, 1812, 9 A.M.

I received this morning your letter of the 28th, 10 A.M.

I have this morning received letters from Cadiz to the 24th, at night. Soult broke up before that place on the 23d and 24th, and commenced collecting his force at Seville. He may therefore be expected shortly in Estremadura, probably by Guadalcanal.

I have written this intelligence to Gen. Graham, and have requested him to fall back upon Villa Franca and Zafra. I think you had better bring the troops which you have at Medellin and Don Benito to Guareña, and fall back thence on Merida, on the day that Gen. Graham's troops will fall back on Villa Franca and Zafra.

I have not heard from Sir T. Graham since the 27th in the evening. He was then at Valencia de las Torres, and his infantry at Maguilla.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 30th March, 1812.

I have received your letters to the 24th, and some from Gen. Cooke; among others one of the 14th, detailing the proceedings of a Junta of Generals, of which Gen. Cooke is one. I don't at all like that arrangement.

1st; I don't think it proper to communicate my intentions and plans to a Junta of Spanish Generals, of whom the ——— is one. If I don't communicate my plans to them, all their deliberations must be nugatory.

2dly; I don't think it very proper or consistent with the principles of military subordination, that Gen. Cooke, who is under my command, should canvass, at a Junta of Generals, military operations directed by me.

I don't know of what use the Junta is, excepting to endeavor, by a side wind, to obtain the direction of the operations of this army, in which endeavor they may depend upon it they will not succeed. No power on earth shall induce me to take a step that I don't approve of; and the deliberations of the Junta must only afford fresh ground for dispute, and involve me in fresh discussions.

In their deliberations of the 5th March, I see that they interfered with the Portuguese army in Braganza, besides (as all councils of this description do) throwing doubts upon the operations recommended and fixed for Ballesteros. Then they manœuvre the army of Galicia, as usual, without having the slightest knowledge of local circumstances, or of the strength of the enemy, or of their own means and resources. This they have done in their meeting, reported on by Gen. Cooke in his letter of the 21st March, No. 59, besides in that of the 5th.

Gen. Castaños is the Commander in Chief of all the Spanish troops on this side of Spain; and it will appear by the papers which I have transmitted to you that he and I have considered every point referred to by the Junta, and have provided, as well as circumstances and the means and resources at our disposal would permit, for every event. Do the Junta propose to overturn what we have settled, or improve upon the arrangement which we have made, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances? Why then deliberate upon these points?

When I required the co-operation, although distant, of Gen. Ballesteros, I proposed the plan for it, through the King's Ambassador, according to the instructions which I have received, and the government agreed to the plan. Where then is the use of the deliberations of the Junta on this point? Where have they any room for deliberation?

I don't wish to send Gen. Cooke any orders not to attend the Junta, when you have desired him to attend; but I shall be obliged to you if you will let him discontinue his attendance quietly, and let matters get to their natural state.

We are going on well, and shall open our breaching batteries to-morrow.

P.S. I see by the accounts from Seville that the enemy have little there but *Civicos*; and I hope that Ballesteros will take advantage of their weakness.

In answer to your letter of the 15th, respecting the money in the

Standard, it would certainly be very desirable to me to have some of it; but as government disapproved of your retaining any before, I cannot desire that you should retain any now; but I shall write home on the subject, and you had better do the same.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 1st April, 1812, 8 A.M.

We opened our breaching batteries yesterday with great effect. The wall is a good one, however, and it will not be well breached probably till the evening of the 3d. In the mean time I hope to be able to get the better of the inundation, which hitherto has been very detrimental to us.

I have letters from — of the 29th, and from Salamanca of the 28th. The French cavalry were at Tamames on the 29th, and — — intended to move that night. Marmont was at Salamanca on the 28th, but it was expected that he would move on the following day. They have collected about 15 days' provisions, ladders, a bridge, &c., and I am inclined to believe they will attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. They have got one old 24 pounder, and some 12 pounders; and Longa, in a letter of the 4th, mentions that some troops had entered from Bayonne with 20 pieces of ordnance, of which 17 were 16 and 12 pounders, that is to say 18 and 14 pounders. We have no account of the arrival of these guns even at Valladolid; but in the letter from Salamanca of this morning, it is stated that they talk of the arrival of guns and troops from Burgos.

If Soult should move forward when your troops shall be in the stations mentioned in my letter of the 29th, I should wish you to collect them in the wood in front of the position at Albuera. I mean that Hill should remain at Merida as long as possible, in case Soult should prefer to endeavor to relieve the place by the right bank of the Guadiana. He would in that case retire upon Montijo if the enemy should be too strong for him; and I will have the bridge down between this and Talavera, in order to join him with the remainder of the army. If Soult should keep his troops collected on the left of the Guadiana, Hill would join on the left of the army by Lobon and Talavera. If he should be too late, and the enemy should be in possession of Lobon, he will always be able to pass by our bridge, which I shall move to the neighbourhood of Talavera, as soon as I find that Soult collects.

I have a letter from Lima without a date, in which he says, that, on the 20th, an aide de camp of Marmont's had come to Talavera de la Reyna, and had stated that Marmont was about to move his head quarters to Alfaiates, and that Suchet was to join Soult by forced marches. Indeed he said that he expected that Marmont was already at Alfaiates.

I believe that the rain which annoyed us so much here will turn out to have been our best friend, as it must have delayed the execution of all Marmont's schemes.

P.S. I shall send Hill a copy of this letter.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 1st April, 1812, 11 A.M.

Sir T. Graham received my letter of the 29th at 4 A.M. on the 30th, and probably commenced yesterday to carry into execution what I directed. He would of course write to you, as I sent him, with the duplicate, a copy

of the letter I wrote to you on the 29th. I now enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to Sir T. Graham this morning, giving an account of our state here and elsewhere, and making known to him my intentions.

I think it not improbable that Soult may endeavor to communicate with the place by the right of the Guadiana, when he shall find that we are so strong on the left of the river. If I should find this to be his intention, I shall reinforce our left to the degree that may be expedient, either with a part or the whole of our troops, for which I shall use every facility by placing our bridge below Talavera.

If you should find that all the enemy's troops manœuvre upon Villa Franca, &c., you will march from Merida upon Lobon, and thence on Talavera, so as to take your place on the left of the army. It would be desirable that you should destroy the bridge at Merida when you will leave the place, particularly if you should be certain of making your march on Lobon and Talavera.

If the enemy should pass the Guadiana with the whole or part of his army at Medellin, or if Foy's division or any other troops should remain on the right of the Guadiana, while the others will manœuvre on the left of the river, you will remain on the right of the Guadiana, and will fall back gradually, if you should find the enemy too strong for you, upon Montijo, taking advantage of any favorable ground to delay the enemy's advance. On leaving Merida, you will in this case also break the bridge.

If the uncertainty of the enemy's movements towards the right bank of the Guadiana should detain you at Merida so long as that you should entertain doubts of your being able to march by Lobon and Talavera to place yourself on the left of the army, you will in that case march by the right bank to the bridge of pontoons, which you will find fixed below Talavera. You will in this case also destroy the bridge of Merida when you shall leave that place.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Celorico.

1st April, 1812.

I have referred your letter, with the several enclosures from Col. Le Mesurier, and your answers thereto, to the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to desire that you will immediately order back serjeant — and the gunner. I am, moreover, to state to you from his Excellency, that if you send one man from Celorico upon any authority except what you may receive from head quarters, you will be acting in opposition to his orders, and you will be brought to trial before a General Court Martial. I regret to have thus strongly to express his Excellency's displeasure upon the subject of Col. Le Mesurier's application to you; and you will perceive that you are not called upon to attend to any orders but those conveyed to you by me from the Commander of the Forces, or sent from the head quarters of the army.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Camp before Badajoz, 2d April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 30th March, and I am much concerned that you should feel any uneasiness respecting my recent report to the British government on the want of means of transport for the army. I think it very likely that I did not trouble you upon the subject in the short time that I saw you at Elvas; but you must recollect that you were yourself detained at Elvas from the 6th, the day on which I had fixed to arrive there, till the 11th, when I did arrive, after staying 5 days longer in Castille than I had intended, in order to wait the arrival of the equipments

for the siege; and when I did arrive, I could not undertake any thing till the 16th, 5 days afterwards, for the same reason. The delay in the arrival of the equipments for the siege was to be attributed to the want of means of transport at Evora; and I have to add, that those equipments are not, to this moment, arrived for the same reason, and that I have been getting on in the best manner I could without them.

You seem to think that you are to blame for any defect of these regulations, or deficiency in their execution. I assure you there is nothing so far from my thoughts as a notion that you are in any, the most distant manner responsible for any act of the Portuguese government. All that you can do is to remonstrate, and point out what ought to be done. It remains for them to execute what you recommend to them.

In respect to the regulation for means of transport, I beg to refer to my letters upon the subject, and the regulation itself; and it will be seen that the object of the latter is to save the people of the country from the necessity of supplying the army, and that all the penalties recommended by me are omitted.

In respect to the execution of the regulation in this province, I enclose 2 letters which the Commissary Gen. put into my hands this morning, informing you at the same time that if I wanted 1000 carriages instead of 100, there ought to be no difficulty in procuring them.

The question is, are we to carry on the war, or are we not? If we are, the government must set their shoulders to the wheel.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 2d April, 1812.

Mr. Bissett has communicated to me a letter from the Commissary in Chief, from the perusal of which I am concerned to observe that the Treasury are not satisfied with him for having lately engaged, under the authority of my sanction, to receive a sum of 400,000 dollars, to be brought from Gibraltar, at the exchange of 5*s.* 8*d.* the dollar, the market rate at Lisbon being lower.

As this was not the first contract of this kind which I have sanctioned for Mr. Bissett, as well as Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Murray, I am only concerned that the Lords of the Treasury, who have invariably been made acquainted with these contracts, did not make known their disapprobation of them at an earlier period, as, if they had, I should not have sanctioned those offered for my consideration subsequent to the notification of the disapprobation of their Lordships. I can justify the measure adopted lately, and upon the former occasions, upon no other ground than necessity. I also thought that it was the wish of the Lords of the Treasury, and of government in general, that I should authorise the adoption of every measure that was practicable, in order to procure specie for the army; but it appears that I have been mistaken, and I hope that government will take measures to supply the deficiency which must exist in our funds from my refusal to sanction contracts of this description in future.

My brother has informed me that he expects the *Standard* at Cadiz from America with specie, on account of the British government, and he has desired to know whether he is to detain any of it for the use of the army, at the same time informing me that government had disapproved

of his detaining money at Cadiz upon a former occasion.. I beg to have your Lordship's directions upon this subject, as I have told my brother that I can't interfere with any directions given by the government. I at the same time beg to refer your Lordship to the various financial statements sent home by Mr. Bissett and by me, and to inform you that it is quite impossible that we can go on without money.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 3d April, 1812.

We opened our fire on the 31st March from 26 pieces of cannon in the second parallel, to breach the face of the bastion at the south east angle of the fort called La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion by which the face is defended, called S^{ta} Maria. The fire upon these has continued since with great effect.

The enemy made a sortie, on the night of the 29th, upon the troops of Gen. Hamilton's division, which invest the place on the right of the Guadiana, but were immediately driven in with loss. We lost no men on this occasion.

The movements of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham and of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill have obliged the enemy to retire by the different roads towards Cordova, with the exception of a small body of infantry and cavalry which remained at Zalamea de la Serena, in front of Belalcazar.

Marshal Soult broke up in front of Cadiz on the 23d and 24th, and has marched upon Seville with all the troops which were there, with the exception of 4000 men. I understand that he was to march from Seville again on the 30th or 31st; and I should think that by this time he has joined the troops under Drouet, by Constantina.

I have not heard from Castille since the 30th March. One division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which had been in the province of Avila, had on that day arrived at Guadapero, within 2 leagues of Ciudad Rodrigo, and it was supposed that Marmont was on his march with other troops from the side of Salamanca. I have not heard from thence since the 28th, on which day Marshal Marmont was there; but it was expected that he would march on the following day. The river Agueda was not fordable for troops on the 30th. The enemy will certainly reconnoitre Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida when the Agueda shall fall; and they will probably attack the former if they should be in possession of heavy cannon and other means to enable them to carry on their attack, which I doubt. I am very apprehensive, however, that I shall be obliged to return to that part of the country, in order to insure the safety of those places, as soon as I shall have brought to a close the operations which I have now in hand.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 3d April, 1812.

I enclose the answer which I have received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, on the reference made to him by your Lordship's desire, respecting the value of the spherical case shot called 'Shrapnel's shells.'

Since I wrote to your Lordship on that subject, I have heard that they have been very destructive to the enemy in Badajoz, when thrown from 24 pounder carronades; and I have directed that some of them may be loaded with musket balls, in order to remedy what I have reason to believe

is a material defect in these shells, viz., that the wounds which they inflict don't disable the person who receives them, even for the action in which they are received.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Camp before Badajoz, 4th April, 1812, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 10 P.M.

I hear from Sir T. Graham, and indeed the intelligence which I before received induced me to believe, that Soult would arrive at Llerena this day, and all accounts appear to agree that all the troops which he has are collected on that point, and that there are none moving towards Merida.

Although I am prepared to send my bridge to Talavera, it would be more convenient not to move it from the place at which it is; and as the enemy have collected, and appear to intend to act on the southern side of the Guadiana, I am desirous that you should be better prepared than you are to place yourself on our left flank.

If Soult shall intend to fight a battle, he will certainly advance immediately, and we may expect that he will be on the Albuera on the 7th; and, under those circumstances, I am anxious that, on to-morrow evening, you should move your corps to Arroyo de San Servan, Calamonte, and the woods to the south of the Guadiana, and your cavalry looking out on the roads to Almendralejo and Zafra. By this measure you will be quite ready for a start whenever you will find that Soult passes the high road from Seville to Merida, and that nothing is moving on that town.

I hope to be able to attack the place to-morrow night. As for the redoubts, destroy them if you can with convenience; but the French don't seem to care much about them, nor do I.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 4th April, 1812.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday.

I likewise send a letter for the Secretary in the War department from Don Carlos de España, which will inform the government how things were at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 31st March. I have since received a letter of the 1st April, from which I learn that a party of dragoons had crossed the ford of the Agueda above Ciudad Rodrigo on that day, and Don Carlos de España had removed to Gallegos. The convoy, which was expected on the 30th, only arrived on the 31st near Almeida. Thus, by '*mañana*,' the Spaniards will lose that place again, unless I should go with the whole army to its assistance; and they will lose a great part of the benefit which they would derive from the success of our operations here.

We are getting on well; and I hope that this night, or to-morrow, we shall be ready to attempt to take the place by storm.

I have received your letters of the 28th. I shall be much obliged to you if you will tell Gen. O'Donell that I will do every thing in my power to get his brother exchanged; but I enclose the copy of a letter, which will show the result of an attempt which I made to get Gen. Herrasti exchanged for Gen. Renaud.

P.S. I find that the letter from Don Carlos de España to the Minister at War has been lost. I likewise find that I sent to Castaños the letter

respecting the exchange of Herrasti; but it will be returned, or I shall get a duplicate of it, which I will send to you.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 4th April, 1812.

I enclose a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State, conveying to me the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to accept the honor recently conferred upon me by the Regency and Cortes of Spain.*

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of informing the Spanish government that I accept the honor conferred upon me, and of again expressing my gratitude for it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Camp before Badajoz, 5th April, 1812, noon.

I received your letter of 2 P.M. yesterday. If Foy remains in his position at Alia, &c., that is, if you should not receive any positive intelligence of his moving along the right of the Guadiana, before you will be required to move to Lobon, &c., in consequence of Soult's movements, there is no occasion for your leaving any body at Merida. If Foy should be moving along the right of the Guadiana, when you shall receive intelligence of Soult's movements, I don't think it would be necessary for you to stay with your whole corps at Merida. Gen. Howard might stay with one British, and Col. Ashworth's brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery. Of course he would not destroy the bridge till the last moment; and if you should determine to march upon Lobon, you will not destroy the bridge till the last of your troops shall come away. Tell the Alcalde, or Corregidor, that if we destroy the bridge, I shall render it passable again for them; that it is to answer a military purpose, and must be done if necessary.

I have not yet heard of Soult's arrival at Llerena, yesterday.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Camp before Badajoz, 6th April, 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that I approve of your discharging 5 serjeants from the 87th regt., according to the request of Col. Doyle, in order that they may be appointed to commissions in the Spanish service.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp before Badajoz, 6th April, 1812

Alava delivered to me yesterday evening your letters of the 30th March and — April.

I congratulate you upon being made a Knight of the Bath. You must be introduced by a Knight of some Order to the person who is to invest you, carrying in your hand the insignia of the Order. The authority to invest you is then read; and the person who is to invest you must knight you by passing his sword over your shoulder. He then puts the riband over your right shoulder, and the star on your left breast. The ceremony here generally ends in eating and drinking, &c. &c.

I have no objection to the delay in sending the garrison to Tarifa till matters shall be settled here; and it will be expedient that Ballesteros should return.

* The title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, and a Grandee of Spain. See Appendix, No. XIX.

Memorandum for the attack of Badajoz.

(The parts in the smaller print are alterations and explanations afterwards made by the Earl of Wellington.)

Camp, 6th April, 1812.

1. The Fort of Badajoz is to be attacked at 10 o'clock this night.*
2. The attack must be made on three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria.
3. The attack of the castle to be by escalade; that of the two bastions by the storm of the breaches.
4. The troops for the storm of the castle, consisting of the 3d division of infantry, should move out from the right of the first parallel at a little before 10 o'clock, but not to attack till 10 o'clock.
5. They should cross the river Rivillas below the broken bridge over that river, and attack that part of the castle which is on the right, looking from the trenches and in the rear of the great battery constructed by the enemy to fire on the bastion of La Trinidad.
6. Having arrived within the castle, and having secured the possession of it, parties must be sent to the left along the rampart, to fall on the rear of those defending the great breach, in the bastion of La Trinidad, and to communicate with the right of the attack on that bastion.

It is recommended that the attack of the 3d division should be kept clear of the bastion of San Antonio, at least till the castle which is above and commands that bastion shall be carried.

7. The troops for this attack must have all the long ladders in the engineers' park, and 6 of the lengths of the engineers' ladders. They must be attended by 12 carpenters with axes, and by 6 miners with crow-bars, &c.
8. The 4th division, with the exception of the covering party in the trenches, must make the attack on the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the Light division on the flank of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria.
9. These two divisions must parade in close columns of divisions at 9 o'clock. The Light division with the left in front; the 4th division with its advanced guard, with the left in front; the remainder with the right in front. The 4th division must be on the right of the little stream, near the piquet of the 4th division, and the Light division must have the river on their right.

This arrangement of the columns is made in order that the Light division may extend along the ramparts to the left; and that the 4th division, with the exception of the advanced guard, which is to communicate by its left with the Light division, might extend along the ramparts to the right. It may be necessary, however, for these two divisions mutually to support each other, and attention must in this case be paid to the formations.

10. The Light division must throw 100 men forward into the quarries, close to the covered-way of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria, who, as soon as the garrison are disturbed, must keep down by their fire the fire from the face of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria, and that from the covered-way.

* The hour originally named was 7½, being immediately after dusk; but it was subsequently changed to 10, in consequence of the arrangements being found to require that delay. The garrison took advantage of the interval between the breaching batteries ceasing to batter, and the commencement of the assault, to cover the front of the breaches with harrows and crow's-feet, and to fix a chevaux-de-frise of sword blades on their summits.

11. The advance of both divisions must consist of 500 men from each, attended by 12 ladders; and the men of the storming party should carry sacks filled with light materials, to be thrown into the ditch, to enable the troops to descend into it. Care must be taken that these bags are *not* thrown into the covered-way.

12. The advance of the Light division must precede that of the 4th division; and both must keep as near the inundation as they possibly can.

13. The advance of both divisions must be formed into firing parties and storming parties. The firing parties must be spread along the crest of the glacis, to keep down the fire of the enemy; while the men of the storming party, who carry bags, will enter the covered-way at the *place d'armes*, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad; those attached to the 4th division on its right, those to the Light division on its left, looking from the trenches or the camp.

No. 13 will run thus: after the words 'while the men of the storming party who carry bags will enter the covered-way,' insert, 'those of the Light division, at the *place d'armes* on the left, looking from camp, of the unfinished ravelin; those of the 4th division, on the right of that ravelin, at the *place d'armes* under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad.'

14. The storming party of the advance of the Light division will then descend into the ditch, and turning to its left, storm the breach in the flank of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria, while the storming party of the 4th division will likewise descend into the ditch, and storm the breach in the face of the bastion of La Trinidad. The firing parties are to follow immediately in the rear of their respective storming parties.

Major Gen. Colville will observe that a part of the advance of the 4th division must be allotted to storm the new breach in the curtain.

15. The heads of the two divisions will follow their advanced guards, keeping nearly together; but they will not advance beyond the shelter afforded by the quarries on the left of the road, till they shall have seen the heads of the advanced guards ascend the breaches: they will then move forward to the storm in double quick time.

The place here pointed out may be too distant. The heads of the columns should be brought as near as they can without being exposed to fire.

16. If the Light division should find the bastion of S^{ta} Maria entrenched, they will turn the right of the entrenchment, by moving along the parapet of the bastion. The 4th division will do the same by an entrenchment which appears in the left face, looking from the trenches of the bastion of La Trinidad.

17. The Light division, as soon as they are in possession of the rampart of S^{ta} Maria, are to turn to their left, and to proceed along the rampart to their left, keeping always a reserve at the breach.

18. The advanced guard of the 4th division are to turn to their left, and to keep up the communication with the Light division. The 4th division are to turn to their right, and to communicate with the 3d division, by the bastion of San Pedro, and the demi-bastion of San Antonio, taking care to keep a reserve at the bastion of La Trinidad.

19. Each (the 4th and Light) division must leave 1000 men in reserve in the quarries.

It will be necessary for the Commanding officer of the Light division to attend to the ditch on his left as he makes his attack. He should post a detachment in the ditch towards the salient angle of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria, so as to be covered by the angle from the fire of the next bastion on its left, looking from the trenches.

20. The 4th division must endeavor to get open the gate of La Trinidad; the Light division must do the same by the gate called Puerta del Pilar.

21. The soldiers must leave their knapsacks in camp.

22. In order to aid these operations, the howitzers in No. 4 are to open a fire upon the batteries constructed by the enemy to fire upon the breach, as soon as the officers shall observe that the enemy are aware of the attack, which they must continue till they see that the 3d division are in possession of the castle.

Some signal must be arranged between the Commanding officer of the artillery and the officer who shall command the attack on the castle, for ceasing the fire in No. 4.

23. The Commanding officer in the trenches is to attack the ravelin of San Roque with 200 of the covering party, moving from the right of the second parallel, and round the right of the ravelin, looking from the trenches, and attacking the barriers and gates of communication between the ravelin and the bridge; while 200 men likewise of the covering party will rush from the right of the sap into the salient angle of the covered-way of the ravelin, and keep up a fire on its faces. These last should not advance from the sap, till the party to attack the gorge of the ravelin shall have turned it. That which will move into the covered-way on the right of the ravelin looking from the trenches, ought not to proceed further down than the angle formed by the face and the flank.

It would be better that this attack should move from the right of the sap. The Commanding officer in the trenches must begin it as soon as he shall observe that the attack of the 3d division on the castle is perceived by the enemy.

24. The remainder of the covering party to be a reserve in the trenches. The working parties in the trenches are to join their regiments at 7½ o'clock. 12 carpenters with axes, and 10 miners with crowbars, must be with each (the 4th and Light) division. A party of one officer and 20 artillerymen must be with each division.

25. The 5th division must be formed, one brigade on the ground occupied by the 48th regt.; one brigade on the Sierra del Viento; and one brigade in the low grounds extending to the Guadiana, now occupied by the piquets of the Light division.

26. The piquets of the brigades on the Sierra del Viento, and that in the low grounds towards the Guadiana, should endeavor to alarm the enemy during the attack by firing at the Pardaleras, and at the men in the covered-way of the works towards the Guadiana.

A plan has been settled with Lieut. Gen. Leith, for an attempt to be made to escalate the bastion of San Vicente, or the curtain between that bastion and the bridge, if circumstances should permit. The Commanding officer of the Light division will attend to this.

Gen. Power will likewise make a false attack on the tête-de-pont.

27. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments, and the officers commanding companies, to impress upon

their men the necessity of their keeping together, and formed as a military body after the storm, and during the night. Not only the success of the operation, and the honor of the army, but their own individual safety, depend upon their being in a situation to repel any attack by the enemy, and to overcome all resistance which they may be inclined to make, till the garrison are completely subdued.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Langley, R. W. Train.

6th April, 1812.

I am directed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to transmit you the enclosed communication from Lieut. Col. Lord R. Manners, with the accompanying statement from Lieut. Williams in explanation of the transaction in which he was concerned with a detachment of the Royal Waggon Train, under his orders from Meda to Celorico; and it appears to his Excellency that the circumstances are so clearly detailed, that it would be an injustice to keep Lieut. Williams further in arrest. I am also to observe that the Commander of the Forces has much reason to complain of the conduct of the Royal Waggon Train in general; and am further to express his desire that the serjeant and men in question may be put into confinement, and sent forthwith to the head quarters of the 6th division, where a Court Martial will be assembled for their trial.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

My dispatch of the 3d inst. will have apprised your Lordship of the state of the operations against Badajoz to that date; which were brought to a close on the night of the 6th, by the capture of the place by storm.

The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria; and on the 4th, in the morning, we opened another battery of 6 guns in the second parallel against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the wall in its gorge.

Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above mentioned on the evening of the 5th; but as I had observed that the enemy had entrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, and the most formidable preparations were making for the defence, as well of the breach in that bastion, as of that in the bastion of S^{ta} Maria, I determined to delay the attack for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad; in hopes that by effecting a third breach, the troops would be enabled to turn the enemy's works for the defence of the other two; the attack of which would besides be connected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the curtain. This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and the fire of the face of the bastion of S^{ta} Maria and of the flank of the bastion of La Trinidad being overcome, I determined to attack the place that night.

I had kept in reserve in the neighbourhood of this camp the 5th divi-

G. O.

Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General officers, officers, and soldiers of the 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, to the Royal engineers and artillery, and to the Portuguese artillery, for their persevering patience, and laborious industry, and the gallantry which they have uniformly manifested throughout the late siege of Badajoz.

In thanking them for the uncommon gallantry displayed last night in the assault of the place, under the most trying circumstances, the Commander of the Forces must include among those, the General officers, officers, and soldiers of the 5th division.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the men's arms may be immediately got into order again, as he hopes that another occasion of meeting the enemy will before long occur.

sion under Lieut. Gen. Leith, which had left Castille only in the middle of March, and had but lately arrived in this part of the country; and I brought them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was, that Lieut. Gen. Picton should attack the castle of Badajoz by escalade with the 3d division; and a detachment from the guard in the trenches furnished that evening by the 4th division, under Major Wilson of the 48th regt., should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon his left, while the 4th division under Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, and the Light division under Lieut. Col. Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and S^{ra} Maria, and in the curtain by which they are connected. The 5th division were to occupy the ground which the 4th and Light divisions had occupied during the siege; and Lieut. Gen. Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras; and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under Major Gen. Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favorable; and Brig. Gen. Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false attacks on the tête-de-pont, the Fort San Christoval, and the new redoubt called Mon Cœur.

The attack was accordingly made at 10 at night: Lieut. Gen. Picton preceding by a few minutes the attacks by the remainder of the troops. Major Gen. Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation; but notwithstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade; and the 3d division established in it at about 11½ o'clock. While this was going on, Major Wilson of the 48th carried the ravelin of San Roque by the gorge, with a detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches; and with the assistance of Major Squire, of the Engineers, established himself within that work.

The 4th and Light divisions moved to the attack from the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the inundation. They were not perceived by the enemy till they reached the covered-way; and the advanced guards of the two divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch, protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis for that purpose; and they advanced to the assault of the breaches, led by their gallant officers, with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles prepared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and so determined their resistance, that our troops could not establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the top of the breaches; others who succeeded to them were

A. G. O.

Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

It is now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease; and the Commander of the Forces requests that an officer and 6 steady non-commissioned officers may be sent from each regiment, British and Portuguese, of the 3d, 4th, 5th, and Light divisions, into the town to-morrow morning, at 5 o'clock, in order to bring away any men that may be straggling there.

2. The Commander of the Forces has ordered the Provost Marshal into the town, and he has orders to execute any men he may find in the act of plunder, after he shall arrive there.

This order is to be communicated to the Portuguese as well as to the British troops.

obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their progress. These attempts were repeated till after 12 at night; when, finding that success was not to be attained, and that Lieut. Gen. Picton was established in the castle, I ordered that the 4th and Light divisions might retire to the ground on which they had been first assembled for the attack.

In the mean time, Lieut. Gen. Leith had pushed forward Major Gen. Walker's brigade on the left, supported by the 38th regt. under Lieut. Col. Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regt. under Col. Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the Pardaleras with the 8th caçadores under Major Hill. Major Gen. Walker forced the barrier on the road of Olivença, and entered the covered-way on the left of the bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there descended into the ditch, and escalated the face of the bastion of San Vicente. Lieut. Gen. Leith supported this attack by the 38th regt., and 15th Portuguese regt.; and our troops being thus established in the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and in the town; and the 4th and Light divisions being formed again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased; and at daylight in the morning, the Governor, Gen. Philippon, who had retired to Fort San Christoval, surrendered, together with Gen. Vieland, and all the Staff, and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners: but Gen. Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 5000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1200 were killed or wounded during the operations; besides those lost in the assault of the place. There were 5 French battalions, besides 2 of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, and the artillery, engineers, &c.; and I understand there are 4000 prisoners.

It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey to your Lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of killed and wounded will show that the General officers, the Staff attached to them, the Commanding, and other officers of the regiments, put themselves at the head of the attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of gallantry which was so well followed by their men.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford assisted me in conducting the details of this siege; and I am much indebted to him for the cordial assistance which I received from him, as well during its progress, as in the last operation which brought it to a termination.

The duties in the trenches were conducted successively by Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, Major Gen. Bowes, and Major Gen. Kempt, under the superintendence of Lieut. Gen. Picton. I have had occasion to mention all these officers during the course of the operations; and they all distinguished themselves, and were all wounded in the assault. I am particularly obliged to Lieut. Gen. Picton for the manner in which he arranged the attack of the castle, and also for that in which he supported the attack, and established his troops in that important post.

Lieut. Gen. Leith's arrangements for the false attack upon the Pardaleras, and that under Major Gen. Walker, were likewise most judicious; and he availed himself of the circumstances of the moment, to push forward

and support the attack under Major Gen. Walker, in a manner highly creditable to him. The gallantry and conduct of Major Gen. Walker, who was also wounded, and that of the officers and troops under his command, were conspicuous.

The arrangements made by Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville for the attack by the 4th division, were very judicious; and he led them to the attack in the most gallant manner. In consequence of the absence, on account of sickness, of Major Gen. Vandeleur, and of Col. Beckwith, Lieut. Col. Barnard commanded the Light division in the assault, and distinguished himself not less by the manner in which he made the arrangements for that operation, than by his personal gallantry in its execution.

I have also to mention Brig. Gen. Harvey of the Portuguese service, commanding a brigade in the 4th division, and Brig. Gen. Champelmond, commanding the Portuguese brigade in the 3d division, as highly distinguished. Brig. Gen. Harvey was wounded in the storm.

Your Lordship will see in the list of killed and wounded a list of the Commanding officers of regiments. In Lieut. Col. Macleod of the 43d regt., who was killed in the breach, His Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer who was an ornament to his profession, and was capable of rendering the most important services to the country. I must likewise mention Lieut. Col. Gibbs of the 52d, who was wounded, and Major O'Hare of the 95th, unfortunately killed in the breach; Lieut. Col. Elder of the 3d, and Major Algeo of the 1st caçadores. Lieut. Col. Harcourt of the 40th, likewise wounded, was highly distinguished; and Lieut. Cols. Blakeney of the Royal Fusiliers, Knight of the 27th, Erskine of the 48th, and Capt. Leaky, who commanded the 23d Fusiliers, Lieut. Col. Ellis having been wounded during the previous operation of the siege.

In the 5th division I must mention Major Hill of the 8th caçadores, who directed the false attack upon the fort Pardaleras. It was impossible for any men to behave better than these did.

I must likewise mention Lieut. Col. Brooke, of the 4th regt., and Lieut. Col. the Hon. G. Carleton of the 44th, and Lieut. Col. Gray of the 30th, who was unfortunately killed. The 2d batt. 38th regt. under Lieut. Col. Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regt. under Col. Luiz do Rego, likewise performed their part in a very exemplary manner.

The officers and troops in the 3d division have distinguished themselves as usual in these operations. Lieut. Gen. Picton has reported to me particularly the conduct of Lieut. Col. Williams of the 60th; Lieut. Col. Ridge of the 5th, who was unfortunately killed in the assault of the castle; Lieut. Col. Forbes of the 45th, Lieut. Col. Fitzgerald of the 60th, Lieut. Col. the Hon. R. Le P. Trench, and Lieut. Col. Manners of the 74th; Major Carr of the 83d, and Major the Hon. H. Pakenham, A.A.G. to the 3d division. He has likewise particularly reported the good conduct of Col. Campbell of the 94th, commanding Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville's brigade, during his absence in command of the 4th division, whose conduct I have so repeatedly had occasion to report to your Lordship.

The officers and men of the corps of engineers and artillery were equally distinguished during the operations of the siege and in its close.

Lieut. Col. Fletcher continued to direct the works, (notwithstanding

that he was wounded in the sortie made by the enemy on the 19th March,) which were carried on by Major Squire and Major Burgoyne, under his directions. The former established the detachments under Major Wilson, in the ravelin of San Roque, on the night of the storm; the latter attended the attack of the 3d division on the castle. I have likewise to report the good conduct of Major Jones, Capt. Nicholas, and Capt. Williams, of the Royal Engineers.

Major Dickson conducted the details of the artillery service during the siege, as well as upon former occasions, under the general superintendence of Col. Framingham, who, since the absence of Major Gen. Borthwick, has commanded the artillery with the army.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the officers and soldiers of the Royal and Portuguese artillery during the siege; particularly Lieut. Col. Robe, who opened the breaching batteries; Major May, Capt. Gardiner, Major Holcombe, and Lieut. Bouchier of the Royal artillery; Capt. de Rettberg of the German, and Major Tulloh of the Portuguese artillery.

Adverting to the extent of the details of the ordnance department during this siege, to the difficulties of the weather, &c., with which Major Dickson had to contend, I must mention him most particularly to your Lordship.

The officers of the Adj. Gen. and Q. M. Gen.'s departments rendered me every assistance on this occasion, as well as those of my personal Staff; and I have to add that I have received reports from the General officers commanding divisions, of the assistance they received from the officers of those departments attached to them, the greatest number of whom, and of their personal Staff, are wounded.

In a former dispatch I reported to your Lordship the difficulties with which I had to contend, in consequence of the failure of the civil authorities of the province of Alentejo to perform their duty and supply the army with means of transport. These difficulties have continued to exist; but I must do Major Gen. Victoria, the Governor of Elvas, the justice to report that he, and the troops under his command, have made every exertion, and have done every thing in their power to contribute to our success.

Marshal Soult left Seville on the 1st inst., with all the troops which he could collect in Andalusia; and he was in communication with the troops which had retired from Estremadura, under Gen. Drouet, on the 3d, and he arrived at Llerena on the 4th. I had intended to collect the army on the Albuera rivulet, in proportion as Marshal Soult should advance; and I had requested Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham to retire gradually upon Albuera, while Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill should do the same on Talavera, from Don Benito and the upper parts of the Guadiana. I don't think it certain that Marshal Soult has made any decided movement from Llerena since the 4th, although he has patrolled forward with small detachments of cavalry, and the advanced guard of his infantry have been at Usagre. None of the '*Armée de Portugal*' have moved to join him.

According to the last reports which I have received of the 4th inst., from the frontier of Castille, it appears that Marshal Marmont had established a body of troops between the Agueda and the Coa, and he had reconnoitred Almeida on the 3d. Brig. Gen. Trant's division of militia

had arrived upon the Coa, and Brig. Gen. Wilson's division was following with the cavalry, and Lieut. Gen. the Conde de Amarante was on his march, with a part of the corps under his command, towards the Douro.

It would be very desirable that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against Marshal Soult before he could be reinforced; but the Spanish authorities having omitted to take the necessary steps to provision Ciudad Rodrigo, it is absolutely necessary that I should return to the frontiers of Castille within a short period of time. It is not very probable that Marshal Soult will risk an action in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid, and it is very necessary that he should return to Andalusia, as Gen. Ballesteros was in movement upon Seville on the 29th of last month, and the Conde de Penne Villemur moving on the same place from the Lower Guadiana.

It will be quite impossible for me to go into Andalusia till I shall have secured Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore propose to remain in the positions now occupied by the troops for some days; indeed a little time is required to take care of our wounded; and if Marshal Soult should remain in Estremadura I shall attack him; if he should retire into Andalusia, I must return to Castille.

I have the honor to enclose returns of the killed and wounded from the 31st March, and in the assault of Badajoz, and a return of the ordnance, small arms, and ammunition found in the place. I shall send the returns of provisions in the place by the next dispatch. This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by my aide de camp Capt. Canning, whom I beg leave to recommend to your protection.

He has likewise the colors of the garrison, and the colors of the Hesse Darmstadt regiment, to be laid at the feet of H. R. H. the Prince Regent. The French battalions in the garrison had no eagles.*

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army, at the siege and capture of Badajoz, from the 18th March to 7th April, 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	72	51	912	1035
Wounded	306	216	3265	3787
Missing	—	1	62	63

The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Camp at Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose to your Royal Highness extracts of dispatches to the Sec. of State, containing accounts of the siege and capture of Badajoz by the troops under my command.

In order to give your Royal Highness a clearer idea and a more detailed account of the last operations, I enclose a memorandum, with the

* See Appendix, No. XXI.

plan of attack, which I gave to the General officers named in it, on the 4th, in order that they might thoroughly understand it, and examine the ground on which they were to act; and copies of the alterations and explanations which I made of the different articles up to the evening of the 6th.

I likewise enclose copies of the reports which I have received from the several General officers commanding divisions, from the Chief Engineer, and from the Commanding officer of the Artillery, from which your Royal Highness will see in what manner the service was executed, and the names of the officers who distinguished themselves.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Camp at Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

I send by this occasion the accounts of our success before Badajoz; and I have sent to His Royal Highness copies of my instructions for the attack, and the reports of the several officers commanding divisions, &c., on the execution.

These name officers, and His Royal Highness will judge whether it is fit that they should be promoted or noticed. I am particularly anxious about Gen. Picton's aide de camp, Capt. Stovin,* and his A. A. G., Major Pakenham,† whom he has particularly mentioned to me; likewise Capt. Stuart, of the 95th, the D. A. Q. M. G. of the Light division; and Major Rowan, the A. A. G. with the same; and Major Broke,‡ the A. Q. M. G. with the 4th division.

Our loss has been very great; but I send you a letter to Lord Liverpool which accounts for it.§ The truth is, that, equipped as we are, the British army are not capable of carrying on a regular siege.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp at Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship to have sent to the Tagus 4000 barrels of gunpowder. There is but little of that article remaining in Badajoz; and the siege has expended a large proportion of what was in Elvas, which must be replaced from the stores at Lisbon.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

It gives me great pleasure to inform your Lordship that our numerous wounded officers and soldiers are doing well.

I have had great reason to be satisfied with the attention paid to them by Dr. McGrigor, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and the medical gentlemen under his direction; and I trust that the loss to the service, upon this occasion, will not eventually be great.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch to the Sec. of State, giving an account of the capture of Badajoz by assault.

* Major Gen. Sir F. Stovin, K.C.B.

† Major Gen. the Hon. Sir H. Pakenham, K.C.B.

‡ The late Major Gen. Sir C. Broke Vere, K.C.B.

§ A search, hitherto unsuccessful, has been made for this letter. From the *précis* of it in the Index of 1812, as well as from documents in the Ordnance office, it appears that this letter recommended the formation of a corps of Sappers and Miners; the want of such an establishment with the army being the chief cause of the great loss in the sieges.

I beg that you will communicate to the Spanish government such parts of this dispatch as you may think proper. And I send it by Col. Don Josef O'Lawlor, who has for some time been employed with this army, very much to my satisfaction, and has been present at all the operations; and can give the government any further details which they may wish to have.

I have requested Lieut. Gen. the Marques de Monsalud to come over here; and I propose to give him possession of the place, and all that it contains.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

I send my dispatch on the fall of Badajoz by Capt. Canning, my aide de camp. I had thought of sending it by Lord FitzRoy Somerset, for whom I am very anxious to obtain the rank of Lieut. Colonel; but it would really be so inconvenient to me, and to the public service, to be without him, that I prefer to trespass upon His Royal Highness' kindness, and to ask him as a favor to promote him.

I have more than one claim for promotion for my aides de camp, as I have not availed myself of all the opportunities of which I might have availed myself to send them to England with accounts of important events. I hope, therefore, that if His Royal Highness should be favorably disposed to grant me this request, you will make it.

I likewise wish again to draw the notice of His Royal Highness to Major Dickson. I am certain that there is not an officer in this army who will not admit that he deserves any favor which can be conferred upon him.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

I have the pleasure to tell you that we took Badajoz by storm on the night of the 6th. Our loss was severe, but it is impossible to perform services of this kind without heavy loss. I am in great hopes that Bal-

G. O.

Camp before Badajoz, 8th April, 1812, at 11 o'clock P.M.

1. The rolls must be called in camp every hour, and all persons must attend till further orders.

2. Brig. Gen. Power is ordered, and held responsible, that no British or Portuguese soldiers, excepting those belonging to the place, or having a passport from a field officer, shall go into Badajoz till further orders.

3. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to learn that the brigade in Badajoz, instead of being a protection to the people, plunder them more than those who stormed the town.

4. Brig. Gen. Power's brigade are to be put under arms to-morrow morning, at daylight, and to continue under arms till further orders. The Brig. General is to send a state to head quarters, every 6 hours, of the number of men under arms, in the form of the daily morning state.

5. The ladders in the counterscarp and scarp of the fort are to be taken out of the ditch to-morrow morning, at daylight, by fatigue parties of Brig. Gen. Power's brigade, and the Brig. General will report when this order is obeyed.

6. The Commander of the Forces calls upon the staff officers of the army, and the Commanding and other officers of regiments, to assist him in putting an end to the disgraceful scenes of drunkenness and plunder which are going on at Badajoz.

7. The Provost Marshal of the army, and the assist. provosts of the several divisions, are to attend there to-morrow at daylight, and throughout the day.

8. Brig. Gen. Power is requested to place 50 men, with officers in proportion, on guard at the gate of Elvas, and another of the same number at the breaches; and to prevent soldiers from entering the town, or from quitting it with bundles of any description.

9. British and Portuguese soldiers are forbid to go into Badajoz, and the provosts are to punish those they may find there, as being guilty of disobedience of orders, unless they should have a pass signed by a field officer or the Commanding officer of the regiment.

lesteros will likewise get into Seville, and if that should be the case, and he destroys every thing as he ought, the French will be done for in Andalusia.

P.S. Capt. Canning was to have taken this, but he is gone without it, and I send it by the post.

To Col. Austin.

Camp at Badajoz, 9th April, 1812.

I write to the Conde de Penne Villemur to suggest to him the expediency of returning to Estremadura, and that he should pass by the left of the Guadiana.

In case, however, that he should prefer to pass through the Kingdom of Portugal, I beg that you will give him provisions to support his troops to Beja, from whence the Commissary Gen. of this army will provide for him.

I enclose the route for the Conde de Penne Villemur, and I beg you to fill up the dates and send me a copy of it.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Camp at Badajoz, 9th April, 1812.

In answer to Dom M. Forjaz's note of the 4th inst., enclosed in your letter of the 6th, I beg that you will inform that gentleman that I refer him to my letters on the subject of the regulation for means of transport, and to the regulation alone, in which he will see that every measure which I proposed is frittered away to nothing; that the form and words only remain, and the spirit of the measure is taken away. I must observe that this is the mode in which the local government of Portugal have acted by me for the last 2 years. They are apprehensive of the displeasure of their Prince and of the country, if they openly object to what is proposed; but they carry it into execution in such a manner as to deprive it of all chance of success. I purpose not to give myself any further trouble about this or any other arrangement; and the local government will act as they may think proper. I give them notice, however, first, that they will lose the fortress of Elvas, if they don't take measures to carry up to that place the stores which I had provided for the siege of Badajoz, which are now at Alcaçer do Sal; as, for want of those stores, I have been obliged to use the stores in Elvas. 2dly; that they will lose Badajoz, if they don't take measures to provide me with the means of transport to supply that place with stores for its defence.

I beg that this warning may be recollected, and that it may be understood, that from this time forward, I consider myself in no manner responsible for the safety of either place.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Camp at Badajoz, 9th April, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 11th Feb., in regard to the relief of 2d battalions of this army.

As soon as the 2d batt. 4th regt. shall arrive, I shall send away two of the 2d battalions ordered by His Royal Highness. The 2d batt. 52d is already gone, under His Royal Highness' former orders; and the 2d battalions of the 5th, 38th, and 42d regts. shall go as soon as the 1st battalions of those regiments shall arrive. There will then remain three 2d battalions in this

country, which His Royal Highness is desirous should quit it, and they shall go as soon as I shall receive orders to send them; and I beg your Lordship will state to what part of the world the several battalions are to be sent, when they shall quit this country.

Your Lordship and His Royal Highness are the best judges of what description of troops it is expedient that this army should be composed. I beg leave, however, to submit, that some of the best and most experienced soldiers in this army, the most healthy and capable of bearing fatigue, are in the 2d battalions. The 2d batts. 53d, 31st, and 66th, for instance, are much more efficient, and have always more men for duty in proportion to their gross numbers, and fewer sick, than any of the 1st battalions recently arrived which had been in Walcheren; and it is certain that this army will not be so strong by the exchange of new for old soldiers. I have thought it proper to submit this matter to your Lordship, assuring you at the same time that it is entirely indifferent to me; and that whatever orders I shall receive upon the subject will be immediately obeyed.

I ordered Gen. Cooke to occupy Tarifa as soon as I received your Lordship's directions; but, as the Spanish government had reinforced Gen. Ballesteros at my request, and had reduced for that purpose the Spanish force at Cadiz, referring, at the same time, to the state of the British force at that station, they objected to send a detachment to Tarifa at present. As, however, the object for which Gen. Ballesteros was reinforced is accomplished, I conclude that the Spanish troops will be recalled to Cadiz; and I have desired Gen. Cooke to obey your Lordship's orders.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Le Mesurier, Governor of Almeida.

9th April, 1812.

I have laid your letter of the 2d inst. before the Commander of the Forces, and I am to acquaint you with his Excellency's directions that you immediately send back to Castanheira and Celorico any officers and soldiers who may have been marched from those stations to Almeida. You are to comply with this order without hesitation; and in future you are not to send any directions to Major Cimetiere or Capt. Poppleton, who will invariably receive their orders from head quarters.

To Capt. Poppleton, Castanheira.

9th April, 1812.

I am directed to acquaint you, upon your letter of the 31st March and enclosure, that the Commander of the Forces positively desires you will immediately get back the officers and men you have sent to Almeida; and in future you are to obey the orders that are sent to you from head quarters only, and not to attend to any sent from Col. Le Mesurier, or any one else. The Commander of the Forces is astonished that you should have attended to any such communications as those which have been made to you by the Governor of Almeida. His Excellency knows what is passing on the frontier of Beira better than Col. Le Mesurier, and you are only to obey such orders as shall be sent to you from head quarters.

The A.G. to Capt. Stewart, Castello Branco.

9th April, 1812.

I am to acquaint you, in reply to your letter of the 4th inst., that the Commander of the Forces desires that you will obey no orders except such as may be sent to you from head quarters; and I am to observe to you, regarding the movements of the enemy, that his Excellency is better acquainted with them than Gen. Le Cor or any one else, and any orders that may be necessary, you will invariably receive from hence.

To Major Gen. ———.

Camp at Badajoz, 10th April, 1812.

I beg to refer you to my instructions of the 5th ult. from Freneda, in which you will see that, in case the enemy followed your march from Ciudad Rodrigo, you were to move gradually, and you were not directed to proceed farther than Castello Branco without further orders. I cannot consider movements to be gradual which brought you from Val de Lobos to Castello Branco in 2 days. You have now crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha without orders, and you propose to destroy the bridge at that place.

It does not appear from your letters whether you had or not received the order of the Q. M. G. of the 8th inst. to halt at Castello Branco, or to return thither if you had left that place; and I can't tell whether you will obey that order or not.

If, upon the receipt of this letter, you have no positive intelligence that the enemy are actually in Castello Branco, you will march there, and act according to the order contained in the letter from the Q. M. G. of the 8th inst.

You are not to interfere in any manner with the bridge at Villa Velha. I send an officer there to take up the bridge if it should be necessary, and to remove the boats to a station below Villa Velha on this side of the Tagus, from which they can afterwards be moved up again, and formed into a bridge for the service of the army.

The troops will move in the morning.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Camp at Badajoz, 10th April, 1812.

In my last letters I omitted to recommend to His Royal Highness' favor Capt. Nicholas of the Engineers, because he is so desperately wounded that I thought it impossible he could live, but I understand that he is likely to do well;* and it is but justice to him to make known his merits to His Royal Highness.

Lieut. Col. Fletcher has likewise requested me to recommend Capt. Ellicombe of the Engineers.

P.S. It would be very desirable to get back to their duty in this country all the officers absent in England for various causes. I have really more to do than I can manage.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Camp before Badajoz, 11th April, 1812.

I heard yesterday evening that some of Marmont's troops had crossed the Coa, and had appeared on this side of Sabugal on the 8th; it is even said that they were that night at Penamacor. It is therefore necessary that I should return to that side of the Tagus, and I have put some of the troops in motion this day.

It is desirable that Gen. Long's brigade should move forward to Villa Franca and Zafra, having posts of observation at Llera, Usagre, and Bienvenida, in order to relieve Gen. Anson's brigade, which are following and observing the enemy. Major Gen. Long must take care not to engage himself in any affair of consequence, but must fall back upon you in case of necessity.

* He died of his wounds.

You will judge of the best place to put your corps in to fulfil the following objects, for the present. My own opinion is, that your infantry should be in Almendralejo, Azauchal, &c., and your light cavalry as above pointed out, and your Portuguese cavalry on the north side of the Guadiana; I propose, besides, to attach a brigade of heavy cavalry to Sir W. Erskine's division, which should be in the best situation for forage, &c.

My wish is to put Badajoz in a state of defence again as soon as possible, and Lieut. Col. Fletcher is setting to work upon it, and that you should cover the place with your corps while the work will be going on. Either Gen. Spry's or Gen. Power's brigade, and the 22d Portuguese regt., will be in the place as a garrison, and to work upon it, till Penne Villemur and Morillo shall return from the Condado; and two companies of Portuguese and one of British artillery to set the ordnance, &c., to rights.

Of course, if the enemy should attempt to play tricks with small corps, you will fall upon them: if they should advance in force, I recommend to you to occupy the place with the 3 regiments above mentioned, and with your corps to occupy the position of St^e Engracia, having your right protected by the redoubt Mon Cœur, or the French redoubt, which we re-established during the siege. You might have the ground looked at to see where you could place your left with advantage, and where it would be expedient to throw up works to enable you to defend the ground more easily; you might also have the ground opened to see how it would work, in order to determine whether it would be necessary to construct such works beforehand; and if it should not be necessary, it would always be an advantage to delay them to the last moment.

As it appears that it would be impossible for the enemy to assemble so large a corps in this country as to distress you in that position, without my having previous knowledge of their intention; and considering that you would be surrounded by strong places, and would have the choice of the use of either side of the river for your communications, I should wish that that position should be considered as one to be maintained, unless the enemy should be in such strength as to render the maintaining it very uncertain. When Morillo and Penne Villemur shall arrive, the Spaniards will give the garrison of the fort; and Gen. Spry's brigade, and the 22d regt., might remove to Elvas, if not wanted for work, or encamp near the fort, if required for work by Lieut. Col. Fletcher.

I think also, that when you are in your position at Almendralejo, &c., it might be expedient to encamp one British brigade at Badajoz, on the dry ground near the breach, in order to assist in the work.

I leave in Badajoz camp equipage for 14,000 men, of which you will make such use as you please.

Let me have as soon as you can, returns of the number of masons, bricklayers, carpenters, sawyers, wheelwrights, miners, and smiths in each of the regiments, British and Portuguese, in the 2d and Gen. Hamilton's divisions.

I am going into Badajoz this day, and I shall set out for Portalegre, either the day after to-morrow, or the next day, according to the intelligence which I shall receive from Castello Branco.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Badajoz, 11th April, 1812.

On the morning that Badajoz fell, I desired Gen. Alava to write to the Conde de Penne Villemur, to acquaint him with that event and to desire him to communicate it to Gen. Ballesteros. I likewise desired that the Conde de Penne Villemur might be prepared to march again into this province; a measure which I have since suggested to him in a letter which I wrote to him on the 8th inst; and I requested that the Conde de Penne Villemur would apprise Gen. Ballesteros of my opinion, that it was probable that the enemy would return into Andalusia immediately; and of the fact that, owing to the state of affairs on the frontiers of Castille, it was out of my power to follow them into that kingdom. The enemy have since acted as I supposed. They had collected about 30,000 men at, and in the neighbourhood of Villa Franca, on the 8th inst.; and they retired on the 9th, as soon as they heard of the fall of Badajoz.

You have been informed of the causes which render necessary my return to the frontiers of Castille. The enemy have not only blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo, but they have moved some troops into Lower Beira. A small force could get the better of the latter; but I shall not be able to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo without taking with me such a proportion of the army as would leave too small a force for the expedition into Andalusia; to which I have to add, that I must collect a body of troops near this place to protect it till the breaches in its works shall be repaired, and to aid in the repair of the breaches. I don't think it probable that I shall have another opportunity of relieving the Andalusias from the enemy, by the most certain mode, the movement of a superior body of troops into that kingdom; but I am convinced that the Regency will see the impossibility of attempting it at the present moment, and the causes which have led to that impossibility.

If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned as I had a right to expect, there was nothing to prevent me from marching to Seville at the head of 40,000 men, the moment the siege of Badajoz was concluded. If I were to march there under existing circumstances, the formidable position which I have acquired with so many sacrifices would undoubtedly be lost, and, with that position, all the objects of the expedition into Andalusia. It remains then to be seen what is to be done under existing circumstances.

1st; I request you to inform the Regency, that it is absolutely necessary that a garrison should be provided for Badajoz without loss of time. I understand that the regiments of *Zamora*, *El Rey*, *Navarra*, and the battalion *del General*, now called of *Cadiz*, belonging to the 5th army, taken to Cadiz last year by the Capt. Gen. Blake, are still at that place; and it is desirable that they, and a body of 300 artillerymen, should be sent round to Setuval without loss of time, to become the foundation of the garrison, which should consist of 5000 men. It is quite impossible for me to furnish any part of the garrison; and the place must be destroyed if the Spanish government will not garrison it.

2dly; It is desirable that Gen. Ballesteros should keep himself in safety, under Gibraltar, &c.; but should be prepared to advance upon Seville, in case the enemy should move into this province in strength in order to attack Badajoz.

3dly; It is absolutely necessary that the Conde de Penne Villemur and Gen. Morillo should return into Estremadura, as well as the garrison for Badajoz; as otherwise you will observe that there are no troops in this province to re-establish the authority of the government.

But these measures will not be sufficient; as it may be depended upon, that, notwithstanding all that I shall do to weaken the enemy as much as may be in my power, they will collect their forces when the harvest will be on the ground, and they will be certain of subsistence for their army, in order to remove the inconveniences which they will feel from our early successes; and it must be expected that they will be too strong for me. Under these circumstances it is most desirable that some diversion should, if possible, be made in my favor on the Eastern coast.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have lately received from the Sec. of State, enclosing one from Lord W. Bentinck, of the 25th Jan.; and the answer of the Earl of Liverpool, and my opinion on the proposed plan of operations on the eastern coast of Spain, in a letter to Lord W. Bentinck of the 24th March.

Since I wrote that letter, Lord F. Bentinck has arrived here with other letters from Lord W. Bentinck and Adm. Sir E. Pellew, of which I enclose copies.

I propose to urge Lord W. Bentinck in the strongest manner to undertake the expedition to the coast of Catalonia. I am about to send my battering train of artillery to Gibraltar, to be put in order for him; and early in the month of June I will likewise send there British and Portuguese artillerymen, engineer officers, and such other assistance of every description as I can afford him. But I still fear that he will be too weak to undertake even the smaller object of the two recommended to his attention, and I have not the means of reinforcing him. I beg leave, therefore, to suggest to you the expediency of proposing to the Regency:

4thly; That 3000 men of Gen. Roche's division at Alicante, and 3000 men of Gen. Whittingham's division at Majorca, should be prepared to be embarked early in June, in order to join and co-operate on the Eastern coast with the troops under Lord W. Bentinck, which will come from Sicily. If the Spanish government will consent to this proposal, I will take care that transports shall be at Alicante and in Majorca early in June, to take these troops to their destination.

Lord F. Bentinck will return to Sicily in a few days, and I will desire him to go to Cadiz to receive from you the decision of the government on this proposition, in order that he may carry to Lord W. Bentinck the fullest information regarding the assistance to his operations which he may expect in the Peninsula.

If Lord W. Bentinck should be made sufficiently strong, it is probable that we shall succeed in opening a communication between the fleet and the patriots in Catalonia, and the war will revive in that principality, and there is a chance of recovering Valencia. At all events, a diversion of the enemy's force must be created for my operations; without which I shall have upon me the '*Armée de Portugal*,' the armies of the south and centre, and that of Suchet.

The A.G. to Dr. McGrigor, Inspector of hospitals.

11th April, 1812.

Upon producing a statement of the great inconvenience the hospital at Badajoz labored under from not having a resident Commissary, the Commander of the Forces was pleased to direct that immediate measures should be taken to remove the hospital from that place, and directed that the statement of —, Purveyor to the Forces, should be referred to the Commissary Gen., which has been done accordingly. You will have the goodness to communicate with the Commissary Gen. on this head.

I gave the necessary orders relative to the bearers and orderly men, and that accounts of necessities should be sent with the sick and wounded to the hospitals, agreeably to the G.O. of the army; but it is not to be expected, at this moment, that this order can be strictly complied with.

To Gen. Victoria.

Elvas, 13th April, 1812.

It is desirable that you should take measures to have brought into the fort, and lodged in the stores at Elvas, the shot and other military stores now at the flying bridge.

Major Dickson will communicate with you upon this subject. I shall likewise be much obliged to you if you will take measures to have taken out of the water, placed upon their carriages, and drawn into Elvas, the 5 boats now formed into the 2 flying bridges, with all the materials belonging to them.

There are in Badajoz 15 pontoons, which the government has given to me; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make arrangements to have them drawn into Elvas; each pontoon will require 6 bullocks to draw it, but it will not be necessary to draw the whole at once. Col. Fletcher will communicate with you on these two last subjects.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Portalegre, 15th April, 1812.

This letter will be delivered to you by Prince Reuss, an Austrian officer, who is desirous of entering the Spanish service; and as his character is well known to Sir T. Graham, who speaks of him in the highest terms, I beg leave to recommend him to your notice, and I trust that you will be good enough to forward his views as much as may be in your power.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures from the Sec. of State, which I beg you to peruse and return to me, and to let me have your opinion on the plan proposed.

G. O.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces observes that there are several carts on the march loaded with private baggage, and other articles, which ought not to be so carried; to which subject he calls the attention of General officers commanding brigades and divisions. He likewise observes that the carts are very much overloaded, in consequence of which several are broken. He begs that the knapsacks of the soldiers may be inspected, and all articles not necessary for a soldier may be destroyed.

2. When troops in the same or neighbouring cantonments, or in the same column, are to separate on the march, the officer commanding each part of the column which separates should leave a steady non-commissioned officer at the point of separation, in order to direct the baggage of the troops to follow by the right road.

5. Major Gen. Peacocke is requested to put Lieut. —, of the — regt., in arrest, for being absent from his regiment without leave; and to send him to the head quarters of the — division of the army.

I think we shall get some money, or, at all events, pay some debts, by this scheme.

To Major Gen. — — —.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 13th, and this day that of the 14th.

I will hereafter reply to that part of the first which refers to your justification of your own conduct, confining myself now to telling you that it is by no means satisfactory; and that you have disobeyed my instructions in three instances, in all of which they were clear. I have also to observe, that if you had obeyed them, the enemy would, probably, never have passed the Coa.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

I have in contemplation a plan for the attack of some of the fortresses on the eastern coast of Spain, by the forces from Sicily under the command of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, to be aided by 3000 Spanish troops to be brought from Alicante, and 3000 Spanish troops to be brought from Majorca. It will be necessary, however, that transports should go from hence to convey the Spanish troops to the coast of Catalonia, and that they should be at Alicante and Majorca early in June. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether it will be convenient to you to send them at that time.

It is necessary, however, that I should first point out to you the principal other services for which transports may be required in the mean time. The principal of these appears to me to be to take home to England the garrison of Badajoz, consisting of between 4000 and 5000 men. We have likewise, I believe, from 500 to 800 invalids, who ought to go home. I don't exactly know what is the state of the transport tonnage in the Tagus (including troop men of war) at the present moment. If you have sufficient to send home the French prisoners, without touching upon the troop men of war, it would be best to reserve these last for the service on the eastern coast. If you have not sufficient to send away the prisoners without employing the troop men of war on this service, it would probably be best to send away the prisoners without loss of time, and to order the troop men of war to return to the Tagus as soon as they shall have landed the prisoners in England, and then to send them off to Alicante and Majorca as soon as they shall return. I merely suggest this for your consideration. All I want is to send the prisoners away, and to have tonnage for 6000 men at Alicante and Majorca (troop ships of war, if possible) in the beginning of June, and you know best how to provide for the service.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 18th March, enclosing the Order in Council of the 4th March, relative to the residence of the partners of British commercial houses in parts of Spain occupied by the enemy.

I am much afraid that the effect of this Order in Council, if the British

troops should ever enter into the heart of Spain, will be to afford the protection of the British government to Spanish and British subjects who have exerted themselves to support the usurpation of the enemy, and have done more to establish the enemy's government in Spain than any other description of persons. I know some who come under this character.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter from the Prince Regent of Portugal, by which I learn that His Royal Highness has been pleased to create me Marquez de Torres Vedras.

I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will lay this letter before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and request His Royal Highness' permission for me to accept the honor conferred upon me by H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

I enclose a letter from Gen. H. Clinton (in which he proposes a levy of men of inferior size and strength, to perform certain duties, for which men are now necessarily taken from the ranks), because I think it proper that every plan of this description should come under the view of the Commander in Chief, particularly when it proceeds from a respectable officer; but I acknowledge that I don't think the plan would have the effect expected from it.

1st; I don't think that the men to be formed into these battalions would be very trustworthy. If they should not be so, the medical gentlemen will not like to use them as orderlies in the hospitals, nor the captains of companies, nor others entitled to bätmen, be induced to trust them in that capacity. It will not be easy to prevent soldiers in the regular regiments from being so employed.

2dly; I am afraid that, with all our care, we have at this moment, in every regiment, men of the description mentioned by Gen. Clinton. Sometimes they are employed as bätmen and orderlies, but generally they are too weak even for these duties. Surely, if we have men of that description in all the regiments, there is no use in raising entire battalions of them.

3dly; We have no escorts with convalescents, nor with commissariat stores, and very rarely with sick going to hospitals. The convalescents coming up to the army are the guards for the treasure sent at the same time. Here, therefore, there would be no saving of men. The cattle guards require at times the strongest and most active men in the regiments. These men are frequently out at night, and their marches are always more fatiguing than those of the other soldiers.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Niza, 16th April, 1812.

It is really necessary to attend to the orders from England which I have transmitted to you, for the relief of the garrison of Tarifa.

I conclude that the Spanish government will now bring back to Cadiz part of Gen. Ballesteros' corps; but, whether they do or not, you must send the troops to Tarifa according to my direction; and I beg to have,

as soon as possible, an account of the state of the works there, and of the position which you propose should be taken up and defended.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Niza, 16th April, 1812.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have received your letter of the 6th inst.

The Commanding officer at Tarifa is to continue to receive 10*s. per diem*.

I beg that you will apply to Lieut. Gen. Campbell, to leave Capt. Vava-sour, of the Engineers, at Tarifa.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Niza, 16th April, 1812, 1½ P.M.

I enclose intelligence received from the north and from Brito. It appears that Marmont came to Sabugal, and I conclude that the river and our advance will induce the whole to retire again. I have not heard from Gen. — this day. If Marmont retires, and I can get the convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo, I am still inclined to try my original plan, and in this case I shall halt the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

Niza, 16th April, 1812.

I received on the 7th your letter of the 23d Feb., which you had sent by your brother; and I refer you to one which I wrote to you on the 24th March, for my opinion on the plan proposed by your Lordship to the Sec. of State in your letter of the 25th Jan., and agreed to by the Sec. of State in his dispatch to you of the 4th March. Since I wrote to you on the 24th March, I have had further reason to believe that a diversion on the Eastern coast will be highly useful during the present campaign, and I hope that you will have it in your power to carry your proposition into execution.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to my brother,* in which you will see the state of affairs here, and the measures which I have recommended should be adopted in order to add to the strength of your corps.

I besides propose sending to Gibraltar, to join you eventually, some British and Portuguese artillerymen, some officers of engineers, and artificers, who may be of use to you. I shall likewise send there a battering train on travelling carriages, which has lately come from England for my use, consisting of twelve 24 pounders; six 18 pounders; and twenty 12 pounders; and 30 travelling carriages for 24 pounders, for which I shall request Gen. Campbell to have guns, &c., fitted. You will find these carriages much more manageable in trenches and batteries than those which would be furnished from the ships. I hope also to send some mortars and howitzers.

In respect to time, the period in which your operations would be of most use there, would be in the months of June, July, and August; say from the 3d week in June to the 2d week in September: this is the period during which the harvest is on the ground, and we may be certain that the French will collect their armies in one body. All the prepara-

* See page 588.

tions, therefore, which depend upon me shall be made, and every thing at its place early in June.

I have recommended to Lord Frederick to return to you, and to take from Cadiz accounts of what you may expect.

In consequence of my letter to my brother of the 11th you will of course have to send to Gibraltar, Alicante, and Majorca, to collect the troops and equipments destined to co-operate with you, and for your use.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 16th April, 1812.

I enclose Sir T. Graham's opinion on the spherical case shot. Since I wrote to you last upon the subject, I have had opportunities of hearing accounts of the effects of this description of shot on the garrison during the siege of Badajoz. Several wounded in the hospital have declared that they were wounded by these shots; and I learn from a person who was in the town during the siege, and had opportunities of hearing the French officers talk, that this description of shot had great effect, and that it was quite impossible to keep the men at their guns or at work when they were fired.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 16th April, 1812.

Marshal Soult collected his army at Villa Franca in Estremadura on the 8th inst., and, having there heard of the fall of Badajoz, he retired before daylight on the 9th towards the frontiers of Andalusia. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham directed Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton to follow their rear with the cavalry, and he attacked and defeated the French cavalry at Villa Garcia, with Major Gen. Le Marchant's and Major Gen. Anson's brigades, the latter under the command of Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby, on the morning of the 11th inst.

I have the honor to enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham's letter, enclosing Sir S. Cotton's report,* and the return of killed and wounded on this

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., to Gen. the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

Sta Marta, 12th April, 1812.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the enclosed report of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, giving the detail of a very brilliant and successful attack against the enemy's rear guard. It must be unnecessary for me to call your Lordship's attention to the distinguished ability with which the Lieut. General planned and conducted this enterprise, so admirably seconded by the gallantry and judgment of Major Gen. Le Marchant and Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby, as well as by the great exertion of the officers and men of the 2 brigades employed on this service.

Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B., to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Villa Garcia, 11th April, 1812.

I have the honor to report to you that, having received information last night of the cavalry of Gen. Drouet's corps (amounting to 2500) being encamped between Usagre and this place, I ordered Major Gen. Anson's (commanded by Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby) and Major Gen. Le Marchant's brigades to move in the course of the night from Villa Franca and Los Santos, so as to arrive before day-break, the former at Usagre, the latter at Bienvenida, determining to attack the enemy with Gen. Anson's brigade in front, whilst Major Gen. Le Marchant's, by a flank movement from Bienvenida, should cut off his retreat upon Llerena. The advanced guard of Major Gen. Anson's brigade drove in the enemy's piquets from near Usagre 2 hours sooner than I had intended, and Gen.

occasion; and I have only to add my commendation of the conduct of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Major Gen. Le Marchant, and the officers and troops under their command. The enemy retired on that day from Llerena, and since entirely from the province of Estremadura.

I have not yet heard whether Gen. Ballesteros had entered Seville. The Conde de Penne Villemur, with a detachment of the army which had been

Le Marchant's brigade had not time to get into the rear of the enemy, who fell back, upon the alarm being given, a sufficient distance to secure his retreat upon Llerena.

Lieut. Col. Ponsonby followed the enemy soon after day-break through Villa Garcia, and was skirmishing with him when Gen. Le Marchant's brigade arrived on the other side of the heights between the Llerena road and Bienvenida: I desired Col. Ponsonby would show only 3 squadrons, and endeavor to amuse the enemy in front, until Major Gen. Le Marchant's brigade (which I had sent Col. Elley to conduct under cover of the heights) was prepared to attack the enemy in flank: this succeeded admirably; and the enemy, being vigorously attacked, at the same moment, in front and flank, retired in the greatest confusion and disorder. I pursued him with Major Gen. Anson's brigade, and one regiment of Major Gen. Le Marchant's (the 5th dragoon guards), supported by the 3d and 4th dragoons, to near Llerena, a distance of 4 miles, during which the enemy's loss in killed was very considerable; and about 150 prisoners, including a Lieutenant, Colonel, 2 Captains, and one Lieutenant, with about 130 horses, were brought off the field.

The enemy's cavalry formed on the right, and in rear of 7 guns, and between 8000 and 10,000 infantry, which had taken up a position on the left of and close to the town. The whole soon afterwards retired upon Berlanga and Asuaga, to the former of which places my patrols followed them.

I cannot say too much in praise of the gallantry and regularity of the 4 regiments which attacked and pursued the enemy, nor could any thing have exceeded the steadiness and good discipline displayed by the 3d and 4th dragoons (commanded by Major Clowes and Col. Lord E. Somerset), who supported them. I have to recommend strongly to your notice Major Gen. Le Marchant and Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby, who commanded the 2 brigades with so much gallantry and judgment; and I have great pleasure in assuring you of the good conduct of Lieut. Col. Hervey, commanding 14th light dragoons; Major Prescott, commanding 5th dragoon guards; Capt. Dickens, commanding 12th light dragoons; Capt. Murray, commanding 16th light dragoons; and Major the Hon. C. Cocks, commanding detachments of the 12th and 14th light dragoons.

To Lieut. Col. Elley, my A.A.G., I am much indebted for the very great assistance which I derived from him, particularly in conducting my right column to the point of attack. I beg also to recommend to your notice Capt. White, my D.A.Q.M.G., and Capt. Baron Decken.

Herewith I send a list of the killed and wounded, which I am happy to find is not great, considering the very superior force of the enemy.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the first cavalry division of the army, in an affair with the enemy's rear guard, near Llerena, on the 11th April, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	1	13	18	14
Wounded	2	4	35	9	41
Missing	—	—	2	1	2

sent from Estremadura into the Condado de Niebla, had approached that town by the right of the Guadalquivir, and was engaged with the enemy's garrison of Seville, and of the fortified convent on that side of the river, on the 5th, and had obliged them to retire within their works. The Conde de Penne Villemur retired on the 10th, according to a suggestion made to him by me, in consequence of the fall of Badajoz, and the certainty that I had that Marshal Soult would return immediately into Andalusia, without risking an action, which it was not in my power to bring him to; and I trust that the Conde de Penne Villemur will have communicated to Gen. Ballesteros the intelligence and suggestions which I desired might be conveyed to him, and that all is secure in that quarter.

I have since urged the Conde de Penne Villemur to return into Estremadura.

Since I wrote to your Lordship on the 7th inst., I have received reports of transactions in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo only to the 9th. The enemy still kept the place blockaded, but had made no attack upon it, nor had they repeated their visit to Almeida, having suffered some loss in the reconnoissance of that place on the 3d inst.

It appears that on the 3d inst. the greatest number of the troops in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo broke up and marched towards Sabugal, where I believe that Marshal Marmont came himself. Major Gen. ———, whom I had kept in front of Ciudad Rodrigo with the 1st hussars till the end of March, in order to mask the movement of the army into Estremadura, I hope misunderstood, as he disobeyed my instructions in every point. He was followed, although at a distance, through Lower Beira, by Marshal Marmont's advanced guard; and, having quitted Castello Branco, contrary to orders, on the 8th inst., the enemy being then at Meimoa, 12 leagues distant from him, they moved on, and the advanced guard, consisting of 2500 men, of which there were 6 squadrons of cavalry, entered Castello Branco on the evening of the 12th; Brig. Gen. Le Cor, with his brigade of militia, having been obliged to retire upon Sarnadas, when he saw the enemy advance. In the mean time, having heard that ——— had crossed the Tagus, I ordered him to cross that river again, which he did on the 12th, and the enemy retired from Castello Branco before daylight on the morning of the 14th, and Brig. Gen. Le Cor and Major Gen. ——— entered the place.

The enemy have, as usual, in this expedition robbed and murdered the inhabitants of the country. But the injury which they have done, as far as I can learn, has been confined to these acts of atrocity, all the stores in our magazine at Castello Branco, and our hospital there, having been removed to this side of the Tagus.

I can't sufficiently applaud the firmness and good conduct of Brig. Gen. Le Cor. He remained in Castello Branco till he saw a superior enemy advancing upon him, and he then retired in good order no farther than was necessary. If my orders had been obeyed by others as well as by Brig. Gen. Le Cor, it is probable that the enemy would never have passed the Coa, and certainly would never have ventured so far as Castello Branco.

As soon as I heard of Soult's retreat from Villa Franca, I put the army

in motion towards Castille. The advanced guard has arrived at Castello Branco this day, and I shall go there myself to-morrow.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill remains with the 2d division of infantry, and Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division of infantry, and Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine's division of cavalry, consisting of 2 brigades of British and one of Portuguese cavalry, in Estremadura; and I have placed the regiments of Portuguese infantry which were in Elvas and Abrantes for the present in Badajoz, in order to repair the works and to garrison the place for a short time, till the Spanish government can provide a garrison for it.

I have heard of no movement in the north.

The A.G. to Dr. McGrigor, Inspector of hospitals.

16th April, 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to request that you would consider of the best method of accommodating the sick to move from Castello Branco. It appears to his Excellency that either Alter do Chão or Abrantes would best answer the purpose; and when you have decided, as his Excellency marches to-morrow, you will have the goodness to communicate direct with Capt. Stewart, Commandant of Castello Branco, at Niza, where the hospital establishment of Castello Branco is at present.

Your letter relative to the Portuguese medical officers taking charge of the French sick and wounded at Badajoz, has been referred by the Commander of the Forces to Marshal Beresford, and the resignation of hospital mate — to the Military Secretary.

To Brig. Gen. Sir N. Trant.

Castello Branco, 17th April, 1812.

I arrived here about 2 hours ago. Marshal Beresford received your letter of the 13th upon the road; and I received that of the 12th from Gen. Bacellar this morning.

We shall move on as soon as the troops come up. It would appear that the French are collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care of yourselves on Guarda, if they should collect 2 divisions at or in the neighbourhood of Sabugal. Guarda is the most treacherous position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the Mondego behind.

Have you used my magazine at Celorico? I enclose a letter for the Commissary there, and one for Don Carlos de España. Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to Celorico.

Show this letter to Gen. Bacellar; I don't write to him, as I have no Portuguese with me.

To Major Gen. — — —.

Castello Branco, 18th April, 1812.

In consequence of your letter of the 13th inst. I think it proper to explain to you in what way you disobeyed my orders.

The orders of the 5th March provided for two possible events, when the enemy should discover that the allied army had marched from the frontiers of Castille. 1st; that of the enemy moving to the southward: 2dly; that of the enemy passing the Agueda.

In case the enemy should make the movement first mentioned, you were to march with the 1st hussars, by easy marches, through Lower

Beira; to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and to proceed to Elvas. In case the enemy should cross the Agueda, you were to fall back *gradually* through Lower Beira to Castello Branco.

The instructions of the 5th March, besides, contain an injunction to you not to allow yourself to be diverted from what they contained by the operations of Gen. Bacellar, or of Don Carlos de España, but you were desired 'not to be in a hurry, and to give them your countenance as far as might be in your power; and to tell them that you were left in the front for a particular object, and that you had positive instructions for your conduct in the event of the occurrence of the enemy's movement to the Agueda.'

I afterwards wrote to you on the 26th and 27th March, to acquaint you that Don Carlos de España had informed me that he expected to be able to introduce a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, and to request you 'to endeavor to have those provisions introduced into the place;' and you were afterwards to carry into execution my instructions of the 5th March.

I now request you to advert to your conduct under these instructions. On the 29th you reported that the enemy were arrived in Tamames, and that it was your intention to fall back that evening to Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving piquets near Tenebron. On the 30th you wrote from Ituero; in which letter you acknowledged the receipt of one from me, I conclude that of the 26th or 27th, as I had not written to you before since the 19th. The enemy had that day arrived at Guadapero.

On the 1st April you wrote from Nave, at 9 P.M., that the enemy had on the 31st a piquet of 40 cavalry at the ford of the Agueda, between Pastores and Zamarra; and that a regiment of infantry had marched to Martiago. You left Ituero that morning, the 1st April, and marched to Nave; and the enemy on the same morning crossed the ford with 2 squadrons and took possession of Pastores. The convoy for Ciudad Rodrigo was expected on the 1st April, from Aldea del Obispo. I beg leave to observe, that if you had assembled the 1st hussars at Pastores on the 30th March and 1st April, the Agueda being then scarcely fordable for cavalry, and that ford being always the first that is practicable, sending your baggage, &c., away to Sabugal, you would have kept open the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and the convoy would, probably, have got into the latter place. At all events, my instructions of the 26th and 27th March would have been obeyed.

On the 2d April you wrote from Sabugal that the 1st hussars had arrived there, and that it was reported the enemy had recrossed the Agueda; and on the 3d you marched to Val de Lobos, where you halted the 4th; on the 5th you marched to Pedrogaõ, and on the 6th to Castello Branco.

Putting the instructions of the 26th and 27th March out of the question, it is obvious that the case had occurred adverted to in my instructions of the 5th March, viz., the enemy had crossed the Agueda; in which case 'you were to fall back gradually, taking care not to commit yourself, upon Sabugal; and from Sabugal in the same manner by Penamacor on Castello Branco;' and I would wish you to consider whether you did fall

back gradually; whether there was any necessity of any description for your quitting Nave on the 2d, or Sabugal on the 3d; or whether to march 12 leagues in 2 days through Lower Beira can be deemed, in any sense of the word, 'falling back gradually.' In fact, when you wrote on the 7th from Castello Branco, you knew nothing about the enemy; and, instead of receiving from you, as I had expected under my instructions of the 5th March, a regular daily account of their operations, you knew nothing; and, from the manner in which you made your march, all those were driven off the road who might have given me intelligence, and were destined to keep up the communication between me and Don Carlos de España.

But this is not all; you were positively ordered by your instructions to go to Castello Branco, and no farther. The reason for this instruction is obvious. 1st; the militia of Lower Beira would have been there in the case supposed, and they were there: 2dly; as soon as I should be informed of the enemy's approach to the Coa, it would have been absolutely necessary for me to assemble a force at Castello Branco, of which the foundation would have been the 1st hussars. Yet, notwithstanding these orders and the reason for them, you marched from Castello Branco on the 8th, and crossed the Tagus on the 9th.

Till I received your letter of the 7th April I did not conceive it possible that you would have so far disregarded your instructions, otherwise I should certainly have prevented it; and the consequence of your conduct was, that I did not know that the enemy had crossed the Coa till the 10th inst. I am willing to believe, nay, I am certain, that the omission to obey my instructions was not intentional, and that it is to be attributed to that description of inattention which is too much the practice of the service. If the instructions of the 5th March had been read with attention, and pains had been taken to understand them, and a plan had been considered for the mode of executing them, in case of the occurrence of the event for which they provided, it is impossible that the mistakes of which I complain could have occurred.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Castello Branco, 18th April, 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose the last letters from Gen. Bacellar and Don Carlos de España.

The enemy were still at Pedrogaõ yesterday; but our patrolle took a courier, who says they intended to retire last night.

I had at first intended to bring the divisions across the Tagus two at a time. But the weather is so bad that it is impossible to bivouac the troops, and the cantonments on this side the Tagus will scarcely hold one division. I have therefore given the troops a second halt, in order to allow the 4th division to follow the 5th across the Tagus.

I am much afraid that Major Grant is taken. He was at Idanha a Nova, and the man taken yesterday says that an officer was taken there by one of the enemy's patroles. I have not heard from him since the 15th.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Vandeleur, Light division.

18th April, 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 14th inst., I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you would apply to the Commissary of the division for a cart

for each regiment, to carry the arms and knapsacks of the men who fall out from sudden illness or fatigue on a march.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Campbell, Brigade of Guards.

18th April, 1812.

I am desired by the Commander of the Forces to request that you would state whether you recommend that the 40 men of the 3d regt. of Guards, who have served for 16 years, should be allowed to return to England; it appearing to his Excellency very extraordinary that he should have received no orders upon the subject from H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, or from the Sec. of State. The Commander of the Forces conceives himself responsible, that when officers or soldiers are sent to serve in this country, they should not be allowed to go home without sufficient cause.

The application of Mr. ——— to proceed to England is referred to Dr. M'Grigor.

The A.G. to Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector of hospitals.

18th April, 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 14th inst., requiring tonnage for men who are invalided, or that require to be sent home for their recovery, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to inform you that he has lately received very particular orders from the Commander in Chief regarding the settlement of accounts of soldiers invalided in this country; and his Excellency requests you will state where the invalided men are, their names, and the regiments to which they belong.

The Commander of the Forces desires that Capt. Stewart, late Commandant at Castello Branco, with the other officers attached to that establishment, should remain at Niza, notwithstanding any other disposition should be made of the sick, his Excellency wishing to keep the establishment entire, to be ready for any future arrangement.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Castello Branco, 19th April, 1812.

It is necessary that some attention should be paid to the mowing of hay this year, otherwise I think there is great reason to fear that the cavalry will be but ill provided with forage during the winter. I believe the best places in Alentejo are Portalegre, Alpalhaõ, Gafete, Niza, Castello de Vide, Villa Viçosa, Estremoz, Crato, and all the villages along the Sor river. Mr. Routh should take early measures on this subject: some might be mowed on the left of the Guadiana, near where our bridges were, and between Badajoz and Talavera Real; the former stored at Elvas, the latter at Badajoz. The mode in which I propose to settle this matter in this part of the country is to make arrangements with the magistrates of the villages to mow and stack the hay, for which they should be paid from 40 to 50 *reis* a truss of from 12 to 15 lbs. The magistrates should then be held responsible to produce all the hay for cutting and storing for which they should have been paid.

The best season for cutting is the month of May, so that you see Mr. Routh has no time to lose. I recommend this arrangement in case of accidents, as I hope and believe we shall spend the winter out of Portugal yet.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Castello Branco, 19th April, 1812.

The transports (the names of which are in the margin) have been lately sent from England, loaded with heavy ordnance and stores for the use of this army, which I no longer require; and I have received the directions of the Sec. of State to send them to Gibraltar, there to wait the directions of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck. I enclose a return of the ordnance and stores which these transports contained when they arrived in this country; from which I have directed that 8833 *twenty-four* pound shot,

4416 *eighteen* pound shot, and 11,040 *twelve* pound shot, including grape and case, might be landed at Lisbon.

It will be very desirable that this shot should be replaced at Gibraltar; and that the quantity for each gun should be 800 rounds of round shot, 100 rounds of grape, and 100 rounds of case shot.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Castello Branco, 20th April, 1812, 8 A.M.

The enemy have continued to withdraw from this part of the country, and our piquets were yesterday in Penamacor; and from the Alpedrinha side, in Val de Lobos; and I conclude that this day the whole will be across the Coa. The Light division and hussars are this day at S. Miguel and Pedrogaõ; the 3d division and 11th at Alpedrinha, &c. The 4th and 5th divisions will move to-morrow from hence; and I shall keep the front in movement gradually towards the Coa till the rear shall come up.

We had an unpleasant report yesterday morning from Coimbra, of the 17th, that Trant had been defeated on Guarda, and his militia dispersed. The report was brought to Coimbra by an *alferes* of militia, and some non-commissioned officers; the day of the defeat not mentioned. We had heard from Trant on the 13th, at night; and there was a possibility that the affair had happened on the 14th. Guarda being 29 leagues from Coimbra, it appeared barely possible that it might have happened on the evening of the 15th, as the letter from Coimbra was dated at 9 in the morning of the 17th.

There are letters in this town from Celorico of the 15th, which don't notice this affair; and, therefore, it certainly did not happen on the 14th, and probably not on the morning of the 15th; and yet, if it was not then, it is scarcely possible that the *alferes* and non-commissioned officers could have gone the distance in the time.

We have heard from Covilhã of the 17th, and have no accounts of this action; and the Ordenanza are in all parts of the country, and there is no report of it among them; nor any among the prisoners and deserters from the enemy, some taken even yesterday.

I sent an officer from hence on the 16th with letters to Guarda; and he would certainly have returned if he had heard of this action; unless, indeed, he has been taken, which is not very probable. A non-commissioned officer went likewise with letters on the night of the 17th from Alpedrinha, and we have no accounts from him.

Upon the whole I believe that the *alferes* and non-commissioned officers have taken fright, and run away; and have spread this report at Coimbra as a justification of their own conduct.

I am going to Escalhos de Cima this day, to be nearer the advanced posts. It is only 2 leagues from hence.

G. O.

Escalhos de Cima, 20th April, 1812.

1. Lieut. —, of the —, having committed a gross violation of the G. O. of the army, dated 7th Dec. 1811, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, in relation to the Governor of Abrantes, has been put in arrest by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces; but having made an apology to the Governor of Abrantes and to the Commander of the Forces, and the Governor of Abrantes having requested that no further notice might be taken of his conduct by the Commander of the Forces, Lieut. — is released from his arrest, and is to return to his duty.

P.S. I have no accounts from Ciudad Rodrigo since the 11th.

Escalhos, 4 P.M. I enclose a letter from Col. Wilson, from which you will see that there was some affair at Guarda on the 14th, though not what the *alferes* reported. It is strange that the person who wrote from Celorico on the 15th knew nothing about it. The dragoon who brought this letter says that 2 companies of militia were taken prisoners on the Mondego.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

Castello Branco, 20th April, 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 16th.

All the pontoons, and all the boats which are in Badajoz, with their baulks, anchors, &c., for which there are carriages, must be sent to Elvas. I beg you to speak to the Marques de Monsalud on this subject, and to communicate upon it with Gen. Victoria, in order that he may find the means of moving these boats. Any boats for which there are not carriages should be floated down the river to Jurumenha.

I beg that you will tell Gen. Campbell, that if he wants bill hooks, he must apply for them to the Portuguese head quarters. No article of any description, excepting the pontoons and boats, and what belongs to them, must be taken out of the stores at Badajoz.

The A.G. to Major Gen. W. Anson, 4th division.

20th April, 1812.

I had the honor to lay your letter of the 17th inst., and enclosures, before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed by his Excellency to desire that the Court of Inquiry held at Castello de Vide on the 16th inst., of which Capt. — of the 40th regt. was president, should be reassembled. The Commander of the Forces wishes the attention of the Court should be called to the careless manner in which the report is drawn up, the prisoner's name not being mentioned, and directs the prisoner should be tried by a Division Court Martial, for unmilitary conduct in making away with his ammunition to light his pipe. The Commander of the Forces also directs that the officers commanding the company to which he belongs should be put under arrest for neglect of duty, in having omitted to examine the arms of the prisoner since the 6th April, notwithstanding the G.O. of the army, and practice of the service, and the particular G.O. dated the 7th April, 1812, No. 2.

The Commander of the Forces requests that you will pay particular attention to the discipline of the — regt., and require the Commanding officer to report whether the men have their ammunition and arms in good order.

To Brig. Gen. Sir N. Trant.

Pedrogaõ, 21st April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and that of Gen. Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened; and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact troops ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned, if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree with me, that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal.

I can only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which you made for the retreat from it. As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt to put it in execution, and it is useless to say any thing

about it. I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz., that the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war, particularly in our situation, and with such troops as we, and you in particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You could not have succeeded in that attempt; and you would have lost your division and that of Gen. Wilson.

I give you my opinion very freely upon your plans and operations, as you have written to me upon them; begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that both you and Gen. Wilson did every thing that officers could do under such circumstances; and that I attribute to you the safety of the two divisions.

I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day; and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each other.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Pedrogaõ, 21st April, 1812, 3 p.m.

I enclose letters from Gens. Bacellar and Trant, which will show what passed at Guarda on the 14th; and letters from Don Carlos de España to the 18th, which will show how matters stand at Ciudad Rodrigo. You will see that the enemy have lost their bridge on the Agueda. They have retired from Sabugal, and I believe are passing the bridge of El Villar.

The Light division and hussars are this day at Penamacor and Meimoa; the 3d division and 11th dragoons at Capinha and Bemquerença. Our patrols have been, I believe, in Aldea da Ponte.

To Lieut. Col. Dickson, R.A.

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 19th. Let me know as soon as possible what ordnance and stores there are for the heavy train in the transports at Setuval, including those recently arrived from Oporto.

Let the 927 barrels of powder be sent to Gen. Rosa at Lisbon; and I will settle with Marshal Beresford to have 1000 barrels of powder sent from thence to Oporto, for the service of the northern garrisons. Let the 7726 *twenty-four* pound shot be likewise sent to Lisbon, and be given over to Gen. Rosa.

I shall hear from you, of course, when the gun carriages arrive at Alcaccer.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Campbell, Kt.

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812.

I received by the last post your letter of the 24th March. I don't exactly recollect what passed between Sir H. Burrard and me on the occasion of the reference made to us by you and Col. Darling, on a difference respecting an exchange. I believe we declined to decide upon the subject, and we gave no opinion. Not recollecting what passed, I certainly cannot recollect what opinion I formed upon reading the papers.

I believe the chief command at the Isle of France is a better situation

G. O. °

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812.

Lieut. —, —, having quitted the hospital station of Castello Branco without leave, and having returned there in consequence of an order from the Commander of the Forces, and having apologised for his conduct, is to return to his duty.

for your health than the staff in the East Indies, but I should doubt its being better for your pocket.

You will see that we have been in a *bustle*, as Sir David says, here. I believe that my patrols will communicate with Ciudad Rodrigo this day.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 18th, regarding Lieut. — of the — regt.

There are with the — 6 subalterns less than I have endeavored to keep with every battalion in the army; and Lieut. — is now the third lieutenant in the 2d batt. He has omitted to inform you, however, that there are 3 subalterns belonging to the 1st batt., now doing duty in the 2d batt.; and, under the King's order, I must detain them till they shall be relieved. I should in like manner be obliged to detain him, even after he should become effective in the 1st batt.; and of course cannot allow him to go to that battalion before his seniors, and before he shall belong to it.

I always feel much concern in being obliged to refuse officers who wish to quit the army; indeed it is the most painful duty I have to perform. But it must be performed; otherwise, between those absent on account of wounds and sickness, and those absent on account of business or pleasure, I should have no officers left.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812, 5 P.M.

Our patrols were yesterday in Alfaiates, which town the enemy left at 9 in the morning, taking the road of Casillas. The patrols were to go this day, if possible, to Ciudad Rodrigo. I shall go to-morrow to Sabugal; and if I should find the enemy decidedly gone, I shall send orders for every body to halt.

I enclose letters received from Don Carlos, Ruman, and the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. Ruman is come here himself. He passed by the right of the Coa yesterday, after 12 o'clock, as far as Malhada-sorda.

The Light division are this day in Sabugal; the hussars at Quadrazaes and Soito.

P.S. I hear that the 42d are arrived, and I shall order them to join the 1st division.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812.

I have delayed to answer your letter of the 16th inst., containing one from the house of Messrs. Alcock, Bulkeley, and Co., till I shall have an opportunity of looking among my papers for the copy of a proclamation issued by me in the year 1809, when I settled that the Commissaries should draw bills on the Commissary Gen. for supplies furnished by the country; but, unfortunately, I have not been able to find it.

When the British army first came to the Peninsula, nothing could be more irregular than the mode in which supplies were taken from the country by Commissaries, corps, and even individuals, for which they were in the habit of giving irregular vouchers. One of the consequences attending this evil was, that it was impossible to settle the accounts of the Commissariat, or to pay for those supplies, without reference to the autho-

city of the Commander in Chief; and I was obliged to examine and consider every irregular voucher left at any distance of time by any individual, and to inquire into all the circumstances attending it, before I could give authority that payment should be made for the supplies furnished. It frequently happened that, owing to the lapse of time, the justice of the demand could not be satisfactorily proved, and I was obliged to refuse sanction to the payment of it.

In order to put an end to these evils, I ordered the officers of the Commissariat to *settle accounts* for the supplies which they should receive from the country before they should quit the town in which they should have received them; and I issued a proclamation, requiring all those who furnished supplies to the army to demand payment for them within one month after the period at which the supplies had been furnished, and I promised that they should be paid, if possible, in ready money, or, if not possible, that the Commissary who had received the supplies should be directed to give a bill for their amount on the Commissary Gen.

This is the origin of the Commissariat bills to which the letter from Messrs. Alcock and Bulkeley refers. It was never intended to promise in this proclamation that which was impossible, viz., to pay within one month for all supplies which this army might receive. That which was intended was to settle accounts with those who furnished supplies, and to give those persons a document to prove the existence of a debt, without the trouble of coming to head quarters, and of being parties to a long investigation to prove the justice of their demand.

A bill was preferred to every other description of acknowledgment of the debt, as being the best known to the people of the country, and as pointing out the person to whom they were to look for payment. But these bills have never specified periods of payment.

Accordingly, the practice has been, from the year 1809 to this moment, to postpone the payment of the Commissariat bills. At times, those drawn in payment of one description of supplies are preferred to others; at other times, those drawn for smaller sums are preferred to those drawn for larger; and generally, the bills have been numbered at the Commissary Gen.'s office when presented for payment, and have been paid in rotation in the register of the numbers.

But there is one rule which has been invariably followed, both in the payment of these bills, and in the payment of demands for supplies furnished before those bills were in use, and that is, to pay those last who should have appeared to have purchased the bills, or the right to demand the payment, at a depreciated rate. These arrangements, and the practice of the Commissariat under them, have been no secret: they are known to the world.

If I am not mistaken, Messrs. Alcock and Bulkeley were apprised, when Mr. Kennedy paid similar demands by bills on the Treasury in the month of September last, that it would be the last time he should consent to such an arrangement; and I know it is notorious throughout the country, and must be well known at Lisbon, that I had, so long ago as the year 1809, ordered that those who should purchase up the debts of the British army should be paid the last.

It is not necessary that I should here enter into a justification of this order. Unfortunately, the difficulty of procuring specie renders it impossible to pay in ready money for all the supplies required by the army; but, whether I have it or not, I have assumed an authority to decide which of the creditors of the army shall be paid last.

I don't think I have exercised that authority unjustly in determining that those shall be paid last who don't, themselves, furnish any supplies or assistance to aid our exertions, and to forward the just cause in which we are engaged; but who, on the contrary, do us and their country all the mischief of which they are capable, by endeavoring to make money of the public difficulties, and to destroy our credit by purchasing our securities from the holders of them at a depreciated price.

It is impossible that this rule can be attended by half the injurious effects that must be the consequences of encouraging the purchase of these securities; the least of which must be to raise the price of all commodities throughout the country to more than the amount of the profit which these purchasers would choose to make by this traffic.

I request you to communicate this letter to the Consul General for the information of Messrs. Alcock and Bulkeley, and that of the British merchants at Lisbon in general. At the same time, I beg that these gentlemen may be informed that, as it appears that a considerable time has now elapsed since these demands have been due to them, I have desired the Commissary Gen. to take an early opportunity of paying them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Penamacor, 22d April, 1812.

I received yesterday your letter of the 2d inst. I sent you on the 27th ult. the copy of the letter which I had written to Lord W. Bentinck on the 24th March, in consequence of your Lordship's letter to me of the 5th ult.; and I now enclose another letter which I have written to him, and one which I have written to Sir H. Wellesley on the operations of Lord W. Bentinck, and on the assistance to be given to him by the Spanish troops on the eastern coast.

Your Lordship will observe that I have promised Sir H. Wellesley and Lord W. Bentinck, that the transports for the conveyance of the Spanish troops from Alicante and Majorca shall be at those places respectively in the beginning of June; and having written to Adm. Berkeley a letter, of which I enclose a copy, in order to make arrangements for sending the troop ships of war preferably on this service, I was sorry to find from his answer, which I received yesterday, that those mentioned in the margin are in England, and the *Melpomene* alone on this station, and now employed in the conveyance of the 2d batt. 4th regt. from Ceuta. The Admiral tells me that he has written to have these ships sent out; which I had hoped would have been kept in this country for the general service; and I hope your Lordship will take measures to have them sent to the Tagus as soon as possible after you will receive this letter.

I have sent the train which arrived in the Tagus on the 2d April to Gibraltar, to wait the orders of Lord W. Bentinck, with the exception of the round and other shot of the three calibres, which I have directed

might be landed at Lisbon; and I have requested Lieut. Gen. Campbell, in a letter of which I enclose a copy, to replace the shot by 800 rounds of round, and 100 rounds of each of canister and grape for each gun, from the stores of Gibraltar. I request your Lordship to enforce this demand, if you should approve of it.

I should have been in Andalusia at this moment, at the head of 40,000 men, and should have obliged Soult to withdraw from thence, if Don Carlos de España had acted as I desired him, or as he ought, in respect to Ciudad Rodrigo. That place is, however, now safe; and I shall determine upon the line of operations which I shall follow during the summer, according to the period at which I shall have Ciudad Rodrigo fully provisioned, and according to the intelligence which I shall receive of the state of Marmont's preparations to endeavor to take it by other means besides blockade.

When I say I shall determine upon the line of operations which I shall follow, I ought to add, provided I shall have money to follow any plan of operations at all. I wrote to your Lordship lately on the subject of the money expected at Cadiz in the *Standard*. That vessel has since arrived at Cadiz; but, in consequence of the disapprobation expressed of Sir H. Wellesley's conduct in appropriating a part of the money received at Cadiz from America on a former occasion, I have not thought it proper to request him to send me any part of this money.

The Commissary in Chief and the Treasury have disapproved of my sanctioning bargains for importing specie from Gibraltar, for which bills were to be granted by the Commissary General at a more disadvantageous rate of exchange than the market rate of Lisbon. I have therefore been obliged, within these last 3 days, to refuse to give my sanction to an offer of 500,000 dollars upon a similar bargain. I can scarcely believe that the Treasury are aware of the distresses of this army. We owe not less than 5,000,000 dollars: the troops are 2 months in arrears of their pay; and I have been able to allot only 100,000 dollars to the payment of the Portuguese subsidy in this month. The Portuguese troops and establishments are likewise in the greatest distress; and it is my opinion, as well as that of Marshal Beresford, that we must disband part of the army unless I can increase the money payments of the subsidy. The Commissary General has this day informed me that he is very apprehensive that he shall not be able to make good his engagements for the payment of meat for the troops; and if we are obliged to stop that payment, your Lordship will do well to prepare to recall the army, as it will be quite impossible to carry up salt meat, as well as bread, to the troops, from the sea coast. The Treasury cannot expect that I shall take upon myself to sanction measures of which they have expressed their positive disapprobation; and I hope that they will have recalled that disapprobation, or that they will have adopted some efficient measures to supply this army with specie. From this statement your Lordship will observe, that it is not improbable that we may not be able to take advantage of the enemy's comparative weakness in this campaign *for the want of money*. I think it most probable, however, as I have explained in my letter of the 11th to my brother, that a great effort will be made, by a concentration of the whole of the enemy's

force when the harvest will be on the ground, to weaken the impression which our early successes have made; and this is the reason why I am anxious for a diversion on the eastern coast.

When writing upon the disapprobation expressed by the Treasury and Commissary in Chief on the measures adopted here, and by my brother, to supply us with money, I must likewise inform your Lordship that the Commissary in Chief has disapproved of measures which he says have been adopted to obtain for the army supplies of different articles of stores. I don't believe those measures have been adopted to the extent he supposes by any means. As long as I conceive that what I do is approved of by government, I am not afraid of any responsibility, and I never will omit any measure which can tend to the success of our object; but it cannot be expected that I shall order or sanction what is disapproved of by my official superiors. That is entirely inconsistent with the principles on which I have invariably acted; more particularly as, at the moment they expressed their disapprobation, they must have been aware of the necessity there was for the adoption of the measures which they disapproved.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Sabugal, 23d April, 1812.

Lieut. Gen. the Marques de Monsalud, who commands in Estremadura, in the absence of Capt. Gen. Castaños, has requested me to apply to government for 8000 suits of clothing, including shoes, shirts, caps, and gaiters, for the Spanish troops destined to be the garrison of Badajoz, of the same description with that recently sent to Oporto for Don Carlos de España, with the exception of the caps, which are to be of black felt; and 400 suits of the same description for artillerymen, and 200 suits of grey for pioneers.

I request that if your Lordship should grant this clothing, it may be sent to the Tagus at an early period.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Alfaiates, 24th April, 1812.

I did not write to you last night, as I was by no means certain of the enemy's movement. It appears, however, by the report which I have just received, that they have all crossed the Agueda, and are in full retreat towards the Tormes. I have therefore ordered every thing to halt to-morrow; and I shall send orders regarding the disposition to be adopted, while I shall bring up supplies for Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. I am in great hopes, however, to be able to carry into execution our southern scheme yet.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Alfaiates, 24th April, 1812.

Marmont has retired, and I shall immediately get provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo. I propose, while this operation shall be going on, to send some of the troops back across the Tagus, and to distribute the whole in such a manner as that they can be easily subsisted. I think that you might avail yourself of this opportunity to strike your blow at Almaraz. I think that one of your British brigades, and two Portuguese brigades, or one and a half British, and one strong Portuguese brigade, would do your business as to the French in that neighbourhood.

All the iron howitzers are now in Elvas, and you might employ, to draw 6 of them, the mules attached to one of Gen. Hamilton's brigades of Portuguese artillery. If Dickson has not got the ammunition carriages prepared for the brigade of howitzers, which I proposed should be in the reserve of the artillery, you might then get mule carts, to carry the quantity of shot, and of howitzers and spherical shells, which you might think it expedient to take. See Dickson in regard to this equipment, and settle the whole with him. You had better take him on the expedition with you. The equipment might be prepared at Elvas, and might join you at Truxillo or Jaraicejo by Caceres. Besides the gun equipment, you should take with you 6 of our small pontoons, to enable you to make a flying bridge if you should require it. The pontoons and bullocks are at S. Vicente, near Elvas; Lieut. Piper, of the Engineers, is in charge of them, and will do whatever you order him; each of them should march with a double proportion of bullocks.

Make all your preparations in secret for this expedition. I shall watch from hence the course of the enemy's retreat, and will let you know if it should appear to me that you have any thing to fear from any of the divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*' going near Almaraz. Of course you will not march till you shall hear further from me.

P.S. You should take a regiment of British and one of Portuguese cavalry on this service.

To Dom M. Pereira Forjaz.

Alfaiates, 24th April, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th April, enclosing one from the Conde de Linhares, in regard to the reward of Major Das Neves, as having first formed the plan of the positions which are fortified in front of Lisbon, and first conceived the idea of the system of defence which was adopted.

It has never been my practice to refrain from giving applause to those officers under my command to whom applause is due, or to omit to recommend them to the notice and generosity of their superiors and their sovereign; but I solemnly protest against its being understood that Major Das Neves, or Col. Caula, either formed the plan, or conceived the idea of the system which was carried into execution for the safety of Lisbon under my direction. I never saw Major Das Neves in my life, nor Col. Caula, till I saw him at Almeida. Your Excellency gave me in 1809 a plan of the country in question, and a memoir by Major Das Neves; I am now obliged to declare, that when I came to examine the ground, I found both so inaccurate, that I could place no reliance upon them; and it is a fact, that having trusted in one instance to the plan and memoir, without reconnoitring the ground, I was obliged to make a second journey to Lisbon, in Feb. 1810, and to destroy the works which had been commenced.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Alfaiates, 24th April, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th March, regarding the importation of articles duty free for the British Commissariat. It appears to me that there can be no difficulty in the business, by apply-

ing to these articles the first article, as proposed in my letter to you of the 4th Nov. 1810.

The Commissary Gen. will apply to me that these articles may be imported duty free, giving me a list of them, which I will sign, and send the application to you. These articles will then be admitted duty free, and carried to the Commissariat stores, under the responsibility of the officers of the Commissariat.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Alfaiates, 24th April, 1812.

My brother-in-law has sent me a carriage from England in one of the transports, of which the wheels must be put on, and the carriage hung upon springs in Lisbon. If you have an English coachman, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow him to put the carriage together for me; if not, I shall be obliged to you if you will employ to do it the most intelligent coachmaker in Lisbon.

I have here one of the Prince's carriages, which I propose to send down as soon as my own shall come up; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will ask Joaquim da Costa to lend me a pair of the Prince's mules and a careful driver to bring the carriage up. I shall send the mules and driver back by the Prince's carriage. One of the police dragoons might as well come up with the carriage. Excuse this trouble.

P. S. Marmont has retired. I hope to be able yet to undertake an expedition to the south.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alfaiates, 24th April, 1812.

The army continued its march towards this quarter since I last addressed you, and the enemy retired before them. The last of the enemy crossed the Agueda yesterday morning, and they are in full retreat towards the Tormes. The rains which had fallen between the 13th and 19th inst. had carried away the bridge which they had constructed on the Agueda, immediately above Ciudad Rodrigo, but they have repaired it within these last 3 days, and the leading divisions of the army crossed by the Puente del Villar, and the fords of the Upper Agueda; the rear only by the bridge near Ciudad Rodrigo.

When Marshal Marmont marched his troops upon Sabugal, Lieut. Gen. Bacellar ordered that the Portuguese militia under Brig. Gens. Trant and Wilson should be concentrated upon Guarda, with a view to protect our magazines at Celorico, and to prevent the enemy's incursions into the Serra d'Estrella. Marshal Marmont moved upon this militia on the 14th inst. with a considerable force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery; and Brig. Gen. Trant, who commanded, conceiving the enemy to be too strong for him, determined to retire across the Mondego. I am by no means satisfied with the conduct of the militia upon this occasion. They had made great progress in their retreat, which, if they had been steady, would have been effected without loss. But a battalion which was covering the retreat having been ordered to fire upon the enemy's cavalry, and the rain having prevented their pieces from going off, broke, and threw the retreating troops into disorder, and the enemy took about 156 prisoners.

The troops were formed again, however, on the left of the Mondego,

and retired upon Celorico, Gen. Bacellar keeping the advanced posts, under Brig. Gen. Wilson, at Lagiosa. On the following morning, the 15th, the enemy advanced again in considerable force, and drove in Brig. Gen. Wilson's outposts at Lagiosa, which induced Gen. Wilson to give directions that our magazines at Celorico might be destroyed, according to instructions which I had left in case the magazines were likely to fall into the hands of the enemy. But the enemy having halted at Lagiosa, Brig. Gen. Wilson countermanded the order for the destruction of the magazines, and nearly the whole have been saved. The enemy retired from Lagiosa in the course of the night of the 15th, and from Guarda on the 16th, which town was occupied on the 17th by the troops under the command of Brig. Gen. Wilson.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Bacellar of the 15th, containing Brig. Gen. Trant's report of the affair of the 14th, and your Lordship will be happy to learn that the officers of the militia behaved remarkably well. It appears to me that Brig. Gen. Trant and Brig. Gen. Wilson, being at Guarda, did every thing they ought to have done. But when Marshal Marmont was in strength at Sabugal, they ought to have kept only an advanced guard at Guarda; and as soon as I heard that they were collected at Guarda, I apprised them of my opinion; but it was too late. The partial success over the Portuguese militia on their retreat from Guarda, and the murder and plunder of the inhabitants of a few villages in Lower Beira, already suffering from the enemy's former depredations, are the only fruits of Marshal Marmont's expedition within the Portuguese frontier, to divert our attention from the siege of Badajoz.

While the troops belonging to the '*Armée de Portugal*' have been collected for this service, I learn from Capt. Gen. Castaños that Gen. Abadia had ordered the Spanish troops in the Asturias to move into Leon, where Brig. Moreno had had some partial success against a French detachment at Otero de las Dueñas. Don J. Sanchez, likewise, who has continued with his cavalry in Castille, has been very successful on the enemy's communications, and against their convoys.

By accounts from the south I learn that neither the Conde de Penne Villemur nor Gen. Ballesteros entered Seville, while Marshal Soult was in Estremadura in the commencement of this month. The Conde de Penne Villemur is now on his return into Estremadura with the troops of the 5th army, in consequence of a suggestion which I conveyed to him on the 8th inst. Gen. Drouet is at Fuente Ovejuna, in Cordova, with the troops under his command, and Marshal Soult at Seville, according to the last accounts of the 21st inst., which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

I have ordered the militia to return to their stations, and I propose at present to canton the army in the stations most convenient for subsistence till Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida be filled with provisions.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alfaiaes, 24th April, 1812.

Having reported in my dispatch of the 16th inst., that Major Gen. ——— had disobeyed the orders which I had given him, I think it proper to enclose to your Lordship copies of the instructions which he received, and

copies of the correspondence which I have had with him upon the subject, in which you will see how the matter really stands.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th April, 1812.

De Lancey will send you the proposed distribution of the troops, and I say nothing about it.

I send you the last reports from Madrid and Salamanca. You see that they differ a little in respect to the person to command the French armies. They would derive great advantage from this supposed arrangement.

I see in a paper of the 10th, that the Russians declared war on the 19th March.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th April, 1812, 11½ P.M.

I have just now received your letter of 12½ at noon this day, and I am much concerned to find that you did not receive last night the letter I wrote to you yesterday, at a little after 12, and one by the Q.M.G., for the 1st division to halt this day. It was likewise intended that the 1st division should halt at Pedrogaõ to-morrow and next day, and should afterwards proceed under orders sent this day, by Castello Branco across the Tagus.

The first thing to do is to get the men under cover; and as Penamacor, João de Pirez, and Aldea del Obispo are vacant, you had better occupy those places in the morning.

To Gen. Conde de Amarante.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 12th inst. I beg to observe to your Excellency, that the object in placing the troops under your command in Tras os Montes, is principally to defend that province, to observe the enemy's movements in that part of the country, and eventually to aid by movements of your troops, without risking their retreat into Portugal, those movements which Gen. Abadia may make from Galicia. I recommend to you not to make the movement which you propose on Tabara and Carvajales, as being entirely inconsistent with all the objects in view in placing you in Tras os Montes, and risking your troops without any object.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

I have a letter of the 14th from the Bath King at Arms, in which he tells me that there is to be an installation of Knights of the Bath in the next month; and he desires me to have a proxy and three Esquires for the occasion. There will be no difficulty about the latter; but the former must be knighted, which is not very agreeable to many. I am going to write

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

1. The Medical Board, before which Lieut. —, of the — regt., has appeared, having reported that he has no complaint of sufficient consequence to prevent his doing his duty he is to join his regiment forthwith.

2. The General officer commanding the 5th division is requested to report when he shall join.

3. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in conveying to the General officers, officers, and troops, engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the approbation of their conduct by the two Houses of Parliament.

to Culling Smith by the mail, either to be himself my proxy,* or to get one for me, and to point out Esquires for the occasion ; and I shall desire him to get a proxy and Esquires for you. I shall desire him to apply to Lord G. Seymour to be your proxy, who need not care about being knighted.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

The same mail which brought me a letter from Lord Liverpool of the 10th inst., will have brought you the decision of the Treasury of the 8th, that all the specie in the *Standard* is to be applicable to the service of this country. Pray let me know how much there is, in order that I may make the appropriation according to the directions of the Treasury, and in the mean time send me 500,000 or 600,000 dollars ; as we are, as usual, much distressed for money. Let me know also what the Spanish expenditure paid by Great Britain is. I did not know that Whittingham received any thing.

You will see that Marmont made but a poor effort after all. However, we should have lost Ciudad Rodrigo if I had not returned here. I am making every effort to provision that place, and I don't yet despair, between ourselves, of being able to undertake the expedition into Andalusia this year.

P.S. In hopes of being able to go into Andalusia, and of freeing that province, I requested government some time ago to have prepared 20,000 suits of clothing, &c., for a Spanish army of that number.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

I enclose the copy of my last dispatch to the Sec. of State.

I beg that you will inform the Spanish government that I have been in Ciudad Rodrigo, and that I conceive that the firmness and conduct of Brig. Gen. Vives, and of the garrison under his command, during the late blockade by the enemy, are highly praiseworthy.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 21st inst., enclosing one of the 10th from the Sec. of State, in regard to the removal of Principal Sousa from the Local government of Portugal.

It is not necessary that I should enter upon the natural defects of Principal Sousa's mind and character. My objections to him as a member of the government, and my recommendation, in 1810, to the Prince Regent of Portugal, that he should be removed from this situation, were founded upon his being the original cause and promoter of the opposition by the Portuguese Local government to the measures which I proposed should be adopted by the Civil government in aid of and co-operation with the operations of the army, which opposition was founded upon erroneous military notions entertained by this gentleman, and by his influence introduced and supported in the councils of this government.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Campbell was the proxy for the Earl of Wellington, as Knight of the Bath, at the Installation in Westminster Abbey ; and Mr. Culling Smith, Lieut. Col. G. Napier, and Capt. Gurwood, were the three Esquires.

The Prince Regent of Portugal refused, however, to dismiss Principal Sousa from his situation at my recommendation; and although the determination was not communicated to me in very gracious terms, I determined not to press again the removal of this gentleman, as, at the time I received it, the circumstances which had occurred must have proved to the most prejudiced and obstinate that I had not been mistaken in my views of the military operations to be carried on in the year 1810, and that those who impeded or failed to forward my views were not the best friends of their country, or of the alliance. It likewise appeared to me that neither Principal Sousa nor the Portuguese government, acting under his influence, were likely again to interfere in military operations.

I subsequently, in October, 1811, received a letter from the Prince Regent of Portugal, which appeared to me to offer a favorable opportunity of being reconciled to the Local government; and I offered and requested that every thing that had passed might be buried in oblivion.

In the mean time His Majesty's government having been made acquainted with all that had passed, and having interfered with their influence that my recommendation should be attended to, and that Principal Sousa should be removed, His Royal Highness has been pleased to consent to his removal, by his letter of the 29th Oct. 1811; and the question is, whether we shall avail ourselves of that letter to remove Principal Sousa from the government. It is obvious from all that has passed and from the letter itself, that the consent of the Prince has been extorted from him, not by conviction of the unfitness of Principal Sousa for his office, or of the injury he has done to his service and to the cause of his allies, but by a desire to conform to the wishes of His Majesty, and of the Prince Regent, and of His Majesty's servants.

Under these circumstances, although Principal Sousa should be removed from the Regency, he would retain the influence which he possesses over its members and their councils, and ministers, and all the civil branches, at least, of the administration. Nothing would be gained, then, by his removal in the manner proposed, and he would be considered by the country at large as a martyr to English influence, and it is natural to suppose that his popularity would proportionably increase.

I object to Principal Sousa, generally, as a member of the Portuguese Regency, and to the Regency itself, and their measures in general, because, in my opinion, they have endeavored to deceive the country, if they have not themselves taken an erroneous view of their situation.

The real nature of the war has never been fairly brought before the people by the government, and instead of being informed that it was a war on their part for every thing that was valuable in life, if not for life itself; and instead of being called upon and encouraged to make corresponding sacrifices to carry it on, the people have been flattered and cajoled, and the resources of the country, which consist essentially in the sacrifices of the people, have never been fairly called forth to provide for any of the emergencies of the war.

On this same principle of deceiving the people, the sole reliance of the Local government of Portugal, on every occasion, is on the resources and aid of Great Britain. With these views, when reforms of abuses in the

customs, or any other branch of the revenue, or the abolition of useless establishments and the saving of their expenses are recommended, with a view to enable the Portuguese government to carry on the war, they are objected to, or not carried into execution, and fresh demands of loans or subsidies are made upon Great Britain. And in the same view of deceiving the people as to the real nature of the war, all the measures recommended with the hope to enable the army to avail themselves of the resources of the country have been frustrated. They would have been objected to and refused, if, under the late orders of the Prince Regent, that had been possible; but they have been adopted in such a manner as to render all their enactments nugatory. Then, on the same principle, the magistrates have carried these measures into execution according to the spirit in which they have been adopted by the government.

It is possible that Principal Sousa does not believe and has no confidence in the representations which have been repeatedly made to the government of the evil consequences likely to result from this conduct. He has experience of the army having overcome difficulties which have been repeatedly represented to him as fatal; and he thinks it better to rely upon their exertions and upon the resources of Great Britain, than to call upon his own country to exert themselves to facilitate our operations, and to contribute all in their power for their own salvation and for the benefit of the cause. But I cannot admit that, to whatever cause his conduct may be attributed, it is otherwise than desirable that he should be removed from the government.

The question still remains, however, whether advantage shall be taken of the letter of the Prince Regent to remove him.

On the same principle that, on the last occasion, I would not urge the Prince Regent to remove him, I don't recommend that advantage should be now taken of His Royal Highness' letter. The Principal will still enjoy His Royal Highness' favor, if report is to be believed that he is to be raised to a higher station, and his influence over the Regency will continue; and if it should be lost, and the Regency should alter its measures, all the unpopularity which will follow them will attach to the English, and the improvements will still be insufficient for the purposes for which they were recommended. I am therefore not desirous that you should send to Brazil the letter which Lord Castlereagh has written to Lord Strangford.

I recommend to you at the same time to impress upon the King's government the necessity of urging the Prince Regent of Portugal to order his Local government to reform all abuses in the collection and management of his revenue, particularly the customs, and to discontinue all unnecessary expenses, including the naval establishments. He should be informed of the real nature of the war, in relation to his own interests and those of his country; of the necessity of further exertion on the part of Portugal, particularly in finance; of the ease with which such exertion could be made, and of the hopeless impossibility that Great Britain could afford him further pecuniary aid. His attention should be seriously called to the complaints recently sent from this country, of the deficiencies in all descriptions of supplies and assistance which the country ought to

afford ; and he should be reminded that these supplies and assistance are afforded by no people voluntarily ; that laws, with due penalties, and execution of them in an efficient manner, could alone compel the people of any country to make the exertions required from the people of Portugal to insure their salvation, and to enable us and themselves to assist the common cause.

If representations of this description are duly, constantly, earnestly, and sincerely urged by His Majesty's ministers at Brazil, it is to be hoped that at last the Prince's eyes will be opened to the real state of his affairs in Portugal ; and that if he should make a change in his Local government, those who may be removed will be so far disgraced as that those who remain, and their successors, and the ministers and their subordinates in office, will be convinced of the necessity of acting in the manner which has been so often, but hitherto so fruitlessly recommended to them.

To Lieut. Col. Dickson, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812.

I received your letter of the 22d. Capt. Rettberg must give charge of the ordnance and stores in Badajoz to the Spanish Lieut. Colonel of the artillery, sending me a list of what he gives over. When this shall be done, you will move the British and Portuguese artillerymen now in Badajoz to Elvas.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 22d respecting the establishment of a Bank. I am quite certain that the plan, however good in ordinary times, will not answer at present, and it is a waste of time to give it any consideration.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812, 5 P.M.

I have received your note of 5 P.M. yesterday, and I conceive that there will be no inconvenience, and you will have plenty of time to make the tour you propose to Zarza, &c. I am afraid that the inhabitants of that place are very disaffected to the cause. They are, in general, smugglers.

I have nothing new from the front. I have not yet heard that Marmont had arrived at Salamanca. I was yesterday at Ciudad Rodrigo, and I am sorry to say that the works are but little more forward than they were when I saw them last on the 5th March ; yet the Spaniards had till the 1st April to work without any enemy being near them.

It is difficult to know what to do with these people. I have this day tried to excite them to work by feelings of national vanity and honor, but I fear I shall not succeed.

To Visc. Castlereagh, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs. Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 8th marked 'Private,' and I am very much obliged to you for communicating to me the papers you enclosed. It is my opinion that your mediation will produce no effect ; and indeed the Spaniards have not accepted it as if they intended it should. I am certain that the only mode of dealing with them is to make them request as a favor every thing in which it is wished that we should interfere.

I enclose to you a letter which I wrote last summer to my brother upon this subject.* From a perusal of this letter you will see that there are two essential points for mediation to which you have not adverted in your instructions. One is the form of government in the colonies; the other, the disposal of the colonial revenue, or rather, the division of that revenue between the colony and the mother country. This is a very important point for Spain, as well as for the colonies.

I am glad to find that you propose to give a million to Spain this year. I was not aware that my brother had till this time supplied the Spaniards with any money, excepting as advances, which had been repaid. It is my opinion that this money should be given to those who act in co-operation with this army, by which means I should hope to be able to guide their operations in some degree. But this must of course depend upon my brother.

Your brother was better when he went away, and I hope will be quite well when he shall arrive in England.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Campbell, Brigade of Guards.

27th April, 1812.

I have submitted your communication of the 23d inst. to the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed by his Excellency to acquaint you that he has no recollection of having allowed any men to go home that were fit for service. Men unfit for service may have permission to leave the country; but his Excellency cannot allow soldiers to quit the army only because they have served 16 years. I am further to observe that if the application is persisted in, where men are in a state fit for service, his Excellency must refer it to the Commander in Chief, and Sec. of State, to whom the Commander of the Forces feels responsible that the army is as complete as possible.

To Brig. Gen. Le Cor.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

It is desirable that no time should be lost in making arrangements for cutting the hay in Lower Beira for the use of the army. The mode in which I propose that this service shall be performed is as follows: I request you to send orders to the magistrates of those places near which the hay grows, to make immediate arrangements to cut it, and to have it cut and stacked at the proper season; and I beg to know from you, by return of post, what sum of money it is necessary to place in your hands, in order to defray the expense of cutting and stacking. You will then

* See letter to the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley, Quinta de S. João, 14th July, 1811, p. 157.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests, that the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments, will attend to the G. O. which have been issued regarding the cutting of green forage.

2. It is very desirable that where grass can be cut, the green corn should not be used as forage; but where it is necessary to use the green corn, the Commander of the Forces requests that the field may be regularly valued, in the manner pointed out in the G. O.; and that the bat men and other foragers may be confined to the use of that field only, and that care may be taken there is no waste.

3. The horses and other animals of the army must not be turned out to graze in the green corn; and the Commander of the Forces having made arrangements to have the meadows cut for the service of the army at a late period of the season, requests the Generals and Commanding officers of regiments will prevent the horses and other animals from being turned to graze in the meadows, if there should be any other place in which they can be turned, where they will find food.

4. The attention of the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments in the Portuguese service to be particularly called to this order.

pay each magistrate the sum which the hay will cost, informing me of the sum you shall have paid him, and for what quantity of hay. You will then inform the magistrate that he will be held responsible to deliver that quantity of hay to the army, whenever I shall think proper to call for it. I request you to make these arrangements throughout Lower Beira.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

I enclose the copy of a letter of the 8th inst., which I have received from Lord Liverpool, in regard to the disposal of certain arms which his Lordship has sent to you from England. I think they cannot be disposed of in a better manner than that proposed by his Lordship; and I beg you to dispose of them according to the directions contained in the enclosed letter. It may probably be as well to send here the arms intended for Don Julian, and any of the guerrillas in this neighbourhood.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

I enclose the postscript to a letter of the 13th from Sir H. Douglas, which might as well be communicated privately to the government. If the circumstances to which it relates should be made public in England, there will be a breeze; yet I don't see how they can be kept secret. I shall write privately to Castaños upon the subject. It has been hinted to me that — has not given satisfaction in Galicia, in consequence of his pressing the general armament of the people; but dissatisfaction on any account should not have occasioned conduct so foolish as that to which he refers.

I am sorry to tell you that, notwithstanding I left money to carry on the works at Ciudad Rodrigo, I found very little done since I was there last, on the 5th March. There were 26 days of valuable time from the 5th to the 31st March, which appear to have been entirely thrown away, even though it be admitted that during the blockade nothing could be done. Since the 23d of this month also, when the enemy raised the blockade, nothing has been done. I have sent Alava over to the place to point out to the principal officers how much their indolence, and their indulgence of the indolence of their men, affected the cause; and I have told them that I should give no assistance in English soldiers to work, unless the demand for such assistance should be founded on an acknowledgment that the Spanish officers have not authority over their men, to induce them to perform works for their own defence! But the indolence and the apathy of their nature is terrible; yet they boast of their activity and energy. I am convinced that we shall lose both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz before the summer is over, by the prevalence of the habits of indolence and delay in this nation. I write to Castaños upon this subject.

I beg that you will represent to the government the necessity of their attending in some degree to the garrisons of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, and to the troops in Estremadura and Castille. These are thrown entirely now upon the resources of the British army.

I hope also that you will recollect, and, at all events, give a positive answer upon the claim which I have brought forward, that a proportion of

the sum of money given by Great Britain to Spain should be applied to the service of those troops which are in co-operation with us. If I had the command of that sum of money really, I should have the efficient control over all their operations.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the answers of the Commanding officers of the 12th, 14th, and 16th light dragoons to the complaints which have been made of the loss, in the service of these regiments, of bullocks given in charity to the villages in the neighbourhood of Cea.

You will observe that these losses have been occasioned entirely by the desertion of the drivers; an evil which I had wished to remedy by the amendment I proposed to the law relative to the means of transport, but the government would not adopt this amendment.

I have desired that an inquiry may be made from the Commissary at Celorico for the bullocks stated to have been given over to him by the 12th light dragoons.

To Gen. Don Carlos de España.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.*

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 28th inst.

As soon as the communication between the magazines on the Douro and the army was opened, I ordered that provisions might be brought up to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and I am happy to find that your Excellency yesterday sent off 184 carriages to aid in that service. I propose to lodge in Ciudad Rodrigo a magazine of 26,000 rations of biscuit or flour, 100,000 lbs. of salt meat, and 40,000 lbs. of rice for the use of the British army, which magazine will be at the service of the garrison in case the place should be attacked or blockaded.

On the 16th Feb. I gave your Excellency an order upon the magazine of S. João da Pesqueira for 175,000 rations of biscuit or flour, and other provisions, besides the supplies already in the place. I don't know what your Excellency has received on account of this order; but I have given directions that the storekeeper of S. João da Pesqueira should continue to issue upon it when your Excellency shall send the means of conveyance to carry the provisions away.

Mariscal de Campo Don M. de Alava has communicated to me the memorandum which your Excellency gave him for my information, in which you desire to reduce the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to 1500 men; to send one battalion into the Sierra de Gata, and one battalion into the Sierra de Francia, in order to feed on the villages; and you desire that I will supply food in Portugal for 2000 men.

I beg leave to observe to your Excellency, that unless the place of Ciudad Rodrigo should be put in a state of defence, the army under my command, instead of being employed in active operations against the enemy, must watch the enemy's movements against that place.

I believe your Excellency will admit, that unless you employ the troops

* In writing to Spanish authorities, Lord Wellington added his Spanish title to his signature.

of the place to work at the fortifications, you cannot expect to complete them; and I am apprehensive that 1500 men will do but little work.

I would likewise beg leave to observe to your Excellency, that the quantity of 175,000 rations of provisions having been calculated to last the garrison 2 months, and a part of it having now arrived, and your Excellency having it in your power to draw for the remainder when you think proper, there can be no want of provisions for the full garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, more particularly as, long before these provisions can be consumed, the magazine, which I have above stated that it is my intention to put in the place, will have arrived, and will be at the service of the garrison in case it should be attacked. Your Excellency, however, is the best judge of the disposition to be made of your troops.

I shall only repeat to your Excellency, that if Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned, as I had a right to expect when I quitted Castille on the 6th March last, I should now have been in Andalusia at the head of an army of 40,000 men; and that the prospect of my being able to carry that plan into execution in this year depends entirely upon the degree of security which I shall find given at an early period to the place of Ciudad Rodrigo, by the completion of the works ordered by the Capt. Gen. Castaños, for which I have given the money, and by the formation, in the place, of the magazine above mentioned.

In regard to the desire of your Excellency that 2000 men, belonging to your Excellency's division, should be cantoned in Portugal, in order to be fed by the British Commissariat, I beg leave to recall to your Excellency's recollection, that since the months of August and September last, some of the troops under the command of your Excellency have been subsisted in this manner upon the resources intended for the British and Portuguese allied army. I consented to this arrangement in hopes that I should have seen corps regularly organised and disciplined, and that I should have had the benefit of the assistance of your Excellency, at the head of a well disciplined Spanish division, to co-operate with this army.

The wishes of your Excellency and of myself upon this subject have been entirely disappointed; and I must therefore decline giving any further assistance of this description. It is a waste of money, of which, in justice to my own country, I cannot be guilty, to lay it out in feeding an undisciplined peasantry, who, although perfectly capable of being made soldiers, are, after a lapse of 6 months, during which the expense of feeding them has been incurred, no better disciplined, as soldiers, than they ought to have been in the first week. I must therefore request your Excellency to provide for the food of the soldiers of your division now in Portugal, in one week from this date.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

I have received your letters, Nos. 12 and 13, of the 2d and 13th inst.

I concur with you in your opinion of the advantages of the island of Aroza over the Bayona islands, as a depôt on the coast of Galicia. I beg you therefore to obtain the consent of Gen. Abadia to have the necessary works erected for the security of that depôt. Gen. Castaños and Gen.

Abadia will fix upon the position they think best in the kingdom of Galicia; but whatever may be the position, or the plan of operations, or the result, it is desirable to have a secure depôt in one of the islands on the coast of Galicia.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

I have heard nothing new of any description since I wrote to you last; and I enclose the only intelligence which I have received.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Don Carlos de España, and the copy of my answer of this day.

I beg to draw your attention to that part of my letter in which I have refused to give food to those troops which are not disciplined, after they have had arms in their hands, and have been fed by me, in hopes that they would be disciplined, since the months of August and September last.

I recommend to you to adopt the same principle in respect to the distribution of the money and other aids of the British government to the Spanish army. I know no other mode in which the officers can be prevailed upon to discipline their troops, or to keep them in any order.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

The enemy have continued their retreat since I addressed your Lordship on the 24th inst.; and I have carried into execution with this army the disposition which I announced to your Lordship in my dispatch of that date.

I am concerned to have to inform your Lordship that but little progress has been made in the works of Ciudad Rodrigo since I left this part of the country on the 6th March last, notwithstanding that I had left money to complete them. I have ordered magazines of provisions into Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which will be established in those places as soon as means of transport can be collected for the purpose.

No movement has been made in the south. Gen. Drouet was still, by the last accounts, at Fuente Ovejuna, in Cordova. The Conde de Penne Villemur has returned into Estremadura with the troops under his command.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

Referring to your Lordship's dispatch, No. 4, of the 3d Jan., I beg leave to remind your Lordship that you have not yet sent me the permission of H.R.H. the Prince Regent for Brig. Gen. Wilson to accept the order of the Tower and Sword, conferred upon him by the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing a list of the officers whom he considers to be entitled to the medal which H.R.H. the Prince Regent has been pleased to grant, in commemoration of the battle of Albuera.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

Adverting to the instructions contained in my letter of the 24th, I think you might now put your boats and the heavy equipment from Elvas in movement upon Caceres, covering the movement by the Portuguese cavalry, which I suppose are towards Montanches; and I beg you to have the other troops prepared to move on the expedition towards Almaraz, as soon as I shall write to you. I wait only to hear decidedly of the movement of the 1st division.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

I enclose a copy of a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from His Majesty's Ambassador in Spain, notifying to me that the Spanish government had been pleased to confer upon me the Grand Cross of the Order of San Fernando.

I beg your Lordship will lay these letters before H.R.H. the Prince Regent, and request His Royal Highness' permission for me to accept the honor conferred upon me by the government of Spain.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., in which you enclosed one from the Sec. of State to the Regency, to your Excellency, and to myself, informing me that the Spanish government had been pleased to confer upon me the Grand Cross of the Order of San Fernando.*

I beg that you will return my thanks to the government for this mark of their favor, and that you will inform them that I have applied to H.R.H. the Prince Regent for permission to accept it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st May, 1812, 8 A.M.

I received this morning your letter of the 29th. The Conde de Penne Villemur has arrived in Estremadura, in consequence of a suggestion from me. He communicated with Ballesteros, who, as he had notice of Soult's march into Andalusia after the siege of Badajoz, must have retired in time: but he tells me in a letter received this morning, that it is reported at Seville, that Ballesteros had beaten Gen. Rey near Malaga. There was such a General at the head of a small body of troops, I suppose the garrison of Malaga; and Ballesteros, when he advanced upon Seville, detached a column to observe his movements. He probably augmented that column as he retired; and thus he may have defeated Gen. Rey.

I send you the intelligence received last night from Salamanca, which

* See Appendix, No. XXI.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces begs that the staff and regimental officers of the 3d, 4th, 5th, and Light divisions, and Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, will send to Almeida to get the tents they will require for the campaign. It must be clearly understood, that if they do not take them now, they cannot have them hereafter.

2. The A.Q.M.G. with each division will send to the Q.M.G. a return of the number of tents required by each individual officer of the staff and by each regiment, and the Q.M.G. will send orders to Almeida, that the tents may be issued accordingly.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests, that the General officers commanding brigades will occasionally inspect the camp kettle mules in the regiments in their brigades, and will see they are efficient for the service.

shows the disposition of the enemy's several divisions. You will see in the paper from Valladolid, that the enemy have some heavy artillery already, and some on the march from Bayonne.

To the Corregidor of the Comarca of —.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d May, 1812.

I am desirous of making arrangements to have the hay cut in the Comarca under your directions, in order that the army under my command may have the advantage of it, at the same time that the people will derive profit. I beg you, therefore, to give directions to the other magistrates in your district, to make arrangements to have the hay in their districts cut and stacked at the proper season. They are to report to you the quantity which will be cut and stacked in each village, and the expense of the same; and you will forward this report to the Commissary Gen. at head quarters, who will send you the money to be distributed for this service among the several magistrates of the district.

The magistrate who will receive the money will be responsible to produce for it a corresponding quantity of good hay for the service of the army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d May, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatches, Nos. 24 and 26, of the 25th March and 2d April; and having considered with the Commissary Gen. and other persons here, who have a knowledge of the facilities in raising money in this country, the probability of succeeding with the securities drawn and transmitted by your Lordship, it has appeared to those persons, as well as to me, that the chance of success would be greater if the certificate were altered, as proposed in the enclosed draft, in which the option is left to receive the interest at head quarters or at Lisbon, and to receive payment of the principal likewise at the same places.


There would be but little inconvenience in paying the interest at head quarters as well as at Lisbon; and in regard to the principal, I would observe that the measure is calculated to provide for a momentary scarcity of specie in England, applicable to the service of the army abroad. It is not probable that in 3 years there will be the same difficulty in procuring specie in England to send abroad as there is at present; and if there should be, it is not improbable that the regularity of the payment of the interest, and the advantages and security enjoyed from this description of certificate, will have improved the credit of the British government to such a degree, that there will be no difficulty in borrowing specie in the Peninsula to pay off these certificates.

There remains for consideration another possible event, viz., that the British army shall have been withdrawn from the Peninsula before the expiration of the term of 3 years. It will be necessary in that case to appoint an agent for the holders of these certificates, to receive their interest and the principal when it shall become due, at the office of the Commissary in Chief in London, and transmit it to them in the Peninsula.

In case your Lordship should consent to the proposed alterations in the certificate, I beg you will determine and let me know whether the alterations shall be made here in the certificates already transmitted, or

whether your Lordship will have others made out according to the form enclosed.

No. 123.
1000 Dollars.
Don Manuel
Velasquez.
(his signature)
transferred on
the
to Don Diego
Lopez.
(his signature.)



No. 123.

Certificate for 1000 Dollars.

For 1000 dollars advanced to the British army the holder of this certificate is hereby entitled to receive interest at the rate of 5 *per cent. per annum*, in half-yearly payments, on the _____ and the _____ in each year, at the office of the Commissary General of the British army, at head quarters or at Lisbon.

The said 1000 dollars will be repaid by the said Commissary General of the British army, at head quarters, or in Lisbon, at any period after the expiration of two years from the date hereof, within ten days of the presentation of this certificate for that purpose.

In case the holder of this certificate should choose to receive payment of the interest or principal in England, he will, upon giving notice thereof, receive payment, as above specified, at the office of the Commissary in Chief in London, at the rate of 5 shillings sterling for each Spanish dollar.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

(Countersigned)

Com. Gen.

Dep. Pay. Gen.

MEMORANDUM.

Every transfer of this certificate must be duly registered and certified at one of the offices where the interest is made payable, without which it will not be acknowledged.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Bowes, 4th division.

2d May, 1812.

I should have earlier done myself the honor of replying to your wishes, suggested when at Badajoz, had the Commander of the Forces enabled me to do so, by deciding upon the subject; but having again submitted the application, as conveyed in your letter of the 24th ult., I am directed by his Excellency to refer you to the state of the Fusiliers for want of officers, which prevents his being able to comply with the appointment of Capt. Wylls as your A.D.C. The Commander of the Forces is much distressed in being obliged to refuse any thing that is asked by a General officer, who ought to be as well aware as he is of the inconvenience which must attend the grant of it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d May, 1812, A.M.

I received this morning your letter of the 1st, and I now enclose a paper from Salamanca. The Curate of Coca is come over, and says that Marmont had brought back to Salamanca the troops which had marched through that place; being under some apprehension that we should move forward.

I am sorry that you experienced difficulty in passing the road from Villa Velha to Niza. It is very bad; and I am afraid cannot be materially improved.

I have sent Sturgeon and Todd to endeavor to repair the bridge of Alcantara; in which I hope they will succeed.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d May, 1812, 11 P.M.

I received in due course your letter giving me an account of the progress of the repairs, &c., at Badajoz; and I am happy to find that you are going on so well.

There are two or three points, however, to which I think you ought to attend, in order in some degree to improve the state of the works.

1st; the sluices in the dams of the bridge over the Rivillas, and in the dam of the ditch of the ravelin of San Roque, ought to be protected in some manner or other, so as to prevent the enemy from effecting the object which we attempted in regard to the latter. Probably a good wall of stone masonry in front of, and enclosing each of the dams, with a grating at the bottom of the wall to give a free passage to the water, would answer the purpose.

It would likewise be desirable to have a good covered communication from the Picurina to the ravelin. Indeed, if the inundation can be depended upon, I should think that the Picurina might be rendered very difficult of attack by its gorge, approaching it by its right flank.

I don't know whether you have found the plans of the French engineers for bringing water into the ditch of the fort from the Guadiana. It is very desirable that these schemes should be examined, and their practicability and expense ascertained.

I conclude that you have discovered the communication between the inundation of the Rivillas and the water in the ditch of the fort, and have ascertained whether it is, or can be retained in the latter, supposing that it is let out of the former.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d May, 1812.

I am very sorry to tell you that affairs are going on very badly at Ciudad Rodrigo. I sent Gen. Alava there yesterday, upon hearing that they had not yet commenced upon the works; and, as far as I could understand him, the garrison were in a state of mutiny, because Don Carlos de España had not performed a promise which he had made to pay the officers of the garrison for their extra allowances of provisions, which

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d May, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers commanding divisions and brigades in this army, to the orders, page 279 of the printed General Regulations and Orders, containing directions respecting the half yearly confidential reports, which are required to be made by the General officers employed upon the staff of the army, at home and abroad, and the circular letter from the Adj. Gen. of the army, of the 18th Jan. 1812, on the same subject.

2. As, notwithstanding the various occasions on which the Commander of the Forces has called the attention of the officers of the army to the orders which he has had occasion to issue on various branches of the service, he is concerned to observe that, in many instances, they are still unattended to, he particularly requests the General officers commanding brigades, in reporting upon the qualifications of the officers of the regiment, as directed in page 280 of the printed Regulations, and in the letter from the Adj. Gen. of the 18th Jan. 1812, will specify whether or not they are acquainted with the G. O. of the army, particularly those which relate to the mode of sending soldiers to the hospital; to the march of detachments through the country; to the care and inspection of their men, and of their conduct in cantonments, on a march or stationary; and to the mode of making requisitions for supplies of all descriptions required from the country. These points, as well as others referred to, particularly in the General regulations of the 12th Aug. 1811, and in the letter from the Adj. Gen. of the 18th Jan. 1812, can be ascertained only by the General officer who will make and report on the inspection, conversing with the officers on the object and meaning of the several orders referred to.

had been stopped from them during the blockade. He gave me to understand that he should write to the Spanish government this day to apprise them of his opinion, and that of several of the principal officers of the garrison, that it was absolutely necessary that a British officer should be appointed Governor of that garrison; and as far as I could understand him, that allied troops, meaning British and Portuguese, should be in it.

I am tolerably well acquainted with the sentiments of some of these officers, among others, of Alava himself, regarding the employment of British officers in any Spanish concern; and I am thoroughly convinced that this proposal does not proceed from any desire to improve the Spanish military system, but that it is to be attributed solely to the desire to get out of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. They dislike the restraint which must prevail soon in a Spanish garrison; they dislike being exposed to my view in the occasional visits which I make to the place, and to my remonstrances on their indolence, and want of discipline, which I have assumed a right to make, on the ground of the assistance which I have given them of different descriptions; and, above all, they dislike the prospect of, some day or other, being attacked in Ciudad Rodrigo. This last feeling is common to all Spaniards. I refer you upon this point to Roche, who says very truly, that when a Spanish officer or soldier is running away, the last place he will run to is a fortified town, although he should be certain of receiving there assistance of every description. It is very desirable that you, and the Spanish government, should be clearly informed of my opinions and intentions on this point.

1st; I consider the British troops the best we have, and I will not put them in garrison. 2dly; I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the Peninsula, and I will not put more of them in garrisons than I am under the necessity of employing in that manner. I am obliged to employ some Portuguese regular troops in Elvas, and one regiment in Abrantes, but the Portuguese forts in general are occupied by the Portuguese militia, who, like other militia, cannot regularly be marched beyond the Portuguese frontier; and if they should be sent beyond the frontier for any length of time, they would desert.

I insist upon it, that Spanish troops are the proper garrisons for Spanish forts. If the Spanish government differ with me upon this point, and insist upon my placing garrisons in these forts which we have taken from the enemy, and I have made over to them; or if they don't adopt measures to place, and support, in them proper garrisons, I now give notice that I will destroy both Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo. It will not answer their purpose or mine, that I should be tied by the leg to guard these two places against the evils to be apprehended from the want of proper garrisons, or sufficient supplies in them. The Spanish troops, however, will be no more fit to garrison these places, unless they should be disciplined, paid, and fed, than they are for other military services; and I see no chance of their being the first, unless they should be the two last.

But the British government having agreed to aid the Spanish government with one million sterling this year in specie, besides aids in other modes, I see no reason why a part, at least, of this sum should not be applied to the support of those garrisons, and troops which are to act in

concert with the British army, and to aid and support our operations. The distribution of this money having been referred to you, I am anxious to have your decision, whether you propose to give any, and what part of it, for the support of the garrisons of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the troops under Don Carlos de España, destined to act in Castille, and of the Conde de Penne Villemur, destined to act in Estremadura.

If I am to have any thing to say to the distribution of this aid, I shall employ it in giving their pay, or a certain proportion of their pay, to a certain number of officers and soldiers, regularly organised and disciplined. Those who shall not be disciplined in two months, shall receive no more of this aid, nor any assistance whatever from the British government. The contributions levied from the province, and any money that could be sent by the government, should go to make up the deficiency of the pay from the British subsidy. In this manner we might contrive to discipline and maintain these Spanish garrisons, and to render them useful.

In regard to the employment of British officers with the Spanish troops, I entertain the same opinion which I have always held upon this subject. British officers will be worse than useless, if they have not the support to their exertions of the authority of the Commander in Chief, who must have the cordial support of the government, or he will have no authority. British officers, besides, require an authority of no mean description, exercised with considerable strictness, to keep them in order and within due bounds. The history of our service in Portugal will afford many instances of the truth of both these opinions. British officers would have more difficulties to contend with in Spain than they had in Portugal, and more temptations and opportunities of abusing their authority.

I retain likewise the same opinions regarding my having the command of the Spanish armies. I consider troops that are neither paid, fed, nor disciplined (and they cannot be disciplined, and there can be no subordination among them, unless they are paid and fed), to be dangerous only to their friends when assembled in large bodies: as guerrillas they might be of some use, but it would be better, probably, if the same men were employed under the guerrilla officer, who is much better acquainted with his trade than what is called the officer of the regular Spanish service, knows the country better, which is the seat of his operations, knows better and is better known to the inhabitants, and, above all, has no pretensions to military character.

I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot, and will not obey; and therefore I am not desirous of having any thing to say to the command of the Spanish troops till I shall see the means provided for their food and pay, and till I shall be certain that the regular issue of these has had the effect of introducing among them a regular system of subordination and discipline.

Upon this subject of the introduction of British officers into the service, and of the command being given to me, I may be wrong, but I entertain opinions which I have not heard from others. It is my opinion, that the officers of the Spanish army, and the *employés* of the government in the military as well as the civil departments, are the principal excitors and supporters of the general sentiment which prevails among the people

against the French. Excepting the *grandees*, and a few men of large estate, who resided in the provinces, every person in Spain of the class or a gentleman, or, more properly speaking, above the class of the cultivators of the soil, was in the civil, military, or naval service of the government. All these consider themselves deprived of their profession by the establishment of the government of Buonaparte, particularly the officers of the army: and it is a very remarkable circumstance, and tending strongly to support my opinion, that the officers of the navy, whose services are least likely to be required by their country, in case the Spanish nation should succeed in shaking off the Buonaparte yoke, and that the alliance with England should become the permanent system of Spain, have done least in the war, have seldom agreed cordially with us, and a larger proportion of them, than of the military, have taken the side of the usurpation.

The conclusion which I draw from these observations is, that if we mean to encourage the continued resistance of the Spanish people, we ought not to disgust the officers of the Spanish army, and so far deprive them of their profession as to give to British officers the effectual control over the army. Mind, I don't say that the Spanish officers are the sole cause of the continued resistance of the people; for I believe the sentiment of hostility against the French is part of the nature of a Spaniard; but it must be admitted, that the example and instigation of the superior class of officers must have some effect in continuing the resistance of the lower orders.

But, although I conceive that there are many difficulties and inconveniences in introducing our officers into the Spanish service, and in giving the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's troops the supreme command of the whole, I conceive that many of the advantages to be expected from both arrangements might be acquired in another manner. I think that I have already acquired such an influence over the officers of the Spanish army, that they would do any thing I should desire them, excepting perhaps to discipline their troops, establish subordination and order among them, and overcome their habits of indolence and procrastination. I doubt that they can effect these objects till the troops shall be regularly paid and fed; and if what I have above suggested be adopted, you will see that the remedy for these defects is provided.

It has always been my opinion that much might be done by the British government to increase the authority and influence of the Commander in Chief in this country.

1st; Travelling military missions ought to be put an end to, or ought to be under the immediate direction of the Commander in Chief.

2dly; No aid of any description ought to be given to any Spanish troops, or commander of army, or guerrillas, excepting under the direction of the Commander in Chief.

I have above stated the condition upon which alone I would issue any aid to any regular troops. The discipline of guerrillas might not be insisted upon; but it might be possible to couple with the grant of any aid, whether of arms, provisions, or money, even to guerrillas, an arrangement for their following a certain system, or line of operations, connected with those of others.

All propositions for increase and extension of authority are received in England with jealousy; and I have therefore never made any direct proposition upon this subject. I might have hoped that the desire which I have always expressed to be allowed to confine my attention to my own army, might have satisfied the King's government that I want no extension of authority, and that I deprecate it as throwing upon me additional responsibility and trouble. But the state of the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the discussions into which we are about to enter respecting those establishments, render it necessary to speak out; and I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, that the only remedy for the existing evils is for the British government to increase to the utmost extent the power and authority of the Commander in Chief, and to leave to his discretion the distribution of all the aids to the Peninsula.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 30th April, to which I would not trouble you with an answer, only that I see that Dom M. Forjaz, of course, deceived himself by those under him, has thus deceived you.

I have as yet made no complaint of means of transport in Alentejo, wanting to convey provisions and stores to Elvas and Badajoz since the siege of the latter. What I complained of, was want of means of transport to convey the stores for the siege of Badajoz, in the months of February and March, and to facilitate the operations of the siege. These wants occurred before the complaints were made.

I am afraid that Dom M. Forjaz thinks that I am inclined to complain without reason. In order to avoid disappointment and complaint, and in order, if possible, to throw provisions into all the fortified places and magazines without pressing the country for means of transport (which, by the by, I must observe ought to be done by others, and not by me), I have done what I believe no other General at the head of an army ever before dreamt of. The allied army are now separated, from the Douro to the Sierra Morena, close to the magazines, in order that the troops may subsist with facility, and that all the means of transport belonging to the army may be employed in filling the forts and magazines with provisions, in order that I may have to call for little transport from the country, and may have no complaints to make.

I beg, however, that Dom M. Forjaz may not boast that the want of complaint is to be attributed to the activity of the agents of the government, or the efficiency of the law.

I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about my carriage. I shall write to Gen. Lobo about it.

To Brig. Gen. Lobo.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d May, 1812.

Mr. Stuart, His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, has informed me, that he has taken the liberty of addressing to you a carriage which has been sent for me from England.

I shall be obliged to you if you will direct the person who is bringing the carriage to proceed by the route enclosed to head quarters.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

I beg, that as soon as convenient after the receipt of this letter, you will inspect the — regt. under the G.O. of the 3d May, 1812, and make me a report upon its state without loss of time, in order that I may judge of the expediency of again ordering that regiment into the field.

I understand that the — regt. have their mules, &c. in readiness to march at the shortest notice.

To Brig. Gen. Le Cor.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst., and I have given directions to the Commissary Gen. to have a sum of money in the hands of the Commissary at Castello Branco, for the purpose of making the advances for cutting hay, at an early period in this month.

The Commissary at Castello Branco will be directed to wait upon you on this subject. I beg, however, that you will observe, that I don't propose to make advances for straw; I make advances for hay, under the notion that this description of forage would not be cut, under the existing circumstances of the country, if these advances were not made. Whatever may be the state of the country, the corn will be cut, and the straw will be a resource, and I am willing to take my chance of its being one, for the army on payment on delivery, rather than pay for it beforehand. It will not be necessary, therefore, to provide so large a sum to be advanced as you propose.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812, 11½ p.m.

I enclose papers of the 27th and 30th April, from Salamanca. The former ought to have been received before.

Marmont ought certainly to place his left on the Tagus, and his right at Avila, and to hold Salamanca by a small corps. But the French are so distressed for provisions, and in every other way, that it is difficult to guess what they will do. Affairs are going on but ill at Ciudad Rodrigo; and as far as I can understand, there has been something very like a mutiny there; and all parties agree that the garrison must be given over to us; that is to say, the officers don't choose to stay in it. I have given fair notice, however, that I will not take charge of the garrison, excepting on an acknowledgment under their hands, that they are incapable of holding it, or, as officers, of commanding their men; and that sooner than garrison the place permanently, I will destroy it entirely. I have, however, begged my brother to draw the serious attention of the government to this subject.

I think this time favorable for Hill's operation upon Almaraz, and I have desired him to march upon it with a part of his troops.

I have sent large numbers of carts and animals to the magazines to bring up supplies for the places; and that business is going on well. Before it can be so far completed as to enable me to leave this place, I must know what Marmont's dispositions are, and I shall be prepared for a movement on one side or the other of the Tagus before the harvest. In order to make this preparation, however, I have done what could not be attempted in any other war but this; having placed the right of the army upon the Sierra Morena, and the left at S. João da Pesqueira, on

the Douro. But I am certain that the French will not find out how weak we are in all points.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Madrid from a person unknown to me, in regard to the two young men who will wait upon you with this letter.

I beg leave to recommend them to your protection; and if it should appear that there is any person in authority at Cadiz acquainted with the character of the writer of the enclosed letter, or with that of their family, I beg you will recommend that they may be received into the academy, and eventually employed in the army.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 26th April. It does not appear to me to be necessary that you should issue the stores required by Brig. Gen. Carroll till he shall have men to make use of them, and only in proportion as he shall have men.

I beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of abstaining from making remonstrances on the detachment of troops from Galicia to America, till you shall receive orders to do so from His Majesty's government. Your duty is to make such representations as you may be directed to make to the General officer commanding in Galicia in regard to his operations, and to suggest the measures which may occur to you as likely to forward the object in the view of His Majesty's government, or of the Commander in Chief of the army. You are likewise to superintend the distribution of the stores sent to Galicia for the purposes of the war, according to the orders which you will from time to time receive. But I beg leave to suggest to you, that you have nothing to say to political measures. You have nothing to do with the detachment of troops or artillery to South America.*

It is obvious that Gen. Abadia, or Gen. Castaños, could not make such detachments without orders from their government; and you must not endeavor to prevail upon them to disobey the orders which they may receive, although you may press the expediency of the employment of the troops and artillery in other quarters, without reference to the orders of the government that the troops and artillery should be sent to America.

If His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz should wish to have those orders recalled, he will make the request direct to the government; and at all events your interference with the person who is to obey the orders of the government must be hopeless, while it will lead to discussions of an unpleasant nature, which may as well be avoided.

In regard to the supply of arms and equipments to troops about to be detached to America, you have received the Sec. of State's orders upon that subject, and you will of course obey them.

* Lord Wellington was not aware that Sir H. Douglas had received orders from His Majesty's government to use every exertion to defeat any project of the kind, and which Lord Wellington afterwards acknowledged to Sir H. Douglas in a letter dated 25th May, 1812, the draft of which is missing; but the record of that letter in the Index states as follows: 'not to obey the instructions of the 6th inst. till he receives further orders from the Sec. of State.'

If troops should be detached to America which you have supplied with arms and equipments, you will observe to Gen. Abadia that the design in supplying these arms and equipments was to enable the Spanish government to oppose the common enemy in the Peninsula, and not to attempt any thing so hopeless as the conquest of the Colonies; and you will suggest to him the expediency of using the arms and equipments for troops destined to serve against the common enemy in Europe.

If any of the arms and equipments issued by you should be detached to America with the troops notwithstanding these remonstrances, you will, upon every occasion on which you shall make an issue to the troops in Galicia in future, stipulate that neither the arms nor the equipments issued by you are to be detached with any troops to America.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 16th, 23d, 25th, 26th, and 29th April, Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, and 68; and I have perused with great attention the enclosures from Major Gen. Ross.

I entirely concur with Gen. Ross in opinion, that it is expedient that he should occupy Fort Atalaya, as well as Fort Galeras, and that those places should be provisioned for the period during which it is probable that they would hold out if attacked by the enemy, or during which it might be expedient that the garrison should be kept within them without communication with the town.

In regard to the heights of San Julian, I was induced, upon examining the plan of Carthagená, and upon conversing with Lieut. Wells, to be of opinion that it was expedient not to occupy that position. According to Lieut. Wells' report, the construction of a respectable field work on that point appeared impracticable; and any thing more solid appeared to require such a length of time and a sum of money, owing to the extreme difficulty of getting materials to the spot, that it could not be expected that it would be completed within any reasonable period.

It likewise appeared from an examination of the plan, that although the occupation of San Julian was essentially necessary, with a view to any more extensive system for the protection of the right of the works of the town, and for the protection of the navigation of the harbour, it was not itself sufficient for either object; and therefore upon the whole I was of opinion, that it was better not to occupy San Julian, more particularly as it appeared that there was at all times a good communication with the sea from Galeras. It is, however, impossible to form a conclusive opinion upon a question of this description without seeing the ground. It is obvious that some of the information received from Lieut. Wells was erroneous; and Major Gen. Ross on the spot, must be a better judge than I can be here, of the effect of his work upon San Julian; and upon the whole I certainly concur in his plan to complete the old Spanish field work on that hill, and to build within it the tower proposed by Capt. Roberts.

Major Gen. Ross must likewise be a better judge than I can be of the expediency of placing guns of a large calibre in Fort Atalaya, and his works on San Julian.

I have observed that the French have come but ill provided with ord-

nance and ammunition for the attack of strong places in Spain; and, therefore, unless there should be reason for preferring heavy ordnance in outworks, light ordnance should be adopted. But if heavy ordnance should be necessary, and there should be any of the irregular calibres, it should be preferred to ordnance of the regular calibres. For this same reason I recommend, that if Major Gen. Ross should think ordnance of large calibres necessary in these outworks, he should prefer the English ordnance, as the ammunition will not answer for the French and Spanish calibres. I believe, however, that the heavy English iron 12 pounders will throw a shot as far as any other gun; and if the shot is not required for destroying masonry, that calibre would answer as well as any other for all other purposes. This gun, therefore, ought to be preferred for these outworks, and it would be useless to the enemy if it should fall into their hands.

The same observation regarding the deficiency of ammunition generally felt by the enemy for his operations, suggests the expediency of firing as few guns as possible of the regular calibres; as I know, that upon more than one occasion, the French have carried on a siege nearly unprovided with shot excepting that fired by the besieged, which is picked up by the soldiers for a reward.

The next subject which requires an answer in Major Gen. Ross' letters, relates to Alicante. I have received no orders from His Majesty's government to occupy that post with British troops, and I cannot think it expedient, in any view of the subject, to detach troops from Cadiz, or from this army, to occupy that post.

In regard to the proposition from Gen. O'Donell, that Major Gen. Ross should detach troops from Carthagena, I might refer Major Gen. Ross to the instructions which have been handed over to him by Col. Lambert. He has the copy of the instructions which were given to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart when he was detached from this army to Cadiz, in 1810, to which he is directed to attend, as far as they may be found applicable to the circumstances at Carthagena; and he will find in those instructions an article relating to quitting the Isla de Leon. I should be sorry to be bound myself, and I don't wish to bind others by positive orders, which may not be applicable to circumstances as they may arise.

The Spanish nation and troops, particularly the common soldiers, entertain an opinion that our soldiers are invincible; and that it is only necessary that they should appear, in order to insure success; and they are so ignorant of the nature of a military operation, that they attribute our refraining from interfering upon many occasions to disinclination to the cause, and frequently to the want of the requisite military qualities in the General officer who directs our operations. It may be depended upon, that where there are British troops, there will be no want of invitations for their co-operation; but I am convinced that there is no officer who can believe that 500 or 600 men can perform any thing essential; or that it is proper to employ the King's troops, or to risk their safety in the execution of plans which have really no essential object in view, which are adopted without consideration, and relinquished without cause; and for the execution of which there do not exist, even in the opinion of those who propose them, any adequate means excepting the military virtues of

the British troops. I therefore beg leave to warn Major Gen. Ross of the inexpediency of his attending to the invitations of Gen. O'Donell of co-operation in expeditions in the field; as he may depend upon it, that they will not answer any purpose. I can't at this distance, however, take upon me to say, that a case will not occur, in which it may be proper that Major Gen. Ross should detach some of the troops under his command from Carthagea; and I beg to refer him to my letter to you upon the subject of detachments from Cadiz, of the 15th Nov. 1811, which has been approved of by the Sec. of State.

In regard to Major Gen. Ross' complaints of the inclination of the soldiers of Watteville's regiment to desert, I beg to observe: 1st; that it affords an additional reason for not detaching from Carthagea the few British troops he has under his command: 2dly; that all General officers, who have foreign troops under their command, have the same cause to complain. In that part of the allied army under my command, called British, there are between 6000 and 7000 of them, who desert whenever they can get an opportunity; and I cannot increase the number, and decrease that of the really British troops, in order to send another British regiment to Major Gen. Ross; neither do I think that you can spare another British regiment from Cadiz in exchange for 500 foreign troops. I am responsible for the description of troops which I have sent to Carthagea, and Major Gen. Ross is responsible for making the proper use of them; and if he thinks that I have not sent to Carthagea troops upon whom he can depend for the service on which he is employed, he has only to say so, and he shall be relieved.

I don't think it quite clear, whether Major Gen. Ross has or not a warrant from you to enable him to hold a General Court Martial, as he mentions in one letter that he has not a warrant, and in another that he has ordered a General Court Martial to try certain deserters. I therefore enclose a warrant to enable him to hold a General Court Martial.

It is necessary that you should request the Governor of Gibraltar to supply the ordnance and stores required as well for Carthagea as for Tarifa, and inform me and the Sec. of State of the nature and amount of those requisitions. I concur in your paying the Spanish soldiers a *real* a day for their work at Tarifa, but I beg leave to suggest to you, that measures may be adopted to insure their doing a day's work for the payment, either by fixing the task which each man is to perform, or by the active superintendence of officers, or by any other mode that may be proposed.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

Although I have neither the authority nor the means of applying a remedy to the various complaints which you may have occasion to make, I beg that you will understand that it is my duty to attend to them, and that it is not necessary that you should make any apology for sending them.

I beg leave to observe, however, that the papers transmitted in your letter of the 2d inst. are no answer to the complaints made by me of the civil authorities in Alentejo for omitting to supply the means of transport required in February to bring up to Elvas the stores for the siege of

Badajoz. After the place was taken I threw upon the government the responsibility of bringing up the supplies to replenish the magazines of Elvas, and to fill those of Badajoz; and I am happy to find that that measure has had the effect of calling forth an exertion which, according to Dom M. Forjaz's account, has accomplished my object.

When a complaint is made in Portugal, I observe that there is no want of answers. But answers written months after the cause of complaint arises will not carry on the service, and I only wish that those who write them would come forward and suggest resources to remedy or remove the inconveniences of all descriptions occasioned by the neglects and omissions which gave cause for the complaints. They will then probably think it necessary to do something more than give fallacious answers.

In regard to money for the Portuguese government, I begged Mr. Bissett to suggest to you that if you were not satisfied with the sum he was enabled to supply you, you should make your complaint on the subject to the King's government. I am not the Minister of Finance, nor is the Commissary Gen. It is the duty of the King's ministers to provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake a service for which they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other requisite. They have thrown upon me a very unpleasant task in leaving to me to decide what proportion of the money which comes into the hands of the Commissary Gen. shall be applied to the service of the British army, and what shall be paid to the King's minister, in order to enable him to make good the King's engagements to the Portuguese government; and at the same time that they have laid upon me this task, and left me to find money to carry on the war as I could, they have, by their orders, cut off some of the resources which I had.

In every view of the case, therefore, it is to the King's government that you should make your complaint. I must say, however, that there is little cause for complaint of want of supplies of money from the Portuguese government in the months of March and April. It appears by Mr. Bissett's statement that he issued to you in those months 725,000 dollars, besides supplies to a large amount; and besides provisions for the Portuguese troops serving with our divisions, for the garrison of Almeida, and to the militia under Gens. Trant, Wilson, and the Conde de Amarante, and pay and provisions to the regiment at Cadiz. I cannot be certain, but I believe the Portuguese government are not entitled to more in money than the sum above stated. This, however, is no concern of mine; I merely suggest it for your consideration, before you bring the subject under the consideration of the King's government.

At all events, whether the sum is less or more than the King has engaged to supply to the Portuguese government, I could not authorise the issue of more, with justice even to the Portuguese service. The British army have not been paid for nearly 3 months; we owe nearly a year's hire to the muleteers of the army; and we are in debt for supplies in all parts of the country; *and we are on the point of failing in our payments for some supplies essentially necessary to both armies, which cannot be procured excepting with ready money.*

I admit that the payments made in March and April, although to the full amount of what the Portuguese government are entitled to, are not sufficient for their wants. But that is no concern of mine. I have frequently recommended measures which, if they had been adopted, would by this time have rendered the Portuguese government independent of the subsidy, and an aid instead of being a financial burthen on Great Britain. I repeat those measures: a reform in the abuses of the customs of Lisbon and Oporto; a more equal and just collection of the income tax on the commercial property, particularly in those large and rich cities. (It is really scandalous to hear of the fortunes which have been made by the mercantile classes in those cities by the war, and to reflect that they contribute nothing to bear its burthens.) A reform of the expenses of the naval establishments of the country and those of the arsenal. If these measures were adopted, the income would be equal to the expenditure, and the government would get on without calling upon Great Britain at every moment to find that which, in the existing state of the world, can't be procured, viz., money.

I am concerned that I can't agree with you in the justice of the proposition that the King should pay the hire of boats detained in the service of the Portuguese government, when the Commissariat don't issue from the stores all that is required at the moment it is required. Adverting to the extensive store houses there are at Lisbon unemployed, and belonging to the government, it is not very friendly, nor, adverting to the scarcity of specie, very politic, to make the Commissary Gen. hire his stores at a large rent; and I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of demanding from the Portuguese government a proportion of the rent for store houses, equal to the proportion of the stores consumed by the Portuguese army. This demand, however, has not been made. That which has been made for rent is for stores not taken away, when the orders for their issues had been given, which, considering that when an issue is ordered, a purchase must be made of fresh quantities to supply its place; and that if the stores of which the issue has been ordered are not carried away, new store rooms must be hired and additional expense incurred, does not appear to me to be unreasonable.

I must observe upon this discussion that it originates in the system of giving *answers* to complaints, instead of applying a remedy.

Marshal Beresford makes a complaint of want felt by the army, and Senhor Cardoso *answers*, by what I must term a falsehood, viz., that he can't get his supplies from the British Commissariat. When this *answer* comes to be examined here, after having gone through the usual course of notes, &c., it turns out to be proved that the issues had been ordered months before; that the stores were still lying in the British store houses; and that they had been replaced by fresh purchases of stores, to hold which fresh store houses had been hired. Is a demand for payment for store room, under these circumstances, at all like a demand for payment of hire for boats, detained possibly by the usual course of business, but certainly, as appears by the above statement of facts, not by design?

The man who wrote the paper which you sent to England is not employed by me. I thought he had been employed by you, but I find he is employed by my brother. I judge from the intelligence that he is the same person who sends information from Valencia de Alcantara.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I wrote to my brother 3 days ago, in regard to the temper of the officers of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; since which time the officers have been in open mutiny. It is not necessary that I should enter upon the details of this event; but it is obvious to me from the pretence for it, the conduct of the body of the officers in general, and the mode in which it was put an end to, that what they want is to get out of the garrison. I cannot but admit that their situation in the garrison is very distressing; they have no pay, and nothing but their rations to subsist upon. The inhabitants in general had quitted Ciudad Rodrigo previous to the late blockade, and they have not yet returned, and the officers enjoy none of the conveniences which they would have by residing in the houses of the inhabitants in cantonments in the villages. They are, therefore, dissatisfied with their situation, and I am certain that unless means can be devised of paying them and the troops under their command regularly, it is useless to expect any assistance from them. If I was enabled to pay them, I would force them to learn and to perform their duty.

Your Lordship will observe in the enclosed letter, that it is my opinion that all the supplies sent to this country for the Spanish government should be at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the King's troops. I have long entertained this opinion; and if I have not given utterance to it more clearly, it is because I was not desirous of creating an impression that I wished to accumulate power into my own hands. It might besides appear that I blamed the distribution of the supplies in kind, which had been made by His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, as, till I read Lord Castlereagh's dispatch to the Duque del Infantado, I did not know that the Spanish government had received any but very small occasional sums of money, always upon a promise of repayment, which promise had frequently been performed.

The reasons why I think the supplies ought to be exclusively in the hands of the Commander in Chief are: 1st; That it will give him an influence over all the operations more efficient than the command under existing circumstances, and probably as efficient as it could be under any circumstances. 2dly; It is the only mode in which the due distribution of the supplies, money in particular, can be secured for the purposes of the service.

I beg to refer your Lordship to Sir H. Douglas's statement of the revenue and expenditure of Galicia, and to the monthly estimates of the military expenditure in Portugal, in which you will see how large a revenue can be laid out among military pensioners and civil establishments of all descriptions, and an example of how small a proportion of a sum of money can be applied to the support of the real fighting soldier. I contend for it, that if the King's Ambassador at Cadiz disposes of this money,

he must dispose of it through the hands of the government: admitting that the government dispose of it conscientiously for the benefit of the army, what happens? They send a part to —, and the first thing — — will do will be to take the whole arrear of his own appointments, and those of his whole Staff, and probably a part of the appointments of 1500 officers living at his head quarters at —, who have dispersed; the officers doing duty with the regiments will probably get but very little, and the soldiers positively nothing: this is a real representation of what I know to be a fact.

A sum of money sent to — — might be distributed rather more fairly, because he has with him more effective men and fewer idlers; but still I will venture to assert, that the officers of his Staff are less in arrears than those of the regiments, and the officers of the regiments infinitely less than the men. If this money is placed at my disposal: 1st; I shall insist that after the first 2 months, it shall be paid to none but disciplined troops.

2dly; That Staff and regimental officers and the soldiers shall each receive their regular proportion of their pay.

3dly; That every other sum of money, either collected upon the country by way of contribution, or sent by government, shall be distributed among the whole on the same principle.

I don't think that the King's Ambassador, distributing the money through the government, can effect this object: however, in whatever way the King's servants may decide this point, I beg to lay in a claim for a part of the money for the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and for the Spanish troops in Castille and Estremadura, otherwise much of the benefit to be expected from these conquests will be lost.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

Having understood that some discussions of an unpleasant nature had taken place between Sir H. Douglas and Gen. Abadia in Galicia, and having observed, from the postscript to a letter of the 13th ult. from Sir H. Douglas, that he was not on the terms on which he ought to be with Gen. Abadia, I have thought it proper to send him the instructions of which I enclose a copy. His direct interference to prevent a detachment of troops from embarking from Galicia for America must be quite hopeless, if His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz cannot prevail upon the Regency to refrain from that measure; and it has been the cause of the discussions to which I refer, the existence of which has tended to weaken Sir Howard's influence in Galicia, and to diminish the benefit to be expected from his employment in that quarter.

The truth is, that when the Spanish government or nation are determined to adopt a measure, however injurious to their cause, nothing can prevent them from carrying it into execution.

The measure of sending troops to America has been insisted upon by the City of Cadiz, from which alone the government receive any pecuniary assistance, and which possesses unbounded influence over the Cortes, and it may be depended upon that no power which can be exerted will prevent its execution.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

The enemy have distributed their troops generally in the cantonments which they occupied previous to their late march to this quarter, and nothing of any importance has occurred since I last addressed you.

We are collecting provisions and stores for Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which I hope will arrive at an early period. No movement of importance has been made in the south.

By accounts from Galicia I learn that Espoz y Mina fought a very successful action with the enemy in the end of March, and frustrated all the endeavors of Gen. Dorsenne to destroy his corps with an infinitely superior force. He has since been very successful against one of the enemy's convoys on the 9th April, and it is reported that he has taken a very large sum of money.

The A.G. to Mr. Egerton, Military Library, Whitehall.

6th May, 1812.

I beg leave to transmit you the G. O. of this army, from the 1st Jan. to the 31st Dec. 1811, in order that you may cause them to be printed, and bound in a manner exactly similar to those of 1809 and 1810; and I have to request they may be expedited as much as possible. As the copying of these orders has been entrusted to a clerk in this office, it is more than probable that inaccuracies of grammar and spelling may be found in the copy now sent you, in which case I request the greatest possible care may be taken to have them corrected in the press. I have also to inform you that a remittance will be made you for printing the Orders of 1810 by the next mail.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th May, 1812, 9 P.M.

I have desired Sir R. Hill to undertake the service which I have long had in contemplation for the destruction of the enemy's establishments at Almaraz, and I hope that he will have marched about this time with about 5000 or 6000 men for that object. I am not quite certain whom Sir Rowland will leave in command of the troops in front of Badajoz.

It appears by a letter which I have from Hill this morning, that some of Bonet's troops were in motion in the beginning of the month towards Zalamea, &c.; and I hear from Clementi Pereira that the 2d division of the '*Armée de Portugal*' was likewise in motion towards the Puerto del Pico; while Marmont, with a part of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' remains at Salamanca. I conclude, therefore, that the first measure of the King's command has been to draw closer the two armies; and that they will be in direct communication by Talavera, but nothing offensive can be intended with troops so widely extended.

As some time must elapse yet before we can attempt any thing, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will move your quarters to Portalegre, and if you will have your eye upon what is passing in front of Badajoz, and will go there, if you should find that any serious movement is likely to be made by the enemy on that place during Hill's absence. I have ordered the 6th division from Castello de Vide to Portalegre, in order to be nearer Badajoz, in case you should think more troops there to be necessary.

I enclose the copy of the instructions which I gave Sir R. Hill when I left Estremadura, which I shall be obliged to you to return to me, as I have no other copy. Brig. Gen. Power's brigade, and the 22d regt., still re-

main in Badajoz, and Penne Villemur's cavalry and infantry are at Burguillos, &c.; the Spanish government having as yet given neither answer nor orders respecting the garrison for that place.

The communication with Almendralejo is carried on through Badajoz and Elvas, to Portalegre; and as that road is but little about, it may probably as well be continued by that line. The 6th division would be 3 days marching from Portalegre to Badajoz; of which, 2 to Campo Maior, or the left of the position of S^{ta} Engracia, referred to in the enclosed letter.

The mutiny at Ciudad Rodrigo has taken place, and was settled by Don Carlos de España without communicating with me, in a manner of which I cannot approve. Not knowing of his arrival at the place, I sent a letter to the Governor the night before last, which would have had the effect of opening the eyes of the well disposed, and would have separated them from the bad; and at all events, would have ascertained, and probably have fixed the sentiments of the soldiers on the right side, and would have settled the business as it ought to have been settled, without concession. We can never depend upon this garrison under existing circumstances; and I must endeavor to prevail upon Castaños to send one from Galicia.

I write to Hill to request him to desire the officer in command of the troops in front of Badajoz to report to you at Portalegre, as well as to me.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 8th May, 1812.

I enclose the only intelligence which I have received since yesterday.

By a letter from Hill of the 5th, I find it was only a part of Drouet's troops that moved.

I enclose a declaration which I have received from England, from which it appears that the question of the Orders in Council is settled.

I have a paper from America, from which it appears that the Americans have laid a general embargo on all vessels. This is a measure of importance, as all this part of the Peninsula has been living this year on American flour.

To Col. Austin.

Fuente Guinaldo, 9th May, 1812.

I have received this day your letter of the 2d inst., informing me of the arrival at Ayamonte of the regiment of Jaen, which is to go to Badajoz.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 8th May, 1812.

1. In order to insure the regularity of the delivery of soldiers' letters in England, it is necessary that the Commanding officers of regiments should have a list made of the soldiers' letters which will go to England by every post.

2. The Commanding officers of those regiments which communicate with England through head quarters, are to send the soldiers' letters, with the list of them, to Major Scovell, the Superintendent of military communications.

3. The Commanding officers of those regiments which communicate with England without passing through head quarters, are to send the soldiers' letters, with a list of them, to T. Reynolds, Esq., agent of the packets at Lisbon, and a duplicate of the list to Major Scovell, the Superintendent of military communications, at head quarters.

4. The soldiers are to pay 15 *reis* postage for each letter. The officers commanding companies are to pay the postage into the hands of the paymaster of the regiment; and the paymasters of regiments are to pay the sums received on account of postage into the hands of the Dep. Paymaster Gen. or his assistant, upon every occasion on which they will wait upon him, or his deputies, to receive the balance due on their estimates.

5. Major Scovell will take care to supply the Paymaster Gen. with the amount of the demand against each regiment for each week; and he will forward the sums received, either by bill or otherwise, to Mr. Reynolds, the agent for packets at Lisbon.

I intended that the troops destined to garrison Badajoz should be landed at Setuval, as being nearer Badajoz, and a place from which they could be more easily provisioned on their march.

It will be necessary for you to adopt the arrangements for subsisting these troops on their march which I requested you to adopt for the subsistence of those under the Conde de Penne Villemur. I enclose a route for them, but I much fear that they will be distressed for provisions on their march, if they should have marched before you will have received the route, and the Commissary can have had time to order that preparations might be made for them from Beja.

The A.G. to Major Royal, Santarem.

9th May, 1812.

I have the honor to inform you, in reply to your communications of the 26th, 27th, and 30th ult., that all deserters, or persons suspected of having deserted, are to be forwarded to the head quarters of their regiments with the least possible delay, when an opportunity offers, at the same time apprising the Adj. Gen. thereof. The deserters from the French army, employed as orderlies at the hospital station under your command, are to be paid as orderlies usually are, and it will be charged accordingly. Such deserters as have proved or shall prove refractory, and do not conform to the rules of the station, you are to proceed against at first by confinement, or stopping their spirits or wine; in the event of that not having the desired effect, you will inform me further on the subject. I am further desired to inform you, that such French deserters as are not actually employed or wanted as orderlies are to be sent back to Lisbon.

When officers are reported to you fit to join their regiments, they may proceed, having received the necessary route from you, without any reference to me. As it is very probable that Lieut. —, — light dragoons, left Santarem without informing you or the senior Medical officer, through ignorance of the customs at hospital stations, you will make known to all the officers at the station under your command, that your sanction and that of the senior Medical officer are necessary before they can quit the station.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose 3 letters from Cadiz; I have others from Gen. Cooke which I will send you to-morrow. They contain details on which I must give an answer. There is nothing new here.

I find that the American embargo took place on the 7th April for 90 days, and I conclude will then be renewed, if the harvest should be so bad in Europe that their assistance will be required to feed these countries.

We have more than 200 days' provisions for the British and that part of the Portuguese army fed by our Commissariat. The demands, however, for the Portuguese garrisons, and that part of the army not fed by us, will reduce the supply to 4 months. But I some time ago sent to Brazil, and to the Mediterranean, and to the British settlements in North America. I think, therefore, that both army and people, and Cadiz will continue to be well supplied, even if the American embargo should be continued. If it should not, corn will be excessively cheap.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send to Gibraltar the 4 transports named in the margin, which are laden with ordnance and stores, according to the enclosed return. These transports, as well as those respecting which I wrote to you on the 19th April, are to wait at Gibraltar the orders of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

Your Excellency will observe in the return twenty seven 24 pounder carriages, and three 18 pounder carriages, which it is desirable should receive at Gibraltar the repairs which they will require; and it is recommended by the officers of the artillery that they should be fitted with strong iron trunnion boxes, to secure the guns from forcing their way back by constant firing.

In order to complete the heavy ordnance equipment required by Lord W. Bentinck, it is desirable that guns for these carriages and stores should be provided in the garrison of Gibraltar; and I have therefore to request your Excellency that twenty seven 24 pounder iron guns, Carron manufacture, of 9 feet 6 inches long, and three 18 pounder guns of the same manufacture, 8 feet 6 inches long, should be prepared for these carriages, and embarked, with 1000 rounds of ammunition for each gun; eight 24 pounder guns, with their carriages and ammunition, in the *Southampton*, and eight 24 pounder guns, with their carriages and ammunition, in the *Mary Anne*.

I propose to send from Lisbon two more transports to receive the remaining 14 guns and the ammunition, which transports shall take to Gibraltar the 3664 24 pounder spherical case shot, and the 7000 5½ inch spherical case fuses, stated in the enclosed return as forwarded in these transports.

Included in the 1000 rounds for each gun, I beg that there may be 100 of grape, and 100 rounds of case shot for each.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

I return Mr. Pipon's letter of the 6th, and Mr. Stuart's to me, and my answer; and I beg that the two letters may be sent back to me. I beg that orders may be given to Mr. Pipon to issue the quantities required by the Portuguese government for the month of May, excepting the rice, of which it appears, by Mr. Dalrymple's return, that there is none in store.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

I have received your letters to the 28th April.

I learn from the Governor of Algarve, that one of the regiments intended for Badajoz is arrived at Ayamonte, which is unlucky, as I expected they would have come to Setuval; and no preparations have been made to supply them on the road from Ayamonte. These preparations, however, were ordered yesterday, after I heard of their arrival at Ayamonte.

I concur with you in respect to the expediency of giving assistance to Whittingham's division. It would have been desirable, however, to know the last expense; and I recommend to you to call for an estimate of it without loss of time. It would likewise be desirable to know what part of the expense would be borne by the revenues of the islands of Minorca and Majorca. I mention this, because there will be much to do with the million allowed for Spanish services.

I was never so much disappointed as by the *Standard*. I did not expect 4 or 5 millions, but I expected more than she has brought. I have no idea what we shall do for want of money. If I had a little now, I should

certainly keep the campaign on its legs. But how are we to pay this Spanish million in addition to our other charges?

You will have heard of the American embargo for 90 days, from the 7th April; that is to say, to see whether their corn will be absolutely necessary for our subsistence next year. If it should not be so, they will take off the embargo. But I see that the new ministry have lowered their tone about the Orders in Council. Indeed, they have laid themselves on this subject at the mercy of France and America.

Since I wrote to you last, the officers of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo have been in a state of mutiny, the details of which will have been communicated to the government by Gen. Alava. Don Carlos de España went there and settled the matter; not, in my opinion, exactly as it should have been settled; and it is impossible to have any confidence in the troops in that garrison. As soon as I shall know whether you will give any, and what sum of money for the support of that garrison, I shall write to Castaños to have them relieved by troops from Galicia.

P. S. Would it be possible to come to any arrangement with the Barbaresque powers to supply Cadiz, Lisbon, &c., with corn? It would be capital to turn the tables upon these cunning Americans, and not to allow them to have any intercourse with those ports. I have sent to Brazil and to the Mediterranean for corn, and to the British settlements in North America; to the Western Islands, &c. Mexico ought to be able to supply some.

I enclose the last dispatch.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 7th. It would, I believe, save you, and certainly me, a good deal of trouble, if you would be so kind as to send me the requisitions for supplies by the Portuguese government on our Commissariat. It is impossible for me to allow Mr. Pipon or any body else to grant them without my consent, and it would save a great deal of useless correspondence if they were to come in the regular form to me. This becomes the more necessary, as there is a prospect that the supply of corn, &c., will not be so plentiful as it has been lately.

Reckoning for that part of the Portuguese army supplied by our Commissariat, we have in magazine for our army for 200 days; the demands of the Portuguese government upon us, supposing them to continue at the same rate at which they have been for the last 4 months, will reduce our stock to one for 4 months. I have desired that it may be increased and kept up to one for 6 months for both armies, so that you will see there is no difficulty in supplying the demands. But I cannot allow them to be supplied without my consent.

I had already ordered that all the demands for *depositos*, &c., made from January to the end of April, might be complied with. I have now desired that the demand for May might be complied with, excepting rice. We have none of that article in our stores, excepting 4443 *quintals*, ordered to be issued to the Portuguese government, being their demand for April, not taken away.

If would be very desirable if the demands for supplies were made in the

last 10 days of each month for the ensuing month, specifying where it would be most convenient for the Portuguese government to receive the amount; that is to say, at Lisbon, at Figueira, or at Oporto. I don't mean to say that we can always supply the demand at the place they wish to have it; but it would frequently be more convenient to us to supply the demand at Oporto instead of at Lisbon.

You are the best judge respecting the amount of these demands, and the expediency of continuing to supply them at the rate they are made. I hope to-morrow to be able to send to Dom M. Forjaz a statement of their amount and cost, from 1st Jan. to 30th April, from which I am afraid it will appear that the Portuguese government have received from the Commissariat more than the subsidy, in the 4 months which have elapsed since the 1st Jan., to the amount of £250,000! You will judge whether you will go on at that rate. All that I contend for is that the tone of complaint of insufficient supplies from us ought to be laid aside, and that I, at least, ought not to be the *target* on these occasions.

In regard to the bills demanded for £100,000 sterling, you must be the best judge how far it is expedient to grant them in the existing state of our credit and of our finances.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

De Lancey has communicated to me your letter to him of the 8th inst., and the enclosure from Gen. Le Marchant in regard to the portable forges. If Gen. Le Marchant states that there are no horses in his brigade decidedly unfit for the ranks, but still capable of some service, I beg you will authorise him to have purchased, and kept upon the strength of troops, as pointed out in my letter of the 2d, 4 mules for each portable forge, at the price stated in that letter.

It is really necessary, however, that we should all avoid incurring an expense for the public, when it is not absolutely necessary, and I hope that Major Gen. Le Marchant thoroughly understands the principle on which I have consented to the purchase of mules for this service. The horses which Major Gen. Le Marchant states to be unfit for service should be sent to grass.

In regard to your proposal to have a different saddle, I beg that you will give your own orders to have any saddle made that you may think proper, and it shall be supplied, if you will only state the kind of saddle that it is to be.

I shall be sorry if this establishment should not answer, and I have no doubt it will answer, if pains be taken to have the men taught how to saddle the horse with a bât or pack-saddle. If it should not, we must only return to the old forge-carts.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 8th, and I am happy to see that the troops have their pay to so late a period. They are paid as far as we are.

I hope to be able to send Dom M. Forjaz my letter of this day. It is in English, and therefore I don't send you a copy of it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th May, 1812, 9 A.M.

I have received your letter of the —, and I am concerned to learn that there is a fever at Portalegre. I had not heard of this circumstance before.

Hill takes with him only the 13th light dragoons, and the Portuguese dragoons, Col. Ashworth's, Gen. Howard's, and 2 battalions of Col. Wilson's brigades of infantry.

Order any of Sir Stapleton's division of cavalry that you please to move up, in case you hear of any serious movement of the enemy in Estremadura.

The 4th dragoon guards, belonging to Gen. Slade's brigade, and Sir W. Erskine's division of cavalry, are still at Ponte de Sor, not having their number of mules; their mules having been taken from them when they were at Tondella, to attach them to the German dragoons. I expect that the 4th dragoon guards will be completed immediately, when they shall join their brigade at all events; but you will consider Sir Stapleton's division likewise at your disposal.

I am very much afraid that Hill will be late.

The —th were very bad when I sent them away from the army, but I was in hopes they had improved at Lisbon. I am to send away 2 battalions in exchange for the 2d batt. 4th regt., and I think the —th shall be one of them, although we have 2 or 3 others that are very bad.

There is nothing new here.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th May, 1812.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take measures to suggest to the Colonels of regiments serving in this country to have the clothing for their regiments at Lisbon before the 1st Oct. next. Some of the regiments have put on since Christmas last, and have now in wear, the clothing due to the men at Christmas, 1810; and the Colonels of those regiments can experience no difficulty in having their clothing out at the time above specified. Others of them have in wear the clothing due at Christmas, 1811; and although it may be more difficult for the Colonels of these regiments than it is for the others to have their clothing, due at Christmas, 1812, in Portugal by the 1st Oct. 1812, I conceive it is not impossible; and it is really necessary, with a view to the arrangements to be adopted, to have the clothing brought up to the army in time.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th May, 1812.

We have received here the accounts of the American embargo for 3 months from the 7th April; and, adverting to the quantity of provisions imported into the Kingdom of Portugal, principally, I believe, from the American States, in the last 12 months, of which I enclose a return, you will readily believe that these accounts have occasioned a good deal of anxiety. Not only Portugal, but the neighbouring provinces of Spain have subsisted upon these importations. I feel no anxiety respecting the subsistence of the army in consequence of this measure; and I had already adopted some measures with a view to supply the deficiencies which might be generally felt in the markets if the embargo were to continue, which I think might be still further improved.

When your Lordship informed me, in your letter of the 21st Nov., that we could not expect any supplies of grain from England, I desired that the magazines of the army might be augmented from a stock for 3 months' consumption to one for 6 months' consumption. We had accordingly in the magazines, when we received the accounts of the embargo, more than sufficient to last our army 200 days, including that part of the Portuguese army serving in the British divisions.

The Portuguese demands upon us for grain instead of money as subsidy will reduce that stock in some degree; but I have directed additional purchases, in order to keep up our magazines to that quantity till the state of the next harvest in England shall be known, when, if it should be plentiful, I shall reduce them again to a supply for 3 months.

Expecting that something of the kind that has lately taken place in America would occur, I requested Mr. Stuart in the winter to take measures to get corn from Brazil, from the North American States, and from the coast of Barbary; and I have since adopted measures to get some from the British Colonies in North America, where I believe much can be got.

I believe that our expectations of a supply from Brazil will not be disappointed; and indeed I believe that a very large supply could be drawn from thence if ships were sent there. I am afraid that our demands in North America were too late.

It is not impossible that this measure of hostility (under the disguise of peace) of the worst description has been adopted by the American government at an earlier period than was intended, in consequence of their receiving intelligence of the measures taken by us to purchase supplies there.

Our measures to procure supplies on the coast of Barbary have failed, principally, as I am informed, from the deficiencies of the persons employed by the British government to conduct their affairs on that coast. The affairs of that coast become every day more interesting. It is very desirable that the allies should, and that the enemy should not, enjoy the benefit of their resources; and I believe that both objects could be accomplished if persons of character and talents were employed to conduct the affairs of the British government there, instead of those who are there at present.

The persons who should be sent from England on these services, if any should be sent, might call at Lisbon and at Cadiz, in order to converse with the King's ministers, and the persons employed at those places to superintend the supply of the markets, and of the magazines of the army.

The measures which I have adopted to get corn from the British Colonies in North America have been confined to the Commissary Gen. directing the Commissary Gen. there to make purchases for him, and to send them to Portugal; and Mr. Stuart has desired Mr. Foster to employ some money which he had sent him to make purchases in the American States, in making purchases in the British Colonies. But if the embargo should be renewed, these measures will not be sufficient to supply the demands of this country and Cadiz, notwithstanding the prospects of the plentiful harvest.

Your Lordship knows best whether the British Colonies in North America can supply any large quantity of corn; if they can, I would beg leave to suggest that some measures should be adopted by government, probably through the Board of Trade, to secure the importation of a large quantity into the Peninsula before the winter.

You will see in the enclosed paper the prices which the different kinds of grain have brought in the Lisbon market. Flour has latterly been from 15 to 17 dollars the barrel of 196 lbs. The price has increased very much since the accounts of the embargo have been received, but I think it will fall again as the harvest approaches, which promises to be remarkably plentiful. We have already had an offer from America to supply us with 60,000 barrels of flour, at an advance of 50 *per cent.* beyond the price before the accounts of the embargo were received, to which I have declined to agree, as there is no want at present, and we could not get this supply before the harvest even in England; and if the want should be so great as that the price will rise to the amount demanded by about 23 dollars a barrel, the embargo will prevent the Americans from bringing their corn to the Lisbon market. If the price should not rise to that sum it will be because there will be plenty of corn, and if that should be the case there is no reason why we should engage to pay this exorbitant price.

However, the subject requires early attention to counteract the mischief which the American government certainly intended by laying on the embargo at the time they did; and I am certain that by attention there will be plenty in Portugal, notwithstanding the failure of the supply from America.

Your Lordship will have heard that the *Standard* has brought no money on account of the Spanish government, and only 380,000 dollars on account of the British government. This failure has disappointed me much, and I am quite at a loss to know what to do.

The eventual success of the campaign depends upon my being able to move forward into Spain before the harvest, but I can't venture upon that measure without having a sum of money in hand. Under these circumstances, the want of the 500,000 dollars which we might have got from Gibraltar but for the orders of the Treasury, may be most unfortunate. It would be very desirable on every account that the Treasury should appoint a person here in whom they would feel confidence, to conduct the financial concerns of this army. It would relieve the Commissary Gen. and me from much business and anxiety, on a subject with which I at least ought to have nothing to do, and the business would be done to the satisfaction of the Treasury.

We are now 3 months in arrears of pay to the troops; we owe the muleteers an immense sum; and what is worse than all, there are bills outstanding for meat to the amount of 800,000 dollars.

I enclose the weekly and daily states.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R.E.

12th May, 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to transmit you a copy of a letter received from the senior Medical officer at Elvas. His Excellency would feel great

repugnance in being obliged to take notice of Capt. —'s conduct; but at the same time he cannot avoid observing that these acts of violence are so extremely subversive of all good order, that I am to request you will fully explain to Capt. — the impropriety thereof. If Capt. —'s health should be of the nature described by the senior Medical officer, it would be advisable that steps should be taken to prevent him repeating these excesses.

To Capt. P. Malcolm, R.N.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

I received your letter of the 22d March, and I am very much obliged to you for the wine which you sent me by the *Latona*, which I conclude is the same for which Capt. Digby of the *Theban* ordered Mr. Dobree of Guernsey to draw upon me. I ordered Messrs. Coutts to pay the bill. There are two cases, of 12 dozen, although you mention in your letter 3 cases.

I was very happy to hear of your appointment to be Captain of the fleet, which I conclude to be agreeable to you, although you will not have quite so much to do at an early period as some of your predecessors. Pray present my best respects to Lord Keith.

I can give you no news from hence. I hoped to be able to make a great campaign of this, and I have not yet lost all hopes, although I have met with some disappointments.

When do you expect your brother John?

P. S. About Pasley: I could recommend him, and would recommend him if he were under my command; but I can recommend nobody excepting by permission; and the permission would not be granted for an officer not serving here. I have a very high opinion of him, and I wish we had him; although we have made such an expenditure of engineers, that I can hardly wish for any body, lest the same fate should befall him as has befallen so many!!

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose the only paper of intelligence which I have received since I wrote to you last, from which it would appear that Marmont's troops have not yet moved into Estremadura. If this is the case, Hill will yet be in time.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.,* R.E.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

I am very anxious to send some engineer officers and some of your artificers to Gibraltar, in order to be prepared for a service likely to be carried on on the Eastern coast; and I should be glad to know from you how many engineer officers and artificers you could now spare for that purpose. All those that you can spare should march to Lisbon as soon as may be convenient: and I beg that it may not be known on what service they are going. If you cannot spare their services immediately, it does not much signify, as I shall find means of sending them in fast sailing vessels.

I beg to draw your attention to the enclosed reports from Lieut. —, who is employed on the Douro; and to the reports from Capt. Ross, made

* Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher had been made a Baronet, in consequence of having been the commanding engineer at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

last year, which I likewise enclose. It appears to me, that the great obstacle which Lieut. — finds to the completion of the navigation of the Douro, is that which Capt. Ross reported to have been overcome by the Portuguese government at great expense. I doubt Lieut. — being very capable of understanding the subject on which he writes: and it is really very desirable that we should take some decided steps in order to know whether we can, or not, render the Douro navigable to Barca d'Alva. Return the enclosed papers.

I am anxious to hear from you what you propose to do to defend the sluices of the Rivillas; what you have discovered respecting the means of throwing water into the ditch of the place, and retaining it there; and respecting the mines; and at what period you expect to have finished your work.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

The only movements which the enemy have made since I addressed your Lordship last, have been apparently with a view to connect the army of the South with the '*Armée de Portugal*.' Gen. Drouet has moved his head quarters from Fuente Ovejuna to Hinojosa de Cordova, apparently with a view to communicate with the detachments of the 1st division of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which from Talavera de la Reyna are in the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana.

It has been for some time reported that King Joseph had been appointed Generalissimo of the French armies in Spain, with the exception, I believe, of the army of Aragon and Catalonia. I have not seen any official notification of this appointment, but I give credit to the report; and I attribute the partial movements which have lately been made of the army of the South to their right, and of the '*Armée de Portugal*' to their left, to the desire of the King to establish a more perfect communication between these armies than had hitherto existed. It is very obvious, however, from the general distress suffered by all the enemy's troops for want of provisions, that they cannot undertake any operation till the harvest shall be ripe.

I have directed Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to endeavor to destroy the enemy's establishments at Almaraz, constructed with a view to give them that passage over the Tagus, which object I hope he will be able to effect. He was to break up from his cantonments at Almendralejo with part of the 2d division of infantry, and the 13th light dragoons, in order to march upon this expedition on the 11th inst.

I have requested Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham to go to Portalegre, and have ordered the 6th division of infantry to Arronches, in order to be in readiness to march into Estremadura, in case the enemy should move upon hearing of Sir R. Hill's march.

The measures for filling the magazines of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida are still in progress; and till those objects are accomplished, the allied army will continue cantoned, as I before reported to your Lordship.

Great progress has been made by our engineers in the repairs of the damages done to Badajoz. But I am sorry to have to mention to your Lordship that the Spanish engineers have continued to neglect Ciudad

Rodrigo, where but little work has been done since I left the place on the 5th March to go into Estremadura. I have frequently remonstrated upon this neglect since my return to this part of the country, and I have mentioned it to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz. I approve highly of the conduct of the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, Gen. Vives; but I am concerned to add, that the officers and garrison under his command are but little to be depended upon.

The guerrillas are very active in all parts of the country; some employed in forming and disciplining their troops, and others in enterprises against the enemy, in many of which they have lately been very successful.

There has been no movement in the north.

Gen. Ballesteros surprised at Alora, and defeated, a column under Gen. Rey, on the 14th April; and it is reported that the division of Gen. Copons, one of those composing the corps under the command of Gen. Ballesteros, had on the 17th entered Malaga. But this report has not been confirmed.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

Major Gen. Cooke having informed me that he had represented to your Lordship that the corps of Royal Military Artificers at Cadiz was much reduced by a detachment which had been sent to Portugal, I beg to acquaint you, that I gave orders some time ago that these men should return forthwith, and I imagine that they must have arrived before this period at Cadiz.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

I have the honor to transmit lists of officers entitled to medals for the action at El Bodon,* and the assault and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, under the regulations contained in your Lordship's letter of the 3d Sept. 1811.

The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions.

13th May, 1812.

The men in the enclosed return being invalidated for England, it is the Commander of the Forces' direction that *immediate steps* may be taken to settle their accounts, prior to their embarkation, at the station where *they now are*; and the Paymasters of the respective corps must be apprised of the same accordingly.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812, 11 P.M.

I enclose letters from my brother and Gen. Cooke, and some just received from Salamanca.

We have the accounts of Copons' entering Malaga from other quarters besides in the enclosed papers, and the dates agree.

I am glad to find that the fever at Portalegre is not so bad as was reported. That place is very subject to infectious fevers, if great care is not taken to keep the town clean; but not at this season of the year. It is situated at the south side of the hills, and does not enjoy the advantage of the northerly breezes, and is intolerably hot in the months of July, August, and September, at which season the town is very unhealthy, if great attention is not paid to cleanliness; but in general it is the most healthy town in the province of Alentejo.

* Medals were not granted for El Bodon.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812.

I have received your letters of the 3d, and I regret that I had not received that from Major Gen. Ross of the 20th April, marked 'confidential,' before I wrote you my last letter of the 10th inst., as I should have had before me a clearer view of Major Gen. Ross's intentions, and of those of Gen. O'Donnell. However, there is no reason why that letter should not be sent to Major Gen. Ross, with the explanation that I had not seen his of the 20th when I wrote it.

I shall not fail to mention Capt. Adam to Sir E. Pellew as Gen. Ross desires.

I beg that serjeant J. Johnson may be appointed an Assistant at Carthagena to the Deputy Provost at Cadiz. His pay will be ensign's pay and allowances, under the G. O. of this army of the 3d May, 1809.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812.

I have received your letters of the 6th, and I shall recommend Mr. Dobson for an ensigncy.

I don't know what sums of money have been sent into Estremadura; but I have been well acquainted with the state of affairs in Castille since August last, and I can assure you most positively, that the officers and troops here have not received one shilling for any purpose whatever. The troops in Ciudad Rodrigo have subsisted solely upon what I have given them; and Don Carlos de España's division, some of them upon our magazines, and others by plundering the country.

If you wish to know what becomes of the money which you give to the government, and the government send to Gen. —, I refer you to Sir H. Douglas's reports of the finance of Galicia, in which you will see a sample of the manner in which civil and military pensioners, and large civil and military staff, can eat up the revenues of a kingdom, and leave nothing for the men who must fight for its defence. To which information I shall add what I know to be fact, viz., that when —, or any other General officer, receives a sum of money, he does not, as we do, pay the soldiers first, and the staff last; but he first takes the arrears of his own appointments, and of those of his staff officers; he then pays the officers a part of their pay, and the men *nothing*. There are 1500 officers and — soldiers at —'s head quarters at — —, each of whom has received more pay than those officers now doing duty with their regiments in Ciudad Rodrigo. These are the abuses which have sunk Spain; and there is no Spanish government equal to the task of getting the better of them; and I will add, that if the English subsidy, instead of being one million sterling, was ten millions sterling, and was to pass through the hands of the Spanish government, it would be spent in the same manner, and would produce no benefit whatever; excepting it can be called a benefit to maintain such men as Gen. — (of whom, by the bye, I have not a bad opinion), Gen. —, and Gen. —, and their numerous staff with enormous salaries.

I admit, that it is not very easy for the King's Ambassador to give the King's aid in any other manner than through the Spanish government; though he does give clothing, arms, and equipments, by a direct commu-

nication with the Chiefs; but the difficulty he would experience in giving the pecuniary aid direct to those who are to enjoy the benefit of it, is the principal reason why I think that the whole ought to be at the disposal of the Commander in Chief.

I accept of that part of the aid of which you have allowed me the disposal, viz., £200,000 sterling in this year; and I hope that you will continue to send me *the money* in addition to the usual supplies from Cadiz, otherwise this aid will be an intolerable burthen to us, and will probably be as fatal as the feather was to the camel's back. As it is left to my disposal, I acknowledge that I shall not lay it out in forming a depôt of recruits. A depôt of recruits is very necessary for an army actively employed in the field; and the mechanical discipline of soldiers is essential to the formation of an army. But, in my opinion, those take an erroneous view of what an army is, who suppose that well drilled recruits are all that is required for it. Subordination and habits of obedience are more necessary than mechanical discipline acquired at the drill; and these can be acquired by soldiers to any useful purpose only in proportion as they have confidence in their officers; and they cannot have confidence in officers who have no knowledge of their profession, even of that lowest part of it acquired at the drill, who have no subordination among themselves, and never obey an order. The plans for improving such an army should have for their first object the officers, and principally those belonging to the regiments; and it may be depended upon, that there would be no want of drill, or of that military expertness acquired at the drill, if habits of subordination and obedience, and some information, were given to the officers.

I will go one step farther, and express my doubts whether, to launch a number of well drilled recruits into regiments such as I have seen in the Spanish service, can ever answer any practical good purpose. The object of all drill must be to practise and form individuals to perform that which it is thought expedient they should perform when part of a body before an enemy, under the command of their officers: and it is supposed that all of the body are equally, or nearly equally expert; and that, at all events, the officer cannot only order what is to be performed, but know whether the body under his command performs it well or ill. Is this the case in one of a hundred instances in which recruits well drilled might be sent from a depôt to a Spanish company or regiment? Certainly not. The consequence is, that the well drilled recruit in the day of action is no better than the rabble with whom he is mixed up; and he either very soon forgets all that he has learnt for want of practice, or despises it as useless, as he finds that the boasters among whom he comes have none of the acquirements which he has gained with so much trouble; or he despises the ignorance both of his officers and comrades, and has no confidence in either, or in himself. The money, then, which I should lay out in a depôt of recruits, I should, under present circumstances, consider as thrown away.

What I propose to do first, is to call for an account of the monthly pay of the several ranks of officers and soldiers composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I shall desire to have from Don Carlos de España

an account of the sums of money which he receives in contributions from the country (as there is some received in this manner) applicable to the purpose of paying the garrison. I shall then offer to pay what is deficient, provided the sum collected in contributions, and the sum which I shall give, shall be appropriated solely to the purpose of paying those who perform duty, each, whether officer or soldier, his fair proportion; and provided that, at the end of 2 months, the system of discipline, subordination, and obedience, ordered by the Spanish regulations, is completely established in each of the battalions composing the garrison.

If there should be any residue, after completely providing for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, in which *we* are most interested, I shall assist Don Carlos de España's division on the same system; unless I should find the garrison of Badajoz is thrown upon me, in which case I must adopt the same system for paying the troops in that garrison. I entirely concur with you in the propriety of assisting Roche and Whittingham's divisions with part of the British subsidy. But I earnestly recommend to you to call for estimates and accounts of the expenditure; to make those officers responsible for the distribution which you shall order, and to see whether you could not get something out of the contributions of Majorca and Minorca, for the support at least of the latter.

I shall send you regularly all that passes in regard to the distribution of the £200,000.

The A.G. to Capt. Stewart, Castello Branco.

14th May, 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 12th inst., I have to request that you will furnish, as usual, routes to parties of convalescents that may arrive from other hospitals, as you are not only considered as Commandant of the hospital station, but likewise of the place. It will not be necessary to report to this office, except in cases where you are at a loss for a route; and you will, as usual, prolong the routes for any detachments that may arrive at Castello Branco. The object of the Commander of the Forces is to keep down as much as possible the list of convalescents reported fit to join, by marching them, whenever they amount to 40 or upwards, to their corps: it will be impossible strictly to comply with the orders for want of officers, but his Excellency wishes it to be done whenever practicable. There are some officers of the 52d regt. at Castello Branco; and as this regiment has very few officers, it will be most desirable to have some others substituted in their room from corps that are stronger in officers.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th May, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in communicating to the army the following extract of a letter from the Earl of Liverpool, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, dated 'Downing Street, 28th April, 1812:'

'His Royal Highness has commanded me to express to your Lordship the sense he entertains of the great service rendered to this country, and to her allies, by the reduction of Badajoz.

'The Prince Regent has perused with the most sincere regret the long list of brave men who have suffered in this memorable siege, and particularly in the assault of Badajoz, on the night of the 6th inst. Never, perhaps, was immovable intrepidity more imperiously required, and never was it more conspicuously and more gloriously exhibited. The great proportion of officers of high rank who have bled in this tremendous conflict, affords an affecting proof of the zeal with which they pointed out the path of victory to their willing followers.

'The Prince Regent desires that your Lordship will receive his Royal thanks for your conduct throughout these important and arduous operations, and likewise that you would convey his thanks, in the most public manner, to the General officers, the officers of engineers and artillery, and to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers (both British and Portuguese) employed under your command, in the siege of Badajoz, for their distinguished services on this occasion, in which their superiority has been so unequivocally and nobly manifested.'

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th inst.

Although I have received the instructions of the Sec. of State to secure the island of Aroza, I don't think it proper to authorise the expenditure of so large a sum as more than £10,000 on that service, more particularly as there does not exist any reason to press the measure at present. I therefore wish you would take the orders of the Sec. of State on the subject.

There is no officer of engineers with this army whose services can be spared to go into Galicia to superintend the performance of these works.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

I enclose the only intelligence I have received since I wrote to you last, excepting letters from Col. Austin, mentioning that about 2500 men had gone from Seville towards Ayamonte, and that Soult had gone towards the Puertos. I conclude that the movement towards Ayamonte was occasioned by the landing at that place of the regiments destined for the garrison of Badajoz.

P. S. I enclose a small parcel, sent to me by Col. Carroll, directed to you, containing, I believe, a medallion of the Marques de la Romana.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

I enclose a memorial from a gentleman, by the name of —, of this province, who was one of the members of the Junta before Ciudad Rodrigo fell into the hands of the French. He remained there afterwards by my desire, in a situation in which his life was at stake at every moment. He did not quit his post till I permitted him last autumn; and in the mean time he rendered services of the utmost importance to the cause. He is a person of very good talents, and is, I believe, the most fit to be at the head of the Hacienda in this province.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

Adverting to your letter of the 27th April, in regard to the Spanish troops eventually destined to join Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, I have to inform your Excellency that I had arranged with Adm. Berkeley to send transports (for the conveyance of 3000 men) to Alicante, and for the conveyance of 3000 men to Majorca; and I requested that Lord W. Bentinck would send to those places respectively, and to Gibraltar, to collect the troops from the two former, and the stores from the latter, which should have been prepared to join him. It is desirable that the Spanish government should determine as soon as possible whether they will or will not allow any, and what number of the troops from Alicante to proceed on this service, and what number they will allow to proceed from Majorca.

In all cases of maritime expeditions, the effort is necessarily limited by the means of maritime transport; and I have to inform you that I don't believe Adm. Berkeley will have it in his power to send more transports than those above referred to, which, for a short voyage, might be sufficient for the conveyance of 8000 men; and I had arranged that these transports should go in equal proportions to Alicante and Majorca.

In this case, however, there are other points for consideration :

1st ; How many men is it expedient to leave in Majorca for the defence of the island, of the 7000 of which it is supposed Gen. Whittingham's division will consist ?

2dly ; Gen. Whittingham's division of 7000 men will have been newly raised, excepting 3000 men. How many of the 7000 men would it be expedient to leave behind, as being recruits and unfit for service ?

3dly ; These points being taken into consideration, for how many men are transports to be sent to Majorca ?

4thly ; Supposing that the Regency should think proper to order a part of Gen. Roche's division from Alicante on the proposed expedition, how many men belonging to the division at Alicante is it expedient to leave for the defence of that post ?

5thly ; For how many men shall transports be sent to Alicante ?

It would be desirable to have answers upon all these points ; but as that is impossible before the period at which I hope that the transports will have left the Tagus, I propose to request Adm. Berkeley that the officer in command should have orders to send into Cadiz to receive directions regarding the distribution of their numbers at the two places, Alicante and Majorca. I request you to be prepared, therefore, to give the directions to the officer in charge of the convoy when he shall send for them.

It will be desirable that you should apprise Adm. Sir E. Pellew of what will be decided by the Spanish government, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, particularly whether or not it will be necessary for his Lordship to send to Alicante for the troops.

To Adm. Sir E. Pellew, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th April.

Your Excellency will have received before this time, that which I had the honor of addressing you on the 16th April, in which I enclosed the copy of one of the same date, to Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, with its enclosures.

The enemy retired and raised the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, in proportion as I advanced, and we have since been employed in throwing provisions into those places, and in moving forward our magazines.

Your Excellency will have seen in my letter to Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, of the 16th April, the measures which I proposed to adopt, and which the Spanish government should adopt to aid in his operations. I have sent to Gibraltar the ordnance and stores, and ordnance carriages referred to in that communication, and I have requested the Governor of Gibraltar to have the equipment completed with guns, and with stores for 1000 rounds for each gun.

I likewise propose to send to Gibraltar 400 British and Portuguese artillerymen, and a few Engineer officers and military artificers.

By a letter from Sir H. Wellesley of the 27th April, I learn that the Spanish government had not decided whether they would send to co-operate with Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck any of the troops stationed at Alicante, or how many of those at Majorca. But I have written to Sir H.

Wellesley this day a letter (of which I enclose a copy), in which I have suggested to him to bring these points to a decision, and I have requested him to inform your Excellency what should be settled upon them.

It is desirable that your Excellency should apprise Lord W. Bentinck of the state of the preparations, and that he should know from you, whether or not it will be necessary that he should send to Alicante to collect the troops from thence.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Berkeley, A.A.G. 5th division.

17th May, 1812.

I have the honor to inform you, in reply to your letter of the 11th inst., that the Commander of the Forces cannot accede to Major — of the — foot proceeding to England, and I beg leave to state his Excellency's reasons in his own words: 'It does not appear to me to be clear that there is a *necessity* for Major — going to England; and I must say, that I can't conceive that his having been present with the regiment since Nov. 1810, or about a year and a half, gives him any claim to go now. If Major — were to go to England, he must and would employ legal persons to do his business, and he might appoint them here. I am always concerned to refuse leave of absence to officers, and I wish they would refrain from making these applications. It is my duty, and I am determined to resist the inclination which too many feel to quit their duty in this country for some idle pursuit in England; and I will give leave to no officer who does not make it clear to me that the settlement of the business which renders him desirous of returning to England is paramount to every other consideration in life.'

To the General Officers commanding divisions.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th May, 1812.

The Spanish government having been pleased to allow a limited number of the natives of Spain to serve His Majesty in the British regiments composing this army, I have to request that you will authorise the regiments named in the margin to enlist and bear on their strength 100 Spanish volunteers, on the following conditions:

1st; The men must not be under 5 feet 6 inches high, strongly made, and not under 19 years of age, nor older than 27.

2dly; They are to be attested according to the following form by the commanding officer of the regiment to serve during the present war; but in case the regiment into which they shall enlist should be ordered from the Peninsula, the Spanish volunteers are to be discharged, and each of them is to receive one month's full pay to carry him to his home.

Form of the Attestation.

I, A. B., do make oath that I will serve His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, in the — battalion of the — regiment of foot, during the existing war in the Peninsula, if His Majesty should so long require my services, and provided that the — battalion of the — regiment of foot shall continue in the Peninsula during that period.

3dly; They are to be allowed to attend Divine service according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic religion, in the same manner as British soldiers, His Majesty's subjects, are.

4thly; They are to be fed, and clothed, and paid in the same manner as the other soldiers; and they are to be posted to companies indiscriminately, as any other recruits would be.

5thly; They are to receive pay from the date of their attestation, but no bounty. The captain of the company to which any of these volunteers shall be posted, will be allowed 8 dollars for each to supply him with necessaries, from which must be purchased a knapsack, 2 pairs of shoes,

and 2 shirts. The officer commanding the company must be accountable to the volunteer for the residue of the sum after purchasing these articles, in the same manner as for his pay. The shoes may be received at the usual rate from the Commissariat.

In communicating this arrangement to the several regiments, I request you to point out to the Commanding officers of regiments how desirable it is that these volunteers should be treated with the utmost kindness and indulgence, and brought by degrees to the system of discipline of the army.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 18th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 15th inst., and I beg you to observe that the certificates sent of the transport of stores to Badajoz and Elvas refer to stores which left the sea coast between the 23d April and the 3d May. This is in answer to my complaints, which referred to the stores required for the siege of Badajoz, which ought to have commenced the 6th March, and ended the 6th April.

Whatever measures government may order in respect to means of transport, shall be obeyed by me and the authorities of the British army; but if those measures are inefficient in themselves, are adopted by an unwilling government, and are carried into execution by the subordinate officers of the government in a manner conformable to the spirit in which their superiors adopted them, it must be expected that the measures, even if perfect in theory, will fail in practice; and it may be depended upon, that if they do fail, I shall complain to my government, be the cause of failure what it may. I don't know whether the government have taken the pains of ascertaining the truth of any one of the returns of means of transport which they have received, but it appears to me that there is fraud on the face of those returns.

Whatever may have happened in the northern provinces of the Kingdom, at least the southern have never been invaded, and the resources of the southern provinces have seldom been called for, and that only for short periods; yet it appears, by looking at the returns of 1810 and 1812, that the district of Evora alone contained in 1810 more bullocks, and nearly as many carts, as are now in the two provinces of Alentejo and Algarve.

If the deficiency of means of transport in the country should be the cause of important failures, the British government will have to judge and decide whether they shall continue to expose their army to the consequences of these failures.

I did not answer the letter of Dom M. Forjaz, because it proceeds on a fallacy. I say that the alterations which I proposed to the regulation were not made in some instances, and when made, were not made in the spirit in which they were proposed; my object having been to secure means of transport for the armies which are to defend the country, and the object of the government having been something else for its benefit and advantage.

It is very proper that the Governors of the Kingdom should endeavor to do that which will be advantageous and beneficial to the Kingdom, in the proper season; but now they should attend to that which will enable

them to carry on the war vigorously, and save the country from the hands of the enemy.

Dom M. Forjaz's note, marked G, is like every other paper from that gentleman, very able, and looks well to the eye; but it is not sound. The Governors of the Kingdom dare not do otherwise than profess they will act as I recommend to them; but I, who am to carry measures into execution with aids which depend upon their arrangements, can see and feel the difference between professing to perform an action and really performing it.

The A.G. to Major D'Ogby, A.A.G. 7th division.

18th May, 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 16th inst., relative to the boy of the Brunswick light infantry, the Commander of the Forces has instructed me to say that the Commanding officer of the corps must manage in the best manner he can to correct the boy, but that his Excellency cannot write to the Admiral on the subject. The Commander of the Forces will not allow any recruiting whatever at Lisbon: of course, it will not be necessary to send an officer there. I regret much that the circular, dated 18th Jan. 1812, should not have been received: I have sent Gen. Hope the only printed copy remaining. I send you a memorandum taken off the hospital states of the men of the 68th regt., which will probably account for the 'missing' of that corps.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812, 10 A.M.

I enclose the only intelligence I have received since I wrote to you last. I am afraid that unless I can get Grant away by force, I shall not get him at all.

In regard to force also, I find by an account from Tordesillas, that our principal correspondent there has been seized by Gen. Boyer, in consequence of his own imprudence. I am apprehensive that some traces may have been found of my letters to the different guerrilla chiefs to urge them to intercept Grant, and to offer a reward to the party which should take him, and that Marmont will take care that he shall have a sufficient escort. This was the person through whom all the correspondence with the north was carried on.

You will have seen in the last letters from my brother his account of the sum he is authorised to give the Spaniards this year. I doubt that

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces having received an order to draft the 2d batt. 42d regt. into the 1st, the following arrangement is to be made for that purpose:

2. The private men belonging to the 2d batt. 42d regt. in Portugal and Spain, are to be drafted into the 1st batt., and are to be distributed into companies in the 1st batt., with the exception of men deemed unfit, at present, for service in the field, and 30 men to be selected by Lieut. Col. Lord Blantyre, or the officer appointed by him for that purpose.

3. All men missing from the 2d batt. are to be kept on the strength of the 2d batt.

4. The transfer is to be made immediately, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for them up to the 24th inst., and are to account, in the usual manner, with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt., to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order.

5. When this transfer shall be completed, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batt., and such private men as remain, are to proceed, by route furnished by the Q. M. G., to Lisbon, preparatory to their embarkation for England.

6. The Commander of the Forces regrets the loss of the services of Lord Blantyre, and of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 2d batt. 42d regt. in this country. The battalion has, on every occasion and in every situation, conducted itself in a manner worthy of the distinguished regiment of which it forms a part; and the Commander of the Forces requests that they will accept his thanks for their services, and best wishes for their success.

Great Britain can realise in specie what is necessary even for that purpose, and to support this army. I am, besides, afraid that the grant of money to the Spanish government would not answer our purpose. Their system is so overgrown by abuses, that no sum which we could give them would insure to us an active military co-operation. I have therefore desired my brother to confine his issues of pay only to effective officers and troops, who shall not receive for more than two months unless they shall be reported to be in such a state of discipline and subordination as a military body ought to be.

It will be impossible, I am afraid, to effect all that I have in contemplation by this mode of giving our pecuniary aid, particularly if the aid should be given through the government; and I have therefore proposed that the aid should be at my disposal, to give it direct to such troops as I might think fit. There will still remain the difficulties of subsistence; but as some contributions are collected in all parts of the country, I propose that they should be applied solely to the subsistence of the troops. We may do something in this manner.

We are getting on with our convoys. The first arrived yesterday at Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812.

I enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by the Inspector General of Hospitals, and I beg that, according to the recommendation which it contains, the — regt. may be removed to the sea side as soon as possible.

I beg that you will inform the Commanding and other officers of the — regt. that they have been sent, and are detained at Lisbon, because their regiment is *unfit for service*, a circumstance not very creditable to any regiment; and that I trust that by their attention to the discipline, as well as the health and necessary comfort of the soldiers, by their obedience to orders, and by their endeavors to establish in the regiment a system of order and subordination, they will render their regiment fit to belong to this army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 29th ult., allowing of our making private bargains for bills on England, if we should find it necessary; and I have desired the Commissary Gen. to endeavor to procure the sum, of which I had before refused to sanction the acceptance, in consequence of Mr. Herries' notification to Mr. Bissett of the disapprobation of the Treasury of these transactions. This money will be of great use to us just now, if we can get it, as we are very badly off indeed.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

The 26th regt. are to be embarked, and to proceed to Gibraltar to relieve the 82d, which regiment is to be brought round to the Tagus. I request you to let the Admiral know the strength of the 26th regt., that he may order transports accordingly. When the 1st batt. 38th

regt. and 91st shall arrive in the Tagus, they are to be landed, and be prepared to march to join the army.

You will be pleased to give the enclosed letter for Major Gen. Campbell to the Commanding officer of the 26th, who will deliver it on his arrival at Gibraltar.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

As you expressed an anxiety to have an account of our wounded officers and soldiers, I hope to be able to send an official one this day; but the materials for it have not yet come in. I can tell you generally, however, that with the exception of Gen. Walker and Col. Elder, and one or two other officers of inferior rank, the officers are all doing well. Gen. Walker has been better for the last 3 days; but he is much weakened by repeated hemorrhage, and he is not out of danger, although the hemorrhage is stopped. He was badly wounded, and was very imprudent, both in exerting himself improperly, and in his food during the first day after he was wounded, which brought on hemorrhage. Elder was also very badly wounded, but had so far recovered as to be thought out of danger; but he has for some days past had lock jaw. He has not become worse for these last 4 days, and hopes are entertained of his recovery; but of course he is still in great danger.

Major Gen. Kempt's wound proved to be worse than was at first imagined; but he and Gen. Colville, and Gen. Bowes, are getting well. Many of the men have already returned to their duty; others are convalescent, and nearly all are doing well. The real loss has been small, and I hope, that as the season continues favorable, we shall save many.

Au Général Dumouriez.

À Fuente Guinaldo, ce 20 Mai, 1812.

J'ai été obligé de revenir en Castille après le siège de Badajoz. Les Espagnoles, comme de coutume, ont négligé de jeter dans la place les provisions que je leur avais donné pour ravitailler Ciudad Rodrigo, jusqu'à ce qu'il était trop tard. Le convoi était à 5 lieues de la place la nuit du 31 Mars; et les Français ont passé l'Aguada le 1 Avril au matin. Je leur avais donné l'ordre sur nos magasins à 17 lieues de distance le 16 Février; et pour n'avoir pu charier cette distance en 6 semaines, la place aurait été perdu, si je n'y avais pas retourné avec l'armée, et nous avons manqué la plus belle occasion que la guerre présentera de faire évacuer les Andalousies par un mouvement direct sur ces contrées. Marmont a fait une petite course en Portugal, et a manqué un beau coup sur la milice Portugaise, qui était à Guarda. Il y a eu panique, et tout le monde aurait été détruit s'il les avait poursuivis vigoureusement, mais il a donné du tems pour le rétablissement de l'ordre; l'avant garde de l'armée repassa le Tage à Villa Velha, et il fut obligé de se retirer avec quelques prisonniers, et sans aucun autre fruit de son expédition.

Guarda est une mauvaise position pour un petit corps, et si on ne veut pas s'y maintenir à toute outrance; et aussitôt que j'entendis que la milice était là, je leur ai fait dire de s'en aller; mais l'affaire avait eu lieu.

Je suis ici pour couvrir le ravitaillement des places de Ciudad Rodrigo

et Almeida. Le Général Hill a marché sur Almaraz pour y détruire les établissemens de l'ennemi; et je compte me mettre en campagne pour tâcher de faire évacuer les Andalouses, ou de frapper quelque beau coup qui les fera évacuer avant que les Français puissent recevoir des renforts. J'ai lieu de croire qu'on compte à Paris être obligé de faire ce sacrifice.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

The government of Spain have recently informed me that they will allow 5000 Spaniards to enlist and serve in the British regiments composing this army during the war, and as long as these regiments will remain in the Peninsula; and having adverted to the approbation signified by your Lordship in your dispatch of the 28th Aug. 1811, of the orders given by Lieut. Gen. Graham to Col. Skerrett, to enlist Spaniards in the British regiments which went under his command to Tarragona, and to your Lordship's letter of the 17th July, 1811, in which you suggested the expediency of enlisting native Portuguese to serve in the British regiments in this army, I have thought it proper to avail myself of this offer of the Spanish government, and I enclose the copy of a circular letter which I have written upon the subject to the General officers commanding divisions, directing that Spaniards might be enlisted.

I have departed from the form approved of by your Lordship for the levy of native Portuguese, for the reasons detailed in my letter of the 4th Aug. in answer to those directions. But if H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, or your Lordship, should not approve of the form of the levy, it will be easy to make any alteration that may be thought expedient; and in the mean time the expense of the experiment of raising native Spaniards or British soldiers will be trifling. It may perhaps eventually be necessary to provide for the increase of the establishments of the several battalions of this army, if the measure should be attended with the wished for success.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 29th ult., regarding the arrival of the 1st batt. 38th regt. in the Tagus, and the proposed disposal of that regiment when it will arrive. As the 2d batt. 38th regt. is in this country, and as I know that the 1st batt. is composed of a very fine body of men, I think, upon the whole, it would be most expedient to allow that battalion to join the army, and then to send home the 2d batt. The — regt. are at Lisbon, where I had sent them in consequence of their being very sickly, a very weakly body of men, and in very bad order; and according to all accounts of them, they are now by no means fit for service in the field, either as a body of men, or in reference to their discipline. They consist of 802 R. and F., and they might improve in health, strength, and discipline at Gibraltar, where I propose to send them to relieve the 82d regt.

I have already had the 2d batt. — regt. with the army, and I had sent them to Lisbon, as being unfit for service in the field, before they went to Cadiz, and I don't think they will be an acquisition. It is better that they should remain in garrison.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

I have not yet heard of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's progress beyond the neighbourhood of Truxillo on the 14th; but the enemy have not been alarmed either in the south or in this part of the country, and I have great hopes that he will have effected the object on which he is sent.

A small detachment, consisting of about 2500 men, moved from Seville on the 5th towards Ayamonte, near which place they arrived on the 16th. I believe that the object of this detachment has been to disturb the march of the Spanish troops destined to be in garrison at Badajoz, 2 battalions of which had been landed at Ayamonte. They had, however, commenced their march through the Kingdom of Portugal before the enemy approached the Guadiana.

The enemy have made no other movement of importance, either in the south or in the north, since I addressed you on the 13th inst.

Some of the provisions destined for Ciudad Rodrigo have arrived, and the convoys are in progress towards that place and Almeida.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st May, 1812, 6 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 19th, and those from Sir W. Erskine of the 18th.

The enemy are evidently moving upon Hill's rear, probably in larger force than that which has hitherto been under the command of Drouet. The last I heard of Soult was that he had left Seville for the Puertos on the 10th and 11th; and on the same day there were about 2500 men near Ayamonte, it was said, under Gazan. It is not probable, therefore, that the whole army of the South are in motion. I apprised Hill of the probability of this movement; and it is most likely that he heard of the enemy being at Don Benito on the 17th as soon as Sir W. Erskine.

If this is the case, he will have arrived at Aldea del Obispo, so as to open the road to Caceres on the 19th; and he will be at Caceres this day, whether successful or otherwise in the enterprise which was the object of the expedition. If he should be a day later, I think he will still be in time, as it is probable that the troops which were at La Granja on the 18th are intended to pass the Guadiana at Medellin, which they cannot do before the 20th. I have therefore but little anxiety respecting Hill's retreat.

I was apprehensive that the enemy would make this movement in consequence of the delays which took place; and the movement of the equipment upon Merida instead of upon Caceres. However, I hope that the evil will be confined to the disappointment of my views upon Almaraz for this time.

The 1st division cannot move in a better direction than towards Caceres; but if Hill's retreat should have been effected, it would be best to get the troops back to their stations, as matters are getting very forward here.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st May, 1812.

1. Lieut. — is dismissed from the service of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and is to report himself to the officer commanding the 3d or Buffs.

2. Major Gen. Peacocke is requested to place Lieut. — in arrest, upon charges which will be forwarded to that officer.

I say nothing about the measures to be adopted in case the movement of the enemy should be only upon Hill's rear, and confined to a moderate force. If the whole army of the South should have entered Estremadura, it would be best to take the position indicated in my letter to Hill, of which I sent you the draft.

P.S. There is nothing new here.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d May, 1812, 10 A.M.

I have received as yet no intelligence from Sir W. Erskine of a later date than the 18th in the evening, or from you of a later date than the 19th, at 3 P.M.; but the guide arrived yesterday evening, and I see from the *Roteiro* that the head quarters were still at Almendralejo on the evening of the 19th.

The enclosed letters from Cadiz show that Soult was expected in that quarter about the 8th, and that troops had arrived there. I know that 2500 men were near Ayamonte on the 11th; and therefore upon the whole I feel no anxiety respecting affairs in Estremadura, although I should be glad to hear of them. I fancy that Sir William has been misinformed.

It is very desirable that the 1st and 6th divisions and the cavalry should return to their stations as soon as Hill's safety is beyond all question.

We are nearly ready with our magazines here; and it is obvious that this must be our operating flank; and I intended to put the troops in march as soon as Hill should return.

P.S. I enclose papers from Salamanca.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 22d May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and its enclosures.

I am happy to find that you propose to inquire at Tarifa respecting the necessity for the staff appointments which have been made there. An interpreter may be necessary, who ought to perform all the duties of the Staff officers, if he is an officer. If he should not be so, there might be another Staff officer; but I cannot see the necessity for two Staff officers, and that one of them should be the adjutant, the other the quarter master of the 87th, neither of whom can have any duty to perform in his new situation which does not belong to him in that which he has hitherto held.

It is also very desirable that you should ascertain whether two assistant engineers are required, and whether the officers appointed to those situations are the most fit to fill them.

In regard to the works at Tarifa, you have not sent me the plans and sections, and I cannot judge of them from description; and even if I had the plans and sections, I should not be so well able to determine on the propriety of undertaking the works as those who might see the ground. The impression on my mind is, that nothing can render Tarifa a post likely to hold out, even for a short time, against the attack which may, and probably will be made upon the place. The garrison will, after all, be obliged to retire to the island, where, it is my opinion, they can be so

secured at a moderate expense, incurred gradually, as to render it probable that the enemy would not be able to carry this point.

On the other hand, it is my opinion that the possession of the island, as a military post, would deprive the enemy of all the advantages which they expect to derive from the possession of the town of Tarifa, viz., the navigation of the coast to Algeiras. If instead of the town falling into their hands fortified, or in part fortified, as it certainly will if the works in contemplation should be continued, it were to fall into their hands with all the works demolished, it is probable that when they should find that they could not obtain possession of the island, they would abandon the place altogether, and leave the town, as well as the island, in the hands of the allies.

If they should, under such circumstances, pretend to hold the town, they must either leave a large force in it, which would alone be a great advantage to the allies; or, if they should leave a small one, the troops composing it would be exposed to the constant attacks of the allies from the island. Whereas, if the town should be fortified, or in part fortified, and lost, as it certainly will, the enemy may with impunity leave in it in security as small a force as they please; and as long as they can remain in Andalusia, the allies will be deprived of that *débouché* into the country.

I wish you to consider the works carrying on at Tarifa in this view of them. As long as the British government shall furnish money, there will not be wanting Spanish engineers to execute fancies of all kinds in the way of fortifications; and it is probably neither your business nor mine to interfere in the nature, or extent, or object of the assistance afforded to the Spanish government by His Majesty's Ambassador. But, adverting to the great expense incurred in the Peninsula, to its daily and necessary increase, to the expenses now incurring for the fortifications at Cadiz, and those at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and to the absolute necessity which exists for curtailing those expenses as much as may be possible, particularly in instances in which it may appear, as it does to me in this instance, that the expense is not only not necessary, but may prove injurious, and in those in which the whole expense must be incurred in money; I recommend to you, if you should agree with me upon the view of the place in the opinions which I have formed, to urge His Majesty's Ambassador to withdraw the assistance afforded for carrying on the works for fortifying the town of Tarifa; and that our exertions should be confined to making a secure post of the island.

Boards and trestles may be provided for the soldiers to sleep upon at Tarifa.

I conclude that the Sec. of State will give directions that your requisitions for supplies for Tarifa may be complied with.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d May, 1812, 10 A.M.

Major Currie arrived here yesterday with accounts of Sir Rowland's success of the 19th, and he tells me that he wrote to you of it.

He likewise informs me that the enemy's troops which had appeared upon the Guadiana had retired again, which report I hope that Hill will have heard before he will have received that from Sir W. Erskine; as it

appears from Blanckley's reports, who is on the spot, that the numbers reported to Sir William were very much exaggerated. However, whatever they were, they are gone again.

I received your letters of the 20th and 21st last night, the former enclosing that of the 19th from Sir W. Erskine. I have, besides, one of the 15th from Austin, who reports that the French troops have taken up cantonments in the Condado, apparently with a view to subsistence.

The object now in Estremadura is to see Hill back in safety; and as soon as he returns, to put the troops of the 1st and 6th divisions and the cavalry in march for this country.

I believe that the infantry can pass at Alcantara and at Alconeta; and if they can, a great object will be gained in saving them the fatigue of the circuitous march by Villa Velha, at least for the troops of the 6th division. The artillery and cavalry must go by Villa Velha. I have desired Sturgeon to report to you immediately what the means are of passing the Tagus at Alcantara, and how long a given body would be in passing; and I send an officer down to see the *barcas* at Alconeta, and to report to you; of which *barcas*, however, I should think that the Marques de Monsalud might be able to give you an account.

If you should find that the infantry can pass with convenience at either

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23d May, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when any of the General officers of the army pass through or near a town in which an hospital may be stationed, they will be so kind as to visit it, and see that it is conducted as it ought to be, and according to the regulations of the service and orders of the army.

2. He likewise requests they will see on the parade the convalescents in charge of the Military Commandant, and will receive from him a return of their numbers, and a report on their state: they are requested to report their observations to the Commander of the Forces.

3. The great inconvenience which is felt by the service in consequence of the soldiers losing or making away with their necessities and camp equipments, on their marches from the hospitals, or from Lisbon, to join their regiments, induces the Commander of the Forces to order that when a detachment shall march from any hospital station, or from Lisbon, the officer in command of it shall receive a return of the soldiers' necessities and equipments from the officer in charge of the dépôt or station from which he will march; and he is to inspect the necessities and equipments of the soldiers every day after the march will be concluded. If the necessities or equipments of any soldier should be found deficient, he is forthwith to be tried and punished, if there should be a sufficient number of officers present for that purpose; if not, the soldier, whose necessities will be found, on inspection, deficient, must be marched a prisoner to the regiment, in order to be tried by a regimental Court Martial.

4. The officer in charge of a detachment on its march to the army will, for this purpose, divide his detachment into as many divisions as there are officers, and will employ an officer to make the inspection ordered of each division.

5. This order is to be added to those directed to be given to the officers commanding detachments of troops on their march from the hospital stations, or Lisbon, to the army; and the officers are requested to observe that if a soldier should make away with his necessities or equipments on a march, under their command, and they should not discover it and bring him to punishment, they will be responsible for a neglect of duty.

6. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be understood that when new blankets, or camp equipments of any description, are issued to any regiments, in consequence of their requisition, they will be called upon to pay for them, not only their actual cost, but the expense of their carriage from Lisbon, unless they shall be able to prove that the want and requisition for them has been occasioned by fair wear, or by unavoidable accident.

7. The Commander of the Forces is, however, convinced, that all the evils and inconveniences occasioned by the sale of their necessities and their camp equipments by the soldiers, would be avoided if the non-commissioned officers were to do their duty, which cannot be expected without the constant inspection and control of the officers of the regiment.

or both these ferries, I request you to put the artillery and carriages of the 6th division at least (and of the 1st, if you should think it expedient that they likewise should cross the ferries) in march upon Villa Velha and Castello Branco by the usual stages, as soon as Hill's return shall be quite secure; and afterwards put the infantry in march to cross the Tagus at the ferries on the day that the artillery shall cross the bridge of Villa Velha.

I shall send orders for the cavalry to move as soon as I shall hear from you that you have ordered them back to their cantonments.

In regard to supplies on the march by Alcantara, &c., there is a magazine at Castello Branco, from which I shall have supplies forwarded to the frontiers of Portugal.

P.S. There are with Hill 2 flying bridges of our pontoons, of 3 or 4 boats in each flying bridge, which might go to Alconeta, to facilitate the passage there, if you should think proper, when Hill returns. I am afraid they could not go to Alcantara, though I am not certain. If they could, it would be the most convenient point for the troops.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 24th May, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose papers from Salamanca, from which it appears that Marmont intended some movement, and that he had heard of Hill's arrival at Lugar Nuevo.

They don't know what to make of the disposition of our troops, which, without a knowledge of our circumstances, it is not easy to understand; and they are very anxious to know where head quarters are.

This was the object of Marmont's letter to me, adverted to in the enclosed, which contained only one from Grant of the 27th April. It came by the hands of a friend, who is gone back well tutored.

I likewise enclose a letter from Cadiz of the 10th. Col. Austin informs me, on the 16th, that Soult had again left the Puertos in a great hurry; I conclude upon hearing of Hill's march; and that the Spanish troops ordered to Tarifa had been countermanded.

I have a letter from the Spanish Minister at War, urging strongly a movement upon Andalusia. This would now be a false movement. At least six divisions of Marmont's army are free, and would follow us, or would attack Ciudad Rodrigo, in which operation they would now succeed, as you will have observed they are bringing up heavy cannon by degrees. Our first object must certainly be now to get the better of Marmont's army, of which we have a chance in the 2 months which will elapse between this time and the period of reaping the harvest in Castille.

Matters were very different 2 months ago. The French could not have collected any where; and if Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned, we might have marched 40,000 men into Andalusia, throwing the remainder of the army upon Castello Branco to observe Marmont. But the harvest will be ripe in Andalusia in the beginning of June. It was reaped last year in Estremadura in the second week in June; and we should not be well through the province before we should have Marmont after us.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received a letter from Hill of the

21st, from which I find that he was to be at Truxillo on that day, so that he will be on the Guadiana sooner than I expected when I wrote to you; and I found yesterday that Mr. Bissett was not quite so forward as I thought he was from his report. There is therefore no immediate occasion for hurry in the movement across the Tagus. I think the artillery, with the 1st and 6th divisions and the cavalry, had better be thrown back to the old cantonments at all events; and I request you to decide whether the infantry shall, upon the following considerations:

1st; Whether the troops can cross at Alcantara without inconvenience, with the aid of Dickson's flying bridges.

2dly; Whether they can be subsisted in the positions which they now occupy, and keep up their supplies.

The nearest magazine to the 6th division at Montijo is Badajoz; the nearest to the 1st division is Niza. This last had passed Castello de Vide before they received your order to halt at that place.

I find that there is a boat at Alconeta capable of containing 12 horses, which might probably be brought down to Alcantara. I have desired Capt. Pierrepont to report to you on that ferry; but I recollect one inconvenience attending the use of it to come to this part of the country, and that is, that the Alagon must be passed likewise by a ferry. The troops also which would march by Alconeta would have to send far for their supplies on their march. I would recommend the use of Alcantara alone therefore, if you should send any troops across the Tagus by any other road than the bridge of Villa Velha.

According to what I have above stated to you in regard to Mr. Bissett's preparations, I request you not to move the infantry, excepting towards their old cantonments, till you shall hear further from me.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 24th May, 1812.

I have just received your letter of the 21st. I have invariably ordered that as much money as could be spared from the service of the army should be delivered to the chest of the 'aids,' and I believe the subsidy has been much overpaid. But that is no concern of mine. I shall continue the same practice. I must say, however, in answer to your letter of the 21st, that I don't believe I shall be able in the month of June to order the issue of more *money* than was given in the month of May, and I cannot fix the time at which any will be given.

You had much better write to government on the subject. I can do no more than I am doing.

P.S. You may depend upon it that the subsidy has been infinitely overpaid since the 1st Jan.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812, 8 A.M.

I have received your letters of the 20th and 21st inst., but not yet that containing your report of your transactions on the Tagus. I wish you would take measures to know exactly what passes at Mirabete, if you have not got that garrison as prisoners. It is my opinion that they will abandon the place as soon as they can; and I shall be glad to hear from you when they shall abandon it.

I don't believe that Soult intended to attack Tarifa; but if he did, you will have seen that your movement upon Almaraz has deranged all his projects, as well as those of Marmont. Soult's troops are again marching towards Seville; and Marmont moved from Salamanca on the 23d towards Avila and Talavera. He was to move himself, I believe, yesterday.

In consequence of Sir W. Erskine's reports, Sir T. Graham moved into Estremadura the 1st and 6th divisions of infantry, and part of the 1st division of cavalry. These troops will either withdraw into Alentejo again, or will wait in Estremadura till I shall order them across the Tagus at Alcantara, and will be considered applicable to other services as soon as you shall return to the Guadiana, where you will resume your old position, and revert for the present to my instructions of the 11th April.

You will observe that your success has given great security to your left, as, whatever may be said, I know that the roads from the Tagus to the Guadiana, leading from the bridge of Arzobispo and Talavera, cannot be called military communications for large bodies of troops. You might therefore adventure a little against Drouet, and keep him out of the province of Estremadura if you can, keeping me apprised of your designs. In the formation of all these plans, keep in view the support which Drouet will have from Soult, whose head quarters, I suspect, are about to be moved to Andujar. Endeavor to gain accurate information respecting Belalcazar and any other fortified posts which the enemy may have towards Cordova.

It will be necessary that the flying bridge which you have should be moved towards Alcantara, and placed at the disposal of Sir T. Graham if he wants it; and that Lieut. Col. Dickson's reserve of howitzers should be placed in a situation to be in readiness to cross the Tagus at the same place, with that part of their equipment, consisting of 5½ inch shells, spherical case, and powder.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812, 8 A.M.

I enclose some letters from my brother, and a letter and its enclosure from Salamanca.

You will see from the latter that Hill's operation has induced Marmont to move. I don't know yet whether he has got the garrison of the tower of Mirabete. I should think he would, if he had not been alarmed by Sir William's reports.

Hill's operation has deranged Soult's as well as Marmont's plans, as I learn from Austin, on the 18th, that the troops had been withdrawn from the Condado; and you see that they have been withdrawn from Cadiz.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E. Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812, 8 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 22d, in regard to the cut from the Picurina to the inundation.

First; is what you propose now better than what you proposed before, viz., a communication from the Picurina to the ravelin?

You will observe that an enemy could not attack the redoubt by its gorge without obtaining possession of the communication, the approaches to which would be better flanked and defended by the fire of the fort, and

from the gorge of the redoubt, than from the proposed line. There is another advantage in the communication likewise, which is, that it would afford an additional obstacle to an enemy attempting to turn the redoubt by its left. Unless the whole of the new proposed line, and the covered way on the left of the redoubt, should be occupied, the redoubt will always be liable to an attack in the night by surprise in its gorge. The only guard against it will be the flank fire from the right of the redoubt, and the fire from the body of the place.

And here the second question arises, viz., is the proposed line flanked by any, and what works of the place? You must be the best judge, being on the spot, of the validity of this reasoning; and I beg you will decide which you will adopt, the communication as first proposed, or the line as proposed in your letter of the 22d.

As far as I can judge from the plan, the proposed line will be seen only from the face of the bastion of S^a Maria.

I have omitted to write to you respecting an engineer to be attached to Lieut. Gen. Hill. I rather believe that you had better detain Lieut. Col. Jones for that purpose.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812.

I received yesterday your letter of the 18th inst., and I had at the same time one of the 20th from the Conde de Amarante, from which I learnt that the enemy, after plundering the villages on the frontier of Galicia, had retired to Benavente.

There is no chance of their attacking Galicia as long as this army shall be on this frontier; and, entertaining this opinion, and feeling an anxious desire that the Portuguese government should be saved the expense of the militia in arms when not necessary to be incurred, and that the individuals composing the militia should have the advantage of returning to their homes when their services should not be required, I desired that the militia should be disbanded as soon as I brought back the army to this quarter, with the exception of those corps necessary to observe the enemy's movements. They are, however, ready to turn out again at a moment's notice.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State of the War Department, desiring that the troops under Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill should move into Andalusia, in co-operation with the 4th army, to drive the enemy from that kingdom.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill has lately made an important movement and effected in a very brilliant manner a very important operation on the Tagus, near Almaraz, of which I propose to transmit to you the detailed accounts for the information of the Spanish government, in the course of a day or two.

It appears that Marshal Soult abandoned whatever design he might have had immediately in view in Andalusia, as soon as he heard of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's movement towards the Tagus; and I have only now to add, that I will take care that Gen. Sir R. Hill shall annoy the enemy in

every manner that may be in his power with the force which he has under his command.

I am apprehensive, however, that the force under his command, even assisted by the 4th army, is not equal to the undertaking of forcing the enemy from Andalusia.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th May, 1812.

When we had taken Ciudad Rodrigo in January, and I intended to carry on the siege of Badajoz in March, I expected to be able, if successful in that object, to invade Andalusia with a superior army to that which the French had in that part of Spain.

These expectations were founded on the knowledge which I had, that even if Soult and Marmont had collected their armies, either to impede our operations at the siege of Badajoz or to stop our further progress, the want of subsistence at that season of the year would have obliged them to separate, which want, we, with our superior means and better arrangements, should not have felt.

It appeared to me also that nothing which Marmont could undertake at that season of the year could prevent me from carrying my plan into execution. He could not attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, because we had taken, in the former, the heavy artillery belonging to the French army, which could not be replaced in time. He could not venture at that season of the year to make a serious invasion of Portugal; and if he had, two or three divisions of the army which could have been spared after the siege of Badajoz, with the militia, would have stopped him effectually; nor could he at that season invade Galicia with any prospect of success. In either of these operations he would have felt a want of provisions equal to, if not greater, than that which he would have experienced if he and Soult had joined to impede our progress south of the Tagus.

I enclose a copy of the memorandum which I gave to Gen. Castaños before the siege of Badajoz, in which the probable plans of the enemy are discussed, and measures to defeat them are proposed. Your Lordship will see that I adverted to that which at length obliged me to return into Castille; I mean the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I thought I had adopted the most effectual measure to frustrate it, by giving to the Spanish authorities, before I wrote the enclosed paper, the provisions in our magazines which they were to have carried to the place. But unfortunately they could not find the means of moving these provisions, only 17 leagues, in nearly 7 weeks! Other mistakes and disobedience of orders occurred, and I was obliged to bring back to Castille an army able to beat Marmont in the field, in case he should persevere in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon, for the moment, the execution of my plan upon the Andalusias.

The measure then to be adopted was to replenish the magazines of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as soon as possible; and it was necessary to keep the army in a situation to be in readiness to concentrate, to protect that service, in case the enemy should attempt to interrupt it. If such an attempt had been made, and we had not been at hand to prevent its

success, your Lordship will observe that both places would probably have been lost, as neither could have in it at the same time provisions for more than a few days, and could not have held out till assistance could come to their relief.

I did not, however, lose all hopes of being able to relieve Andalusia by a movement into that province, although I was obliged to detain the army for some time in Castille. Those hopes depended upon the period at which Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida should be replenished with provisions, and upon the accounts which I should receive of the degree of progress made by the enemy in providing themselves with artillery and stores for the siege of those places.

The magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida have been replenished, but I have reason to believe that the train for Marmont's army is in considerable forwardness on its road from Bayonne. But at all events, the season is now so far advanced that the reasoning in reference to the expedition into Andalusia, which would have rendered that plan advisable in April or in the beginning of May, is not now applicable. The harvest in Andalusia will be ripe in the beginning of June, and that in Estremadura in the same state in the second week in June; and this is the state in which it is most convenient to the French to find the harvest, from which they can take what they please where they want it, without any account; and wherever they find ripe corn on the ground, they can collect any number of men they please, and can keep them collected during the time which may be necessary to perform any operation. If then I were to choose this period for my expedition into Andalusia, Marmont would follow me march for march, and on my arrival in Andalusia I should find an army much superior to mine.

It may here be necessary to advert to the state of the enemy's numbers at present. I reckoned that Soult had about 45,000 men under his command in March, of which 5000 were the garrison of Badajoz; and I calculated that he could bring 32,000 for a few days into Estremadura to raise that siege. I have reason to believe that Marmont has 45,000 men under his command, including the divisions of Souham and Bonet, received from the army of the north in January, which are about 14,000 or 15,000 of the number; and I reckoned that he would have brought 30,000 men into Estremadura to raise the siege of Badajoz, leaving those divisions to occupy Castille and Leon. I enclose, however, some intercepted letters in regard to that siege, which show that I was mistaken respecting the numbers which the enemy could bring into Estremadura to raise it, which it appears by the enclosed letters were 80,000 men. In these numbers, however, I conclude that 5000 men belonging to what is called the Centre Army are included.

Of the two armies called the army of the South and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which are opposed to us, the latter can produce the largest number of men in a distant operation. Soult must maintain the blockade of Cadiz as long as he remains in Andalusia, and in effecting that object he must keep garrisons in Seville, Granada, Malaga, and some other points; and if he is to be absent from the province for any length of time, he must leave a body of men to observe Ballesteros, who would otherwise

be able to effect some operation attended by permanent injury to his objects in Andalusia.

Marmont, however, has no object, nor, as he has been repeatedly told in letters from Berthier, any thing to attend to but the British army. By abandoning Castille and Leon for a short time he might lose some plunder and some contributions, but he can lose nothing which could permanently affect his situation or the operations of the war; or which he could not regain as soon as he should again be able to have a superiority, particularly of cavalry, in the open country of Castille. Marmont's then being, what may be called of the two, the operating army, the movement which I should now make into Andalusia, which, as I have above pointed out, would enable the enemy to bring the largest body of men to act together on one point, would be a false movement, and this must by all means be avoided.

There are other circumstances also which render a movement into Andalusia, at the present moment, inexpedient. 1st; your Lordship will have seen that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo is not in a very satisfactory state, and it is desirable not to carry the operations of the army to a distance from that place, so as to leave it exposed under existing circumstances. 2dly; the harvest in all the countries north of the Tagus, particularly in those north of the mountains, by which Castille is separated from Estremadura, is much later than it is to the southward. We shall retain our advantages for a longer period of time in these countries than we should do to the southward; and we have time to strike some important blows, which, if successful, may have the effect of relieving the Andalusias, as effectually as a direct movement upon those provinces.

I propose, therefore, as soon as ever the magazines of the army are brought forward, which work is now in progress, (the troops continuing in dispersed cantonments for that purpose,) to move forward into Castille, and to endeavor, if possible, to bring Marmont to a general action. I think I can make this movement with safety, excepting always the risk of the general action. I am of opinion also that I shall have the advantage in the action, and that this is the period of all others in which such a measure should be tried.

Your Lordship will have observed that Gen. Hill's recent operation gives great security to our right in any forward movement into Castille. The enemy have, in truth, now no good military communication across the Tagus, excepting the bridge of Toledo. I know that the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera can't be deemed military communications for large corps, and scarcely for any body of troops marching with cannon and carriages. There are besides other difficulties for a corps advancing along the valley of the Tagus towards the frontier of Portugal. It is not very probable, therefore, that we should be turned by our right; and if reinforcements should be drawn from the north to press upon our left, we shall always have our retreat open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo or by the valley of the Tagus.

In respect to the general action, I believe there is no man in this army who entertains a doubt of its result, and that sentiment alone would do a great deal to obtain success. But we possess solid physical advantages

over the enemy, besides those resulting from recent successes. Our infantry are not in bad order; our cavalry more numerous in relation to the enemy, and the horses in better condition than I have known them since I have commanded the army; and the horses of the artillery in the same good condition and complete in numbers, whereas the enemy are, I know, terribly deficient in that equipment.

Strong as the enemy are at present, there is no doubt that they are weaker than they have been during the war, or than they are likely to be again, as they will certainly be in some degree reinforced after the harvest, and very largely so, after Buonaparte's projects in the north shall have been brought to a conclusion. We have a better chance of success now, therefore, than we have ever had; and success obtained now would produce results not to be expected from any success over any single French army in the Peninsula upon any other occasion.

The certainty of the loss in every action, and the risk which always attends such an operation, ought not, therefore, in my opinion, to prevent its being tried at present. I am not insensible to these losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I shall undertake this operation. My friends in Castille (and I believe that no officer ever had better) assure me that we shall not want provisions, even before the harvest will be reaped; that there exist concealed granaries which will be opened to us; and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given us for the remainder. They have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castille upon British securities; and it was with a view to loans from the people of the interior principally, that I applied to your Lordship for the forms of the securities.

In case we should not be able to maintain ourselves in Castille, the general action and its result being delayed by the enemy's manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall at all events have our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. But with all these prospects I can't reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed, nor upon the consequence which may result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.

I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections, and the plan according to which I propose to proceed for the campaign, which I hope at all events will be a successful one.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

2. Adverting to the G. O. of the 8th May, the Commander of the Forces desires that all soldiers at Lisbon or Belem shall take their letters to Thomas Reynolds, Esq., agent for packets, who, upon their paying him 15 *reis* for each letter, will have them marked as paid, and they will be transmitted to England by the first opportunity.

3. Soldiers absent from their regiments, whether on detachment or in hospital, any where but in Lisbon, must send their letters intended for England to the officer commanding the company, who will forward them by the first opportunity, under the G. O. of the 8th May.

4. It is to be clearly understood, that as the object of these orders is to insure the delivery in England of the soldiers' letters, for which the soldiers pay the postage in this country, the post office serjeant at Lisbon, or at head quarters, cannot receive soldiers' letters, and money to pay the postage for them.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

I gave directions some days ago to the Commanding officer of artillery that 2 companies of the Royal artillery might be prepared to be embarked for service; and I requested Marshal Sir W. Beresford to apply to the Portuguese government for permission to send 2 companies of Portuguese artillery with them, to which the government having consented, the Marshal has directed that those might be prepared; and I applied to the Admiral to have transports prepared to take these troops to their destination.

I request you to inquire from Gen. Rosa and Lieut. Col. Fisher when the troops shall be ready to embark, and that you will settle with Gen. Soares de Noronha the period of their embarkation, after having ascertained from his Excellency the Admiral that the transports are ready to receive them.

These 4 companies are to proceed to Gibraltar; and I enclose a letter for the Governor of Gibraltar, which the Commanding officer is to deliver to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

Marmont had not quitted Salamanca on the 24th, but it was expected he would go on the 25th. I enclose a letter from Ruman, containing the accounts of the 24th.

I have a letter from Sir W. Erskine of the 24th, from which it appears that he then thought the enemy were retiring. I don't think Sir William has very good intelligence.

I don't know how Sir William makes himself out much inferior to Drouet in cavalry.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

The government of Spain having signified to Mariscal de Campo Don M. de Alava their consent that His Catholic Majesty's subjects, to the number of 5000, might be permitted to enlist into His Majesty's army serving in the Peninsula, I enclose the copy of a circular letter which I have written to the General officers commanding divisions, to permit the regiments in their several divisions to enlist His Catholic Majesty's subjects, and specifying the terms on which the enlistment is to be made. You will observe that this letter provides for enlisting 4100 men, which is all that I have thought it proper at present to allow of; and I have not allowed the foreign regiments in the British service to enlist any Spaniards.

I request you to lay the enclosed before the Spanish government.

I likewise request that you will apply for leave for Capt. Gray, of the 95th regt., who will have the honor of delivering a duplicate of this letter, to go to Alicante and the kingdom of Valencia, with the order of the government, directed to the Captains General of Valencia, Murcia, and Catalonia, to permit him to enlist His Catholic Majesty's subjects, natives of those kingdoms, into His Majesty's 95th regt.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812, 9 A.M.

Since I wrote to you on the 25th, I find that Sir T. Graham will not require the flying bridges, which you had better send back, with all the appurtenances, bullocks, &c., to San Vicente; and I shall write to Fletcher respecting the disposal of the bridge of pontoons.

Lieut. Col. Dickson's reserve brigade of howitzers must, however, be ready to cross the bridge of Alcantara on the day Sturgeon will have it prepared; and I shall write to Sturgeon to let him know exactly on what day it will be ready.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

I received last night your 3 letters of the 25th.

I send Major Currie to England with Sir R. Hill's dispatches, which I hope will be of service to him. I received 3 letters from Hill with his dispatch, including the dispatch, and I believe all in their covers.

I desired Col. Framingham to attach Major Gardiner to the artillery with the 1st division, and it was necessary to move Capt. Lawson's company with him. But it is certainly desirable that some of the experienced artillerymen and drivers should remain with the 1st division, and I shall speak to Col. Framingham on the subject.

I think it probable that I shall be able to send directions for the march of the troops to-morrow morning. All will now pass by Villa Velha, in consequence of their having taken up their old cantonments, as stated in your letter of the 25th.

I shall write to Sturgeon to fix his bridge where he can, and then to join the army.

P.S. You will have heard of Mr. Perceval having been murdered coming out of the House of Commons on the 11th.

To Don Carlos de España.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz having placed at my disposition a part of the aid supplied by Great Britain to the Spanish government, I conceive that I can't fulfil the wishes of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland, nor forward the interests of the Spanish government more essentially, than in making use of that aid to furnish the pay of the officers and troops composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of those composing the division under the command of your Excellency.

I request your Excellency, however, to understand that the expenses of the army under my command, and the other expenses incurred by His Majesty in the cause of the Peninsula, are very large, and that it is frequently impossible to procure funds to defray those of them which must be paid in money. Whatever may be my intentions or my wishes, therefore, regarding the regularity of the payment of the troops above referred to, it must depend upon the realization of specie for the other necessary expenses of the army. I mention this in order to guard myself against future reproaches on account of the irregularity of these payments, which I now declare I can't expect will be regular.

I likewise consider it my duty, acting on the behalf of His Majesty's

government, and doing what I conscientiously consider best for the cause of Spain, to make the following conditions:

1st; The money is invariably to be applied to the purpose for which it will be issued by me; that is to say, to give their pay, or the stated proportion of their pay, to a certain specified number of officers and soldiers.

2dly; As the object in giving this aid is to render the officers and troops efficient for the service, it is desirable that it should be understood that as long as the contributions which can be raised in Castille are allowed by the government to be applicable to the support of the military establishments employed in the country, they should be applied to the provision of subsistence to the troops, particularly the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; to the completion and maintenance of the works of that fortress; and lastly, to aid in the payment of the troops, so that the money supplied by Great Britain may be applied to another object for the service of Spain.

3dly; I beg it may be understood clearly that I employ the aid placed at my disposition in the manner above stated only because I consider the troops composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and those under the command of your Excellency, to be regular troops; among whom ought to be established, and by whom ought to be observed and practised, the Rules and Regulations established by the Kings of Spain for the government of their armies; and these troops ought to be as good as any in the Peninsula engaged on either side.

If I should find that I have been mistaken, it may be depended upon that I shall correct my error; and I shall discontinue the payment of this aid to any corps which shall not be properly disciplined, and in which the Royal Orders and Regulations for the establishment and maintenance of discipline and subordination among officers and soldiers shall not be duly observed.

When I make this last condition, however, I admit that I have no right, nor have I the intention, of criticising the conduct of others. But His Majesty's Ambassador having confided to me the distribution of a part of His Majesty's aid to the Spanish government, it is my duty to satisfy myself, at least, that I shall dispose of it for the benefit of the cause of Spain and her allies; and I don't conceive that I should perform this duty if I were to throw away money to pay officers and soldiers who should have no knowledge of their duty, and among whom there should exist no subordination, no discipline, or no knowledge of or attention to the Orders and Regulations of their Sovereign.

To Don Carlos de España.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

According to my letter No. 1 of this day's date, I have now the honor to enclose a warrant upon the Commissary Gen. for 12,675 dollars, 19 *reales*, and 32 *marav.*, which is sufficient to pay the officers and soldiers according to the enclosed estimate for half of a month; and I beg that this money may be so applied to pay the troops in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and under the command of your Excellency, for half of the month of June.

I have made the calculations in this estimate according to those which your Excellency first gave me as the rate of pay of each individual.

To Major Gen. G. Murray.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

I received this day your letter of the 2d, and I can't express to you how much concerned I am that you have relinquished your situation with this army. I acknowledge that when I first heard of your intention to quit us, my sentiments were not confined to concern and regret; but it is impossible to expect that men will pass their lives in these countries, who have other objects to look to, and I can't be surprised, that after such continued absence, you should be desirous of spending some time at home.

In answer to your letter I can only express a hope that you relinquish your situation with as much regret as I feel upon losing your assistance; and I assure you that I shall always be happy to receive it again when you feel disposed to give it. You will have appreciated the difficulty and importance of our late operations. The siege of Badajoz was a most serious undertaking, and the weather did not favor us. The troops were up to their middles in mud in the trenches, and in the midst of our difficulties the Guadiana swelled and carried away our bridge, and rendered useless for a time our flying bridge. However, we never stopped, and a fair day or two set all to rights. The assault was a terrible business, of which I foresaw the loss when I was ordering it. But we had brought matters to that state that we could do no more, and it was necessary to storm or raise the siege. I trust, however, that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis, and to blow in the counterscarp, instead of placing them wherever the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers and troops to get into and cross the ditch as they can.

Hill's late operation is likewise very important, as unless the enemy have another bridge, they can no longer pass the Tagus as an army, excepting at Toledo. As you have left us, I will not *tantalize* you by entering on our plans for the remainder of the campaign; I think it will be ours at all events, and I hope it may be attended by permanently important consequences.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

I received this day your letter of the 2d, announcing Gen. Murray's removal from the Q. M. G.'s department of this army, and the intention of His Royal Highness to send here Col. Gordon, to perform the duties of that office.

I very much regret the loss of Gen. Murray's assistance, to whom I have so long been accustomed, and who has been of so much service to me. But I am very much obliged to His Royal Highness for having fixed upon Col. Gordon to succeed him; and I assure you that, as Gen. Murray is to go, no arrangement can be more satisfactory to me.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

I enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, with a return of the officers who

have died of their wounds, during and since the siege of Badajoz; and another letter, giving an account of the soldiers who have died, and of the present state of the wounded.

I am sorry to say that Major Gen. Walker is in a very dangerous state, as is Major Gillies, of the 40th. Lieut. Col. Elder is better, and out of danger. Major Gen. Bowes has returned to his duty; but Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville and Major Gen. Kempt are still confined by their wounds.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

When I found that the enemy had retired from this frontier on the 24th April, and that I was enabled to make a disposition of the army, to give me the command of the means of transport attached to the troops, and to enable me to throw provisions into the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and to move up the magazines of the army, with a view to the further operations of the campaign, I directed Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to carry into execution the operations against the posts and establishments of the enemy at the passage of the Tagus, at Almaraz, which I had in contemplation before the siege of Badajoz, and which I had then delayed for reasons into which it is not now necessary to enter.

Owing to the necessary preparations for this expedition, and to the unexpected delays of the repairs of the bridge over the Guadiana at Merida, which I had destroyed during the siege of Badajoz, Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill could not begin his operation with part of the 2d division till the 12th inst.; and he attained the object of his expedition on the 19th inst., by taking by storm Forts Napoleon and Raguse, and the *têtes de pont*, and other works by which the enemy's bridge was guarded, by destroying those forts and works, and the enemy's bridge and establishments, and by taking their magazines, and about 259 prisoners, and 18 pieces of cannon.

I have the honor to enclose Sir R. Hill's report * of this brilliant exploit;

* Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B., to Gen. the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

Truxillo, 21st May, 1812.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that your instructions relative to the capture and destruction of the enemy's works at Almaraz have been most fully carried into effect by a detachment of troops under my orders, which marched from Almendralejo on the 12th inst. The bridge was, as your Lordship knows, protected by strong works, thrown up by the French on both sides of the river, and further covered on the southern side by the castle and redoubts of Mirabete, about a league off, commanding the pass of that name, through which runs the road to Madrid, being the only one passable for carriages of any description, by which the bridge can be approached. The works on the left bank of the river were a *tête de pont*, built of masonry, and strongly intrenched; and on the high ground above it, a large and well constructed fort, called Napoleon, with an interior intrenchment and loopholed tower in its centre. This fort contained 9 pieces of cannon, with a garrison of between 400 and 500 men; there being also on the opposite side of the river, on a height immediately above the bridge, a very complete fort, recently constructed, which flanked and added much to its defence.

On the morning of the 16th, the troops reached Jaraicejo, and the same evening marched in three columns; the left column, commanded by Lieut. Gen. Chowne (28th and 34th regts., under Col. Wilson, and the 6th Portuguese caçadores), towards the castle of Mirabete; the right column, under Major Gen. Howard (50th, 71st, and 92d regts.), which I accompanied myself to a pass in the mountains, through which a most difficult and circuitous footpath leads by the village of Romangordo to the bridge; the centre column, under Major Gen. Long (6th and 18th Portuguese infantry, under Col. Ashworth, and the 13th light dragoons, with the artillery), advanced upon the high road to the pass of Mirabete.

and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the difficulties with which he had to contend, as well from the nature of the country as from the works which the enemy had constructed, and to the ability and characteristic

The two flank columns were provided with ladders, and it was intended that either of them should proceed to escalate the forts against which they were directed, had circumstances proved favorable; the difficulties, however, which each had to encounter on its march were such, that it was impossible for them to reach their respective points before daybreak: I judged it best, therefore, as there was no longer a possibility of surprise, to defer the attack until we should be better acquainted with the nature and position of the works; and the troops bivouacked on the Sierra.

On further examination of the Mirabete works, I was satisfied that any attempt to force that pass, however successful, must be attended by so serious a loss, that I determined on endeavoring to penetrate to the bridge by the mountain path leading through the village of Romagordo, although, by that means, I should be deprived of the use of my artillery.

On the evening of the 18th, I moved with Major Gen. Howard's brigade and the 6th Portuguese regt. for the operation, provided with scaling ladders, &c. Although the distance marched did not exceed 5 or 6 miles, the difficulties of the road were such, that with the united exertions of officers and men, the column could not be formed for the attack before daylight. Confiding, however, in the valor of the troops, I ordered the immediate assault of Fort Napoleon. My confidence was fully justified by the event.

The 1st batt. of the 50th, and one wing of the 71st regt., regardless of the enemy's artillery and musketry, escalated the work in three places, nearly at the same time. The enemy seemed at first determined, and his fire was destructive; but the ardour of our troops was irresistible, and the garrison was driven at the point of the bayonet through the several intrenchments of the fort and *tête de pont*, across the bridge, which having been cut by those on the opposite side of the Tagus, many leaped into the river, and thus perished. The impression made upon the enemy's troops was such, that panic soon communicated itself to those on the right bank of the river, and Fort Raguse was instantly abandoned, the garrison flying in the greatest confusion towards Naval Moral.

I cannot sufficiently praise the conduct of the 50th and 71st regts., to whom the assault fell. The cool and steady manner in which they formed and advanced, and the intrepidity with which they mounted the ladders and carried the place, were worthy of those distinguished corps and the officers who led them.

Could the attack have been made before day, the 92d regt., under Lieut. Col. Cameron, and the remainder of the 71st, under Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan, were to have escalated the *tête de pont*, and effected the destruction of the bridge at the same time that the attack was made on Fort Napoleon. The impossibility of advancing deprived them of this opportunity of distinguishing themselves, but the share which they had in the operations, and the zeal which they displayed, entitle them to my warmest commendation; and I cannot avoid to mention the steadiness and good discipline of the 6th Portuguese infantry, and two companies of the 60th regt., under Col. Ashworth, which formed the reserve to this attack.

Our operations in this quarter were much favored by a diversion made by Lieut. Gen. Chowne, with the troops under his orders, against the castle of Mirabete, which succeeded in inducing the enemy to believe that we should not attack the forts near the bridge until we had forced the pass, and thus have made way for our artillery. The Lieut. General conducted this operation, as well as his former advance, entirely to my satisfaction. I regret much that the peculiar situation of Mirabete should have prevented my allowing the gallant corps under his orders to follow up an operation which they had commenced with much spirit, and were so anxious to complete; but the possession of these forts would not have made amends for the valuable blood which must have been shed in taking them.

I cannot too strongly express how much I am satisfied with the conduct of Major Gen. Howard through the whole of this operation, the most arduous part of which has fallen to his share; and particularly with the manner in which he led his brigade to the assault. He was ably assisted by his staff, Brigade Major Wemyss, of the 50th, and Lieut. Battersby, of the 23d light dragoons. To Major Gen. Long I am also indebted for his assistance, although his column was not immediately engaged. Lieut. Col. Stewart, and Major Harrison, of the 50th, and Major Cocher, of the 71st, commanded the three attacks, and led them in a most gallant and spirited manner.

I have received the greatest assistance from Lieut. Col. Dickson, of the Royal artillery, whom, with a brigade of 24 pounders, a company of British, and one of Portuguese artillery, your Lordship was pleased to put under my orders. Circumstances did not permit his guns to be brought into play, but his exertions, and those of his officers and men during the attack and destruction of the place, were unwearied. In the latter service, Lieut. Thiele, of the Royal German artillery, was blown up; and we have to regret in him a most gallant officer. He had particularly distinguished himself in the assault. Lieut.

qualities displayed by Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, in persevering in the line, and confining himself to the objects chalked out by his instructions, notwithstanding the various obstacles opposed to his progress.

I have nothing to add to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's report of the conduct of the officers and troops under his command, excepting to express my concurrence in all he says in their praise. Too much cannot be said of the brave officers and troops who took by storm, without the assistance of

Wright, of the Royal Engineers, has also rendered me very essential service. He is a most intelligent, gallant, and meritorious officer; and I must not omit also to mention Lieut. Hillier, of the 29th regt., whose knowledge of this part of the country (in which he has been for some time in observation) proved of great assistance.

Your Lordship will observe from the return of ordnance and stores which I have the honor to enclose, that Almaraz has been considered by the enemy in the light of a most important station; and I am happy to state that its destruction has been most complete. The towers of masonry which were in forts Napoleon and Raguse have been entirely levelled, the ramparts of both in great measure destroyed, and the whole apparatus of the bridge, together with the workshops, magazines, and every piece of timber which could be found, entirely destroyed.

A color belonging to the 4th batt. of the *Corps Étranger* was taken by the 71st regt.; and I shall have the honor of forwarding it to your Lordship.

Our loss has not been severe, considering the circumstances under which the attack was made. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded. Capt. Candler, of the 50th regt., (the only officer killed in the assault,) has, I am sorry to say, left a large family to deplore his loss. He was one of the first to mount the ladder, and fell upon the parapet after giving a distinguished example to his men.

I have had frequent occasions to mention to your Lordship, in terms of the highest praise, the conduct of Lieut. Col. Rooke, A. A. G. During the whole period I have had a separate command in this country, that officer has been with me, and rendered most essential service to my corps; on the present expedition he has eminently distinguished himself, and I beg leave particularly to notice his conduct. Your Lordship is also aware of the merits of Lieut. Col. Offeney, my A. Q. M. G., of whose valuable aid I have been deprived during the latter part of this expedition. Though labouring under severe illness, he accompanied me, to the serious detriment of his health, and until it was totally impracticable for him to proceed. Capt. Thorn, D. A. Q. M. G., succeeded to his duties, and I am indebted to him for his assistance, and also to Major Hill and my personal Staff.

The Marques de Almeida, member of the Junta of Estremadura, has done me the honor to accompany me since I have been in the province; I have received from him, as well as from the people, the most ready and effectual assistance which it was in their power to bestow.

Major Currie, my aide de camp, will deliver to your Lordship this dispatch, and the color taken from the enemy, and will be able to give you any further particulars. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship.

I enclose a Return of prisoners, in number 250, including the Governor, one Lieut. Colonel, and 15 officers. I also transmit a Return of provisions in the forts near the bridge, taken from one signed by the Chief of the French Commissariat, on the 18th May.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the storm and capture of Fort Napoleon, and the enemy's other works in the neighbourhood of Almaraz, on the morning of the 19th May, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	2	1	30	33
Wounded	13	10	121	144
Missing	—	—	—	—

cannon, such works as the enemy's forts on both banks of the Tagus, fully garrisoned, and in good order, and defended by 18 pieces of artillery.

Your Lordship is aware that the road of Almaraz affords the only good military communication across the Tagus, and from the Tagus to the Guadiana below Toledo. All the permanent bridges below the bridge of Arzobispo have been destroyed during the war by one or other of the belligerents, and the enemy have found it impossible to repair them. Their bridge, which Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill has destroyed, was one of boats; and I doubt their having the means of replacing it, or that they will again form such an establishment at that point, however important it is to their objects, as that of which he has deprived them.

The communications from the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera to the Guadiana are very difficult, and cannot be deemed military communications for a large army. The result then of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's expedition has been to cut off the shortest and best communication between the army of the South and the '*Armée de Portugal*,' which, under existing circumstances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to re-establish.

Nearly about the same time that the enemy's troops, reported in my last dispatch to have moved into the Condado de Niebla, marched from Seville, it is reported that another considerable detachment, under Marshal Soult, went towards the blockade of Cadiz; and it was expected that another attack was to be made on Tarifa, from which it appears that the enemy intended to divert the attention of the allies by a renewal of the bombardment of Cadiz, which was actually carried into execution on the 16th inst.

It appears, however, that the enemy received early intelligence of Sir R. Hill's march. The troops under the command of Gen. Drouet made a movement to their left, and arrived upon the Guadiana at Medellin on the 17th; and on the 18th a detachment of the cavalry, under the command of the same General, drove in as far as Ribera the piquets of Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine's division of cavalry, which had remained in Lower Estremadura with a part of the 2d division of infantry, and Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's division of infantry. Marshal Soult likewise moved from the blockade of Cadiz towards Cordova, and the troops which had marched from Seville into the Condado de Niebla returned to Seville nearly about the same time.

As soon as Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham was apprised of the movements of the enemy in Estremadura, he marched the 1st and 6th divisions, and part of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton's division of cavalry, into that province; but Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill had attained his object on the 19th, and had retired to Truxillo, and was beyond all risk of being attacked by a superior force on the 21st, and he has since arrived on the Guadiana at Merida.

The enemy's troops have retired into Cordova, and it is stated that Marshal Soult's head quarters have been moved to El Carpio, between Cordova and Andujar, and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham's troops have returned to their cantonments.

Since the accounts have been received of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's expedition, the enemy's troops have likewise been put in motion in Old and New Castille. The 1st division, under Gen. Foy, and a division of the army of the Centre, under Gen. Darmagnac, crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo on the 21st, and have moved by the road of Deleytosa,

to relieve or withdraw the post which still remained in the tower of Mirabete. The whole of the '*Armée de Portugal*' have likewise made a movement to their left, the 2d division being on the Tagus; and Marshal Marmont's head quarters have been removed from Salamanca to Fontiveros.

By a letter from Sir H. Douglas of the 24th, I learn that the troops under Gen. Bonet, after having made two plundering excursions towards the frontiers of Galicia, had again entered the Asturias, and were on the 17th in possession of Oviedo, Gijon, and Grado. In the mean time the troops under Gen. Mendizabal are in possession of the town of Burgos, the enemy still keeping the castle; and in all parts of the country the boldness and activity of the chiefs of guerrillas are increasing, and their operations against the enemy are becoming daily more important.

The measures for moving up the magazines of the army are still in progress.

I forward this dispatch by Major Currie,* aide de camp to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's notice and protection.

To H. R. H. the Commander in chief.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose to your Royal Highness the copy of my dispatch of this day's date, and of its enclosures to the Sec. of State; and the copy of a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, in which he desires me to recommend to your Royal Highness' notice the officers who have distinguished themselves on the expedition to which his dispatch relates. I likewise enclose a sketch of the ground near the Tagus at Almaraz.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

You will be as well pleased as I am with Gen. Hill's success, which certainly would have been still more satisfactory if he had taken the garrison of Mirabete, which he would have done if Gen. Chowne had got on a little better in the night of the 16th, and if Sir W. Erskine had not alarmed him, by informing him that Soult's whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. Sir Rowland, therefore, according to his instructions came back on the 21st, whereas, if he had stayed a day or two, he would have brought his heavy howitzers to bear on the castle, and he could either have stormed it under their fire, or the garrison would have surrendered.

But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail upon the General officers to feel a little confidence in their situation. They take alarm at the least movement of the enemy, and then spread the alarm and interrupt every thing; and the extraordinary circumstance is that if they are not in command they are stout as any private soldiers in the army.

Your Lordship will observe that I have marked some paragraphs in Hill's report not to be published. My opinion is that the enemy must evacuate the tower of Mirabete; and indeed it is useless to keep that post, unless they have another bridge, which I doubt. But if they see that we entertain a formidable opinion of the strength of Mirabete, they

* Afterwards killed at Waterloo.

will keep their garrison there, which might be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to establish there our own bridge.

I enclose a *Madrid Gazette*, in which you will see a curious description of the state of King Joseph's authority, and his affairs in general, from the most authentic sources.

P.S. I enclose the last morning state.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 25th, and with every desire to oblige Don E. Bardaxi, I am very sorry that I cannot comply with his request.

The magazines of the army in Elvas and Badajoz are required to enable the army not only to carry on their operations, but to remain in Estremadura at all. If these magazines were given over to the garrison of Badajoz, the place would fall for want of the necessary support.

There is but one remedy for the inconvenience felt, and that is, for the Marques de Monsalud to oblige the towns in Estremadura to send their means of transport to Alcacer do Sal, to remove to Badajoz the provisions which Don E. Bardaxi is desirous of sending to that place.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose two newspapers received yesterday from Sir H. Douglas, containing accounts of Mr. Perceval's death, and of proceedings in Parliament on that event. I beg you to send them on to my brother, when you shall have read them. If you send them to Señor de los Barcenas, at Badajoz, he will forward them by the Spanish post to Cadiz. There is nothing new here.

I enclose a paper from Salamanca.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

I have perused Major Gen. Hulse's confidential reports of the state of the regiments of his brigade; and I observe in the reports of the Courts Martial of the 61st regt., it is stated that there are 5 men, —, —, —, —, and —, whose punishment is 'remitted, to depend upon their future behaviour.' This appears to me to be irregular.

It is impossible that these soldiers can be put on duty in the situation of convicted criminals; and I conclude that the Commanding officer does not propose to make their punishment depend upon their behaviour while in confinement. These men should have been either punished or pardoned; but as I should imagine they have been on duty since they were convicted of the crimes with which they were severally charged, they ought now to be pardoned; and this irregular practice must be avoided in future.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 26th, enclosing one of the 4th from Lord Castlereagh, regarding the Portuguese account.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th May, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in communicating to the army the resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons, approving of the conduct of the General officers, officers, and troops employed in the siege and storm of Badajoz.

I concur with you in thinking that the Portuguese government ought to have credit for the money for which Mr. Villiers refused to give them credit in 1809. They undoubtedly maintained many more than the stipulated number of troops, whether Da Costa can furnish the regular vouchers or not.

Mr. Bissett has the accounts of issues prepared, I believe, to the end of the year, with every thing excepting prices, which I have desired him to calculate and add to the document, and I hope you will have it in a few days. I know nothing of the receipts of the Portuguese government of articles of military equipment from England, or their prices. There will be to be added, a demand from Mr. Murray for supplies delivered before 1810, when Mr. Kennedy took charge, which came to me, but without prices, and I sent it back to have the prices included.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

In transmitting to your Lordship a duplicate of my dispatch (No. 14) of the 11th Feb., I beg leave to request that you will be pleased to give directions that the scythes for which I then made application should be sent to Lisbon without loss of time, as otherwise they will arrive too late for the object for which they were intended.

To Lieut. Col. Dickson, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 31st May, 1812, 10 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 28th. We *must* have in this part of the country immediately the 6 howitzers, and as many spherical case (principally) as you can carry; and after the spherical case as many common shells. I shall have 24 pounder shot and powder ready here, and means to move both, which will answer our purpose.

I want this equipment here now for a particular purpose, and when that purpose is accomplished, we must dispose of it somewhere till it can be got properly in order to follow the army. You know best how many waggons you want, and you will give such directions as you may think necessary to have them prepared and properly fitted for this equipment; the nearer to the army the better.

In respect to the draft for your waggons, Sir W. Beresford says that if you will write to Gen. Rosa, and point out to him where your waggons will be found fitted and prepared, he will send the mules to bring them up to you. Let Gen. Rosa know the number of mules you will require.

The company of British artillery is to remain with you. It is absolutely necessary that you should cross the Tagus at Alcantara, as soon as the bridge there is ready.

I shall give orders that you may find provisions on this side of the Tagus.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

My attention has been called in a very particular manner to the

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 31st May, 1812.

Lieut. —, of the —, having absconded from his billet at Lisbon, is, when found, to be placed in close arrest.

expenses at Cadiz, to the extravagant amount of which it is absolutely necessary to fix some bounds.

The troops at Cadiz are a part of this army, and the departments at Cadiz are branches of the same departments here. They should correspond constantly with the heads of departments here, and keep the latter acquainted with the state of the demands upon them, and of their expenses; but instead of that, I was concerned to learn from Mr. Bissett this day, that Mr. O'Meara had not obeyed an order which Mr. Bissett had recently transmitted to him, to send to the army 3 officers belonging to the Commissariat department at Cadiz. I beg that you will see that he obeys this order forthwith; and in future, he is to lay before you every order which he shall receive from the Commissary Gen., and I request you to see that he obeys them, unless you should have good reason to believe that obedience would be inconvenient to the service.

I beg to have for the month of July, estimates of the expenses at Cadiz, Tarifa, and Carthagená, severally, under the following heads:

Ordinaries.

Extraordinaries.

Under the latter head, I request to have distinguished the amount of the following expenses:

Commissariat salaries.

Staff paid by the Commissariat.

Bât and Forage.

Provisions.

Forage.

Means of Transport.

Hospitals.

Works by the Engineers.

Supplies purchased for the Engineers.

Supplies purchased for the troops.

Expenses not classed under the foregoing heads, of which a general enumeration must be returned, including the sum furnished monthly to the ordnance.

I request to have likewise an estimate of the quantity of provisions and forage which can be purchased by bills upon England at each place; or can be procured by contracts entered into in Great Britain and Ireland. I beg that these estimates may be accompanied by returns of the quantities of provisions, forage, and military equipments in the Commissariat stores at each place, on the 20th June; and by returns of the number of persons receiving rations of provisions and forage at each place.

I request that in future, similar returns, and similar estimates, may be made up between the 20th and 30th of each month, for the following month; and that it should be stated opposite each head of expense, whether it has exceeded, during the current month, the amount estimated for the same in the preceding month. I beg also to know, to what period the troops and staff are paid.

I earnestly entreat your attention to keep down the expenses at Cadiz, Tarifa, and Carthagená, as far as may be in your power.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 21st May, upon the state of the works at Tarifa; and as you appear, upon a view of the place, to be of opinion that the possession of the town is important to the possession of

the island, I have no objection to measures, reasonable in amount of expense, being adopted to improve the works of the town. At the same time, it is necessary that the Spanish government should employ a sufficient and a proper garrison to secure the place, in addition to the troops which may be employed by His Majesty.

In regard to the payment of the expenses for these works, as I before stated, it is no business of yours or mine, and you must refer it to His Majesty's Minister. If you are of opinion that the money is laid out on objects not deserving the expense, or that it is not laid out at all for the objects for which it is given, you must represent your opinion to His Majesty's Ambassador.

Not only the British government, but the Spanish government and nation, are most materially interested in curtailing every expenditure of money in that part of the Peninsula; as every shilling spent there is taken from the military chest of this army, and diminishes so much the means it would have of rendering service to the cause.

It is my opinion, from the knowledge I have of the mode in which works are generally performed by Spanish officers and soldiers, that no money ought to be paid through the former to the latter; that an English officer should be charged with the disbursement of the money, even when given to the Spanish government as loans for the purpose of constructing certain works; and that the English officer should be directed to see that adequate work was performed, before he gave their day's payment to any soldier or party of soldiers. This is the way in which the soldiers of this army are worked; and the Spanish officers and soldiers could not complain of an arrangement founded on a clear principle of natural justice; viz., that no man should be paid, excepting he should perform adequate work.

If the Spanish engineers should propose to perform works of which you don't approve, and should require British assistance for the performance of those works, you should likewise make your representation to His Majesty's Ambassador on that subject; who will, of course, decline to give such assistance.

I beg to recommend that the works of the town of Tarifa may be mined in different places, in order to be effectually destroyed in case it should be necessary for the garrison to retire to the island. In regard to the works carrying on upon the island, the only thing to which I object is the expensive mode of executing them. Although I am decidedly of opinion, that when works are to be executed, the largest view should be taken of their object; and that every day's work should be carried on on a systematic plan, having some great object in view; it does not appear to me to be necessary that all works should be constructed in an equally permanent and expensive manner.

I acknowledge that I don't see the use of the casemates and the works revetted in masonry on the island of Tarifa.

1st; The expense of works in earth, although probably in the end the largest, is at first infinitely the smallest; and works in earth are equally good, if not better for defence, than those revetted in masonry. They have, besides, the advantage of being finished at an earlier period; and I have to observe in respect to the works on the island of Tarifa, that it is

to be hoped that the occasion for them will cease long before the expense of constructing them in earth will be felt by the British government.

2dly; Adverting to the means which the enemy possess, and the probability which exists that they will make a formidable attack by bombardment on the island of Tarifa, I doubt the necessity of constructing casemates for the troops.

Troops are well protected from the effects even of the heaviest fire of shells, by what are called *blindages*; the expense of which is trifling in comparison with that of casemates, and these buildings have the advantage of being easily moved from one place to another.

I beg you to turn your attention to these suggestions; and to do every thing in your power to curtail the expenses at Tarifa, as far as may be consistent with the necessary defence of the place.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812, 9 P.M.

I enclose the description of a spy, to which it may be well to pay some attention.

Thinking it probable from your letter of the 28th, that Foy would move off again immediately, I did not send you any answer to it, nor to the others on the same subject. The dispatches are gone, and I hope that Currie got down to Lisbon in good health, and that he will have taken with him the colors.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812, 10 P.M.

I enclose a letter from Ruman, containing the last account from Salamanca; from which you will see that Marmont has returned there. I learn from a muleteer, that he did so suddenly, after receiving a courier from Joseph.

I likewise enclose a letter from my brother, and some enclosures. You will see that — — — was terribly misinformed respecting Soult.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

I enclose my last dispatch; and I see from the information in your letter of the 23d, that I had been misinformed respecting the movements of Soult. Indeed, I must say that — — —'s intelligence during the whole period of Hill's absence upon the expedition to the Tagus did us a great deal of mischief.

I intend to attack Marmont, and expect to be able to march next week. It is possible that the whole army of the south may be thrown upon Hill while I shall be so employed, and Ballesteros should be prepared to execute the old project upon Seville; and the army of Murcia to move upon Andujar and Cordova, if not occupied by Suchet.

If Soult should attack Tarifa, Hill shall move upon Cordova, &c., and do every thing in his power to create a diversion in favor of Gen. Ballesteros, unless it should be necessary that he should cover my flank, which does not appear probable; and the army of Murcia should in that case likewise get on upon the Guadalquivir.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

I have long had in contemplation the means of obtaining intelligence

from distant and various parts of the Peninsula, and I had settled a plan with that view with our principal correspondent at Salamanca, who is certainly the best of the whole class.

In searching for correspondents at Madrid, he has fallen in with the persons with whom you correspond in that city, and I enclose an extract of his letter regarding them. I rather believe it would be the best mode, as it certainly would be the cheapest, to confine their correspondence to one channel; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether I shall tell them so through my Salamanca friend, and direct them to send their letters through him in future. I beg of you also to enable me to give an answer respecting the missing messenger adverted to, and the letter.

If you should determine that this correspondence shall come in future by Salamanca, there is no occasion to say any thing on the subject to —, who was only a receiver of the letters.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

I received your letter of the 28th. I have no objection to Mr. Burford's making a panorama of Badajoz, and I enclose a letter to Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, who is there repairing the works, to request him to give him every information and assistance. He had better go there as soon as he can.

I have ordered the Commissary Gen. to give the Portuguese government 150,000 dollars in June, notwithstanding our own distresses, and the urgency of demands for money; but I hope they will pay this money to the troops with the army.

P.S. Fill up the blank in my letter to Sir R. Fletcher, with the name of the gentleman; as in your letter you call him *Burford*, and in Mr. Hamilton's he is called *Barker*.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from the Consul General, Mr. Duff, at Cadiz, to which I request to call your Lordship's attention, in which you will see described the difficulties in our way in raising money for this army, in consequence of the extravagant rate of exchange in the Mediterranean and Gibraltar.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

I enclose a letter from Sir W. Beresford and its enclosure, being one from the office of Military Accounts to the Paymaster of the 1st batt. — foot, directing that 'the pay of officers belonging to the British army, permitted to serve in the Portuguese army, is to be issued to them under a similar restriction to that which has been prescribed in the case of officers holding more than one military appointment under the British government;' and as some of these officers receive their pay from the Treasurer of the 'Aids,' under warrants from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, I request to know whether it is the intention of government that this regulation should be enforced, and from what period.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

In consequence of a demand made by the Spanish government, in the month of January last, for assistance to enable them to work the foundries on the Isla de Leon, for the supply of guns and shot for the works on the Isla and at Cadiz, I directed that certain returns should be made out, in order to enable His Majesty's government to judge of the expediency of defraying the expense of these foundries, or of supplying from England the articles expected to be supplied by them; and I now enclose the returns received, in which your Lordship will see an account of the demand of ordnance and shot for Cadiz and the Isla only, and the expense to be incurred in supplying that demand from the foundries at Cadiz, and the time which will elapse before it is supplied. Your Lordship will observe that the estimate does not include the expense of iron, which must sooner or later be incurred, as the supplies of old iron in the stores cannot be inexhaustible; and no estimate is formed of the expense which must be incurred to supply the other demands for the Spanish service, besides those for the works on the Isla and at Cadiz.

Upon this paper, however, your Lordship may be able to form a judgment of the expediency of defraying the expense of keeping up the foundries, or of sending the articles provided by them from England, as a mere question of expense. In this view, however, it may not be proper to decide it by referring solely to the account of sums to be expended in supplying the articles from England, or in manufacturing them at Cadiz, as I beg leave to remind your Lordship that every shilling spent at Cadiz deprives the military chest of this army of so much, which, if it were here, would render it more efficient. It may likewise be an object to encourage the iron manufacturers in England, by giving them the supply of this demand.

On the other hand, it must be recollected that if the workmen at the Spanish foundry are not employed on the Isla, they will find their way to the French arsenals on the opposite coast, and at Seville. But as, from the mode of recruiting the French armies, they are never in want of workmen in any trade, or of any description, I don't believe we should supply them with means which they don't already possess, if all the workmen in the Spanish foundries were sent over to them.

I certainly think that some measures ought to be taken to supply the Spanish government with the quantity of ordnance, shot, and shells, stated by Lieut. Col. Duncan; but, adverting to the nature and extent of the works at Cadiz and the Isla, and to the improbability that an army can be brought against those works, under existing circumstances, capable of carrying on an attack upon them which can at all be deemed general, I consider his calculation of the quantity of shot required for the works to be extravagant.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 24th, in regard to the letter to be written to the guerrilla chiefs, with the swords and pistols to be presented to them in my name.

I have found that the shortest and most simple mode of expression is the

most agreeable to the Spaniards, and has most effect; and it appears that, particularly since the assembly of the Cortes, they have felt that they were to look for their happiness in the independence of their country, rather than in the internal institutions. If, therefore, the letter is to be written to them in my name, I request that they may be informed that I obey with great satisfaction the commands of H.R.H. the Prince Regent, in transmitting to them these presents, as a small mark of the estimation in which their conduct is held by His Royal Highness, and by His Majesty's subjects in general; in having, notwithstanding the reverses of all the regular armies in Spain, the misfortunes of the country, and in the face of difficulties of all descriptions, continued to maintain successfully the contest against the enemy. That I, having been employed by His Majesty in the Peninsula since the commencement of the contest for the independence of the nations inhabiting this part of the world, have been fully aware of the difficulties of their situation, and of the benefit which the cause has derived from their constant perseverance and valor; and that I trust that the applause which their conduct has gained, of which what is now sent them is a small token, the consciousness that they have done their duty, and the hopes which there are now good grounds for entertaining, that their labors and exertions will be crowned by the attainment of their object, the independence and the happiness of their country, will be their inducement for continuing, and, if possible, increasing their exertions.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d June, 1812.

I received your letter of the 27th, respecting letting the water of the Guadiana into the ditch of Badajoz. It is obvious that we can do nothing effectual till the period at which the river will probably rise, and it may be as well to leave the work alone till other matters shall be finished.

I should wish to know from you whether the Spaniards have yet placed a garrison in Badajoz, and whether the Spanish soldiers perform any work.

I am anxious to have our bridge so arranged that we can make use of it if I should want it; and wishing it to consist of 36 pontoons, I have desired Mr. Bissett to have bullocks at Abrantes, to draw up the 6 pontoons which are there, to S. Vicente, where the others are.

I should wish the whole then to be kept collected at S. Vicente, complete in all its parts, with the bullocks attached to it, and the seamen ready to start at a short notice to wherever it may be ordered.

I beg you to order up the 6 pontoons to S. Vicente as soon as the bullocks will be ready to draw them; and that you will communicate with the officer in charge of the boats respecting their being complete in equipments of all descriptions, and let me know whether they will require any additional seamen.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2d June, 1812.

In consequence of your letter informing me that you intended to allow me to dispose of £200,000 sterling of the money applicable to the service of Spain, and having taken into consideration the distressed situation of the troops in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the division under the command of Don Carlos de España, I determined to make an advance

of a part of their pay to those troops, out of the sum above mentioned; and having called for a return of their effective numbers, and of the pay of each rank, I gave Don Carlos de España a warrant upon the Commissary Gen. for the sum of 12,675 dollars, 19 *reales*, and 32 *maravedis*. I enclose copies of 2 letters which I wrote to Don Carlos de España upon this occasion, containing the conditions on which I should continue to make these payments, and the copy of his answer. I propose to carry this sum of 12,675 dollars to account against the sum of 158,000 dollars which your Excellency has sent to Lisbon to be at my disposal for the service of the Spanish government.

No call has yet been made upon me for assistance for the troops in Estremadura; and if none should be made, the sum which you have sent will last for those in this quarter for 5 months.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d June, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose the only intelligence which I have received.

Foy has returned towards Arzobispo; but I don't know whether he has crossed the Tagus, or what his subsequent movement will be; nor have I heard yet that the 2d division has returned into Castille.

Bonet is certainly gone into the Asturias, so that Marmont's force is a good deal dispersed; and I think it probable he will not risk an action, but will fall back towards Burgos, by Sahagun, &c., keeping his communication with Bonet. This appears to be the line chalked out for him by his instructions from Paris.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 29th May, enclosing one of the same date from Capt. Gillard, of the *Sabrina*.

The sum of 158,000 dollars, which Capt. Gillard brought from Cadiz to be disposed of by me, which Mr. Pipon received, is His Majesty's money, and assigned to me by His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz to be employed in a particular manner.

Mr. Pipon ought to have given Capt. Gillard the usual certificate, to enable him to receive in England the freight usually paid on the transport of the King's money; and I have given directions that he may rectify this error, and give Capt. Gillard a certificate that he has received from on board the *Sabrina* the sum of 158,000 dollars.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d June, 1812.

The troops are in march towards this part of the country, and I hope to have them collected on the Agueda by the 8th or 9th. The magazines in Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo are tolerably well supplied.

Marshal Marmont has again moved his head quarters to Salamanca, and the troops which had marched from thence when he moved his head quarters to Fontiveros, have returned. The troops, which I reported in my letter of the 28th had moved from the bridge of Arzobispo, by the road of Deleytosa, arrived at Truxillo on the 26th, but they retired again on the 28th, by the road by which they advanced. I have not heard of their having moved from Arzobispo, nor that the 2d division had moved

from Talavera. I find that I was misinformed respecting the movements of Marshal Soult, as reported in my last dispatch. He was still at the blockade of Cadiz on the 25th.

The troops in the Condado de Niebla had been moved to Seville, however, as therein stated. And I believe the officers attached to the head quarters of the army of the South are removed from Seville to El Carpio, and part of the Marshal's baggage. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill has taken the position south of the Guadiana, which he occupied previous to his march upon the bridge of Almaraz.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d June, 1812.

In the list of officers whom I considered to be entitled to the medal for the assault and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I transmitted to your Lordship on the 13th ult., I included Capt. Mitchell of the 95th regt., under the supposition that he had the distinct command of the detachment of the 2d batt. of that corps; but as I have since understood that the 2 companies of which he had charge were attached to, and acting immediately under the orders of Major Cameron, commanding the 1st batt., I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I don't consider Capt. Mitchell to be entitled to the distinction of a medal on this occasion, and therefore recommend that his name should be erased from the list.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d June, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a list of officers entitled to the distinction of a medal for the siege and capture of Badajoz; and a return of the officers of the Adj. and Q. M. G.'s department who (with the exception of Lieut. Col. De Lancey, the D. Q. M. G.) were serving as Assistants in those departments, and attached to divisions in the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, Talavera, and Busaco.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3d June, 1812.

I am very sorry to have to inform you that Dr. M'Grigor has told me that he has great reason to apprehend that Sir T. Graham will, in a short time, be obliged to quit the army. He has a disorder in his eyes, one of which it is most probable he will lose; and the sight of the other, if he should retain it, will be very defective. I have not seen Sir T. Graham since I left Estremadura in April, when he was in very good health; and he has not mentioned to me the disorder in his eyes. But I have heard of it from others; and Dr. M'Grigor has his information from the medical gentleman who attends him.

I mention the circumstance to your Lordship, in case you should think it proper to make provision for the event of any accident happening to prevent me from continuing to hold the command. The officer next to me after Sir T. Graham is Sir S. Cotton, and after Sir Stapleton, Sir R. Hill, and next to him Sir W. Beresford. As far as I am concerned, I certainly should prefer that no officer should be sent out. There are few officers who understand the situation of the officer second in command of these armies. Unless he should be posted to command a division of cavalry or infantry, and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary

occasions, nothing to do; and at the same time that his opinion relieves me but little from responsibility, and that after all I must act according to my own judgment in case of a difference of opinion: there are but few officers who should be sent from England as second in command, who would not come here with opinions formed, probably on very bad grounds, and with very extravagant pretensions. To this add, that when necessary to detach a body of troops in any situation, but few would be satisfied to remain with the detachment, unless indeed it should consist of nearly the whole army. If, therefore, Sir T. Graham should be obliged to go home, I am not desirous of having any body sent to fill his situation, as far as I am concerned.

Sir S. Cotton commands the cavalry very well; and I am convinced that we shall go on better if nobody is sent to replace Sir T. Graham.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 4th June, 1812.

I enclose a letter just received from Pereira, from which it appears that Foy, as well as Clausel, are marching into Castille.

I have ordered a day's halt for the troops, as Sir Stapleton did not receive the orders in time, and did not march till the day after we expected he would. I have a letter from Col. Dickson, of the 1st June, and he had received the instructions which I sent him the day I found that you had moved the 6th. division back to their old cantonments.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose a letter received last night from Pereira, confirming the report of the movement of the 1st and 2d divisions into Castille. You will see likewise that it is probable that Mirabete is evacuated and destroyed. I likewise enclose a letter from Salamanca, and one containing reports of the state of things on the Tormes. I likewise enclose a letter from my brother, with some very interesting intercepted letters.

I have a letter from the Governor of Gibraltar, stating what is most extraordinary, viz., that there are only eleven thousand 24 pound shot at Gibraltar! So that I am much afraid that Lord W. Bentinck will be disappointed in his expectations of being supplied from thence. I expected to have fitted him out with not less than forty 24 pounders from thence, for which I have sent some of the guns and all the carriages. But every day's experience convinces me that our military machine is very ill arranged, and that there is no depending upon it for any thing. Who would believe that in the great fortress of Gibraltar, which is besides a naval arsenal, from which the ships of war receive supplies of shot, there are only eleven thousand 24 pound shot? I dare say I shall find the stores equally deficient in powder.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

I beg that, on the receipt of this letter, you will apply to the Admiral for a vessel to take to Gibraltar 20,000 English 24 pound shot, which you will have put on board of her. These shot are to be placed at the disposal of the Governor of Gibraltar, to fit out an equipment of ordnance, respecting which I have addressed his Excellency. You will be so kind

as to allow no time to be lost in the execution of this order; and you will apprise the Governor of Gibraltar of the receipt of it, and of the progress of embarking the shot by every opportunity.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22d May.

In consequence of the Sec. of State having apprised me that it was the intention of His Majesty's government that a force under the command of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck should be employed on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula during the summer, I considered it my duty to do every thing in my power to forward the objects of government. Accordingly, I sent to Gibraltar the different equipments and troops referred to in my letters to your Excellency of the 19th April, the 10th, 11th, and 27th May, of the last of which I have already sent a duplicate; and I now enclose duplicates of those of the 10th and 11th, lest they should not have reached your Excellency when you shall have received this letter. I likewise enclose the extract of a letter which I wrote to Lord Mulgrave on the 15th April, which will show you that the Master General and Board of Ordnance will expect that the means in possession of the ordnance in the garrison of Gibraltar shall be employed in carrying into execution the intentions of His Majesty's government in respect to the expedition under the command of Lord W. Bentinck, as far as they will go.

After having communicated this information and those papers in one view to your Excellency, you and the officers of the ordnance in the garrison of Gibraltar must be the best judges whether any proportion, or what proportion, of the 24 pound shot in the garrison of Gibraltar ought to be embarked with a view to carry into effect the intentions of His Majesty's government.

The total demand of round shot for the thirty nine 24 pounders is 31,200, at 800 rounds for each gun; and the troops at Cadiz being under my command, and I being responsible for the safety of that place, I have ordered that twenty thousand 24 pound round shot may be sent to Gibraltar immediately, to be at your Excellency's disposal for the purposes of this equipment.

I propose, besides, to send from this country 5000 more, notwithstanding that the late services here have exhausted the stores of all the garrisons in this part of the Peninsula, and that it is not impossible that they may have occasion for the use of them. There will still, however, be a deficiency which it is advisable should be provided from the stores of Gibraltar.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

It is desirable that transports to convey the number of troops stated in my letter of the 15th April, should be sent to the eastern coast of the Peninsula for the object stated in that letter, as soon as it may be convenient.

I enclose a letter for His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz, who will let the officer in command of this fleet of transports know for what number

of troops he is to station transports at Alicante and in Majorca respectively, or whether he is to send the whole to one place. I am obliged to refer to His Majesty's Ambassador on this subject, as the Spanish government had not decided, according to the last accounts on this subject, whether any troops were to proceed from Alicante, or how many from Majorca.

Sir H. Wellesley will likewise have orders prepared for the officers commanding at those places respectively, to embark the troops when Lord W. Bentinck shall send for them.

I send him a duplicate of the enclosed letter, and request that the orders may be ready to be sent off as soon as the fleet of transports shall appear in the offing.

In regard to the sailing of these transports from the places at which they will take on board the troops, and their destination when they sail, that must depend upon Vice Adm. Sir E. Pellew, and Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck; and I request you will give directions to the officer who may command this fleet of transports, or any division of them, to proceed to the ulterior destination, when the Spanish troops are on board, according to the orders which he will receive from Adm. Sir E. Pellew, or Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck. It is desirable that the tonnage should be calculated at one ton and a half for each man, as it is probable that the numbers will exceed 6000 men.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E. Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812, 9 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst. It is very necessary that we should be quite certain of finishing every thing we have in hand, or have recommended to the Marques de Monsalud, at Badajoz, before you come away; but after requesting you would attend to this opinion in fixing the period for your departure, I have no objection to leaving it to yourself. You will go on with the works already directed by me at our expense, till the Marques de Monsalud shall supply you with money. If he should supply you with money, you will then point out to him the state of the works, and the expense remaining to be incurred to complete each; and those estimated for under the heads Nos. 6, 7, and 10, in the estimate forwarded in your letter of the 17th May. If he should supply you with money for the whole, you will begin Nos. 6, 7, and 10. Next to that work, I conceive that a wet ditch to be brought as far as is practicable is the most important work to be executed. Next to that the completion of any one of the ravelins that you may prefer. If the Marques de Monsalud should give money only to complete the works estimated for in Nos. 6, 7, and 10, I have no objection to continue those ordered by me at our expense.

I beg you will let me know whether the Spaniards have any and what troops in the garrison, as I want to get the Portuguese troops away.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B. Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I addressed you this day, the original of which you will receive from an officer of the navy; and the copy of a letter which I have written to Adm. Berkeley.

I beg that you will endeavor to have the orders referred to in the enclosed letters prepared to be sent off to the fleet, when it shall appear in the offing of Cadiz.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

The officer who will deliver this letter is the commanding officer of a fleet of transports, proceeding to the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, with a view to take in Spanish troops at Alicante and Majorca, for the proposed service under the command of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

I request you to let this officer know whether any and how many troops will embark at Alicante, and how many at Majorca, in order that he may distribute the transports under his charge accordingly. I request, likewise, that you will give him the orders, or duplicates to the officers commanding at these stations, to embark the troops destined for this expedition, when Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck shall send to him; and to sail in these transports to the destination pointed out by his Lordship, or by Adm. Sir E. Pellew, for the rendezvous of the fleet and army.

The transports are calculated for 6000 men, one ton and a half for each man; and they will hold with convenience 9000 men for a short voyage.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

I received your letter of the 1st inst., and I am happy to find that you are satisfied that the government are disposed to reform the abuses of the Custom House. I am quite convinced that the revenue of the Customs on imports and exports of Lisbon and Oporto, if honestly collected and accounted for, would alone nearly cover the deficit. The export of wines from Oporto is enormous: just call for an account of the duties paid in the year 1811.

I expect an account of the real value of exports to Portugal from Great Britain and Ireland, under the different heads, in the year 1811, which will serve to show what the revenue of the crown of Portugal ought to have been last year, for customs on British produce only.

I have no doubt of the interest which different individuals take in the continuance of the abuses, nor of their efforts to prevent all reform. The person who mentioned to Sir W. Beresford that the man employed to superintend the Customs, and to detect and suggest the reformation of abuses, owed his appointment to a job, was ——. The report never reached me in any manner, excepting through Sir W. Beresford, and ——— was his authority. But I have generally found ———'s information erroneous on all subjects.

I differ entirely from Senhor Nogueira in regard to the collection of the income tax. 600 *contos*, or even double that sum, will be far from the truth of the profits of the mercantile class in Lisbon and Oporto alone; and I shall never be satisfied with the collection of that tax till it be collected in the way it is on us in England. Why is the rich merchant in Portugal, the only class in the Kingdom which has gained, and gained immensely, by the war, to be the class exempted from bearing its burthens? Because the government are not equal to their situation.

because they dare not meet the unpopularity of forcing people to pay what they ought.

Let the following experiment be tried in Lisbon and Oporto, and I shall be satisfied; and I will bear all the odium of the measure, and all the blame if it should not be successful, provided it is sincerely carried into execution.

Both cities are divided into *barrios*. Let there be a collector of direct taxes appointed for each *barrios*. Let each individual, of every description, make the following return to the collector of the *barrios*.

1st; A return, specifying the yearly value of his house, stating whether it is let on rent to one or several persons, the rent received for it in the year, and whether he lives in it himself.

2dly; A return of the number of servants, horses, dogs, carriages, &c., which he keeps.

3dly; A return of his income, specifying whether arising from rent of landed property, from *commanderías*, from pensions, from interest of money paid by government, from profits or salary of office, from professional fees and emoluments, such as lawyers, physicians, judges, players, &c. &c., from the profits of commercial speculations of all descriptions, from interest of money lent to individuals, from annuities received from individuals, &c. &c.

Upon these returns, let the collectors of the direct taxes in the *barrios* calculate the amount of the taxes to be paid by each individual in the *barrios*, and demand payment of the same.

Let a return be printed and published of what each individual has made as his return to the collector of the *barrios*. This may be done in one line for each individual, and one sheet for the whole *barrios*. Thus,

Name of Individual.	Value of House.	No. of Servants.	Horses.	Dogs.	Carriages.	Income from Land.	Commanderías.	Pensions.	Interest of Money.	Profits of Office.	Professional Fees.	Commercial Speculations.	Money lent to Individuals.	Annuities from Individuals.

Then let all persons understand that if they make a false return on any head, they are liable to pay treble the amount of what they really ought to pay on that head. If the collector of the *barrios* should receive private information that the return of any person in the *barrios* is incorrect, he should have authority to call together two persons of the *barrios*, who, with him, should be empowered to examine books, &c., and the individual himself, and to adopt all means to discover the truth. On the other hand, if any individual of the *barrios* should conceive that the collector has overcharged him, he should have a right to demand an investigation, and the collector should be obliged to call two persons to hear, and with him determine upon the representation.

Let this question be first tried in Lisbon and Oporto, and if it does not

succeed, if really carried into execution, and if the government there will not have an opportunity of diminishing some of the taxes, I will bear all the blame.

I don't advert in this system to the *Terço Ecclesiastico*, which is made a particular *regie* applicable to the whole diocese, and which had better be continued.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Hinde, 32d regt., 6th division.

5th June, 1812.

Major Gen. Clinton having reported the apparent neglect of duty of Lieut. —, — regt., in charge of the convalescents at Niza, on the General's late inspection of that depôt, I am to convey to you his Excellency the Commander of the Forces' pleasure that, in the event of a vacancy occurring, that officer may be passed over and the next in seniority recommended for promotion.

You will be pleased to send an officer to the Castello Branco depôt to relieve Lieut. —, who will forthwith join his regiment.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th June, 1812, 9 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 3d, 2 P.M.

As Foy and Clausel have certainly moved towards Castille, I did not think it probable that Soult would move against you; however, I conclude that the enemy imagine that we have weakened you to a greater degree than we have done. Including Drouet, I don't think that Soult can assemble 25,000 men in Estremadura, unless he should abandon entirely the blockade of Cadiz, and leave Seville, and all the open country, at the mercy of Ballesteros, at the moment at which it is important to him to secure the harvest.

Reckoning the 5th, 17th, and 22d regts., which are still in Badajoz, I conceive that you will have not less than 19,000 British and Portuguese, besides the Conde de Penne Villemur and Morillo. It must be observed upon this force, however, that it is not exactly of the description I should wish to see with you, and it must not be depended upon to manœuvre in presence of an enemy on ground which should not give you an advantage. It must be placed on a strong position, in which I entertain no doubt of the result of any general action. The best position in the country, in my opinion, particularly as Badajoz is now in some degree repaired, is that of Albuera. Whether the enemy attempt to turn it by the right or by the left, there is an easy movement to the right or to the left, and the position continues equally good, and there is always an easy retreat upon Badajoz, or upon Jurumenha, or such passage of the Guadiana as it might be thought expedient to adopt. It is better at this season than any position on the north side of the Guadiana, because it covers more country, and because the enemy cannot, without forcing the position, pretend to turn the defences of Portugal, and to enter that Kingdom by the passages of the Guadiana about Jurumenha, and by the roads of Villa Viçosa and Estremoz. I therefore recommend the position of Albuera to your attention in the first instance, in case Soult should move into Estremadura in force. If you should determine to occupy the position of Albuera, you should appear to determine to hold the wood and the position in front of the wood towards S^{ta} Marta, and throw up a little ground there, in order to induce the enemy to believe that you have fortified it; you will then have an opportunity of seeing his whole force in and about S^{ta} Marta, and

probably of judging on which side he proposes to manœuvre, and you can always retire before him across the Albuera rivulet, the passages of which should, however, be well reconnoitred.

If you should find Soult inclined to manœuvre by your right, and to enter Portugal by the roads above mentioned, you should place Morillo in Badajoz, and with the remainder of the troops cross the Guadiana, and take a position near Jurumenha. If you should find that he intends to manœuvre by your left, you should move upon Badajoz, and take a position there, or, according to circumstances, take the position of San Christoval. If you should find Soult advancing, write to the Marques de Monsalud to throw into Badajoz all the troops lately arrived from Cadiz, and all that he can collect in the province; and likewise to Gen. Leite at Estremoz, and desire him to collect the militia again at Elvas, and to occupy Campo Maior and Ouguela.

I intended to have in Badajoz a supply of provisions for 5000 men for 60 days, which I intended should be made over to the Commanding officer of the garrison, in case the place should be invested; and I had ordered that 600,000 rations should be in Elvas, in order to provide for the contingency, that I might carry the operations of the campaign to the southward. Mr. Routh will let you know the progress which has been made in both those objects, and you will consider both magazines entirely at your disposal. You will recollect, however, that I believe that at present there are no other provisions in Badajoz, but Elvas is well provided. There would not be much harm done if our magazines at Elvas were reduced to 300,000 rations.

I have a letter from the Conde de Penne Villemur, of the 30th, in which he tells me that he has been ordered to move into the Condado de Niebla, and asks my consent. Tell him that I will answer his letter to-morrow, but that I think that just at present the movement would be very imprudent.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose letters of the 4th and 5th from Salamanca, and one from Avila. I have one intercepted letter from Marmont to Jourdan; which I am endeavoring to decipher. It is obvious, however, from what I see in it, that both Marmont and Jourdan discovered that I intended to collect in this direction, in consequence of Hill's early return; which was certainly occasioned by Sir W. Erskine's false alarm.

To Lieut. Col. May, R.A.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812, 10 P.M.

I have desired the Commissary Gen. to have delivered over to you at Almeida, 20 carts to carry 600 24 pounder shot; 10 carts to carry 400 18 pounder shot; 10 carts to carry 60 barrels of powder, for the equipment

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

1. Lieut. and Adj. —, of the — regt., has quitted his regiment without leave, and is supposed to have gone to Lisbon. The officers commanding the several military stations through which Lieut. — may pass on the road, as well as Major Gen. Peacocke, are requested to place Lieut. — in close arrest, and send him to the head quarters of the army as soon as they may find him.

of Dickson's howitzers; and 5 carts to carry 30 barrels of powder for the 18 pounders; and 5 spare carts for any thing else you might want. Likewise 80 bullocks to draw 4 iron 18 pounders, at 10 pairs each gun; and 5 pairs of bullocks to draw a transporting carriage loaded with ladders, which I desired Lieut. Shanahan, of the Staff corps, to cut and make up at Almeida. I shall be obliged to you if you will see the whole of this equipment packed and arranged; and I will speak to Col. Framingham to send an officer and conductor over to Almeida to-morrow, to take charge of it.

I beg you will fix upon the best of the transporting carriages in the fort to carry the ladders, and desire the officer of the staff to secure them upon it. The bullocks and carts will not be at Almeida till the 9th; but they ought to be prepared as soon afterwards as possible.

Au Gén. Conde de Penne Villemur.

A Fuente Guinaldo, ce 7 Juin, 1812.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a adressé le 3 Mai, qui aurait dû être le 3 Juin.

Je vais marcher sur l'ennemi en Castille, et jusqu'à ce que je puisse connaître les résultats de mon mouvement, il est très important de ne pas s'affaiblir en Estremadure. Je suis sûr que la Régence n'a pas connu l'état des affaires quand elle vous a ordonné de partir pour le Condado de Niebla; et comme elle vous a ordonné de consulter mon opinion, je vous prie de n'y pas marcher, mais d'agir de concert avec le Général Hill, et d'être préparé à jeter en garnison à Badajoz les troupes du Général Morillo, en cas que ce soit nécessaire.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Conde de Penne Villemur, informing me that the Spanish government have ordered him into the Condado de Niebla, if I should approve of the movement; and a copy of my answer.

I am about to move into Castille, and I have calculated upon the Conde de Penne Villemur and Gen. Morillo continuing in concert with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, till the result of this operation shall be seen.

I think it most probable that Soult will move upon Gen. Hill as soon as my march is known; and affairs will be in a bad situation if that General should not be in strength. I am the more anxious upon this subject, because having this day received a return of the army of the South, of the 1st April, which has been intercepted, I see, that notwithstanding all the reports to the contrary, it consisted then of more than 56,000 effective men; from which deducting the garrison of Badajoz, since made prisoners, it must now amount to more than 50,000 effective men. The Polish division which had been sent to France are not included in this return.

The movements of the enemy may render it necessary for Lieut. Gen. Hill to throw a garrison into Badajoz; and I beg to know where that garrison is to be found, if it is not for the time composed of the troops under Gen. Morillo.

The Spanish government have lately desired that, in case of a movement by Marshal Soult on Gen. Ballesteros, Gen. Hill should make a movement to divert the attention of the enemy from Gen. Ballesteros. I have directed this movement in the notion that Gen. the Conde de Penne Villemur would

co-operate in it. It is surely better that, if it be possible, the allied troops in Estremadura should act together in a concentrated body, than that one corps of them should be in the Condado de Niebla, and another at Cordova.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B. Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812, 10 P.M.

I send you copies of 3 letters in cipher, of which it is very desirable to discover the key; and I shall be obliged to you if you will send them to Gen. Navarro, to try what he can do with them. We can make nothing of them here.

I can see, however, that the King and Marmont have discovered that I intend to carry on operations on this side; and the King had already given orders to Soult on the 7th May, which he has repeated on the 26th May, to take a position with a view to those operations. I conclude that the object of those orders is to distract my attention from Marmont by an attack upon Hill. This, I think, will be made; but if Morillo and Penne Villemur stay with Hill, and there is any garrison for Badajoz besides Morillo's troops, Hill will be in tolerable strength; and they will all be disappointed in their expectations of finding a very weak corps in that part of the country.

I shall send you an abstract of the return of the army of the South, the strength of which has certainly surprised me, though I never reckoned it less than from 42,000 to 45,000 men.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Mr. Dep. Commissary Gen. Pípon, pointing out the inconveniences likely to be felt by this army in consequence of the excessively disadvantageous rate of exchange at which the Commissaries in the Mediterranean negotiate their bills at Gibraltar.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 8th June, 1812, 9 P.M.

I omitted to tell you in my letter of this morning that I had ordered one of the Portuguese brigades of artillery in the reserve of the army to proceed to join you by the bridge of Alcantara. I shall desire De Lancey to send you the route.

To Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector of Hospitals.*

Fuente Guinaldo, 9th June, 1812.

As I propose to send to England your report on the mortality in this army, which, however, considering all the circumstances, has not been large, and not amounting to 15,000 men, including losses in actions, from April, 1809, to Jan. 1812, I wish to draw your attention to a few remarks upon your report.

In respect to the third recommendation, I have to observe that it is impossible in any army of the size of that under my command to take from the men and return them their equipments at every moment when it appears convenient. The demands for food for the army amount to 200,000 lbs. weight daily, which must be brought from the sea, besides ammunition, supplies for hospitals, equipments of all descriptions, &c. &c.

* Sir J. M'Grigor, Bart., Director General of the Army Medical Board.

The soldiers, therefore, must keep their blankets during the summer, in order to be certain of having them in October.

In regard to the fourth remark, I have to observe that His Majesty has ordered that the soldiers' accounts shall be settled, and the balance on them paid on the 24th of every month. The pecuniary distresses of this army have prevented obedience to this order, and the pay of the army is seldom less than 3 months in arrear; but no more than one month's pay is ever issued at a time, and the balance due on one month's account only can be given at a time. You will likewise see that under the G. O. of this army of the 24th Jan. 1810, the balance due on one month's account cannot be paid till two months' accounts shall be settled.

You will likewise see in the G. O. that the attention of commanding officers of regiments has been frequently called to the expediency of supplying the soldiers with breakfast; and I believe that in every well regulated regiment they are so supplied when the means can be procured. Their rations are *invariably* delivered to the soldiers daily, except on marches; and the army would be incapable of all movement if I were to order that the soldiers should carry no provisions. The British soldiers, on such an occasion, carry 3 days' bread; the Portuguese soldiers, 6 days' bread; the French soldiers, 15 days' bread.

The only mode that I know of removing sick to the rear is in spring waggons, which are all applied to this service, and in aid of them bullock carts. I am aware that the drivers of the spring waggons are very irregular, and take but little care of their horses; but this, like many other evils in the service, which, although equally the cause of mortality, you have not noticed, and, among others, the irregularities of the soldiers themselves, it is impossible for me to remedy, till the Mutiny Law and the whole system of the service are altered.

To Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 9th June, 1812, 9 A.M.

I enclose an extract from the return of the army of the South,* of the 1st April, from which you will see that they are stronger than any body thought they were. I always thought them about 45,000. However, I think it impossible that they can bring more against you than from 18,000 to 20,000 infantry, and about 4000 cavalry.

Sir S. Cotton had ordered the 4th dragoon guards to join Le Marchant's brigade, to relieve the 3d dragoons, not in very good condition; but I

* *Note on the return.* The total of the present fit for duty of the French army of the South, on the 1st April, was 56,980, in which are included artillery, engineers, sappers; 2d batt. of Hesse Darmstadt infantry, 940; marines, 1510, &c. &c. The Hesse Darmstadt regiment was taken in Badajoz, and artillery, engineers, &c. &c., reducing the fit for duty to about 52,000. It will be seen on the other side that the reduction of French infantry, on the return of the divisions, was only 2738; but, besides this French infantry, returned as present on the 1st April, and since taken in Badajoz, there was a detachment of 204 men of the 64th regt., returned detached in the return of the 1st April in Badajoz, which were likewise taken, but these make no diminution of the present fit for duty in this return. From what I see of Soult's disposition of his troops to relieve Badajoz, and from what I know of the manner in which he was pressed by Ballesteros on that occasion, I conceive that he cannot bring into Estremadura more than 3 divisions, or half of his infantry, present fit for duty, but he may bring more than 4000 cavalry.

Besides the 56,980 fit for duty, and 4037 detached, of which the greatest number is in the south, there are on the return 4869 sick in hospitals (it is strange there should be so few), 414 prisoners, 410 absent on leave; making a total of 68,283 men, and 12,529 horses of all descriptions.

have written to Col. Sherlock to halt at Niza till you shall send him orders; and you had better order him to join his brigade by easy marches. The regiment is now very strong, and in good order.

P.S. You will observe that on the day after to-morrow the communication between you and me will pass by Alcantara, and it will therefore be necessary that you should send a person express to Niza to give Col. Sherlock his orders.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812, 9 A.M.

I have received your letter of the 6th.

I consider it most probable that Drouet will retire from Estremadura, unless he should be considerably reinforced, so as to give him a force equal, or superior to that under your command. You cannot follow him out of Estremadura; and as soon as you get rid of him, you cannot do better than canton your troops in the most healthy situations in the province, sending the 3 regiments belonging to the garrisons back to Badajoz or Elvas; and look to assembling again on Albuera, if the enemy should again enter the province in strength.

By an intercepted letter from Madrid, I see that the King is assembling the army of the Centre, which may make some difference in the situation of us all. However, you have two positions from which it will not be easy to dislodge you, that at Albuera, and that of S^{ra} Engracia; and I feel no anxiety about you. I wish that I was as strong in respect to the enemy as you are.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

I enclose my dispatch. We shall cross the Agueda on the 12th.

I am almost certain that the enemy will move into Estremadura, upon Hill, as soon as it is known that I have moved; and I hope that every thing will be done by Ballesteros, the army of Murcia, and the troops at Cadiz, to divert the enemy from their intentions upon Hill.

I shall send, if possible, by this post, the abstract of the return of the enemy's force in the south. They have still above 50,000 men.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

The army are collected upon the Azava, and will pass the Agueda on the 12th inst. As I find from intercepted letters that King Joseph had, on the 7th and 26th May, given orders to Marshal Soult to make a disposition of the troops under his command, in expectation of the movement which I am about to make into Castille, I have left Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill in such strength in Estremadura as will, I hope, enable him to keep every thing in tranquillity in that province, and secure our right flank.

All the troops belonging to the '*Armée de Portugal*' are collected in Castille, excepting Bonet's division, which, however, is reported to have again evacuated the Asturias, and to have arrived at Leon. I have no official account of this movement.

Marshal Marmont's quarters are at Salamanca; but the enemy have destroyed all the bridges on the Tormes, excepting that of Salamanca;

and it is supposed that they propose to evacuate that town, leaving in the fortified convents a small garrison.

Marshal Soult arrived at Seville, from the blockade of Cadiz, on the 28th May; and I have not heard of his quitting that town.

I have not heard of any movement of troops in the north.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

The outrages committed by the British soldiers belonging to this army have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect upon the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your Lordship's early attention to the subject.

I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject in this view of it than I have done; and I have been so far successful, that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this country. But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances through the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c.; and notwithstanding that none of these detachments are ever allowed to march excepting under the command of an officer, or more, in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed; and, I am sorry to say, with impunity.

The foundation of every system of discipline which has for its object the prevention of crimes, must be the non-commissioned officers of the army. But I am sorry to say, that notwithstanding the encouragement

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests the particular attention of the General officers of the army, and of the Commanding officers of regiments, to his orders of the 28th April last, referring to the former orders of the army respecting cutting green forage.

5. The soldiers must not be allowed to quit their camps or cantonments to plunder vegetables in the gardens or fields: if vegetables are wanted and can be procured, regular parties under officers must be sent to get them, and the officer must see that the quantity taken is paid for.

6. The Assist. Provosts attached to divisions must see that the orders of the army on this subject are not disobeyed.

7. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe that the outrages so frequently committed by the soldiers when absent from their regiments, and the disgraceful scenes which occurred upon the storming of Badajoz, have had the effect of rendering the people of the country the enemies instead of being the friends of the army.

8. It is the duty of all officers to prevent the soldiers from plundering; and the Commander of the Forces calls upon them to perform it.

9. He declares his determination to punish any person who may be found plundering on any occasion, and to make the soldiers give up any money or other valuable articles that they may have plundered.

10. As these acts of outrage are generally committed by parties of men, the parties shall be put under stoppages to make good the damage which they shall do upon any occasion.

11. The Commander of the Forces will be sorry to be under the necessity of having recourse to any measure of severity or restraint to prevent those evils; and he is convinced that the officers and non-commissioned officers, and the good soldiers, will do every thing in their power to restrain the ill disposed, and to avoid the disgrace which must be the consequence of these continued irregularities and crimes; and he earnestly hopes that there will be in future but little ground for complaint.

which I have given to this class, they are still as little to be depended upon as the private soldiers themselves; and they are just as ready to commit irregularities and outrages. I attribute this circumstance very much to the lowness of their pay in comparison with that of the soldiers.

Within my recollection, the pay of the soldiers of the army has been increased from 6*d.* to 1*s.* *per diem*, with other advantages; while that of the corporals, which was 8*d.*, has in the same period been raised only to 1*s.* 2*d.*; and that of the serjeants, which was 1*s.*, has been raised only to 1*s.* 6*d.*, both with the same advantages as the private soldiers.

Your Lordship will observe that the old proportions have not been preserved; and the non-commissioned officers of the army not only feel no inclination to preserve a distinction between them and the private soldiers, but they feel no desire to incur the responsibility, and take the trouble, and submit to the privations of their situation for so trifling a difference in their pay, as that of 2*d.* in 1*s.* 2*d.* to corporals, and that of 6*d.* in 1*s.* 6*d.* to serjeants; and they are indifferent whether they continue non-commissioned officers or not.

The remedy for this evil is to increase the pay of the corporals and serjeants, so as at least to restore the old proportions between non-commissioned officers and soldiers before the first increase of pay to the army at the commencement of the last war. This measure becomes particularly necessary, in consequence of the opinions generally prevalent in respect to the punishment of soldiers; which are certainly so far well founded, that it must be admitted by all, that the best mode of insuring regularity among soldiers is to prevent the commission of crimes.

Then, not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to preserve order in one of these detachments upon a march, owing to the badness of the non-commissioned officers of the army, but the crimes which the soldiers commit remain unpunished.

It is impossible to try these offences while the soldiers are on their march, from the want of a sufficient number of officers to constitute a Court; and I refer your Lordship to my letter to the Judge Advocate General of the 13th Nov. 1811,* for a detail of the difficulties attending the procuring evidence against them when they join the army. I proposed remedies for this evil which have not been entirely adopted.

Then if it should be possible to produce evidence of these outrages, I refer your Lordship to the Judge Advocate General for the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor General, of the nature of the powers given by the 4th Article of the 24th Section of the Articles of War, to try offences of this description by Courts Martial. It appears that these powers are confined to the infliction of punishments for offences according to the law of England, and of course to the exclusion of corporal punishment.

I beg leave likewise to refer your Lordship to a letter which I wrote to the Judge Advocate General on the 13th of March last,* to point out the difficulty of the situation in which the members of a General Court

* The drafts of these, and of other papers, of the period between July, 1811, and July, 1812, were lost by shipwreck. A search has been made for these two letters in the offices of the Judge Advocate General, the War Office, and the Treasury, but without success; although they are acknowledged to have been received in the answers to them.

Martial and I should be placed, in consequence of the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General ; it being impossible for any Court Martial or for me to affix the technical name to any crime committed by a soldier ; or to know what was the punishment for that offence under the law of England.

In consequence of this opinion, I have been obliged to send home for confirmation the proceedings of every General Court Martial before which a soldier has been convicted of one of these crimes ; and to request the Judge Advocate General to advise H. R. H. the Prince Regent regarding the measures to be taken upon the subject.

The guard rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners ; and the offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the army, and to the injury of the reputation of the country for justice.

I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances before your Lordship. I am about to move the army farther forward into Spain ; and I assure your Lordship that I have not a friend in that country who has not written to me in dread of the consequences which must result to the army, and to the cause, from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to prevent.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

When your Lordship apprised me of the design that Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck should make an attack upon the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, with the troops from Sicily, in the course of the summer, I considered it to be my duty to aid his Lordship by every means in my power, with troops, if I could spare them from the service in this part of the Peninsula, with equipments to facilitate the execution of the plans of government, and with ships to transport the Spanish troops ; with which I requested His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz to urge the Spanish government to co-operate with his Lordship.

Accordingly, I sent in the first instance to Gibraltar the ships named in the margin, containing the stores of which I enclose the return, which had recently arrived from England, with a battering train, from which I ordered that the shot specified in the margin might be landed in Portugal, where shot of those calibres was wanted ; and I requested that the Governor of Gibraltar would have the shot in the ships replaced by 800 rounds of round shot, 100 rounds of canister, and 100 rounds of grape shot for each gun.

I have since sent to Gibraltar, likewise to be at the disposal of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, the ships named in the margin ; and I enclose a return of the ordnance and stores they contain, including the stores which were at Setuval, and those on their march from Elvas to Alcacer do Sal, which were embarked in those ships.

I requested the Governor of Gibraltar, upon that occasion, to have the gun carriages put into a state of repair, and that guns should be fitted to them ; and with 800 rounds of round shot, 100 rounds of canister, and 100 rounds of grape, for each gun, with a suitable proportion of powder, should be embarked in those ships, and in two others which I had requested

Adm. Berkeley to send round, the four ships not having been sufficient to contain the whole equipment. I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to the Governor of Gibraltar upon this occasion.

I have not yet heard of the arrival of these ships at Gibraltar; but I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Campbell, written upon the arrival of the three vessels first mentioned; from which your Lordship will observe that the garrison of Gibraltar is stated not to have in store more than 11,000 24 pound shot, and that the officers of the ordnance in that fortress have refused to allow any of it to be embarked at my requisition. I likewise enclose my answer to Lieut. Gen. Campbell, from which your Lordship will observe, that for the purposes of this equipment I have ordered 20,000 24 pound round shot from Cadiz to Gibraltar, and 5000 from Lisbon to the same place, notwithstanding the wants at both, and I trust that Lieut. Gen. Campbell will find it convenient to supply the remainder of the demand.

I have likewise sent from this country to Gibraltar 2 companies of British, and 2 companies of Portuguese artillery, to remain there in their transports at the disposal of Lord W. Bentinck, when he shall send for them; and Lieut. Col. Jones, and 4 subaltern officers of Engineers, and 2 companies of military artificers, including all the sappers there are with this army, with the same intention.

Every ship and all the troops and equipments for this service have sailed from the Tagus; and I trust that your Lordship will approve of these arrangements, and will give orders that the 24 pound shot may be replaced at Cadiz and Lisbon.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

I enclose the abstract of the return of the army of the South, of the 1st April last, from which it appears that it consisted of nearly 57,000 men present and fit for duty, including the garrison of Badajoz. Estimating that garrison at 5000 men of all arms, the army of the South now consists of 52,000, of which about 38,000 are infantry, and about 7000 cavalry.

This army is more numerous and efficient than I imagined it was, and much more so than it was ever represented to be; and the state of it affords another ground for adopting the plan of operations for the campaign which I have preferred. I could not take more than 40,000 men into Andalusia, where it appears I should have had another army, the '*Armée de Portugal*,' following my march, consisting of at least 30,000 more.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

I wish to know from your Lordship whether it could be possible to give the medal to the Prince of Orange. He has been in the action at El Bodon, and in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; and although he is not exactly in the situation which would entitle him to it, he has the rank, and certainly deserves it, and would be highly flattered at obtaining it. I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will let me know if it can be given to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th June, 1812.

The army is collected on the Agueda, and I intend to move forward on

the 13th. I am almost certain, from what I have seen of the intercepted letters from Joseph to Soult, and from Marmont to Joseph, that Soult will move upon you with a part at least of his force, notwithstanding that the Marques de Monsalud says in a letter which I have from him this morning, that he believes that Joseph has ordered Soult to approach the Tagus; he did not send me the paper on which he founds this notion, and, therefore, I am not able to judge of it.

In my letter of the 6th inst. I pointed out to you what I thought would be the enemy's line of operations, and I recommended certain measures to you. There are still two or three objects to which I wish to draw your attention.

1st; My bridge of pontoons, which is at San Vicente. I think that for the present, the bridge had better be lodged at Elvas, the bullocks, &c., being kept in the best situation in the neighbourhood for grazing. I request you to give directions accordingly to Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher. Hereafter, if I should find, from the course the campaign takes, that it is not likely that I shall require that bridge for the communication between you and me by Almaraz, which will depend very much upon the events of the next 15 days, I shall order it down to Abrantes; as there is no use in being loaded with too many concerns.

2dly; The bridge at Alcantara. We have repaired this bridge by a piece of machinery which can be taken up and laid down at pleasure, but it will require 2 days' notice to lay it down, and as much time to take it up. I enclose the copy of the instructions which I have given regarding this bridge, and you will only send notice if you should want to use it.

If you should find it necessary on any account to retire into Portugal, you will in that case send orders to Lieut. Pery at Alcantara, to lodge his bridge, &c., at Marvaõ; and his bullocks, people, &c., had better continue their march by Castello de Vide, Niza, &c., to Abrantes.

It is very difficult to manage the defence of the Kingdom of Portugal, the whole country being frontier. I am quite convinced, that if Soult moves upon you, he will manœuvre by your right flank, and will cross the Guadiana somewhere about Jurumenha, where he will be at no great distance from our magazine, hospital, &c., at Estremoz. We have very little, I believe, in magazine at that place, the greater part having been removed to Elvas, and it is as well that there should be no great accumulation at Estremoz, upon which subject I request you to communicate with Mr. Routh. I have desired Dr. M^rGrigor to give directions that the hospital at Estremoz may be gradually evacuated upon Alter do Chaõ and Abrantes, leaving in Estremoz only 400 or 500 men, which number can always be moved without difficulty.

By the last account from Brito, I see that there had been some affair with Ballesteros on the 1st, near Bornos, and that some troops had been moved in that direction; this may be true, but we must be certain that we are the great object of the movement.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th June, 1812.

The Commander of the Forces desires that a contractor, by name Francisco d'Almeida, of Villa Nova de Foz Coa, who was the person who gave the two soldiers of the - regt. the liquor which occasioned their death at Niza, shall be no longer employed in the army.

You will have received my letter about the 4th dragoon guards; the remounts for the 2d division of cavalry will soon join, and will make you tolerably strong in that arm. There is a Portuguese regiment of cavalry in the forts of Elvas, Campo Maior, &c., of which, of course, you will make use in the neighbourhood of those places.

The Marques de Monsalud tells me, that besides the regiment of Doyle now in Badajoz, he has 1500 men which he is sending into the place, not reckoning a battalion now on its march from Ciudad Rodrigo; so that Badajoz will be very tolerably garrisoned without Morillo's infantry. It ought to have 5000 men, if it is likely to be attacked; but half the number are sufficient if it is not, which is the case we have to provide for.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 8th. When I was in Zealand, I recollect a person by the name of ———, who was afterwards taken prisoner in a Danish privateer; and I saw him in London, and I believe was of use to him. The particular circumstances I don't recollect; but this I do recollect, that he was of no service to us in Zealand. Foreigners of that description are of no use to me; and I shall be very much obliged to the government if they should not allow Mr. ——— to pass through the country to the army.

Au Général ———.

À Fuente Guinaldo, ce 12 Juin, 1812.

J'ai reçu la lettre de votre Excellence du 8. L'armée sous mes ordres passera l'Agueda demain matin et s'avancera sur Salamanca.

Comme le Roi Joseph commande toutes les armées d'Espagne, votre Excellence peut être assurée qu'il ne verra pas écraser le Maréchal Duc de Raguse, si nous sommes les plus forts, sans faire faire un mouvement quelconque en Estremadure par le Maréchal Soult. Je sais, par les lettres interceptées en chiffre, qu'il a ordonné un mouvement par le Maréchal Soult; mais comme je ne peux pas deviner la clef du chiffre, je ne connais pas le mouvement.

Mais quel que soit le mouvement, il est à désirer que les alliés soient en force en Estremadure; et que les troupes soient bien en main. Vous ferez les mouvemens projetés dans votre lettre du 8, ou non, comme il vous plaira; mais vous devez compter que je serai obligé de changer mes dispositions en conséquence de la faiblesse qui en sera la suite en Estremadure.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th June, 1812.

I enclose a copy of a letter of the 8th, which I have received from the ———, and of my answer. It appears that that officer, instead of attending to the interesting events likely to occur in this quarter, is desirous of plundering corn and crimping recruits; and the consequence of these advantageous operations will probably be, that Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will be too weak to hold his ground in Estremadura, and I shall be obliged to evacuate Castille, to go to his assistance.

I have already sent you my letter of the 7th inst. to the ———, in which I have advised him not to lose his communication with Sir R. Hill.

I have a report that Gen. Ballesteros was defeated on the 1st June. I

enclose you an extract from the report of the Chief of the Staff of the army of the South, regarding Gen. Ballesteros' operations. You will see that he is stopped by any thing like a strong hold, however contemptible; and I beg that you will again recommend to the government that he should be equipped with only 2 or 3 Spanish 16 pounders, to enable him to lay open any place of this kind, in which the enemy's small posts may take refuge.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th June, 1812.

I enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, containing observations on the mortality in the 7th regt., and the 40th regt., in the last year. I concur with Dr. M'Grigor in deeming it very desirable that the troops and recruits destined for this army should be sent out in the winter, before the spring equinoctial gales. They should leave England, if possible, with the first easterly wind in December.

The same rule is desirable for the remount horses for the cavalry and artillery. They likewise should arrive before the equinoctial gales in spring; and the earlier in the winter the better. It is likewise desirable, that whatever transport tonnage there may be, should be allotted for the remount horses of the several regiments, in proportion to the number of horses belonging to each regiment to be sent out. The horses for all the regiments are not yet arrived in Portugal; and very few have yet joined any of the regiments.

The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.

12th June, 1812.

It having been reported by the Inspector of hospitals that the convalescents at Coimbra suffer much for the want of a breakfast mess, I have to request that you will establish one for their comfort, charging the regiments to which they belong with the expenditure. I do not recollect that money was ever refused for this purpose, or any other necessary for the comfort or cleanliness of the convalescents. When money is required, application should be made to the Adj. Gen., who will move the Commander of the Forces to direct the Paymaster Gen. to advance it; and upon furnishing him with a regular account of what has been issued to the regiment, more money will be issued when necessary.

I have received your letter with 3 bills of exchange.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Guadapero, 13th June, 1812, 1½ P.M.

I have a letter from Salamanca of the 9th; there was nothing very particular. Marmont was still there, and had been at Alba, to reconnoitre the position there.

I have sent the orders for the march to be made to-morrow, which was to have been made this day, under the orders of the 11th.

The A.G. to Major Gardiner, R.A., 1st division.

13th June, 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to inform you that he observed 3 bullock carts this day on the march, stated to be attached to your brigade of artillery. These means of conveyance are contrary to the orders of this army, and it is his Excellency's desire that what is upon them may be otherwise disposed of this day, and the carts made over to the Commissary of the 1st division of infantry, to be sent to their homes, or disposed of for the public service.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Cabrillas, 14th June, 1812.

We crossed the Agueda yesterday, and are so far advanced towards Salamanca.

I have received your letters of the 9th and 11th, and I think Zafra as convenient a position, in the view of your former instructions, and more healthy than that which you before occupied. I hope that the Conde de Penne Villemur will not get himself into a scrape.

We have deciphered the letter you sent, and it goes back to you with the key of the cipher. We have got some letters, however, in cipher, which we have not been able to decipher; but as far as I can judge, it appears to me that King Joseph has ordered Soult to send to the Tagus one third of the force under his command, in order to join some other troops to be assembled there, probably belonging to the army of the Centre. I at first thought this assembly was to take place at the bridge of Arzobispo, and that Soult's troops were to march without cannon; but having seen by a letter of the 12th, received this day from Clementi Pereira, that a body of troops, attended by 5 boats, had arrived on the 9th at Talavera, and that the troops had moved on to the neighbourhood, and it is probable that the boats will follow, I think that Almaraz will be the point of assembly for these troops, and that they will communicate by the flying bridge to be formed of these boats.

It is most probable, that if Ballesteros has been beaten, which I am afraid is not unlikely, Soult will, with a part of his army, cover the movement of the third, which are going to the Tagus, and if this is the case, you can do nothing to prevent the movement, but must attend to your own situation; but if Ballesteros has not been much hurt, and the third of Soult's army should attempt to move through Estremadura alone, you might make their march very dangerous and difficult; and I shall be obliged to you to attend to it.

I shall hear from you, of course, the extent of the force which the enemy will send this way.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Cabrillas, 14th June, 1812, 12 at noon.

I received last night from Gen. Castaños some very interesting intercepted documents; among others, a return of the 1st April of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' The effective fit for duty are 51,492; of which 43,396 are infantry; 3204 are cavalry; 3393 artillery; and the remainder *sapeurs*, &c. &c. There are besides about 1500 infantry, and 1000 cavalry, returned on command at Salamanca, Alba, &c., which ought to be added to the present fit for duty, and would make the army 43,800 infantry, and above 4000 cavalry. Bonet's division, consisting of 6270 infantry, are in the Asturias. Castaños tells me that the French are about to evacuate Astorga; and he mentions that the Adjutant, who carried there the order, went on to order Bonet likewise to retire from the Asturias. I reckon that he would receive the order about the 9th, and he might be on the Tormes on the 19th or 20th.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' have 98 pieces of cannon; but they are very badly provided with horses, and I see that some of the cannon have been left at Avila, and some at Talavera; and Marmont has ordered that they may be drawn by bullocks to Tordesillas.

I enclose a letter just received from Salamanca, from which you will see

that it is reported that Bonet is coming to join the army. It is also said that some of Foy's troops are about Talavera; but that I don't credit. Notwithstanding that the enemy is considerably stronger than I believed he was, I propose to continue our movement forward. We shall at least force them to collect their troops, and I see by Castaños' letter, that he is about to move the army of Galicia, and he has ordered Mendizabal to move all the troops and guerrillas in the north, so as to cut off all Marmont's communications; and if Marmont should detach, or he should not be joined by Bonet, or the whole of all his divisions, or by the division at Valladolid, we shall be superior to him. I have ordered the march for to-morrow.

P.S. There are in the '*Armée de Portugal*' 7460 sick; and the grand total amounts to 65,597, including 2277 officers and 11,147 horses, including 2593 belonging to officers.

The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions.

14th June, 1812.

The Commander of the Forces now expects every morning the daily state of the army of the preceding day. In order to carry his Excellency's wishes into effect, it becomes absolutely necessary that the states of the divisions should arrive at this office by 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the day on which they are due.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Campbell, Kt.

Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

I received yesterday your letter of the 26th May, and this day that of the 3d June. I am very much obliged to you, and flattered by your having been my proxy at the installation of the Knights of the Bath; and I agree with you in thinking, that I should not have been less happy even if I had seen the dress in which it was intended I should appear. In regard to the disposal of the money intended for the ball, I beg that you will do as others do; and I enclose an order for £350 sterling.

Affairs appear to be in a strange state in England; however, I trust that at last some government will be formed. I always detested home politics, and late occurrences have not given me a relish for them.

You will hear of our march here. The French have a fort which I must take, and then we shall see what I can do.

P.S. I have been considering your situation, and your not going to the Isle of France: pray show every desire to go, at all events, by the earliest opportunity. The iron gets cold, and does not work well, if not struck when heated; and if you show a disinclination to go to that situation, a short turn might be taken, you might be deprived of it, and it would be difficult to obtain for you another.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th. I have never been more annoyed than by ———'s affair, and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at every thing, and their galloping back as fast as they gallop on the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of manœuvring before an enemy; so little that one would think they cannot manœuvre, excepting on Wimble-

don Common ; and when they use their arm as it ought to be used, viz., offensively, they never keep nor provide for a reserve.

All cavalry should charge in two lines, of which one should be in reserve ; if obliged to charge in one line, part of the line, at least one-third, should be ordered beforehand to pull up, and form in second line, as soon as the charge should be given, and the enemy has been broken and has retired. The Royal and the 3d dragoon guards were the best regiments in the cavalry in this country ; and it annoys me particularly that the misfortune has happened to them. I don't wonder at the French boasting of it ; it is the greatest blow they have struck.

P.S. We entered this place yesterday. The enemy still hold the fort which they have made, but I hope soon to have them out.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

The army crossed the Agueda on the 13th inst., and marched forward in three columns, the troops under Don Carlos de España forming a fourth ; and the whole arrived upon the Valmusa rivulet, about six miles from hence, on the 16th. The enemy showed some cavalry and a small body of infantry in front of the town on that day, and manifested a design to hold the heights on the south side of the Tormes. But their cavalry were immediately driven in by ours, and the enemy evacuated Salamanca on the night of the 16th, leaving a garrison of about 800 men in the fortifications which they have erected on the ruins of the colleges and convents which they have demolished. By the fire from these they protect the passage of the Tormes by the bridge, and our troops crossed that river yesterday morning, by 2 fords which are in this neighbourhood.

The forts were immediately invested by the 6th division, under the command of Major Gen. H. Clinton, and having been accurately reconnoitred, it was found necessary to break ground before them. This was done last night, and I hope that we shall commence our fire to-morrow morning from 8 pieces of cannon, at the distance of 300 yards from the principal of the enemy's works, the possession of which will, I hope, give us the possession of the others. Major Gen. Clinton conducts these operations.

It is impossible to describe the joy of the people of the town upon our entrance. They have now been suffering for more than three years ; during which time the French, among other acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed 13 of 25 convents, and 22 of 25 colleges, which existed in this celebrated seat of learning.

The enemy retired by the road to Toro, and their rear guard was about 15 miles from hence last night. They retired again this morning by the same road ; and I understand that they intend to collect their army on the Duero, between Toro and Zamora. Our advanced guard is advanced on the road to Toro, and the main body of the army in this neighbourhood.

I enclose a return of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' of the 1st April, which has been intercepted, from which it appears that there are at present under arms 2074 officers and 51,492 troops in this body, of which 43,396 are infantry, and 3204 cavalry. Of the 4244 men returned detached, there

are about 1500 infantry and about 1000 cavalry in this neighbourhood, who will of course be called in to join the army.

I enclose the morning state of this army of yesterday, in which I have marked thus * those troops which are in this part of the country, the others being in Estremadura, under the command of Lieut. Gen. Hill. To these numbers must be added about 3000 Spanish infantry, under Don Carlos de España, and about 500 Spanish cavalry, under Don J. Sanchez, who are with the army.

This state includes only the cavalry and infantry of the army; but your Lordship will observe that the enemy are superior to us in numbers in those arms; and it appears from the return, that the enemy have 92 pieces of cannon.

I have adopted every measure in my power to prevent the enemy from collecting their forces against us. I have urged the Conde de Amarante to move upon the enemy's flank from Braganza, along the Douro, with 4 battalions of militia and 3 regiments of Portuguese cavalry, under Gen. D'Urban, and to cut off the enemy's communication between Zamora and Benavente and Astorga. Gen. Castaños has promised me to attack Astorga with the army of Galicia; and I have urged Gen. Mendizabal and the chiefs of the guerrillas in all the northern parts of Spain to make an effort to prevent Marshal Marmont from collecting his whole force against this army. But I am apprehensive that I can place no reliance on the effect to be produced by these troops. The guerrillas, although active and willing, and although their operations in general occasion the utmost annoyance to the enemy, are so little disciplined that they can do nothing against the French troops, unless the latter are very inferior in numbers; and if the French take post in house or church, of which they only barricade the entrance, both regular troops and guerrillas are so ill equipped, as military bodies, that the French can remain in security till relieved by a larger body.

Then Gen. Castaños, although I believe he is equipped with a few guns for the attack of Astorga, has no pecuniary resources to enable him to collect and keep together the army of Galicia. And if the enemy should abandon Astorga to its fate, and should withdraw Gen. Bonet from the Asturias, I am very apprehensive that the advantages of my march into Castille will be confined to regaining the principality of Asturias for Gen. Castaños, and to the little advantages which the guerrillas will derive from the evacuation of different parts of the country by the enemy's posts.

Your Lordship will observe from my letter of the 26th ult., that I did not calculate that the enemy's '*Armée de Portugal*' was so strong when I determined upon this expedition, and I had certainly reason to believe that Marshal Marmont would not evacuate the Asturias. I shall not give up the plan, however, unless I should see that success is not to be looked for, as I am convinced that the most advantageous consequences will result from success in this quarter, or even from my remaining in an advanced position in Castille.

From intercepted letters between the King and Marshals Soult and Marmont, which, however, I have not been able entirely to decipher, I

judge, that the King's plan, referred to in my dispatch of the 10th inst., is to collect a corps in the valley of the Tagus, consisting of a part of the army of the South, and a division of the army of the Centre, in order to create a diversion in favor of Marshal Marmont. I had requested the Empecinado to alarm the King for the safety of his situation at Madrid; and I hope that Marshal Soult will find ample employment for his troops in the south in the blockade of Cadiz, the continued operations of Gen. Ballesteros, and those in Estremadura of Lieut. Gen. Hill, whose attention I have called to the probable march of this corps of the army of the South through part of Estremadura.

The King is very desirous of restoring the bridge of Almaraz, which can only be for the object of collecting a corps upon the Tagus, but hitherto he has sent there only two small boats, for the purpose of communicating with the post at Mirabete.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill,* and its enclosures, being two from Major Gen. Slade, giving an account of an affair which he had with the enemy on the 11th inst., in which, owing to the eagerness and impetuosity of the soldiers, considerable loss was sustained.

Your Lordship is aware that misfortunes of this kind have happened more than once in this country from the same cause, and I have frequently

* Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to Gen. the Earl of Wellington, K.B. Zafra, 13th June, 1812.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the copies of reports which I have received from Major Gen. Slade, relative to an affair between 2 regiments of the brigade of cavalry under his command, and the brigade of French cavalry under Gen. Lallemand, in the neighbourhood of Valencia de las Torres, on the 11th inst.; in which, I am sorry to observe, we have suffered severely, and have not gained the advantage which might have been expected.

Major Gen. Slade had advanced to Llera, and was to have proceeded the following day in the direction of La Granja, to cover a reconnaissance to be made by the Conde de Penne Villemur on that day, from Llerena towards Azuaga.

The 17th and 27th dragoons, under Gen. Lallemand, which had been stationed in the neighbourhood of Azuaga, had, however, moved at the same time towards Valencia de las Torres, and Major Gen. Slade was induced to bring him to action.

While I forward these reports to your Lordship, I shall feel it my duty to cause further inquiry to be made into the circumstances of this affair, and shall have the honor of communicating them to your Lordship.

Major Gen. Slade to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Llera, 11th June, 1812, 4½ P.M.

I beg to have the honor of stating to you that the enemy, whom I reported this morning to have been in Valencia, advanced upon this place about 9 o'clock with the 17th and 27th regts. of dragoons, under Gen. Lallemand. I immediately advanced with the 3d dragoon guards and Royals, attacked and pursued him nearly 3 leagues, to within a short distance of Maguilla, when I had an opportunity of charging him again, broke through his first line, and killed a great many; among the numbers are a captain of the 27th dragoons, and we took an aide de camp of Gen. Lallemand prisoner. I am sorry to say our loss was severe, as the enemy brought a support, and my troops being too eager in pursuit, we were obliged to relinquish a great number of prisoners which we had taken, and to fall back on this place.

Nothing could exceed the gallantry displayed by both officers and men on the occasion, in which Col. Sir G. Calcraft, and Lieut. Col. Clifton, commanding the 2 regiments, particularly distinguished themselves, as well as all the officers present. I beg particularly to report the conduct of Brig. Major Radcliffe, to whom I feel extremely indebted for his assistance on this occasion.

I have not yet been able to collect the returns, but I am concerned to say, Lieuts. Windsor, of the Royals, and Homewood, of the 3d dragoon guards, have fallen into the enemy's hands, the former having his horse shot, and the latter being wounded.

Major Gen. Slade to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Camp near Llera, 12th June, 1812.

In forwarding the enclosed return of the casualties which occurred yesterday, I feel it my

been present on occasions when the same conduct in the cavalry was likely to be attended by the same unfortunate results. Notwithstanding that this misfortune has occurred upon this occasion to a brigade consisting of two of the best and most experienced regiments we have, I have concurred with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill in thinking that it is necessary to make a formal inquiry into the causes which occasioned the disorder, and the consequent losses in the attack made by Major Gen. Slade on the enemy on the 11th inst. Gen. Slade's action was occasioned by his advancing to Llera, to cover a movement by the Conde de Penne Villemur on Llerena, in order to collect the harvest of Estremadura; and I learn that the enemy have since retired to Cordova.

I have reports from the south, stating that Gen. Ballesteros had had an action with the enemy near Bornos, on the 1st inst., of which I have not received the detail, or any regular confirmation, notwithstanding that there is no doubt of the fact. The result has been stated differently by the two parties, and it is reported by the enemy that Ballesteros is badly wounded. But they have certainly reinforced their troops in that direction since the action, from which circumstance it may be inferred that the success, if on their side at all, was not very decisive.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Salamanca, 19th June, 1812.

I return the enclosures in Dom M. Forjaz's note, respecting Senhor Vasconcellos. Neither Sir W. Beresford nor I know any thing about this

duty to state, in addition to what I had the honor of communicating to you before, that our misfortunes arose from too great eagerness and zeal in the pursuit, after having broke the enemy's first line, each regiment vying with each other who should most distinguish itself, which gave him an opportunity of bringing up fresh troops, and of charging us at a time when we were in confusion.

I beg leave again to repeat, that the exertions of the officers to restore order were conspicuous; but the two regiments having got mixed in the charge, it took some time before this object could be accomplished, during which we lost most of the prisoners we had taken, and suffered, I am grieved to say, severely. It is a satisfaction to me to be able to add, that the enemy lost, in killed and wounded, full as many as ourselves, and considered himself completely routed.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the affair near Maguilla, on the 11th June, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	2	20	6	22
Wounded	—	—	26	14	26
Missing	2	10	106	127	118

G. O.

Salamanca, 19th June, 1812.

1. Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton has taken charge of the outposts of the army, and has given to the cavalry the orders which may be necessary.

2. The General officers commanding divisions of infantry in front, will receive from Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton information of the enemy's movements; and they will attend to the requisition they will receive from him, for the support of infantry to his posts of cavalry.

person, who, I am informed, has been seized by the French. But it is not impossible that this is part of the trick. Austin should seize him, or should get some of the Spanish authorities to seize him, if the French should let him go.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton. On the heights above Aldea Lengua, 24th June, 1812, 6½ A.M.

The enemy have crossed the Tormes in some force, and are skirmishing with Gen. Bock's brigade of dragoons, which is in front of Calvarrasa de Abaxo.

I have ordered the 7th and 1st divisions to cross the Tormes at the ford of S^{ra} Marta; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order a brigade and a Portuguese regiment of the 6th division to move out of the town, and to cross the Tormes at the ford below S^{ra} Marta. You should send your baggage, except camp kettles, heavy guns and stores, &c., across the Tormes at the ford of El Canto.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

On the heights behind Aldea Lengua, 24th June, 1812.

Upon looking carefully at the plain I can see but very few troops, and the great body of the enemy are certainly still on the right of the Tormes, some on the bank of the river, but mostly on the heights, extending nearly as far as Gomecello. It is my opinion, therefore, that you should keep Gen. Le Marchant's brigade assembled near the ford of Calvarrasa, at which they crossed. One regiment might even be on this side with advantage.

I shall observe the enemy's movements here, and will take care to reinforce you in time.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

On the heights in front of Aldea Lengua, 24th June, 1812.

All the enemy's infantry on the plain on the left of the Tormes are collected or in march towards Calvarrasa. They appear to me to be about 10,000 men, with cavalry, the numbers of which I cannot tell, but not so many as we have on the left of the Tormes.

I shall observe their movements, and reinforce you as it may be necessary. The remainder of the army is in the same position as yesterday afternoon, and are not apparently about to make any movement; I therefore imagine that the others are not about to do any thing of importance.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

24th June, 1812, 5 P.M.

The enemy's infantry and cavalry have moved to the rear, as you will have observed; but I see that they are getting under arms at Aldea Rubia, and on the hill on the right of that village. I think it advisable, therefore, that if the men of the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions are not cooking, they should move to the ford of S^{ra} Marta. If they are cooking, the movement may as well be delayed till they have done, unless I should see reason to make it earlier, of which I will give you notice.

I was just going over to you, but the enemy's movement prevents it just at present.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton. Heights behind Aldea Lengua, 25th June, 1812, 6 A.M.

I am very anxious to have a little conversation with Col. Burgoyne, Col. May, and Col. Dickson, and shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire them to come to me at the village of Cabrerizos as soon as they can. They can be there, I conclude, by 8 o'clock, when I shall be there; and if I should not be there, I will send word where I may be found.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

I have received your letters of the 16th and 17th, regarding the reforms in the Portuguese navy. It is difficult to say how far they ought to be carried, but if the British government undertake to protect Portugal from the Barbary powers, I see no reason why they should have any ships in Europe, excepting probably the flotilla on the Guadiana.

P.S. You did not enclose in your letter of the 16th the paper regarding the guerrillas taking the stud of brood mares.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 17th inst., and although I have but little leisure just at present, I shall not delay to reply to it.*

The Chevalier de Sousa wrote to me some time ago respecting the schemes for establishing a bank in Lisbon, and for lending money on English securities, upon which I gave him my opinion, and he must, I believe, have received it before he sent his plan to Mr. Hamilton. Nothing can be more absurd than all the reasoning respecting the establishment of a bank in Portugal, to be conducted on the principle of the Bank of England. 1st; the constitution of the country will not allow of such an establishment: 2dly; the military and political situation of the country is such that no man in his senses, whether native or foreigner, who has capital, will lay it out in this or any other scheme, which shall prevent him removing it from the country at a moment's notice.

People appear to me to be as wild now in their notions of the security of the Portuguese territory as they were desponding two years ago. But I who, from repeated reflection, must have a tolerably accurate notion of the real state of this country, and those who will be called upon to lay out their capital upon this banking scheme, and know well the relative force of the contending armies in the Peninsula, and the advantages and disadvantages attending each, and particularly those attending the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, will not be so ready as Senhor de Sousa (with his 90,000 men) thinks they will, to take their money out of their chests to lodge it in those of the bank, and eventually in those of the Portuguese Treasury.

At this moment the two armies with which the allied armies are engaged are exactly double the strength in the field, according to the returns, of the allied British and Portuguese armies; and a more serious accident to Ballesteros than that which befell him in the beginning of this month at Bornos (and which it was totally out of my power to prevent) would bring a larger force upon Gen. Hill, and *coûte que coûte*, I

* This letter must have been written whilst in presence of the enemy.

should be obliged to withdraw into Portugal, and all the prospects of the campaign would vanish.

I have put out of the question the accidents which may happen to Gen. Hill or to me, as what I have above stated is sufficient to show that Portugal, though I trust she will be saved, is not in that state of security in which these visionaries would represent her.

Then in respect to the British funded security for the capital of the bank, the reasoning upon that part of the subject is as fallacious as that upon other points. We are to collect in England the Portuguese duties upon wines exported from Portugal to England. The first question upon which I am not informed is, whether the existence of these duties is conformable to the treaty? The rest is referable to that part of the subject already discussed. Will Great Britain guarantee to the bank subscribers their capital whether Portugal is lost or saved? If that country should be lost, I believe it will be found that the new possessors will understand the mode of levying a duty upon the export of wine as well as the old; and will the British government make the people of Great Britain pay, in the price of their port wine, the two duties, viz., the existing one for the benefit of the capitalists of the bank, and the new one for the benefit of the usurping government? However, I acknowledge that if all these difficulties could be overcome, the plan for establishing a bank, even with the views detailed in the project, would not be the most beneficial mode in which Great Britain could employ her credit for the advantage of Portugal.

All the other plans considered in the papers which you enclosed, are mere spendthrift schemes for borrowing money on English security, to make up the deficit of the revenues of this country to defray the expenses of the war; which schemes, even if the King's government could be brought to listen to them, would fail, owing to the absolute impracticability of procuring specie in the Peninsula, or in England to send to the Peninsula, or of taking from the military chest, for the service of Portugal, more specie than is already given in subsidy.

I have been uniform, and, I believe, correct, in my opinions upon this subject. When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts. This is what I have invariably recommended to the Portuguese government, and if they had attended to my recommendations, instead of flattering themselves with idle hopes of loans to be raised from England, the deficit in the revenue for the great war expenditure of last year, which I calculate at 15 millions of *cruzados*, would have been covered. I don't ask for new taxes: on the contrary, I would repeal many; but I want a real and fair collection of those which should be allowed to exist. This is the only measure which can relieve Portugal and us; and it is that one of which we ought not to lose sight for one moment.

Honesty in the payment of debts has likewise been attended to. After a great deal of trouble and discussion, I at last *forced* the Portuguese

government to pay the interest on the paper money in circulation, and on the *Apolices Grandes*, by giving notice that I would order the Commissary Gen. to take no more in payment of his bills on the Treasury, if the measure was not adopted. In the mean time the government jobbed the question of the interest on the *Apolices*.

There is no doubt but that the payment of the interest has had a most material effect in restoring the credit of the paper money securities, notwithstanding that their nominal value in the market has not been materially altered. But let it be recollected that when this measure was adopted we had in the chest nearly £500,000 in paper money, which had accumulated there, and of which we could not dispose; and that we have never more now than the sum received in the month for bills, and that we experience no difficulty in disposing of the paper money to make our payments, particularly in the capital and large towns; and it will be seen that the measure has had a very important effect.

I beg to refer to the calculations in England, regarding the value of bank notes in reference to gold and silver, and to compare the result with the existing paper money in Portugal, which, till the interest was paid, depended for its existence solely upon its being taken by the Commissary Gen. in payment for bills upon the Treasury; and I believe it will be found that the difference in current value, in reference to gold and silver, is but trifling, while the English bank note, as security, is infinitely superior to the Portuguese paper money.

I believe I have now considered all ——'s financial schemes for Portugal, excepting the Commissariat notes, and the recoinage of silver from dollars to *cruzaos*.

Your reasoning upon the commissariat notes is undeniable. The bills drawn upon the Commissary Gen. by his deputies, in payment of supplies, and by him on his deputies at Lisbon, are not very good paper; and I believe that a great deal of money is made by the traffic in them by the *sharks* residing in Lisbon, and other large towns, principally Englishmen, at the expense of the people who furnish supplies, and not improbably at the expense of the public. I have endeavored to prevent these gains, though I fear with but little success; but we may depend upon it that the commissariat notes would be as low in value comparatively with money as the commissariat bills, and it would be totally out of my power to apply a remedy.

The other scheme of —— is, in my opinion, very objectionable. A new *cruzado*, *cruzado novo*, as it is called, is current for 8 *per cent.* more than the value of the silver it contains in reference to dollars, and we should gain 8 *per cent.* by this recoinage. The new *cruzado* being current at Lisbon principally, it is possible that we should gain this 8 *per cent.* on all our payments there; but even this is not certain, as we may depend upon it that foreigners, Americans particularly, and our own merchants, from whom we should purchase any thing, would add the 8 *per cent.*, which they would lose on the coin in which we should pay them, on the price of the article which we should purchase from them. But this is not all. The operations in the expenditure of the British army are not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal. How would the *cruzaes* pass

in Spain? Not at all. And we should thus suffer the greatest inconvenience from a scheme, at best, not very worthy of the British government.

Upon the whole I am convinced that the only measure to be adopted to relieve the Portuguese from their financial difficulties, is never to cease urging them to discontinue all their useless expenses and establishments, and to set to work in earnest to reform the gross abuses which exist in the collection of their revenue.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

Marshal Marmont collected his army on the Duero between the 16th and 19th inst., with the exception of Gen. Bonet's division, which I believe is still in the Asturias, and some small garrisons, and he moved forward from Fuente el Saucó on the 20th. I formed the allied army, with the exception of the troops engaged in the operations against the forts at Salamanca, on the heights extending from the neighbourhood of Villares to Morisco; and the advanced posts of the cavalry and infantry retired upon the army in good order, and without material loss. The enemy remained in our front on that night, and during the 21st; and during that night they established a post on our right flank, the possession of which by them deprived us of an advantage which might eventually be of importance; I therefore requested Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham to attack them in that post on the 22d with the troops on the right, which he did with those of the 7th division, which were the reserve of the right, under the command of Major Gen. Hope and Major Gen. de Bernewitz. The enemy were driven from the ground immediately, with some loss. Our troops conducted themselves remarkably well in this affair, which took place in the view of every man of both armies. The enemy retired during that night; and on the following evening, they posted themselves with their right on the heights near Cabeza Velloso, and their left on the Tormes, at Huerta; their centre at Aldea Rubia.

The object of the enemy in this movement being to endeavor to communicate with the garrisons in the forts of Salamanca, by the left of the Tormes, I changed the front of the army, and placed the right at S^{ta} Marta, where there is a ford over the Tormes; and the advanced posts at Aldea Lengua; and I extended the troops so as to cover Salamanca completely, while I had it in my power to concentrate the army at any point at a short notice.

I sent Major Gen. Bock's brigade of heavy dragoons across the Tormes, in order to observe the passages of that river. The enemy crossed the Tormes at Huerta, about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, in considerable numbers of cavalry, infantry, and artillery; and there was every appearance of a general movement in that direction. The conduct of Major Gen. Bock's dragoons was conspicuously good upon this occasion. They did every thing in their power to make known the enemy's movement; and opposed their advance vigorously under many disadvantages, in order to afford time for the dispositions necessary to be made. As soon as I was certain that the enemy had crossed the Tormes, I requested Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham to cross that river with the 1st and 7th

divisions, and I sent over Major Gen. Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry; and I concentrated the remainder of the army between Morisco and Ca-brerizos, keeping the advanced posts still at Aldea Lengua. At about noon, the enemy advanced as far as Calvarrasa de Abaxo; but observing the disposition made for their reception, they retired again in the afternoon across the Tormes to Huerta; and they have since remained in the position which they occupied on the 23d.

Between the 20th and 22d, I had a favorable opportunity of attacking the enemy, of which, however, I did not think it proper to avail myself, for the following reasons:

1st; It was probable he had advanced with an intention to attack us, and, in the position which we occupied, I considered it advantageous to be attacked; and that the action would be attended by less loss on our side.

2dly; The operations against the forts of Salamanca took up the attention of some of our troops; and although I believe the superiority of numbers in the field was on our side, it was not so great as to render an action decisive of the result of the campaign, in which we should sustain great loss.

3dly; In case of failure, the passage of the Tormes would have been difficult, the enemy continuing in the possession of the forts, and commanding the bridge of Salamanca.

The siege of the forts of Salamanca has not advanced with the rapidity which I expected when I addressed your Lordship last. Although, from the pains taken and the expense incurred in their construction, and the accounts which I had received of them, I was prepared to meet with some difficulties, and provided an equipment accordingly; the difficulties are of a more formidable nature than they were represented; and the forts, 3 in number, each defending the other, are very strong, although not of a regular construction, and the equipment which I had provided for their attack was not sufficient; and I have been obliged to send for more, which has created some delay in the operations.

We have breaches open in the Convent of San Vicente, which is the principal convent; but these cannot be attacked in security till we shall have possession of Fort Los Cayetanos. Major Gen. Clinton made an attempt to carry that work by storm on the night of the 23d inst., the gorge having been considerably damaged by the fire of our artillery. This attempt unfortunately failed; and I am concerned to add, that Major Gen. Bowes was killed. He was so eager for the success of the enterprise, that he had gone forward with the storming party, which consisted of a part of his brigade, and was wounded; and after his first wound was dressed, he returned again to the attack, and received a second wound, which killed him. Our loss in officers and men was likewise considerable.

I expect that every thing that is necessary to get the better of these forts will arrive to-morrow, and that I shall soon have the happiness of reporting that they are in our possession.

We have discovered the cipher in which King Joseph wrote his orders to Gen. Drouet in regard to his operations against Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, which were to move upon the allied troops in Estremadura. Your Lordship will observe from my dispatch of the 10th inst., that I had left

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill in strength, and I have desired him to collect his troops in the position of Albuera, which is the best in the country; and to act according to circumstances, and to the movements of the enemy. By a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill of the 22d, I learn that Gen. Drouet had been considerably reinforced from Andalusia since the defeat of Gen. Ballesteros at Bornos, in the beginning of the month, and had advanced as far as Almendralejo and Villa Franca; and Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill had concentrated his troops at Albuera. He had not decided whether he should attack Drouet or not, and he delayed the decision only because he was not quite certain of Drouet's strength.

Gen. Ballesteros had sustained a severe loss in his action at Bornos on the 1st June; and I understand that he retired to the neighbourhood of Gibraltar.

In the north, Gen. Santocildes, under the direction of Gen. Castaños, has invested Astorga with the Galician army, and is about to attack that place; in which operation I imagine that he cannot be interrupted, as the whole of the enemy's army, excepting Gen. Bonet's division in Asturias, is employed against that under my command.

The guerrillas are in unmolested possession of all parts of the country; and the enemy's weak and scattered garrisons are cut off from all communication with each other, or with the country.

P.S. I enclose returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 17th to the 24th June inclusive. [*Included in the general return at p. 728.*]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

I enclose several letters in a cipher which we cannot discover, and it is very important that an endeavor should be made to discover it in London. It is the same cipher as is used by the Emperor's ministers, and the discovery of the key, therefore, may be important for other objects as well as for our operations.

Matters have not gone on as I could wish at Salamanca; but the truth is that my attention has been so much and so constantly taken up with Marmont's movements and my own, that I have not been able to attend to the operations of the siege as I ought.

P.S. I enclose the last morning state.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Cabrerizos, 26th June, 1812, 2 P.M.

I enclose a letter which I received from Lieut. Col. May on my return here.

I conclude that you have stopped the firing for this day, and I recommend the following preparatory measures to be adopted for an attack to-morrow:

1st; The batteries to be all repaired.

2dly; The approach to be continued as far on as may be possible.

3dly; The new approach to be made from which Col. Burgoyne proposed to mine Los Cayetanos.

4thly; Two 24 pound carronades to be in readiness in No. 2, to fire red-hot shot upon those parts of the convent already breached, the roofs, &c. I am not certain that it would not be most convenient to make the

attack by daylight, and the shot would be ready to be fired so that the building may be on fire when the attack is made on Los Cayetanos.

5thly; Two 24 pound howitzers, with Shrapnel's or common shells, to be placed in the new redoubt, to fire along that part of the exterior work from which the enemy can annoy the assailants of Los Cayetanos.

6thly; I wish that this evening or to-morrow morning you would ride to the left of the Tormes, and look at the ground on which the Ice House stands. I think that guns placed at a low stone wall on the top of that hill would see the reverse of some of the works from which the enemy could annoy the assailants of Los Cayetanos; and if this be true, send over to that point 2 guns and one howitzer, or 3 guns of the brigade attached to the 6th division, in order to perform this service during the attack. They must be concealed till the attack shall commence. Take one of the artillery officers with you.

7thly; Let some of the ladders be carried forward into the trenches before daylight in the morning.

8thly; Let the ground be well examined on which parties may be posted to keep up a warm fire of musketry on the parapets of Los Cayetanos, and on the works of San Vicente by which Los Cayetanos is defended, during the time the attack is going on, and let a calculation be made of the number of men each of them will contain.

I shall be with you to-morrow if I can.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Salamanca, 26th June, 1812.

I enclose my last dispatches. The armies are about 5 miles distant from each other. Marmont will not attack us, and I doubt whether I can attack him, even when I shall have taken the Salamanca forts: at all events, not before we shall have succeeded in that enterprise.

In answer to your letter of the 9th and 10th, I have to tell you, that I don't yet know that I shall have demands upon me for more than Don Carlos' troops, although I think it probable I shall for the troops in Galicia, from Castaños and from Monsalud, for the troops in Estremadura. You had better, therefore, keep the sum you propose, £370,000, disposable.

I can give caps and shoes to Doyle's regiment, but I have not great coats, knapsacks, or canteens. I shall desire Monsalud to supply them with caps and shoes from those I send to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 28th June, 1812

We took the forts of this place yesterday, two of them by storm, and the third by capitulation. It was stormed, however, at the very moment it capitulated. Marmont has retired, and we march forward to-morrow.

If you should find that Drouet separates his troops, or if he pretends to

G. O.

Salamanca, 28th June, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to Major Gen. Clinton, the General officers, officers, and soldiers composing the 6th division of infantry, and to Lieut. Col. May, and the officers and soldiers of the Royal British and Portuguese artillery, and to Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, and the officers and men of the Royal Engineers, employed in the siege of the forts in Salamanca, for their conduct during the late operations against these forts.

hold you in check with a smaller body of men than you think you can get the better of, fall upon him, but take care in doing so to keep a very large proportion of your troops in reserve.

P.S. Since writing this letter, I have received yours of the 25th. Fall upon the enemy if you can with advantage. I should prefer a partial affair to a general one; but risk a general affair, keeping always a very large body in reserve, particularly of cavalry, rather than allow Drouet to remain in possession of Estremadura, and to keep you in check.

Be assured of the correctness of the return of the 1st April, allowing always for the battalions known to be taken or absent.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812, 7½ P.M.

From all that I can learn, the greatest part of the enemy's army are at Alaejos and La Nava. One division has certainly gone to Toro, I believe the 1st; and I have a report that they marched last night at 12 against Silveira. We warned him, however, of their movement towards the Duero 3 days ago, and I hope he will be safe.

I propose to move to-morrow upon Alaejos.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 25th. I see no reason to alter the opinion which I formed, that it is desirable to Portugal that the Prince Regent should return to his European dominions, even to Lisbon.

I don't see what assistance it is proposed by Mr. Vansittart's memorandum to give. This appears to me to contain only another proposal for a bank, and new plans for paying or rather securing old debts; but none to relieve present difficulties. I shall object to every plan which is to fall upon the military chest of this army. We are not able to answer the demands upon us.

P.S. I don't know where the writer of Lord Castlereagh's memorandum found that I had increased the embodied militia from 15,000 to 40,000 for the defence of the frontiers. I recollect desiring that the militia of Silveira, which were embodied; of Trant, which, I believe, were not; and of Wilson, part of which were embodied, might be embodied and moved into Beira, in case the enemy crossed the Agueda in March, when I went to the siege of Badajoz. I never heard it pretended that this militia were 12,000, but the Sec. of State has them as 25,000! I suppose in the same manner as Senhor de Sousa has the army as 90,000. To serve this country and Great Britain really becomes too heavy a task.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 19th May, regarding Major Macleod. He is a very fine young man, for whom I entertain a very great respect and regard, and he conducted himself remarkably well in the siege of Badajoz, and was very useful in the preparations for that operation; and I think it not improbable that if he had not been wounded early in the siege, I should have had an opportunity of mentioning him in such a manner as that His Royal Highness would have thought proper to promote him, as well as others who were promoted on the same occasion.

The question is, whether I ought now to recommend him for promotion, and I will acknowledge that I feel a great bias in his favor, not only on his own account, but on account of his brother. But I don't think I ought to do so. Major Macleod is junior to many, even in his own corps, who have not been promoted, whose merit is distinguished, and who would complain, with reason, of injustice and partiality, if he were preferred to them upon the occasion of the siege of Badajoz at this late date.

I hope that he will soon recover and return to us; and you may depend upon it that there is no person more anxious for an opportunity of recommending his advancement than I am.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

The ammunition to enable us to carry on the attack of the forts having arrived at Salamanca in the afternoon of the 26th, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge of the redoubt of Los Cayetanos, in which a practicable breach was effected at about 10 o'clock in the morning of the 27th; and we had succeeded nearly about the same time in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of San Vicente, by the fire from which the approach to Los Cayetanos by its gorge was defended.

Being in Salamanca at this moment, I gave directions that the forts of Los Cayetanos and La Merced should be stormed; but some little delay occurred in consequence of the commanding officer of these forts in the first instance, and afterwards the commanding officer of San Vicente, having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours.

As it was obvious that these propositions were made in order to gain time till the fire in San Vicente should be extinguished, I refused to listen to any terms, unless the forts should be instantly surrendered; and having found that the commanding officer of Los Cayetanos, who was the first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependent upon the Governor of San Vicente, and could not venture to carry into execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, I gave directions that his fort and that of La Merced might be stormed forthwith.

These operations were effected in the most gallant manner by a detachment of the 6th division, under the command of Lieut. Col. Davis of the 36th regt., under the direction of Major Gen. Clinton.

The troops entered the fort of Los Cayetanos by the gorge, and escalated that of La Merced; and I am happy to add that our loss was but trifling.

The Governor of San Vicente then sent out a flag of truce to ratify the surrender of that fort on the terms I had offered him, viz., the garrison to march out with the honors of war; to be prisoners of war; and the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks: and notwithstanding that the 9th regt. of caçadores had actually stormed one of the outworks of San Vicente, and were in possession of it, I deemed it expedient to accept the fort by capitulation on those terms, and to stop the attack. I have already informed your Lordship that Major Gen. Clinton commanded the attack against these forts, which was carried on with great vigor and ability; and he mentions in strong terms of commendation the conduct of the General officers, officers, and troops employed

under his command; particularly Col. Hinde of the 32d regt., Lieut. Col. Davis of the 36th regt., Capt. Owen of the 61st regt., Brigade Major Hobart, and Ensign Newton of the 32d regt., who distinguished himself in the attack of the night of the 23d inst., and volunteered to lead the advanced party in the attack of the 27th. He likewise mentions in strong terms Lieut. Col. May, who commanded the artillery under the direction of Col. Framingham, and the officers and soldiers of the Royal and Portuguese artillery under his command, and Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, Lieut. Reid and the officers of the Engineers, and Major Thompson of the 74th regt., who acted as an engineer during these operations.

The enemy had been employed for nearly 3 years in constructing these works, but with increased activity for the last 8 or 9 months. A large expense had been incurred; and these works, sufficiently garrisoned by about 800 men, and armed with 30 pieces of artillery, were of a nature to render it quite impossible to take them, excepting by a regular attack; and it is obvious that the enemy relied upon their strength, and upon their being sufficiently garrisoned and armed; as they had left in San Vicente large depôts of clothing, and military stores of every description. I was mistaken in my estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue these forts; and I was obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition. This necessity occasioned a delay of 6 days.

The enemy withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes as soon as they heard of the fall of the forts of Salamanca; and I have ordered that the works at both places may be destroyed.

The operations against the forts of Salamanca were carried on in sight of Marshal Marmont's army, which remained in its position with the right at Cabeza Velloso, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th inst., when they broke up, and retired in three columns towards the river Duero; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas.* The allied army broke up the following day, and are this day encamped upon the Guareña.

We have various reports of reinforcements on their march to join the enemy, but none on which I can rely. I know from intercepted letters, that Marshal Marmont expects to be joined by a division of the army of the North, reported to have been at Burgos on the 24th; and it is reported that Gen. Bonet had withdrawn from the Asturias by San Andres, and was on his march likewise for the same purpose. It is also reported that Gen. Bonet had received a check in the Asturias, and had sustained the loss of a considerable number of men. If this last report be true, it will account for his withdrawing from the Asturias; in which province I have reason to believe, from the intercepted letters, that he had been ordered to maintain himself; and that these orders had proceeded from Paris.

By accounts from Estremadura of the 26th inst., it appears that the enemy still continued in the position which they had occupied in Estremadura; and Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill was in front of Albuera. It is obvious that they don't intend to attack him, and I have recommended to him to attack them, if he should deem his force sufficiently strong, and of a sufficiently good description to give a fair chance of success, rather

* See Appendix, No. XXII.

than allow them to keep him in check, and to remain in possession of a large part of the province of Estremadura.

I have not yet heard that Gen. Santocildes has commenced his attack upon Astorga. Gen. Cabrera is at Benavente with his division; and I understand there are Spanish troops in Leon. The Conde de Amarante has his infantry at Carvajales, and Brig. Gen. D'Urban had crossed the Duero below Zamora, in order to aid in intercepting the enemy's communication with Toro, before he heard of the fall of Salamanca. I have now desired him, however, to return across the Duero.

I have received no late intelligence from the south.

P.S. I enclose a return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army since my last dispatch.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing in the siege of the Forts of San Vicente, Los Cayetanos, and La Merced, and in the position on the heights of Villares, from the 16th to the 27th June, 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	6	5	104	28	115
Wounded	28	44	340	—	412
Missing	2	—	11	5	13

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

I omitted to report to your Lordship in my last dispatch the particulars of a very gallant affair of the cavalry in Estremadura, under the command of Lieut. Strenuwitz, the aide de camp of Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill having learnt that the enemy had left at Maguilla a great proportion of the soldiers who had been taken prisoners in Major Gen. Slade's affair of the 11th inst., sent Lieut. Strenuwitz on the 13th with a detachment consisting of 50 men of the 3d dragoon guards and Royal dragoons under the command of Lieut. Bridges of the Royal dragoons, to bring them in: on his arrival there, he found a detachment of French dragoons, consisting of 80 men, whom he attacked with such conduct and effect as to kill many, and to take prisoners one officer, 20 men, and 25 horses, with the loss of one man of his detachment killed.

I have frequently had occasion to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. Strenuwitz, and I am happy to have this fresh opportunity of doing so.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 4th June, in regard to the proposed alteration of the certificates intended to be granted for money expected to be borrowed in this country. I beg leave to remind your Lordship that it is intended to note the payment of each

half year's interest at the back of the certificate, so that it would not be possible for the holder to receive his interest both at head quarters and at Lisbon.

In regard to the other objection to the proposed alteration, viz., that it would be necessary to be prepared with money to pay the interest both at head quarters and at Lisbon, I have to observe that there would be no difficulty in settling with each holder of a certificate at what place the interest should be paid, even though the certificate should be drawn as I had proposed it should be altered.

It is desirable that there should be a place fixed at which the interest should be paid besides the head quarters of the army, in case the army should be withdrawn from the Peninsula.

It is not probable that either the Treasury or the military chest of the army would be called on to pay, within ten days, the whole amount of the sum of £500,000 sterling, to which the grant of these certificates is limited.

I am quite convinced that I shall never be able to impress on the minds of the people of this country, from whom I expected to derive some resources by the grant of these certificates, that they have any security for their money, if it is to be optional with the British authorities whether they are to be paid in the Peninsula or in England by bills, valuing the dollar at 5 shillings. None of these people can know the value of 5 shillings relatively with a dollar, or any other coin with which they are acquainted, and they will certainly lend nothing upon such a security. I don't propose, therefore, to make any use of these certificates.

At the same time I beg leave to point out to your Lordship how impossible it is to expect that this or any other army can carry on operations in Spain so ill supplied, as this is, with money. We can get nothing from the country without payment in ready money, and every day's march increases our distance from our magazines and the difficulty of communicating with them. The troops are 4 months in arrears of pay; the Staff of the army 6 months; and the muleteers nearly 12 months; and we are in debt for every article of supply, of every description.

I beg your Lordship to advert to the impossibility of remaining any length of time in the forward position which our successes have enabled us to assume, and to reflect upon the consequences which, under these circumstances, would result from any misfortune.

To Adm. Sir E. Pellew, Bart.

Alaejos, 1st July, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 13th May, and I have received one of the 20th of that month from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, from which I learn that his Lordship was about to detach to Mahon a force under the command of Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland, which, however, was not of the strength which his Lordship had at first expected he should be able to detach.

It is probable that this force will be by this time at Mahon, and that

G. O.

Alaejos, 1st July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the officers of the army to the following order given out on the 7th May, 1811, No. 1. (See vol. iv. p. 786.)

it will have been met at that post by the equipments and stores which I had sent from this country to Gibraltar, with a request to the Governor to have them repaired and put in order there (of which there is a general enumeration in the margin); and by 4 companies of British and Portuguese artillery, engineer officers, artificers, &c., who have likewise sailed to Gibraltar from Lisbon.

I trust also that the transports for the conveyance of the Spanish troops to their destination will have arrived at Alicante and in Majorca, and that Lieut. Gen. Maitland will find every thing prepared to enable him to commence his operations.

In regard to the plan of those operations, I still entertain the opinion which I did at first, viz., that the force is not sufficient to attack Barcelona; and that its first object should be to obtain possession of Tarragona, in order to secure a point of communication between the fleets under the command of your Excellency and the army in Catalonia. It is my opinion that that is all which our troops will be able to effect in Catalonia, and the rest of the plan of the Baron de Eroles, or of any other plan of internal warfare in that country, ought to be left to Gen. Lacy and the troops under his command.

But I think, that as soon as Tarragona shall be in our possession, and such temporary repairs shall have been given to the works as will secure them from a *coup de main*, and measures adopted for those repairs being effectually carried into execution, that part of the force, consisting of the troops from Sicily, Portugal, Majorca, and Alicante, ought to be re-embarked, and proceed to make an attack upon the city of Valencia.

Your Excellency will observe that I was always of opinion that this was the next object to the establishment of the communication by Tarragona, and circumstances have come to my knowledge lately which prove in the clearest manner that no blow could be so fatal to the interests of the French, or of King Joseph, as to deprive them of this city, and to renew the war in the kingdom of Valencia; and that no diversion, whether in Catalonia, Aragon, or elsewhere, will have the effect of inducing the enemy to relinquish, or will deprive them of their possession of that kingdom and its resources. It must be done, therefore, by a direct attack; and if the attack should first be made upon Tarragona, and the secret of the future plan of the operations of the allied forces is well kept, I entertain no doubt of success.

It would doubtless be a great object that Valencia should afterwards be kept, and that the allied force, under Lieut. Gen. Maitland, should be the foundation of our system for maintaining the war in the kingdom of Valencia and the eastern coast of the Peninsula, upon which points I shall communicate to your Excellency and Gen. Maitland my opinion hereafter, if I should find that the plan which I have above proposed is adopted, and if it should be decided that the force under Lieut. Gen. Maitland is to remain in the Peninsula during the winter.

After I wrote to your Excellency on the 16th April, I crossed the Tagus with the army, in order to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, which was effected by the enemy retiring across the Agueda in front of our army on the 24th of that month. It was necessary then to provide for the

subsistence of the garrison of that place for some time in advance, and by the time that object was effected, the season was so far advanced, that it was too late for our operations in the southern parts of the Peninsula. I therefore determined to direct them to this quarter; and in the mean time Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill struck a very brilliant and important blow on the enemy's bridge and establishments on the Tagus, at Almaraz, whereby the direct communication between their northern and southern armies was cut off.

We crossed the Agueda on the 13th June, near Ciudad Rodrigo, and invested the forts which the enemy had constructed at Salamanca on the 17th; and we took two of them by assault, and one by capitulation, on the 27th, in the presence of the enemy's whole army. They retired on the following day towards the Duero, and we have followed them to this point. We hear of their expecting reinforcements, but I have no accounts of any on which I can rely; and, upon the whole, it appears to me that they are as determined, as I am, not to fight an action in a disadvantageous situation.

From this outline of the state of affairs on this side of the Peninsula your Excellency will see what an important part the forces on the eastern side of the Peninsula have to perform.

I request your Excellency to communicate this letter to Lieut. Gen. Maitland, who, I conclude, will be near you when you will receive it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Villa Verde, 3d July, 1812, 5½ P.M.

I returned here about an hour ago, and received your letter of this day. I have for some time past been apprehensive that you would be under the necessity of confining yourself, in order to apply the remedies which may be necessary for your eye; but I cannot avoid feeling the utmost concern that this necessity should have become urgent at the present moment, and that I should now be deprived of your valuable assistance. I must, however, make up my mind to this loss; as, from what I have heard, I am apprehensive that no time is to be lost in applying the remedies to your eye, which are most likely to recover it.

I made our light infantry (the 60th) pass the Duero this day under the fire of our cannon, and I left them on the right of the river this afternoon. Notwithstanding the enemy's fire we had nobody hurt. The enemy,

G. O.

Villa Verde, 2d July, 1812.

1. * * * * *
- Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.
2. Lieut. —, of the —, is to be released from his arrest.
3. The Commander of the Forces has had reason frequently to urge the officers of the army to treat with respect the authorities of the country, and with kindness the people.
4. All must be sensible that no people will submit to be treated with contempt, particularly not those in authority; and there is no officer who is not aware that, in his own country, he dare not conduct himself towards either magistrates or people in the manner of which there are too frequent instances in this country.
5. Yet there are laws here to protect persons in authority from insult, as well as in England; and it is not generous or manly to take advantage of the good nature of the people, and of their gratitude for the services rendered to them by the army, to insult them.
6. The Commander of the Forces is determined that he will never pass, unnoticed, conduct of this description, and he hopes that Lieut. — will take warning from what has passed at this Court Martial, and from this reprimand, not to insult or amuse himself at the expense of the terrors of the people of the country in future.

about 8 battalions, took post on a height about a mile or more from the river, there being a plain between them and the river. I think we could have dislodged them; but it would have answered no purpose. The enemy are too near for us to keep the post, unless we should pass over the whole army; which it would not be desirable to do, till we shall have found at least one more passage for infantry. I have heard of another at Castro Nuño, which I have sent officers to look at.

I rather think, from the reports of this morning from the outposts, that Marmont, is about to move to his left; but it is impossible to say, as he changes his determination every hour. The infantry certainly moved in that direction this morning; but Stanhope* tells me, that upon the firing being heard, some were sent towards Pollos, who afterwards returned.

It appears certain that Marmont will not risk an action unless he should have an advantage; and I shall certainly not risk one unless I should have an advantage; and matters therefore don't appear likely to be brought to that criterion very soon. I am anxious to find passages of the Duero, in order to be able to take advantage of his detaching troops to look for provisions, &c.; and I wish to get him to abandon Tordesillas, or to destroy the bridge at that place. The possession of that place and of its bridge gives him great advantages. It is as near Salamanca almost as Toro, and nearer than Zamora; and we cannot move to the right or left without exposing our communications, so long as he has that bridge. I hope, however, to induce him to abandon it.

I am afraid that the 1st, 7th, and 4th divisions are encamped in an unwholesome situation, and I have desired De Lancey to write to have the two former at least encamped at Medina del Campo, getting their water from the wells of the town; and the latter I proposed to bring towards the centre at Foncastin. We wait for the report on the lower part of the Zapardiel, before the distribution is made. I propose to go to Rueda in the morning, to look more accurately at the ground in front of the bridge than I could yesterday; and I propose to establish head quarters there in order to be more in the way. I will call upon you in my way.

I have no news whatever from the army of Galicia, or from D'Urban, since the 30th.

The A.G. to Major Royal, Santarem, and Capt. Kipping, Coimbra. 3d July, 1812.

Herewith I enclose you a return of men invalided for England at the (Santarem and Coimbra) depôt; and as great inconvenience has arisen in arranging the accounts of invalids at the several hospital stations where invalided, it has been found expedient that these men should be forwarded to the depôt at Belem for the above purpose, preparatory to their embarkation for England. You will therefore be pleased to lose no time in taking the necessary steps to send *the whole* of the invalids at the station under your command to Belem, transmitting at the same time their accounts, or any other documents that may facilitate the final settlement of the accounts on their arrival at that place; and my former instructions to you on this head of service are, of course, cancelled.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

3d July, 1812.

Great difficulty having arisen in settling the accounts of the invalids at the

* Capt. the Hon. James Stanhope (brother of Earl Stanhope), aide de camp to Sir T. Graham.

depôts where they now are, as latterly proposed, I have the honor to acquaint you that the Commandants of the several hospital stations have received instructions from me to forward to Belem the whole of the men invalided for England (amounting to about 2000), transmitting at the same time their respective accounts, in order that this head of service may be facilitated as much as possible. Some delay having already existed in sending these men to England, I have to request you will give the necessary directions that the final settlement of their accounts may be made with the greatest expedition.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Rueda, 4th July, 1812, 9 P.M.

I have not yet received such accounts of the fords as to enable me to arrange a plan for the attack of the enemy's detachment opposite Pollos. The upper fords will certainly not answer. The enemy have shown a small detachment (150 men) at Valdestillas this day, which I imagine must have come from some of the garrisons. Sir Stapleton tells me this evening that the troops which marched yesterday to Valladolid have returned; but he does not say to what place; probably to Simancas.

I enclose a letter from Marmont to Drouet, of which I have the 3 copies. It appears that Bonet was at Aguilar de Campo;* which I take to be two long marches from Valladolid.

I have written to Adm. Martin to request him to send a vessel to Oporto to take you home; and to write to you to Oporto under cover to Governor Trant, to let you know on what day the vessel will have left the Tagus. As the post is not yet regularly established, and has not come in lately with regularity, I send this letter by a messenger.

Wishing you a pleasant journey, and the early recovery of your sight, believe me, &c.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 4th July, 1812.

I received this day by Col. Gordon your letter of the 16th June; and I assure you, that the arrangement by which you have been placed at the head of the War Department is perfectly satisfactory to me; and you will find that I shall correspond with you with the same freedom and confidence as I have with your predecessors.

You will be apprised of the state of affairs here, by my late letters to Lord Liverpool. Our principal and great want is money, with which I am afraid you cannot supply us sufficiently. But we are really in terrible distress; I am afraid, in greater distress than any British army has ever felt.

I hope that I am strong enough for Marmont at present, whatever force he may bring from the Asturias or the army of the North; but I am anxious to get Castaños' Galician corps forward, in order to establish myself well upon the Duero. If we cannot effect that object, we may be obliged to fall back.

* There is Aguilar de Campos, 10 leagues from Valladolid, north east from Medina de Rio Seco. Aguilar de Campo on the Pisuerga, in the province of Palencia, where Gen. Bonet appears to have been, is 23 leagues north from Valladolid.

A. G. O.

Rueda, 6th July, 1812.

1. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham having been under the necessity of quitting the army, on account of his health, Major Gen. H. Campbell is appointed to command the 1st division of infantry till further orders.

To. — — —.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

At a time when I have other important subjects to think of, it is very unpleasant to me to be obliged to write to you on the conduct of Capt. — — — towards Mr. **** and Mr., of the Commissariat.

It appears that Mr. having refused to issue rations twice in one day to Capt. — — —'s servants, was sent for by Capt. — — —; and being then employed by Mr. ****, this gentleman desired that Capt. — — — might be informed he could not then attend him. Capt. — — — then went to Mr. ****'s department, and in presence of Mr. ****, put Mr. in arrest for not attending him, notwithstanding that Mr. **** assured him that Mr. was actually employed by him in the public service.

The Commissariat is a public department, under the particular charge and direction of the Commissary Gen. and his officers; and no officer of the army, be his rank what it may, has a right as a matter of course to interfere in its duties. I don't mean to say that the General officers and their Staff are not to superintend the performance of their duties by the officers of all the departments of the army attached to the particular division of troops placed under their command; but the duty of a General and his Staff in respect to these departments is confined to superintendence; he cannot give directions, because he is not responsible for the performance of the duty of the department; and when his interference goes beyond superintendence, he is liable to be thrown upon his own justification.

Now if the conduct of Capt. — — — is tried by this plain and simple rule, he will be found highly deserving of blame. I know of no right that Capt. — — — had to order the attendance of Mr. to give an account why rations had not been issued to his servants. If he has that right, every officer in the division has the same; and if all are to exercise it, and all are to call for Mr.'s attendance when they please, what is to become of the issues to the division? It is clear that he had no such right; and it follows of course, that he exceeded his authority when he placed Mr. in arrest for not obeying this improper command to attend him.

But this is not all. He went to the Commissariat, and in presence of the Deputy Commissary Gen., who ordered Mr. not to attend him, placed Mr. in arrest. There is certainly no relation of rank between the officers of the Commissariat and the officers of the army; but (putting out of the question the unmanly proceeding of putting in arrest a clerk, who it appeared had acted, and was acting under the orders of his immediate principal) it was a most irregular proceeding to put him in arrest in the presence of his principal of the rank of Deputy Commissary Gen., who very properly, in my opinion, ordered him out of arrest.

I am very much concerned to be obliged to do any thing unpleasant to Capt. — — —, who is an officer for whom I entertain a very high respect; but his conduct has been of such an improper description on this occasion, that if he does not make an apology for it, I must remove him from his situation on the Staff, and send him to join his regiment.

I enclose you Mr. ****'s report on this transaction; and I am sorry to say that I differ with you upon it. But I must act upon my own views, or I can't carry on the service; and I only hope that Capt. — — — will

have the good sense to see the impropriety of his conduct, and make that atonement for it which every man who is aware that he has conducted himself improperly, ought to make.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

I enclose a letter from the Commissary Gen. in regard to the supplies demanded by the Portuguese government in this month, enclosed in your letter of the 23d June, from which you will see that all the supplies will be given, and at what places.

In regard to money, I know that we have absolutely *none*.

I expect some from England, of which I shall take care that a proportion, when it does arrive, shall be given to the Portuguese government. I have written repeatedly to England to make known our distresses.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

I observe from your letter of the 13th June to the Sec. of State, that His Royal Highness does not approve of the mode in which I have carried into execution the plan for raising Spanish recruits for this army. The fact is, that I adopted it because any other that was preferred might be adopted in lieu of it; and I suspected what has turned out to be the case, that we should get but few or no recruits. We have not got enough in the whole army to form one company; and I am sorry to add that some have deserted.

If His Royal Highness wishes the plan to be altered, and additional companies to be added to each regiment, it can be done the moment I shall receive the notification of his pleasure.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Adm. Sir E. Pellew, and the copy of one which I have written to him on the plan of operations to be adopted on the eastern coast of the Peninsula.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

I am concerned to have to inform you, that Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, having for some time suffered from a disorder in his eyes, has at last been obliged to quit the army, and to return to England in order to apply the remedies which are thought necessary.

I have every reason to regret the loss of the assistance of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham at this moment.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

The army broke up from the encampment on the Guareña on the morning of the 1st inst., and the enemy having retired from Alaejos, encamped on the Trabancos, with the advanced guard at La Nava del Rey. Having heard that the enemy had destroyed the bridge of Tordesillas, and knowing, from intercepted letters, that Marshal Marmont intended to take a position near this town, our advanced guard crossed the Zapardiel, and moved upon Rueda on the morning of the 2d, supported by the left of the army, while the right and centre moved towards Medina del Campo. The

enemy, however, had not destroyed the bridge over the Duero, as reported; and the main body of the army had retired upon Tordesillas, leaving the rear guard at Rueda.

Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton immediately attacked the rear guard with Major Gen. Anson's and Major Gen. V. Alten's brigades of cavalry, and drove them in upon the main body at Tordesillas. As the right and centre of the army were at a considerable distance, I could not bring up a sufficient body of troops in time to attack the enemy during their passage of the Duero; and they effected that operation without material loss, and took their position on that river with their right on the heights opposite Pollos, their centre at Tordesillas, and their left at Simancas on the Pisuerga.

I moved our left to Pollos on the 3d, and obtained possession of the ford over the Duero at that place. But as the ford was scarcely practicable for infantry, and the enemy's corps was strongly posted with a considerable quantity of cannon on the heights which command the plain, on which the troops must have formed after crossing the ford; and as I could not establish the army on the right of the Duero till I should have adequate means of passing the river, I did not think it proper to push our troops farther. We have since been employed in endeavors to discover the fords of the Duero, which are in general but imperfectly known; and are waiting till they become practicable for infantry. By that time I hope that the army of Galicia, under Gen. Santocildes, will have been able to advance, the siege of Astorga having been brought to a conclusion. The fire against that place opened on the 2d inst., but I have not heard with what effect; and I have recommended to Gen. Santocildes to leave a small body of troops to continue the siege, and to move forward with the remainder.

Lieut. Gen. the Conde de Amarante remains at Carvajales, and Brig. Gen. D'Urban is with his cavalry in rear of the enemy's right flank at Castromonte. The guerrilla Marquinez is at Palencia.

Gen. Bonet was at Aguilar de Campo in the end of last month, and orders have been sent to him to join the army. As many copies of these orders have been intercepted, it is doubtful whether he has received them; and I have not heard of his moving. There are no accounts of the movement of the troops of the army of the North.

By the last accounts from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, of the 1st inst., he was about to move to attack Gen. Drouet, whose force he considered inferior to that under his command.

The A.G. to M. le Général de la Martinière.

7th July, 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter with the sum of 3000 francs for M. Duchemin, which shall be immediately forwarded to Lisbon for that officer, with particular directions to be remitted to him in England should he already have left Lisbon. In compliance with the request contained in your communication, the serjeant is sent agreeably to the proposed exchange. With regard to the further exchange of officers, I am directed by his Excellency Marshal the Earl of Wellington to acquaint you that from the time that has elapsed since the garrisons of the forts of Salamanca were conducted to Lisbon, his Excellency is apprehensive that prior to this period they have been embarked for England; but, at the same time, arrangements will be made for exchanging the French officers proposed in your letter on their arrival in England, should it meet the wishes of Marshal the Duc de Raguse to send in Capt. — and Lieut. — (the former of whom has been conceived for some time past to labor under mental derange-

ment). His Excellency would feel much pleasure in acceding to the exchange submitted for M. Duchemin; but he is not aware of the regular cartel upon occasions of this nature. The Earl of Wellington will, however, most willingly embrace the first opportunity of promoting any exchange upon a regular basis for that officer. 168 dollars and the baggage of Capt. — are sent in by the flag of truce.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 8th July, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 4th. If Drouet is reinforced, you will of course resume the old position. If you should find that the enemy propose to make the siege of Badajoz, after they shall have got their reinforcements, and shall have dislodged you from Albuera, you must prepare to take the position on the hill of S^{ta} Engracia, and keep your communication by Campo Maior.

The enemy have got into a strong situation on the other side of the Duero, from which we cannot dislodge them till the river shall fall.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Rueda, 8th July, 1812, 5 P.M.

I learn from Pollos that cannon and carriages, escorted by troops, were passing through San Roman, on the road to Toro, from 10 to 12 last night, the numbers of either cannon or troops not stated.

In a report from Tordesillas, it is stated that 8000 men had marched in that direction last night; but this is stated only as a report. It is necessary to have a good look out kept this night upon the Adaja. Have we any thing at Puente de Duero, or any communication with the guerrilla who is there? Let me know every thing that passes as soon as possible.

As I see that Palombini's division, expected from the army of the North, had not arrived at Valladolid this morning, I am inclined to suspect that the movement towards Toro, if it is of more than carriages, has nothing to do with us, but is directed against Santocildes at Astorga. However, it is as well to be prepared to collect our troops; and I have directed that the baggage and Commissariat may be pushed out of the town this night.

I am going towards Pollos to see whether they have made any further discovery of fords, and shall be back between 8 and 9.

P.S. Show this to Beresford.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Rueda, 8th July, 1812.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday.

The enemy have got into a very strong position beyond the Duero, to which we cannot look till there shall be more fords in the river.

Sir R. Hill tells me that Soult is about to reinforce Drouet still further, and that they talk of the siege of Badajoz. This would ruin every thing. I have given him directions what to do, and I think he may prevent the siege; but if Drouet should be reinforced, it is very desirable that Ballesteros should act.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Rueda, 9th July, 1812.

I have made no alteration in our position since you left us; and the French have continued in their positions on the fords, which it is impossible to cross as long as they hold them in such strength. Indeed it would

not answer to cross the river at all in its present state, unless we should be certain of having the co-operation of the Galician troops.

I understand that there was a breach in Astorga yesterday, but I doubt the inclination of the Spaniards to storm it.

Bonet has joined; and on the evening of the 7th the enemy made a movement to their right, and Foy's division arrived at Toro yesterday. I have not heard that any other troops moved in that direction, and I believe not.

I see by an intercepted letter that Marmont was a little uneasy at the progress of the Galicians and Silveira, and it is probable that these movements are the cause of Foy's; but, at all events, I propose to move 2 divisions to La Nava del Rey this evening, in case the enemy should entertain any design of striking upon our communication.

I have an intercepted letter from Marmont to a Gen. Palombini, who is coming by Aranda de Duero to join him from the army of the North. He had not arrived at Aranda on the 7th.

Marmont has dismounted his infantry officers in order to remount dragoons. If he takes all the horses, he may get 700; but in a letter from Valladolid I see that he gets 400.

I hope that you bear your journey well.

P.S. I send this to the Governor of Almeida, with a request that he will send it to meet you at Barca d'Alva; and if you should have passed that place, that he should send it to Oporto.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 9th July, 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 24th June, and I don't delay to answer it, as it is possible that there may be an opportunity of sending this letter from Lisbon before the next packet will sail.

You will have seen from my dispatch of the 7th (No. 1) that Sir T. Graham has been obliged to quit the army, but I must inform you that it is his determination to return, if he should save one of his eyes. You will be able to learn whether this is probable, and will judge according to what you will hear upon this point; and, regarding the period of his absence, whether it is expedient to make any and what arrangement to fill his station.

In regard to the first arrangement to which you have adverted, I have no objection to it, excepting that it would mortify Sir Stapleton exceedingly. It would likewise be necessary to supersede — — —, upon whose *sanity*, I am sorry to say, much reliance cannot be placed. He deprived us of many of the advantages which would have resulted from Sir R. Hill's expedition to the Tagus in May; and it is impossible to trust to his judgment in any critical case.

In regard to the second arrangement, I have to inform you that I don't believe Lord W. Bentinck will come to Spain; at least, if he does, it will not be till a late period in the season. Besides, in case the event should occur for which you wish to provide, you could send an officer from England who would reach the army as soon as Lord W. Bentinck could from the eastern coast.

In respect to the third arrangement, I have a great regard for, and enter-

tain a very high opinion of, Sir E. Paget; but I think it probable that he would not come, on the chance of Sir T. Graham returning to the army.

Considering that Sir W. Beresford is here, and would naturally have considerable influence in the conduct of the operations, I acknowledge that, although ——— is not exactly the person I should select to command an army, I don't think any evil would result from his holding the command for a short time, till you could make a permanent arrangement. However, I shall be perfectly satisfied with any arrangement you may make.

Since I wrote my dispatch of the 7th, Bonet has joined the army; and I have a letter from Marmont to Gen. Palombini, directing him to move quickly from Aranda de Duero to Valladolid, with the troops of the army of the North under his command. He is an Italian, and I don't believe his troops are of the best kind. Indeed, it appears, from letters from Marmont to the King, that he does not feel great confidence in them; but these letters are written in the Paris cipher, of which we have not been able to discover the key.

Marmont has taken the horses from the officers of the army to remount the cavalry. This resource, if he carries the arrangement into execution strictly, will give him 700 additional cavalry. He has heard of the siege of Astorga, and of the collection of force in that direction; and he detached a division towards Toro and Zamora on the night before last, to acquire a knowledge of what was going on, I believe. This division has been replaced in his line by that of Bonet.

I hear that a breach was open at Astorga on the 7th, but I fear that the Spaniards will not storm it. If they do not, the Governor will not surrender.

I have a letter from Hill of the 4th. Drouet had retired to Ribera, as I expected he would; but it is reported that additional reinforcements have been sent to him, in which case Hill will be obliged to retire upon Albuera. But I have no idea that the French will be strong enough in Estremadura to make any impression upon Hill.

They talk of preparing a train at Seville to lay siege to Badajoz; but that appears impossible, unless they should be able to beat Hill out of the field.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 9th July, 1812.

Since I wrote my letter this day, I have received one from Sir R. Hill of the 5th, from Bienvenida. The French had retired that day from Usagre, and their rear guard was at Llera. They will certainly now retire entirely into Cordova.

The A.G. to Officers commanding at hospital stations.

10th July, 1812.

I have the honor to inform you that his Excellency the Commander of the Forces has determined that no more than 12 men shall be allowed as a guard for any hospital station; and that if it should not be found practicable to keep the men in hospital without a sentry at every door, that the doors should be locked. You will therefore make the best arrangements you can, and see that no man is detained at your station who is fit to do his duty in the field.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Rueda, 11th July, 1812, 9 A.M.

I have had no account from Toro since yesterday at 12 at noon. A part

of Foy's troops, about 800, had then moved in this direction, and the remainder were at Toro. Very few, if any, had passed the river; and those which had passed had done so only for plunder. They were repairing the bridge.

The enemy yesterday morning moved a body of troops, about 5 battalions, from the camp opposite Pollos to their right, and we were informed in the evening that these had halted at San Roman, which place is about two miles from Castro Nuño, on the road towards Toro. I desired Don Julian's officer at Castro Nuño to report to you any event at that place, to which it will be necessary for you to attend. Send a Staff officer over to Castro Nuño, and let me know the distance from Alaejos, the kind of road, country, &c. Yesterday evening the enemy moved about a division of infantry from Tordesillas to the camp opposite Pollos, as well as I could judge; and about the same number from their left to Tordesillas. I have not yet received the morning reports from Pollos, but I believe matters are there in the state in which I left them last night. They are so at Tordesillas.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 11th July, 1812.

I enclose a letter which I received yesterday evening from the Marques de Monsalud, containing the decipher of a letter from the King to the Comte d'Erlon.* I wish that the Marques had sent the ciphered letter here, or at least an accurate copy of the decipher, as in this letter there are some faults of spelling, &c. and it appears to me that the whole letter is too loosely worded to be intended as a military order. It is, besides, in its present form, not consistent with the King's orders to Drouet, of which Lord FitzRoy sent you a deciphered copy on the 23d June.

It is necessary, however, that I should give you some directions for your guidance in case that Drouet, finding that he cannot march over you, according to the King's orders of the 31st May, should cross the Tagus, according to those of the 21st June. Much will depend upon the force with which Drouet will cross the Tagus, and the description of it. If he takes across with him all the cavalry he has, you must send across the whole of the 2d division of cavalry, with the exception of one British and 3 Portuguese regiments: if he should take across only one brigade of cavalry, you must send one brigade across, Gen. Slade's, and the 2d hussars. If he should take across the Tagus 2 or 3 divisions of infantry, you must send across the following troops: Major Gen. Howard's and Col. Byng's brigades of the 2d division, and Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division. All these troops must cross by the bridge of Alcantara, respecting which you must give timely directions to have it put down. They are then to march by the pass of Perales and Guinaldo upon Ciudad Rodrigo, where they will receive further orders from me.

The station for the troops which will remain in Estremadura must depend partly upon the strength which the enemy will leave in the province, and partly upon considerations of health. The high grounds about Zafra are the most healthy; but if, on account of the strength of the enemy in the province, the troops cannot remain there, they must be

* Lieut. Gen. Drouet.

brought back towards Badajoz, &c. It will be necessary that you should superintend the movement of these troops till they shall come within my reach, and then that you should return, and continue in charge in Estremadura.

It is not impossible but that the King may meditate an invasion of Portugal along the valley of the Tagus by Plasencia, as I see that they are very busy at Madrid constructing boats, &c. In order to guard against this, therefore, it might be expedient that those troops destined, according to these directions, to remain in Estremadura, when the others shall come into Castille, should move by easy marches to Caceres, when the others shall move upon Alcantara, and should remain there till Drouet shall have quitted the valley of the Tagus. If the King should attempt to penetrate by the valley of the Tagus, you must defend the passages of the Alagon, if you should not be in time to prevent the enemy from passing the Tietar; in this case you will bring your whole force across the Tagus, with the exception of the garrison regiments, leaving Estremadura to the care of the Marques de Monsalud.

P.S. There is a regiment of Portuguese cavalry in the valley of the Tagus, under the command of Col. Diggins, and three very good battalions of militia in Lower Beira, under the command of Brig. Gen. Le Cor.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Rueda, 12th July, 1812, 5 P.M.

By a letter just received from Toro, of 11 last night, I find that Foy having left that place, had returned there in the evening with part of his force, and that the work at the bridge proceeded but slowly. At the same time, all the intelligence and the enemy's movements lead to a belief that their intention is to cross the Duero at that place.

You will see my intentions from the Q. M. G.'s instructions of this day. I have ordered Gen. Bradford's brigade to Castro Nuño, which will give us ample time to collect upon our left.

I write to Don Carlos to desire that any correspondent at Toro may be directed to write to you.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Rueda, 12th July, 1812.

In reference to Dom M. Forjaz's question regarding the post horses at Thomar, Cabaços, Espinhal, and Foz d'Arouçe, I have to acquaint you that Major Scovell has discontinued to advance the payment of their maintenance in consequence of their services not being required for the communications of the army; but of course it rests with the Portuguese government to decide upon the propriety of keeping up this establishment. He has also ceased to advance the pay for the support of 4 horses of the 10 kept at Golegão, in consequence of the line by Thomar being no longer necessary, that by Abrantes being considered fully sufficient for the purposes of the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 13th July, 1812, 1 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst., 9 A.M., and you will have observed from my letter of yesterday that I had anticipated the report

expected from you, that Drouet would march in this direction. The King, from accounts received last night, appears to be collecting a large force at Madrid, particularly in cavalry, and I am apprehensive that, after all, the enemy will be too strong for me; but we shall see. Don't let any time be lost unnecessarily.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 14th July, 1812.

Gen. Bonet joined the enemy on the evening of the 7th inst., and they have since extended to their right as far as Toro, where they have been actively employed in repairing the bridge which they had before destroyed. It is generally reported that they propose to cross the Duero at that point, when they are reinforced by the troops expected from the armies of the North and Centre.

In regard to the reinforcements from the army of the North, I have reason to believe that Gen. Caffarelli has altered his intention of sending them. Marshal Marmont certainly expected a division under Gen. Palombini, which had been detached from the army of Aragon, at Aranda de Duero, in the beginning of this month, but they have not yet arrived there, and I understand have marched towards the Ebro. The King has, however, given orders for the collection of the army of the Centre at Madrid, and he has abandoned all the posts occupied by that army in La Mancha, and those in the valley of the Tagus.

The posts of Avila and Mombeltran, and all those destined for the preservation of the communication between the '*Armée de Portugal*' and the army of the Centre, have likewise been abandoned by his orders, and the troops have marched to Madrid, in order to enable him to take from thence a body of troops.

I have not any account on which I can rely, of the strength of the army of the Centre. It has been stated to be lately as 19,000 men, of which 5000 cavalry. But this account is much exaggerated, or many of the troops must be Spanish *Juramentados*.

The King has besides ordered Gen. Drouet to join him with a body of troops to be taken from Estremadura; and from the late movements of that General, I conclude that he has received those orders, and is about to cross the Tagus with a corps of 10,000 men, and to join the army of the Centre.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill broke up from Albuera on the 2d inst., and moved upon the enemy, who retired before him towards Cordova. His last letter is of the 9th, from Llerena; and at that time part of the enemy's force had marched upon Fuente Ovejuna from Berlanga; and Gen. Drouet with 10,000 men, with a very small proportion of artillery, had marched through Campillo upon Zalamea.

Sir R. Hill has been informed of the King's order, that Gen. Drouet should cross the Tagus and join the army of the Centre, and he has marched after him; and I ordered him to detach a force to join this army, proportionate to that which Gen. Drouet should take with him across the Tagus, as soon as I was made acquainted with the King's order to Gen. Drouet.

I have no authentic account of the siege of Astorga of a later date than

the 5th inst., at which period Gen. Santocildes, who was conducting that operation, entertained no hopes of bringing it to an early termination, and he expected to be in want of ammunition. It is reported that there are two breaches in the place; but I am apprehensive that there is no foundation for these reports.

The enemy's position on the Duero is very strong, and their army is sufficient to occupy it. On their right they have the strong places of Zamora and Toro, which cannot be taken excepting by a regular attack. Their left rests upon the Pisuerga, which is not fordable any where. They have a fortified post at Simancas, where there is a bridge over that river, and they have fortified, and have a garrison in Valladolid, where there is another bridge. They occupy with their army, and nearly 100 pieces of cannon, the bridge of Tordesillas, and the heights which command the fords of the Duero, from Toro to the Pisuerga.

It is obvious that we could not cross the river without sustaining great loss, and could not fight a general action under circumstances of greater disadvantage than those which would attend the attack of the enemy's position on the Duero. In truth, the enemy's numbers are equal, if not superior to ours; they have in their position twice the amount of the artillery which we have, and we are superior in cavalry alone, which arm, it is probable, could not be used in the attack we should have to make.

I have again written to suggest the expediency that the siege of Astorga should be carried on by those troops only which are necessary for the operation, and that the remainder of the army of Galicia should be brought forward to the Esla; but in the mean time, I have deemed it expedient to order Gen. D'Urban to cross the Duero, and join the army with the Portuguese cavalry, in order to be more equal to the enemy in that important arm, even though the King should not join the '*Armée de Portugal*' with a reinforcement from the army of the Centre.

I expect that the 5th, 38th, and 82d regts. will join the army in the course of the next 3 weeks; and there are not less than 2000 recruits and convalescents on the road. But at this season of the year it is impossible to rely upon the fitness for service of troops just arrived, or recovered from sickness, after such a march. I likewise hope that the detachment from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's corps will be near us almost as soon as Gen. Drouet can join the army of the Centre.

I have this day received a letter from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, of the 9th June, in which he has enclosed the copy of one of the same date to the Earl of Liverpool, from which I am concerned to observe that his Lordship does not propose to carry into execution the operations on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, which had been in contemplation, until he shall have tried the success of another plan on the coast of Italy. I am apprehensive that this determination may bring upon us an additional force of the army of Aragon, but I still hope that I shall be able to retain at the close of the campaign those acquisitions which we made at its commencement.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 14th July, 1812.

I have but little to add to my official dispatch of this day. The deter

mination of ——— to land in Italy is a great disappointment to me. His arrival upon the Eastern coast at this moment, which would have been certain, would have relieved me effectually. He would have taken Tarragona, and most probably Valencia, and we should have made a glorious campaign of it altogether. His success in this Peninsula, or even his appearance here, would have had permanent good effects. I hope that he has decided right, and that he will be successful where he is going; but I cannot believe that the French will allow 15,000 British and Neapolitan troops to remain in Italy; and I am apprehensive that, however successful he may be at first, he will eventually be obliged to embark.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst.

I concur entirely with you respecting the expediency of Gen. Ballesteros carrying on his operations at present on the side of Gibraltar.

It is true that I at one time preferred that he should be in the Condado de Niebla; and I think it not improbable that occasions might occur in which it might be possible to concert an operation with more advantage between his corps and the allied troops in Estremadura if he were in the Condado de Niebla, than it is, his troops being in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. But it must be observed that the great object of all, the safety of Gen. Ballesteros' corps, is best provided for in his station near Gibraltar. From the activity of his operations likewise, and the greater scope there is for them from Gibraltar than from Niebla, I think it very doubtful whether they could be carried on with so much advantage from any station on the right of the Guadalquivir.

From the information received of the strength of the French army of the South, and from the account which you transmitted in your letter of the 12th June of the nature of the enemy's works at Seville, I consider it quite certain that Gen. Ballesteros could not gain possession of the Carthusian convent, and he would have no chance of entering the city from the right of the Guadalquivir. All that we can expect from Gen. Ballesteros is, that he should, by his operations, prevent as many of the enemy as he can from quitting Andalusia to carry their operations into Estremadura. They must maintain the blockade of Cadiz; they must have garrisons in Seville, and in their works on the Guadalete; and likewise one in Malaga, if Gen. Ballesteros should remain where he is, and a corps of observation on his movements. I should hope that, after providing for those services, they would not have the power of detaching into Estremadura such a number as would overpower Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

An attack upon Seville is doubtless the operation in Andalusia which is most likely to have decided effect; but that should not be undertaken which the evidence before us proves cannot be accomplished. We must not lose in an undertaking of this description such a corps as that under the command of Gen. Ballesteros; and if we cannot undertake that operation, of which the successful result would have the most decided effects, we must others, of which the success is more easily attainable, although the advantage to be derived will be smaller.

These general principles will be perfectly understood; and I am convinced that Gen. Ballesteros will do every thing in his power to prevent the enemy from detaching largely to Estremadura, particularly now that I have been obliged to order a detachment of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's troops across the Tagus.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 2d; and I enclose one for Sir E. Pellew, which I beg you to peruse and forward.

Lord W. Bentinck's decision is fatal to the campaign, at least at present. If he should land *any where* in Italy, he will, as usual, be obliged to re-embark; and we shall have lost a golden opportunity here.

I have an intercepted letter, stating that the King would collect 12,000 men, of which 6 regiments are cavalry.

Castañón tells me he has ordered the Galician army to Benavente; but I have no account of it from Santocildes.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

I have just received your letter of the 8th, and I return the estimates for July. I have not yet heard of the money expected from England. Till it arrives I can give nothing.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this subject to Lord Castlereagh, as I have to Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst. War cannot be carried on without money. We are to find money as we can, at the most economical rate of exchange, and then comes Lord W. Bentinck to Gibraltar, and carries off four millions of dollars, giving one shilling for each more than we give; and after all, he sends his troops upon some scheme to some part of Italy, and not to the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, as ordered by government, and arranged with me.

I have never been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if the government don't attend seriously to the subject, and adopt some measures to supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government are a joke to ours, and if our credit were not better, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don't find means of paying our bills for butchers' meat, there will be an end to the war at once.

I have not leisure to go through the returns; but there never was any thing so fallacious as the statement of 45,000 militia in arms in March and April, or 25,000 at other times. The whole militia are now disbanded, excepting 4 battalions with Silveira, 3 battalions in Almeida, and about 4000 men in the garrison of Alentejo. I fully believe that the establishments would not amount to half the number of 25,000, and the effectives to be paid, not to one quarter of it. I shall speak to Sir W. Beresford on the subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

I enclose a letter from Adm. Martin, from which you will see that he

was to send the *Peterel* to Oporto for your use on the 9th. I think it probable that that ship will have arrived before you will.

Since my last Marmont has continued to reinforce his right to Toro, and at last, this morning, has moved every thing from opposite Pollos. I came here last night, and have not yet received the reports from Tordesillas. The enemy have continued to repair the bridge of Toro, and Marmont was there yesterday. Astorga is not taken, but I believe Santocildes is at Benavente. It is impossible to communicate with him excepting by a very circuitous route. Either the Galician army have induced Marmont to collect his troops near Toro, or he has heard that the King is collecting the army of the Centre at Madrid; and he threatens our left and our communications in order to prevent us from molesting the King. I should think that he would do the business more effectually by his left. But he would then leave the communication open between Santocildes and us.

The King has ordered Drouet to cross the Tagus, and we thought some days ago that he was about to obey that order. But by a letter from Hill of the 12th, from Llerena, just received, I find they have sent to Zalamea 3 regiments of infantry and a small body of cavalry; the main body of the army having retired into Cordova.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

I have just received your letter of the 12th, and I hope that, being convinced that the enemy were not carrying into execution the King's orders of the 23d June, you will not have detached the troops, notwithstanding my orders of the 11th and 13th. I have this day got a letter from the King to Marmont of the 9th, in cipher, which I cannot entirely decipher; it appears, however, that he thinks that Drouet cannot cross the Tagus, and I suspect that he has ordered Gen. Treillard to collect some troops in the valley of the Tagus, and to move up by Plasencia.

I think it desirable, therefore, at all events, that Gen. Campbell's Portuguese and Col. Byng's British brigades, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, should move in the direction of Merida, and there remain. Let Gen. Campbell put himself in communication with Col. Diggens, who is at Plasencia with a regiment of Portuguese cavalry; and if he should find the enemy advancing in that direction, he is to move by Caceres or Alcantara (to order the bridge to be laid for himself), to cross the Tagus, and beat Treillard, if he is sufficiently strong; if he is not, he will retire before

G. O.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the Commissariat, attached to divisions and brigades of infantry and to regiments of cavalry, and of the General officers of the army, and commanding officers of regiments, to the orders which have been issued regarding the cutting of forage.

2. He desires that whenever it is possible, grass may be given to the horses and other animals, instead of straw with corn in the ear.

3. The Assist. Provosts must be employed to prevent the plunder of the corn fields, and their destruction by turning cattle into them.

4. In consequence of the number of foreign troops serving in the allied army, the practice of giving out a parole or countersign has been discontinued; but all out sentries and videttes should be particularly instructed to allow no person whatever to pass their post after night-fall.

5. All persons attempting to pass their post should be stopped till the guard can be turned out, and each person can be examined. This order is referrible of course only to the out sentries.

him on Castello Branco, and thence into the strong country between the Tagus and the Zezere: if he should retire beyond Castello Branco, he will order the bridge of Villa Velha to be taken up, and floated gradually down the river. Let Gen. Campbell take Col. Diggins under his orders, if he should cross the Tagus.

I am not quite certain that Treillard will not cross the Tagus and join Drouet; but if that should be the case, Gen. Campbell cannot be better placed than at Merida, neither can he be better placed than at Merida if Drouet should carry into execution the King's orders of the 23d June. Drouet cannot, at all events, cross the Guadiana by Medellin. It will be necessary that some of your cavalry should attend Gen. Campbell's movement, but they need not stay with him, as he will find cavalry on the right of the Tagus. It may be a question whether you ought to stay so far forward as Llerena when you shall send away Gen. Campbell, of which you must be the best judge: of course, if Drouet should cross the Tagus, you will do as directed in my letter of the 11th July, and it will be particularly necessary to attend to that part of it which relates to the force to come to Caceres, in case of Treillard becoming part of the game with Drouet in the valley of the Tagus.

Remember that the bridge of Alcantara takes time to be prepared for the passage of troops.

P.S. Marmont has collected his troops about Toro, with what object I don't know; but we have rather drawn in our right.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812, 7 A.M.

The only alteration which I wish to make in your instructions, in consequence of the enemy's great movement to their right, and the movement which we made yesterday evening, is, that in case the enemy should cross the river at Toro, or the fords below Castro Nuño, you should move at once upon Fuente la Peña with the 6th division, and 2 regiments of Gen. Le Marchant's brigade. I will order the 7th division to follow you as soon as the other troops from the right shall approach Alaejos. You should endeavor to get some peasants to watch what passes at the bridge of Toro at night, and desire Lieut. Shanahan to do the same. These movements of Marmont are certainly intended to divert our attention from the army of the Centre, which is collecting at Madrid; if he knows of this circumstance, which I doubt.

I have a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 9th June. He had sent the 1st division of the expedition to Minorca, and the 2d division was about to go to Sardinia; but neither of them destined for the operations concerted on the eastern coast of the Peninsula. He has determined in lieu thereof to try his fortune in Italy with 15,000 men, instead of 6000 which he was to send into Spain. I hope he will succeed; but I doubt it. There is no solid foundation for his plan. He has not even fixed the degrees of latitude for his operations, much less the place of his landing, nor arranged any of the circumstances which ought to be settled before such a service should be entered on. The French cannot have less than 15,000 men in Italy, and I fear that he will be obliged to re-embark. If he were again to alter his determination, and now to appear upon the coast of Spain,

I believe the army of the Centre would do us but little harm ; at the same time that he would succeed in his objects.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 9 A.M.

Since I wrote to you I have heard from Gen. Picton that the enemy have withdrawn entirely from opposite Pollos a very large body of cavalry in the morning early, and their infantry at about $7\frac{1}{2}$, and marched in the direction of Toro.

I am anxious to hear from you what movements they have made on their left.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812, 6 P.M.

Gen. Picton has informed me at 9 $\frac{1}{2}$, that the enemy had sent a battalion and a few cavalry out of the wood of Cubillas to the heights opposite his left.

I have just now heard from Gen. D'Urban, who commands about 800 or 900 Portuguese cavalry, which have hitherto been in the rear of the enemy ; but thinking they could be more useful on this side of the Duero, I desired him to cross the river ; and he is to be this night in the wood of El Piñero, which you will see in the map about a league south from Benialbo, and about the same distance east by north from Fuentes Preadas, on our left of the Val-de-finjas road. I wish you would communicate with him this night through Lieut. Shanahan. The officer at Val-de-finjas might also communicate with him.

Let Gen. D'Urban know that I wish him to be on our left of the Val-de-finjas road, observing the enemy's movements from the neighbourhood of Toro, and keeping his communication with Lieut. Shanahan and you. In case the enemy should cross the Duero, and he should be obliged to retire, he must join the 6th division on the Guareña. He must let you know beforehand if he should want provisions, and I will take care that he shall be supplied. From the accounts received by the officer who brought D'Urban's letter, I guess that the enemy are *en masse* between Toro and the Palacio de Cubillas. They have nothing on their right of Toro, and nothing in the valleys in their rear.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812, 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ P.M.

Since I wrote to you half an hour ago, I have received an intercepted letter, which makes it clear that the enemy propose to cross the Duero.

I beg that you will communicate this night with the officer belonging to Don Carlos' corps at Villa Franca, in order to receive the earliest information of the enemy's movements on the Duero, whether at that ford or at the bridge of Toro, where I think it certain that the enemy will cross. If you should move upon Fuente la Peña, send your baggage to Cañizal.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812, 7 P.M.

I have just now heard that the enemy have crossed the Duero at Toro in strength, and are in march upon Villa Buena. If you have not already moved, you should move immediately on Fuente la Peña.

I order the 1st division to march immediately; and the 7th must follow you as soon as the 1st shall cross the Trabancos.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., 1st division.

16th July, 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 13th inst., I am directed to acquaint you that the General officer commanding the division is empowered to approve of the sentences of General Regimental Courts Martial. In all cases, however, the proceedings are to be transmitted to the Dep. Judge Advocate at head quarters, who will forward them to the Judge Advocate Gen. in England, agreeably to the directions contained in the circular on that head.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cabrerizos, near Salamanca, 21st July, 1812.

In the course of the 15th and 16th the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Duero, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable body passed the Duero at Toro, on the evening of the 16th; and I moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guareña.

It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Duero at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords; but he recrossed that river at Toro in the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Duero on the morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey; having marched not less than 10 leagues in the course of the 17th.

The 4th and Light divisions of infantry, and Major Gen. Anson's brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guareña, and were at Castrejon under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed farther, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Duero at Toro, and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava and daylight of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden; and Major Gen. Le Marchant's, Major Gen. Alten's, and Major Gen. Bock's brigades of cavalry to Alaejos.

G. O.

Fuente la Peña, 17th July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is anxious that during the period that the army will be so near the enemy as at present, an arrangement should be adopted respecting the baggage, ammunition, and commissariat with the troops, which shall give them and their officers all the convenience of having the baggage with them, and shall provide that it shall not impede the movements of the army.

2. During the continuance of the hot weather the Commander of the Forces requests that the troops shall be cantoned in a town during the day, if that is practicable; but they invariably must be out of the town at night, and the staff officers must make themselves acquainted with all the roads round the town, so as to be able to conduct the troops to any road by which it may be necessary to order them to march without passing through the town.

3. All baggage and stores of all descriptions must be packed every evening at sunset, and must be placed in a convenient situation out of the town, excepting the baggage of the General officers who may reside in the town, and the animals to carry the baggage must be near it.

4. All baggage and stores, every morning at the hour the troops turn out, must be loaded till the troops shall be dismissed.

The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of day of the 18th, and Sir S. Cotton maintained the post without suffering any loss till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon.

The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in their rear, and thence to the Guareña, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army. The Guareña, which runs into the Duero, is formed by 4 streams, which unite about a league below Cañizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and Light divisions on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the Upper Guareña at Vallesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn our right.

Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guareña at Castrillo, below the junction of the streams; and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Cañizal. Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3d dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French General de Carrié; and I desired Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole to attack with Major Gen. W. Anson's and Brig. Gen. Harvey's brigades of infantry, the latter under the command of Col. Stubbs, the enemy's infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regts., which advanced to the charge with bayonets, Col. Stubbs' Portuguese brigade supporting; and the enemy gave way; many were killed and wounded; and Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were taken.

In these affairs, Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, Major Gen. V. Alten, Major Gen. W. Anson, Lieut. Cols. Arentschildt of the 1st hussars, and Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; Lieut. Col. Maclean of the 27th, and Major Archdall of the 40th; Col. Stubbs, Lieut. Col. Anderson, commanding the 11th, and Major de Azeredo, commanding the 23d Portuguese regts., distinguished themselves. The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa.

On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all the troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, with the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th. But shortly after daylight the enemy made another movement, in several columns, to his left along the heights of the Guareña, which river he crossed below Cantalapiedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villorueta; and the allied army made a corresponding movement to its right to Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division and Major Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes

at Aldea Lengua. During these movements, there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side.

I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river near Huerta. The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want of which he knows well would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castille, and even if we had money, we could not now procure any thing from the country, unless we should follow the example of the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops.

It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond the ground which they occupy; and provided the enemy opposed to them is not too strong for them, they are indifferent in respect to the quarter from which their operations are directed, or on which side they carry them on.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' has been surrounded for the last 6 weeks, and scarcely ever a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organised rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every description than we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that of the enemy; even if such a movement could have been made with advantage as an operation purely military: this, however, was not the case, and when the French attempted to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not think expedient.

I have invariably been of opinion, that unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by the allied army, unless under such favorable circumstances as that there would be reason to hope that the allied army would be able to maintain the field, while those of the enemy should not. Your Lordship will have seen by the returns of the 2 armies that we have no superiority of numbers, even over that single army immediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French army is of the two the strongest; and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery double ours in numbers, and of larger calibres. It cannot be attacked therefore in a chosen position, without considerable loss on our side.

To this circumstance, add that I am quite certain that Marshal Marmont's army is to be joined by the King's, which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army of the North, and some are ordered from that of the South; and it will be seen that I ought to consider it almost impossible to remain in Castille after an action, the circumstances of which should not have been so advantageous as to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative

strength, while that of the enemy should have been much weakened. I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes, if the enemy should; to cover Salamanca as long as I can; and above all, not to give up our communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and not to fight an action, unless under very advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely necessary.

Since I wrote to your Lordship on the 14th, I have learnt that Gen. Drouet had not crossed the Guadiana, nor had he moved in that direction. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill therefore still remains at Llerena.

The siege of Astorga continues. Gen. Santocildes had detached a division of 4000 infantry, under Gen. Cabrera, to Benavente. Gen. D'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, joined on the left of the allied army, on the 17th inst.

The enemy abandoned and destroyed the fort of Mirabete on the Tagus on the 11th inst., and the garrison marched to Madrid to form part of the army of the Centre. They were reduced to 5 days' provisions. From all that I have seen and heard, I am quite certain that the King is making every effort to collect a body of troops to oppose us.

P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the 18th inst.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army near Castrejon, on the 18th July, 1812.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
British	61	297	27
Portuguese	34	96	27
Total	95	393	54

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. On the heights near Alba de Tormes, 23d July, 1812.

I write to let you know that we beat Marshal Marmont's army yesterday evening, near Salamanca, and they are now in full retreat, and we are following them.

Our loss has not been severe, I believe, in men: Marshal Beresford, Gens. Leith, Cole, and V. Alten, are wounded; Gen. Le Marchant killed. Sir S. Cotton was likewise wounded last night by a shot from one of our own sentries, who took him for one of the enemy.

We have taken a good many prisoners and cannon, above 3000 of the former, and I should think 20 of the latter, and I understand 2 eagles. All the troops behaved admirably.

P.S. Let the Marques de Monsalud know of these circumstances.

G. O.

Tordillos, 23d July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General officers, officers, and troops for their conduct in the action with the enemy on the 22d inst., of which he will not fail to make to H. R. H. the Prince Regent the favorable report that it deserves.

2 He trusts that the events of yesterday have impressed all with a conviction that military success depends upon troops obeying the orders which they receive, and preserving the order of their formation in action, and that upon no occasion they will allow themselves to depart from it for one moment.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

I beg that if Lord R. Manners is not quite well when you shall receive this letter, you will tell him from me that I desire he will go to England forthwith. It is of no use his endeavoring to struggle through the next 2 months in the Peninsula, which are the most unhealthy of the whole year. The sooner he goes, the sooner he will return.

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

My aide de camp, Capt. Lord Clinton, will present to your Lordship this account of a victory which the allied troops under my command gained in a general action, fought near Salamanca on the evening of the 22d inst., which I have been under the necessity of delaying to send till now, having been engaged ever since the action in the pursuit of the enemy's flying troops.

In my letter of the 21st, I informed your Lordship that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops, in the afternoon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allied army, with the exception of the 3d division, and Gen. D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed the Tormes in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position, of which the right was upon one of the two heights called Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of Sta Marta. The 3d division, and Brig. Gen. D'Urban's cavalry, were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps on the heights above Babila-fuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in the morning on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank.

In the course of the night of the 21st, I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that Gen. Chauvel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the North, to join Marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22d or 23d at latest.

There was no time to be lost therefore; and I determined that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22d, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of cavalry might have made a march of manœuvre, such as we have had for the last 4 or 5 days, very difficult, and its result doubtful.

During the night of the 21st, the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the heights near it called N. S. de la Peña, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo; and shortly after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the two hills called Dos Arapiles. The enemy, however, succeeded; their detachments being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were; by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.

In the morning the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th caçadores

belonging to Gen. Pack's brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called N. S. de la Peña, on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army *en potence* to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division, under the command of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. L. Cole: and although, from the variety of the enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgment of his intentions, I considered that upon the whole his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore ordered Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, who commanded the 3d division in the absence of Lieut. Gen. Picton, on account of ill health, to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including Brig. Gen. D'Urban's cavalry, and to place himself behind Aldea Tejada; Brig. Gen. Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de España's infantry, having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, between the 3d and 4th divisions.

After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appears to have determined upon his plan about 2 in the afternoon; and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that of the two Arapiles which we possessed, and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our right. The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under Lieut. Gen. Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division, and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, I ordered Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham to move forward with the 3d division and Gen. D'Urban's cavalry, and 2 squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under Lieut. Col. Hervey, in 4 columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights; while Brig. Gen. Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieut. Gen. Leith, the 4th division, under Lieut. Gen. the Hon. L. Cole, and the cavalry under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under Major Gen. Clinton, the 7th, under Major Gen. Hope, and Don Carlos de España's Spanish division; and Brig. Gen. Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles which the enemy held. The 1st and Light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve.

The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham formed the 3d division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. These troops were supported in the most gallant style by the Portuguese cavalry, under Brig. Gen. D'Urban, and Lieut. Col. Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt

made by the enemy on the flank of the 3d division. Brig. Gen. Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank in proportion to the advance. Brig. Gen. Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in diverting the attention of the enemy's corps placed upon it from the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Cole in his advance. The cavalry under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge Major Gen. Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer.

After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of Brig. Gen. Pack's attack upon the Arapiles, and Lieut. Gen. the Hon. L. Cole having been wounded. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed Brig. Gen. Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division; and I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this service, he received a wound which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time Lieut. Gen. Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division, under Major Gen. Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success.

The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist; and I ordered the 1st and Light divisions, and Col. Stubbs' Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was reformed, and Major Gen. W. Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3d and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division; and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the 1st and Light divisions, and Major Gen. W. Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, as long as we could find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their advance; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover who must otherwise have been in our hands. I am sorry to report that, owing to this same cause, Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted.

We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and Major Gen. Bock's and Major Gen. Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with the enemy's rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. They

were immediately attacked by the 2 brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of the King's German Legion, under Major Gen. Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of 3 battalions of the enemy's 1st division, were made prisoners. The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Peñaranda last night, and our troops were still following the flying enemy. Their head quarters were in this town, not less than 10 leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to be of much use to them.

It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the enemy's loss in this action; but, from all reports, it is very considerable. We have taken from them 11 pieces of cannon,* several ammunition waggons, 2 eagles, and 6 colors; and 1 General, 3 Colonels, 3 Lieut. Colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and between 6000 and 7000 soldiers are prisoners;† and our detachments are sending in more at every moment. The number of dead on the field is very large.

I am informed that Marshal Marmont is badly wounded, and has lost one of his arms; and that 4 General officers have been killed, and several wounded.

Such an advantage could not have been acquired without material loss on our side; but it certainly has not been of a magnitude to distress the army, or to cripple its operations.

I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship that, throughout this trying day, of which I have related the events, I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the General officers and troops. The relation which I have written of its events will give a general idea of the share which each individual had in them; and I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of every individual in his station.

I am much indebted to Marshal Sir W. Beresford for his friendly counsel and assistance, both previous to and during the action; to Lieut. Gens. Sir S. Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and Major Gens. Clinton, and the Hon. E. Pakenham, for the manner in which they led the divisions of cavalry and infantry under their command respectively; to Major Gen. Hulse, commanding a brigade in the 6th division; Major Gen. G. Anson, commanding a brigade of cavalry; Col. Hinde; Col. the Hon. W. Ponsonby, commanding Major Gen. Le Marchant's brigade after the fall of that officer; to Major Gen. W. Anson, commanding a brigade in the 4th division; Major Gen. Pringle, commanding a brigade in the 5th division, and the division after Lieut. Gen. Leith was wounded; Brig. Gen. Bradford; Brig. Gen. Spry; Col. Stubbs; and Brig. Gen. Power, of the Portuguese service; likewise to Lieut. Col. Campbell of the 94th, commanding a

* The official returns only account for 11 pieces of cannon, but it is believed that 20 have fallen into our hands.

† The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7000; but it has not been possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army immediately after the action was over.

brigade in the 3d division; Lieut. Col. Williams of the 60th foot; Lieut. Col. Wallace of the 88th, commanding a brigade in the 3d division; Lieut. Col. Ellis of the 23d, commanding Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham's brigade in the 4th division, during his absence in the command of the 3d division; Lieut. Col. the Hon. C. Greville of the 38th regt., commanding Major Gen. Hay's brigade in the 5th division, during his absence on leave; Brig. Gen. Pack; Brig. Gen. the Conde de Rezende of the Portuguese service; Col. Douglas of the 8th Portuguese regt.; Lieut. Col. the Conde de Ficalho of the same regiment; and Lieut. Col. Bingham of the 53d regt.; likewise to Brig. Gen. D'Urban and Lieut. Col. Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; Col. Lord E. Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons; and Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby, commanding the 12th light dragoons. I must also mention Lieut. Col. Woodford, commanding the light battalion of the brigade of Guards, who, supported by 2 companies of the Fusiliers, under the command of Capt. Crowder, maintained the village of Arapiles against all the efforts of the enemy, previous to the attack upon their position by our troops.

In a case in which the conduct of all has been conspicuously good, I regret that the necessary limits of a dispatch prevent me from drawing your Lordship's notice to the conduct of a larger number of individuals; but I can assure your Lordship that there was no officer or corps engaged in this action who did not perform his duty by his Sovereign and his country.

The Royal and German Artillery, under Lieut. Col. Framingham, distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire wherever it was possible to use them; and they advanced to the attack of the enemy's position with the same gallantry as the other troops.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Col. De Lancey, the D. Q. M. G., the head of the department present, in the absence of the Q. M. G., and to the officers of that department and of the Staff corps, for the assistance I received from them, particularly Lieut. Col. the Hon. L. Dundas and Lieut. Col. Sturgeon of the latter, and Major Scovell of the former; and to Lieut. Col. Waters, at present at the head of the Adj. Gen.'s department at head quarters; and to the officers of that department, as well at head quarters as with the several divisions of the army; and Lieut. Col. Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and the officers of my personal Staff. Among the latter I particularly request your Lordship to draw the attention of H.R.H. the Prince Regent to H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange, whose conduct in the field, as well as upon every other occasion, entitles him to my highest commendation, and has acquired for him the respect and regard of the whole army.

I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and of Brig. Don Julian Sanchez, and with that of the troops under their command respectively; and with that of the Mariscal de Campo Don M. de Alava, and of Brig. Don José O'Lawlor, employed with this army by the Spanish government, from whom, and from the Spanish authorities and people in general, I received every assistance I could expect.

It is but justice likewise to draw your Lordship's attention upon this occasion to the merits of the officers of the civil departments of the army.

Notwithstanding the increased distance of our operations from our magazines, and that the country is completely exhausted, we have hitherto wanted nothing, owing to the diligence and attention of the Commissary Gen., Mr. Bissett, and the officers of the department under his direction. I have likewise to mention that, by the attention and ability of Dr. M'Grigor, and of the officers of the department under his charge, our wounded, as well as those of the enemy, left in our hands, have been well taken care of; and I hope that many of these valuable men will be saved to the service.

Capt. Lord Clinton will have the honor of laying at the feet of H.R.H. the Prince Regent the eagles and colors taken from the enemy in this action.* I enclose a return of the killed and wounded.

By letters received from Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, I learn that Gen. Santocildes had left 8000 men to carry on the siege of Astorga, and had joined Gen. Cabrera's division at Benavente with about 3000; and that the whole 7000 were on their march along the Esla towards the Duero.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the allied army, in the battle near Salamanca, on the 22d July, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total.	British.	Portuguese.	Spanish.
Killed	41	28	625	114	694	388	304	2
Wounded	252	178	3840	133	4270	2714	1552	4
Missing	1	1	254	44	256	74	182	—

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

I hope that you will be pleased with our battle, of which the dispatch contains as accurate an account as I can give you. There was no mistake; every thing went on as it ought; and there never was an army so beaten in so short a time. If we had had another hour or two of daylight, not a man would have passed the Tormes; and as it was, they would all have been taken, if Don Carlos de España had left the garrison in Alba de Tormes as I wished and desired; or, having taken it away, as I believe before he was aware of my wishes, he had informed me that it was not there. If he had, I should have marched in the night upon Alba, where I should have caught them all, instead of upon the fords of the Tormes. But this is a little misfortune, which does not diminish the honor acquired by the troops in the action, nor, I hope, the advantage to be derived from it by the country; as I don't believe there are many soldiers who were in that action who are likely to face us again till they shall be very largely reinforced indeed.

I am very anxious that a mark of His Royal Highness' favor should be conferred upon Sir S. Cotton. I believe he would be much gratified at receiving the Red Riband. No cavalry could act better than ours did in the action; and I must say for Sir Stapleton, that I don't know where

* See Appendix, No. XXIII.

we should find an officer that would command our cavalry in this country half so well as he does.

I request your Lordship to send us out remount horses for the cavalry and the artillery. These daily marches, skirmishes, battles, &c., consume an immense number of them; and we can get none here to suit our purpose for either artillery or cavalry. Marmont has now had a reinforcement of not less than 2000 cavalry since I came to Salamanca in June. I hope that we have deprived him of a few hundreds of them; and that, at all events, his late reinforcement does not make him now more than 500 or 600 more than he was when he last crossed the Duero. But the loss has fallen principally upon the French infantry; and our cavalry must be kept up, or we cannot stay in the plains. I should wish also to be able to equip some more artillery, and of a larger calibre; as it is not agreeable to be cannonaded for hours together, and not be able to answer even with one gun.

I see that the King is very anxious to collect every thing against us. I think the French could not now remain in Andalusia, probably not south of the Duero, if the Anglo-Sicilian army had appeared upon the eastern coast.

Marmont has lost his arm;* Gens. Foy, Clausel, Bonet, and Ferey, are wounded; Gen. Thomière is killed. These are five of 8 Generals of division. There are, besides, a great number of Generals of brigade killed or wounded. Gen. Curto is missing, and I believe is prisoner. How they get on their troops at such a rate, I can't conceive; but they left this about 2 this morning, and they will arrive in Valladolid tomorrow. I will answer your letter of the —, which I have received, by the next post.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

I can't allow the dispatches to go off without writing you a few lines respecting our action of the 22d. You will see our previous movements detailed in my dispatch of the 21st, and that of yesterday.

I took up the ground which you were to have taken during the siege of Salamanca, only the left was thrown back on the heights, it being unnecessary, under the circumstances, to cover the ford of S^a Marta. We had a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the two detached heights which you will recollect on the right of your position: this race the French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a general action.

I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the army of the North on the 22d or 23d, and that the army of the Centre was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a *pont d'or*, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, after manœuvring all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last pressed upon my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles, or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, turning his left flank; and I never saw an army receive such a beating.

* This proved to be incorrect.

I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de Tormes. Don Carlos de España had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes; and he was afraid to let me know that he had done so; and I did not know it till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of them in the dark, I marched upon Huerta and Encinas, and they went by Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison in Alba, I should have marched there, and should probably have had the whole.

Marmont, Clausel, Foy, Ferey, and Bonet, are wounded badly. Ferey, it is supposed, will die. Thomière is killed. Many Generals of brigade killed or wounded.

I am in hopes that our loss has not been great. In 2 divisions, the 3d and 5th, it is about 1200 men, including Portuguese. There are more in the 4th and 6th; but there are many men who left the ranks with wounded officers and soldiers, who are eating and drinking, and engaged in *regocijos* with the inhabitants of Salamanca; I have sent, however, to have them all turned out of the town.

I need not express how much I regret the disorder in your eyes since this action. I hope that you receive benefit from the advice of the oculists in London.

P.S. Beresford's wound is not dangerous. Leith's arm is broken, and his wound painful. Cole's wound is through the body, and it is apprehended will be tedious. Cotton's is through the fleshy part, and the two bones of his arm: it may be a bad wound, if there should be hæmorrhage.

To Dr. McGrigor, Inspector of hospitals.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812, 2 P.M.

I have received your letter of yesterday at noon, and I am very much obliged to you for the good accounts which you have given me of our wounded. I assure you that I am very sensible of the diligence and attention of the medical department, of which I have reported my sense to the Sec. of State.

I think you will do well to send to Ciudad Rodrigo only those whose wounds are not likely soon to recover, and the movement of whom will not be prejudicial to them, as we must get the men to their regiments again as soon as we can.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

I enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Sec. of State containing accounts of the operations of the allied army from the 14th inst., including the general action fought near Salamanca on the 22d inst.

I beg you to lay before the Spanish government, for their information, such parts of these dispatches as you may think proper.

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

I enclose a letter from Dr. McGrigor, which will show the state of our wounded officers and soldiers. Most of the wounds are, I believe, slight. I beg your Lordship's attention to that part of the letter which refers to the sending out additional medical assistance to this army.

I have reports this day, that the King moved from Madrid on the 21st with 12,000 or 15,000 men to join Marmont; and he had arrived yesterday at San Pascual and Papatrigo, in the province of Avila, on his road to

Alba de Tormes. He there heard of Marmont's defeat, and he retired, my posts inform me, towards Villa Castin; others say on the Adaja, to cover Marmont's retreat. He will add to Marmont's cavalry; but I don't think that both together will venture to allow us to approach them.

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

I find the troops so much fatigued by the battle and their previous and subsequent marches, and the enemy have got so far before the infantry, that I halted this day, and have sent on the light cavalry and guerrillas in pursuit.

I will try the remedy proposed in your dispatch and letter of the 3d, for the inconvenience of the Attorney and Solicitor General's opinion on the 24th Section of the Articles of War. But I am afraid it will not answer the purpose entirely. I don't know of any thing that annoys me so much, as the misbehaviour of a few of the troops (those coming up from hospitals, or those just arrived from England) to the inhabitants of the country who invariably behave with kindness to them. I trust entirely to Mr. Sutton to choose a proper person to be sent out here. But besides a knowledge of his profession, he should have some little knowledge of the world, and indulgence for the manners of the class of people among whom he is coming to live.

I concur with you in thinking that it is not likely to make the measure worse, to make the full increase of pay to non-commissioned officers depend upon their having been in the situation for two years. The enjoyment of some increase, and the hopes of the further increase, will keep them on their good behaviour, and it does not much signify how men acquire good habits; when once acquired, they don't easily abandon them. I should wish, however, if the public could afford the expense, to see the old proportions of pay re-established.

The explanation of the Order in Council respecting Spanish merchants is perfectly satisfactory. When I complained of that order, I had it in contemplation to march into Andalusia; and I was apprehensive that I might be involved with the Spanish authorities for the protection of Mr. ——— of Xerez, who has behaved very ill.

I am much obliged to you for the intelligence from the North. If the Emperor of Russia has any resources, and is prudent, and his Russians will really fight, Buonaparte will not succeed.

The A.G. to Capt. Hare, D.A.A.G., Salamanca.

25th July, 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that in addition to the instructions you have already received relative to the march of the French prisoners you will observe the following: the officers to be forwarded separately; the prisoners will be marched in such proportions and in such strength as may enable the guard at present over them to afford a sufficient escort for their safe guidance on their route, and a further party of 50 dragoons will be immediately ordered to Salamanca to furnish you more means to carry on this service. It will be extremely advisable that the French prisoners may not be marched in too large parties, as it may give rise to great irregularities and, perhaps, tend to assist the escape of several; and I would recommend you to impress on the minds of the Spanish officers the necessity of treating the prisoners with mildness. Another Spanish battalion will also be sent to Salamanca on this service. You will therefore have sufficient force to insure its being carried on agreeably to the wishes of his Excellency.

The A.G. to Brigade Major M-Pherson, 4th division.

25th July, 1812.

In your return of casualties for the 23d inst. you have omitted to specify the names of the officers killed and wounded; the consequence is that the returns of the army cannot be completed, and the dispatches are consequently delayed. I am therefore to request by a *mounted officer* you will *immediately* forward a return to this office, made out agreeably to the usual forms of the service.

To Lieut. Col. Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Aldea Seca, 26th July, 1812.

Marshal Marmont has continued his retreat by Olmedo towards Valladolid, and our troops have followed him; and the main body of the army will be to-morrow at Arevalo and at Muriel, on the Zapardiel river, the advanced guard being forward in pursuit of the enemy, and the army will continue its march along the Zapardiel and Adaja rivers.

The King moved from Madrid on the 21st with a corps of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, and arrived yesterday at Blasco Sancho, between Arevalo and Avila. He there heard of the defeat of Marmont, and immediately retired, it is said, towards Villa Castin and Madrid. The direction of his retrograde march, however, is not confirmed; and I think it most probable that he is gone towards Segovia. Under these circumstances, it is most desirable that Gen. Santocildes should approach a little nearer to us with that part of the Galician army which is disposable.

It appears that Gen. Silveira remaining on the Esla, and observing well the garrison of Zamora, Gen. Santocildes might move forward as far as the heights of San Roman, and communicate with our left by the fords of Castro Nuño, to which I will request Don Carlos to detach a party of Don Julian's cavalry. If, contrary to my expectations, a part of Marmont's army should move upon him, he would always have his retreat open across the Esla. If they should move upon Rio Seco, in order to raise the siege of Astorga, he could move in the same direction, in order to cover that operation; and on the other hand, he could be so near our left as to be able to co-operate in any offensive plan against the enemy; or if the sieges of Toro and Zamora should be thought expedient, he would be in readiness to receive the supplies and assistance to carry on these operations. I request you, therefore, to suggest to Gen. Santocildes to take up this position. I have not adverted to the garrison of Toro; as, consisting only of 200 men, it cannot give a moment's uneasiness to any body.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Aldea Seca, 26th July, 1812.

I received this morning your letter of the 22d. It is difficult to form an opinion of the enemy's intentions in the south. From the three letters sent in your letter of the 20th, I judge that the King presses Soult to send Drouet according to his former orders; yet it would appear from Soult's

G. O.

Aldea Seca, 26th July, 1812.

1. When it is possible, it is desirable to get the troops into the towns in the day time. If that should not be possible, and there should be wood, conveniently situated in respect to the water, they should be placed in the wood; but the Commander of the Forces is most anxious that they should be placed on the high grounds every night, clear of the woods and marshy grounds, and rivulets.

2. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the General officers commanding divisions and brigades to this subject, as one likely to have great influence on the health of the troops.

letter of the 8th July, that he does not think of such a movement; and according to your accounts to the 22d, nothing had been done towards it; on the contrary, it appeared that he was coming himself into Estremadura.

I think that my instructions to you from the 8th to the 16th of this month provide for every event: 1st; That of Soult assembling his whole force in Estremadura: 2dly; That of Drouet crossing the Tagus to join the King, according to the orders we know the King sent: 3dly; That of Treillard making an invasion by the valley of the Tagus.

In regard to the last, it appears not likely to take place, particularly at present, as the King has actually marched from Madrid, and is in front of this army; but you will of course have judged it proper to call in Gen. Campbell's detachment from Merida, if Soult should be in Estremadura in force: for the purposes of the march to the north of the Tagus, it would be nearly as well placed at Badajoz as at Merida: and if Soult should be in force in Estremadura, sufficient to keep your main body in check, no detachment at Merida can answer any of the purposes for which Campbell's detachment was to be placed there, or even be in safety.

Marmont has gone in all haste on Valladolid: he left Olmedo this morning. The King was yesterday at Blasco Sancho, between Avila and Arevalo; he there heard of the defeat of Marmont, and went off, it is supposed, towards Villa Castin, that is, Guadarrama and Madrid. I don't understand this movement, as he leaves Marmont's remains in a manner at my discretion, unless he intends to cross the Tagus with his army of the Centre, to join Drouet and Soult, and fall upon you: however, I shall observe him closely, and can reinforce you, as fast as he can reinforce Soult.

To Major Gen. ———.

Arevalo, 27th July, 1812.

I heard some time ago of some dissatisfaction with his situation on the part of Lieut. Col. ———; but as you did not mention the subject to me, and I heard no more of it on his part, I concluded that it was one of those cases of difference of opinion which sometimes occur among those who mean best by the service; and I took no further notice of what had been mentioned to me.

I had heard nothing of the circumstances of which you write; and I beg to know from you, whether you wish what you mention to be formally

G. O.

Arevalo, 27th July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces having received an order to draft the 2d batt. 5th regt. into the 1st, the following arrangement is to be made for that purpose:
2. The private men belonging to the 2d batt. 5th regt., in Portugal and Spain, are to be drafted into the 1st batt., and are to be distributed into companies in the 1st batt., with the exception of men deemed unfit at present for service in the field.
3. All men missing from the 2d batt. are to be kept on the strength of the 2d batt.
4. The transfer is to be made immediately, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batt. are to draw pay for them up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batt., to whose companies these men will be transferred under this order.
5. When this transfer shall be completed, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and Staff of the 2d batt., and such private men who remain, are to proceed by route furnished by the Q. M. G. to Lisbon, preparatory to their embarkation for England.
6. The Commander of the Forces cannot part with the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 2d batt. 5th regt. without again requesting them to accept his thanks for their uniform good conduct, and brilliant and important services, since they have been under his command.

considered, or only that Lieut. Col. — should be removed from the —th division. In order to enable you to decide upon this point, it may be expedient to make you acquainted with my opinion. There is no doubt that it is the duty of the A.A.G. to make such a reconnaissance as you ordered Lieut. Col. — to make upon Alba de Tormes; and I can't understand his refusing to make it.

If you are satisfied with his being removed from the —th division, I have no objection to the matter being there dropped, as I am convinced that Lieut. Col. — cannot be serious in supposing that that which he was ordered to do was inconsistent with the duty of the A.A.G. But if you wish the matter to go farther, it must be regularly inquired into. I shall take no further steps upon the subject till I shall hear from you, which I beg may be as soon as may be convenient to you. I shall be at Olmedo to-morrow.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Arevalo, 27th July, 1812.

I have been so much occupied lately, that I have not been able to answer your letter of the 13th July.

Besides the 100,000 dollars which I told you in my letter of the 16th that I had ordered to be issued to the Portuguese government, I ordered 100,000 dollars of the money in the town should be likewise given. I shall desire the Commissary Gen. to send a note of the value of the supplies to Mr. Bell, when he shall furnish them in future.

You omitted to enclose Lord Castlereagh's letter to which you refer in your's of the 13th July; although you did enclose a letter from the Dep. Storekeeper Gen. to Mr. Harrison, together with a list of clothing, &c., for the Spanish troops; and a letter from Mr. Herries to Col. Gordon. These articles must remain in store at Lisbon, and I shall order them to be issued in proportion as they may be wanted.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

As the fairest way of enabling His Royal Highness to judge of the merits of the officers and corps engaged in the general action of the 22d,

G. O.

Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

1. The number of soldiers of infantry who stay behind their regiments on a march is so very large, the practice is so unmilitary in itself, and leads to such inconveniences and losses when the troops are moving near an enemy, and is at all times so prejudicial to the health of the soldiers, that the Commander of the Forces begs to draw the attention of the General officers of the army to the G. O. upon this subject.

2. Under these orders no soldier ought to be out of the ranks on a march without the knowledge of the officer commanding his company, and the officer commanding the regiment should report all absentees, at the end of the march, to the General officers commanding the brigades.

3. The object of these orders is to insure the attention of these several authorities to the absence from the ranks of every soldier, and to make it certain that this evil will not exist in any instance without sufficient cause.

4. But if it takes place without notice from the officers of the regiment, or the General officer of the brigade, it is time some further measures should be adopted.

5. The Commander of the Forces declares his intention to have the name taken down of every soldier whom he may find straggling from his regiment on the march; and if he should find upon inquiry that the soldiers' names have not been reported, according to the G. O. of the army, he will bring to trial before a General Court Martial the officer of the company, or the commanding officer of the regiment if he should not have noticed the neglect of the commanding officer of the company.

6. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions, and the officers of the General staff, will pay attention to this subject.

I think it proper to transmit to you the reports which I have received from the several General officers commanding divisions engaged; with the exception of the cavalry, Sir S. Cotton not having transmitted a report.

Some of these gentlemen have been rather liberal in their recommendations of officers for promotion, while others have not been so much so; and I have therefore deemed it best to make out a list from the whole, which I beg you to submit to His Royal Highness.

I include Lieut. Col. Elley in the list, as His Royal Highness may think it expedient to take this occasion to grant him the rank of Colonel, which he claims as Lieut. Colonel of 6 years' standing of the Blues. He was wounded, and had 2 horses killed under him.

To Earl Bathurst.

Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

The army have continued their march in pursuit of the enemy since I addressed you on the 24th inst., and we have continued to take many prisoners.

A part of the enemy's army crossed the Duero yesterday, near Puente de Duero, and the remainder, their left wing, were in march towards the bridge of Tudela this morning at 9 o'clock, when I last heard from our advanced posts.

The main body of the allied army is this day on the Adaja and Zapardiel rivers, in this neighbourhood, the light cavalry being in front in pursuit of the enemy.

I have requested Gen. Santocildes, who is upon the Esla with 8000 men of the army of Galicia, to move forward to the heights of San Roman on this side of Toro, and to communicate with our left by the fords of Castro Nuño.

It appears that the King left Madrid on the 21st, with the army of the Centre, supposed to consist of from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry, and from 2000 to 3000 cavalry; and he directed his march by the Escorial upon Alba de Tormes. He arrived at Blasco Sancho, between Avila and Arevalo, on the 25th, where he heard of the defeat of Marshal Marmont; and he retired in the evening; and between that time and the evening of the 26th he marched through Villa Castin to Espinar. A non-commissioned officer's patrol of the 14th light dragoons and 1st hussars, from Arevalo, took in Blasco Sancho, on the evening of the 25th, shortly after the King had left the place, 2 officers and 27 men of the King's cavalry, who had been left there to follow his rear guard. I have reason to believe that the King had no regular account of the action of the 22d till he passed the Puerto de Guadarrama yesterday; but he then returned, and was directing his march upon Segovia. I have not yet heard how far he had advanced. All accounts concur in regard to the great loss sustained by the '*Armée de Portugal*;' but I think it probable that they will endeavor to join the King on the Upper Duero, if the King should continue on this side of the mountains, unless I should previously have it in my power to strike a blow against his corps.

By accounts from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to the 24th inst., it appears that the enemy had in some degree reinforced the troops in Estremadura. The Lieut. General had removed to Zafra, as being the coolest and most healthy situation in Estremadura, and preparatory to the detachment

which I ordered him to make to the right of the Tagus, in case the enemy should detach in that direction. It is reported that Gen. Ballesteros had marched on another expedition towards Malaga, and that he was opposed by a division of the army of the South, under Gen. Leval.

I have not received detailed accounts of Commodore Sir H. Popham's operations on the coast since the capture of Lequeitio, but I understand that he has taken Castro Urdiales; and there is no doubt that those operations have drawn the enemy's attention to that quarter, and that Gen. Caffarelli has been able to detach only cavalry to the assistance of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' From the advantage derived from these operations, your Lordship will form a judgment of that which would have been derived, under existing circumstances, from the expedition which had been concerted and agreed upon to the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, with the troops from Sicily, combined with the Spanish troops in Majorca and at Alicante.

I enclose a statement which I have made out from a return in my possession of the strength of the army of Aragon in the month of April, from which your Lordship will see that, after allowing for the divisions detached to the army of the North, under Gen. Palombini, which was destined to join Marshal Marmont, there will still remain a very formidable army under Marshal Suchet, which it is desirable should not be added to the other troops acting against this army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

I enclose the last report of our wounded officers and soldiers. I shall be much obliged to you if you will urge the Medical Board to send us out medical assistance as soon as possible. I likewise request your Lordship not to forget horses for the cavalry and the artillery, and money. We are absolutely bankrupt. The troops are now 5 months in arrears, instead of being one month in advance. The staff have not been paid since February; the muleteers not since June, 1811; and we are in debt in all parts of the country. I am obliged to take the money sent to me by my brother for the Spaniards, in order to give my own troops a fortnight's pay, who are really suffering for want of money.

It is said that Marmont cannot live, but could not stop to have his arm cut off, and that a mortification has taken place. It is difficult to judge of the exact loss of the French; but it is said to be between 17,000 and 20,000 men. They all agree, that if we had had an hour more of daylight, the whole army would have been in our hands. Gen. Clausel, who is wounded, now commands the army. The only apprehension I have is, that when the '*Armée de Portugal*' and the King shall have joined, they will be too strong for us in cavalry. I am convinced that their infantry will make no stand.

APPENDIX

TO

THE FIFTH VOLUME.

No. I. (p. 4.)

Le général de division Regnier au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.
Au pont de S. Felices el Grande, ce 11 Mai, 1811.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous prévenir de l'arrivée de la garnison d'Almeida. Je n'étais, heureusement pour elle, pas encore parti de San Felices el Grande lorsqu'on a entendu tirer vers Barba de Puerco. J'ai aussitôt fait porter le 31^{me} régt. d'infanterie légère et les voltigeurs du 4^{me} régt. au pont. On est arrivé lorsque la tête de la garnison arrivait au défilé, et que sa queue était vivement chargée par deux colonnes d'infanterie Anglaise, que le régiment que j'ai fait placer dans les rochers dominants le défilé ont arrêté. Un détachement de la garnison qui s'était écarté de la route a été obligé de se précipiter dans les rochers, où quelques-uns se sont tués en tombant, et les autres cachés reviennent successivement au pont, d'où je fais chasser les Anglais afin de retirer ces hommes. Les Anglais, en poursuivant la garnison, s'étaient avancés jusqu'au pont, et ont beaucoup perdu en se retirant. On m'a déjà ramené 10 soldats Anglais pris de l'autre côté du pont. Le général Brenier m'a dit qu'il n'a presque pas laissé d'hommes en arrière dans sa marche de cette nuit. Ceux que j'ai vu prendre, lorsqu'à mon arrivée ici les Anglais les chargeaient à Barba de Puerco, ne sont pas plus de 40, mais il y a plusieurs morts dans les rochers et de blessés.

Je reste ici aujourd'hui avec le 2^{me} corps pour achever de rallier la garnison d'Almeida et la reposer. Demain j'exécuterai la marche que vous m'avez ordonnée.

Le général Brenier au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.
San Felices, 11 Mai, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte que, conformément aux ordres de V. A., j'ai fait sauter la place d'Almeida. J'ai marché sur le ventre aux troupes qui m'investissent, et je suis arrivé à San Felices.

J'aurai l'honneur de rendre un compte plus détaillé à votre Altesse de cette critique opération, par laquelle tous les officiers et soldats qui composaient cette garnison ont montré un zèle, un courage, et un dévouement dignes des plus grands éloges, et je vous demanderai la permission de solliciter auprès de votre Altesse toute sa bienveillance pour obtenir les bontés de Sa Majesté pour eux.

Si dans cette occasion votre Altesse est satisfaite de l'exactitude avec laquelle j'ai exécuté ses ordres, j'oserais lui demander pour récompense l'ordre de porter moi-même la nouvelle à l'Empereur.

Le général Brenier au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse, Commandant en Chef l'Armée de Portugal.
Salamanque, le 17 Mai, 1811.

La place d'Almeida a été investie le 7 Avril. D'après les ordres que j'avais reçus auparavant de S. A. le Prince de Neufchâtel et de S. E. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, j'avais fait préparer les mines pour en faire sauter les fortifications. J'ai continué ce travail après l'investissement; et, avant la fin du mois d'Avril, il y avait 140 fourneaux tout prêts à être chargés. Je pensais que l'armée, après s'être reposée quelques jours, ferait un mouvement sur Almeida; tout était disposé pour évacuer promptement l'artillerie et les munitions; pendant cette évacuation, les fourneaux eussent été chargés, et il eût fallu très-peu de jours pour tout terminer. Je n'attendais le mouvement de l'armée que du 10 au 15 de ce

mois ; et, pour me donner le temps d'attendre jusque-là, j'avais établi un système d'économie extrêmement rigoureux, et que je surveillais moi-même avec la plus rigide sévérité. Par ce moyen, j'avais calculé avoir de quoi vivre jusqu'au 25, et j'étais bien décidé à prolonger, d'une manière ou d'autre, au moins jusqu'au 1^{er} Juin.

Dès le lendemain de mon investissement, j'étais resserré sur tous les points d'une manière très-sévère ; tous les jours des tirailleurs venaient tirer sur mon troupeau, et le forçaient de rentrer : je me suis décidé alors à en faire saler une partie.

Persuadé que l'ennemi ne pouvait avoir amené de parc de siège, j'ai pensé que, connaissant la faiblesse de ma garnison, il pourrait tenter quelque coup de main ; et, de concert avec les commandants du génie et de l'artillerie, j'ai pris toutes les dispositions imaginables pour le repousser. Tous les flancs des bastions ont été garnis de pièces toujours chargées à mitraille ; des faux, des fourches ont été placées dans chaque bastion ; des poutres ont été rangées sur le parapet du chemin des rondes ; des obus et des grenades chargés ont été placés à portée, ainsi que des balles à feu, et des tourteaux goudronnés pour éclairer les fossés. J'avais fait faire des répétitions aux troupes, pour leur faire connaître leur place d'alarme de jour et de nuit.

Le 15, j'ai été sommé de me rendre par le major général Campbell, qui me faisait observer que les circonstances de la campagne m'ôtaient tout espoir d'être secouru ; que la faiblesse de ma garnison m'ôtait tout espèce de moyen de me défendre. J'ai répondu verbalement que, si on croyait ma garnison trop faible pour défendre la place, on n'avait qu'à essayer de venir la prendre, et que je n'avais point d'autre réponse à faire. Le 17, Lord Wellington m'a fait demander une entrevue ; j'ai cru devoir la refuser.

J'ai fait une sortie le 28 au matin ; j'ai chassé les postes Anglais. On leur a tué quelques hommes, et fait 4 prisonniers.

J'ai fait une autre sortie sur des postes Portugais, et j'ai fait 3 prisonniers ; mais jamais je n'ai fait attaquer le côté par où je suis sorti.

Le 3 Mai, j'ai entendu une canonnade et une fusillade qui m'ont annoncé l'approche de l'armée ; le 5, j'ai jugé qu'il y avait une affaire sérieuse, et à chaque instant je m'attendais à communiquer.

Le 7, j'ai reçu l'ordre de S. A. le Prince d'Essling, par un soldat du 16^{me} léger, de faire sauter la place, et de me retirer sur Barba de Puerco avec ma garnison ; de suite, je me suis occupé de faire charger les fourneaux et de détruire l'artillerie. On a employé, pour ce dernier objet, le moyen dont nous avons déjà fait l'expérience quelque temps auparavant sur une pièce hors de service, de tirer des coups de canon dans la volée des pièces ; on a détruit de cette manière les pièces, les obusiers et les mortiers. Les cartouches ont été jetées partie dans un puits, et partie dans les fossés, au pied des revêtements qui devaient sauter. Les plombs ont été jetés de même dans les fossés pour être ensevelis. Une grande quantité de saucissons était déjà prête et chargée, par les soins infatigables et la prévoyante intelligence de M. le chef de bataillon Morlet, commandant du génie de la place ; les affûts ont été sciés en grande partie, et les autres placés sur les parapets qui étaient minés ; le parc des voitures a été renversé et rangé contre les bermes au-dessous des revêtements, où il a été enseveli ; enfin, je crois qu'aucune des précautions à prendre pour mettre hors de service tout ce qui pouvait être de quelque utilité à l'ennemi, n'a été oubliée ; et c'est ici que je dois rendre hommage à l'intelligence, à l'activité, et au dévouement des officiers du génie et de l'artillerie, qui connaissaient aussi bien que moi toutes les chances d'une opération aussi critique, et à qui néanmoins rien n'est échappé de tout ce qui pouvait contribuer à l'entier accomplissement des ordres de S. M.

Le 9, tous les fourneaux étaient chargés ; mais les travaux pour la destruction de l'artillerie n'étaient pas terminés, et j'ai dû encore retarder d'un jour, afin de ne laisser aucun regret en arrière de moi. Le génie a profité de ce temps pour faire et charger 400 toises de plus de saucissons, qui étaient encore nécessaires pour le comblement des feux.

Dans le matinée du 10, je rassemblai chez moi les principaux officiers de la garnison ; je leur lus l'ordre du Prince d'Essling ; je ne leur cachai pas que notre expédition présentait beaucoup de difficultés et de dangers ; qu'une fois dehors, le feu mis à la place, nous nous trouverions dans la nécessité de nous faire jour,

pour rejoindre l'armée, au milieu des obstacles de tous genres, ou de succomber avec honneur ; qu'une fois la place détruite, les intentions de S. M. seraient parfaitement remplies ; que ce seul but devait nous animer ; que nous étions Français, et qu'il fallait prouver à l'univers entier que nous étions dignes de l'être ; que si notre expédition réussissait, elle nous couvrirait de gloire, quels qu'en fussent les résultats pour nous personnellement. Tous ont témoigné le plus courageux dévouement. Je leur ai ensuite fait part des dispositions que j'avais arrêtées, ainsi que de la manière dont je comptais arriver sur les postes ennemis, et je les ai conduits sur un point de la place, d'où je leur ai fait voir la direction que je comptais prendre ; et, voulant marcher sur deux colonnes, pour avoir moins de profondeur et pour renverser un plus grand front d'ennemis, ce qui me donnait au delà de leur ligne plus de latitude pour mes mouvements, je leur ai donné toutes les instructions nécessaires pour la marche des deux colonnes, et pour base, j'ai annoncé que la colonne de gauche était la colonne de direction. Les deux compagnies d'élite du 5^{me} batt. du 82^{me} régt. devaient marcher en tête de la colonne de gauche, composée dudit bataillon, pour balayer le passage à la colonne qui les suivait ; les deux compagnies de canonniers marchaient en tête de la colonne de droite avec le même objet ; cette colonne, commandée par le chef de bataillon du génie Thruiller, était composée de divers détachements du 6^{me} et du 8^{me} corps ; les sapeurs devaient rester en ville, une partie pour mettre le feu, une autre partie en bataille sur divers points, pour empêcher les habitants de déranger notre opération, et pour protéger la sortie de tous ; ils devaient ensuite former l'arrière-garde ; ils étaient commandés par M. le chef de bataillon du génie Morlet, qui est resté dans la place jusqu'à ce que le feu ait été mis, et qui a été obligé de se faire jour une seconde fois avec ses sapeurs à travers les postes ennemis, qui s'étaient joints sur nos derrières.

J'avais fait mettre les équipages en queue de la colonne ; je prévoyais, que dans toute espèce de cas, ils ne pourraient nous suivre, et je n'étais pas fâché de les placer de manière à les faire prendre pour occuper l'ennemi.

Après être convenu avec tous les officiers de toutes armes de tous les détails préliminaires de notre opération, j'ai été, comme à mon ordinaire, me promener dans la ville et sur les remparts ; j'ai causé avec tous les soldats ; j'ai fait en sorte, par un air de sécurité et de confiance, d'écarter de leur esprit toute idée de doute ou d'inquiétude sur le résultat de notre opération, et j'ai vu tout le monde plein de confiance, et j'ose dire d'enthousiasme ; à l'entrée de la nuit, j'ai fait prendre les armes à toute la garnison pour empêcher que quiconque ne s'éloigne, et pour être prêt aussitôt que toutes les dispositions seraient terminées ; car on a travaillé jusqu'au moment du départ. A 10 heures tout était prêt, j'ai envoyé l'ordre à tous les postes avancés des demi-lunes et des chemins couverts de se porter dans le plus grand silence en dedans de la barrière par où on devait sortir. Au moment de commencer le mouvement, j'ai donné pour mot d'ordre, *Bonaparte* et *Bayard* ; et tout le monde s'est mis en marche sous les auspices de la gloire et de l'honneur.

Je suis sorti le dernier ; alors j'ai envoyé l'ordre à M. le chef de bataillon Morlet de mettre le feu dans les boîtes ; il était convenu que ce seul ordre suffirait, parce qu'il devait faire un signal particulier aussitôt qu'il aurait eu la certitude que les mèches allumées étaient en place, afin que le feu fût mis aux poudres en même temps. Tout a été parfaitement exécuté ; mes deux têtes de colonnes ont commencé à être aux prises avec les postes ennemis au moment même de l'explosion. Tout a été enfoncé, et j'ai continué rapidement ma route, toujours harcelé sur mes derrières et sur mes flancs, ainsi que je l'avais prévu ; tous les équipages ont été pillés. Je n'avais point voulu de guide, parce qu'il n'aurait pu m'enseigner que les chemins que je ne voulais pas suivre, et qu'il aurait pu mettre de l'incertitude dans nos mouvements. Ne pouvant reconnaître de nuit les divers points de direction que depuis long temps j'avais étudiés de jour, la lune m'a servi de boussole ; les différents ruisseaux ou rivières que j'ai traversés, et dont je connaissais l'existence, ont aussi contribué à assurer ma direction ; j'ai été harcelé jusqu'au Turon. Là j'ai été abandonné. Enfin, au jour, je me suis trouvé entre Villar de Ciervo et Barba de Puerco ; j'ai pris ma direction sur l'Agueda. Entre ces deux villages, avant d'arriver sur la crête, la cavalerie ennemie m'a atteint sur ma droite, et a marché parallèlement en me fusillant, pour m'arrêter ou pour indiquer aux troupes qui étaient en marche pour me poursuivre, la route que j'avais prise. Je voyais sur ma gauche quelques crêtes couronnées de troupes ; j'ai manœuvré

pour les éviter ; je suis enfin arrivé à un sentier qui conduisait au pont de San Felices.

Les deux colonnes qui avaient toujours marché en vue et à portée l'une de l'autre, sont arrivées ensemble sur la rive gauche de l'Agueda, dans le même ordre qu'elles étaient sorties d'Almeida ; elles avaient marché toujours en ordre par section, malgré les rochers, les rivières, et les précipices.

L'arrière-garde des sapeurs avait rejoint depuis quelques moments la queue de la colonne de gauche. J'ai aperçu alors quelques troupes de l'autre côté, que j'ai reconnues avec une lunette pour être Françaises, et nous sommes descendus rapidement sur le pont. L'ennemi arrivait de tous côtés ; il a atteint la queue de ma colonne, et j'ai eu la douleur de voir périr quelques-uns de mes braves camarades ; enfin le général Regnier, commandant du 2^{me} corps, a fait descendre des troupes vers le pont, et a protégé notre passage. Il a recueilli tous les blessés, et les a fait porter à San Felices, où nous nous sommes trouvés réunis au nombre d'environ 1000 hommes. J'ai perdu dans toute cette opération 360 hommes, dont à peu près 150 tués, la plupart au précipice, et 200 prisonniers qui se sont écartés, et n'ont pu suivre la marche rapide de la colonne.

Je joins ici le rapport du commandant du génie et celui de M. Lechêne, capitaine d'artillerie. Ils donnent chacun dans leur partie des détails circonstanciés, que je n'ai pu qu'indiquer en grand. Je joins aussi un plan côté de la place ; tout ce qui est tracé en noir indique les revêtements qui ont sauté.

Maintenant, Monseigneur, il me reste un devoir à remplir, c'est de rendre justice à tous les officiers de la garnison ; j'oserai demander la décoration de la Légion d'Honneur pour tous ceux qui ne l'ont pas encore. Je joins à ce rapport l'état nominatif de tous, et j'ai fait noter par une étoile ceux qui sont déjà décorés.

No. II. (p. 40.)

The battle of Albuera.

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Solano, le 21 Mai, 1811.

Je partis de Séville dans la nuit du 9 à 10, ainsi que mon rapport du 9 vous l'annonçait. Le 12 je joignis entre Fuente Cantos et Bienvenida la division que commandait le général Latour Maubourg. Le 14 je pris position à Villa Franca et Almendralejo ; le 15 à S^{te} Marta et Villalba : ma cavalerie fut poussée jusque devant Albuera, où j'appris que l'armée ennemie se réunissait. Les différens corps Espagnols, Portugais, et Anglais venus de Cadix et de Lisbonne, et même une brigade Anglaise tirée de la Sicile, menaçaient l'Andalousie. Ma marche avait dégagé cette province, et l'ennemi avait rappelé tous ses corps pour les réunir sur l'Albuera. Nous nous trouvâmes ainsi, le 15, en présence de l'armée ennemie, et je résolus de ne pas perdre un instant, et de lui livrer bataille.

La position que l'ennemi occupait était avantageuse. Elle était à l'embranchement des routes qui conduisaient à Badajoz et à Jurumenha par Valverde et Olivença ; mais la division Espagnole de Blake ne l'avait pas encore joint, et quoiqu'en différant je pusse attendre des renforts, et que je n'eusse sous la main que 4 brigades d'infanterie, faisant 15,000 hommes, avec 3000 chevaux, en tout 18,000 hommes seulement, je jugeai convenable de prévenir la jonction de Blake avec 9000 Espagnols, et de l'attaquer sur sa droite, afin de me porter sur la ligne de communication : d'ailleurs la nature du terrain rendait ce point d'attaque le plus avantageux. Je savais que le général Beresford, qui commandait l'armée qui m'était opposée, avait deux divisions d'infanterie Anglaise, fortes de 10,000 hommes, 8000 Portugais, et 3000 Espagnols commandés par Castaños, avec 3000 hommes de cavalerie, ce qui faisait en tout 24,000 hommes ; mais je ne doutais point du succès.

M. le général de division Latour Maubourg commandait toute la cavalerie, et M. le général de division Ruty l'artillerie. M. le général de division Girard commandait les 2 premières brigades, faisant 7000 hommes. Les généraux de brigade Werlé et Godinot commandaient chacun une autre brigade.

Le général Godinot fut chargé avec sa brigade, à laquelle se joignit 5 escadrons aux ordres du général de brigade Briche, de faire une fausse attaque sur le village

d'Albuera ; et je me portai avec le reste de l'armée sur la droite de l'ennemi, qui fut aussitôt débordé par notre cavalerie. M. le général Latour Maubourg manœuvra avec audace et habileté ; il chercha vainement à engager dans une affaire la cavalerie ennemie. Celle-ci se tint constamment en réserve. M. le général Girard, avec ses deux brigades, marcha au pas de charge et enleva la position de l'ennemi. Cette position était occupée par une division Espagnole et une brigade Anglaise, qui lâchèrent pied après une résistance assez opiniâtre, et furent vivement poursuivies. Le champ de bataille était couvert de leurs morts, et nous leur fîmes bon nombre de prisonniers. La seconde ligne de l'ennemi s'avança alors, et déborda considérablement la nôtre. M'étant posté sur la hauteur, je fus surpris de voir un si grand nombre de troupes ; et peu après j'appris, par un prisonnier Espagnol, que Blake était arrivé avec 9000 hommes, et avait fait sa jonction à 3 heures du matin. La partie n'était plus égale. L'ennemi se trouvait avoir plus de 30,000 hommes, tandis que je n'en avais que 18,000. Je ne jugeai plus devoir suivre mon projet, et j'ordonnai que l'on gardât la position qui avait été enlevée à l'ennemi.

Cependant la ligne ennemie s'approcha bientôt de la nôtre, et le combat fut des plus terribles. Le général Latour Maubourg fit charger le 2^{me} de hussards, le 1^{er} de lanciers de la Vistule, le 4^{me} et le 20^{me} de dragons, avec une habileté et une bravoure telles que 3 brigades d'infanterie Anglaise furent entièrement détruites. Six pièces de canon, 1000 prisonniers, et 6 drapeaux (ceux du 3^{me}, 48^{me}, et 66^{me} régimens Anglais) restèrent en notre pouvoir. L'ennemi nous laissa la position que nous lui avons prise, et n'osa plus nous attaquer. La tirailerie dura jusqu'à 4 heures après midi, moment auquel elle finit de part et d'autre.

Les généraux de brigade Werlé et Pepin ont été tués. Les généraux de brigade Maransin et Brayer ont été blessés. Le colonel Præfke du 28^{me} régt. d'infanterie légère a été tué, ainsi que les chefs de bataillon Astruc et Camus, du 26^{me} et du 28^{me} régimens. Notre perte en tués et blessés se monte à 2800 hommes. L'ennemi ne nous a pas fait de prisonniers, si ce n'est 200 ou 300 blessés qui sont restés dans les rangs.

L'ennemi a perdu 3 généraux tués, deux Anglais et un Espagnol. Il y a 2 généraux blessés. 1000 Anglais ont été faits prisonniers (quelques-uns se sont échappés, mais nous en avons compté aujourd'hui 800) ; 1100 Espagnols ont également été pris. Tous les renseignemens que j'ai pu me procurer portent la perte de l'ennemi en tués et blessés à 5000 Anglais, 2000 Espagnols, et 700 à 800 Portugais. C'est donc en tout une perte de 9000 hommes pour l'armée ennemie, c'est-à-dire une perte triple de la nôtre.

Les troupes se sont couvertes de gloire. La cavalerie a fait des plus belles charges, et s'est particulièrement distinguée. L'artillerie a soutenu sa réputation. J'ai eu constamment en batterie 40 bouches à feu, qui vomissaient la mort dans les rangs ennemis. Les Anglais ont perdu plus d'un homme sur deux.

Le 17 nous sommes restés en présence. 5000 hommes partis d'Elvas joignirent l'armée ennemie. Je continuai à garder le champ de bataille, et le 18, à la pointe du jour, je fis un mouvement de flanc sur Solano.

J'ai chargé le général de division Gazan de conduire à Séville mes prisonniers Anglais et Espagnols, et mes blessés, avec une escorte convenable. Aussitôt que je le saurai arrivé, je manœuvrai pour me joindre à d'autres troupes, et compléter la défaite de l'ennemi.

Je ne terminerai point cette dépêche sans faire à V. A. S. une mention particulière des services que m'a rendus le général de division Gazan, chef de l'état major général : M. le général Latour Maubourg la mérite également pour ses bonnes dispositions, ainsi que M. le général Ruty pour la manière dont il a dirigé l'artillerie. Je dois citer aussi les généraux Godinot, Bron, Briche, Bouvier des Éclats, et Vielande ; l'adjudant commandant Mocquery, sous chef de mon état major ; le général Bourglat et le colonel Berge, de l'artillerie ; le colonel Konopha, du 1^{er} régt. de lanciers de la Vistule ; le colonel Vinot, du 2^{me} hussards ; et le colonel Farine, du 4^{me} de dragons. Je devrais également citer plusieurs autres chefs et officiers de tout grade qui se sont particulièrement distingués ; mais tous les rapports particuliers ne m'étant pas encore parvenus, je suis obligé de remettre à un autre rapport de faire mention de ce qu'ils ont fait. Je dois des éloges particuliers aux officiers de l'état major et à mes aides de camp, la plupart d'entre eux ont été démontés, et quelques uns ont été blessés. J'aurai incessamment l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. l'état des officiers que je crois avoir mérité les grâces de S. M. I. et R.

Le Comte Gazan, général de division, au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

Ribera, le 19 Mai, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Excellence que je viens d'arriver avec la totalité de la colonne, qui est infiniment plus forte que je n'aurais pu le croire. Je tâche de l'organiser afin d'éviter des malheurs, et surtout le pillage qui nous ferait mourir de faim, et que j'ai trouvé à son comble ce matin à mon arrivée à Ahnen-dralejo. J'ai trouvé à mon arrivée ici la lettre de M. Lenormand à M. le major Daubersac, qui courait après lui. Je la joins ici après en avoir pris connaissance. Comme je dois croire que ce ne peut être que le 9^{me} corps qui soit à Almaraz, j'écris d'ici au Comte d'Erlon afin de l'engager à presser sa marche et à vous rejoindre. Cependant comme il serait encore possible que ce fût des troupes de l'armée du Centre commandée par M. le général d'Armagnac, je lui écris pareillement afin qu'il fasse un mouvement sur vous.

Je réponds à M. le capitaine Lenormand pour lui annoncer que c'est avec votre Excellence qu'il doit correspondre, M. le major Daubersac ayant rejoint l'armée. Je lui ordonne de rassembler un fort convoi de subsistances, et de l'accompagner pour qu'il vous parvienne avec plus de sûreté. Les grandes chaleurs feront beaucoup de mal à nos blessés, dont le nombre s'élève à plus de 4000, surtout n'ayant pour les panser que 5 chirurgiens; quelques uns d'entr'eux sont morts pendant la route, dont M. Lapiere, chef de bataillon au 103^{me} régt.

Je suis encore sans nouvelles de M. le chef d'escadron La Barthe; j'aurai l'honneur de vous en donner du même instant que je pourrai communiquer avec lui. Des partis Espagnols sont à Los Santos et à Fuente del Maestre, et ont paru ce matin à Almendralejo et à Villa Franca. Ils ont pris dans ce dernier endroit des renseignemens sur la marche de notre colonne, et ont annoncé de voir arriver aujourd'hui à Los Santos 400 chevaux et une forte colonne d'infanterie. Je ne crois nullement à ce mouvement, mais à tout événement nous les verrons, et je tâcherai de les échapper. Que votre Excellence veuille bien recevoir avec bonté l'assurance de mon sincère et respectueux dévouement.

No. III. (p. 45.)

Le Prince de Neuchâtel et Wagram, Vice Connétable, Major Général, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.

Paris, ce 8 Avril, 1811.

En rappelant le Duc d'Elchingen, l'Empereur vous envoie pour commander le 6^e corps le Duc de Raguse. Ce Maréchal, jeune, actif et que vous connaissez, vous sera utile; il a le désir d'acquiescer de la gloire.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général.

Salamanque, 14 Mai, 1811.

Quelque diligence que j'aie pu faire, la rareté des escortes et l'éloignement des stations m'ont empêché d'arriver à l'armée près d'Almeida avant le 7 à 4 heures du matin. L'armée était en présence depuis trois jours, et l'avant-veille il y avait eu un combat extrêmement honorable pour les troupes de Sa Majesté, dont le Prince d'Essling vous aura rendu compte. Un succès extrêmement brillant avait commencé la journée, il n'avait été acheté par presque aucune perte. L'opinion générale des officiers et des soldats, et les indications que présentent les localités, semblent prouver que si la division Marchand du 6^e corps avait été soutenue, une victoire signalée aurait été le résultat des efforts de l'armée. Des engagements sans objet et sans but ont succédé à une première impulsion, et ont coûté trop d'hommes à l'armée.

Ce qui me paraît évident de la campagne de Portugal, c'est que la situation des choses actuelles vient de ce que le Prince d'Essling n'a voulu livrer bataille ni pendant la retraite ni dans son opération sur Almeida, bataille qui lui a été offerte plusieurs fois, qu'il aurait évidemment gagnée, et qui aurait fixé le sort de la campagne.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général.

Salamanque, le 14 Mai, 1811.

J'ai reçu seulement le 6 l'ordre de S. M. qui me confie le commandement de

son armée de Portugal. J'ai déjà pris une connaissance générale de la situation des choses; et malgré le désordre de l'armée, sa fatigue extrême, et l'état de désorganisation où elle est, je trouverais facile à remplir la tâche que l'Empereur m'a donnée, si l'armée n'était en totalité dépourvue de moyens de transport pour l'artillerie et pour les vivres, et dans un pays où la longue station de l'armée et les sièges de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeida ont détruit tous les bestiaux. Cependant S. M. peut être assurée que tout ce qui sera humainement possible de faire sera mis à exécution, et que les intérêts de son service dans cette circonstance importante, mes devoirs envers sa personne, le besoin de justifier l'honorable choix dont je suis l'objet, me sont beaucoup plus chers que la vie. Mais V. A. me permettra d'exposer ici mes besoins, fondés sur la situation des choses, et de réclamer les secours qui sont éminemment nécessaires. De 4200 chevaux qui composaient l'artillerie de l'armée, il y a un an, 1400 restent aujourd'hui, et de ce nombre 400 seulement peuvent être attelés, 400 ou 500 pourront l'être dans quelque temps; le reste n'existera plus dans 15 jours. V. A. jugera quel est mon embarras pour rendre l'armée mobile; car enfin il faut des canons et des cartouches à sa suite. Le Duc d'Istrie m'a donné 100 chevaux de l'artillerie de la Garde, et j'apprécie ce secours; mais j'ose supplier S. M. de m'en accorder un plus grand nombre. Les chevaux de l'artillerie de la Garde sont très-près d'ici, et pourraient nous être donnés, tandis que d'autres venant de France les remplaceraient. L'équipage de l'artillerie de l'armée, pour une bonne défensive, devrait être porté à 2000 chevaux ou mulets. Sans moyens de transport réguliers, il est impossible de se mouvoir dans un pays que la guerre a dévasté, que de nombreuses bandes parcourent sans cesse, où les réquisitions sont extrêmement difficiles à effectuer. Y renoncer, ce serait rendre plus grands encore des désordres qui peuvent avoir les conséquences les plus graves. L'armée avait en entrant en campagne 300 caissons de vivres; il n'en existe plus que 34. Je demande avec instance, pour les vivres, 1200 à 1500 mulets de bât, qui pourraient sans doute être promptement achetés à Bayonne. L'armée Anglaise a 12,000 bêtes de somme, soit pour l'artillerie, soit pour les vivres; aussi tous les mouvements se font-ils avec facilité, et c'est de l'Espagne qu'ils en tirent le plus grand nombre.

Les moyens de transport que je demande sont calculés pour la défensive; l'offensive dans l'intérieur du Portugal en exigerait presque le double.

La destruction des mulets et des chevaux que l'armée de Portugal vient d'éprouver, est moins encore le résultat de la campagne proprement dite, que de l'absence totale d'administration, qui a eu lieu à son retour de Portugal, et qui existe encore.

V. A. apprendra avec étonnement qu'il n'a pas été fait une seule distribution, ni aux chevaux d'artillerie, ni à ceux de la cavalerie, depuis qu'elle est en campagne. Aussi la division de dragons, composée de 6 régiments, est réduite à 800 chevaux pour le service; le reste est incapable d'être monté. Les troupes légères, à l'exception de la brigade Fournier, qui est en meilleur état, sont réduites à rien. La brigade Lamotte, composée du 3^{me} de hussards et du 15^{me} de chasseurs, et qui est la plus forte du corps d'armée, n'a aujourd'hui que 247 chevaux susceptibles d'être montés. Mes premiers soins ont eu pour objet d'empêcher le mal de s'accroître, et de conserver au moins les chevaux existants; et les mesures que je vais prendre encore rempliront, j'espère, cet objet, le premier et le plus important de tous.

C'est au nom de la gloire des armes de S. M., c'est au nom du salut de son armée, et pour lui donner la facilité de détruire ses ennemis, que je supplie S. M. de nous accorder les moyens de transport que je réclame, et qui nous sont indispensablement nécessaires.

No. IV. (p. 90.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie au Maréchal Duc de Raguse. Llerena, 5 Juin, 1811.

En répondant à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 16 Mai dernier par le retour de M. le capitaine Fabvier, votre aide de camp, je vous ai prévenu que je serais aussi prêt à me reporter en avant dans les premiers jours de Juin. Nous voici à l'époque que j'avais annoncée, et je n'attends plus que

d'être instruit de votre marche pour commencer mon mouvement à l'effet d'opérer notre réunion et marcher vers le but que, l'un et l'autre, nous avons.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire prier de me faire part de vos opérations le plus promptement possible, et de presser votre marche vers Merida. Il n'y a plus de tans à perdre sans s'exposer aux plus graves conséquences. Nous aurons ainsi prévenu les renforts que l'ennemi attend, et Badajoz sera sauvé. Dans 3 ou 4 jours je me porterai en avant, quelques nouvelles que je reçoive de vous.

No. V. (p. 106.)

Le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général. Valladolid, le 6 Juin, 1811.

Je vous ai écrit depuis deux mois, pour vous faire connaître la situation de ce pays. Quels que soient les rapports que l'on fasse à l'Empereur des différents points de l'Espagne, il n'en est pas moins positif que je dis la vérité, et que les affaires sont partout les mêmes. Il est temps de prendre un grand parti. L'armée du Nord se compose de 44,000 hommes, il est vrai ; mais, si on en réunit 20,000, il n'y a plus de communication, et l'insurrection va faire les plus grands progrès. La côte sera perdue jusqu'à Bilbao. Nous manquerons de tout, parce que ce n'est qu'avec la plus grande peine que nous vivons au jour le jour. L'esprit de ce pays est affreux. Le départ du Roi pour Paris, la retraite de l'armée de Portugal, et sa marche sur le Tage, l'évacuation de tout le pays, même de Salamanque, tout cela monte les têtes à un point difficile à exprimer. Les bandes grossissent, et se recrutent sur tous les points avec la plus grande activité.

J'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler dans plusieurs de mes lettres de cet état de choses. Je n'ai rien à me reprocher, Monseigneur ; je ne cesserai de vous en parler : le service de S. M. le veut, ses intérêts me le commandent. J'ai cru devoir, en attendant, me mettre en mesure. J'ai donné l'ordre au général Bonet de se porter sur Léon, en gardant le col de Pajares pour menacer de tomber sur ce qui chercherait à déboucher par Oviedo, le long de la côte, ou dans la Castille.

J'envoie un bataillon et la cavalerie du général Wathier à Salamanque. Je réunis ici 4 régiments. Au premier signal, j'appellerai toutes les troupes de la Garde, soit pour agir contre quiconque déboucherait contre moi, soit pour me porter au secours du Duc de Raguse, ou de Madrid. Si je suis obligé de prendre ce grand parti, il ne faudra pas, de quelque temps, compter sur les communications. Vitoria, Burgos, et Valladolid sont les seuls points que je puisse garder. Cependant je ne lèverai les postes intermédiaires entre ces trois points qu'à la dernière extrémité.

Je vois avec regret le temps qu'il me faut pour réunir les troupes, et le peu de moyens que j'ai pour garder fortement Santander, qui est, sous tous les rapports, un mauvais poste qu'on ne peut défendre qu'en le couvrant de beaucoup de troupes.

Monseigneur, parlez de l'Espagne ; on fait illusion à l'Empereur. Ce n'est plus d'une bataille contre les Anglais que dépend la pacification de la Péninsule. Si les Anglais sont les plus forts, ils la livreront ou la recevront. A nombre égal ils la refuseront, à plus forte raison s'ils ne sont pas les plus forts. Ils ne la donneront point en plaine : s'ils la perdent, ils ont le Portugal pour retraite ; et, en Portugal, ils ne voient que leurs vaisseaux.

Tout le monde connaît le mode vicieux de nos opérations. Tout le monde convient que nous sommes trop disséminés. Nous occupons trop de pays ; nous usons nos moyens sans profit et sans nécessité ; nous tenons à des rêves. Cadix et Badajoz engloutiront toutes nos ressources : Cadix, parce qu'on ne le prendra pas ; Badajoz, parce qu'il faut une armée pour l'appuyer. Il faut détruire celui-ci et renoncer pour le moment à l'autre. Il faut se resserrer, avoir des points d'appui pour nos magasins et nos hôpitaux, et regarder les deux tiers de l'Espagne comme un vaste champ de bataille, qu'une victoire nous donne ou nous fait perdre, jusqu'à ce que nous ayons changé de système et que l'on veuille véritablement conquérir et pacifier l'Espagne. Nous n'avons personne sur la côte depuis Barcelone jusqu'à Vera ; Valence est l'entrepôt de tous les insurgés du nord et du centre ; et nous faisons le siège de Cadix !

Si je me trompe dans mon calcul, et que je passe encore pour un homme timide, vous vous rappellerez que j'ai l'habitude de calculer les chances; mais que, quels que soient les événements, je suis ensuite le plus tenace. Les conséquences de tout ceci peuvent être irréparables, s'il n'est rien changé au système actuel.

Il faut se dépêcher de renvoyer le Roi à Madrid. Son départ a fait bien du mal; on aura de la peine à le réparer.

Je vous envoie mes rêves; n'y voyez que la passion du bien.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Badajoz, le 21 Juin, 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. de tous les efforts que j'avais faits pour mettre l'armée en état d'entrer en campagne, et de manœuvrer pour secourir l'armée du Midi. Comme j'ignorais la situation précise de l'ennemi, je crus d'abord devoir m'en rapprocher, afin de profiter des circonstances que la fortune pourrait m'offrir, et en second lieu pour lui déguiser pendant quelque temps mes véritables intentions. En conséquence j'échelonnai mes troupes sur la route de Ciudad Rodrigo et sur celle de Plasencia, et je me portai de ma personne, le 5, à Ciudad Rodrigo, avec la plus grande partie de la cavalerie, et une forte avant-garde. Je profitai de cette circonstance pour jeter dans la place beaucoup d'approvisionnements; j'en partis dans la nuit, me dirigeant sur Gallegos, dans l'espoir de surprendre la division du général Craufurd, qui était cantonnée à 3 lieues de Ciudad Rodrigo. Peu d'heures ont suffi pour que ce général fût instruit de mon arrivée à Rodrigo; et il s'est mis en marche immédiatement pour se retirer au delà de la Coa, laissant sa cavalerie en observation, et abandonnant divers magasins de subsistances. Le général Montbrun manœuvra avec sa cavalerie sur la cavalerie ennemie, la poussa avec une grande vigueur, et lui fit quelques prisonniers. J'appris que Lord Spencer, qui commandait l'armée en l'absence de Lord Wellington, avait à ses ordres 5 divisions échelonnées des bords de la Coa jusqu'à Castello Branco. Je conclus qu'une partie de ces troupes était destinée à passer sur la rive gauche du Tage à la première apparence du besoin. Il me paraît évident que le maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, qui avait déjà devant lui l'ancienne armée qu'il avait combattue renforcée de 2 divisions, n'aurait jamais le moyen de faire lever le siège de Badajoz, et qu'un détachement de l'armée de Portugal même serait insuffisant, puisqu'il pourrait être toujours neutralisé par un détachement de pareille force qui conserverait à l'ennemi sa supériorité. Je me décidai donc à marcher avec toute l'armée. J'envoyai l'ordre au général Regnier de partir de Fuente Roble et de Los Santos, où il était avec 2 divisions, pour se porter sur Baños et Plasencia, en ayant soin d'établir l'opinion que ces 2 divisions seules étaient celles qui se rendaient sur le Tage. Il paraît que Lord Spencer a été complètement trompé sur ce mouvement, et que Lord Wellington n'a été instruit que d'une manière très-tardive de la marche de l'armée. L'équipage de pont sur lequel je comptais pour passer le Tage n'étant point arrivé de Madrid, ma marche a été retardée. Cependant il était urgent d'arriver; car tous les rapports annonçaient que la place de Badajoz était attaquée avec une grande vigueur, que 3 brèches étaient ouvertes, que 2 assauts avaient déjà été donnés, et que l'ennemi voulait à tout prix se rendre maître de cette ville importante. Quels qu'aient été les obstacles qui naissaient des circonstances, nous avons fait une si grande diligence, que mon avant-garde est arrivée à Mérida le 17 au soir, d'où elle s'est liée avec les postes de l'armée du Midi. Le 18 au matin, le Duc de Dalmatie et moi, nous nous sommes concertés sur les mouvements qu'il convenait de faire pour chasser l'ennemi de ses positions retranchées d'Albuera, et délivrer Badajoz; mais l'ennemi s'est retiré en toute hâte, a repassé la Guadiana, et est rentré en Portugal sans que nous ayons eu moyen de l'atteindre. Il est fâcheux qu'il n'ait pas osé tenter la fortune, car une victoire signalée aurait infailliblement marqué notre arrivée dans ces contrées. Nous sommes entrés hier à Badajoz, où nous avons pu voir de nos yeux quelle vigueur le général Philippon, gouverneur de Badajoz, et sa brave garnison ont mise à la défense de cette place, et combien ils sont dignes d'éloges.

Je ne puis me dispenser de louer l'excellent esprit qui a animé l'armée pendant une marche longue et pénible, dans une saison brûlante, et au milieu de beaucoup

de privations ; mais on ne saurait trop attendre de preuves de dévouement au service de S. M., des braves régiments qui composent l'armée de Portugal.

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Badajoz, le 22 Juin, 1811.

Je m'empresse de rendre compte à V. A. S. que la place de Badajoz est dégagée, et que les troupes qui en formaient le siège se sont retirées dans l'intérieur du Portugal, pour joindre le restant de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise, commandée par Lord Wellington, qui a pris la même direction.

Le 12 de ce mois, je partis de Llerena avec les troupes de l'armée du Midi que j'avais fait réunir. M. le général Drouet, Comte d'Erlon, que je savais devoir joindre 2 jours après, suivit le mouvement ; la tête de sa colonne arriva le 13 à Usagre, où était le 5^{me} corps. Je me portai sur Los Santos, où je me trouvai au milieu des établissements de l'armée ennemie. Le 15, je pris position à Fuente del Maestre ; et le 17 à Almendralejo, d'où le 18 je communiquai avec l'armée Impériale de Portugal, dont l'avant-garde arrivait à Mérida. Le même jour, je concertai avec M. le maréchal Duc de Raguse les mouvements des deux armées.

Le 19, nous fûmes instruits que le siège de Badajoz était levé, et que l'ennemi avait abandonné sa position d'Albuera, évacué Olivença, et qu'il retirait ses troupes sur la rive droite de la Guadiana, du côté d'Elvas. Dans l'après midi de la même journée, l'armée se porta en avant, et je reçus une lettre de M. le général Philippon, gouverneur de Badajoz, qui me confirmait la retraite de l'ennemi. Le 20, nos troupes arrivèrent sur la Guadiana, devant Olivença et à Badajoz. L'armée de Portugal manœuvra par la rive droite et suivit la route de Talavera ; celle du Midi déboucha par S^{te} Marta et Albuera, tandis qu'une colonne longea les montagnes sur la gauche. La cavalerie des deux armées est aujourd'hui en reconnaissance sur Villa Viçosa, Elvas, et en avant de Campo Maior, à l'effet de connaître les mouvements et dispositions des ennemis. Sur les rapports qui seront faits, nous conviendrons avec M. le maréchal Duc de Raguse des nouvelles opérations que l'armée de Portugal et celle du Midi devront entreprendre.

La jonction des deux armées sur les bords de la Guadiana est un des événements les plus remarquables de la guerre d'Espagne ; il sera par la suite du plus grand effet pour le bien du service de l'Empereur. Son premier résultat a été de sauver Badajoz. Les provinces méridionales de l'Espagne se trouvent entièrement dégagées du côté du Portugal, et la tranquillité, qui a été momentanément troublée sur plusieurs points, va se rétablir. Nous étions dans l'intention, M. le maréchal Duc de Raguse et moi, de livrer bataille aux ennemis ; mais Lord Wellington s'est prudemment retiré avant que nous puissions le joindre. Cependant ses forces consistaient en 60,000 hommes, dont 30,000 Anglais, y compris les divisions commandées par le général Spencer qu'il venait de retirer du nord, 14,000 Portugais, et 16,000 Espagnols ; il y avait dans ce nombre 5000 hommes de cavalerie.

Il est fâcheux qu'une affaire générale n'ait pu avoir lieu, le succès n'eût pas été incertain ; mais il est à espérer que l'occasion s'en présentera, surtout si l'armée de Portugal se tient en rapport d'opération avec l'armée du Midi, et communique avec elle, ainsi que cela a eu lieu aujourd'hui. Je ne puis à ce sujet conserver le moindre doute : l'empressement que M. le maréchal Duc de Raguse a mis pour venir, avec toutes ses troupes disponibles, au secours de Badajoz et de l'armée du Midi, lui est si glorieux, que j'en tire la conséquence que M. le maréchal sera toujours disposé à régler ses mouvements de la manière la plus avantageuse au service de l'Empereur, en attendant que S. M. ait daigné manifester ses intentions sur les opérations de la campagne.

Je dois à présent rendre compte à V. A. de la situation dans laquelle nous avons trouvé la place de Badajoz, et de la glorieuse défense de sa brave garnison. M. le général de brigade Philippon, qui la commande en qualité de gouverneur, a eu le rare mérite de se créer des moyens, et d'utiliser pour la défense tout ce qu'il y avait de Français dans Badajoz, tandis que d'une main vigoureuse il contenait les habitants, et les employait même aux travaux de fortification, que l'on a sans cesse perfectionnés. J'aurai incessamment l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. copie du journal de siège qui a été tenu ; aujourd'hui je ne puis que lui indiquer les principaux faits qui se sont passés, et la prier de vouloir bien présenter à l'Empereur M. le général Philippon comme ayant mérité d'éprouver l'effet de ses

bonnes grâces. J'ai l'honneur de demander pour lui le titre de Comte, et une dotation ; je solliciterai aussi des récompenses pour divers militaires de tout grade qui se sont distingués par des actions d'éclat.

Au 16 Mai dernier, époque de la bataille que je livrai à l'armée alliée à Albuera, il y avait 9 jours que l'ennemi avait ouvert la tranchée devant Badajoz, et 6 jours que le feu avait commencé contre la place. Le 15 au soir, les assiégeants retirèrent toutes leurs troupes, et les réunirent au restant de leur armée à Albuera ; elles ne reparurent que le 19. Pendant leur absence, le général Philippon fit raser la totalité des ouvrages qu'elles avaient élevés, et il fit rentrer dans la place les plates-formes et fascinaiges qu'il y trouva. Il prit même quelques convois aux ennemis, lesquels se disposèrent à reprendre les travaux du siège ; mais ils n'ouvrirent pour la seconde fois la tranchée que dans la nuit du 30 au 31 Mai. Le feu contre la place recommença le 3 Juin, et il continua sans interruption jusqu'à la levée du siège. Le 6, trois brèches étaient déjà faites, l'une au château, et deux au fort San Cristoval. La brèche du château, située entre le bastion de la Trinité et la Guadialua, à gauche de la lunette Saint Roch, était praticable ; mais le général Philippon la fit escarper, et ordonna d'élever en arrière un retranchement intérieur dans le terre plein du château. Cette dernière disposition était parfaitement entendue ; l'ennemi ne fit qu'une fausse attaque sur ce point.

Au fort San Cristoval, il n'y avait qu'une des deux brèches qui fût praticable. Dans la nuit du 7 au 8, 1500 Anglais se lancèrent dans les fossés du fort, appliquèrent des échelles, et voulurent donner l'assaut. Trois fois ils revinrent à la charge ; 75 braves, commandés par le capitaine Chauvin, du 88^{me} régiment, les repoussèrent constamment, et leur firent éprouver de très-grandes pertes. Nous eûmes des soldats blessés de coup de baïonnette sur le haut de la brèche. Le succès fut complet ; les morts, les blessés, et les échelles restèrent dans le fossé.

Les jours suivants, l'ennemi continua son feu sur le fort San Cristoval, et chercha à agrandir la brèche. Le capitaine Joudion, du 21^{me} léger, commandait dans ce fort avec une garnison de 140 hommes. Chaque soldat avait 4 fusils chargés à ses côtés, et le général Philippon avait fait placer sur les parapets une grande quantité de bombes chargées, dont le sergent Brette, du 5^{me} régiment d'artillerie, avait la direction (ce même militaire s'était déjà distingué au premier assaut). Dans la nuit du 10 au 11, 2000 Anglais se présentèrent de nouveau dans le fossé. Déjà ils avaient appliqué 40 échelles, la tête de leur colonne arrivait au haut de la brèche ; le sergent Brette s'écrie : *Mon capitaine, faut-il faire sauter la première mine ?* Les bombes et les grenades descendent, et, en éclatant, elles brisent les échelles et répandent la mort et l'épouvante parmi les ennemis, tandis qu'à coup de baïonnette la garnison les précipite de la brèche. En un instant, les fossés sont comblés de morts et de blessés, parmi lesquels plusieurs officiers Anglais. Dans cette confusion, des officiers Anglais demandent du secours ; le brave Joudion leur ordonne de redresser une échelle et de monter dans le fort pour se rendre prisonniers, ce qui fut exécuté. Au jour, le général ennemi écrivit au général Philippon pour lui demander une trêve de 3 heures, afin d'enlever les blessés qui étaient restés dans les fossés ou sous le feu du fort ; la demande fut accordée. La perte des Anglais, dans cette circonstance, fut de plus de 600 hommes. Nous n'eûmes pas 10 hommes hors de combat. C'est un des plus beaux faits d'armes que l'on connaisse.

On estime que la perte des Anglais, au siège de Badajoz, est au moins de 3000 hommes. Les Portugais et les Espagnols ont aussi perdu du monde.

En adressant à V. A. le journal du siège, j'aurai l'honneur de lui présenter le nom des militaires de tous grades qui se sont distingués, et qui ont mérité les grâces de l'Empereur, pour qu'elle ait la bonté de les solliciter.

M. le chef de bataillon Lamare commandait le génie, M. le chef de bataillon Colin l'artillerie. Ce dernier tomba malade pendant le siège ; il fut parfaitement secondé par M. le colonel Gonzalés et le chef de bataillon Horré, tous deux au service de S. M. C. Je regrette infiniment de ne pouvoir, dans ce premier rapport, citer tous les braves.

M. le général Philippon se loue de la fermeté de caractère que M. Theran, commissaire royal de la province, a montrée, ainsi que les chefs principaux de l'administration Espagnole qui étaient dans Badajoz.

Le 12, les ennemis étant instruits des mouvements que les armées opéraient, commencèrent à retirer leur artillerie de siège. Le 17, toutes les troupes ennemies

avaient disparu. Le 18, la communication fut rouverte avec Badajoz, au moyen des partis qui y arrivèrent par les deux rives de la Guadiana. Le 20, j'arrivai à Badajoz avec M. le maréchal Duc de Raguse.

Ainsi, les ennemis n'ont retiré de leur dernière expédition en Estremadure, et de leur attaque sur Badajoz, que la honte de s'être livrés à ces deux entreprises. Les Anglais ont perdu au moins 8000 de leurs propres troupes ; les Portugais, de 3000 à 4000 hommes, et les Espagnols autant. Ces pertes ont assuré de nouveaux triomphes aux armées de l'Empereur, et elles ont consacré, en faveur de l'armée Impériale, la victoire signalée qui a été remportée, le 16 Mai dernier, dans les champs d'Albuera, où je remplis le premier objet que je m'étais proposé, celui de faire diversion en faveur de Badajoz, et de mettre la place en état de prolonger sa résistance. Aujourd'hui, il est bien constant que la bataille d'Albuera a fait gagner au moins 20 jours, et que, pendant ce temps, des dispositions ont pu être prises pour faire arriver de nouveaux renforts et donner le moyen à l'armée de Portugal de prendre part aux opérations. Par là, le second objet que je m'étais proposé, en faisant mon premier mouvement, a été également rempli, et les troupes qui ont combattu à Albuera n'ont pas cessé un seul jour de garder l'offensive contre les ennemis.

J'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. l'ordre du jour qu'hier j'ai donné à l'armée.

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuschâtel, Major Général.
Badajoz, le 28 Juin, 1811.

L'armée ennemie qui avait repassé la Guadiana a continué sa retraite. Elle est dans ce moment à 3 marches de nous. Elle paraît renoncer entièrement l'Espagne, et se concentrer pour la défense de Lisbonne.

Lord Wellington avait déjà le 26 Juin son quartier général à Portalegre. Plus de 8000 malades et blessés Anglais ont été évacués sur Lisbonne, avec tous leurs gros bagages. Les Espagnols se sont reposés d'eux, et ont été dirigés sur l'embouchure de la Guadiana.

Les cadres des 6 régimens Anglais qui ont été détruits à la bataille de l'Albuera sont retournés en Angleterre. Il n'est resté de ces régimens que des officiers et des sous officiers.

Par les renseignemens recueillis des habitans, les Anglais ont eu à la bataille 6500 hommes tués, blessés, et prisonniers. Beaucoup de blessés sont morts. Les Espagnols et Portugais ont perdu 4000 hommes. La perte de l'ennemi est triple de la nôtre. Aussi dans la nuit du 17 au 18 avait il commencé à battre sa retraite ; et il aurait repassé la Guadiana si j'avais dû continuer l'attaque ; mais la réunion des Espagnols, sur lesquels je ne comptais pas, m'ayant présenté une trop grande masse de troupes, je ne jugeai pas à propos de le faire. J'avais d'ailleurs été informé que le siège de Badajoz avait été levé, et que l'artillerie en avait été retirée, ce qui me donnait un répit de deux mois pour venir au secours de cette place.

Les Anglais sont très mécontents du général Beresford, qui a été suspendu et renvoyé en Angleterre pour avoir exposé les troupes Anglaises, et épargné les Portugais et les Espagnols. Il est vrai que ceux-ci, qui étaient plus nombreux, ont été moins exposés que les Anglais, et ont fait de moindres pertes qu'eux.

Il nous arrive un très grand nombre de déserteurs de l'armée Anglaise. Tous assurent que les Anglais sentent leur impuissance pour soutenir la lutte en Espagne, et tout porte à penser que lorsque l'armée de réserve que V. A. m'annonce sera arrivée sur Almeida, ils se convaincront de l'impossibilité de tenir même à Lisbonne.

Les Anglais ont éprouvé une grande pénurie de vivres et d'argent. L'argent devient très rare chez eux : ils ne le répandent plus avec la même profusion. Ils attribuent cela à la défaveur de leur change.

Les brèches de la place de Badajoz se réparent avec la plus grande activité. La place est réapprovisionnée pour 7 mois. On vient de trouver un nouveau magasin de 100 milliers de poudre, qui avait été caché dans les souterrains.

J'ai fait raser Olivença.

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuschâtel, Major Général.
Badajoz, le 24 Juin, 1811.

Hier, toute la cavalerie des armées de Portugal et du Midi a été portée en

reconnaissance sur la ligne ennemie. M. le Maréchal Duc de Raguse a dirigé le général Montbrun sur Campo Maior, où il a rencontré 1200 chevaux Portugais et 2 divisions Anglo-Portugaises. Il n'y a pas eu d'engagement sur ce point.

J'avais donné ordre de diriger la colonne de dragons, commandée par le général Bron, vers Villa Vîpoca; elle n'a rien rencontré, et est rentrée sans avoir poussé jusqu'à cet endroit.

Le général Latour Maubourg ayant fait passer les gués de la Guadiana entre Jurumenha et l'embouchure de la Caya, au restant de la cavalerie de l'armée du Midi, il s'est porté directement sur Elvas. La colonne de droite, qui était commandée par le général Briche, a occupé pendant quelques instans 5 escadrons Anglais qui lui étaient opposés, tandis que la brigade du général Bouvier-des-Eclats, à la tête de laquelle était le 1^{er} régt. de la Vistule, manœuvrait sur leur droite. Ce mouvement a réussi : 2 escadrons du 11^{me} régt. dit des chevaux-légers Anglais et des hussards Hanovriens ont été détruits : 3 officiers et 160 cavaliers avec leurs chevaux sont restés en notre pouvoir; l'ennemi a eu en outre plusieurs morts et un grand nombre de blessés. Les 2^{me} et 10^{me} particulièrement ont été engagés : cette affaire leur fait honneur. M. le colonel Lallemant a été légèrement blessé, ainsi que 10 cavaliers. Dix autres escadrons Anglais sont restés à une distance respectueuse, et n'ont pas voulu s'engager.

D'après les renseignemens que l'on a recueillis, il paraîtrait qu'il y a dislocation dans l'armée alliée. On dit que les troupes Espagnoles, commandées par le général Blake, retournent vers l'embouchure de la Guadiana et le Condado de Niebla; que les Anglais et les Portugais ont déjà fait filer des troupes vers le Tage, et envoyé leurs équipages à Lisbonne; que Lord Wellington s'est dirigé sur Lisbonne; et que les ennemis ont envoyé sur cette ville plus de 8000 malades et blessés. On annonce également l'arrivée d'un renfort considérable venant d'Angleterre, qui a du débarquer, il y a peu de jours, à Lisbonne. Le régiment de chevaux-légers qui a éprouvé devant Elvas l'échec dont je viens de parler, avait joint l'armée 3 jours auparavant.

No. VI. (p. 148.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Duc de Raguse.
Paris, le 10 Juillet, 1811.

L'Empereur, M. le Duc, après avoir lu vos dernières dépêches, me charge de vous faire connaître qu'une division ne suffit pas à Truxillo; qu'il faut 2 divisions, une partie de votre cavalerie, et 15 pièces de canon. Vous donnerez le commandement de ce corps, soit au général Regnier, soit au général Montbrun. Vous devez tirer des vivres de Mérida et de Médellin, et ne pas laisser l'ennemi s'y établir. Vous vous tiendrez en correspondance immédiate avec Badajoz et le 5^{me} corps. Le reste de votre armée doit se placer à Almaraz, Talavera, Plasencia, &c., sur les rives du Tage, pour se reposer et être en position de se réunir promptement.

Il faut établir un pont sur le Tage, soit à Almaraz, soit à Garovillas, où jadis il en a existé un.

Vous devez faire construire le pont sur pilotis, et y faire une tête de pont, de manière à avoir un ouvrage important sur le Tage, qui soit à l'abri des incursions des guerrillas et de tout autre parti. Vous pourriez faire faire des ouvrages dans le genre de ceux que l'Empereur a fait construire au Spitz, mais sur une plus petite échelle. Il faut occuper Alcantara, et le fortifier comme poste; ce qui donnera un autre pont sur le Tage, et une nouvelle communication directe sur Badajoz. Cet objet est de la plus haute importance, et deviendra très-avantageux, lorsqu'on sera dans le cas d'opérer sur le Portugal, puisqu'on aura à Alcantara un lieu de dépôt qui servira d'appui.

Les Anglais, qui avaient d'abord réparé Almeida, l'ont fait sauter et raser en entier, dans le dessein de porter la guerre dans le midi.

L'Empereur pense, M. le Duc, qu'avant de retourner sur le Tage, vous vous serez assuré que les fortifications de Badajoz sont réparées, et la ville approvisionnée pour 6 mois. Cela supposé, il reste à voir ce que fera le général Anglais.

Il ne paraît pas probable qu'il veuille recommencer la campagne pendant la canicule, et notamment la commencer par un siège dans la saison la plus malsaine en Espagne. Si, contre toute probabilité, il le faisait, c'est, M. le Duc, au secours de l'Andalousie que vous devez marcher avec toute votre armée.

L'Empereur a donné le commandement en chef de son armée du Nord au général Dorsenne. Ce général sera bientôt en état de pouvoir couvrir Ciudad Rodrigo, de présenter une forte colonne pour inquiéter l'ennemi du côté de cette place, et de menacer le Portugal. Il pourrait même, en cas d'événement, réunir des forces assez nombreuses pour couvrir Ciudad Rodrigo.

L'Empereur vous recommande de faire retrancher le col de Baños de manière à y maintenir un poste qui assure, dans cette direction, vos communications avec l'armée du Nord.

Aussitôt que l'armée du général Dorsenne sera plus considérable, on le chargera entièrement de la province et de la place de Ciudad Rodrigo, ce qui pourra vraisemblablement avoir lieu vers le 15 Août. Alors l'armée du Nord aurait un corps sur la Coa. L'armée de Portugal garderait Alcantara, et serait à cheval sur le Tage, ayant sa gauche appuyée à la Guadiana.

L'armée du Midi occuperait Badajoz avec un corps d'observation pour soutenir cette place. Dans cet état de choses, M. le maréchal, si l'ennemi se portait sur Ciudad Rodrigo avec toutes ses forces, l'armée de Portugal marcherait au secours de cette place, de concert avec l'armée du Nord; ce qui réunirait une force de 70,000 hommes sur Ciudad Rodrigo.

Si, ce qui est beaucoup plus probable, le général Anglais marchait sur Badajoz, l'armée de Portugal se porterait sur la Guadiana, se réunirait à 25,000 hommes de l'armée du Midi; ce qui ferait 65,000 hommes. Enfin, si l'armée ennemie débouchait sur l'armée de Portugal par l'une ou l'autre rive du Tage, l'armée du Nord pourrait envoyer au secours de l'armée de Portugal 10,000 hommes; l'armée du Midi, 15,000 hommes; et celle du Centre, 6000: ce qui formerait une réunion de plus de 70,000 hommes. Car, avant que l'ennemi eût franchi l'espace depuis Alcantara ou Alfaiates jusqu'à Almaraz, l'armée de Portugal aurait eu le temps de recevoir tous ses secours. Vous sentez assez, M. le Duc, qu'on parle de ce projet pour parler de tout, car les localités doivent faire considérer cette opération de l'ennemi comme impraticable; mais l'Empereur a voulu parcourir ces différentes chances, afin de vous convaincre davantage que l'ennemi ne peut plus avoir de but aujourd'hui que de se porter sur l'armée du Midi.

S. M. désire donc que votre quartier général soit sur le Tage, au point le plus près de la Guadiana; que l'armée soit placée sur les deux rives; que votre droite soit sur Plasencia, au lieu d'y avoir votre centre, puisqu'il est plus probable que l'armée de Portugal sera obligée de se porter sur l'Andalousie que vers le nord. Voilà pour la défensive.

Quant à l'offensive, M. le maréchal, l'armée de Portugal ne peut faire autre chose que de se reposer, se refaire, se réorganiser, atteler son équipage à 84 pièces de canon, nommer à tous les emplois d'officiers (envoyez-moi promptement le travail), compléter les généraux, former des magasins, bien asséoir le passage du Tage par des ponts sur pilotis, faire de doubles têtes de pont, enfin occuper et fortifier Alcantara.

Après la canicule, si l'offensive doit avoir lieu sur le Portugal, cette opération se fera par un mouvement combiné de trois corps d'armée: celui du Nord, celui du Portugal, et celui du Midi, formant un total de plus de 100,000 baïonnettes, avec une immense artillerie et tous les moyens de transport nécessaires.

L'Empereur, M. le maréchal, aura le temps de donner ses ordres et de connaître vos projets, à mesure que vous serez instruit sur les lieux.

La guerre de Portugal n'est plus une expédition. On ne doit plus songer à aller à Lisbonne dans une campagne, mais dans deux, s'il le faut.

Ainsi donc, M. le Duc, tout ce que vous pourrez faire dans ce moment pour préparer l'offensive, est d'occuper Alcantara, et de le fortifier pour en faire un lieu de dépôt de vivres et de munitions.

L'Empereur, M. le maréchal, compte sur votre zèle et votre activité, et sur vos moyens pour qu'il ne puisse arriver rien de désastreux à l'armée du Midi.

Vous devez, M. le Duc, avoir un chiffre avec le Roi, le Duc de Dalmatie, et le général Dorsenne, pour les dépêches importantes.

No. VII. (pp. 229, 239.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Naval-moral, le 5 Août, 1811.

V. A. m'a fait connaître que l'intention de S. M. était que je formasse des magasins, et j'en sens toute l'importance. D'après le recensement que j'ai fait faire de tous les moyens de transport que le pays peut fournir, et dont je puis disposer, il n'y a aucun rapport entre leur quotité et nos besoins : en conséquence, j'ai l'honneur de renouveler à cet égard les demandes que je vous ai faites à diverses reprises. Le Prince d'Essling avait à l'armée 300 caissons de vivres attelés ; il m'en a laissé 10 qui y existent encore, et la guerre a détruit complètement tous les chariots du pays. V. A. trouvera sans doute ma demande légitime, et j'ose espérer que S. M. daignera l'accueillir, et ordonner qu'il y soit fait droit ; car ces transports sont au moins aussi nécessaires pour préparer la campagne que pour la faire.

No. VIII. (p. 235.)

Traduction d'une lettre en chiffre du général de division Foy à M. le général de division Girard.
Truxillo, le 20 Août, 1811.

Wellington bloque Rodrigo avec 40,000 hommes. Son avant-garde occupe la Sierra de Francia. On assure que l'artillerie du train arrive de Porto pour faire le siège de cette place, qui est approvisionnée pour 3 mois. Marmont va se porter vers le nord pour se réunir avec l'armée commandée par le général Dorsenne, et attaquer l'ennemi. Ma division partira le 26 pour passer le Tage et suivre le mouvement de Marmont. 8000 hommes de l'armée du Centre nous remplaceront à Plasencia et au pont d'Almaraz.

M. le Maréchal Duc de Raguse me charge de vous écrire que c'est à vous de contenir les 4000 Espagnols qui sont en ce moment réunis devant Truxillo.

No. IX. (pp. 250, 276.)

La général de division Wathier au Gouverneur de Ciudad Rodrigo.

Salamanque, 1 Sept. 1811.

L'armée Espagnole de Galice honteusement chassée de ses positions de La Bañeza et de Puente de Orbigo, et poursuivie par l'avant garde au delà de Villa Franca, s'est retirée en grande hâte sur la Coruña. Le Général en Chef, après avoir nettoyé ces parages, vient ici sous 6 jours avec 25,000 hommes de la Garde, et nous irons tous ensemble voir s'il plaît à ces illustres Anglais de nous attendre et de nous permettre de rompre quelques lances avec eux.

Le Duc de Raguse, à qui j'envoie de vos nouvelles, est autour de vous à Baños, Val de Fuentes, Plasencia, &c., et nous agirons de concert avec lui.

No. X. (pp. 276, 280.)

Traduction d'une lettre en chiffre interceptée du général de division Montbrun au Gouverneur de Ciudad Rodrigo.
Val de Fuentes, — Sept. 1811.

Je reçus le — du courant, *mon cher général*, votre réponse due à la lettre que je vous écrivais le — ; et je m'empresse d'en communiquer le contenu à S. E. le Maréchal Duc de Raguse, qui me charge de me mettre en communication avec vous. Je m'en acquitterai avec plaisir puisque c'en est toujours un nouveau pour moi de recevoir de vos nouvelles.

Je vous annonce qu'un approvisionnement très considérable se prépare à Salamanque par les soins du général Dorsenne. Le Maréchal, sur lequel vous pouvez compter, fait aussi des préparatifs pour vous envoyer des vivres. Tous les convois partiront sous bonne escorte, et se mettront en marche d'après ce que je présume le

— ou le — du courant au plus tard. Dans tous les cas ne vous impatientez pas. Nous sommes prêts à venir à votre secours de toutes les manières.

Vous ne saurez trop, de votre côté, nous mettre au courant de la force, de la position, et enfin vous ne pourriez pas nous donner trop de détails sur l'armée Anglo-Portugaise.

Je reçois à l'instant le billet que vous avez écrit hier au général Boyer, sur lequel vous nous faites connaître que d'après tous les renseignements que vous avez obtenus, vous croyez que les 7 divisions Anglaises sont dans vos parages. Il importe de s'en assurer positivement, de connaître leur position, et s'il est possible leur composition.

Il paraît que vous n'avez pas beaucoup de monde dans votre place sur qui vous puissiez compter. Proposez à l'homme que je vous envoie d'aller reconnaître les Anglais à Gallegos et Fuente Guinaldo, et de revenir par El Bodon, et vous me le renverrez ensuite. Dites lui que je le payerai bien s'il veut faire cette tournée, mais s'il s'y refuse je vous prie de ne pas l'y contraindre.

The parts in Italics were in cipher.

No. XI. (p. 296.)

Projet d'opération pour l'armée de Portugal, adressé au Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse, par S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.

Compiègne, le 18 Sept. 1811.

M. le Maréchal, Quand vous aurez 80 pièces d'artillerie bien attelées, que le général Vandermasen vous aura rejoint, ainsi que tous vos dépôts laissés dans le nord, que vous aurez reçu les habillements destinés pour votre armée, l'Empereur compte que vous aurez alors une armée de 41,700 hommes, et nous serons près du 1^{er} Oct. Quand vous serez certain que Ciudad Rodrigo a été ravitaillé pour 3 mois, l'Empereur, M. le maréchal, vous laisse maître, dans cette situation de choses, de vous porter sur Badajoz, d'investir Elvas, et d'inonder l'Alentejo. Dans ce cas, S. M. ordonne que le 5^{me} corps soit en entier sous vos ordres, avec 3000 hommes de cavalerie que le Duc de Dalmatie vous fournira, ce qui vous fera une armée de 57,300 hommes, appuyé à l'Estramadure et à la place de Badajoz. Vous pourriez faire le siège d'Elvas, prendre la ville et un des forts, ce qu'on ne considère pas comme très-difficile, inquiéter les Anglais jusque vers Abrantes et Lisbonne, et prendre une bonne position pour les attendre s'ils voulaient donner bataille pour faire lever le siège d'Elvas. S'ils vous laissent faire le siège d'Elvas, sans attaquer votre position, vous obtenez encore un véritable succès, vous dégagéz tout le nord, et par ce seul coup vous jetez l'ennemi dans Lisbonne. Elvas pourrait être pris avant le 15 Nov., hormis un des forts qui est de peu d'importance, ce qui achèverait les choses de manière qu'avant le mois de Février la campagne se trouverait tout à fait engagée dans l'intérieur du Portugal. Si l'ennemi voulait alors prendre l'offensive et se porter sur Salamanque et Valladolid, il trouverait Salamanque fortifié et approvisionné pour 2 mois; et le général Dorsenne aurait à se replier sur Valladolid, et même sur Burgos, où il se trouverait avoir une armée de 50,000 hommes, non compris une division dans les Asturies, et les troupes restées dans les 3^{me}, 4^{me}, et 5^{me} gouvernements. Mais le mouvement des Anglais n'étant probable, ils courront à la défense de Lisbonne, et ils seront poursuivis sur la Coa par une armée de 25,000 hommes, détachée de l'armée du Nord, ce qui leur tiendra en échec 2 divisions. L'opération dont je viens de vous parler, M. le maréchal, est la seule qui puisse rendre l'honneur à nos armes, nous faire sortir de la défensive où nous sommes, faire trembler les Anglais, et marcher au grand dénoûment. Les 25,000 hommes de l'armée du Nord qui seraient sur la Coa suivraient l'armée Anglaise; et, si celle-ci se concentrerait entièrement sur le Tage, l'armée du Nord détacherait 15,000 hommes pour vous joindre, ce qui porterait votre armée à 72,300 hommes.

La prise d'une place forte sous les yeux de l'armée Anglaise, la conquête d'une partie du Portugal, qui couvre notre armée du Midi, la réunion à votre armée de 25,000 hommes de l'armée du Midi, sont pour vous des motifs de gloire et de succès.

D'un autre côté, le maréchal Suchet marchera sur Valence, et tout porte à

croire que cette place sera prise quand vous prendrez la place d'Elvas, ce qui permettra de vous renforcer encore d'une bonne division.

Vous remarquerez bien, M. le Duc, que pour exécuter l'opération dont je viens de vous parler, il faut que l'ennemi n'ait pas d'artillerie de siège sur Ciudad Rodrigo; car si le siège de cette place était commencé, il faudrait d'abord marcher pour la dégager, puisque l'armée du Nord n'est pas en mesure de la faire à elle seule, et que son rôle est de battre en retraite si, ce qui n'est pas présumable, l'armée ennemie voulait tomber sur l'armée du Nord, quand vous marcherez sur le midi. Mais, si vous êtes en mesure, et que Ciudad Rodrigo ne soit pas assiégé, vous pouvez, avec le renfort du 5^{me} corps, attaquer et culbuter de toutes ses positions la ligne que les Anglais ont laissée sur la rive gauche; cela porterait l'alarme et inquiéterait tellement Lord Wellington, qu'il est à présumer qu'il retournerait à grandes marches sur Lisbonne.

En cas de réunion avec l'armée du Nord, pour marcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo si l'ennemi l'assiège, S. M. vous donne le commandement des 2 corps.

Vous trouverez ci-joint un duplicata d'ordre pour mettre le 5^{me} corps à vos ordres, quand vous serez décidé à marcher sur Elvas, ainsi que le duplicata de l'ordre au général Dorsenne si vous marchez sur Ciudad Rodrigo.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général. Ciudad Rodrigo, le 30 Sept. 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. qu'après avoir fait lever le siège de Badajoz, et rejeté l'armée Anglaise au-delà de la Guadiana, le Duc de Dalmatie et moi convinmes que je me porterais sur le Tage en laissant une division sur la Guadiana; que l'armée du Midi laisserait le 5^{me} corps dans l'Estramadure; que le Duc de Dalmatie se porterait avec le reste de ses troupes contre les divisions Espagnoles, qui avaient quitté l'armée Anglaise, et contre l'armée insurgée de Murcie; et que tandis qu'il détruirait et nettoierait les provinces de Cordoue, Grenade, Malaga, et Murcie, je tiendrais en échec l'armée Anglaise. Nous avons pris nos mesures dans le cas où le général Anglais ferait une diversion et se porterait de nouveau sur Badajoz; mais le général Anglais, sourd aux cris des Espagnols, a abandonné l'armée de Murcie à son destin, et, passant le Tage, s'est porté sur la Coa. On lui supposa dès-lors le projet d'aller au secours de l'armée de Galice.

Aussitôt que le général Dorsenne fut instruit de cette nouvelle combinaison, il marcha sur Astorga, battit les Galiciens, les dispersa au-delà de Villa Franca, et retablit les fortifications d'Astorga. Nous espérions que ce mouvement engagerait les Anglais à se porter sur Salamanque; mais ils restèrent impassibles à cet événement, comme ils l'avaient été aux désastres de l'armée de Murcie.

Vers les premiers jours de Septembre j'appris que les 7 divisions de l'armée Anglaise étaient toutes réunies sur la Coa; qu'elles bloquaient Ciudad Rodrigo; qu'on rassembaient à Fuente Guinaldo des fascines et des gabions; que les ouvrages du camp retranché de Fuente Guinaldo étaient déjà avancés; et que même l'équipage de siège y arrivait d'Oporto. Je proposai alors au général Dorsenne de me réunir à lui avec une partie de mon armée pour faire lever le siège de Ciudad Rodrigo, l'approvisionner pour long-tems, enlever le camp retranché de l'ennemi, ses magasins, et son parc de siège; et enfin lui livrer bataille et le poursuivre aussi loin que pourrait le permettre le plan général d'opérations que V. A. m'a communiqué par sa dernière lettre en chiffre, plan qui embrasse tous les climats. J'ai aujourd'hui la satisfaction d'annoncer à V. A. que tout a réussi à nos armes.

Je partis avec 5 de mes divisions, et j'arrivai le 22 par le col de Baños à Tamames, où je fis ma jonction avec les 4 divisions du général Comte Dorsenne. J'admirai le bon état d'un convoi de 1500 voitures chargées de vivres qui avaient été rassemblées et organisées avec une activité et un ordre extraordinaires. Les deux armées se mirent en mouvement. Nous reployâmes tous les postes ennemis, et fîmes entrer le 24 tout le convoi à Ciudad Rodrigo. Cette place se trouve par là approvisionnée pour long-tems. Le Comte Dorsenne m'a rendu les troupes de la garnison qui appartenaient à mon corps d'armée, et les a remplacées par celles de l'armée du Nord.

Le 25 nous nous mîmes en marche: nous aperçûmes à 2 lieues de Ciudad Rodrigo l'arrière-garde Anglaise. Le général Montbrun, commandant l'avant-garde, chargea l'ennemi avec cette rapidité et cette audace qu'il a si souvent

montrées, et lui enleva 4 pièces de canon.* Nous nous emparâmes du plateau, et nous nous y maintenîmes malgré tous les efforts des Anglais; qui furent obligés de se mettre en retraite. Le général Monthbrun les poursuivit pendant 2 heures : son feu fut si vif qu'il usa ses caisses de munition. La perte de l'ennemi a été considérable : il ne s'est arrêté qu'au camp de Fuente Guinaldo; mais notre avant-garde seule était là; nos divisions d'infanterie étaient à une marche en arrière; sans cela l'armée Anglaise était perdue. Nous eûmes la douleur de voir ses divisions se précipiter dans toutes les directions sur le camp retranché. Si j'eusse eu alors seulement 15,000 hommes sous la main, l'armée Anglaise était perdue, et battue en détail sans pouvoir se réunir. La division du général Anglais Cole était encore à Payo, tandis que la division légère du général Craufurd était à Martiango; mais notre infanterie n'arriva que pendant la nuit; et à la pointe du jour nous reconnûmes le camp retranché entièrement garni de troupes ennemis. Nous fîmes le général Dorsenne et moi les dispositions nécessaires pour attaquer le 27 au matin. Le général Anglais ne crut pas devoir nous attendre; il abandonna son camp pendant la nuit, se retirant sur Alfaiates et Sabugal. Nous entrâmes au jour dans Fuente Guinaldo, et fîmes conduire dans la place de Ciudad Rodrigo une grande quantité de fascines et autres matériaux rassemblés pour le siège. Je fis détruire les lignes de l'ennemi. Sa retraite se fit sur 3 colonnes. Le général Monthbrun se mit à sa poursuite par la route de Casilhas de Flores. Le général Wathier, avec la cavalerie de l'armée du Nord, prit la route de Albergueria : il rencontra l'arrière-garde ennemie à Aldea da Ponte, et la fit charger sur le champ. La division Souham étant arrivée, le combat fut glorieux pour les armes de S. M., et l'ennemi fut repoussé avec une grande perte et confusion. Son arrière-garde continue sa retraite sur Sabugal. Nous avons pris les bagages du Prince d'Orange et ceux du général Craufurd. La confusion était telle dans l'armée Anglaise qu'un aide de camp du général Wellington, cherchant à le rejoindre, est venu se jeter dans nos rangs. Nous avons fait à l'ennemi 200 prisonniers. L'armée de Portugal a eu 120 hommes hors de combat. L'ennemi a perdu 700 à 800 hommes. Assurez S. M. que les insurgés Espagnols ont éprouvé la plus grande indignation en se voyant ainsi abandonné au nord comme au midi; et ce contraste entre la conduite des Anglais et les promesses qu'ils ne cessent de faire nourrit une haine nationale qui éclatera tôt ou tard.

Je dois citer avec éloges les généraux Montbrun et Boyer; le capitaine Hubert, du 22^{me} de chasseurs; le lieutenant Merel, de la compagnie d'élite du 15^{me} de dragons; ainsi que mes aides de camp Jaret et l'abbé. Je ne saurais du reste trop me louer du zèle des généraux, officiers, et soldats de l'armée. Nous aurions suivi l'ennemi jusqu'aux lignes de Lisbonne, où nous aurions pu opérer notre jonction avec l'armée du Midi, qui, toute entière, n'a devant elle qu'une division commandée par le général Hill, si le moment marqué pour la catastrophe des Anglais était arrivé.

Le Comte Dorsenne, commandant en chef l'armée du Nord de l'Espagne, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général. Ciudad Rodrigo, le 30 Sept. 1811.

Dès l'instant que j'ai été instruit que l'armée Anglaise avait repassé le Tage et s'approchait de la Coa, je me suis décidé à marcher contre l'armée insurgée de Galice, dans l'intention de reprendre Astorga et de rejeter dans les montagnes ces corps mal organisés. J'avais prévenu le Maréchal Duc de Raguse de mon mouvement, pour que si l'armée Anglaise marchait au secours de celle de Galice, il pût faire des dispositions pour la suivre; mais l'armée Anglaise ne se donna aucune peine pour soutenir celle de Galice, qui fut battue et dispersée. Je repris Astorga, qui fut réparée et approvisionnée. Je me portai sur Salamanque; je réunis, grâce aux soins, à l'activité, et aux talens de l'ordonnateur Voland, que je ne saurais trop recommander aux bontés de S. M., près de 1500 voitures chargées de subsistances pour Ciudad Rodrigo. Le Duc de Raguse m'ayant fait connaître qu'il viendrait avec une partie de son armée co-opérer au ravitaillement de Ciudad Rodrigo, j'ai cru me devoir profiter de la latitude que m'avait donnée V. A. d'appeler à moi l'armée de réserve; je me contentai de faire venir la division Souham, et de laisser dans les cantonnemens désignés par S. M. les 3 autres divisions de ce corps d'armée.

* See note †, p. 447.

Je me réunis le 22 à Tamames au Duc de Raguse. Nous entrâmes le 24 à Ciudad Rodrigo. Je changeai aussitôt la garnison, évacuai les hôpitaux, et approvisionnai la place pour un an.

Le premier objet de mon mouvement se trouvait rempli heureusement ; le second, qui était d'enlever le camp retranché de Fuente Guinaldo, l'a été aussi promptement.

Dans le tems que le général Wathier marchait avec la cavalerie de l'armée du Nord sur Espeja, le général Montbrun se dirigeait par la gauche. Il rencontra l'ennemi sur le plateau d'El Bodon, où il engagea une affaire brillante, dans laquelle l'ennemi fut culbuté. Nous arrivâmes bientôt à Fuente Guinaldo, où nous apprîmes avec étonnement que l'armée Anglaise ne s'était point encore réunie. Si nous avions pu prévoir que le général Anglais était capable d'une pareille faute, nous aurions pu enlever une partie de l'armée Anglaise par des combats partiels ; mais nos troupes d'infanterie ne devaient arriver que dans la nuit et dans la journée du 26. Je fis mes dispositions pour attaquer le 27 ; elles ne purent être si secrètes que l'ennemi ne s'en aperçût. Dès 10 heures du soir, le général Anglais se mit en pleine retraite sur Alfaiates. Le 27 le général Wathier rencontra à Aldea da Ponte l'arrière-garde ennemie, forte de 15,000 hommes d'infanterie, 3000 chevaux, et 14 pièces de canon. Il chargea la cavalerie Anglaise avec audace, la rompit, et la mit en fuite, tandis que le général Thiébault se portait rapidement sur la route d'Alfaiates, en faisant sur l'ennemi en désordre un feu terrible d'artillerie.

Plusieurs charges de cavalerie nous rendaient maître de toute la plaine. A 4½ heures, le général Souham joignit le général Thiébault avec ses grenadiers et voltigeurs ; il fit attaquer le village avec cette vigueur qui le caractérise. L'ennemi résista avec opiniâtreté pendant une demi-heure, mais enfin le village fut emporté au pas de charge, et l'ennemi culbuté dans un ravin. Bientôt après cette partie de l'armée Anglaise fut rejetée au-delà de la Coa. Mon corps d'armée a perdu dans cette affaire 40 hommes tués et 110 blessés. La perte de l'ennemi est considérable, et le général Anglais Cole a été grièvement blessé. J'ai été extrêmement satisfait du zèle, de l'activité, et de l'intelligence du général Renaud, commandant à Ciudad Rodrigo. Il a organisé cette place de manière à faire, s'il y avait lieu, la plus brillante défense.

Je fais passer à V. A. l'état des officiers qui se sont distingués. Je prie V. A. de mettre sous les yeux de S. M. le zèle et l'ardeur qui animent toutes mes troupes. Lorsqu'elle jugera arrivé le moment de commencer les grandes opérations pour chasser définitivement les Anglais de la Péninsule, S. M. ne trouvera dans aucune armée plus de zèle et de dévouement.

No. XII. (p. 333.)

Le Comte Dorsenne, commandant en chef l'armée du Nord de l'Espagne, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général. Valladolid, le 21 Oct. 1811.

Le général Renaud, commandant à Ciudad Rodrigo, est sorti le 15 de ce mois de la place, avec 4 chasseurs à cheval, pour reconnaître par lui-même un lieu convenable pour faire du fourrage sur la route de Fuente Guinaldo. Il eut l'imprudence d'avancer jusqu'à une lieue et demie de la ville, lorsqu'un escadron de la bande de Don Julian, qui rôdait dans les environs, se précipita sur lui. Il tenta inutilement à se défendre : il fut pris avec 3 de ses gens. Le quatrième s'est échappé, et est rentré en ville. V. A. aura sans doute peine à concevoir une telle imprudence, de la part du général Renaud, surtout après les défenses réitérées que je lui avais faites à Rodrigo de ne point faire de sorties hasardeuses, surtout de sa personne, puisqu'il était pourvu de tout ce qui lui était nécessaire. J'ai aussitôt donné ordre au général de brigade Barrié de prendre le commandement de Ciudad Rodrigo. Il vient de partir avec un convoi de farines destinées pour cette place.

No. XIII. (p. 343.)

Copie d'une lettre déchiffrée du Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse, au général de division Foy. Talavera de la Reyna, ce 21 Oct. 1811.

Général, Je reçois seulement dans ce moment votre lettre du 18, avec la copie
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de celle du général d'Aultanne. Pour instruction générale, vous ne devez obéir à aucun ordre qui vous serait donné au nom du Roi, lorsqu'elles sont contraires à mes intentions particulières. Ne vous départez jamais de ces dispositions. L'armée de Portugal ne doit point servir aux escortes ni à la communication de l'armée du Midi. Mes troupes auront bien assez de courses à faire pour assurer la rentre de nos approvisionnement. Le Roi a paru désirer que je n'occupe point Illescas à cause de son voisinage de Madrid : par ce motif et plus en raison de l'éloignement et du service pénible que feraient les troupes, je ne veux point l'occuper.

Mon intention était de ne point occuper Aranjuez, mais puisque les ministres du Roi ont pris la mesure inconsidérée d'ordonner la vente des magasins, ne perdez pas un seul instant pour envoyer un détachement occuper Aranjuez, où le préfet de Tolède fera faire le plus de biscuit possible. Prenez la même mesure pour tous les points où il y a des magasins. Emparez vous en et que personne n'y touche. L'Empereur a indiqué la province de Tolède, et non la Préfecture, ainsi ce sont les ressources de toute la province qui nous sont affectées. Emparez vous en, et que le Préfet administre tout le pays. Dites bien au Préfet qu'à quelque titre que ce soit, aucune des ressources en blé, argent, de quelque source qu'elles proviennent, ne doivent être distraites pour Madrid, et qu'elles doivent toutes être conservées pour l'armée de Portugal.

A la fin du mois la division de dragons arrivera dans les environs de Tolède. J'espère qu'elle éloignera les guerrillas. Dans le cas où ils resteraient dans le voisinage, on leur donnerait la chasse.

Voyez à obtenir du Préfet de Tolède, qu'il fasse un effort extraordinaire pour envoyer à Talavera le blé et l'orge qui lui ont été demandés, attendu que comme ici on est obligé de faire des expéditions en avant, nous sommes dans un besoin très pressant. Je désirerais rentrer dans la possession de tout le blé qui a été vendu. On renverrait les acheteurs par devant le gouvernement Espagnol pour être indemnisés : s'il y a possibilité, engagez le Préfet à prendre des mesures conservatoires en attendant que je prenne un arrêté à cet égard sur le rapport que vous me ferez.

Je me rends à Madrid, où je passerai deux jours dans l'espérance d'éclairer le Roi sur la conduite que ses véritables intérêts lui commandent de tenir envers l'armée Française. De là je me rends à Tolède.

Je n'ai pas besoin, général, de vous recommander d'envoyer à Aranjuez un officier sage et ferme, qui exécute ponctuellement les ordres qui lui seraient donnés, qui se fasse obéir, et qui mette le plus grand soin à faire respecter l'habitation du Roi.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Talavera, le 21 Oct. 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. que les difficultés des subsistances allant en croissant, je me suis vu dans la nécessité d'établir mes troupes jusqu'à Tolède. L'armée est établie de la manière suivante : la 6^{me} division à Plasencia et sur les bords de l'Alagon ; la 5^{me} dans la Vera de Plasencia, disposée pour la soutenir ; la 2^{me} division à Avila, chargée d'assurer, par des envois de blé, la subsistance des 5^{me} et 6^{me} ; la 3^{me} division ayant des postes à Bejar, d'où elle est à même de savoir tout ce qui se passe sur l'Agueda, ainsi qu'à Talavera, dans la vallée du Tage et sur le haut Tietar ; la 4^{me} division en arrière de Talavera, sur la communication de la route de Madrid ; la 1^{re} division à Tolède et dans la province : ces deux dernières sont chargées de faire des envois de subsistances sur Talavera. La division de dragons sera placée sur la rive gauche du Tage, entre Tolède et Talavera ; et les troupes légères entre Talavera et l'Arzobispo. Par ce moyen, l'armée pourra vivre pendant quelque temps, et occupera assez de pays pour que je puisse espérer de former quelques magasins. Si je puis y parvenir, mon intention est de faire les plus grands efforts pour réunir une certaine quantité d'approvisionnements à Naval-moral ; ce magasin sera également bien placé pour tous les mouvements que pourrait commander la défensive, et il serait un premier échelon pour l'offensive. Aussitôt que l'offensive sera indiquée, si j'ai des moyens de transport, je porterai ce magasin à Galisteo (sur la route de Plasencia à Coria), excellent poste que je fais arranger, qui exige très-peu de monde pour être gardé,

et qui mettra mes magasins parfaitement en sûreté. Si ces magasins peuvent être proportionnés aux besoins de l'armée, ils seront d'un grand secours pour l'expédition de Portugal, telle au moins que je la conçois.

Quoique S. M. soit parfaitement informée de la nature des choses, je vous demande la permission de vous adresser un projet d'opération tel qu'il me paraît qu'il serait convenable de l'exécuter.

A mon retour de Ciudad Rodrigo, je suis resté à Plasencia pendant 15 jours, afin d'être mieux informé du mouvement de l'ennemi. Les Anglais n'ont fait autre chose que de rapprocher leurs postes de Ciudad Rodrigo; mais la plus grande partie de leur armée est restée en arrière de la Coa, et aucun détachement n'a passé l'Agueda. D'après les dernières nouvelles que j'ai reçues, l'ennemi s'est rapproché du Tage; il me paraît assez probable que, sentant son infériorité pour l'offensive, il n'entreprendra rien de sérieux, et qu'il n'a d'autre objet, en changeant de position, et quittant le pays élevé où il s'était établi pendant les chaleurs, que de rentrer dans celui où il était précédemment, qui a cessé d'être aussi malsain, et lui offre plus de facilités pour vivre.

Je ne place point de troupes sur la rive gauche du Tage, attendu que, pour qu'elles pussent y être en sûreté et y vivre, il faudrait les faire soutenir par beaucoup de cavalerie, et que j'en ai si peu, et qu'elle se fond dans ce pays avec une si grande rapidité, qu'il faut la conserver précieusement pour une opération déterminée. Néanmoins je m'établis solidement sur les hauteurs du Tage, de manière à pouvoir toujours déboucher avec facilité, et tomber sur l'ennemi dans le cas où il tenterait quelque opération sur la Guadiana.

J'ai établi de bons passages sur le Tietar, qui sont couverts par un bon camp retranché, où la division de Plasencia pourrait tenir tête à toute l'armée ennemie. Cette division est couverte par l'Alagon, qui présente de grands obstacles, surtout dans l'arrière-saison; ainsi cette division est parfaitement en sûreté.

No. XIV. (p. 355.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Au quartier général de Séville, le 26 Oct. 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. du mouvement que le général Girard avait fait sur Cáceres, et du but qu'il s'était proposé. Il a parfaitement réussi. Sa présence a occasionné la dispersion du corps que le général insurgé Castaños s'efforçait d'organiser. Plus de la moitié des officiers et soldats de ce corps a été dispersée ou prise; une partie est entrée dans ses foyers. Castaños lui-même a dû chercher son salut en Portugal. Le chef de bataillon Brondel, du 21^{me} d'infanterie légère, a fait une battue dans les montagnes en avant de Xerez de los Caballeros et d'Oliva. Il a rencontré plusieurs corps de divisions Portugaises. Il les a dispersés après leur avoir tué une centaine d'hommes, et blessé un plus grand nombre. Il est rentré avec un convoi de plusieurs centaines de bœufs enlevés à l'ennemi.

Deuxième lettre.

Au quartier général de Séville, le 2 Nov. 1811.

L'événement dont me rend compte le général Comte d'Erlon, commandant le 5^{me} corps, dans ses rapports des 28, 29, et 30 Octobre, est si honteux que je ne saurais comment le qualifier.

Le général Girard, après avoir dispersé le corps Espagnol du général Castaños, avait poussé jusqu'à Cáceres, où il était depuis le 13. Il avait ordre de se rendre le 22 à Mérida. Il crut cependant devoir rester à Cáceres jusqu'au 26. Enfin il en est parti pour venir coucher le 27 à Arroyo Molinos. Son quartier général fut établi dans ce village, ainsi que celui du Duc d'Alémbert, commandant la cavalerie légère. On se coucha sans placer aucuns postes au dehors, ni établir d'avant-garde. Cependant le général Girard était prévenu que la division Anglaise du général Hill manœuvrait sur la frontière. Plusieurs chefs de flanqueurs l'avaient averti que l'ennemi s'approchait en force. Son aveuglement et sa présomption furent si grands, que le 27 au soir l'ennemi était déjà dans les premières maisons à demi lieue de la ville, sans qu'il en eût aucune connaissance. Le 28 la 1^{re} brigade, commandée par le général Rémond, était déjà en route, et à plus d'une lieue et demie, lorsque le

général Hill arriva avec ses troupes jusqu'au logement du général Girard, sans qu'aucun coup de fusil eût été tiré. Un bataillon du 34^{me} et un du 40^{me} étaient en ville avec 3 pièces d'artillerie légère, et furent ainsi surpris par la négligence de leurs chefs. Ces braves prirent cependant les armes, se rallièrent rapidement, et, perçant à travers l'ennemi, se dirigèrent vers les montagnes, mais non sans perte. Le Duc d'Arenberg, colonel du 27^{me} régt., 15 officiers (dont 2 chefs de bataillon), avec 400 soldats, et 3 canons, ont été pris par l'ennemi. Le général Girard a gagné les montagnes avec la moitié de ces 2 bataillons, 500 cavaliers, et les aigles des 2 bataillons. Le reste de la division, commandé par le général Rémond, qui était parti une heure avant le jour, est arrivé à Merida, sans avoir rien entendu. Le général Bron, à la tête du 20^{me}, s'était porté rapidement sur l'ennemi, dès le commencement de l'affaire, et par plusieurs charges il avait aidé à dégager les troupes ; mais son cheval ayant été tué sous lui par une balle, il fut pris.

Le général Girard avait avec lui les troupes d'élite, et il s'est honteusement laissé surprendre par excès de présomption et de confiance. Au moment où il était en danger, aucune garde n'était établie. Les officiers et les soldats étaient dans les maisons, comme en pleine paix. Je vais ordonner une enquête et un exemple sévère.

Aussitôt que le Comte d'Erlon fut instruit de cet événement fâcheux, il se porta sur Merida, où déjà les Anglais étaient arrivés ; mais ils évacuèrent cette place à son approche. Après ce coup de main, les Anglais sont rentrés en Portugal, suivis par le Comte d'Erlon.

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Séville, le 12 Nov. 1811.

Le rapport que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire le 2 de ce mois à V. A. sur la surprise que le général Girard a éprouvée le 28 Octobre au matin n'offrait aucun détail. L'honneur des armes est sauvé : les aigles ne sont pas tombés au pouvoir de l'ennemi.

Le fond des 2 bataillons est rentré au 5^{me} corps, avec les généraux Girard et Dombrowski, et l'état major de la division qui était avec cette arrière-garde.

Par les rapports qui me sont parvenus, notre perte se monte à 400 hommes d'infanterie prisonniers, 120 de cavalerie, 200 chevaux, et 25 canonniers qui suivaient les 3 pièces qui ont été prises.

Le général Bron se trouvait en marche déjà loin d'Arroyo Molinos à la tête de 150 chevaux du 20^{me} régt. de dragons, lorsque l'ennemi attaqua le village. Il revint aussitôt sur ses pas, et exécuta avec beaucoup de valeur 3 charges ; mais les forces étaient trop disproportionnées, son cheval fut renversé, et il a eu le malheur de tomber au pouvoir de l'ennemi. M. le Duc d'Arenberg fut aussi démonté dans une charge, et en tombant il a reçu 2 coups de baïonnette. On annonce qu'ils ne sont pas dangereux. Son frère, lieutenant du 27^{me}, a obtenu la permission d'aller le voir aux avant-postes, entre Elvas et Campo Maior. Je regrette vivement que parmi les braves que l'armée a momentanément perdus dans cette occasion malheureuse, nous ayons à compter M. le général Bron et M. le Duc d'Arenberg, que leur mérite et leur valeur faisaient distinguer.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. un rapport de M. le général Comte d'Erlon, sous la date du 4 de ce mois, auquel se trouve jointe copie de celui du général Girard sous la date du 2. V. A. peut ainsi rendre compte à S. M. de tous les détails sur cet événement qui me sont jusqu'à présent parvenus, et auxquels j'ajouterais successivement ceux que je recevrai.

La conduite de M. le général de division Girard est trop répréhensible pour qu'elle ne doive pas donner lieu à un éclatant témoignage de mécontentement. J'avais annoncé à V. A. que si M. le général Girard rentrait, je lui ôterais le commandement de sa division, et que je le ferais conduire devant un conseil de guerre. Cependant, considérant ce qu'il a fait, après sa surprise, pour ramener le fond des 2 bataillons et pour sauver les aigles ; considérant aussi que la cavalerie légère paraît ne pas avoir établi de garde, et qu'elle a ainsi découvert le débouché par où l'ennemi a pénétré, j'ai pensé qu'en attendant les nouveaux ordres de V. A., je devais me borner à retirer le commandement de la division au général Girard, et à l'envoyer à Cordoue, où il sera, jusqu'à nouvelle disposition, sans emploi. J'ai fait donner ordre à M. le général de division Barrois de se rendre au 5^{me} corps pour le remplacer.

M. le général Comte d'Erlon me propose de réduire à 2 bataillons le 34^{me} et le 40^{me} régimens de ligne. Cette disposition me paraissant utile au bien du service, en considération de la force actuelle de ces 2 régimens, je vais l'ordonner, et j'envverrai le résultat de ce travail à V. A.

J'ai reçu des lettres de M. le général Philippon, gouverneur de Badajoz, sous la date du 1^r Octobre. Il me rend un compte satisfaisant de sa situation. Un convoi considérable que j'ai fait partir de Séville est arrivé à Badajoz.

Le général Comte d'Erlon au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie. Almendralejo, 4 Nov. 1811.

J'ai reçu hier le rapport du général Girard. Je l'envoie en original à V. E. par un aide de camp de cet officier général, afin qu'elle puisse le questionner sur ce qui s'est passé. Il y a eu dans tout cela une sécurité condamnable. Mais l'honneur des armes Françaises a été sauvé par la fermeté et la valeur des généraux Girard et Dombrowski; et cette affaire, qui devait avoir des suites fâcheuses, même déshonorantes, doit maintenant être rangée au nombre de celles qui sont assez fréquentes à la guerre. Le général Girard a ramené avec lui 800 hommes. Il en avait 1300.

J'ai retiré de Badajoz le bataillon du 40^{me}; ce bataillon rejoindra son régiment, et le bataillon du 88^{me} le remplacera. Je ferai former le 40^{me} et le 34^{me} à deux bataillons, afin de donner à ces deux régimens l'organisation qui convient à la situation où ils se trouvent, et au nombre d'officiers qui leur restent.

Le général de division Girard au général Comte d'Erlon, commandant le 5^{me} corps d'armée.
Ribera, le 2 Nov. 1811.

J'envoie mon aide de camp auprès de vous pour vous donner les détails du combat d'Arroyo Molinos.

A mon départ de Caceres, quelques bruits vagues, mais sans fondement, annonçaient un mouvement d'Anglais. Je quittai cette position, pour venir coucher à Torre Mejia, et le 27 à Arroyo Molinos. Dans ces deux jours, aucune démonstration n'a pu faire croire à la marche d'un corps ennemi.

Je devais me rendre le 28 à Merida. Le général Rémond avait ordre de se rendre à Medellin. Les troupes se rassemblent à 6 heures, et se mettent de suite en marche. L'arrière-garde commença son mouvement à 7½ heures, lorsque des cris et des coups de fusil annoncent que les troupes ennemies pénétraient dans la ville, qui n'était plus occupée que par les patrouilles de l'arrière-garde. J'accours alors. Le général Dombrowski forme en colonne les troupes de l'arrière-garde, et ordonne au 2^{me} bataillon du 34^{me}, commandé par M. Mouilland, d'arrêter les tirailleurs Anglais, qui commençaient à déboucher du village, et de dégager la cavalerie légère, qui était en avant du village, et que je supposais aux prises. J'avais jugé la force de l'ennemi, mais je ne pouvais abandonner la cavalerie. Je fais un mouvement en avant. Les colonnes Anglaises s'ébranlent alors, et marchent sur moi, qui avais, au plus, sous la main 1300 hommes; ils résistent à leur premier choc, et repoussent les charges de cavalerie; mais l'ennemi faisait en même tems un grand mouvement sur ma gauche, et manœuvrait pour m'envelopper. La route de Merida était déjà coupée; mes équipages enlevés; notre cavalerie ne se montrait pas. Je donnai ordre qu'on se retirât. Les Anglais se jettent alors par leur droite derrière moi. J'étais environné. Le général ennemi me fait sommer de me rendre. Je ne fais jour à la baïonnette, et nous faisons lentement notre mouvement rétrograde. Par une fatalité inouïe, notre artillerie ne me suivait pas. La pluie avait éteint les mèches; celle de l'artillerie de l'ennemi frappait nos bataillons; je perdais beaucoup de monde. Je vis alors qu'il m'était impossible de tenir plus longtems la plaine, n'étant pas soutenus par les autres armes. Je résolus de me retirer par les montagnes, mais il fallait abandonner mes trois pièces d'artillerie; je m'y décidai. J'ordonnai un mouvement à droite, et je me jetai sur les hauteurs qui se prolongent vers Montanches. L'ennemi me poursuivit vivement; je faisais à chaque instant repousser les attaques; mes flancs étaient également assaillis. Ma marche étant retardée par ces attaques, j'avais été prévenu sur le col de Montanches. Je fis enlever cette position. Je laissai Montanches sur ma gauche, et je suivis les montagnes qui se prolongent sur Zarza. L'ennemi occupe déjà le débouché. Le général Dombrowski reforma les troupes. Je me jetai dans la plaine, et fis charger à la baïonnette l'ennemi, qui cherchait à m'arrêter. Un

second parlementaire se présenta au général Dombrowski et à moi ; il fut renvoyé avec le même mépris. Je continuai ma retraite dans la plaine, mais sans cesser d'être aux prises jusque sur la hauteur de Iba-bernando, où je pris position. L'ennemi cessa ses attaques : je m'arrêtai quelques heures à Iba-bernando. Je me dirigeai ensuite sur Zorita ; de là sur Naval-villar et sur Orellana, où je passai la Guadiana.

J'ai perdu du monde dans les longs combats que j'ai livrés pendant une grande partie de la journée, contre des forces si supérieures. L'ennemi avait plus de 7000 hommes d'infanterie. Je délivrai dans une charge bon nombre de prisonniers fait dans les montagnes. Le général Dombrowski a montré une grande force de caractère. Il a dirigé les troupes avec autant de bravoure que de sang-froid. Son dévouement mérite votre bienveillance. Les officiers Guillot, Vectix, Mouilland, et Voirol ont fait preuve de valeur. Mon chef d'état major, H. Audry, a été fait prisonnier. C'est une perte sensible. MM. Vectix et Voirol sont restés blessés au pouvoir de l'ennemi. Le général Dombrowski a tout perdu ; mais sa belle conduite et tant de bravoure méritent une récompense. Je sollicite pour lui de l'avancement dans la Légion d'Honneur.

Le général de division Girard au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

M. le Comte d'Erlon charge mon aide de camp de remettre à V. E. le rapport du combat d'Arroyo Molinos. V. E. y verra que j'étais en marche, que je pouvais me retirer et éviter de combattre avec mon arrière-garde. Mais la cavalerie était compromise, et il fallait l'abandonner. L'ennemi était nombreux. Je ne vis que l'honneur des armes de S. M. Je ne consultai que le devoir d'un soldat dévoué. Je marchais aux Anglais ; et en attirant sur moi toutes les forces ennemies, je dégageai la cavalerie légère.

Nous avons fait des pertes sensibles, mais nous sommes sortis avec honneur de la position la plus difficile. Trois fois enveloppés, trois fois nous sommes faits jour à la baïonnette. M. le maréchal, je serais au désespoir si cette circonstance, que des résultats fâcheux accompagnent, pouvait m'éloigner de la confiance de S. M. ; je la mérite par les sentimens qui m'ont dirigé, par ceux qui m'animent.

No. XV. (p. 390.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, à S. M. le Roi d'Espagne.

Paris, le 13 Déc. 1811.

L'Empereur m'ordonne de faire connaître à V. M. les dispositions que je viens de prescrire pour la nouvelle organisation des armées du Nord et de Portugal.

Je mande au Duc de Raguse que l'Empereur a jugé convenable de lui confier la défense de Ciudad Rodrigo, d'Astorga, des provinces d'Avila, de Plasencia, de Salamanque, de Palencia, du royaume de Léon, des Asturies, et enfin de tout le territoire qui forme les 6^{me} et 7^{me} gouvernements ; en sorte que le nouvel arrondissement de l'armée de Portugal comprend désormais ces deux gouvernements, la province des Asturies, celle d'Avila, celle de Plasencia, et une partie de l'Estremadure ; au moyen de cet accroissement de territoire, le Duc de Raguse rendra à l'armée du Centre la portion de la province de Tolède que V. M. lui avait dernièrement cédée.

Je donne l'ordre au maréchal de porter de suite son quartier général à Valladolid, et même, s'il est possible, à Salamanque.

La division Souham, qui est à Salamanque, est mise sous ses ordres ; elle formera sa 7^{me} division ; et la division Bonet, qui est dans les Asturies, formera la 8^{me} division de son armée.

Toutes les autres troupes de l'armée du Nord, qui sont maintenant dans les provinces cédées à l'armée de Portugal, se réuniront sur Burgos. Le général Dorsenne établira son quartier général dans cette place ; il conservera le commandement en chef de l'armée du Nord, dont le nouvel arrondissement sera composé des provinces qui forment les 3^{me}, 4^{me}, et 5^{me} gouvernements.

L'Empereur espère que Valence sera pris dans le courant de ce mois, ce qui permettra le retour de la division Caffarelli à l'armée du Nord ; et il est possible

qu'alors S. M. retire de l'Espagne une partie de sa Garde, si les nuages qui obscurcissent la politique du nord ne s'éclaircissent pas.

Il est probable que les Anglais n'entreprendront rien d'ici au mois de Février, et tout porte à penser qu'ils resteront sur la défensive. Si le cas arrivait qu'ils se portassent en avant, le Duc de Raguse a l'ordre de réunir ses 8 divisions, et de marcher droit à eux pour leur livrer bataille, soutenu par le général Dorsenne, qui, de Burgos, se porterait avec toutes ses forces pour appuyer l'armée de Portugal.

Je donne l'ordre au Duc de Dalmatie de renforcer, autant qu'il sera possible, le corps qui est sur la Guadiana, afin d'arrêter et de contenir le corps du général Hill dans l'Alentejo, de forcer les Anglais de rester sur la rive gauche, et d'empêcher ainsi toute entreprise contre Madrid.

Je recommande à ce maréchal de faire tout ce qui est possible afin d'approvisionner Badajoz pour un an, et de seconder, par une forte diversion sur Murcie, la prise si importante de Valence.

No. XVI. (p. 447.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Valladolid, le 16 Janvier, 1812.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. que j'ai reçu hier au soir le rapport que l'armée Anglaise s'est subitement réunie, et le 8 a passé l'Aguada après avoir jeté un pont de bateaux à 2 lieues au-dessous de la place, et a amené avec elle des pièces de siège. Le 10 la place a été investie, et les travaux de siège sont commencés sur-le-champ. Je ne perds pas un instant pour marcher au secours de la place. J'avais réuni 4 divisions pour le ravitaillement de Ciudad Rodrigo; mais ces forces ne suffisent pas aujourd'hui. Je suis donc forcé d'appeler 2 divisions de l'armée du Nord et la division Bonet, à laquelle j'ordonne de quitter les Asturies. Tout cela me formera après de 60,000 hommes, avec lesquels je marcherai à l'ennemi. Vous pouvez vous attendre à des événemens heureux et glorieux pour les armes Françaises. Mon armée sera réunie le 21. Comme j'avais ordonné au général Montbrun de revenir à la fin de Janvier, je ne pense pas qu'il puisse arriver ici avant Février. Il a sous ses ordres 3 divisions, et une partie de ma cavalerie.

Deuxième Rapport.

Salamanque, le 18 Janvier, 1812.

A l'instant où j'arrive à Salamanque j'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte que d'après les derniers rapports que je reçois, le faubourg de Rodrigo, ainsi qu'une redoute que j'ai fait construire, ont été enlevés de surprise pendant la nuit du 10. C'est un événement malheureux; car j'avais toujours compté que leur défense exigerait des travaux de siège, et nous ferait gagner 8 ou 10 jours.

On m'annonce d'un autre côté que les premières pièces de siège ont seulement passé l'Aguada le 14. En attendant la réunion des troupes, je vais faire une diversion, et pousser une forte avant-garde le plus près possible de la ville, afin qu'elle se fasse entendre, et qu'elle avertisse qu'on marche au secours.

Troisième Rapport.

Salamanque, le 22 Janvier, 1812.

Le 10 dans la nuit l'ennemi s'est présenté devant Rodrigo: il s'empare des couvens du faubourg. Dans la journée du 16, des batteries Anglaises commencent leur feu à une grande distance, et le 19 la place est prise d'assaut, et tombe au pouvoir de l'ennemi. Il y a dans cet événement quelque chose de si incompréhensible que je ne me permets aucune observation. Je n'ai pas encore les renseignements nemens nécessaires.

Quatrième Rapport.

Salamanque, le 24 Janvier, 1812.

Je m'étais concerté avec le général Comte Dorsenne pour la réunion de nos troupes, mais les espérances que j'avais conçues de voir l'armée ennemie fière d'un premier succès tenir au-delà de l'Aguada, se sont promptement évanouies. Les reconnaissances que j'ai envoyées me rendent compte que le corps ennemi qui

s'était porté sur Tamames, et qu'on avait déjà pris pour l'armée réunie, s'est replié sur l'Agueda, a repassé cette rivière, et est rentré en Portugal après avoir levé ses ponts.

Les Anglais ont enlevé une partie de la grosse artillerie de la place pour la transporter à Almeida. Ils n'ont laissé aucun Anglais à Ciudad Rodrigo.

Rapport du général Barrié, Gouverneur de Ciudad Rodrigo, sur la défense de cette place, adressé au Ministre de la Guerre. Le 8 Août, 1812.

La garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo se croyait au moment d'être ravitaillée, lorsque l'ennemi se présenta sous les murs de la place. Elle n'avait du pain que jusqu'au 2 Fév., et la viande lui aurait manqué depuis longtemps, sans la prévoyance du gouverneur, qui, par des sorties faites à propos, parvint à se procurer une certaine de pores, et fit alterner à temps la distribution de viande avec celle de légumes.

L'ennemi n'avait encore fait aucune démonstration inquiétante. Il s'était borné à occuper les villages et les hameaux des environs de la place, et à faire de fréquentes patrouilles pour intercepter nos communications avec Salamanque. Un assez grand nombre de déserteurs qui nous étaient arrivés, se contredisaient dans leurs renseignements sur la position et les mouvements des divers corps de l'armée Anglaise; mais tous s'accordaient à assurer que cette armée manquait complètement de vivres, et que plusieurs divisions avaient été obligées de repasser la Coa pour trouver des subsistances. J'étais cependant certain que Lord Wellington avait fait arriver à Almeida beaucoup de grosse artillerie, qu'il était très-fâché d'avoir laissé échapper le petit convoi avec lequel j'étais entré à Ciudad Rodrigo, et qu'il ferait tous ses efforts pour s'emparer de celui qui nous était annoncé.

Dès les premiers jours du mois de Décembre, l'ennemi s'occupa de la construction de ponts sur l'Agueda, et en fit un assez solide pour faire passer de la grosse artillerie, entre Gallegos et San Felices, à deux lieues au-dessous de la place. En même temps, il fit requérir toutes les voitures et toutes les bêtes de somme du pays pour effectuer des transports que je crus être ceux des projectiles et des approvisionnements nécessaires pour alimenter au besoin son armée, lorsqu'elle se porterait sur la rive droite de l'Agueda. J'ai donné avis de tous ces mouvements à M. le général en chef Comte Dorsenne, par mes lettres des 8 et 30 Déc., adressées au général Thiébault, commandant à Salamanque.

Enfin, le 8 Jan., toujours dans l'attente du convoi que nous devions recevoir, nous aperçûmes l'armée Anglaise en mouvement vers le couvent de la Caridad au sud de la place. De nombreuses colonnes vinrent prendre position sur la route de Salamanque, et d'autres se jetèrent dans les ravins au nord de la place. Vers 3 heures, une reconnaissance poussée de ce côté rapporta qu'on apercevait beaucoup de voitures, et que l'ennemi déchargeait des gabions et des fascines. Je n'eus alors aucun doute sur ses projets contre la place. Je fis de suite renforcer la garde de la petite redoute Renaud, où il n'y avait que 10 hommes d'infanterie et 5 canonniers, et j'y envoyai 50 hommes d'infanterie commandés par un officier et 8 canonniers avec un officier d'artillerie. Le commandant d'artillerie y fit porter des munitions pour les 3 bouches à feu qui s'y trouvaient, et s'y rendit lui-même avec le commandant du génie pour prescrire les moyens de défense. On approvisionna également les 2 pièces placées dans le couvent de Saint François, et le poste de ce couvent eut l'ordre d'observer les mouvements que l'ennemi pourrait faire de ce côté, sur la redoute Renaud, et de la secourir au besoin.

Ces dispositions étaient à peine achevées, lorsque entre 7 et 8 heures du soir une fusillade très-vive nous annonça que la redoute était attaquée. Au feu des pièces de canon, nous vîmes succéder le jet des grenades, et bientôt après nous entendîmes un hurra qui se prolongea jusqu'à ce que le feu ayant entièrement cessé, nous pûmes juger que la redoute avait été enlevée. En ce moment commença le feu de toutes les pièces de la place qui avaient vue de ce côté, et il continua toute la nuit. Au jour, nous vîmes que l'ennemi avait ouvert sur le plateau du grand Teso une parallèle appuyée à la redoute Renaud, ainsi qu'une communication. Nous lançâmes beaucoup de bombes, et la batterie de Saint François inquiéta les travailleurs de la parallèle. Je fis donner l'ordre aux

habitants qui désiraient quitter la place de sortir immédiatement; et, dès ce moment, toute communication cessa avec le dehors.

Dans la nuit du 9 au 10, je fis partir pour Salamanque deux émissaires chargés d'annoncer au général Thiébault la prise de la redoute Renaud et le commencement du siège. L'artillerie continua son feu sur le terrain occupé par l'ennemi, et lança des pots à feu qui nous firent découvrir quelques-uns de ses travaux. La batterie de Saint François tira toute la nuit, et de petites sorties faites de ce poste et du couvent de Santa Cruz inquiétèrent l'ennemi qui, néanmoins, prolongea sa parallèle vers la droite en suivant la pente du terrain, et entreprit deux grandes batteries. Au jour, nous remarquâmes un grand transport de sacs à terre: plusieurs parties des coffres de ses batteries en étaient pleines, ainsi que la parallèle et ses communications. Un grand nombre de travailleurs tiraient des terres du dehors et du dedans des batteries, et formaient une place d'armes en arrière de la redoute Renaud. Le feu de la place fut dirigé sur les points où les travaux paraissaient les plus imparfaits, et les mortiers lancèrent des bombes sur les batteries commencées. Trente fusils de rempart répartis sur le pourtour de la place firent feu sur tous les travailleurs qui se montrèrent.

Dans la nuit du 10 au 11, un nouveau message fut envoyé à Salamanque pour faire connaître la situation de la place. L'ennemi forma un crochet à la droite de la parallèle, et un autre à la gauche pour s'opposer aux tentatives du poste que nous avions au couvent de Saint François; il plaça même des tirailleurs dans des trous creusés près de ce couvent pour inquiéter nos canonniers. Au jour il continua ses travaux et élargit le crochet commencé la nuit à la droite de la première parallèle. On aperçut des voitures de paysans dans les batteries et dans les tranchées. La place continua son feu, et le poste du couvent de Saint François parvint à déloger de leurs trous les tirailleurs ennemis embusqués près de ce couvent.

Dans la nuit du 11 au 12, l'ennemi déboucha par un zigzag de l'extrémité de la première parallèle, en s'avancant vers la place. Il fit ce travail à la sape volante, et y employa des sacs à terre. Au jour, ce cheminement était imparfait, et il travailla toute la journée à s'y enfoncer. Il continua aussi les travaux de ses batteries. La place mit tous ses mortiers en jeu, et entretint son feu comme les jours précédents. Une des deux pièces de la batterie Saint François tomba de la terrasse où elle se trouvait; on la remplaça par un petit obusier placé au pied de cette terrasse.

Dans la nuit du 12 au 13, l'ennemi avança peu; mais il travailla beaucoup à ses batteries, dont il prépara les plateformes, et il acheva le zigzag qu'il avait commencé en avant de la première parallèle. Notre artillerie ne cessa de tirer toute la nuit, et un feu continu de mousqueterie fut dirigé des postes de Saint François et de Santa Cruz sur les travaux de l'ennemi.

Le 13, vers 8 heures du soir, le couvent de Santa Cruz fut attaqué par des forces supérieures. Les 50 hommes qui s'y trouvaient furent contraints de se replier avec quelque perte et se jetèrent dans le fossé de la place. L'ennemi entreprit alors deux longs zigzags qui furent conduits jusqu'au pied du petit Teo.

Le 14 au matin, une sortie de la place détruisit ces travaux, reprit le couvent de Santa Cruz, et ne rentra dans la ville qu'à l'arrivée des réserves de l'ennemi, laissant un poste dans le couvent. Vers 3 heures du soir, les Anglais démasquèrent leurs embrasures et commencèrent leur feu avec 20 pièces de 24, réparties dans deux grandes batteries. A la nuit, ils cessèrent leur tir, et nous fîmes rentrer dans la place le poste de Santa Cruz.

Dans la nuit du 14 au 15, le couvent et le faubourg de Saint François furent attaqués de toutes parts. Les 150 hommes qui gardaient le couvent firent leur retraite sur le glacis, après avoir encloué leurs deux pièces. L'ennemi fit une communication de la redoute Renaud au couvent qu'il entourait d'un fossé, et il entreprit de ce même côté une nouvelle batterie. La place fit un feu continu d'artillerie et de mousqueterie sur tout le front d'attaque. Au jour, l'ennemi reprit le sien avec 26 pièces de 24, réparties dans ses deux grandes batteries, et le dirigea principalement sur le point de jonction de la brèche faite en 1810 avec l'ancienne maçonnerie. Cette partie de la muraille, reconstruite en pierres de taille sans chaux ni ciment, fut démolie avec une rapidité étonnante, bien que les batteries en fussent éloignées de 150 toises. A la nuit, l'amoncellement des décombres s'élevait déjà à 10 ou 12 pieds au-dessous du parapet.

(Retd)

(Retd)

Dans la nuit du 15 au 16, la garnison commença de chaque côté de la brèche des coupures appuyées au mur intérieur du rempart, qui formait un escarpement du côté de la ville. Des corvées furent employées par le génie à déblayer le pied de la brèche et à étendre les décombres sur le terre-plein de la fausse braie. De son côté, l'ennemi répara ses batteries, et poussa un cheminement jusque sur le petit Teso, qu'il couronna de sacs à terre. Il travailla à force à la nouvelle batterie qu'il avait commencée près de Saint François. Le feu de ses deux autres batteries fut très-nourri, tant sur la brèche que sur nos défenses, et des tirailleurs qu'il plaça sur le petit Teso inquiétèrent beaucoup nos canonniers. Dans la journée, un brouillard très-épais favorisa l'ennemi, qui en profita pour continuer ses travaux. Je fis garnir de troupes la fausse braie pour défendre le fossé, où circulaient constamment des patrouilles. Lord Wellington me somma de lui rendre la place ; je lui répondis que la garnison et moi nous péririons sous ses décombres plutôt que de la livrer.

Toute la nuit du 16 au 17, la garnison fut sur pied et occupée, soit à faire feu sur les cheminements et les batteries de l'ennemi, soit à retrancher la brèche et à en enlever les décombres. Au jour, nous vîmes que l'ennemi avait continué à force à travailler à la batterie qu'il avait commencée près du couvent de Saint François, et qu'il avait étendu sur le petit Teso sa deuxième parallèle, dont il travaillait à épaissir le parapet avec des sacs à terre. Il perfectionna la communication qui y aboutissait, voulant sans doute partir de cette parallèle pour s'avancer sur le glacis. Il continua avec succès son feu contre la brèche. Celui de la place ne fut pas ralenti, et deux nouvelles embrasures furent ouvertes pour contre-battre la nouvelle batterie que faisait l'ennemi près de Saint François. Nous continuâmes à préparer les moyens de défense de la brèche, et nous plaçâmes des poutres sur le parapet du corps de place, afin de les jeter sur les assaillants s'ils tentaient l'escalade.

Dans la nuit du 17 au 18, l'ennemi jeta des obus sur la brèche, et tira à mitraille d'une batterie de campagne, qu'il établit derrière une gabionnade, près du couvent de Santa Cruz. Il plaça aussi des tirailleurs au pied du petit Teso, dans le ravin le plus voisin du glacis ; il perfectionna ses ouvrages et acheva sa nouvelle batterie. Nous fîmes une vive fusillade sur le petit Teso et sur les tirailleurs qui s'étaient établis en avant, et notre artillerie réduisit au silence la batterie de campagne voisine du couvent de Santa Cruz. Le génie continua ses défenses sur le rempart et derrière la brèche, dont il essaya encore de déblayer les décombres qui s'élevaient jusqu'au niveau du terre-plein. Au jour, nous aperçûmes que l'ennemi n'avait pas fait de cheminement en avant du petit Teso ; seulement, il avait débouché de sa communication de droite par un boyau qu'il chercha à pousser à la sape pleine ; mais notre artillerie ayant arrêté et bouleversé ce travail, il s'enterra et ne fit plus un pas en avant. Il continua à tirer sur la brèche, dont il augmenta beaucoup les ruines. Vers 9 heures, il démasqua à sa nouvelle batterie 7 pièces de 24, qui commencèrent leur feu sur la partie du rempart contiguë à la face gauche d'une vieille tour, située à peu près à moitié distance de la brèche déjà faite et de la porte del Conde. Ce point était unique dans la place pour la facilité avec laquelle on pouvait y faire brèche, et par la difficulté de s'y défendre ; c'est l'endroit où le mur est le plus bas, le parapet le plus mince, le terre-plein du rempart et de la fausse braie le plus étroit ; enfin c'était là que se trouvait la seule pièce de canon qui pouvait flanquer la brèche déjà faite. La muraille de la vieille tour, battue très-bas, s'écroula bientôt comme une avalanche, et cette nouvelle brèche, dont la formation semblait devoir nous faire gagner du temps, puisque les cheminements de l'ennemi en étaient encore à plus de 100 toises, devint pour nous à la fin du jour une grande cause d'alarme, et précipita notre perte.

Pendant la nuit du 18 au 19, la garnison resta sur pied et fit un feu continu sur l'ennemi. On commença des coupures pour la défense de la nouvelle brèche. Au jour, nous aperçûmes que les Anglais avaient suspendu leurs travaux : ils continuèrent leur feu sur les deux brèches. La première se trouvait praticable comme une grande route, depuis le fossé jusqu'au haut du rempart, et la seconde fit des progrès effrayants : cependant la contrescarpe était intacte partout. Nous vîmes dans l'armée Anglaise de grands mouvements qui nous firent craindre une attaque prochaine. Je fis tout disposer pour soutenir l'assaut, et je ranimai le courage de la garnison par une adresse énergique. Notre feu d'artillerie et de mousqueterie reprit une nouvelle activité sur tous les points du front d'attaque.

Deux pièces de 24 démontées, qui étaient restées sur la brèche principale, furent disposées à portée de cette brèche pour rouler sur les assaillants, et des sachets de poudre furent préparés sous les décombres. Je plaçai 3 compagnies d'élite au sommet et sur les flancs de cette brèche; d'autres troupes occupèrent la fausse braie pour défendre les approches du fossé. La seconde brèche était praticable, quoique encore étroite et peu aisée, et les travaux entrepris pour sa défense n'avaient pu être achevés. Je plaçai à cette brèche une compagnie de voltigeurs, qui devait en garnir aussi les flancs. D'autres troupes étaient postées et retranchées derrière le rempart. Les artilleurs et les soldats auxiliaires furent répartis pour le service des pièces, et devaient jeter sur l'ennemi des poutres, des obus, et des grenades, s'il tentait l'escalade.

Tel était l'état des choses lorsque, vers 6 heures du soir, il s'engagea une vive fusillade sur tout le développement du front d'attaque. Bientôt après, on vint m'annoncer que les Anglais escaladaient la fausse braie près de la porte d'Almeida. J'accourus sur ce point avec une réserve de 60 hommes que j'avais placés entre les deux brèches, et je vis en effet que l'ennemi, après s'être jeté dans le fossé, escaladait la fausse braie. Ne pouvant l'en empêcher, j'ordonnai qu'on roulât sur lui des bombes et des obus, et je revins à la grande brèche raffermir les troupes qui s'y trouvaient. L'alerte y avait été donnée, et M. Husson, commandant d'artillerie, y attendait l'ennemi avec les moyens de défense qu'il avait fait préparer. Le feu faiblit bientôt dans la fausse braie, et le bruit se répandit que l'ennemi escaladait la muraille du côté du sud, près de l'hôpital. Je courus sur ce point avec une partie de ma réserve; mais je reconnus avec plaisir que la nouvelle était fautive: ce qui y avait donné lieu, c'est que quelques hommes de garde dans la fausse braie étaient rentrés dans la place à l'approche de l'ennemi en montant le long des chaînes du pont-levis de la porte Santiago. Je retournai aussitôt à la grande brèche, où tout était en feu. L'ennemi était parvenu sur le rempart, mais il y était criblé par le feu de nos retranchements. Peu d'instant après, des coups de fusil et des cris se firent entendre de l'intérieur même de la place. Des hommes qui conduisaient des blessés donnèrent l'alarme, et l'ennemi se trouva dans la place. Le désordre se répandit alors parmi les troupes que personne ne put plus retenir, et tout fut perdu. Ce qui suit est trop douloureux à décrire.

J'ai appris depuis que les voltigeurs postés à la petite brèche, après avoir résisté au premier choc de l'ennemi, avaient plié ensuite, et que les Anglais, parvenus sur le rempart, n'avaient pu s'étendre sur leur droite, où ils avaient été repoussés par le feu de notre retranchement; mais qu'ayant porté leurs efforts à la gauche, ils y avaient forcé nos voltigeurs, et de là s'étaient répandus dans la ville.

J'ignore quelle aura été notre perte: celle des Anglais paraît avoir été considérable, à en juger par leurs regrets.

No. XVII. (p. 483.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Bellune au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

Virgen de la Luz, devant Tarifa, le 5 Janvier, 1812.

Le siège de Tarifa a été levé aujourd'hui. Le temps, qui maîtrise tout, ne nous a pas permis d'achever la conquête de cette place, quoique quatre beaux jours nous eussent suffi pour l'obtenir. Ma lettre du 2 a dû vous instruire de la situation affligeante de nos troupes. En vous l'adressant, j'avais encore quelque espoir, mais il a été bientôt déçu; le déluge que je vous ai annoncé s'est accru au point que, 24 heures encore devant Tarifa, et nos soldats étaient perdus. J'ai chargé MM. les généraux Leval et Barrois de nous les ramener: nous serons très-heureux s'il n'en reste qu'un 5^{me} dans les précipices qu'ils doivent traverser. J'aurai l'honneur d'instruire V. E., avec plus de détails, de nos misères; en ce moment je ne puis que les déplorer.

(Reid)

(Reid)

Le Maréchal Duc de Bellune au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie. Vejer, le 7 Janvier, 1812.

Nos troupes commencent à arriver à Vejer, et demain elles y seront réunies en totalité; le 9, elles en partiront pour se rendre aux diverses destinations que je leur ai provisoirement assignées, en attendant les ordres de V. E. Celles qui font partie du 4^{me} corps se dirigent sur Moron par Xerez, les routes de la montagne

étant aujourd'hui impraticables, et n'offrant pas de ressources pour les subsistances. La 2^{me} division du 1^{er} corps restera momentanément à Vejer et à Medina. Toutes ces troupes sont extrêmement fatiguées; leurs vêtements sont en lambeaux, et il est indispensable qu'en leur donnant quelques jours de repos on leur fournisse de quoi s'habiller.

Nos pertes ne sont pas aussi considérables que les circonstances l'ont d'abord fait croire. Notre retraite a été faite lentement et avec beaucoup d'ordre, et les soldats que le mauvais temps avait éloignés en grand nombre des régiments y sont rentrés. L'ennemi n'a pas osé nous suivre plus loin que le Rio Salado, où il s'est arrêté, surpris de la contenance encore imposante de nos malheureux et braves soldats: c'est avec des peines infinies qu'ils sont parvenus à s'arracher des fondrières que les pluies avaient creusées sous leurs pas. Il n'existe plus de chemins, et tout le terrain de Vejer à Medina n'est plus aujourd'hui qu'un cloaque impraticable. Il était devenu impossible à nos convois d'arriver, et il y avait déjà cinq jours que nos soldats éprouvaient la plus affreuse disette; leurs besoins étaient tels, que ne pouvant faire de feu, et mourant de faim, ils mangeaient de la viande crue. Cette circonstance seule justifierait la levée du siège de Tarifa, s'il n'en existait pas d'autres encore plus impérieuses; V. E. pourra s'en faire une idée en lisant les copies ci-jointes des lettres qui m'ont été adressées le 1 et le 3 de ce mois. J'ai résisté aux instances qui m'y étaient faites, autant par l'espoir que j'avais du retour prochain du beau temps que par la nécessité de sauver l'honneur de nos armes. Un jour encore, il n'était plus possible de se maintenir devant Tarifa; les officiers y auraient été abandonnés. Le soldat était exténué, désespéré; il avait fait jusque-là tout ce que les forces humaines et le dévouement le plus déterminé peuvent permettre; en exigeant de lui de nouveaux sacrifices, c'eût été se résoudre à sa perte et à notre honte.

On s'occupe dans ce moment de la rédaction du journal de nos opérations; dès qu'il sera terminé, je m'empresserai de l'adresser à V. E.

L'état de délabrement où est maintenant la 2^{me} division du 1^{er} corps, joint à la nécessité de la rallier et de lui donner quelque repos, m'engage à proposer à V. E. de la faire remplacer, pour le service dont elle était chargée dans les provinces de Ronda et d'Antequera, par la 1^{re} division, dont les régiments sont mieux tenus, moins fatigués, et plus instruits. Si vous consentez, M. le Maréchal, à cette proposition, dont l'effet ne peut être qu'avantageux au service, j'opérerai ce remplacement, et je rappellerai à la 2^{me} division les détachements qu'elle a laissés à Ronda et ailleurs.

No. XVIII. (pp. 492, 531.)

Gazeta de Madrid, 13 de Enero de 1812.

El mariscal Suchet atacó en los días 26 y 27 de Diciembre al exercito insurgente de Valencia, mandado por Blake, y rompió la línea que occupaba por la parte del Grao, derrotandole completamente. De resulta de esta derrota se dispersó el exercito insurgente, huyendo unos por el camino de Alicante, otros acia Requena y Estado de Jorquera, y encerradosse el resto en Valencia despues de haberse embarcado Blake. Los Franceses persiguieron á los que huian, por el camino de Alicante hasta Alcira.

El 30 por la tarde estaba concluida la circunvalacion de Valencia. Se han cogido mas de 7000 prisioneros, mucha artilleria y bagages. Llegan continuamente dispersos hasta Tarancon y pueblos inmediatos.

El general Freyre, que occupaba a Chinchilla, ha sido derrotado por el general Montbrun. Parte de la coluna que manda el general d'Armagnac ha salido de Cuenca acia Requena.

No. XIX. (pp. 520, 572.)

Decreto de 30 de Enero de 1812.

Deseando las Cortes generales y extraordinarias dar un testimonio publico y correspondiente á la generosidad de la nacion Española del aprecio y gratitud de la misma por los importantes servicios que ha hecho en su favor de nuestra

santa causa en general en gefe de las tropas Británicas en la Península el Lord Vizconde Wellington, y señaladamente por el que acaba de hacer, tomando por asalto la plaza de Ciudad Rodrigo con las tropas combinadas de su mando, han venido conformandose con la propuesta de la Regencia del Reino en conceder, como por el presente conceden, al Lord Vizconde Wellington, grandeza de España de primera clase, para sí y sus sucesores libre de lanzas y medias anatas con el título de Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. Lo tendrá entendido la Regencia del Reino para su cumplimiento, y lo mandará imprimir, publicar, y circular. Dado en Cadiz a 30 de Enero de 1812. *Antonio Pargan*, Presidente; *Josef Antonio Sombiola*, Deputado Secretario; *Josef Maria Gutierrez de Teran*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. fol. 195.

No. XX. (p. 549.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Duc de Raguse.
Paris, le 11 Fév. 1812.

L'Empereur regrette, M. le Duc, qu'avec la division Souham et les 3 autres divisions que vous aviez réunies, vous ne vous soyez pas reporté sur Salamanque, pour voir ce qui se passait. Cela aurait donné beaucoup à penser aux Anglais, et vous auriez pu être utile à Ciudad Rodrigo.

Le moyen de secourir l'armée du Midi dans la position où vous êtes, c'est de placer votre quartier général à Salamanque, d'y concentrer votre armée en ne détachant qu'une division sur le Tage, de réoccuper les Asturies, et d'obliger l'ennemi à rester à Almeida, et dans le nord, par la crainte d'une invasion. Vous pourriez même pousser des partis sur Ciudad Rodrigo si vous avez l'artillerie de siège nécessaire (votre honneur y est attaché), prendre cette place, ou, si le défaut de vivres ou d'artillerie vous forçait d'ajourner cette opération jusqu'à la récolte, vous pourriez du moins faire une incursion dans le Portugal, et vous porter sur le Douro et sur Almeida. Cette menace contiendrait l'ennemi.

L'armée du Midi est très-forte; l'armée de Valence, qui aujourd'hui a ses avant-postes sur Alicante, dégage sa gauche.

La position que vous devez prendre doit donc être offensive de Salamanque à Almeida. Tant que les Anglais vous sauront réunis en forces à Salamanque, ils ne feront aucun mouvement; mais, si vous allez de votre personne à Valladolid, si vos troupes sont envoyées se perdre sur les derrières, si surtout votre cavalerie n'est pas en mesure après la saison des pluies, vous exposerez tout le nord de l'Espagne à des catastrophes.

Il est indispensable de réoccuper les Asturies, parce qu'il faut plus de monde pour garder la lisière de la plaine jusqu'à la Biscaye, que pour garder les Asturies.

Puisque les Anglais se sont divisés en deux corps, un sur le midi et l'autre sur vous, ils ne sont pas forts, et vous devez l'être beaucoup plus qu'eux. La lettre que je vous ai écrite, et que vous avez reçue le 13 Déc., vous a fait connaître ce que vous deviez faire. Menacez les Anglais; et si vous croyez pour le moment ne pas pouvoir reprendre Ciudad Rodrigo, faites réparer les chemins qui mènent à Almeida, faites fortifier Salamanque, réunissez vos équipages de siège, envoyez de gros détachements sur Ciudad Rodrigo: cela contiendra les Anglais, ne fatiguera pas vos troupes, et aura bien moins d'inconvénients que de vous disséminer encore, comme vous le proposez.

Je suppose que le général Montbrun est arrivé, et que vous avez enfin réuni votre armée.

La prise de Valence a beaucoup fortifié l'armée du Midi, et il faut que vous supposiez les Anglais fous, pour les croire capable de marcher sur Badajoz en vous laissant à Salamanque, c'est-à-dire, en vous laissant arriver à Lisbonne avant eux. Ils iront dans le midi si, par des mesures mal calculées, vous détachez deux ou trois divisions sur le Tage; par là vous les rassurez, et leur dites que vous ne voulez rien faire contre eux, et respectez l'opinion de la défensive et de leur initiative.

Je vous le répète donc: l'instruction de l'Empereur est que vous ne quittiez pas Salamanque, que vous fassiez réoccuper les Asturies, que votre armée s'appuie sur la position de Salamanque, et que vous menaciez de là les Anglais.

(Retid)

(Retid)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Duc de Raguse.

Paris, le 18 Fév. 1812.

Monsieur le Duc, je viens de mettre à l'instant sous les yeux de l'Empereur vos lettres des 29 Jan., 4 et 6 Fév. S. M. n'est pas satisfaite de la direction que vous donnez à la guerre ; vous avez la supériorité sur l'ennemi, et, au lieu de prendre l'initiative, vous ne cessez de la recevoir. Vous remuez et fatiguez vos corps ; ce n'est pas là l'art de la guerre. Quand le général Hill, avec 15,000 hommes, marche sur l'armée du Midi, c'est ce qui peut vous arriver de plus heureux ; cette armée est assez forte et assez bien organisée pour ne rien craindre de l'armée Anglaise, aurait-elle elle-même réuni 4 ou 5 divisions.

Aujourd'hui l'ennemi suppose que vous allez faire le siège de Ciudad Rodrigo ; il approche le général Hill de sa droite, afin de pouvoir le faire venir à lui à grandes marches et vous livrer bataille, réuni, si vous voulez reprendre Ciudad Rodrigo. C'est donc au maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à tenir 20,000 hommes sur la Guadiana et à l'empêcher de faire ce mouvement, et, si Hill passe le Tage, à se porter à sa suite, ou dans l'Alentejo. Vous avez eu le double de la lettre que l'Empereur m'a ordonné d'écrire au Duc de Dalmatie, le 10 de ce mois, en réponse à la demande qu'il vous avait fait de porter des troupes vers le midi. C'est vous, M. le Maréchal, qui deviez lui écrire pour lui demander de porter un gros corps sur la Guadiana, pour maintenir le général Hill dans le midi, et l'empêcher de se réunir à Lord Wellington.

La prise de Ciudad Rodrigo est un échec pour vous, et les Anglais connaissent assez l'honneur Français pour comprendre que ce succès peut devenir un affront pour eux, et qu'au lieu d'améliorer leur position, l'occupation de Ciudad Rodrigo les met dans l'obligation de défendre cette ville ; et dès lors ils vous rendent maître du champ de bataille, puisque vous les forcez de venir au secours de cette place, et à combattre dans une position si éloignée de la mer. Le résultat de cet avantage ne peut être retardé que jusqu'à la récolte. Alors vous serez en mesure de faire le siège de Ciudad Rodrigo ; l'ennemi y marchera, et il aura la honte de vous voir reprendre cette place.

Le mouvement du général Hill sur le Tage a été fait dans la croyance que, aussitôt que vous auriez su la prise de Ciudad Rodrigo, vous auriez réuni vos troupes pour marcher rapidement sur cette place, l'investir et profiter du premier moment où la brèche n'était pas relevée, et où il ne pouvait encore y avoir aucun approvisionnement. Cette occasion manquée, il fera tout préparer pour le mois de Mai.

La véritable route de Lisbonne est par le nord ; l'ennemi y ayant des magasins considérables et des hôpitaux, ne peut se retirer sur cette capitale que très-lentement ; et si, dans l'attaque du Prince d'Essling, il s'est retiré rapidement, c'est parce qu'il s'était préparé à ce mouvement ; il a donc un grand intérêt à vous empêcher de pénétrer dans le Portugal. La situation du Prince d'Essling devant Lisbonne était, pour l'Angleterre et le Portugal, une grande calamité. Je ne puis que vous répéter les ordres de l'Empereur ; prenez votre quartier général à Salamanque ; travaillez avec activité à fortifier cette ville ; faites-y travailler 6000 hommes de troupes et 6000 paysans ; réunissez-y un nouvel équipage de siège qui servira à armer la ville ; formez-y des approvisionnements ; faites faire tous les jours le coup de fusil avec les avant-postes ennemis ; placez deux fortes avant-gardes qui menacent, l'une Ciudad Rodrigo, l'autre Almeida ; menacez les autres directions sur la frontière de Portugal ; envoyez des partis qui ravagent quelques villages ; et enfin employez tout ce qui peut tenir l'ennemi sur le qui vive. Faites réparer la route de Porto, celle d'Almeida ; tenez votre armée réunie vers Toro, Benavente, Salamanque. La province d'Avila a même de bonnes parties où l'on trouvera des ressources.

Dans cette situation, qui est aussi simple que formidable, vous reposez vos troupes, vous formez des magasins, et, avec des démonstrations bien combinées, qui mettent vos avant-postes à même de tirer journellement des coups de fusil avec l'ennemi, vous aurez barre sur les Anglais qui ne pourront que vous observer.

Vous devez tous les jours faire faire des prisonniers par vos avant-gardes, et sur toutes les directions qui menacent l'ennemi ; c'est le moyen d'avoir des nouvelles, il n'en est pas d'autre efficace.

L'Empereur me prescrit de donner l'ordre au Duc de Dalmatie d'avoir toujours un corps de 20,000 hommes avec 20 pièces de canon, composé de ses meilleures

troupes, soit sur Merida, pour faire le coup de fusil avec le général Hill et le contenir sur la rive gauche du Tage, soit sur Badajoz, en se portant sur l'Alentejo et l'obligeant ainsi à se rapprocher d'Elvas. Cette opération est d'autant plus importante que, si elle n'avait pas lieu, le général Hill pourrait se réunir à Lord Wellington pour vous attaquer. Il serait insensé de penser que jamais Lord Wellington pût rappeler la division Hill à lui, tant que le Duc de Dalmatie fera des démonstrations. Lord Wellington ne peut donc vous attaquer qu'avec son corps, et, s'il marchait à vous, vous réuniriez 7 divisions à Salamanque, avec toute votre artillerie et votre cavalerie; cela vous ferait 50,000 hommes. Je dis 7 divisions, car il ne faut jamais compter sur celle des Asturies. Alors cette division recevrait ordre de marcher en avant pour menacer la Galice et contenir le corps Espagnol qui est de ce côté. Appuyée à Salamanque, ayant autant d'artillerie et de munitions que vous voudrez, votre armée, forte de 50,000 hommes, est inattaquable, le général Hill fût-il même réuni à Lord Wellington. Elle serait inattaquable, non pas pour 35,000 Anglais (qui au fond sont le total de ce que les Anglais ont en Portugal, sans y comprendre les Portugais), mais pour 70,000 Anglais. Un camp choisi, une retraite assurée sur la place, des canons et des munitions en quantité, sont un avantage que vous savez trop bien apprécier. Cependant, tandis que vous observerez, je suppose que Hill ait joint l'armée Anglaise, et que Wellington soit beaucoup plus fort qu'il n'est; dans ce cas, l'armée du Nord arriverait avec sa cavalerie et 2 divisions, vous vous renforceriez tous les jours, et la victoire serait assurée.

Mais, une fois la résolution prise, il faut la tenir. Il n'y a ni *si*, ni *mais*. Il faut choisir votre position sous Salamanque, être vainqueur, ou périr avec l'armée Française au champ de bataille que vous aurez choisi.

Comme vous êtes le plus fort, et qu'il est important d'avoir l'initiative, évitez de faire des travaux de camp retranché qui n'appartiennent qu'à la défensive et avertiraient l'ennemi. Il suffira de reconnaître les emplacements, et de travailler à force à la place. Si on prend un système de fortification serrée, et qu'on n'admette pas trop de développement, en 6 semaines on peut avoir une bonne place qui mette votre quartier général, vos magasins et vos hôpitaux, à l'abri de toute surprise de l'ennemi, et qui puisse servir à votre corps d'armée de point d'appui pour recevoir la bataille, ou de point de départ pour marcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo et Almeida, quand le temps en sera venu.

Je vous ai dit que vous ne deviez compter que sur 7 divisions; la division Bonet doit retourner sur-le-champ dans les Asturies. Soit que vous considériez la conservation de toutes les provinces au nord, soit que vous considériez un mouvement de retraite, sans les Asturies qui assurent la possession des montagnes, ni Salamanque, ni Burgos, ni même Vitoria, ne sont tenables. Si, après une bataille perdue, il fallait évacuer, la division des Asturies ne devrait pas même alors être rappelée à vous; mais, se repliant avec ordre sur votre droite, elle appuierait votre retraite; et, lorsque vous seriez à Burgos, elle serait à Reynosa pour vous couvrir de ce côté; sans quoi, favorisé par des débarquements sur tous les points de la côte, l'ennemi, dès le commencement de votre retraite, vous tirerait des coups de fusil sur Mondragon et Vitoria. D'ailleurs vous n'avez pas seulement à lutter contre Lord Wellington; vous avez aussi à contenir le corps ennemi qui est en Galice, et, au moment où vous marcherez sur l'ennemi, la division des Asturies contiendra la Galice et épargnera la présence d'une division à Astorga.

Je vous le répète, c'est à l'armée du Midi à avoir un corps de 20,000 hommes pour tenir en échec une partie de l'armée de Lord Wellington sur la rive gauche du Tage. Ce n'est donc pas à vous, M. le Duc, à vous disséminer en faveur de l'armée du Duc de Dalmatie.

Lorsque vous avez été prendre le commandement de votre armée, elle venait d'éprouver un échec par sa retraite de Portugal. Ce pays était ravagé; les hôpitaux et les magasins de l'ennemi étaient à Lisbonne; vos troupes étaient fatiguées, dégoûtées par des marches forcées, sans artillerie, sans charrois; Badajoz était attaqué depuis longtemps; une bataille dans le midi n'avait pas pu faire lever le siège de cette place. Que deviez-vous faire alors? Vous porter sur Almeida pour menacer Lisbonne? Non, parce que votre armée n'avait pas d'artillerie, point de bagages, et qu'elle était fatiguée. L'ennemi, dans cette position, n'aurait pas cru à cette menace; il vous aurait laissé approcher jusqu'à

(Retd)

(Retd)

Coïmbre, aurait pris Badajoz, et ensuite serait venu sur vous. Vous avez donc fait à cette époque ce qu'il fallait faire; vous avez marché rapidement au secours de Badajoz; l'ennemi avait barre sur vous, et l'art de la guerre était de vous y commettre. Le siège en a été levé, et l'ennemi est rentré en Portugal: c'est ce qu'il y avait à faire. Depuis, M. le maréchal, vous êtes revenu dans le nord; Lord Wellington s'est reporté sur le véritable point de défense du pays, et depuis ce temps vous êtes en présence.

Si, après avoir rejeté Lord Wellington au delà de Ciudad Rodrigo, vous fussiez resté dans la province de Salamanque, ayant vos avant-gardes sur les directions du Portugal, Lord Wellington n'aurait pas bougé; mais vous vous êtes porté sans raison sur le Tage. Les Anglais ont cru que vous vous disposiez à entrer dans l'Alentejo pour vous réunir au Duc de Dalmatie et faire le siège d'Elvas; ils manœuvrèrent en conséquence, et restèrent attentifs, lorsque votre mouvement sur Valence leur a fait connaître qu'ils n'avaient rien à craindre.

Dans ce moment, M. le Duc, votre position est simple et claire; par conséquent, elle ne demande pas des combinaisons d'esprit. Placez votre armée de manière qu'en quatre marches vos troupes puissent se réunir et se grouper sur Salamanque; ayez-y votre quartier général; que vos ordres, vos dispositions annoncent à l'ennemi que la grosse artillerie arrive à Salamanque, que vous y formez des magasins, que tout y est dans une position offensive. Faites faire continuellement la petite guerre avec les postes ennemis. Dans cet état, vous êtes maître de tous les mouvements des Anglais. Si Lord Wellington se dirige sur Badajoz, laissez-le aller; réunissez aussitôt votre armée, et marchez droit sur Almeida; poussez des partis sur Coïmbre, et soyez persuadé que Lord Wellington reviendra bien vite sur vous. Mais les Anglais ont trop de savoir-faire pour commettre une pareille faute. Ce n'est pas l'envoi de 4000 ou 5000 hommes sur Valence qui leur a fait faire leur mouvement pour s'emparer de Ciudad Rodrigo; c'est la marche si inutile que vous avez fait faire d'une grande partie de votre artillerie, de votre cavalerie; c'est la dissémination de votre armée.

Ecrivez au Duc de Dalmatie, et sollicitez le Roi de lui écrire également, pour qu'il exécute les ordres impératifs que je lui donne de porter sur la Guadiana un corps de 20,000 hommes, pour forcer le général Hill à rester sur la rive gauche du Tage.

Ne pensez donc plus, M. le maréchal, à aller dans le midi, et marchez droit sur le Portugal, si Lord Wellington fait la faute de se porter sur la rive gauche du Tage.

La division du général Caffarelli doit être arrivée en Navarre: S. M. ordonne même qu'une division Italienne vienne renforcer l'armée du Nord. Mettez-vous en correspondance avec le Duc d'Albufera à Valence, afin qu'il puisse marcher avec ses forces pour soutenir Madrid, s'il y a lieu. Profitez du moment où vos troupes se réunissent, pour bien organiser et mettre de l'ordre dans le nord. Qu'on travaille jour et nuit à fortifier Salamanque; qu'on y fasse venir de grosses pièces; qu'on refasse l'équipage de siège; enfin, qu'on forme des magasins de subsistances.

Vous sentirez, M. le maréchal, qu'en suivant ces directions, et en mettant pour les exécuter toute l'activité convenable, vous tiendrez l'ennemi en échec; Londres elle-même tremblera de la perspective d'une bataille et de l'invasion du Portugal, si redoutée des Anglais; et enfin, au moment de la récolte, vous vous trouverez tout à fait en état d'investir Ciudad Rodrigo, et de reprendre cette place à la barbe des Anglais, ou de leur livrer bataille; ce qui serait à désirer, car, battus aussi loin de la mer, ils seraient perdus, et le Portugal conquis. L'artillerie qui arriverait pour armer Salamanque, servirait pour Almeida et Ciudad Rodrigo.

En recevant l'initiative au lieu de la donner, en ne songeant qu'à l'armée du midi, qui n'a pas besoin de vous puisqu'elle est forte de 80,000 hommes des meilleures troupes de l'Europe; en ayant des sollicitudes pour les pays qui ne sont pas sous votre commandement, et en abandonnant les Asturies et les provinces qui vous regardent, un échec que vous éprouveriez serait une calamité qui se ferait sentir dans toute l'Espagne. Un échec de l'armée du Midi la conduirait sur Madrid ou sur Valence, et ne serait pas de même nature.

Je vous le répète, vous êtes le maître de conserver barre sur Lord Wellington en plaçant votre quartier général à Salamanque, en occupant en force cette posi-

tion, et en poussant de fortes reconnaissances sur les débouchés. Je ne pourrais que redire ce que je vous ai déjà expliqué ci-dessus.

Si Badajoz était cerné seulement par 2 ou 3 divisions Anglaises, le Duc de Dalmatie pourrait le débloquer; mais alors Lord Wellington affaibli vous mettrait à même de vous porter dans l'intérieur du Portugal: ce qui secourrait plus efficacement Badajoz que toute autre opération.

Mais lorsque, par les nouvelles dispositions de l'Empereur, qui l'ont obligé à renoncer pour cette année à l'expédition de Portugal, vu la tournure que prenaient les affaires générales de l'Europe, S. M. vous a ordonné de vous porter à Valladolid avec votre armée, et que vous êtes arrivé inopinément à Salamanque, les Anglais, qui ont bien calculé que ces mouvements n'avaient pu se faire en conséquence du leur, ont été attirés; et si du 17 au 18, avec les 30,000 hommes que vous aviez dans la main, vous aviez marché à tire-d'aile sans livrer bataille, mais faisant mine de le vouloir, l'ennemi, qui était déconcerté par votre arrivée, était résolu de lever le siège de Ciudad Rodrigo. Hill vous empêchait en effet de vous porter sur Salamanque et Ciudad Rodrigo avec 25,000 hommes? C'est une opération qu'on pourrait même faire avec 9000 ou 10,000 hommes, en prenant position sans s'engager, et retournant sur Salamanque si l'ennemi présentait trop de forces. La guerre est un métier de position, et 12,000 hommes ne sont jamais engagés quand ils ne le veulent pas, à plus forte raison 30,000, et surtout lorsque ces 30,000 hommes étaient suivis d'autres troupes. Mais le passé est sans remède.

Je donne ordre que tout ce qu'il sera possible de fournir, vous soit fourni pour compléter votre artillerie et pour armer Salamanque: 24 heures après la réception de cette lettre, l'Empereur pense que vous partirez pour Salamanque, à moins d'événements inattendus; que vous chargerez une avant-garde d'occuper les débouchés sur Ciudad Rodrigo, et une autre ceux sur Almeida; que vous aurez dans la main au moins la valeur d'une division; que vous ferez revenir la cavalerie et l'artillerie qui sont à la division du Tage; que vous renverrez la division Bonet dans les Asturies, et en conséquence vous ne donnerez pas de division à l'armée du Nord, parce qu'elle sera renforcée de la division Palombini.

Pourtant, comme ce mouvement sera brusque, il faut lui donner le temps d'opérer son effet, et ce ne peut être que 8 jours après que vous serez arrivé à Salamanque et que ces dispositions seront faites, que leur effet aura eu lieu sur l'ennemi; ce n'est qu'alors que vous pourrez entièrement évacuer le Tage. En attendant, il semble à l'Empereur qu'une seule division d'infanterie sur ce point est suffisante. Le Roi enverra au moins 3000 hommes d'infanterie et 1200 de cavalerie pour appuyer cette division.

Réunissez surtout votre cavalerie, dont vous n'avez pas de trop et dont vous avez tant besoin. Lorsque vous verrez que votre mouvement offensif a produit son effet, vous retirerez du Tage, d'abord une brigade, et ensuite une autre; mais en même temps vous augmenterez vos démonstrations d'offensive de manière que tout montre que vous attendez les premières herbes pour entrer en Portugal.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

Paris, le 19 Fév. 1812.

L'Empereur, M. le Duc, n'est pas satisfait que la division Hill soit restée si longtemps à Merida. Aujourd'hui les Anglais paraissent changer de projet: ils concentrent leurs troupes afin de se porter sur Ciudad Rodrigo, si le Duc de Raguse assiégeait cette place. L'ordre de l'Empereur, M. le Maréchal, est que le général Drouet, avec un corps de 20,000 hommes, dont 4000 de cavalerie, et 40 pièces de canon, soit réuni pour opérer, soit de Merida, soit de Badajoz, de manière à tenir en échec le général Hill avec un pareil corps de 20,000 hommes de l'armée ennemie, en l'obligeant à rester sur la rive gauche du Tage, et l'empêchant par là de rien entreprendre, soit dans le Nord sur l'armée de Portugal, soit sur Madrid.

Le Duc de Raguse a l'ordre de centraliser son armée sur Salamanque; d'avoir 2 divisions en observation, une sur Ciudad Rodrigo, une sur la direction d'Almeida; de faire tous les jours le coup de fusil avec les avant-postes ennemis; et enfin, de se réunir pour entrer rapidement dans le Portugal, si Lord Wellington commet la faute de se porter sur la rive gauche du Tage, ce que l'Empereur regarde comme une folie qu'il n'osera jamais faire. Lord Wellington sait que vous

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avez 80,000 hommes, et plus de 70,000 présents sous les armes, le jour où vous aurez réuni vos moyens. Le principal ennemi, M. le Maréchal, ce sont les Anglais. Mahy et Ballesteros, qui sont à Alicante et à Gibraltal, n'ont pas 15,000 hommes, et le Duc d'Albufera en tient une partie en échec. La prise de Valence a donc singulièrement amélioré votre position. L'ordre de l'Empereur est que vous formiez le corps du général Drouet de votre meilleure infanterie et de votre meilleure cavalerie, que ces 20,000 hommes entrent dans l'Alentejo, et, si les Anglais s'établissent devant vous, vous les tiendrez ainsi en respect.

C'est vous, M. le Duc, qui devez garder toute la rive gauche du Tage.

Il est très-important que vous tâchiez de vous mettre en correspondance avec le Duc d'Albufera, afin que ce maréchal soit promptement instruit des mouvements des Anglais.

L'Empereur se demande, M. le Duc, comment il est possible que 6000 Anglais et 4000 ou 5000 Portugais aient enlevé les magasins de Merida, se soient avancés jusque sur les débouchés de l'Andalousie, et y soient restés un mois, et cela devant votre armée, forte de 80,000 hommes et composée des meilleures troupes du monde, pouvant présenter plus de 60,000 hommes présents sous les armes et une cavalerie si supérieure en nombre ?

La diversion que doit faire l'armée de Portugal en votre faveur, M. le Duc, consiste à prendre l'offensive dans sa position de Salamanque, et non à marcher sur Merida par un mouvement parallèle, en obéissant à l'initiative que donne l'ennemi.

Portez toute votre attention et la plus grande activité à exécuter l'ordre de l'Empereur de former sur-le-champ le corps de 20,000 hommes composé des meilleures troupes de votre armée. S. M. vous ordonne impérativement cette disposition.

Cet ordre ne souffre aucun délai, et l'Empereur est fâché qu'une aussi belle armée n'ait aucune action sur les Anglais.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse au Prince de Wagram et de Neuschâtel, Major Général.

Valladolid, le 26 Fév. 1812.

Monseigneur, J'ai reçu les lettres que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 11 Fév. ; plus je les ai méditées, plus je me suis convaincu que, si S. M. était sur les lieux, elle envisagerait la position de son armée de Portugal sous un tout autre point de vue. V. A. me dit que j'aurais dû concentrer mes troupes à Salamanque ; mais elle oublie que précédemment les ordres de l'Empereur étaient d'avoir trois divisions au delà des montagnes. Si je concentrais l'armée à Salamanque, elle ne pourrait pas y vivre quinze jours ; et bientôt un désert, semblable à celui qui sépare Rodrigo de Salamanque, séparerait Salamanque de Valladolid, ce qui, pour l'avenir, rendrait bien pire la situation de l'armée.

L'Empereur veut que je fasse des mouvements offensifs sur Rodrigo ; mais S. M. ignore donc que le plus léger mouvement ici cause une perte énorme de moyens, et spécialement de chevaux, équivalente à celle qui résulterait d'une bataille, de manière qu'il faut restreindre ces mouvements uniquement pour un objet déterminé et positif, et qui promette des résultats. Si l'armée faisait aujourd'hui un mouvement sur Rodrigo, elle ne pourrait pas passer l'Agueda, parce que dans cette saison cette rivière n'est pas guéable. L'armée ne pourrait pas rester, faute de vivres, trois jours devant Rodrigo. Cette simple marche, qui n'aurait aucun résultat et n'aurait donné aucun change à l'ennemi, parce qu'il connaît bien l'impossibilité absolue où nous sommes de rien entreprendre, cette simple marche, dis-je, ferait perdre 500 chevaux et rendrait l'armée incapable de faire aucune espèce de mouvement pendant 6 semaines, parce qu'il faudrait qu'elle se dispersât pour aller former sa réserve de vivres, jusqu'à 20 et 25 lieues, et qu'elle eût le temps de les rassembler et de les préparer. Au mois d'Avril de l'année dernière, l'armée de Portugal a perdu presque tous ses chevaux d'artillerie et le plus grand nombre de ses chevaux de cavalerie, pour être restée pendant 6 jours entre la Coa et l'Agueda ; cependant la saison était plus avancée et le pays moins désert qu'aujourd'hui. S. M. pense que je ne dois point envoyer mes troupes se perdre sur les derrières ; mais n'ai-je pas dû relever 7000 hommes de la Garde, et les troupes de l'armée du Nord, dans les postes qu'elles occupaient, postes qui ne peuvent être abandonnés sans bouleverser tout le pays et renoncer aux moyens de vivre ? V. A. me parle du siège de Rodrigo : si je reçois des moyens de transport

et un équipage de siège, cette opération sera facile après la récolte ; mais avant et sans ces moyens, il est absolument impossible d'y penser. V. A. me dit qu'il est de mon honneur de reprendre cette place : il sera toujours de mon honneur de faire tout ce qui sera utile au service de l'Empereur ; mais je n'ai point ici un tort à réparer, car certe les causes de la prise de Rodrigo me sont tout à fait étrangères. Si les circonstances eussent mis plus tôt cette frontière sous mes ordres, je crois pouvoir le dire avec fondement, Rodrigo serait encore à nous.

V. A. me dit que si l'armée était réunie à Salamanque, les Anglais seraient fous de se porter en Estramadure, en me laissant derrière eux et maître d'aller à Lisbonne ; mais cette combinaison ils l'ont faite au mois de Mai dernier, quoique toute l'armée fût à peu de distance de Salamanque, que l'armée du Nord fût double de ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui, que la saison plus avancée pût permettre de faire vivre les chevaux, et que nous fussions maîtres de Rodrigo. Ils n'ont pas cru possible alors que nous entreprissions cette opération, et ils ont eu raison : l'imagineront-ils aujourd'hui que toutes les circonstances que je viens d'énoncer sont contraires, et qu'ils connaissent la grande quantité de troupes qui est rentrée en France ? L'ennemi avait si bien le projet de faire depuis longtemps le siège de Badajoz, que depuis près de 4 mois il a établi de grands magasins à Campo Maior, et j'en ai rendu compte à V. A. ; il n'a cessé de les augmenter depuis. Il était tellement résolu à faire un détachement après la prise de Rodrigo, que, quoiqu'il sût très-bien que j'étais en pleine marche avec l'armée pour me rendre sur la Tormes, et de là sur l'Agueda, il a fait partir deux divisions le surlendemain de la prise de Rodrigo. L'armée de Portugal, dans l'état actuel des choses, n'ayant pas même un ennemi devant elle, ne pourrait pas dépasser la Coa, et les forces que Lord Wellington y a laissées sont plus que suffisantes pour mettre à l'abri de tout événement le village le plus avancé du Portugal. En conséquence aucune espèce de mouvement de ce côté ne remplirait l'objet de sauver Badajoz ; il n'y a que des dispositions qui donnent action immédiate sur cette place, qui puissent en imposer à l'ennemi et faire espérer d'atteindre le but proposé.

L'Empereur, à ce qu'il me paraît, compte pour rien les difficultés de vivres ; ces difficultés sont tout, et si elles eussent cessé par la formation de magasins, tout ce que pourrait ordonner l'Empereur serait exécuté avec ponctualité et facilité ; mais nous sommes loin de là, et je n'ai rien à me reprocher à cet égard. Je ne commandais pas ici il y a 3 mois. J'ai voulu faire des magasins dans la vallée du Tage, et, à cet effet, j'ai demandé un territoire étendu, fertile, et à portée, ainsi que des moyens de transport. Le territoire m'a été refusé, et les moyens de transport, accordés et toujours attendus, ont reçu, à ce qu'il me paraît, une autre destination. J'arrive dans le nord au mois de Janvier, et je ne trouve pas un grain de blé, pas un sou dans les caisses, mais des dettes partout, et, résultat infaillible du système absurde d'administration qui a été adopté, une disette réelle ou factice dont il est difficile de se faire une juste idée. On n'obtient dans les cantonnements des subsistances journalières que les armes à la main ; il y a loin de là à la formation de magasins qui permettent de faire mouvoir l'armée. Nous ne sommes point à deux de jen dans l'espèce de guerre que nous faisons ici avec les Anglais. L'armée Anglaise est toujours réunie et disponible, parce qu'elle a beaucoup d'argent et beaucoup de transports. 7000 à 8000 mulets sont employés pour le transport de ses subsistances ; le foin que toute la cavalerie Anglaise mange sur les bords de la Coa et de l'Agueda vient d'Angleterre. Que S. M. juge après cela quel rapport il y a entre nos moyens et les leurs, nous qui n'avons pas un magasin qui renferme 4 jours de vivres pour l'armée, et aucun moyen de transport ; nous qui ne pouvons pas envoyer avec fruit une réquisition au plus misérable village, sans faire un détachement de 200 hommes, et qui sommes forcés de nous éparpiller à une distance énorme et d'être constamment en course pour subsister. Quelques faibles que soient les garnisons des villes, on ne peut exprimer quelle difficulté il y a à les pourvoir de subsistances. Ainsi, quelque effort que j'aie fait, Valladolid ne renferme pas encore pour 5 jours de vivres pour 2000 hommes qui s'y trouvent. Cet état de choses ne changera entièrement qu'après la récolte, et avec des principes d'administration plus raisonnables, et plus d'ordre qu'on n'en a mis jusqu'à présent. D'ici à cette époque, l'armée sera dans la position la plus difficile qu'on puisse dépeindre, et il serait injuste d'attendre beaucoup d'elle. On ne peut rien faire ici qu'avec du temps ; il faut créer ses moyens, les organiser, et pour cela il

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faut être à l'époque des ressources ; malheureusement j'arrive ici quand elles sont épuisées. Pendant le courant de l'été et de l'automne, époque à laquelle les subsistances que fournit le pays ont pu s'accorder avec les besoins des troupes, tous les mouvements qui ont eu lieu ont été faits d'une manière conforme à la raison, et les résultats l'ont prouvé ; l'ennemi n'a pu rien entreprendre. Aujourd'hui que ce rapport n'existe plus, je suis réduit à lutter contre les événements.

Il est possible que S. M. ne soit pas satisfaite de mes raisons ; mais j'avoue que je ne conçois pas la possibilité d'exécuter ce qui est prescrit, sans préparer des désastres pour l'avenir.

Si S. M. en juge autrement, je lui renouvellerai avec instance la prière de me donner un successeur dans mon commandement, qui, alors, doit être confié en de meilleures mains.

En attendant je m'en vais, conformément à ce que j'ai exposé dans ma lettre d'hier, faire tous mes efforts pour sauver Badajoz ; si j'y parviens, quand les apparences indiqueront que l'ennemi renonce à toute offensive dans le midi, je ramènerai alors toutes mes troupes dans la vieille Castille, et je ferai réoccuper les Asturies. J'espère au surplus qu'avant ce temps, S. M. m'aura soulagé d'un fardeau qui est au-dessus de mes forces.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse au Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.
Valladolid, le 2 Mars, 1812.

A l'instant où je montais à cheval pour me rendre à Avila, je reçois les lettres que V. A. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire les 18 et 21 Février. Les ordres de S. M. sont tellement impératifs, que quelles que soient les raisons qui m'avaient empêché d'abord de m'y conformer, je pense qu'il est aujourd'hui de mon devoir de le faire. En conséquence, je donne ordre à la cavalerie, à la 4^{me} division, et à la 6^{me}, qui sont dans la vallée du Tage, de repasser dans la vieille Castille. J'y ai laissé seulement la 1^{re} division, qui rentrera aussi aux époques fixées par l'Empereur, et lorsqu'elle aura été relevée par l'armée du Centre. Mais, comme il paraît évident que le siège de Badajoz n'a été suspendu que par la présence de ces 3 divisions, mon opinion est que ce mouvement va mettre cette place en péril. J'ose espérer, au moins, que s'il lui arrive malheur, on ne m'en attribuera pas la faute. V. A. m'écrit que l'Empereur trouve que je m'occupe trop des intérêts des autres, et pas assez de ce dont je suis personnellement chargé. Jusqu'ici j'avais regardé comme un de mes devoirs imposé par l'Empereur de secourir l'armée du Midi, et ce devoir a été exprimé formellement dans 20 de vos dépêches, et indiqué suffisamment de nouveau par l'ordre que j'ai reçu de laisser 3 divisions dans la vallée du Tage. Aujourd'hui j'en suis affranchi, ma position devient plus simple et beaucoup meilleure.

L'Empereur paraît ajouter beaucoup de confiance dans l'effet que les démonstrations faites au nord produiront sur l'esprit de Lord Wellington. J'ose avoir une opinion contraire, attendu que ce général sait très-bien que nous n'avons point de magasins, et connaît les immenses difficultés que le pays présente par sa nature et par le défaut de subsistances.

Lord Wellington sait que l'armée de Portugal, sans avoir personne à combattre, n'est pas dans cette saison en état d'aller, et que si elle s'avancait à l'époque où nous sommes, elle reviendrait au bout de 4 jours, hors d'état de rien faire de la campagne, et après avoir perdu tous ses chevaux. Je me rends à Salamanque. Je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir pour remplir les intentions de S. M. ; mais toutes les démonstrations doivent se borner entre l'Aguada et la Tormes, et à des reconnaissances sous le canon de Ciudad Rodrigo ; car l'Aguada n'étant pas guéable, le passage de cette rivière exige des bateaux que je n'ai pas.

Lord Wellington ne peut pas croire, à cette époque de l'année, à une marche offensive, faute de magasins formés, et de subsistances pour les chevaux. Il ne peut pas croire davantage au siège de Ciudad Rodrigo, la grosse artillerie fût-elle à Salamanque. Il sait bien qu'il faut d'autres préparatifs qui exigent du temps ; et, s'il veut faire le siège de Badajoz, il a de grands moyens d'exécution, puisque ses préparatifs sont faits depuis longtemps, et qu'il peut revenir pour soutenir Ciudad Rodrigo. Ainsi je doute fort que mes mouvements lui en imposent beaucoup.

S. M. veut que nos avant-postes fassent le coup de fusil journallement avec les Anglais ; S. M. ignore donc que, par la nature des choses et par l'impossibilité

absolue de vivres, il y a toujours au moins 20 lieues entre les avant-postes Anglais et les nôtres, et que cet intervalle est occupé par les guérillas; de manière qu'en détachant beaucoup de troupes elles meurent de faim, et que si on en détache peu, elles sont compromises. Ce n'est donc qu'avec les guérillas et à peu de distance de nos lignes que nous pourrions avoir affaire.

S. M. trouve qu'ayant la supériorité sur l'ennemi, j'ai tort de lui laisser l'initiative. L'armée de Portugal est bien assez forte pour battre l'armée Anglaise, mais elle est inférieure à celle-ci pour opérer, par suite de la pénurie de moyens. L'armée Anglaise, qui a d'avance de grands magasins et des moyens de transport suffisants, vit partout également bien. L'armée de Portugal, sans magasins, avec très-peu de transports et sans argent, ne peut vivre qu'en se disséminant. Elle se trouve par là dépendante des lieux qui offrent des ressources, et n'est nullement propre à manœuvrer. Cet état de choses durera jusqu'à la récolte.

Puisque V. A. me reproche d'avoir laissé prendre Almeida, il est possible qu'elle me reproche aussi de n'avoir pas fait des magasins à Salamanque et à Valladolid, lorsque je n'y commandais pas. Ces reproches, tout pénibles qu'ils sont, ne me rendront pas coupable.

V. A. m'accuse d'être la cause de la prise de Rodrigo; je crois y être tout à fait étranger. Rodrigo a été pris, parce qu'il y avait une garnison trop peu nombreuse, et parce que le général en chef de l'armée du Nord a été sans surveillance comme sans prévoyance. Je ne pouvais, moi, avoir l'œil sur cette place, puisque j'en étais séparé par une chaîne de montagnes et par un désert qu'un séjour de 6 mois de l'armée avait formé dans la vallée du Tage.

L'Empereur est étonné que je n'aie pas marché du 17 au 18 avec les 30,000 hommes que j'avais rassemblés. Je n'avais point de troupes du 17 au 18; mais les troupes qui étaient en marche, pour relever celles de l'armée du Nord dans leurs cantonnements, avaient reçu en route les ordres nécessaires pour se réunir à Salamanque le 22; ces troupes ne formaient que 24,000 hommes, et ne pouvaient y arriver plus tôt. A cette époque la place était prise depuis 4 jours. La reprendre sur-le-champ était impossible, attendu qu'elle ne pouvait pas être bloquée, parce que la rivière n'étant pas guéable, je ne pouvais ni la passer, ni empêcher Lord Wellington de communiquer avec la place. Ainsi l'armée Anglaise, sans pouvoir être forcée à recevoir bataille, aurait défendu Rodrigo. L'armée de Portugal, qui n'avait d'ailleurs avec elle ni grosse artillerie, ni vivres pour rester longtemps à manœuvrer, aurait donc fait sans objet et sans résultat une marche pénible et destructive de tous ses moyens. L'expérience de la guerre d'Espagne m'a appris que la grande affaire dans ce pays était la conservation des hommes et des moyens, et c'est à cela que je me suis attaché particulièrement.

L'Empereur trouve que je fatigue mes troupes par des marches inutiles. Personne ne s'occupe plus que moi de leur épargner des fatigues, et je ne conçois pas que cette observation s'applique aux détachements qui se trouvent dans la vallée du Tage, car je ne les ai pas envoyés, mais je me suis contenté d'arrêter les troupes qui venaient de la Manche, à l'instant où, après la prise de Rodrigo, j'ai su que le 21 Janvier Lord Wellington avait fait partir deux divisions pour l'Estramadure, regardant alors comme un de mes devoirs de secourir le midi. Ces dispositions étaient toutes naturelles. Lorsque le général Hill a marché sur Merida, j'ai bien vu que c'était une diversion; et j'ai si peu pris le change, qu'en me portant sur Salamanque pour aller au secours de Rodrigo, je ne laissai que 1000 hommes dans la vallée du Tage.

S. M. paraît croire que Lord Wellington a des magasins à peu de distance sur la frontière du nord: ses magasins sont à Abrantes et en Estramadure; ses hôpitaux sont à Lisbonne, à Castello Branco, et à Abrantes; ainsi rien ne l'intéresse sur la Coa. V. A. dit que la véritable route de Lisbonne est par le nord: je crois que ceux qui connaissent bien ce pays sont convaincus du contraire. Quant à moi, je suis persuadé que toutes les fois que le principal corps d'armée prendra cette direction, on aura toutes sortes de malheurs à redouter, et que celle qu'on devrait choisir est celle de l'Alentejo. J'en ai déduit les motifs dans un mémoire que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser, il y a trois mois.

V. A. parle d'occuper les débouchés d'Almeida et de Rodrigo. Le pays qui sépare l'Agueda et la Tormes est une plaine immense, qui est praticable dans tous les sens; ainsi j'ignore ce qu'on entend par ces débouchés.

(Rend)

M (Retd)

L'Empereur me blâme d'être rentré dans la vallée du Tage, après avoir rejeté Lord Wellington de l'autre côté de la Coa ; mais c'était l'ordre positif de l'Empereur, qui ne m'avait assigné d'autre territoire que celui de la vallée du Tage. Rodrigo avait été occupé par les troupes de l'armée du Nord, et S. M. m'avait affranchi du devoir de veiller particulièrement sur cette place. Si j'en eusse été le maître, je serais venu m'établir à Salamanque : la raison militaire le disait, puisque l'ennemi était en présence ; la raison des subsistances le disait de même, puisque ce pays offrait des ressources, et que la vallée du Tage était épuisée. Il paraîtrait donc juste que l'Empereur affranchît ses généraux de toute responsabilité, quand ils suivent littéralement ses ordres, ou qu'il leur laissât plus de latitude et de pouvoir pour les exécuter.

L'Empereur semble croire que je ne suis pas ferme dans mes résolutions ; j'ignore ce qui peut avoir motivé l'opinion de S. M. Lorsque j'ai cru utile de combattre, je ne sache pas que rien ait jamais fait changer ma détermination ; et si, ici, on ne combat jamais, c'est qu'en vérité cette guerre ne ressemble en rien aux autres guerres, ni dans sa nature, ni dans les circonstances qui l'accompagnent et qui ne permettent pas de la faire autrement.

L'Empereur ordonne de grands travaux à la place de Salamanque. Il veut que 12,000 hommes soient employés à ces travaux. Il semble que l'Empereur ignore que nous n'avons ni les vivres pour les nourrir, ni l'argent pour les payer, et que nous sommes menacés de voir immédiatement tous les services manquer dans toutes les places.

C'étaient les provinces du nord qui pourvoient à la plus grande partie des besoins des 6^{me} et 7^{me} gouvernements. Cette situation empire de la manière la plus effroyable, et elle ne changera que lorsque nous aurons un territoire plus proportionné à nos besoins.

Quant aux magasins, leur formation est l'objet de tous mes efforts et de toute ma sollicitude ; mais à l'époque où nous sommes ce n'est pas une chose facile. Si S. M. augmente les ressources, et si alors je parviens à rassembler des subsistances pour nourrir l'armée pendant un mois, je croirai avoir obtenu un grand résultat, et il serait bien désirable qu'elles pussent être conservées pour le moment où il faudrait combattre l'ennemi d'une manière sérieuse, et non pour faire de simples démonstrations.

J'écris au Duc d'Albufera pour lui faire connaître la situation des choses, et je donne l'ordre au général Bonet de rentrer sur-le-champ dans les Asturies par le col de Leitariagos, ce qui donnera à son mouvement un air offensif contre la Galice. Je sens toute l'importance de l'occupation des Asturies, et je comptais y envoyer des troupes incessamment.

Monseigneur, il ne me reste plus qu'à exprimer à V. A. la peine que j'éprouve de la manière dont l'Empereur apprécie les efforts que je fais ici constamment pour le bien de son service : puisque S. M. m'attribue la prise d'Almeida, j'ignore comment je pourrais faire pour me mettre à l'abri de toute espèce d'inculpation.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Duc de Raguse.

Paris, le 16 Avril, 1812.

J'ai mis sous les yeux de l'Empereur, M. le Maréchal, vos lettres des 22 et 25 Mars.

Par mes dépêches des 18 et 20 Février, je vous prescrivais les mesures nécessaires pour prendre l'initiative et donner à la guerre un caractère convenable à la gloire des armes Françaises, en lui ôtant ce tâtonnement et cette fluctuation actuelle, qui sont déjà le présage d'une armée vaincue. Mais, au lieu d'étudier et de chercher à saisir l'esprit des instructions générales qui vous étaient données, vous vous êtes plu à ne pas les comprendre, et à prendre justement le contre-pied de leur esprit. Ces instructions sont raisonnées et motivées. Comme toutes les instructions d'un gouvernement, elles étaient données à 300 lieues et à 6 semaines d'intervalle ; elles vous supposaient vis-à-vis de l'ennemi, et vous prescrivait de le contenir et d'obliger la plus grande partie de son armée à rester dans le nord, en concentrant votre quartier général à Salamanque, et en tirant tous les jours des coups de fusil sous Ciudad Rodrigo et sous Almeida. Ces instructions vous disaient : Si, dans cet état de choses, l'ennemi reste devant vous avec moins de 5 divisions, marchez à lui, suivez-le en queue ; ses hôpitaux et magasins étant entre Lisbonne et la Coa, il ne pourra pas les évacuer si rapidement que vous ne

puissiez l'atteindre. Je vous y ajoutais que, dans cet état de choses, il était absurde de penser que le général Anglais pût abandonner tout le nord pour se jeter sur une place qu'il menaçait.....(Il y a ici une lacune dans la pièce originale.)

L'Empereur vous recommande de seconder le Roi, et de faire de vous-même, par attachement pour sa personne et pour la gloire de ses armes, tout ce qu'il vous sera possible pour empêcher que 40,000 Anglais ne gâtent toutes les affaires d'Espagne; ce qui aura lieu infailliblement, si les commandans des différens corps ne sont pas animés de ce zèle pour la gloire et de ce patriotisme qui seuls vainquent les obstacles, et empêchent de sacrifier jamais à son humeur et à des passions quelconques l'intérêt public.

Au retour de Pologne, S. M. ira en Espagne; elle espère n'avoir plus que des éloges à donner à ce que vous aurez fait, et que vous aurez de nouveau bien mérité dans son estime.

No. XXI. (p. 581.)

Decreto de 11 de Abril de 1812.

Las Cortes generales y extraordinarias deseando dar un nuevo testimonio de la gratitud nacional al Lord Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo por el nuevo y distinguido servicio que con las esforzadas tropas de su mando acaba de hacer á la patria en la gloriosa reconquista de la interesante plaza de Badajoz; y atendiendo á las personales y extraordinarias circunstancias que concuren en esto general, y le hacen acreedor al premio mas honroso que la nacion ha decretado á los valientes que la defienden; han venido en autorizar, como por el presente, autorizan á la Regencia del Reino para se pueda conceder al Lord Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo la Gran Cruz de la orden militar nacional de San Fernando, con el uso de la banda y una orla de laurel al rededor de la venera, y la pension vitalica de treinta mil reales, que son las mayores distinciones de la orden, sin sujecion á las formalidades que prescribe el reglamento. Lo tendrá entendido la Regencia del Reino para su cumplimiento. Dado en Cadiz á 11 de Abril de 1812. *José Maria Gutierrez de Teran*, Vice Presidente; *José Antonio Navarrete*, Deputado Secretario; *José de Zorraquin*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. fol. 220.

Le général de division Baron de Lery à —.

Séville, ce 20 Avril, 1812.

Les journaux, mon cher —, vous auront appris la malheureuse fin de Badajoz, qui a été pris en bien peu de tems. Je vous avoue que je ne conçois pas cette mauvaise défense avec une garnison suffisante et un approvisionnement peu ordinaire, des travaux bien entendus qui avaient été faits devaient faire espérer que l'armée aurait eu le tems de se rassembler et de venir à son secours. Tous les calculs ont été en déroute. L'armée de Portugal s'éloignait de la nôtre dans un mouvement où il aurait fallu s'entendre. Ainsi Wellington, avec les Anglais et les Portugais réunis, a pris cette place à la barbe des deux corps d'armée forts ensemble près de 80,000 hommes! Voilà ce que c'est de ne point avoir de chefs supérieurs à portée de régler les mouvemens à tems de chacun. Quoiqu'il en soit, nous perdons dans Badajoz près de 3 compagnies du génie et 10 officiers, y compris l'adjudant Hounberg. Il paraît que Trevelhier a été tué: il l'a bien voulu en se jetant dans la place avec le capitaine Mesnard, Hollandais, et 50 hommes d'élite, et le lieutenant Cortes. Aucun n'était de la garnison, et c'est par un mouvement de zèle et de courage que nous perdons autant de monde. Ci-joint copie d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir du capitaine Gaillard à l'occasion de cette prise, dont nous n'avons aucun autre détail. On débite d'après des lettres particulières que les soldats avaient refusé de bien se battre, et l'auraient fait mollement. Cela a besoin de confirmation. Ce serait une seconde représentation de Tarifa. Au reste, cette prise me paraît bien extraordinaire, et je serais bien embarrassé d'en donner l'explication claire et précise. Lorsque j'en saurai davantage, j'écrirai au ministre, et vous donnerai des renseignemens que je pourrai me procurer. Adieu, mon cher —: me voilà sans officiers; je ne compte point sur ceux que vous m'annoncez de l'armée d'Aragon. Il me faudrait des jeunes gens. Je reste avec 19: 1 major, 2 chefs de bataillon, et 7 capitaines.

Je vais avoir 200 mulets pour le train. La réquisition est frappée.

(Retd)

(Retd)

Rapport du général de division Philippon, gouverneur de Badajoz, sur la défense de cette place, du 16 Mars au 7 Avril, 1812. Paris, le 12 Juillet, 1812.

Depuis le commencement du mois de Mars, tous les rapports des espions et même des habitants de Badajoz qui voyageaient en Portugal s'accordaient à dire que l'ennemi avait l'intention d'assiéger prochainement Badajoz, et qu'à cet effet il réunissait à Elvas une immense quantité de vivres et de munitions. Le général de division Philippon, gouverneur, transmet fidèlement tous ces rapports à Son Excellence le Duc de Dalmatie.

Vers le 10 Mars, le gouverneur fut informé qu'il existait à Elvas 78 pièces de gros calibre prêtes à être mises en route pour le siège. Cette nouvelle lui fut confirmée le 11, et il sut de plus que toute l'armée de Lord Wellington se concentrait entre Portalégre, Estremoz, et Villa Viçosa. Il écrivit, le 12, à Son Excellence le Duc de Dalmatie qu'il n'y avait plus aucune espèce de doute que Badajoz ne dût être assiégé incessamment; que même l'intention de l'ennemi était d'employer de tels moyens et de pousser le siège avec tant de rapidité qu'il se flattait de se rendre maître de la place avant que les armées Françaises pussent la secourir.

Le 13 et le 14, de pareilles dépêches furent adressées à Son Excellence, lui confirmant les détails que renfermaient celles du 12, et lui donnant une nouvelle certitude d'un siège prochain.

En effet, le 15, une colonne ennemie, d'environ 3000 hommes, vint camper derrière la Caya, à deux lieues de Badajoz; et le 16, vers deux heures après midi, on vit paraître une forte colonne longeant les hauteurs d'Olivenga. Cette colonne, qui s'étendait jusqu'à un pont que l'ennemi avait jeté sur la Guadiana, à environ deux lieues de Badajoz, fit l'investissement de la place. Dès lors toute communication avec l'armée Française fut interceptée; mais les troupes de l'aile droite, sous les ordres du général Drouet, qui étaient à Sta Marta et à Almendralejo, connurent très-bien les dispositions de l'ennemi par la retraite que son mouvement les obligea de faire sur Zafra.

Depuis longtemps la place de Badajoz était menacée d'un siège. Le gouverneur Philippon avait fait parvenir à Son Excellence le Duc de Dalmatie l'état général de tous les postes intérieurs et extérieurs, ainsi que la distribution des troupes en cas d'attaque. Cet état prouvait évidemment qu'en raison de six ouvrages extérieurs à garder, la garnison n'était pas assez forte pour défendre avec sûreté le corps de place: elle ne comptait que 4000 combattants, quoique les états de situation présentassent un complet de 5000 hommes; il y avait 600 hommes à l'hôpital, et l'on devait déduire les administrations.

On avait retiré de la place les anciennes troupes, qui furent toutes remplacées par des 4^{mes} bataillons, composés la plupart d'hommes malingres et de conscrits, n'ayant que peu ou point fait la guerre. Vers la fin du siège, il ne restait que 2900 hommes en état de porter les armes.

Dans la nuit du 16 au 17, l'ennemi commença ses travaux contre la lunette Picurina, à environ 160 mètres de cet ouvrage. Sa tranchée s'étendait vers la Guadiana. La nuit suivante, il perfectionna ses travaux, allongea ses boyaux, et ouvrit une nouvelle tranchée à la gauche de la première, dans la direction de la route d'Albuera, embrassant ainsi la lunette Picurina.

Le 19 au matin, on s'aperçut que l'ennemi avait élevé une batterie percée de 4 embrasures sur la hauteur qui domine la lunette Picurina; on jugea dès lors que son intention était d'attaquer cet ouvrage. A une heure après midi, le gouverneur ordonna que l'on fit une sortie pour détruire les travaux de l'ennemi. Le général de brigade Veiland déboucha à la tête d'environ 1200 hommes et 40 chevaux, chassa l'ennemi de ses retranchements, et s'empara de ses outils. La cavalerie parvint jusqu'au camp de l'ennemi, et sabra les officiers qui s'y trouvaient seuls, les régiments étant aux travaux. L'attaque fut vigoureuse, mais on n'eut pas le temps de détruire les tranchées, comme on se l'était proposé, parce que l'ennemi, qui devait s'attendre à une semblable entreprise, se mit de suite en mouvement pour reprendre ses ouvrages. La place fit un feu très-vif d'artillerie et de mousqueterie. L'ennemi eut 600 hommes tués ou blessés, et la garnison 273.

Le gouverneur, ne doutant pas que le siège serait poussé avec vigueur, ordonna qu'on travaillât jour et nuit aux travaux de défense dans les parties que l'ennemi menaçait. Il prescrivit de ne tirer chaque jour qu'un nombre déterminé de coups de canon, à moins d'un cas extraordinaire, afin de ménager la poudre, dont l'ap-

provisionnement n'excédait pas 100,000 livres. Pendant les premiers jours du siège, la consommation avait été très grande, par la nécessité de faire un feu très-vif sur les ennemis qui travaillaient à découvrir : on avait tiré jusqu'à 3200 coups de canon dans un jour, tous de gros calibre.

Le 20, le gouverneur voyant la lunette Picurina menacée d'une attaque, en donna le commandement au colonel Gaspard Thierry, adjoint à l'état-major, et porta sa garnison à 200 hommes en sus des canonniers nécessaires. Cette lunette était approvisionnée de projectiles creux et chargés, disposés sur les parapets pour les faire rouler dans les fossés au moment de l'attaque, et de 200 fusils de rechange, afin que chaque homme eût plusieurs coups à tirer.

Les 21, 22, 23, et 24, l'ennemi continua ses travaux. Il ouvrit plusieurs tranchées et éleva 4 nouvelles batteries, dont une menaçait le flanc droit de la lunette Picurina ; les 3 autres avaient pour but d'éteindre les feux de la place depuis le château jusqu'au bastion No. 7. Ces batteries firent un feu très-vif dès qu'elles furent armées.

Le 25, les batteries dirigées contre la lunette Picurina ne cessèrent de tirer ; elles mirent hors de combat quelques hommes, et détruisirent une partie des merlons qu'on s'efforça de réparer avec des ballots de laine.

Bien que le dommage fait à cette lunette ne fût pas encore très-grand, l'ennemi y donna l'assaut, à 8 heures du soir. Son attaque fut très-vive. La garnison se battit vaillamment et repoussa les assaillants, qui eurent beaucoup à souffrir du feu roulant que fit l'artillerie de la place ; mais quelques moments après ce premier assaut, l'ennemi en livra un second, et pénétra dans la lunette sans rencontrer aucun obstacle.

Le gouverneur n'a pas été content de la défense de cet ouvrage, qui, d'après la manière dont il avait été armé, pouvait faire beaucoup de mal à l'ennemi. Aucune des bombes disposées sur les parapets ne fut lancée ; on ne fit pas usage des 200 fusils de rechange qui avaient été préparés, et les soldats ne furent point maintenus à leur poste. La garnison fut faite prisonnière, moins 30 hommes et 1 officier du régiment de Hesse qui parvinrent à s'échapper.

Le 26, au point du jour, on s'aperçut que l'ennemi avait tracé 2 grandes batteries en avant de Picurina, pour battre en brèche la face gauche du bastion 6 et la face droite du bastion 7.

Le vrai point d'attaque étant bien connu, on travailla à faire un retranchement en arrière du front menacé, et l'on n'abandonna pas ce travail qu'il ne fût terminé. L'ennemi, présumant bien que l'on travaillait sur ce point, ne cessa d'y jeter des boulets creux, dans lesquels on trouva jusqu'à 200 balles : ces boulets faisaient beaucoup de mal lorsqu'il éclataient au milieu des travailleurs. Le gouverneur et le général Veiland se trouvaient au bastion 7 pour examiner les progrès de la brèche du bastion 6, quand un boulet creux éclata à 4 ou 5 pas d'eux, les blessa, ainsi que l'aide de camp Desmeuves, mais légèrement, et tua 4 travailleurs.

Le 27, l'ennemi fit un feu très-vif de toutes ses batteries. La place, devant économiser la poudre, ne pouvait déjà plus riposter que faiblement. A la fin de chaque journée, 200 hommes étaient employés à déblayer le pied des brèches, mais la mitraille de l'ennemi faisait beaucoup de mal aux travailleurs. Les ouvriers de l'arsenal étaient employés à faire des chevaux de frise avec d'anciennes lames de sabres, dont il se trouvait une grande quantité dans la place. Ces chevaux de frise devaient être placés au sommet des brèches au moment de l'assaut ; ils s'attachaient les uns aux autres au moyen d'anneaux et de chaînes de fer, et, une fois placés, il n'était plus possible à l'ennemi de les enlever : ils furent d'un grand effet, et l'ennemi dans ses rapports s'en plaignit beaucoup. Indépendamment de ces dispositions, le gouverneur fit placer sur les parapets des projectiles creux chargés, de vieux boulets, des essieux de voitures, et des pièces de bois pour jeter dans les fossés au moment de l'assaut.

Le 28, on vit arriver plusieurs colonnes de l'ennemi, venant d'Elvas. Les troupes Anglaises campées sur la Caya avaient aussi quitté leur position pendant la nuit, et étaient venues se poster derrière les hauteurs de la rive droite de la Guadiana, en face de la tête de pont.

Le 29 au matin, on s'aperçut que l'ennemi avait travaillé pendant la nuit à élever une espèce de redoute en avant de la lunette Verley. Le même jour, on vint rendre compte au gouverneur qu'on entendait travailler à peu de distance de la tête de pont. Le général Philippon donna aussitôt l'ordre au bataillon du 9^{me}

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léger, qui se trouvait en réserve sur la place Saint-Jean, de sortir sans bruit par la tête de pont, et de tomber à l'improviste sur les travailleurs ennemis. Le lieutenant Duhamel, aide de camp du gouverneur, s'étant mis à la tête de l'avant-garde, pénétra avec la rapidité de l'éclair jusque dans les retranchements de l'ennemi; mais ce brave officier fut victime de sa bravoure; un coup de feu qu'il reçut dans la poitrine le renversa mort. Les travailleurs ennemis se sauvèrent à toutes jambes jusque dans leur camp; plusieurs qui voulurent se défendre furent massacrés. Les réserves de l'ennemi étant accourues, le bataillon rentra dans la place.

Le 4 Avril, les brèches des bastions 6 et 7 paraissaient praticables. Le gouverneur, voulant s'assurer si on pouvait les gravir facilement avec armes et bagages, y envoya quelques sapeurs qui s'offrirent de bonne volonté, et qui effectivement montèrent sans difficulté: ces brèches étaient assez larges pour que 120 hommes pussent y passer de front.

L'assaut général ne devant pas être éloigné, le gouverneur commanda 8 compagnies d'élite pour la défense du front d'attaque, et fit porter sur les brèches les chevaux de frise à lames de sabres qui avaient été préparés; 200 bombes et obus chargés furent disposés pour être roulés dans le fossé au moment de l'assaut; plus de 100 barils foudroyants étaient aussi placés de manière à ce qu'ils pussent causer à l'ennemi le plus de mal possible.

Dans la nuit du 4 au 5, l'ennemi tira peu. On était surpris de sa tranquillité; mais le 5, au point du jour, on s'aperçut qu'il avait changé la direction de ses embrasures, et bientôt 46 pièces de gros calibre firent feu contre la courtine du front 6-7 pour y faire une nouvelle brèche. La muraille fut détruite si rapidement qu'à 2 heures après midi la nouvelle brèche était aussi praticable que les deux autres; 200 hommes pouvaient monter de front à ces trois brèches.

Cependant le commandant du génie, voyant que l'ennemi ne faisait aucune approche pour faire sauter la contrescarpe, avait eu la précaution de faire couper toutes les rampes qui auraient permis à l'ennemi de descendre dans les fossés. Le conseil de défense fut assemblé à ce sujet, et il fut résolu qu'on placerait de suite au pied de la contrescarpe, vis-à-vis des brèches, 2 chapelets de bombes de 14 pouces pour faire sauter l'ennemi au moment où il se jetterait dans le fossé.

Le gouverneur et le général Veiland s'étant transportés au pied des brèches, et les ayant trouvées toutes les trois très-praticables, ne doutèrent plus que l'ennemi n'y dirigeât une grande partie de ses forces. Ils renforcèrent alors de 4 compagnies d'élite les troupes qui s'y trouvaient, ce qui porta la force de ces troupes à 12 compagnies.

Le 5, l'ennemi continua de tirer sur les brèches afin d'en rendre les pentes plus douces. On devait présumer qu'il tenterait l'assaut dans la nuit. Toutes les troupes étaient à leur poste, animées du meilleur esprit.

Le 6, on vit peu de mouvement dans les camps des Anglais; ils continuèrent de tirer comme la veille. La place riposta peu, car il ne lui restait alors que très-peu de poudre. A 8 heures du soir, l'ennemi commença un feu très-vif de mitraille de toutes ses batteries. On pensa qu'il avait l'intention de livrer l'assaut, et que pendant cette canonnade ses colonnes étaient en mouvement. Tout à coup une très-vive fusillade se fit entendre de tous côtés. L'ennemi se présentait sur la contrescarpe, vis-à-vis des brèches, et se jeta dans le fossé. A ce moment, on fit jouer les chapelets de bombes qui étaient sous ses pieds et qu'il n'avait point découverts: tous ceux qui étaient dans le fossé furent tués ou blessés. La place rassemblait à un volcan. Deux fois l'ennemi tenta de gravir les brèches, mais deux fois il fut repoussé: il laissa plus de 2000 hommes dans ce lieu de carnage.

Le gouverneur était sur la place Saint-Jean, à peu près au centre de la ville, lorsque le chef de bataillon Rio, de l'artillerie Espagnole, vint lui annoncer que l'ennemi avait pénétré dans le bastion 6. On pouvait croire à un tel rapport d'après les cris effroyables qui se faisaient entendre de ce côté; mais le gouverneur, voulant s'en assurer par lui-même, s'y porta aussitôt, et eut la satisfaction d'apprendre que l'ennemi, après un dernier effort qu'il avait tenté, venait d'être repoussé.

La fusillade continuait toujours au château. Le gouverneur, regardant ce point comme le plus fort, avait donné l'ordre aux commandants des bataillons de s'y retirer, en cas que l'on fût forcé dans la ville, afin d'y obtenir une capitulation; lui même y avait envoyé ses bagages, ainsi que ceux des officiers. Il fut donc

très-surpris lorsqu'un officier vint lui rendre compte que l'ennemi en avait escaladé les murailles. Le gouverneur envoya aussitôt au secours du château 4 compagnies de réserve forts ensemble d'environ 200 hommes; mais ces troupes ne purent y rentrer; l'ennemi, déjà maître d'une partie de ce réduit, avait fermé la porte qui se trouve vers le bastion 9. Le gouverneur envoya encore contre le château 2 autres compagnies du 88^{me}, conduites par l'aide de camp Saint-Vincent. Ces 2 compagnies arrivèrent par l'autre porte du château qui n'était point fermée, mais elles furent reçues par un feu très-vif, et perdirent en peu d'instant leur capitaine, et l'aide de camp Saint-Vincent fut blessé, ainsi qu'un grand nombre de soldats. Par l'effet d'une méprise malheureuse, les troupes du régiment de Hesse, qui défendaient le château, avaient pris cette dernière colonne pour des Anglais: les 2 compagnies furent mises en déroute, et le château ne put être secouru.

La garnison du château était assez nombreuse pour résister aux attaques de l'ennemi et l'empêcher de pénétrer, puisqu'il n'avait dressé que 2 échelles; mais les soldats du régiment de Hesse, dont elle était composée, se laissèrent intimider, abandonnèrent leurs postes, et l'ennemi pénétra par des points où il ne trouva personne. Le colonel Koller s'était retiré dans les retranchements du château avec le peu de monde qu'il avait pu rassembler; le reste fut tué, blessé, ou fait prisonnier.

Dans ce moment de crise, on vint annoncer au gouverneur que les bastions 1 et 2 étaient vivement attaqués. Il s'y transporta aussitôt: une partie du bataillon du 9^{me} léger et les administrations qui étaient réunies sur ce point firent une vigoureuse résistance; mais les efforts de l'ennemi furent si grands qu'il parvint à escalader les remparts. Alors 30 dragons et chasseurs qui accompagnaient le gouverneur firent une charge sur la place de las Palmas; mais presque tous leurs chevaux furent blessés ou tués, et il fut impossible d'arrêter l'ennemi: on se battit dans la ville jusqu'à 3½ heures du matin. Ce fut avec beaucoup de peine que le gouverneur, avec une partie de son état-major, parvint à traverser le pont, au milieu d'une grêle de balles, pour se retirer au fort San Cristoval, où il capitula au point du jour, faute de vivres et de munitions.

Le fort Pardaleras avait été attaqué en même temps que la place. Le colonel Pineau, qui y commandait, fit une très-vigoureuse résistance, et obligea l'ennemi de se retirer: ce colonel mérite d'être cité comme extrêmement brave; ce ne fut que le lendemain qu'il se rendit avec sa garnison.

Lord Wellington, dans son rapport, dit qu'il avait ordonné la retraite, lorsqu'il s'aperçut que ses troupes s'étaient emparées du château. Il dit avoir perdu pendant le siège 5000 hommes, dont 400 officiers; mais sa perte a été réellement beaucoup plus considérable, et elle peut être évaluée de 7000 à 8000 hommes, d'après les renseignements qui ont été transmis au gouverneur en Angleterre par les officiers de santé et les officiers restés quelque temps à Badajoz, et emmenés ensuite comme prisonniers.

Le journal du siège se trouve entre les mains du colonel Lamare, commandant du génie, actuellement prisonnier en Angleterre, et qui a promis de faire tout ce qu'il pourrait pour le faire parvenir à Son Excellence le ministre de la guerre.

No. XXII. (p. 727.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse au Maréchal Jourdan, Major Général de S. M. Catholique.
Cañizal, le 28 Juin, 1812.

J'ai reçu la lettre que S. M. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 18 Juin. J'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire le 22, pour lui faire connaître ma position. Depuis ce temps, elle ne s'est pas améliorée, attendu qu'ayant droit de compter sur les secours que m'avait promis le général Caffarelli, y ayant compté en effet, et ne les ayant pas reçus, il en est résulté de fausses opérations. L'assurance que le général Caffarelli m'avait donnée que les troupes étaient en marche pour me joindre, et la suspension du siège de Salamanque que ma présence avait occasionnée, m'avaient décidé à suspendre mes opérations contre l'ennemi. Le 26, dans l'après-midi, ayant été informé et par le bruit du canon, et par les signaux de la place, que le siège était repris avec vigueur, j'ai dû, vu le péril de ce fort, prendre la résolution d'agir seul; et comme, vu la force de la position que l'ennemi occupait sur la droite de la Tormes, je ne pouvais raisonnablement agir que par la rive gauche, opération qui, pour réussir, ne pouvait être entreprise que de nuit, j'ai fait mes dispositions

SM (Retd)

SM (Retd)

pour marcher le 28 au soir. Malheureusement, dans la journée du 27, un violent incendie ayant embrasé tous les bâtiments du fort, et la place étant ouverte, la garnison s'est trouvée dans une situation telle qu'elle a dû se rendre à discrétion, à l'instant où j'avais l'espérance fondée de la délivrer. L'opération que j'aurais faite le 27 au soir, je l'aurais faite 3 jours plus tôt, sans les promesses de secours du général Caffarelli; mais il eût été impossible à moi de livrer une bataille aussi importante pour l'Espagne, avant l'arrivée d'un secours puissant, annoncé officiellement, et sur lequel j'avais droit de compter. Malgré ce résultat fâcheux, le fort de Salamanque aura, en grande partie, rempli son objet, puisqu'il aura retardé de 10 jours les projets de l'ennemi, qui ne vont pas moins qu'à nous chasser de l'Espagne, et aura donné aux autres armées le temps de former leurs détachements, si elles veulent concourir aux opérations du nord. Le commandant et la garnison se sont couverts de gloire par leur vigoureuse résistance, et l'ennemi a perdu trois fois plus d'hommes que nous n'en avions dans le fort. Enfin, quand nous aurons gagné une bataille sur les Anglais, nous le réoccuperons facilement, car il paraît dans un bouleversement tel, qu'il est impossible que l'ennemi le défende aujourd'hui. Lorsque les troupes du général Caffarelli m'auront enfin rejoint, si l'ennemi ne vient pas sur le Douro, je marcherai sur Salamanque. J'ai besoin de ce secours pour combattre l'ennemi avec confiance. Il est aujourd'hui de 12,000 hommes plus fort que moi, sans compter les Espagnols. Le général Hill n'a pas rejoint Lord Wellington; mais on annonce son arrivée comme très-prochaine. Il est donc bien désirable que S. M. envoie les secours par le général Treillard qu'elle m'annonce, avant l'arrivée du Comte d'Erlon. Les affaires d'Espagne vont se décider entre la Tormes et le Douro, ou sur le Douro; tout le reste n'est que secondaire. Je vais prendre position en avant du Douro, en attendant les moyens d'agir offensivement.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Tudela de Duero, le 30 Juin, 1812.

« Dès le mois de Mai, j'étais informé que l'armée Anglaise devait entrer en campagne avec des moyens puissants. J'en rendis compte au Roi, afin qu'il pût ordonner les dispositions qu'il croirait convenables, et j'en prévis également le général Caffarelli, pour qu'il pût se mettre en mesure de m'envoyer des secours lorsque le moment serait arrivé.

« L'extrême difficulté des subsistances, l'impossibilité de faire vivre à cette époque les troupes rassemblées, m'empêchèrent d'avoir plus de 8 à 9 bataillons à Salamanque, mais le reste de l'armée était assez près pour venir me joindre en peu de jours.

« Le 12 Juin, l'ennemi passa l'Agueda. J'en fus instruit, le 14 au matin, et l'ordre de rassemblement fut donné aux troupes. Le 16, l'armée Anglaise arriva devant Salamanque. Dans la nuit du 16 au 17, j'évacuai cette ville, laissant toutefois une garnison dans les forts que j'avais fait construire, et qui, par l'extrême activité qu'on avait mise à exécuter les travaux, se trouvaient en état de défense. Je me portai à 6 lieues de Salamanque, où, ayant réuni 5 divisions, je me rapprochai de cette ville. Je chassai devant moi les avant-postes Anglais, et je forçai l'armée ennemie à montrer quelle attitude elle comptait prendre: elle parut résolue à combattre dans la forte position que présente le beau plateau de San Cristoval. Le reste de l'armée m'ayant rejoint, je manœuvrai autour de cette position; mais j'acquis la certitude que partout elle nous présentait des obstacles difficiles à vaincre, et qu'il valait mieux forcer l'ennemi à venir sur un autre champ de bataille, que d'engager une action avec lui sur un terrain qui lui donnait trop d'avantages. D'ailleurs, divers motifs me faisaient désirer de traîner les opérations en longueur, car je venais de recevoir une lettre du général Caffarelli qui m'annonçait qu'il réunissait ses troupes, et qu'il allait marcher pour me secourir, tandis que ma présence avait fait suspendre le siège du fort de Salamanque. Les choses restèrent dans cet état pendant quelques jours et les armées en présence, lorsque le siège du fort de Salamanque recommença avec vigueur. Le peu de distance qu'il y avait entre ce fort et l'armée Française, et l'emploi de signaux convenus, me permettaient chaque jour d'être informé de la situation de la place. Ceux du 26 au 27 m'annoncèrent que la garnison pouvait tenir encore 5 jours; dès lors je me décidai à exécuter le passage de la Tormes et à agir par la rive

gauche. Le fort d'Alba, que j'avais conservé, me donnait un passage sur cette rivière, une nouvelle ligne d'opérations, et un point de dépôt important. Je fis des dispositions pour exécuter ce passage dans la nuit du 28 au 29.

Dans la nuit du 27, le feu redoubla d'intensité, et l'ennemi, fatigué d'une résistance qui lui paraissait exagérée, tira à boulets rouges sur les établissements du fort. Malheureusement les magasins renfermaient une grande quantité de bois de démolition; ils s'enflammèrent, et en peu d'instants le fort devint le foyer d'un vaste incendie. Il fut impossible à la brave garnison qui le défendait de supporter tout à la fois les attaques de l'ennemi et l'incendie qui détruisait ses défenses, ses magasins, et ses vivres, et mettait les soldats eux-mêmes dans la situation la plus épouvantable; elle dut donc se rendre à discrétion, après avoir eu la gloire de repousser deux assauts et de faire perdre à l'ennemi au delà de 1300 hommes, c'est-à-dire plus du double des défenseurs.

Cet événement se passa le 27 à midi. L'ennemi n'ayant plus d'objet dans son opération au delà de la Tormes, et tout m'indiquant qu'il était sage d'attendre les renforts de l'armée du Nord qui m'avaient été annoncés d'une manière formelle, je me décidai à me rapprocher du Douro pour passer cette rivière avec l'armée, si l'ennemi marchait à nous, et y reprendre une bonne ligne de défense jusqu'à ce que le moment de l'offensive fût venu. Le 28, l'armée partit et prit position sur la Guarena, et le 29 sur le Trabancos, où elle séjourna. L'ennemi ayant suivi le mouvement avec toutes ses forces, l'armée prit position sur la Zapardiéra, et, le 2, elle passa le Douro à Tordesillas, lieu que j'avais choisi pour le pivot de mes opérations, et où le fleuve m'offrait une excellente ligne.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. M. le Roi d'Espagne. Rueda, le 1 Juillet, 1812.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. M. les duplicata d'une lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire, et d'une lettre que j'ai adressée au Maréchal Jourdan.

La prise du fort de Salamanque changeant ma position et celle de l'ennemi sur la Tormes, je me suis mis en marche le 28 Juin au matin pour aller au-devant de mes renforts. L'ennemi avait préparé son mouvement; il m'a suivi immédiatement, sans cependant qu'il y ait eu autre chose que des engagements d'avant-postes. J'ai pris ma ligne d'opérations par Tordesillas, parce que c'est la ligne la plus courte, et j'ai conduit aujourd'hui l'armée ici, après avoir détaché une division sur le bas Douro, afin de défendre cette rivière et de me couvrir des mouvements du corps Portugais de Silveira qui, à ce qu'on assure, a passé l'Esla et est devant Zamora. Demain je rapprocherai l'armée de Tordesillas. C'est de ce point que je manœuvrerai pour défendre le Douro, ou que je prendrai l'offensive lorsque des renforts m'auront joint. Il me faut absolument 1500 chevaux et 6000 ou 7000 hommes d'infanterie de plus, pour pouvoir opérer sur la rive gauche du Douro avec la probabilité du succès. L'armée ennemie a en ligne près de 50,000 hommes, dont 5000 de cavalerie Anglaise, quoique le général Hill ne l'ait pas rejoint: il est vrai que celui-ci n'a pas plus de 8000 hommes. Je n'ai pas pu réunir plus de 32,000 hommes. Le général Caffarelli m'annonce, le 10 Juin, qu'il me conduit tout ce qu'il a de disponible, c'est-à-dire, la cavalerie, 22 bouches à feu, et 7500 hommes d'infanterie. Le 28 au soir, il n'y avait d'arrivé à Valladolid, ni un soldat d'infanterie, ni un soldat de cavalerie, ni une bouche à feu. Cependant, s'il peut avoir quelque excuse légitime pour n'avoir point envoyé d'infanterie, il n'en peut avoir pour sa cavalerie, qui ne peut lui servir dans les montagnes, et pour son artillerie qui est stationnée à Burgos sans lui être d'aucun usage.

Les rapports annoncent que les Portugais ont passé l'Esla, ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de le dire plus haut à V. M. On m'assure aussi que l'armée de Galice a passé l'Orbigo et qu'Astorga est bloqué. Malgré la présence de l'ennemi de tous les côtés, je suis sans inquiétude pour l'avenir et confiant dans un résultat glorieux, si je reçois le renfort que j'ai demandé, et qui consiste en 1500 chevaux, 6000 ou 7000 hommes d'infanterie, et quelques bouches à feu. J'ose donc supplier V. M., si elle peut m'envoyer sa cavalerie du Tage, de le faire dans cette circonstance. J'ai posté de préférence la masse de mes forces sur le haut Douro, parce que, si je suis réduit pendant quelque temps à défendre le Douro, je ne cours aucun risque de voir compromettre ma ligne d'opérations, et parce que cette rivière est peu de chose en cette partie; tandis que, plus forte au-dessous, elle est rendu encore meilleure pour la défense, par les forts qui existent. J'espère que dans 8 jours au

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plus tard, après avoir reçu les renforts qui me sont nécessaires, les projets de l'ennemi seront évanouis, et que je serai rentré à Salamanque. Si je ne reçois aucun secours, je pourrai combattre les événements, mais il me sera impossible de les maîtriser.

No. XXIII. (p. 758.)

Decreto de 22 de Julio de 1813.

Las Córtes generales y extraordinarias, á nombre de la nacion Española, en testimonio de su mas sincera gratitud, decretan: Se adjudica al Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo para si, sus herederos y sucesores, el sitio y posesion Real, conocido en la vega de Granada, por *el Soto de Roma*, con inclusion del terreno llamado *de las Chanchinas*, que si halla situado dentro el mismo término del Soto para que si hayan y desfruten con asego á la Constitucion y á las leyes. Lo tendrá entendido la Regencia del Reino para su cumplimiento, y lo hara publicar. Dado en Cadiz á 22 de Julio de 1813. *Josef Antonio Sombielá*, Presidente; *Manuel Gorganes*, Deputado Secretario; *Fernin de Clementi*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. lib. 2, fol. 222.

Decreto de 7 de Agosto de 1812.

Las Córtes generales y extraordinarias, intimamente reconocidas á los repetidos eminentes servicios que el Lord Wellington, Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, ha hecho en favor de nuestra causa santa, y deseando dar un nuevo testimonio del alto aprecio que merecen á la nacion sus gloriosas acciones, señaladamente la importante victoria que con el valiente exercito aliado de su mando acaba de conseguir en los campos de Salamanca, en el dia 22 de Julio proximo, sobre las tropas enemigas del Mariscal Marmont, han tenido á bien, conformándose con la propuesta de la Regencia del Reino, conceder, como por el presente conceden al Lord Wellington, Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, la decoracion de la insigne orden del Toison de Oro. Lo tendrá entendido la Regencia del Reino para su cumplimiento, y le hará imprimir y publicar. Dado en Cadiz á 7 de Agosto, de 1812. *Felipe Vazques*, Presidente; *Manuel de Llano*, Deputado Secretario; *Juan Nicario Gallego*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. lib. 2, fol. 36.

Orden.

Las Córtes generales y extraordinarias, condesciendiendo con los justos deseos del Ayuntamiento de Salamanca, se han servido conceder su soberano permiso para que se coloque en la plaza mayor de aquella ciudad el busto del Lord Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, con una inscripcion Latina que perpetúe la memoria de la celebre batalla de 22 de Julio último, segun lo ha solicitado dicho Ayuntamiento en papel de 29 del mismo. De orden de S. M. lo comunicamos á V. E. por inteligencia de S. A. y de mas efectos convenientes. Dios guarde V. E. muchos años. Cadiz, 17 de Agosto de 1812. *Manuel de Llano*, Deputado Secretario; *Juan Bernardo O. Gavan*, Deputado Secretario. S^r. Secretario del despacho de Gracia y Justicia.

Le Roi d'Espagne au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre. Madrid, le 18 Juillet, 1812.

M. le Duc, je viens de recevoir la nouvelle que la division Palombini se rend aux ordres que je lui ai donnés. J'attends avec impatience son arrivée pour me porter au secours de l'armée de Portugal.

J'ai donné l'ordre aux troupes de l'armée d'Aragon, qui se trouvent dans la province de Cuenca, de me joindre; mais jusqu'ici je ne puis encore me flatter de les voir arriver. Toutefois je partirai sans elles dès que la division Italienne sera arrivée. Le peu de troupes de l'armée du Centre est réuni aux environs de Madrid. La cavalerie doit être demain à Naval Carnero. Toutes les provinces du centre sont évacuées, et même les positions de Somosierra, de Buytrago, etc. Je n'eusse pas été réduit à ces fâcheuses extrémités, si le général en chef de l'armée du Nord eût obéi aux ordres que je lui ai donnés si souvent, de secourir à tout prix l'armée de Portugal, en abandonnant momentanément les points qui exigent des garnisons, comme je viens de le faire. Je vous le répète, M. le Duc, si l'Empereur ne trouve pas le moyen de faire que les généraux des armées du Nord, d'Aragon, et du Midi

m'obéissent, l'Espagne est perdue, et avec elle l'armée Française. Je vous l'ai déjà mandé, et je le répète encore, parce que les circonstances deviennent tous les jours plus graves, que les généraux qui ne pensent qu'à leurs provinces, et non à l'ensemble des opérations, soient destitués de tout commandement, pour l'exemple de leurs successeurs; qu'ils ne puissent avoir d'autres instructions que celle de m'obéir; ou que l'Empereur ne me condamne pas à être le témoin impuissant du déshonneur de ses armes et de la perte de ce pays. Je confirme donc tout ce que je vous ai déjà écrit par ma lettre d'hier à ce sujet.

Le Maréchal Duc de Raguse à S. M. le Roi d'Espagne. Arevalo, le 25 Juillet, 1812.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à V. M. des événements qui se sont passés jusqu'à mon arrivée sur le Douro, et des motifs qui m'y avaient amené. Ayant augmenté mon artillerie et ma cavalerie, et la division du général Bonet m'ayant rejoint, je me suis mis en devoir de reprendre l'offensive. Le 17 de ce mois, après avoir manœuvré pendant 4 ou 5 jours par ma droite dans la direction de Toro, pour donner le change à l'ennemi, j'ai débouché par le pont de Tordesillas, et je suis arrivé sans difficulté sur le plateau de Rueda. Le même jour, l'armée a couché à Nava del Rey. Le 18, ayant surpris l'avant-garde de l'ennemi à Torrecilla de la Orden, je l'ai poussée avec vigueur, et forcée de faire une retraite à plus de 3 lieues, avec beaucoup de précipitation et le plus grand danger, constamment sous mon canon. Ce jour-là j'arrivai sur les bords de la Guareña, où l'ennemi prit position. La force de cette position m'ayant empêché de l'attaquer, je manœuvrai pour effectuer le passage de cette rivière, qui eut lieu le 20. L'ennemi, qui m'avait suivi dans mon mouvement, chercha à s'emparer des plateaux qui faisaient la sûreté de mon opération; mais il ne put réussir, et nous manœuvrâmes constamment sous le canon l'un de l'autre. Ce genre d'opérations est le seul qui convient avec les Anglais, qui ont un talent particulier pour prendre position, et qu'il faut contrarier autant que possible, en empêchant, avant de combattre, qu'ils puissent s'y établir. Le 20, l'ennemi s'est porté sur la forte position de San Cristoval en avant de Salamanque. Le 21, j'effectuai le passage de la Tormes, après m'être emparé du poste d'Alba. L'armée se plaça entre Alba de Tormes et Salamanque à la tête des bois. Dans la nuit du 21 au 22, l'armée Anglaise passa la Tormes et prit position en face de moi, à 3 quarts de lieue de distance. J'allai la reconnaître à la pointe du jour, et je passai la matinée à faire des dispositions, d'abord dans l'objet d'une bonne défensive, et ensuite dans celui d'attaquer, si les circonstances m'en faisaient espérer des avantages. Après les dispositions que j'avais prises, tout semblait présager les chances les plus favorables. Je crus nécessaire de faire occuper à notre gauche un plateau qui complétait notre défensive, et qui en même temps devait être très utile dans le cas où nous agirions en offensive, à laquelle j'étais presque décidé. Je fis occuper ce plateau par la 5^{me} division et la réserve d'artillerie à cheval, avec ordre formel de ne pas se porter au delà. Comme il était possible que l'ennemi, nous croyant maîtres de ce plateau, se décidât à l'attaquer avant que j'eusse le temps de réunir tous nos moyens, j'ordonnai à deux divisions de se rapprocher pour être en mesure d'y soutenir la 5^{me}. Le général Maucune chassa le détachement Anglais qui occupait les hauteurs, et le culbuta. Jusque-là nous n'avions eu que des succès, et tout annonçait qu'ils seraient complets. Je jugeai qu'il fallait promptement porter de nouvelles troupes pour agir avec vigueur sur le point où se trouvait le général Maucune, et empêcher que l'ennemi, qui réunissait ses forces, ne lui tint tête. Je rassemblai sur-le-champ toutes celles qui étaient à ma portée, et je m'occupais de les conduire et de prendre le commandement de cette partie de la ligne, lorsque, par une cruelle fatalité, et au moment où ma présence était la plus nécessaire, un coup de canon à mitraille me renversa en me fracassant le bras droit, et me faisant deux larges blessures dans le côté, ce qui me mit hors d'état de garder le commandement. L'anarchie qui succéda à cet accident empêcha de suivre les mesures que j'avais ordonnées (ce qui contribua à la prolonger, c'est que le général Bonet, à qui revenait le commandement comme le plus ancien général de division, fut également blessé peu d'instant après moi), de manière que le général Maucune, après avoir eu de fort beaux succès, accablé par le nombre des ennemis, fut obligé de se retirer. Les troupes qui arrivaient à son secours n'ayant pas d'ensemble, furent aussi contraintes de se retirer, après avoir fait des prodiges de valeur. Enfin, Sire, après 3 heures de combat, les troupes abandonnèrent le

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champ de bataille. Le général Clausel, qui commande l'armée, a cru nécessaire de repasser la Tormes, et doit prendre position sur la rive droite du Douro. L'état dans lequel je me trouve me force à ne rendre qu'un compte très-succinct à V. M. ; lorsque je le pourrai, j'aurai l'honneur d'entrer dans de plus longs détails avec elle sur cet événement, qui retrace avec une rare énergie les caprices de la fortune, et l'échange des espérances les plus flatteuses contre les faits les plus tristes. L'armée a à regretter la perte de bon nombre d'officiers de tous grades. Les généraux Ferey, Thomières, et Desgravières ont péri ; le général Bonet a eu la cuisse percée d'une balle ; le général Maine a été blessé, ainsi que le général Clausel, mais la blessure de ce dernier est légère. On évalue par aperçu notre perte à près de 5000 hommes. Celle des Anglais doit être infiniment plus forte ; il est difficile d'exprimer le mal que leur a fait notre artillerie.

Le Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre, au Maréchal Duc de Raguse.

Paris, le 14 Novembre, 1812.

Lorsque, le 18 Août dernier, j'eus l'honneur de répondre aux lettres que V. E. m'avait adressées par son aide de camp, M. Fabvier, pour me donner les détails relatifs à la bataille du 22 Juillet, j'eus soin de vous prévenir que c'était à l'Empereur qu'il appartenait de juger tout ce qui était relatif à cette affaire, sur laquelle je lui avais transmis tout ce que vous m'aviez adressé. S. M., en me répondant, m'a fait connaître sa manière de voir et de juger les choses, et m'a ordonné à cette occasion de vous proposer différentes questions, auxquelles l'Empereur exige de votre part une réponse catégorique. Si j'ai tardé jusqu'à présent de vous adresser ces questions, c'était pour attendre votre rétablissement, et me conformer en ceci aux intentions de S. M. I. ; maintenant je n'ai plus qu'à m'acquitter du devoir que ses ordres m'ont imposé envers vous.

L'Empereur, dans l'examen qu'il a fait de vos opérations, est parti d'un principe que vous ne pouvez méconnaître ; c'est que vous devez considérer le Roi comme votre général en chef, et que vos mouvements étant subordonnés au système général adopté par S. M. C., vous deviez toujours prendre ses ordres, avant d'entreprendre des opérations qui sortaient de ce système. Placé par une suite de dispositions générales à Salamanque, il était tout simple de vous y défendre, si vous étiez attaqué, mais vous ne pouviez vous éloigner de plusieurs marches de ce point, sans en prévenir votre général en chef. Je ne puis vous dissimuler, M. le Maréchal, que l'Empereur envisage votre manière d'agir dans le cas indiqué, comme une insubordination formelle, et une désobéissance à ses ordres. Cependant vous avez fait plus encore : vous êtes sorti de votre défensive sur le Douro, où vous pouviez être secouru par des renforts de Madrid, pour prendre l'offensive sur l'ennemi, sans attendre les ordres du Roi, ni les secours qu'il était à même de vous envoyer. Sans doute, vous avez pensé qu'ils vous étaient inutiles ; et l'espérance d'un succès que vous avez cru pouvoir obtenir seul, vous a entraîné à agir sans attendre des renforts, dont la proximité du Roi vous donnait la certitude. Mais c'est précisément ce que l'Empereur condamne, puisque vous vous êtes permis de livrer bataille sans y être autorisé, et que vous avez compromis par là la gloire des armes Françaises et le service de l'Empereur. Si du moins, en vous décidant à courir les chances d'un combat, vous aviez fait ce qui dépendait de vous pour en assurer le succès, on pourrait supposer que vous avez craint de laisser échapper une occasion favorable ; mais, par une précipitation que rien n'explique, vous n'avez pas même voulu attendre le secours de la cavalerie de l'armée du Nord, qui vous était si important, et dont vous étiez certain, en retardant la bataille de deux jours seulement. Cette conduite, si difficile à concevoir, a fait d'autant plus d'impression sur l'Empereur, que S. M. a vainement cherché dans votre rapport les motifs qui vous ont fait agir. Elle n'y a rien trouvé qui lui ait fait connaître l'état réel des choses ; et, comme elle veut être éclairée à cet égard, elle exige de vous une réponse précise et catégorique aux questions suivantes :

Pourquoi n'avez-vous pas instruit le Roi que vous aviez évacué Salamanque de plusieurs marches, et demandé ses ordres sur le parti que vous aviez à suivre ?

Pourquoi êtes-vous sorti de votre défensive sur le Douro, et avez-vous passé de la défensive à l'offensive, sans attendre les renforts que vous aviez demandés ?

Pourquoi vous êtes-vous permis de livrer bataille sans l'ordre de votre général en chef ?

Enfin, pourquoi n'avez-vous pas au moins retardé de deux jours, pour avoir le secours de la cavalerie que vous saviez en marche ?

Je vous invite, M. le Maréchal, à m'adresser le plus tôt que vous pourrez, une réponse à ces questions, que je puisse mettre sous les yeux de l'Empereur. Je désire vivement qu'elle soit de nature à le satisfaire, et qu'elle lui donne des explications dont il a besoin, pour diminuer l'impression pénible que les événements ont dû nécessairement produire sur son esprit.

Le Roi d'Espagne au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

Ségovie, le 29 Juillet, 1812.

M. le Maréchal, Ma lettre du 6 de ce mois vous a appris que l'armée de Portugal s'était retirée le 1^{er} sur la rive droite du Douro, et que l'armée était en présence sur la rive gauche. Les secours que j'avais demandés à l'armée du Nord n'arrivaient pas, et j'étais en même temps très-inquiet des mouvements du général Hill, qui, n'ayant devant lui, le 3 de ce mois, que 11,000 hommes, du corps du Comte d'Erlon, pouvait facilement faire un détachement de 18,000 à 20,000 hommes sur Madrid.

Dans des conjonctures aussi difficiles, je vous ai prescrit, le 7 de ce mois, de porter un corps de 10,000 hommes sur Tolède, et j'ai donné en même temps des ordres pour réunir les troupes de l'armée du Centre, en ne conservant de garnisons qu'à Madrid et à Tolède.

Aussitôt que cette réunion fut opérée, je partis le 21 de ce mois de Madrid, avec 14,000 hommes, dans le dessein de faciliter à l'armée de Portugal le passage du Douro, et de me joindre ensuite à elle pour tenter le sort d'une affaire décisive.

Mais M. le Maréchal Marmont s'était déjà déterminé à passer ce fleuve le 18, et j'appris son mouvement à Villacastin, le 24. Je dirigeai ma marche d'après cette connaissance, dans l'espoir de joindre l'armée de Portugal avant qu'elle en vint à un engagement général.

Malheureusement il était trop tard ; M. le Maréchal Marmont, suivant l'armée Anglaise, qui s'était repliée vers Salamanque, avait passé la Tormes, pour se porter sur les derrières de l'ennemi, et l'avait forcé à combattre. L'affaire a eu lieu le 22. M. le Maréchal Marmont y fut blessé, et obligé de remettre le commandement au général Clausel. Plusieurs généraux furent tués ou blessés, et l'armée repassa la Tormes, après avoir beaucoup souffert.

Ces détails me furent donnés par une lettre de M. le Maréchal Marmont, qui m'en est parvenue, le 25, à Blasco Sancho, où je m'étais avancé, comptant opérer le lendemain ma jonction. J'en reçus en même temps une de M. le général Clausel, beaucoup plus alarmante, et d'après laquelle je ne pouvais plus douter que l'armée de Portugal, se jugeant hors d'état de reprendre l'offensive, n'ait d'autre parti à prendre que de repasser le Douro, pour atteindre Valladolid avant les Anglais ; le général Clausel ajoutait, qu'il ne resterait sur le Douro que dans le cas où Lord Wellington marcherait sur Madrid.

En effet, l'armée se retira le 25 à Olmedo ; je n'eus alors autre chose à faire, en me rapprochant à petites journées de Madrid, que de chercher, par les mouvements de ma cavalerie, à ralentir la poursuite de l'ennemi, et j'y réussis en attirant sur moi un corps de 20,000 hommes, qui s'avança, par la route de Villacastin, jusqu'au pont de la Boltoya.

Cependant de nouvelles lettres de M. le Maréchal Duc de Raguse, et de M. le général Clausel, me décidèrent à me porter sur Ségovie. L'un et l'autre m'écrivaient que la poursuite de l'ennemi était moins vive ; qu'ils désiraient pouvoir se réunir à moi, et j'ai cru devoir, par ce mouvement, leur en faciliter les moyens autant qu'il dépendait de moi ; mais je ne sais encore si cette jonction pourra s'opérer, mon intention positive étant de ne compromettre dans aucun cas mes communications avec Madrid et avec l'Andalousie, et ne sachant point non plus si le général Clausel voudra renoncer à la défense du nord pour venir me joindre.

Les Anglais sont aujourd'hui à Olmedo, et j'ignore à quel parti le général Clausel se sera arrêté.

En attendant, je ne perds pas un instant à vous instruire de l'état actuel des choses, et à vous donner l'ordre formel d'évacuer l'Andalousie pour vous porter, avec toutes vos forces, sur Tolède. C'est le seul moyen de rétablir les affaires, et les détails dans lesquels je suis entré sur les événements qui viennent d'avoir lieu, vous convaincront aisément que c'est l'unique ressource qui nous reste.

Le général Clausel, commandant l'armée de Portugal, au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.
Valladolid, le 18 Août, 1812.

J'ai rapproché du Douro toute l'armée. Les difficultés pour l'y faire subsister sont presque insurmontables ; tous les habitants sont en fuite, et les nombreuses bandes de guerrillas les éloignent par la force. Ainsi, le cultivateur, d'abord assassiné par nos soldats, est puni, incarcéré, déporté par les guerrillas, s'il reste dans le voisinage de l'armée Française. Il en résulte que l'armée est obligée d'aller faire ses vivres devant l'ennemi, et qu'elle manque toujours de tout ; que, par conséquent, tout mouvement devient impossible. Notre position au milieu de la Castille est parfaitement semblable à celle où nous nous sommes trouvés en Portugal, position qui y causa notre ruine. Je suis cependant parvenu à arrêter les premiers désordres. Plus de 50 soldats ont été jugés prévôtalement et exécutés : l'exemple a produit un bon effet. Les officiers, même les officiers supérieurs, se sont convaincus par l'expérience que les punitions les atteindraient aussi, s'ils n'arrêtaient et ne punissaient eux-mêmes les désordres qu'ils ont tolérés, et qui ont produit un esprit abominable dans l'armée. Depuis, j'ai eu la satisfaction de voir l'armée marcher en bon ordre, les habitants et leurs maisons respectés, et beaucoup moins de pillage qu'auparavant.

L'armée a 20,000 hommes d'infanterie, 1800 chevaux, 50 bouches à feu, et 1,500,000 de cartouches d'infanterie. J'espère qu'il nous reviendra 4000 ou 5000 maraudeurs, qui ont suivi vers Burgos et Vitoria le convoi d'Andalousie, assassinant et pillant partout, et voulant s'en aller en France. Comme l'armée n'est pas assez forte et assez bien remise pour la porter sur-le-champ sur la rive gauche du Douro et dans la direction de Madrid ; que je suis pressé de ravitailler Astorga et Zamora ; qu'il n'y a aucun danger à faire un détachement pour sauver les garnisons de ces places, je détache 2 divisions pour cette opération. Je sais que l'armée de Galice regagne avec précipitation ses montagnes ; j'espère qu'on arrivera à temps à Astorga, dont la garnison se trouve sans vivres depuis quelques jours. Les divisions que je détache seront rentrées le 26 au plus tard, et par conséquent avant que celles que l'ennemi pourrait renvoyer de Madrid sur le Douro soient à portée de Valladolid. A cette époque, le Roi aura sans doute reçu les secours qu'il attend des armées du Midi et d'Aragon. Je me mettrai à même de suivre les mouvements de l'ennemi et de me réunir au Roi, lorsque les armées entreront en opération ; ou de me placer sur les derrières de l'armée Anglaise dans les montagnes d'Avila, si je vois cette armée suivie de près par l'armée du Roi, et que je ne sois pas exposé à être engagé seul avec les forces réunies de l'ennemi. Si l'armée Anglaise ne quitte Madrid qu'à l'approche des armées du Roi, il est à croire que le général Wellington prendra alors sa direction par Avila, le Val d'Ambles, le Puerto de Villatoro, Piedrahita, et Puente del Congosto. Si cela est ainsi, j'espère faire éprouver des pertes à l'ennemi avant qu'il repasse la Tormes. Si l'ennemi revient avec toute son armée vers moi, je me tiendrai en position, quoique toujours à peu de distance de lui, afin de n'avoir aucun échec à éprouver. Votre Excellence peut être persuadée que je ne négligerai rien, pendant le temps que durera mon commandement, pour ramener l'ordre dans l'armée, et la mettre le plus tôt possible en état de combattre ; mais j'avoue que c'est une tâche au-dessus de mes forces, et bien difficile même pour ceux qui ont une grande habitude dans le commandement des armées.

Il est probable que les Anglais sont entrés à Madrid le 12. On rapporte que Sa Majesté avait fait ses dispositions pour sortir de la capitale. Il y a près du Douro un corps de 10,000 hommes, Anglais et Portugais, en observation, soutenus par d'autres troupes près du Guadarrama. Je ne compte pas les bandes de guerrillas qu'ils ont à leur disposition. 1200 hommes de cavalerie Anglaise sont sur le Douro. Le général Anson, qui les commande, a son quartier général à Tudela. Je vais le faire repasser sur la rive gauche du Douro.

END OF THE FIFTH VOLUME.

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